on the nature of essentialism - Marx 1 Popper 0

[peaccenicked]

Let me begin with marixst glossary of term

“Essentialism” is an ambiguous word, like the term “Essence” from which it is derived, generally depending on whether the Platonic/Aristotlean or Hegelian genealogy is referred to. The word was introduced in modern times by Karl Popper in his 1945 work The Open Society. Essentialism is the assertion that there is exists some meaning behind what is immediate given to sensuous perception (phenomenon). Popper took the meaning of ‘essence’ from the Aristotlean genealogy but held that meaning was constructed by institutions and social practices, and it was the business of science to construct definitions reflecting these objectively existing ‘essences’.

Generally-speaking, “essentialism” is used with a negative connotation in contrast to subjectivist constructivism in feminist or postmodern social theory. That is to say, “essentialism” is taken to mean that there is an essential meaning of something that is not given in perception (perception being taken to mean sensuous contemplation), in contrast to constructivism which is taken to mean that meaning is constructed by the subject in practical or critical activity. Broadly speaking the term has the same meaning as “metaphysics” had for positivism.

For Marxism, constructivism and essentialism are not mutually exclusive, since the meaning of essence is taken from the Hegelian genealogy rather than the subjective idealist current and is understood as social and historical, critical activity. Thus, all social and cognitive processes do have a meaning which is indeed “constructed” by the subject, but the subject is a social subject, rather than an individual, whose activity is socially and historically conditioned. In line with the Hegelian genealogy of philosophical terms in Marxism, the “essence” which is revealed by social practice is the dialectical unfolding of the thing through successively deeper and deeper meanings. Essentialism then is concerned not with some final essence which can never be revealed, but rather is concerned with the process of revealing ever deeper meanings.

“Essentialism” is often taken to mean the rejection of the possibility of different, opposed meanings being attached to a thing. However, for Marxism such opposing, contradictory meanings are the very nature of essential development."

Now I wish to quote Vox here since he use this term.
Fact is, HC is using an essentialist argument. One did something, another did the same thing, they must be the same!

I am really unsure of your basis of understanding. HC argument is a very weak syllogism
A does K
B does K
then A=K
This is more faulty formal 'logic' than essentialism.
Essentialism means that the true nature
of an entity can be known.
Anti essentialist views tend to deny this.
Meanings are constructed atomistically
in the head, and merely reflect objective relations but do not correspond to actual objective relations.





(Edited by peaccenicked at 3:41 pm on Feb. 2, 2002)

[vox]

It is true that I use the word in a modern context, which is, of course, not surprising since I live in modern times. I have also stated here previously that I reject unreconstructed (or vulgar) Marxism. Too, it's not an uncommon thing to reject the small vestige of essentialism in Marx, as Althusser did, and while I disagree with Althusser's structuralism I can't disagree with his rejection of essentialism nor his rejection of economic determinism.

But let's see what Marx wrote about it. In his Theses On Feuerbach he wrote:

"Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.

"In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.

"Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:

"To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract - isolated - human individual.

"Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as "genus", as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals. "

So, I would have to say that Marx disagrees with your definition of the word, for he clearly states that essence is the "ensemble of social relations," and while these social relations change, he does not call essentialism a process, for dialectics itself is the process. Indeed, Marx, as you well know, stood Hegel on his head.

You may want to look at Marx's thoughts on species being at some point, as well.

vox

(Edited by vox at 9:09 am on Feb. 4, 2002)

[peaccenicked]

I think it is important to note that the "Thesis on Feuerbach" according to Engels was not meant to be published, and appeared after KM's death.
'Old fashioned' essentialism goes right back to Aristotle
and was something KM was more likely to assume was normal. Modern thougt, may develop many ideas but the idea that abolishes older thought is ill founded. Althusser
has managed to cut up marx. Overdetermination seems just a fancy title for historical accident.
The weakness of my definition is that it is an epistemological one(of knowledge's limits)
The meaning you give is ontilogical (Of being)
To oppose the two would be an eclectical mistake,
it would take two sides, where no polarity exists.
Essentialism is broadly an attitude towards substance in philosophy.
Kant says the thing in itself is unknowable. Hegels epistemology is according to Lenin is materialism.
'where idealism transforms into materialism'.
"Essentialism then is concerned not with some final essence which can never be revealed, but rather is concerned with the process of revealing ever deeper meanings. "
This is not the method of Hume or Kant.
The ontolology of KM is similar to Aristotle. He looks at the potentiality of being to discover actuality. The 'ensemble of social relations' is rather empty of content
Marx sought to flesh that out.
The modern school is idealistic. Post modern social theory is atomistic. It is an atttack on thought it self.
It attacks essentialism to rob it of its meaning and its role in history. This is a treatise in itself. You will find this in the attempts to smuggle hume and Kant into marx's epistemology.
Essentialism is at the very heart any marxist critique of post modernism I would be glad to hear your thoughts.

I dont see how Althusser actually reads 'pour' Marx.
It is easy to throw sand at misinterpretations.

[vox]

"Overdetermination seems just a fancy title for historical accident."

Really? I disagree to the utmost.

Vulgar Marxism, with it's "essential" base/superstructure model, relies upon economic determinism (to the exclusion of will) to make its point. I firmly believe that some things are overdetermined, for example the position of women in late capitalist society.

"The 'ensemble of social relations' is rather empty of content

"Marx sought to flesh that out."

Well, that's what he wrote, in the little that he wrote about essence.

When you say things like, "Essentialism is broadly an attitude towards substance in philosophy," you lose me, for "substance" isn't defined, either as essence or ontological structure.

Regardless, I'm curious as to how one can posit Materialism as an essentialist philosophy, essentialist not in the fabricated meaning of discover, but in the accepted meaning. Indeed, it seems to me that, if we construct our own society, as Marx says we do (and, of course, this structure is overdetermined), we must by necessity speak of an essence of humankind, but Marx is clear that none exists.

I do not throw my lot with the postmodernists, but I'm curious, as well, about your assertion that Modernism is Idealistic, for Marx could easily be grouped with the Modernists, in that a grand narrative is vital to his work, but at the same time, Marx rejects Idealism in favor of Materialism.

Have you read Lukacs?

vox

[peaccenicked]

Lukac's "Destruction of reason"
I liked
His"history and class consciousness". I am still trying to grapple with.
The relationship between historical accident and historical necessity is a good enough tool to understand the role of women in modern society. Mandel's 'late' capitalism along with jameison s ideas. I think impoverish Marx, rather than elucidate and develop his ideas. The artificial nature of capitalism at its purest is part of the whole 'theory as fiction' millieu.
Substance is a philosophical category
all philosophers have an attitude towards it
idealist atomist
idealist essentialist
materialist atomist
materialist essentialist.

Lenin regards essentialism as materialistic as he thinks it corresponds with the scientific attitude towards
substance as corporeal matter.
skepticism takes it that substances are unknowable
Liebniez has an idealistic knowledge of gods perfection.
Lenin incidently wrote 'a good idealist is better than a bad materialist.'
Marx did write that,(thesis on Furerbach) I said under dubious circustances.
Engels says it was a rough draft.
The ontology of essentialism is already found in Aristotle
in the dialectic between actuality and potentiality.
This is the structure rather, framework I am reffering to,
the essence of mankind is indeed the ensemble of his
social relations. However this does not posit any characteristics of man. It merely accentuates Aristotles
definition as man as social animal.
As I have tried to show the essentialist method is to go deeper. Marx singles out social dependency. He asks what is the nature of this in history. Marx in summation
saying that man is essentially moving from social dependency to social independence.In the pocess
we move towards an evermore concrete understanding
of man's essence. In capital we have a model of the total of man's social relations. Engels points out that
they did not do enough work on the superstructure,
and that society was not (directly in every sphere) but ultimately governed by economics. The modern
contemporary school
is generally post modern and usually start by rubbishing the enlightenment into insignificance, generally begins with the singular mind and its constructs.

A useful link
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//article...les/menger.html (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//articles/menger.html)





(


(Edited by peaccenicked at 12:26 pm on Feb. 5, 2002)

[Supermodel]

My head hurts.....

[vox]

I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you for more detail. You see, you say:

"Substance is a philosophical category
all philosophers have an attitude towards it
idealist atomist
idealist essentialist
materialist atomist
materialist essentialist."

But this still is meaningless in regards to a definition of substance, for you give four theories of it, but no definition, and certianly you've decided on a definition by this point. Unless you're casting you lot with the Leninists, and that, I think, would be a great shame, for while Lenin was a dogmatic Marxist, and a great soldier (after all, he won,) he was not a great thinker.

Being a bit of an existentialist myself, I disagree that essence is material substance, of course. I do not take the solipsist's view.

The Theses On Feuerbach may have been a rough draft, but he claims the same thing in The German Ideology. Engels, as I'm sure you know, was often dogmatic, set with the poor task of countering enemies that no longer exist.

I disagree with Engels that economics is always the determining factor. Also, I disagree with your assertion about Marx's consideration of some sort of human "essence," for Marx was very clear that there is no human nature. Again, Marx wrote of "species being," and humankind was not part of it.

When you say, "In capital we have a model of the total of man's social relations," I feel a need to remind you that this "model" is only valid under capitalist social relations, and to try to apply them to another socio-economic paradigm is to try to stick wings on a beagle. It may be done, but the beagle will not fly.

I still do not know what you mean by "historical accident." Too, I don't know what you mean by the "artificial nature of capitalism," for, if one rejects the notion of human nature, then one must reject the notion of artifice implicit in the structure of human socio-political arenas.

vox

[peaccenicked]

I have a difficulty in that my conclusions have not been
publised yet. This is a result of a life long project of an ambitious nature. however, let me endeavour, to seek clarity. Here is a very short essay that might keep you up to speed on some of the philosophical problem.
. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SUBSTANCE

Substance being a genus supremum, cannot strictly be defined by an analysis into genus and specific difference; yet a survey of the universe at large will enable us to form without difficulty an accurate idea of substance. Nothing is more evident than that things change. It is impossible for anything to be twice in absolutely the same state; on the other hand all the changes are not equally profound. Some appear to be purely external: a piece of wood may be hot or cold, lying flat or upright, yet it is still wood; but if it be completely burnt so as to be transformed into ashes and gases, it is no longer wood; the specific, radical characteristics by which we describe wood have totally disappeared. Thus there are two kinds of changes: one affects the radical characteristics of things, and consequently determines the existence or non-existence of these things; the other in no way destroys these characteristics, and so, while modifying the thing, does not affect it fundamentally. It is necessary, therefore, to recognize in each thing certain secondary realities and also a permanent fundamentum which continues to exist notwithstanding the superficial changes, which serves as a basis or support for the secondary realities -- what, in a word, we term the substance. Its fundamental characteristic is to be in itself and by itself, and not in another subject as accidents are.

The Scholastics, who accepted Aristotle's definition, also distinguished primary substance (substantia prima) from secondary substance (substantia secunda): the former is the individual thing -- substance properly so called; the latter designates the universal essence or nature as contained in genus and species. And, again, substance is either complete, e. g. man, or incomplete, e. g. the soul; which, though possessing existence in itself, is united with the body to form the specifically complete human being. The principal division; however, is that between material substance (all corporeal things) and spiritual substance, i. e. the soul and the angelic spirits. The latter are often called substantiœ separatœ, to signify that they are separate from matter, i. e. neither actually conjoined with a material organism nor requiring such union as the natural complement of their being (St. Thomas, "Contra Gentes", II, 91 sqq.). St. Thomas further teaches that the name substance cannot properly be applied to God, not only because He is not the subject of any accidents, but also because in Him essence and existence are identical, and consequently He is not included in any genus whatever. For the same reason, it is impossible that God should be the formal being of all things (esse formale omnium), or, in other words, that one and the same existence should be common to Him and them (op. cit., I, 25, 26).

In the visible world there is a multitude of substances numerically distinct. Each, moreover, has a specific nature which determines the mode of its activity and at the same time, through its activity, becomes, in some degree, manifest to us. Our thinking does not constitute the substance; this exists independently of us, and our thought at most acquires a knowledge of each substance by considering its manifestations. In this way we come to know both the nature of material things and the nature of the spiritual substance within us, i. e. the soul. In both cases our knowledge may be imperfect, but we are not thereby justified in concluding that only the superficial appearances or phenomena are accessible to us, and that the inner substantial being, of matter or of mind, is unknowable.

Since the close of the Scholastic period, the idea of substance and the doctrines centring about it have undergone profound modifications which in turn have led to a complete reversal of the Scholastic teaching on vital questions in philosophy. Apart from the traditional concept formulated above, we must note especially Descartes' definition that substance is "a being that so exists as to require nothing else for its existence". This formula is unfortunate: it is false, for the idea of substance determines an essence which, if it exists, has its own existence not borrowed from an ulterior basis, and which is not a modification of some being that supports it. But this idea in no way determines either the manner in which actual existence has been given to this essence or the way in which it is preserved. The Cartesian definition, moreover, is dangerous; for it suggests that substance admits of no efficient cause, but exists in virtue of its own essence. Thus Spinoza, following in the footsteps of Descartes declared that "substance is that which is conceived in itself and by itself", and thence deduced his pantheistic system according to which there is but one substance -- i. e. God -- all things else being only the modes or attributes of the Divine substance . Leibniz's definition is also worthy of note. He considers substance as "a being gifted with the power of action". Substance certainly can act, since action follows being, and substance is being par excellence. But this property does not go to the basis of reality. In every finite substance the power to act is distinct from the substantial essence; it is but a property of substance which can be defined only by its mode of existence.

II. THE REALITY OF SUBSTANCE

The most important question concerning substance is that of its reality. In ancient days Heraclitus, in modern times Hume, Locke, Mill, and Taine, and in our day Wundt, Mach, Paulsen, Ostwald, Ribot, Jodi, Höffding, Eisler, and several others deny the reality of substance and consider the existence of substance as an illusory postulate of naive minds. The basis of this radical negation is an erroneous idea of substance and accident. They hold that, apart from the accidents, substance is nothing, a being without qualities, operations, or end. This is quite erroneous. The accidents cannot be separated thus from the substance; they have their being only in the substance; they are not the substance, but are by their very nature modifications of the substance. The operations which these writers would thus attribute to the accidents are really the operations of the substance, which exercises them through the accidents. Finally, in attributing an independent existence to the accidents they simply transform them into substance, thus establishing just what they intend to deny. It can be said that whatever exists is either a substance or in a substance.

The tendency of modern philosophy has been to regard substance simply as an idea which the mind indeed is constrained to form, but which either does not exist objectively or, if it does so exist, cannot be known. According to Locke (Essay ii, 23), "Not imagining how simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance; so that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea. of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents." He protests, however, that this statement refers only to the idea of substance, not to its being; and he claims that "we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body" (ibid.). Hume held that the idea of substance "is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination and have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection" (Treatise, bk. I, pt. IV); and that the soul is "a bundle of conceptions in a perpetual flux and movement".

For Kant substance is a category of thought which applies only to phenomena, i. e. it is the idea of something that persists amid all changes. The substantiality and immortality of the soul cannot be proved by the pure reason, but are postulated by the moral law which pertains to the practical reason. J. S. Mill, after stating that "we may make propositions also respecting those hidden causes of phenomena which are named substances and attributes", goes on to say: "No assertion can be made, at least with a meaning, concerning those unknown and unknowable entities, except in virtue of the phenomena by which alone they manifest themselves to our faculties" (Logic, bk. i, I, c. v): in other words, substance manifests itself through phenomena and yet is unknowable. Mill defines matter as "a permanent possibility of sensation", so that no substantial bond is required for material objects; but for conscious states a tie is needed in which there is something "real as the sensations themselves and not a mere product of the laws of thought" ("Examination", c. xi; cf. Appendix). Wundt, on the contrary, declares that the idea (hypothetical) of substance is necessary to connect the phenomena presented in outer experience, but that it is not applicable to our inner experience except for the psycho-physical processes (Logik, I, 484 sqq.). This is the basis of Actualism, which reduces the soul to a series of conscious states. Herbert Spencer's view is thus expressed: "Existence means nothing more than persistence; and hence, in mind, that which persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, is that of which existence in the full sense of the word must be predicated -- that which we must postulate as the substance of mind in contradistinction to the varying forms it assumes. But, if so, the impossibility of knowing the substance of mind is manifest" (Princ. of Psychol., Pt. II, c. i). ElseWhere he declares that it is the same Unknowable Power which manifests itself alike in the physical world and in consciousness -- a statement wherein modern Agnosticism returns to the Pantheism of Spinoza.

This development of the concept of substance is instructive; it shows to what extremes subjectivism leads, and what inconsistencies it brings into the investigation of the most important problems of philosophy. While the inquiry has been pursued in the name of criticism, its results, so far as the soul is concerned, are distinctly in favour of Materialism; and while the aim was supposed to be a surer knowledge on a firmer basis, the outcome is Agnosticism either open or disguised. It is perhaps as a reaction against such confusion in the field of metaphysics that an attempt has recently been made by representatives of physical science to reconstruct the idea of substance by making it equivalent to "energy". The attempt so far has led to the conclusion that energy is the most universal substance and the most universal accident (Ostwald, "Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie", 2nd ed., Leipzig
I hope you can see that substance is controversial in philosophy
defined in my definition of it does not enter into until
we reach materialism.
Lenin is an under-rated as a thinker. He is criticised mainly for his work Empirio-criticism and Empiro-monism.The surrealist Frank Roosevelt describes his Philosophical Notebooks as a relavation on par with his first reading of The Communist Manifesto"
Is essence a material substance?
.In philosophy it is ideal nature of something: the ideal nature of something, independent of and prior to its existence. It is and is not. This is a diversion. Giving materiality to ideas is not outside materialist thinking.
Our disagreement is in what deterimes being. on determinismEngels was guessing from an admitted lack of knowledge.
The controversy I am interested in this field is how broadly can economics be defined? On what basis do you say that Lenin and Engels were dogmatic. That is a gross caricature.
I am not sure how much philosophy I need to expand upon. You know the difference between an idealist and a materialist. It is socialist coinage. Essentialism/atomism is a more current and relevant distinction.
let me quote again.
. Positivism has its roots in atomism, the view that all that exists is atoms associated together in accidental and unintelligible ways and that all intelligible structures and all necessities are merely the result of thought-constructions introduced by man. The origins of the struggle between atomists and Aristotelians in ancient Greek thought are well-summarized by Meikle:

On the one hand there were Democritus and Epicurus, who thought of reality as atomistic small-bits that combine and repel in the void, and who had a hard job accounting for the persisting natures of things, species and genera on that basis. On the other hand there was Aristotle, who realised that no account of such things could be possible without admitting a category of form (or essence), because what a thing is, and what things of its kind are, cannot possibly be explained in terms of their constituent matter (atoms), since that changes while the entity retains its nature and identity over time. (1985, p. 9)
Where the atomist sees only one sort of structure in re, the structure of accidental association, the Aristotelian sees in addition intelligible or law-governed structures that he can understand. Where the atomist sees only one sort of change, accidental change (for example of the sort which occurs when a horse is run over by a truck), the Aristotelian sees in addition intelligible or law-governed changes, as, for example, when a foal grows up into a horse. Just as for the Aristotelian the intelligibility of structure can imply that there are certain sorts of structure which are intelligibly impossible, for example a society made up of inanimate objects, so for the Aristotelian there are intelligibly impossible changes, for example of a horse into a truck, or of a stone into a colour. The presence of intelligible changes implies, moreover, that there is no `problem of induction' for a thinker of the Aristotelian sort. When we understand a phenomenon as the instance of a given species, then this understanding relates also to the characteristic patterns of growth and evolution of the phenomen and to its characteristic modes of interaction with other phenomena. "
It is positivism that rules in current "modern thought"
He is Marx From the German id[4. The Essence of the Materialist Conception of History
Social Being and Social Consciousness]
The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. — real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. "
Substance is the physical life process in Marx.
You can choose to have either an atomistic or essentialist outlook. One which makes nature intelligible
or one which deconstructs its intelligibility.
I hope this is helpful.





(Edited by peaccenicked at 5:47 pm on Feb. 6, 2002)

[vox]

Ah, I fear your a Derrida philosopher: the kind that gives bullshit a bad name.

Let's look closer, eh?
panthei
You state:

"It is impossible for anything to be twice in absolutely the same state; on the other hand all the changes are not equally profound."

You wish here to establish a scientific basis, but your criteria involve subjective, rather than objective, judgment, for prfundity is a subjective qualifier.

You state:

"Thus there are two kinds of changes: one affects the radical characteristics of things, and consequently determines the existence or non-existence of these things; the other in no way destroys these characteristics, and so, while modifying the thing, does not affect it fundamentally."

However, you wish to have it both ways.

When the gross manifestation of something is changed, the thing itself is changed. You may wish to Romantically find the essence of wood in a cinder, but I say it is a cinder and not, any longer, wood.

"It is necessary, therefore, to recognize in each thing certain secondary realities and also a permanent fundamentum which continues to exist notwithstanding the superficial changes, which serves as a basis or support for the secondary realities -- what, in a word, we term the substance."

However, the burning of wood is NOT a superficial change, but a GROSS change. Carving wood is a superficial change, and it remains wood but can also be Art (thereby creating, it seems according to your thought, a dual essence) but burning wood changes its very nature (that is, essence).

"Its fundamental characteristic is to be in itself and by itself, and not in another subject as accidents are."

You use of the term "accident" is pretention and nothing else, for it is only through our observation that wood is wood, fire is fire. If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it fall, it makes no sound.

"And, again, substance is either complete, e. g. man, or incomplete, e. g. the soul; which, though possessing existence in itself, is united with the body to form the specifically complete human being."

And you have proof of the soul? You expect us to submit to your philosophical ramblings without question of the very thing upon which they are based? I fear you disrespect us in this.

The rest of Part One is nothing but a rehash of tired Cartesian foolishness. Of course, all makes sense once you believe in that which cannot be proved: ie God. Indeed, the model is perfect, for God, as conjectured, is perfect and trancendent, and your "substance" also transcends all limits of being, for, as you state, substance defines being (and therefore must be perfect being).

In Part Two you state:

"The accidents cannot be separated thus from the substance; they have their being only in the substance; they are not the substance, but are by their very nature modifications of the substance."

This, needfully, demands the existence of an intelligence outside of any substance which, with forethought, determines the substance. It's a piece of wood as God.

Indeed, you give substance itself will, "The operations which these writers would thus attribute to the accidents are really the operations of the substance, which exercises them through the accidents."

Substance, according to you, is now an active force, but what force is free of "accidents? God, of course, which is imangined as the Perfect Source. So here you embrace Pantheism.

From there you list a bunch of different thinkers' ideas about substance, and then, finally enter into Marx.

However, in doing so you reduce humankind to automatons, unthinking things which are only capable of entering into definite social relations without the ability of reflection, a state of conciousness that you exclude with prejudice, for, as Sartre said, there is a reflective state.

Your theory of human society disregards contradictions and disagreement, for where, in the neat little boxes of Lenin, does one find disapproval?

I submit that if your theory of a substantive nature of humankind is true, and it's a Materialist nature, then a board like this could not possibly exist, for, as you state, the essence defines the material being of a thing, or in this instance, a person, and through that limited existence could not, therefore, break from the essence that is OVERDETERMINED by existence.

I fear that we will never agree on this, for I say that existence preceeds essence, and leaves your theory of "soul" in the dust. This, of course, does not mean existence defined through a philosphical lens, but through the actual day to day messiness of living as a person-in-the-world.

This person-in-the-world does not really on an essential essence to become, but becomes because, verily he IS.

If you wish to call this is-ness "substance," so be it, but remember that it's that way for every individual.

vox

[peaccenicked]

I was not clear enough, the essay I quoted was not my own. It was written by a catholic. I used it to demonstrate different attitudes towards substance.
What I am talking about is different attitudes towards substance and how they can be categorised. Derrida is a deconstructionist. It was he who invented the term.
I am actually arguing against Derrida although I consider him like Lukac. Someone resolving their own self contradictions.
I have no theory of soul. I quite like Steinbecks pantheistic. We are all part of the one big soul. I think it contains a poetic truth.
You seem to be avoiding the crux of the matter.
The essentialst /atomist dichotomy.

Asking if existence precedes essence is an empty question. Both are abstracted at the same time. Otherwise existence is empty which it is not.
I can see now how I mislead you but I did say.
''I hope you can see that substance is controversial in philosophy''. That is all I wanted to show. Defining my definition of substance is inadequate to the philosophical problem.
however,those who declare the "End of Philosophy" or offer confused conjectures about "the end of grand narratives" (the deconstructionist and postmodern, it may be argued are speaking about the annihilation of reflection..
Substance is matter. humans are thinking matter.
To think clearly you should ask yourself
What is atomism?
What is positivism relation to atomism?
What are you arguing against.
The idea that there is no essential human nature
or the method of essentialism of finding deeper essences in processes.
We already find essential human nature here. I ll quote
more selectively from KM
"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. " There is a dynamic here. This a statement here that has an essence. It is not the last word
In the realm of psychology, I think we can find singular characteristics that are general after all we can do in anatomy.
you say"This person-in-the-world does not rely on an essential essence to become, but becomes because, verily he IS.
Are you trying to disappoint me as a father?
And
"If you wish to call this is-ness "substance," so be it"
but remember that it's that way for every individual.
Here I detect atomism, the denial of an intelligble
general form.
If so why not be clear on your position and say that you take the atomist position



(Edited by peaccenicked at 9:42 pm on Feb. 6, 2002)


(Edited by peaccenicked at 9:45 pm on Feb. 6, 2002)

[vox]

First of all, I find it rather disingenuous to portray a work as your own only to back away from it later. I, personally, will not tolerate it. Do no do it again. You were, I suggest, purposefully unclear in your previous post. Argue honestly or not at all.

You say, "If so why not be clear on your position and say that you take the atomist position" (sic)

I find this amusing on two levels. Firstly, because you yourself have not been clear and in fact say "Defining my definition of substance is inadequate to the philosophical problem." You won't even define yourself, yet have the gall to suggest that I won't?

Secondly, I don't throw my lot with the atomists, as I've made very clear to all who have read this thread. I've stated my existentialist postition. You disregard that, saying, to me nonsensically, "Asking if existence precedes essence is an empty question."

I do not see that as "empty," whatever that may mean, for once again you fail to define your terms, at all. Rather, it's a vital question, for if "essence" precedes existence all is changed. Suddenly, there is a "greater" power than mankind, one that can imagine the essence of man before the existence of man. This is basic stuff.

You seem to want to equate psychology with anatomy, but fail, again, to follow up. Perhaps you prefer esoteric speech? Whatever the case may be, unless you wish to argue the case for sociobiology (which has produced interesting experiments but no narrative), I suggest you leave off with the unworthy comparison.

Further, you state, "Are you trying to disappoint me as a father?"

This sort of thing is ridiculous, in that it bears no connection to anything else. Too, your assertion that a statement has "essence" (This a statement here that has an essence) seems to be a vulgar attempt to reduce the "essence" you previously mentioned into a thing, which would, therefore, reduce humanity to a text. Surely you do not wish to do this?

But mayhaps you do, for you say, "Substance is matter. humans are thinking matter."

This sort of reductionism (essentialism) is the sort of thing of which vulgar Marxism is constructed, for you have reduced humanity to a species being, a thinking thing, but not an observant thing.

Indeed, you're beginning to sound a bit like Imperialist Power now, asserting the unproven as fact to suit a contrary agenda.

You even state:

"What are you arguing against.
"The idea that there is no essential human nature
or the method of essentialism of finding deeper essences in processes.
"We already find essential human nature here."

Where? Of course, once again (and again and again) you fail utterly when it comes to exposing it.

You may wish to say that Marxism is some sort of Idealism, and that Materialism is, in fact, Idealist. However, Marx himself refutes that.

vox

[peaccenicked]

I assure that my mistake was an honest one. I have no interest at all in claiming work outside of my own. I only rather clumsily tried to make clear a point. I will do everything in my power not to repeat this. I am confident I will not.
I beginning to understand you position, which previously was not all that clear to me.
I was joking about the father bit to bring out your position for closer examination. Of coure it was nonsensical.
In opposing essentialism to existentialism. It becomes for you a matter of what came first.
Man's existence or essence. I arqued similtaneous relationship. essence in the head and essence outside the head, essence before human existence . These formulations do not explain anything at all.
You have again avoided the method of essentialism.
The problem of susbstance is problematic on the wide scale of philosophy. I have defined at as corporeal matter. That is my starting point you have chosen to ignore that.
I have claimed no greater power. you have put those words in my mouth. I have merely stated how essence
is used in philosophy.
to the crux of your idealist materialist conundrum.
Marx turned Hegel upside down
What remained was his method. The method of an idealist. If you compare Hegels logic to Capital you can see the direct relationship. Hegel developed Aristotles
essentialism and Marx owed Hegel big time. He would have told you himself.
Atomism finds it polar opposite in essentialism.
Existentialism which denies the universe of any meaning or purpose only posits individual responsibility for actions can hardly be considered this opposite.
the alternave is too argue that they are not polar and
only different forms of consciousness, this would make your argument at least meet the point of conflict and
so that anything extraneous to it can be dropped.
not that this should be necessarily done but I had a lot of difficulties with the focus of this debate.

[peaccenicked]

On futher reflection.
I can see that you have misread my argument.
The nature of substance is a universal problem
of philosophy.
There are different attitudes towards it.
I have made the mistake of trying to show method as a development of content. you atomistically attack the content and ignore whether or not there is method.
As pointed out in my openning definition.
In line with the Hegelian genealogy of philosophical terms in Marxism, the “essence” which is revealed by social practice is the dialectical unfolding of the thing through successively deeper and deeper meanings.
You have only argued that my "meanings " are not deep enough. It is funny how you are unconscious of your own essentialism.
Too, it's not an uncommon thing to reject the small vestige of essentialism in Marx, as Althusser did, and while I disagree with Althusser's structuralism I can't disagree with his rejection of essentialism nor his rejection of economic determinism.
Postivism rejects essentialism, so that is true.
Essentialism is not connected to economic determinism.
I do not see what Althusser rejected. I remember reading his passage on the thesis on Fuerabach.
Essentialism is not about at a fundamental level
whether or not there is a human essence. It is a method of examining nature, so as to come to ever more
intelligible conclusions about it.
In your atomistic framework Marx is not an essentialist because sees no human essence. Yet he distinctly says
that human essence is the ensemble of social relations.
Now you seem to be saying that sentence has no meaning as the essence is not revealed.
Do you want to go deeper or say there is no human essence. You have failed to criticise essentialism for what it is a method.
You have not defined atomism. I have did this. You say you do not put yourself in the camp of the atomists. Yet
that is a mere claim no less than my claims which you rubbish as meaningless.
Now the appropiate way to go about thing is to actually try and tease out what our real differences are, not to score points but to assess the real nature of our argument.
1) do we agree on what essentialism is?
2)What is the clearest definitions of both of our positions
3) How do they compare and test with reality
This has not been done. You have failed to define esssentialism and mistaken it for a debate on human essence.
This seems inappropiate because you used the word in reference to a bad syllogism.
You seem to think that essentialism is giving a fallacious logic. A is C then B is C, then A=B.
It is merely a false comparison.
What substance can you give this being anything to do with essentialism?
Now I think I have to be clear on the relationship between dialectics and essentialism. Both have identical
aims ie to expoud nature's intelligiblity. This also the aim of science. Dialectics would be empty if it did not search for deeper and deeper meanings. Thesis A anti-thesis B
synthesis C as process. Is an essentialist movement.

[El Che]

I dont see how the metaphysical question on the essence of things (man included) is relevante to understand or discuss marx. Material exists, as does the capitalist system etc etc. I think its pointless to mix things up.

[peaccenicked]

I don't want to mix things up.
However we use tools of analyses to understand the
world and our role in it. I just dont want to enter a confict with one of my tools disabled atomised and useless or confiscated from my armoury in the name of prioritising existence.

[El Che]

im sorry peace but i just dont see where your getting at with all this essence, philosophical atitude towards substance etc. But dont mind me, i just got lost somewhere in this discution.

[vox]

"1) do we agree on what essentialism is?"

No, of course not.

I said before that I use the modern definition of essentialism. I reject your notion that essentialism is a process, even more so now that you've stated that "Both have identical aims ie to expoud nature's intelligiblity," for I disagree with "essentialism" as a dialectical process. Indeed, one wonders the need for two words!

When you say that "Essentialism is not connected to economic determinism," I have to wonder, for determinism, through an exact "process," distills a certain, an "essential," outcome, an outcome only possible if the players in the drama are NOT free agents but completely determined, that is, "essential" in and of themselves! This is, of course, not the case, and again I refer you to Marx on species being.

For, so you might like to deny it, essentialism finally comes down to a nature for all of mankind, for the "process" you postulate demands definition.

Dialectical analysis makes no such claim, of course, for it it scientific rather the metaphysical, and constantly begs for correction AS A PART OF ITS VERY PROCESS!!!

I would be happy to expound upon my use of the word in another thread if you are able to quote it to me in full, and in full context, of course.

I maintain that your idea of "substance" is nothing but ''substantialism," the sister of "essentialism," in that substance demands a definite and unchanging definition. O may always be oxygen, but man is not so easily defined. Humankind cannot be put on the periodic table, broken down into substance, and I submit that this blather about substance amounts to an argument about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, and, in its minutiae, whether they should dance on the Sabbath!

vox

[peaccenicked]

First of all my idea of substance was merely a stated srarting point not an end all. since you were looking for a definition. I did go on to discuss the dialectal relationship between potential and actual. The is a suggestion of movement here.
I have yet to comprehend the modern version of essentialism apparently. Althussers just seem to turn marx 'ensemble of social relations' into a void and meaningless phrase. This is what you meant by the small vestiges of essentialism in Marx.
I remember reading Lenin "on the mistakes of Trotsky on the question of trade unions. He makes a criticism of
eclecticism here. More than two words can describe the same thing. In relationships to others one word can have more relevance than the other. Dogs and Cats for instance predators, dogs and man pets or domestic animals.
The term Essentialism is used in this context against
atomism. This is my thesis which does not enter your discussion. Except as being meaningless. I have said one tries to make nature intelligible the other denies its possibility, denies narrative on movement.
Dialectics here is not a true oppisition, formal logic fits this bill more readily.
I not only deny your assertion that essentialism
comes down to the
essence of human nature. It is absolutely and categorely false.
This is a hugely mistaken idea perhaps caused by your penchant for rubbishing anything that comes forward to develop this idea. So far I like Fromm as the best in this area, but he is not the last say. Your method is to attack the last say as inadequate so you can rubbish the method. This is not too subtle a trick for me not to notice it.

Essential outcomes have no meaning to me in absolute terms. The knowledge of a thing, and to deeper into the knowledge of thing as process has no absolute outcome, only our best approximation. things are knowable and inteligible but not inexhaustible.
you hve not dealt with your criticism
of A=B B=C A=B 'essentialism'. What are you criticising here is surely a method not an essence to humankind
this a contridiction in your thinking. I stiil dont understand what you think the method of essentialism is.
I will repeat:
"In line with the Hegelian genealogy of philosophical terms in Marxism, the “essence” which is revealed by social practice is the dialectical unfolding of the thing through successively deeper and deeper meanings."
Where here is the essence of human nature.
You are beginning to sound like IP when he insisted that Socialism was Stalinism
method and content of essence can not be equated.
There are two different forms here. Sure a 1st year philosophy student could see that.

[vox]

I'm a bit tired of your misrepresentation. I've been clear in my definition of "essentialism," and I've made that clear previously. I do not believe that it's a "method" at all.

You're correct that your thesis does not enter into my discussion. I've also made it very clear that I find your theory to be sophomoric essentialism masquerading as dialectic. Where have I been unclear?

If you choose to ignore this, so be it.

The nature of essentialism is that if it exists in one thing, it must exist in all. I've made clear that I disagree with this obsolete notion, given the functioning of Late Capitalism.

Your essential substance amounts to fairy dust. You cannot blend the scientific into the metaphysical, young friend. Any first year philosophy student should know that.

vox

[peaccenicked]

I was not clear on that I will look back and see what I over-looked. but in the meantime.
You seem to be avoiding questions.
you say my thesis is wrong out of hand.
Nowhere Have I said that dialectics=essentialism.
There is nothing to hide. I am explaining relationships you choose to ignore perhaps you prefer sleeping.
I make an argument. You fall asleep and then you finally awake to your conclusion.
The one you started with and the one that brought me to start this thread.
now you have choosen to give it expression. I hope that is not a misrepresentation in your mind for I have been waiting for these words all along because I did not want to misrepresent you.
The nature of essentialism is that if it exists in one thing, it must exist in all.
Where did you get this outright fabrication from
A=C B=C A=B Is there anyone in the whole of studied philosophy that recognises this syllogism. Comrade modern Aristotleans, and those who recognize the part played by Aristotle in the influences of Marx would be appalled to the highest degree. Do you remember who invented formal logic?
cat has a tail
an elephant has a tail
SO a cat must be an elephant.
comrade you have been miserably informed. What sort of idiot can not think this through.
Not only do you not understand the essentials of philosophy but you go on to propagate this misunderstanding.
Of course this is not a method if thats what you understand by it. It is so poor a method it can hardly called one.
As you want to fall asleep to any other thesis in the style of dogmatic slumber.you want to stay in a disreputable place, a place of blindness to your mistakes. I can only expect your listening disposition to get worse.
I can not speak for the essential substance in your head.



(Edited by peaccenicked at 7:56 pm on Feb. 9, 2002)


(Edited by peaccenicked at 8:01 pm on Feb. 9, 2002)

[El Che]

I study philosophy, not at the university level, not yet. From what i know and have studied what vox says is correct. Essencialism as defined by the jonics presuposes a double organisation of the real. What is aparent and immediate, the aperance, is given to one by his senses. What is real, ininteligeble is "hidden", to search for what is true in something one must use not the aperance given by the senses but must use logic or science to dig for the truth concerning the object of study. The object of this philosophy is the wrold, everthing thing in it and the origen of the cosmos. Also called cosmology is searches for the "essence" you mention. As a consequense of the double organisation of the real (the aparent and the truth behind the aperance given by ones senses), it follows that when looking around at the world and the universe the aperance given is one of diversity, but using logic one sees that all things however diverse have something in comon, this being the second pillar of their work: to search for the common essence in all things. The primordial soap, atoms, god, take your pick. Tales de Mileto sayed the essence of all things and beings was water, others believed other things. None the less the constante here is the quest to identify the essence of things. Thee essence, there are not many essences, there is only one. Note that this is not an atropomorphic prespective. Man is just another animal runing around, he is not the object of study. I am uncertain as to what you mean by modern essencialism, but its seems to me that if it is radicaly different it should have a different name. The question of essence is metaphysical by nature.

cat has tale
elefant has tale

cat = elefant <--- dont be silly

cat and elefant share common ininteligeble essence and are in fact the same under the apearence of their different apearences. <------ essencialist prespective of the world.


Materialism and dialectics are something other if u ask me. They search for deaper and deaper meanings yes but its a scientific process, these deaper and deaper meanings dont enter into the real of the absolute. They go as far as the can, without entering into the metaphysical, like sciences enters into what in can and stays at that.

[vox]

Comrade,

It's not a syllogism at all, for if essentialism is to exist, it must exist in all things.

Your game of cat's tails plumbs the depths of the inane, for, as is its very name, it is not a physical feature at all, but, by the very essentialist nature that essentialism cannot elude, it must exist in all things.

I'm sorry that you need to stoop to such a low level in order to try to make your point, if, indeed, you've one at all, but your misrepresentation cannot go unanswered.

When you state that essentialism is a method to uncover material foundations, I say that you're fabricating the essential, for essentialism needs objective structure, which is the Absolute of which you spoke. Without this absolute, there can be no essential quality separated from the material. On this one point I think we agree.

It's unfortunate that from there you decide to make to equate material substance with essential being-for-itself.

The world has moved from Aristotle, dear heart. You might be wise to do so yourself.

vox

[peaccenicked]

This is nonsense comrade.
Essentialism does not feature this
at all no subject predicates that swim through one and all thing beyond the laws of physics and dialectics. you are creating an illusion to avoid addressing the questions I have raised ,still persists your dogmatic slumber. The lack of intellectual rigour that compels an honest assessment of set of propositions.
Merely a conviction of all false preconcieved notion,
not based on studied philosophy but a bad comparison,
of predicates not laws of nature put together to misrepresent essentialism in a illogical syllogism.
The absolute dysfunctionalised by a persistent (essential quality) mistake to obscure the reality of subjective weaknesses.
As to material substance.
what did I say was merely a starting point?
What am I trying to describe variousgeneral attitudes towards substance.
Not the all embracing definition that you seem to need.
It is ingenious that you plunk to this to divert the debate from the crux of my contentions, to blow your own nose over me and continue to throw your snotters of ill informed postivism at me.



(Edited by peaccenicked at 1:59 pm on Feb. 10, 2002)

[vox]

Be it as you wish, comrade, but I deny avoiding any questions, for I've stated, repeatedly (and you have ignored it repeatedly) that essentialism demands an essentialist structure.

If you wish me to jump through your hoops, you've picked the wrong vox.

I disgree with your Objectivist Essentialism on a fundamental level, which I've tried to make clear. However, you prefer to ignore that, lolling along in poetic, though not very clear, thought-form problematics.

It's a dear thing to be young and excited. I remember. I am not so young and not so excited anymore, but where I see bad, essentialist, Idealogical philosophy, I'll continue to point it out. Such is my lot.

Now, if you've something to say, say it, for your circular words do not lead, as your "essentialist" might hold you, to clarity of thought and speech but to deconstructionst parlour games, word games that say little, and mean less.

I have stated from the beginning, and state now, that essentialism demands Idealogical Absolutes, but since humankind is the creator of the social fabric, it is only humankind which has a say, rather than your Objectivist Substantialism.

vox

[peaccenicked]

Why do you insist on confounding your mistake. I beginning to feel sorry for you. Since this argument coincides with the other thread at the moment.
I will bring this to your attention.
"The objective absolute is the history present and future of the universe. No matter how long you look at that,comrade, does not change as a place of external reference.
In regards to the potential of human knowledge, which is limitless. What on earth is changeable here. How is limitlessness changeable.
You attack of an essential substance to avoid the problem as I have stated in another thread there is no predicate which is universal. There is only universalty to the laws of nature and dialectics.
You keep on positing your own mistaken idea of essentialism as mine.
You are using the same method as IP who insisted Socialism was Stalinism.
You are incapable at looking at my arguments in the dialectical framework I have provided. Why because you do not understand dialectics as the recognition of the unity of opposites in nature and if you did, It would be abundantly clear to you that the relative and the absolute are opposites one represents the finite the other the infinite. These are the senses
that humans use,
infinitely funny old chap.
thus confounding your original smearing of essentialism."
Here I wish to go back to the old track of human essence because I see it is causing you trouble.
Here is Meickle On Mandel
on the economic and philosophical manuscripts.EPM
and the german ideology GI
"part of Mandel's view that the EPM are transitional that they 'represent at the most the motivation of Capital, not its ''framework'' ' This as a more subtle question that requires more refined argument than there is space fore here, but one of the substantial issues involved in it cannot be avoided, and that is the use Marx makes in the EPM of 'Gattungswewn' or 'species essence'. Mandel takes the view that Marx's treatment of alienation in the EPM stops short of developing int Marx's theory of history('historical materialism'), and diverges into a discussion in which 'alienated labour is contasted to the generic qualities of man, as a "species being".....ans alienation can be understood at first sight,
if not as externalisation in the Hegelian sense then
at least as the of an ''ideal human being" such as never existed.
Mandel adds that Marx was later resolutely to abandon
'the concept of generic man, "the species being"'. This is actually a misreading of the relevant passage in the GI
but more importantly it betrays misunderstanding of Marx's theory of history and his conception of man in the historical process." Essentialism in the thought of Karl Marx
if you wish to follow this trail further consider what Marx means by Communism being the beginning of true human history.

To return you have said Essentialism requires an essentialist structure , the absolute. Something you have never understood . As you have displayed so dramatically in your definition of it.

[TheDerminator]

All this stuff is a bit sore on the eyes. Convolution upon convolution, although it is possible to grasp the thread. In the first place, Althusser was right to reject "essentialism" because it was a deep error of Marx, which reduced historical development to the economic dynamic. This is at the heart of Marxist essentialism.
However, Althusser never provided much an alternative, and you cannot really dismiss the essential, because all you need to know is the essential, all the rest is ... well ...inessential. Sort of obvious. Still, you may seem some contradiction in this statement, but it does not really exist. Because all I am saying is there was a baby and you do throw it out with the bathwater.
The first point is that if you look up essential in a dictionary, there are two basic meanings; the first is of essence; second pertains to necessity. These are two different concepts and it is wrong to confuse essence with necessity.
Now, the volumes of Capital are dedicated only to essence. That is the economic base. Engel's in his Letter to Bloch differentiates between the base and the superstructure. The latter is not tackled in Capital. It is the appearance rather than the essence. In this letter Engel's admits that both he and Marx did not adequately address the superstructure, which is one of the greatest understatements ever made.
Yep, [Capital] only addresses the relationships within the economic base. Ofcourse, this does not even include the economic superstructure, and you have to admit that there is a huge economic superstructure.
If you are new to the word "superstructure" it just means the actual form of societal relations which covers culture, politics, religion, industry and even scientific invention. Everything other than the economic base is the superstructure. Yep, it is a huge other and Marx only covered the essence; the economic base.
So what was it that Marx was covering? The static unchanging relations within the capitalist economic system. Trying squeezing much political consciousness out of that. Well, you get an insight into capitalist exploitation, but hey exploitation is a good word! We all just have to exploit our skills, exploit the situation for our benefit. Nope, the word "exploitation" does not create moral outrage, even if in some contexts it really ought to perform that function. What else? Oh yeah, there is commodity fetishism. Try telling that to an alchololic! Nope, it does not grip me as a great way to show the moral bankruptcy of capitalist society.
There a few problems herein, and the one staring you in the face, it is that as regards tackling the complexities of the superstructure, the essence is,, well a bit inessential.
You see, it is not a simple equation of essence against appearance. Appearance itself, has an essence. Yep. It is not to be confused with the economic essence, so all you need to say it is it is the essential apperance. I will not mystify it. The first thing to say is that although the precise form of the appearance is inessential, the requirement for a from is essential. No form, no superstructure. Hence the superstructure is essential, and Marx would not argue against this point.
However, it opens up possibilities. Possibilities. Could it be possible that there is more essentiality within the superstructure, and could the essential superstructure be objectified, just as the base was objectified by Marx?
Possibilities. Yep, it is possible, and there is an objectification of the whole essential superstructure of historical development in my treatise Heresies on God and Freedom.
One of the greatest weaknesses of essentialism, is that it never could get to grips with consciousness other than to say that it was caused by the base. Nope, even the early barter system was created in consciousness, and the fledgling bourgeoisie of England did the most to create the capitalist economic relations.
Yep, always, always, always cause creates essence. Cause always, always precedes the essence of a thing and this is as true for the creation of natural phenomena as it is for human historical development.
The cause in human development. Well, no mystery, even to orthodox Marxists. Lenin came to the conclusion, that you always ask "Who's interests are served?" Essentially, that is the question.
By determining the interests of the historical person or group, you are able to go even further and then ask "What are the limitations upon those interests?" and this opens up whole new dimension.
There is a deeper analysis of essence in relation to causaton within my treatise, and it also includes an objective methodology which is a large upgrade of the dialectical method used by Marx. The Heresies on God prove definitely that God is only a human creation, and Marx could never analyse the concept of God, nor the concept of Freedom, because his methodology was rooted in his essentialistic approach. Nor could he tackle ethos for the same reason. These are huge gaps in his historical theory. Relating Freedom to necessity is not much of a concept of freedom, because it can never answer the creation of the necessity other than from the essence, and the latter negates the superstructure which is the realm of all first causation within human society, though not in nature where the environment along with the essence of a thing determine the form the thing becomes. However, even here the casuation is from the essential environment or to use a Hegelian term the ground.
The relationship between the ground and the essential phenomenon or even the essential concept is can be termed the heart of the matter, another Hegelian concept. All you require is the essential understanding or the heart of the matter in relation to each subject, the rest is inessential. If you wish for a greater understanding of these relationships, they are contained in Objective Methodology with the treatise. Derminated

(Edited by TheDerminator at 1:41 pm on Feb. 10, 2002)

[peaccenicked]

Essentialism never did reduce history to economic development. It brings categories to the comprehension of that dynamic. To say that these categories are inadequate to the superstructure is an historical given.
When I was writing a history of poetics, one of the more fundamentalist of my comrades, inquired whether or not it was a political economy of poetics?
Of course there are issues, art as commodity production,
art for arts sake, art for the market, art for the people there are issues that can be derived from political economy. Essentialism is not an economic category. It is a philosophical one which is the process of deepening our comprehension of nature. It is the polar opposite of atomism, and as such is helpful in uncovering the nature superstructure in history. Dialectics if applied can establish two fundamental poles that run thruogh history. Science and ideology. In this science corresponds to what is true to the needs of real development whereas ideology corresponds to that which falsifies the process of development. Essentialism merely implies that we dig deeper into this sphere and make intelligible the actual relations between things. This project is still in development. Gramsci is a good srarting point and his notions of commonsense.
This contasted with Hegels notion
that "all that is rational is real", gives us
framework to discern the nature of the superstructure.
I will review your book later and talk to you privately.


(Edited by peaccenicked at 3:23 pm on Feb. 10, 2002)

[TheDerminator]

You have not comprehended a few things. First of all that Marx still saw the economic base as determining forms of consciousness, so it is still reductionist determinism, and this atomist stuff, that Meikle pitted against essentialism is a complete error. Atomism stems from Democritus and Leucippus, two essentialists. What can be more essentialist than to say that everything is make of atoms! Goes to essece. Big style, and part of the poverty of Aristotle is that he did not comprehend the important contribution the atomists made. Whatever, atomism has become you should atleast use inverted commas, because the atomists moved beyond the view of essence of Thales.
Thales, saw the essence as water. Hence for Thales "everything is full of Gods" Now, everything is full of atoms is a considerable, don't you think? In fact you could say what these old pre-Socratics achieved was and is one of the most outstanding bits of prediction ever achieved on this planet. Know that these particular atomists were some of the good guys.
The error of Aristotle was to make substances into continuous matter instead of being composed of atoms.
There should be know polarity between the early atomism, and an understanding of essence. The essence of any natural thing is composed of atoms, and you should realised that confined to nature, that is all there is to atomism. However, if we move onto an empirical approach or any other approach that concentrates on just a few sides of an issue, the wider term that is applicable is subjectivism, and although the early atomists were obviously subjective, they atleast had an understanding of essence, and so there is objective within subjecitivity or truth within error. The error in many respects became truth.
Atomism, was crude essentialism. The essentialism of Aristotle is more advanced, but he threw the baby out with the bathwater, which is reflected in his understanding of matter.
However, it is the essentialism of Marx which matters the most and there is no escaping the facts that Marx saw the economic base as creating the superstructure, and what else can this be temed other than essentialism.
Everyone admits that Marx was an essentialist, but the main point is that this essentialism did not provide
an adequate basis to tackle the superstructure. The whole fucking superstructure, including politics and culture. This is the main point that has to be dwelt upon more than anything.
The highest level attained by Marxism is a mixture of the theories of Lenin, Gramsci and Althusser. However, it still ends with the practical-critique of the superstructure, and this is its barreness, and this is why the socialist movement is paralysed. Not sectarianism, not Stalinism, it is because the theory is still essentially subjective theory, and essentialism is ..well it says it all. One-sided. The essence of the appearance. Why not appearancism? It is equally valid, because every form of essence is created through the introduction of some form of consciousness, hence it makes an appearance in the appearance or the superstructure.
Nope, I am not for appearancism, because I know the essence is still essential. It is called an all-sided analysis. Objective analysis. derminated.

[peaccenicked]

This approach if anything is one sided.
meikle makes more sese to me than you. I quote again.
"On the one hand there were Democritus and Epicurus, who thought of reality as atomistic small-bits that combine and repel in the void, and who had a hard job accounting for the persisting natures of things, species and genera on that basis. On the other hand there was Aristotle, who realised that no account of such things could be possible without admitting a category of form (or essence), because what a thing is, and what things of its kind are, cannot possibly be explained in terms of their constituent matter (atoms), since that changes while the entity retains its nature and identity over time. (1985, p. 9)"

[El Che]

This gets ever more confusing, i wonder why clarity is not a priotiry.

One says Atomism and essencialism are oposits, the other that atomism is an essencialism.

Is not essencialism metapysical? If u say atoms are the essence of all then in that case it is obejctive, empirical and verifiable. But if u say it is a supernatural entity then it is metaphisical. How do you reconsile this quest for essence that may or may not be of a supernatural metaphisical nature with Marxist analises of the capitalist systems basic elements and relations. It has nothing to do with essence, for essence is not verifiable through dialectics, nor through any other empirical or scientic method, it is allas a metaphisical question. If you wish to shuffule concepts to the point where discution is made redundante then so be it but i would advise caution and clarity for the sake of good discution. And of what interest is the aperance? what is this aperancism? the apearence is what is not true, what is false and unconsequencial. What benefit could one extract by having as the object of study that which is inconsequencial?

Your complicated philosophical webs are spining in circular motion.

[peaccenicked]

El che
The Derminator although we are related opposes my views. we are not a monolith or hope to be in this sense.
You have to deal with his oppinions as though they are not mine. Here he takes a line, that quite frankly yet to comprehend.
Clarity is what I am seeking, and I can see the crux of your thinking.
This is a good question!
The history of philosophy is metaphysics and then Marx comes along to distinguish dialectics as an opposite form.
From the dictionary.
met·a·phys·ics [mètt fízziks ] or met·a·phys·ic [mètt fízzik ] noun (takes a singular verb)

1. philosophy of being: the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the nature of being and beings, existence, time and space, and causality

2. underlying principles: the ultimate underlying principles or theories that form the basis of a particular field of knowledge Symmetry is part of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics.

3. abstract thinking: abstract discussion or thinking


From the dictionary.
di·a·lec·ti·cal ma·te·ri·al·ism noun
Marx's framework for explaining reality: the Marxian concept of reality in which material things are in the constant process of change brought about by the tension between conflicting or interacting forces, elements, or ideas.

This framework, is a concerned with the study of the nature of being and beings, existence, time and space, and causality.
Marx/Engels cannot abolish metaphysics. This was a mistake but I take out of the mistake the sense that dialectics is a higher form of metaphysics than previous metaphysics.So different that M+E could not help but see the contrast but their claim against metaphysics was not really a claim against metaphysics but a claim against the content of metaphysics up to that point.
Essence is not the primary consideration of Essentialism,
that is to make nature intelligble, in that if we abolish essence as M+E abolish metaphysics we simply take away from words their actual meaning.
This is the sense that I use it and universally:

1. identifying nature: the quality or nature of something that identifies it or makes it what it is.

You say dialectics can not verify this.
If dialectics can not verify this. Then I say dialectics is useless. You argument makes dialectics a pointless excercise.
However dialectics as the recognition of the unity of opposites in nature is a method to unfold the determinateness of being as its
identifying nature: the quality or nature of something that identifies it or makes it what it is ie essence.






(Edited by peaccenicked at 1:42 pm on Feb. 11, 2002)

[vox]

"Why because you do not understand dialectics as the recognition of the unity of opposites in nature and if you did, It would be abundantly clear to you that the relative and the absolute are opposites one represents the finite the other the infinite."

Absurd friend, here you state that the Absolute and the Relative are equal. This is, of course, a ludicrous notion, so unsound that it's not even considered by Randists to be good philosophy. However, it's the summation of your dead theorizing. It's quite pitiful.

You later quote a reading of Marx that is profoundly mistaken, but, given this earlier error, quite undestandable. You, like a good little Leninist, wish and pray for a determinist Marx, and will find one where none, in actuality, exists.

Do not feel sorry for me, comrade, but I hope you are able to laugh, later, at your sophomoric mistakes.

vox

[peaccenicked]

The relative and the absolute are not equal.
you have read that into what i have said.
i say it is not there.
the relative is finite
the absolute is infinite.
where is the equality?
Your approach is that of clerical obscurantism,
one of turning living theory into dead theory by misrepresenting it.

[vox]

But comrade, if one is infinite and the other absolute, if one is perfect and the other flawed, then where lies the dialectic?

Indeed, the perfect Absolute would always conquer, would it not? If the infinite, and therefore eternal, were to somehow lose, then it would not be infinite or eternat, nor would it be Absolute.

Indeed, it would just be more human conjecture, which the dialect sorts out.

Unless you're proposing some bizarre kind of "absolute relativism," which, to me, would be just more Deconstructionist word games, you've got some very major explaining to do about just how the Absolute can ever lose in the dialectic.

vox

[peaccenicked]

the absolute is not a conscious being opposing man.
this a hegelian notion. the infinite does not have a consciousness.
this an absurd idea. it is no position to win anything.
it is merely all of undifferentiated existence.
the finite, here, is man's understanding. it is by natue flawed but if were not flawed how could it develop.
To quote from my first post:
Essentialism then is concerned not with some final essence which can never be revealed, but rather is concerned with the process of revealing ever deeper meanings.

[vox]

"Essentialism then is concerned not with some final essence..."

Exactly, which is why I say that your "essentialism" amounts to nothing more than superstitious "substantalism," believing that some Greater Truth will be revealed somehow and at some point.

This, I say, is not the case.

It is only through existential confrontation that anything is revealed, and that confrontation is dialectical, not "essential."

Your "substance" fetish would, I think, be more easily satisfied with a study of quarks rather than Marxism.

You've previously embraced Hegel, when he suited your need, and now you seem to reject him when he doesn't. It's an unfortunate circumstance for you.

vox

[peaccenicked]

This is getting absurd
first you attack the absolute for being a hegelian notion.
Then I show you it has a meaning in materialism
the you accuse me of abandoning hegel.
now you say that some greater truth will be revealed at some point can not happen. Not realising that you are trying to make a greater truth than mine.
I have tried to show you the relationship between essentialism and dialectics as to their polar opposites.
you ignored that as you do not seem to have grasped polarity.
And superstitious 'substantilism' ammounts to you insistence that Aristotle essentialism has go something to do with same essence that exists in all things, which is blatantly false to anyone who has read the metaphysics.
From the Metaphysics
"Hence it is clear that no universal exists next to and in seperation from its particulars. The exponents of Forms are partly right in their account when they make Forms seperate; for the Forms are particular substances, but they are wrong in considering the one over many as form. The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the imperishable substances of this kind which exist beside and outside particular sensible substances."
This is anti thetical to any notion of a universal essentialist substance.
and this is a million miles removed from any childish,
superstitious substansilism which seems to be figment of your imagination or some form of the bastardisation of Aristotle by the medieval schoolastics.

[vox]

Perhaps it wasn't clear to you when I said I use the term "essentialism" in the modern context, for, living in a modern time, there is no other way to do so.

You Aristotelian conjecture on "substance" is, to my mind, nothing more than the wake of moth's wings. It is outdated and superfluous--a simple-minded abstraction that is not the realm of philosphy but of science, something the medieval church did not believe, and, apparently, you do not either.

You're correct in one thing, that this is absurd, for your tap dancing around the issues is not amusing. I've been consistent about my view on Hegel, it is you who have changed your tune, and then, amazingly, accuse me of doing just the same!

I maintain that your notion of "essentialism" has been supplanted by Marxist, not Hegelian, dialects, and it's an idea that you should abandon directly, or else delve, as your previously did, into the great Deconstructionist abyss.

vox

[peaccenicked]

"Perhaps it wasn't clear to you when I said I use the term "essentialism" in the modern context, for, living in a modern time, there is no other way to do so."
this sounds dictatorial, especialy when you have not outlined the "modern context" in any way clearly.
"You Aristotelian conjecture on "substance" is, to my mind, nothing more than the wake of moth's wings. It is outdated and superfluous--a simple-minded abstraction that is not the realm of philosphy but of science, something the medieval church did not believe, and, apparently, you do not either. "
a simple minded abstraction maybe but obviously it is beyond your comprehension.now you insist that your version is the modern version and must be true but that is not demonstrated.
You're correct in one thing, that this is absurd, for your tap dancing around the issues is not amusing. I've been consistent about my view on Hegel, it is you who have changed your tune, and then, amazingly, accuse me of doing just the same! "
That maybe true that your attitude towards Hegel is consistent but you have danced around the question
of the absolute shamelessly getting it wrong on each occassion.
I maintain that your notion of "essentialism" has been supplanted by Marxist, not Hegelian, dialects, and it's an idea that you should abandon directly, or else delve, as your previously did, into the great Deconstructionist abyss. "
You have not read a single thing I have read on this and are sahamelessly trying to force this on me.
comrade the method is pitful and stalinistic, you have not answered any my thesis on polarity with any reasoned argument.
I think you have more in common with Popper than marx, who critices marx if anything for his essentialism.

[vox]

You claim that I get "absolutism" wrong on each occasion, yet I've maintained throughout a clear stance on absolutism. If you say that I get it "wrong" it's simply because I disagree with your incredibly contradictory ways, wanting the "absolute" to be infinite at one stage, yet finite at another!

I've been through your reductionist, Leninist school before, Peacenicked, and I found it wanting then, and do still. It's a great shame that you side with the dogmatic essentialists, needing an absolute and unchanging problematic.

I, on the other hand, walk in step with the existing material condition, something that your Ivory Tower cannot withstand.

vox

[peaccenicked]

At what point did I use the word absolutism.
where did I say it was finite.
I find myself arguing against your imaginary visions of my position and not for my real position.
you are painting my out of your world outlook fine.
I do not recognise any of your picture because it is a complete fabrication. it is your position that is reductionist and mechanical.
you need an imagination to delve deeper into the meanings of concepts and categories. it is how marx moved from commodity to capital. He did not stop at the existing material conditions.
Unlike you he actually studied Aristotle and Hegel and did not kick them about like dead dogs, to pander to the dregs of positivism.

(Edited by peaccenicked at 10:31 pm on Feb. 13, 2002)