In the Tractatus

[Bretty123]

Rosa in the tractatus L.W. talks about the proposition, the propositional sign, and the expression. What are these things he speaks of and what is their definition?

is the proposition a picture of reality?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty. I answered this earlier (but it has been lost); did you read that answer?

If not, I will try again.

[Bretty123]

Yes I read it. I think I understand unless you'd like to explain it again. I'm waiting till december to purchase your friends book since by then i'll be finished reading a majority of L.W.'s published work.

Also in Lemmon's 'beginning logic' book what does it consist of? Like what parts of logic does it teach you? I've learned basic logic so i'm curious if it will just be reteaching what i've already learned. Or if it is more advanced.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It depends on how much you know.

Lemmon is just the best Introduction there is, but it will take you to the beginning of the next level, which you can go on to study in books like 'Intermediate Logic' by David Bostock, for instance.

But if you already know a little logic, you will not really need much more to understand the Tratactus.

The difficulty with that book is that it is so compressed and oracular that it is not easy to understand what he is on about.

Roger White's book will make it clear to you, and it is by far and away the most accurate account so far published (and it has taken 85 years for us the get to this point!)

A propositional sign is the physical sign in front of you, or that you hear.

A proposition is a common pattern to all the propositional signs that say the same thing.

So 'Tony Blair is a man' says the same as 'Tony Blair est un homme' (etc.).

According to W propositions are pictures of states of affairs in the world, but just saying that can be misleading, and it does not distinguish him from others who might seem to say the same thing.

One of his guiding thoughts was that it must be possible for us to understand a proposition before we know whether it is true or not. [You only have to think for a second to see that this cannot work the other way round - but most philosophers missed this simple point.]

All other theories (that rely on the so-called 'Correspondence Theory of Truth', or whatever), end up requiring something to be true for a proposition to be understood - getting this the wrong way round.

The problem with that is that if something is known to be true, it must be understood first, so such theories beg the question.

W confronted this in the Tractatus, and came up with one account of how language works which does not do this, but he later came to see (under the influence of Marxism) that his earlier ideas, while not completely wrong, were extremely one-sided.

So, he developed an entirely new way of conceiving of language which still did not beg the question, but which gave an understanding of language that showed how it could work primarily as a means of communication, and secondarily as a means of representation (something he had got the wrong way round in the Tractatus -- and something that philosophers in general have got wrong for 2500 years -- and for ideological reasons which I expose in Essay Twelve, and other Essays).

I take the story up where he left off, and use his ideas to expose every other Philosophical Theory as bogus (in that they all seek to find truths about the world that account for language, mind, meaning, ....), getting the whole thing the wrong way round again.

There can be no philosophical 'truths', or none that would fail to undermine the social nature of language, and thus its origin in communal labour.

So, as a Marxist, in order to defend the social nature of knowledge and of language, I attack metaphysics (in a way similar to Kant), in order to 'rescue' the social nature of language and knowledge, using W's ideas.

I go into this in extensive detail in Essay Twelve, published next year some time.

So my attack on dialectical materialism is only tangential to my attack on all philosophical theories -- which, because one and all are inimical to the social nature of knowledge and language I brand as 'ruling class' theories.

But, as you can see, if you have read my essays, I do not just assert such things, I prove them, and I think I can prove this too.

You will see me do this in Essay Twelve, and later Essays.

That is why, if I am right, this will represent the biggest change in Maxist Philosophy for 150 years.

I am nothing if not over-confident!

As you might have been able to guess from earlier posts....

[Bretty123]

Can you explain how you attack metaphysics in a similar way to Kant? I've read a paper discussing Kant's challenge to metaphysicians which Hegel and others took upon themselves as a project [undoubtably failing in my eyes] but i'm unclear on what Kant's challenge to metaphysicians was.

So Wittgenstein's challenge to the correspondence theory of truth is that one can understand false logical propositions as well? [in that say Heidegger proposes something that is not true to reality and we can understand his meaning behind his proposition yet it does not mean it is necessarily true to reality?]

And also he is saying - or you? - in order to know something is true it must be understood first to assert its truthfulness?

P.S. thanks for the explanation of your work, you should write something similar to explain your position and where your coming from in philosophical history if you haven't already [I didn't see anything on your site]. It does clear up alot for me.

And yes I agree with you so far with what you have proposed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I merely attack metaphysics similar to Kant, not in a similar way to Kant -- in order to destroy metaphysics to make science possible.

Kant did this by showing the limitations of a priori reasoning but using concepts and categories he either invented or borrowed from previous thinkers. In the end his work was entirely subjective (even though Kant scholars willl reject that).

I endeavour to achieve this by the use of ordinary language, which, becaue it is a social product, makes my method non-subjective.


So Wittgenstein's challenge to the correspondence theory of truth is that one can understand false logical propositions as well?

No, I think you have misunderstood things completely.

He did not attack this theory, I do.

And it has nothing to do with 'logical propositions', false or otherwise.

Just ordinary ones.


[in that say Heidegger proposes something that is not true to reality and we can understand his meaning behind his proposition yet it does not mean it is necessarily true to reality?]

I will not comment on Heidegger since I rate his work lower than the thoughts of George W Bush. Possibly lower still.


in order to know something is true it must be understood first to assert its truthfulness?

I am saying that you already know this to be so.

If you do no understand something, you will not be able to tell if it is true or false.

Like W, I just assemble reminders: I remind you of what you already know (but might not be aware of).


you should write something similar to explain your position and where your coming from in philosophical history if you haven't already [I didn't see anything on your site

Done it here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

But it is buried in an attack on Dialectics and metaphysics. [This is a summary of Essay Twelve.]

It will become much clearer when I publish the full Essay Twelve, and a later Essay on language, etc.

I am attacking ideas that have dominated western and eastern thought for 2500 years, and ways of thinking that few have even recognised, let alone questioned. It has taken me well over 20 years to get my own ideas right in this area.

So, do not expect things to be crystal clear from the word go.

These are issues that have sailed right over the heads of the best minds in human history.

What I am proposing is nothing short of a revolution in human thought, ready for a revolution in human society.

I take no credit for this; 45% of it is down to W, 45% to Marx, 10% to me.

[Bretty123]

Alright I understand clearer now. I'm going to take a look at your work moreso however i'm wondering if there is a way to purchase it in book form? I can't stand reading over the computer.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty:


i'm wondering if there is a way to purchase it in book form? I can't stand reading over the computer.

My original plan had been to publish this myself in several years time -- I did not want to surrender editorial control to someone else, and no one would have published such an obscure work, anyway, or in its full form at least.

But, a couple of comrades -- Redstar2000 was one -- pursuaded me to put this material on the web, even though it is only about 50% finished (much of the detailed work is still to be done).

So that is why it has appeared on-line.

I realise it's not easy to read like this (but I did not intend it to be so read originally), but my work has now reached a far wider audience on the left that I could ever have hoped had I adopted plan A. People from all over the world visit my site; some just take one look and log off. Others have worked their way through it, and e-mailed me their thanks.

So, this work does not exist in a hard copy yet; I have printed-off earlier versions just in case the many electronic copies I have made are corrupted in some way.

But the main part of the study -- Essay Twelve -- is only about 1/3rd complete (and even then it is now approaching 100,000 words in length!); much of it is in note form, or just in my head at present.

The other important Essays I plan to post in the next year or so (one on the nature of language as seen from a Marxist perspective) and another about science (from the same angle) are in even worse shape. Another -- a detailed historical/analytical account of the develoment of ruling-class thought down the ages (and over the last 5000 years or so), culminating in Dialectical Materialism and 'Systematic Dialectics' --, exists only in note form.

That is why I have posted all those summaries of my ideas (Comrade Red suggested that, as did one or two others).

Apologies therefore for the difficult-to-read format (I have broken things up by the use of different colours and fonts to try to make things easier), but I hope tha above tells you the background.

The best I can suggest right now is that you print off a copy of whatever Essay it is that you want to read.

When this project is finally finished, I will be producing a hard copy version -- and I will send you one free, gratis and for nothing (should you want one) --. but it might weigh a ton by then.

And you might be about 40 years old....

[Then I will begin to re-construct Historical Materialism!]

[Bretty123]

Rosa in the Tractatus I have a comment and question for you regarding it.

In 4.112 of the Tractatus he speaks of philosophy as the clarification of opaque and blurred thoughts. However when one actually thinks of philosophy in this manner there is literally no application realistically, except to clarify idealist 'philosophical' sentiments.

What type of thought did he have in mind for philosophy to 'clarify'?

Is this where your advocation of abolishing the activity of philosophy finds root?

-Brett.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty:


Is this where your advocation of abolishing the activity of philosophy finds root?

Yes, and his later comments in the Philosophical Investigations etc.

Later his method became more 'therapeutic' (and less clarificatory), that is, he wanted to remove our desire to ask metaphysical questions.

I transform this into an ideological endeavour, to counteract the influence of ruling-class forms of thought, such as dialectics, on Marxism.


What type of thought did he have in mind for philosophy to 'clarify'?

He spent the next 40 years spelling this out -- you can find many examples in the Blue Books (which you have already read).

Gilbert Ryle's work is excellent in this regard, too -- even though his concerns were not exactly the same as W's.

[More Fire for the People]

Speaking of 'propositions', what exactly is a Moore-type proposition? This phrase keeps resurfacing in my notes on Wittgenstein.

[Hit The North]

Given that Wittgenstein claimed the propositions of the Tractatus to be meaningless, why are you even debating this shit (as defined by its author)?

And to think this was the only work of philosophy he felt compelled to publish!

Comrades, you'd be better off studying some revolutionary literature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hop:


Speaking of 'propositions', what exactly is a Moore-type proposition?

Moore had a somewhat Platonic view of these entities, a bit like the early Russell: they were abstract objects that existed, well, who knows where?

Given that both were recovering from a nasty dose of Hegelian Idealism, this is perhaps understandable.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z, wrong again (are you going for the world record??):


Given that Wittgenstein claimed the propositions of the Tractatus to be meaningless, why are you even debating this shit (as defined by its author)?

He said they were 'unsinnig', i.e., incapable of expressing an empirical truth or falsehood.

Check your facts before you mouth off in future -- oh, sorry, you mystics don't do facts, do you.


And to think this was the only work of philosophy he felt compelled to publish!

Comrades, you'd be better off studying some revolutionary literature.

You'd be better off not making a constant fool of yourelf in public.

[Hit The North]

R:


He said they were 'unsinnig', i.e., incapable of expressing an empirical truth or falsehood.

Not much use either way, then.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Not much use either way, then.

Stop being so hard on yourself.

That is my job.

[Hit The North]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 28, 2006 12:35 am
Z:


Not much use either way, then.

Stop being so hard on yourself.

That is my job.
Now that's the kind of misreading you philosophers are well versed in.

Well done.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Now that's the kind of misreading you philosophers are well versed in.

Well done.

Yes, we do our best, but we can never quite seem to match your Grade A in dissembling.

What's your secret?

[Bretty123]

Rosa:

I'm having trouble understand in number 5 of the Tractatus what Wittgenstein means by elementary proposition.

What is an elementary proposition and how is it different from a proposition?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Elementary propostitions are explained earlier on than 5!

By 5 it is too late to try understand these beggars.

Basically, an elementary proposition is a proposition that cannot be analysed any further, and comprises the names of simple objects in immediate concatenation.

As Roger White explains this (and his account is unique to him and it is correct), an example of what W had in mind might be the use of 3 spatial and one temporal coordinate to locate a Newtonian point mass (but there are other ways these can be formed, and other things they can pick out -- W would have said that is up to scientists to decide).

The names of simple objects thus would be, say, the familiar Cartesian coordinates your learnt about in school, the temporal one would be a fourth number locating things in time.

Eg: (X!, Y1, Z1, T1) would be an elementary proposition; if true would pick out a point mass where it says; it would be false otherwise.

The simple names are the X1, Y1, Z1 and T1 signs, the simple objects are the infinite lines these nominate in ideal space, or the time slice in temporal space.

Try to break this down any further and it ceases to say anything.

[Bretty123]

Rosa in the Tractatus there is a part after discussing the truth table. Wittgenstein speaks of Truth functions and Truth values as well as he expresses tautologies and contradictions and tries to apply them somehow, can you explain this clearer for me?

Thanks alot.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty:


Rosa in the Tractatus there is a part after discussing the truth table. Wittgenstein speaks of Truth functions and Truth values as well as he expresses tautologies and contradictions and tries to apply them somehow, can you explain this clearer for me?

Well, that is a huge subject, but it is not too clear what you want me to tell you.

[Bretty123]

I'm confused on why he was explaining the concept of tautologies and contradictions and in what way he was trying to use it to prove his conception of philosophy?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, as he explains these, tautologies and contradictions represent a limiting case of the use of propositional signs; so he calls them 'senseless' (in that they do not picture the world).

Metaphysicians had seen either or both as philosophically important; he shows they represent a breakdown in our sensible use of language, or at least they lie on the very edge of this.

They do not really feature in his philosophy, except to help account for the 'truths' of logic (which he says are all tautologies, and hence are not 'true' in any ordinary sense).