JimFar
12th November 2006, 16:03
Back in 2000, Gerald Cohen has reissued his classic 1978 work Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence in an expanded edition which included a new introduction in which he reflects upon analytical Marxism, as well as some additional new chapters which he attempted to develop a revised historical materialism. He still maintains that his 1978 book presented a faithful presentation of Marx's materialist conception of history (with the aid of tools borrowed from 20th century analytic philosophy) but in the additional chapters he attempts to come to terms with his more recent misgivings oncerning historical materialism by presenting a revised version of the theory which he calls a "restricted historical materialism." In addition to this he also has a chapter on the collapse of the Soviet Union considered from the standpoint of historical materialism, the text of which follows (minus the footnotes).
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What is the significance for Marxists, of the failure of the socialist project in what was the Soviet Union? And what is the significance, for socialists, of the failure of that project? I separate the two questions not merely for the formal reason that 'Marxists' and 'socialists' designate (overlapping but nevertheless) distinct categories, but also for the substantial reason that the significance of the Soviet failure is, in my view, very different for the two cases. For reasons to be explained below, the Soviet failure can be regarded as a triumph for Marxism: a Soviet success might have embarassed key propositions of historical materialism, which is the Marxist theory of history. But no one could think that the Soviet failure represents a triumph for socialism. A Soviet success would have been unambigously good for socialism.
I treat, here, the significance of the Soviet failure for Marxism. Now, as I said, had the Soviet Union succeeded in building socialism, that might have embarassed historical materialism. It might, in particular, have posed a serious challenge to the central claims of historical materialism:
(1) 'No social formation ever perishes before all the productive forces for
which there is room for it have developed . . .'
(2) 'and new higher relations of production never apppear before . . .
[they] have matured in the womb of the old society itself.'
It follows from the passage on exhibit that a capitalist society does not give way to a socialist one until capitalism is fully developed in that society, and that socialism does not take over from capitalism until the higher relations which characterize socialism have matured within the antecedent capitalist society itself. But what, precisely, is imposed by the requirement that relations constitutive of the future socialist society
must mature under capitalism? A complete answer to that question might be difficult to supply, but whatever else is required for such relations to have matured within capitalism, thre surely must exist, for such relations to have matured, a large proletariat within the capitalist society in question: it must be false that the great bulk of 'immediate producers' are peasants, rather than industrial wage-workers.
Now against the background of the two exhibited historical materialist theses, I want to discuss a criticism of historical materialism which is often made by anti-Marxists. I draw attention to this criticism because I believe it to be instructively incorrect.
The criticism is that, whereas Marx predicted that socialist revolution would first break out in advanced capitalist countries, it in fact occurred first in a relatively backward one, one so backward that one might refuse to call it a capitalist country. And this predictive failure was not just of the man Karl Marx himself, but of historical materialis, because of its commitment to theses (1) and (2) above. For here was a socialist revolution in an incompletely capitalist country in which further development of the productive forces , under a capitalist aegis, was surely possible (so that
(1) stands falsified), and in a country which had not generated much of a proletariat (so that (2) also stands falsified).
Before indicating why I think that this criticism is misguided, I should address a standard reply to it, in defence of (2), which I think unsound. The standard reply, against the charge that the 1917 revolution occurred without the existence of a developed proletariat, and, therefore, in contradiction of (2) above, is that there was a highly developed and concentrated proletariat in the huge factories of Petrograd itself, where the leading revolutionary events occurred, and where power was seized. But, while an ample local proletariat may help to explain, and may have even
been crucial to, Bolshevik political success, theorem (2) is, in my view, supposed to be true not because of the exigencies of politics but because of what a socialist form of economy requires for viability. So this way of protecting (2) against the threat posed to it by the Russian revolution fails.
Despite the failure of the 'Petrograd proletariat' gambit, I do not think that the 1917 revolution falsified thesis (2). The reason why I think that it does not is that it would do so only if what occurred in 1917 was indeed a socialist revolution, one which by definition, ushered in a truly socialist society, in which class division is abolished under the rule of the associated producers themselves. I do not believe that Soviet society had such a socialist character: it was not ruled by the associated
producers, but by the leaders, and sometimes just by the leader, of the Bolshevik Party. Indeed, those who criticize historical materialism in the stated fashion would be the last to grant that the 1917 revolution succeeded in establishing what Marxists would regard as a truly socialist society: they should therefore be the last to lodge the criticism of historical materialism that they do lodge. (They may think that the Russian revolution produced the only sort of 'socialism' that is possible, but they
should not (as they do) expect others, who may not agree with that further claim, to accept that the Russian revolution falsified (2).)
In a word , the 1917 revolution and its aftermath offer no difficulty for proposition (2), since appropriately higher relations of production did not supervene. But, all the same, the Russian revolution might still be thought to refute proposition (1), the principle that no social order ever perishes before all the development for which it supplies romm has been completed, for capitalism, surely showed room for fuller development in Russia in 1917. Thus, someone might say, the problem the 1917 revolution poses for historical materialism is not that it causes socialism to succeed
prematurely but that it caused capitalism to fail prematurely.
But I believe that that judgement is also ill-considered. For historical materialism does allow for the possibility of a premature revolution against capitalism, provided that it is not successful in the medium or long run. Only because historical materialism does allow for such a thing could Marx have warned, in the *German Ideology*, that, if there were an attempt to install socialism on the basis of an incomplete development of the productive forces, then 'all the old filthy business' 'would begin again.'
Now, I am confident that the Russia of 1917 was indeed charactrized by an incomplete development of the productive forces, in the sense Marx intended: he undoubtedly thought, in the early 1880s, that Russia was very backward, and I am sure that he would still have thought it backward, and I am sure that he would still have thought it backward (if not very backward) in 1917. Accordingly, under a reasonable interpretation (which I shall presently give) of the aforequoted *German Ideology* passage, the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union confrims the truth of that passage in particular and of historical materialism in general: the
restoration shows that no social order perished here before all of its possibilities of productive development were exhausted. Capitalism receded, but receding, temporarily, is not the same thing as perishing.
The reasonable interpretation of the *German Ideology* passage that I have in mind says, first, that Marx did not think that competition and capitalism would necessarily 'begin again' immdediately: seventy years is the batting of an eyelid, world-historically speaking. And the reasonable interpretation adds, for good measure, that the rigours and death and mismangement of the seventy post-revolutionary years might themselves be regarded as illustrating the 'filthy business' that Marx predicted (whether or not we eccentrically interpret Soviet society as itself a peculiar form of capitalism, as some twentieth-century Marxist sectshave done).
In sum, the standard use of the Soviet case in criticism of (2)requires affirmation that the 1917 revolution established as socialist society, which is not true, and which is hardly considered to be true, in the appropriate sense, by makers of the standard criticism. And the standard Soviet- experienced-based criticism of (1) works only under a crude conception of historical materialism's implication which ignore the
reasonable interpretation just ventured of an important, and entirely representative, *German Ideology* passage. So, as far as anything raised thus far shows, the Russian revolution does not embarass the relevent historical materialist theses.
But there is a further point to be made here. As is quite well known, Marx was consulted in the 1880s by Russian socialists who asked him whether he did not think that Russia could pass from its semi-feudal and merely nascent capitalist condition directly to communism, without undergoing the rigour of a full capitalist development. In order to answer that question, Marx learned the Russian language, so that he could study Russia's history and circumstances. And his answer to the question that the Russians put to him was very interesting: 'If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other,
the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.'
Now, how does that sit with the requirements of historical materialism, and in particular with theses (1) and (2)? I believe that, as long as (1) and (2) are taken to be true for each society separately, then Marx's advice was heresy. But that very advice suggests a global construal of historical materialism in which claims such as (1) and (2) are asserted not of each society taken singularly but of world-scale or at least multi-national social systems. (If Marx had meant that revolution in the West was no more than just politically or militarily required, then his answer to the socialists does not require this construal, but I think that he thought that socialist success in Russia needed Western cooperation for more deeply systemic reasons).
Now was Marx's advice to the Russians heresy, if we interpret (1) and (2) in the suggested global fashion? That is a matter of judgement, and all I can do here is to set out my own. It is that, taken globally, (2) would be consistent with Marx's advice, but that (1) would not be. (2) would be consistent because the proletariat was sufficiently developed across Europe as whole for new, higher relations to count as having matured, in a global sense, within that region. But (1) would still contradict Marx's advice, since as history shows, there was enormous scope for further development under capitalism in Europe when Marx wrote his remarks. Whatever globalism does for (2), in the face of the challenge to it posed by the Russian
revolution - and you may disagree with my judgement that it helps (2) a lot - it makes (1), if anything, more difficult to defend, in the face of that challenge.
Lenin was, of course, an erudite student of Marx, and he did not imagine that the 1917 Russian Revolution would stand alone and succeed. He thought that it would succeed, but only because he thought that there would be the responsive workers' revolution in the West that Marx laid down as a requirement of a Russian success: the needed support from afar would be forthcoming. As a Marxist, Lenin was committed to believing that, in the absence of that desired response, socialism in Russia was doomed, and, in due course, he expressed despair over Western proletarian failure and inaction. The true heresy was not Lenin's making of the 1917 revolution, for he made it with appropriately orthodox hopes, but Stalin's proclamation of 'socialism in one country,' because that had to mean socialism in one
backward country, and such as prospectus contradicts historical materialism on any construal of its central theses. (I do not thereby commit myself to Trotskyism, but perhaps I do commit myself to the view that one must choose between denial of key historical materialist theses and affirmation of some Trotskyist ones).
If the Soviet Union had succeeded in building an attractive socialism, then that would have been wonderful for socialism and for humanity, but bad for the credibility of historical materialism. Of course, since human beings are the sorts of creatures that, fortunately or unfortunately, they are, they might have been more willing to believe historical materialism had the Soviet Union succeeded. But by 'credibility', here, I mean what it could be rational to believe, so the stated infirmity of human nature does not affect what I have said.
_____________
What is the significance for Marxists, of the failure of the socialist project in what was the Soviet Union? And what is the significance, for socialists, of the failure of that project? I separate the two questions not merely for the formal reason that 'Marxists' and 'socialists' designate (overlapping but nevertheless) distinct categories, but also for the substantial reason that the significance of the Soviet failure is, in my view, very different for the two cases. For reasons to be explained below, the Soviet failure can be regarded as a triumph for Marxism: a Soviet success might have embarassed key propositions of historical materialism, which is the Marxist theory of history. But no one could think that the Soviet failure represents a triumph for socialism. A Soviet success would have been unambigously good for socialism.
I treat, here, the significance of the Soviet failure for Marxism. Now, as I said, had the Soviet Union succeeded in building socialism, that might have embarassed historical materialism. It might, in particular, have posed a serious challenge to the central claims of historical materialism:
(1) 'No social formation ever perishes before all the productive forces for
which there is room for it have developed . . .'
(2) 'and new higher relations of production never apppear before . . .
[they] have matured in the womb of the old society itself.'
It follows from the passage on exhibit that a capitalist society does not give way to a socialist one until capitalism is fully developed in that society, and that socialism does not take over from capitalism until the higher relations which characterize socialism have matured within the antecedent capitalist society itself. But what, precisely, is imposed by the requirement that relations constitutive of the future socialist society
must mature under capitalism? A complete answer to that question might be difficult to supply, but whatever else is required for such relations to have matured within capitalism, thre surely must exist, for such relations to have matured, a large proletariat within the capitalist society in question: it must be false that the great bulk of 'immediate producers' are peasants, rather than industrial wage-workers.
Now against the background of the two exhibited historical materialist theses, I want to discuss a criticism of historical materialism which is often made by anti-Marxists. I draw attention to this criticism because I believe it to be instructively incorrect.
The criticism is that, whereas Marx predicted that socialist revolution would first break out in advanced capitalist countries, it in fact occurred first in a relatively backward one, one so backward that one might refuse to call it a capitalist country. And this predictive failure was not just of the man Karl Marx himself, but of historical materialis, because of its commitment to theses (1) and (2) above. For here was a socialist revolution in an incompletely capitalist country in which further development of the productive forces , under a capitalist aegis, was surely possible (so that
(1) stands falsified), and in a country which had not generated much of a proletariat (so that (2) also stands falsified).
Before indicating why I think that this criticism is misguided, I should address a standard reply to it, in defence of (2), which I think unsound. The standard reply, against the charge that the 1917 revolution occurred without the existence of a developed proletariat, and, therefore, in contradiction of (2) above, is that there was a highly developed and concentrated proletariat in the huge factories of Petrograd itself, where the leading revolutionary events occurred, and where power was seized. But, while an ample local proletariat may help to explain, and may have even
been crucial to, Bolshevik political success, theorem (2) is, in my view, supposed to be true not because of the exigencies of politics but because of what a socialist form of economy requires for viability. So this way of protecting (2) against the threat posed to it by the Russian revolution fails.
Despite the failure of the 'Petrograd proletariat' gambit, I do not think that the 1917 revolution falsified thesis (2). The reason why I think that it does not is that it would do so only if what occurred in 1917 was indeed a socialist revolution, one which by definition, ushered in a truly socialist society, in which class division is abolished under the rule of the associated producers themselves. I do not believe that Soviet society had such a socialist character: it was not ruled by the associated
producers, but by the leaders, and sometimes just by the leader, of the Bolshevik Party. Indeed, those who criticize historical materialism in the stated fashion would be the last to grant that the 1917 revolution succeeded in establishing what Marxists would regard as a truly socialist society: they should therefore be the last to lodge the criticism of historical materialism that they do lodge. (They may think that the Russian revolution produced the only sort of 'socialism' that is possible, but they
should not (as they do) expect others, who may not agree with that further claim, to accept that the Russian revolution falsified (2).)
In a word , the 1917 revolution and its aftermath offer no difficulty for proposition (2), since appropriately higher relations of production did not supervene. But, all the same, the Russian revolution might still be thought to refute proposition (1), the principle that no social order ever perishes before all the development for which it supplies romm has been completed, for capitalism, surely showed room for fuller development in Russia in 1917. Thus, someone might say, the problem the 1917 revolution poses for historical materialism is not that it causes socialism to succeed
prematurely but that it caused capitalism to fail prematurely.
But I believe that that judgement is also ill-considered. For historical materialism does allow for the possibility of a premature revolution against capitalism, provided that it is not successful in the medium or long run. Only because historical materialism does allow for such a thing could Marx have warned, in the *German Ideology*, that, if there were an attempt to install socialism on the basis of an incomplete development of the productive forces, then 'all the old filthy business' 'would begin again.'
Now, I am confident that the Russia of 1917 was indeed charactrized by an incomplete development of the productive forces, in the sense Marx intended: he undoubtedly thought, in the early 1880s, that Russia was very backward, and I am sure that he would still have thought it backward, and I am sure that he would still have thought it backward (if not very backward) in 1917. Accordingly, under a reasonable interpretation (which I shall presently give) of the aforequoted *German Ideology* passage, the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union confrims the truth of that passage in particular and of historical materialism in general: the
restoration shows that no social order perished here before all of its possibilities of productive development were exhausted. Capitalism receded, but receding, temporarily, is not the same thing as perishing.
The reasonable interpretation of the *German Ideology* passage that I have in mind says, first, that Marx did not think that competition and capitalism would necessarily 'begin again' immdediately: seventy years is the batting of an eyelid, world-historically speaking. And the reasonable interpretation adds, for good measure, that the rigours and death and mismangement of the seventy post-revolutionary years might themselves be regarded as illustrating the 'filthy business' that Marx predicted (whether or not we eccentrically interpret Soviet society as itself a peculiar form of capitalism, as some twentieth-century Marxist sectshave done).
In sum, the standard use of the Soviet case in criticism of (2)requires affirmation that the 1917 revolution established as socialist society, which is not true, and which is hardly considered to be true, in the appropriate sense, by makers of the standard criticism. And the standard Soviet- experienced-based criticism of (1) works only under a crude conception of historical materialism's implication which ignore the
reasonable interpretation just ventured of an important, and entirely representative, *German Ideology* passage. So, as far as anything raised thus far shows, the Russian revolution does not embarass the relevent historical materialist theses.
But there is a further point to be made here. As is quite well known, Marx was consulted in the 1880s by Russian socialists who asked him whether he did not think that Russia could pass from its semi-feudal and merely nascent capitalist condition directly to communism, without undergoing the rigour of a full capitalist development. In order to answer that question, Marx learned the Russian language, so that he could study Russia's history and circumstances. And his answer to the question that the Russians put to him was very interesting: 'If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other,
the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.'
Now, how does that sit with the requirements of historical materialism, and in particular with theses (1) and (2)? I believe that, as long as (1) and (2) are taken to be true for each society separately, then Marx's advice was heresy. But that very advice suggests a global construal of historical materialism in which claims such as (1) and (2) are asserted not of each society taken singularly but of world-scale or at least multi-national social systems. (If Marx had meant that revolution in the West was no more than just politically or militarily required, then his answer to the socialists does not require this construal, but I think that he thought that socialist success in Russia needed Western cooperation for more deeply systemic reasons).
Now was Marx's advice to the Russians heresy, if we interpret (1) and (2) in the suggested global fashion? That is a matter of judgement, and all I can do here is to set out my own. It is that, taken globally, (2) would be consistent with Marx's advice, but that (1) would not be. (2) would be consistent because the proletariat was sufficiently developed across Europe as whole for new, higher relations to count as having matured, in a global sense, within that region. But (1) would still contradict Marx's advice, since as history shows, there was enormous scope for further development under capitalism in Europe when Marx wrote his remarks. Whatever globalism does for (2), in the face of the challenge to it posed by the Russian
revolution - and you may disagree with my judgement that it helps (2) a lot - it makes (1), if anything, more difficult to defend, in the face of that challenge.
Lenin was, of course, an erudite student of Marx, and he did not imagine that the 1917 Russian Revolution would stand alone and succeed. He thought that it would succeed, but only because he thought that there would be the responsive workers' revolution in the West that Marx laid down as a requirement of a Russian success: the needed support from afar would be forthcoming. As a Marxist, Lenin was committed to believing that, in the absence of that desired response, socialism in Russia was doomed, and, in due course, he expressed despair over Western proletarian failure and inaction. The true heresy was not Lenin's making of the 1917 revolution, for he made it with appropriately orthodox hopes, but Stalin's proclamation of 'socialism in one country,' because that had to mean socialism in one
backward country, and such as prospectus contradicts historical materialism on any construal of its central theses. (I do not thereby commit myself to Trotskyism, but perhaps I do commit myself to the view that one must choose between denial of key historical materialist theses and affirmation of some Trotskyist ones).
If the Soviet Union had succeeded in building an attractive socialism, then that would have been wonderful for socialism and for humanity, but bad for the credibility of historical materialism. Of course, since human beings are the sorts of creatures that, fortunately or unfortunately, they are, they might have been more willing to believe historical materialism had the Soviet Union succeeded. But by 'credibility', here, I mean what it could be rational to believe, so the stated infirmity of human nature does not affect what I have said.