L.W.'s Philosophical Investigations.

[Bretty123]

Rosa I'm having trouble understanding the section 97 in philosophical investigations. L.W. is talking about a priori concepts. I'm not so sure how he uses them in this context. He calls the order utterly simple I'm not quite sure how he uses this term and what he is exploring in this passage.

If you can help that would be great.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

He is looking back at his earlier work, and presenting things he saw them then -- that there is an essential connection between how we think and reality, that logic can tell us about the a priori structure of the world ('the great mirror' as he once called it), and that Philosophy is a superscience of this hidden world.

His new view is that there are no such links, but lots of different ways of expressing things in language (none of which capture the essence of reality, since there is no such thing), and he then connects this new approach with his appreciation of the centrality our social nature.

In other words, language for him now is about communication not representation -- meaning that he has broken with a 2500 year-old tradition, which saw things the other way round (what I call the 'ruling-class view').

There is no a priori structure to reality, and philosophy is not a sort of superscience, as most imagine it to be.

[hoopla]

language for him now is about communication not representationSo what is about representation? I mean, is there anything we can work out an a priori superscience from?

[Hit The North]

Someone's going to have to explain this to me as I don't do philosophy.


His new view is that there are no such links, but lots of different ways of expressing things in language (none of which capture the essence of reality, since there is no such thing)

Do you mean there's no essence or no reality?


and he then connects this new approach with his appreciation of the centrality our social nature.

How?


In other words, language for him now is about communication not representation

Is that really a break-through, outside the rarefied realms of philosophy? Nine out of ten pet owners could tell you that.


(what I call the 'ruling-class view').

Is this some ahistorical ruling class or a trans-historical characteristic of all ruling classes? If it's the latter, why would a Roman aristocrat share the same world view as a 19th century Manchester mill owner? What's going on? And why does seeing language as representation rather than communication serve the interests of a ruling class anyway?

And finally:


There is no a priori structure to reality

Is he arguing that there is no structure to reality, or that if there is it is contingent on how we talk about it?

[Bretty123]

Can you explain the difference between communication and representation in a historical philosophy picture?

Also in L.W.'s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus in 2.0233 he says "The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions - first formed by the configuration of the objects."

He uses the word determine and it makes the passage confusing because it sounds like an anthropomorphic proposition. It makes it seem like he is saying the substance equals matter and it determines the forms of objects which are elements. Can you clarify my thought?

Edit: On second reading I'm starting to understand him but there is still clarification needed when he speaks of form and how the substance of the world which is the entirety of objects determine the form only but not the material properties. He says they are first presented by the propositions. This is confusing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I mean, is there anything we can work out an a priori superscience from [form??]?

Why should we want such a thing?

Science is good enough.

Recall, language originally arose, and is passed on now, as a means of communication.

When it is used to represent reality we have to bend it in ways that make us misunderstand our own creations.

As Marx said, the creations of the brain come to dominate us, like alien beings.

We fetishise language, and out of that grows theology and traditional Philosophy.

Both bogus, both the result of such a process.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Do you mean there's no essence or no reality?

Since you have not specified what these words mean, there is no answer to such an empty question.

[When I use the word 'reality' I employ it in its non-technical sense. If that is true of you, too, then you can answer your own question.]


How?

You sometiimes act as if you are intelligent, so find out yourself.


Nine out of ten pet owners could tell you that.

I agree, but when seemingly intelligent people like you try to do some 'philosophy' they forget this, and begin to distort this social form -- ending up with 'theories' like dialectical materialism.


Is this some ahistorical ruling class or a trans-historical characteristic of all ruling classes?

Read what I have published on this, and find out for yourself.


Is he arguing that there is no structure to reality, or that if there is it is contingent on how we talk about it?

You seem to be intent on putting words in my mouth.

So, either book yourself an eye test, upgrade your reading skills, or stay out of intelligent debate.

I fear your low grade social skills are seriously affecting your capacity to follow an argument.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty, I am at work now, just catching a moment to bat Z over the boundary fence again (but he still keeps coming back for more pain); I will respond to your query later today.

Right:


Can you explain the difference between communication and representation in a historical philosophy picture?

I am not sure what you mean by that last phrase 'historical philosophy picture'.


He uses the word determine and it makes the passage confusing because it sounds like an anthropomorphic proposition.

I agree, but recall he is beginning to break with a tradition that automatically does this, and he has not yet developed the wherewithall to make the final break.

I think he would have said that it is we who determine from a propositional sign its sense, and when fully analysed, in order to make sense, it would have to present to us the simple objects so configured.


It makes it seem like he is saying the substance equals matter and it determines the forms of objects which are elements.

The substance he speaks of here is more Atistotelian, in that it is a logical substance, not a material one.

We deploy this logical apparatus to represent to ourselves the material aspects of reality.

The 'objects' he refers to are not material either (99% of commentators on W get this wrong); they are logical objects. What they are he did not say, but it is not too difficult to determine what they might be.

In that book I recommend on that other thread, the author does just that.


On second reading I'm starting to understand him but there is still clarification needed when he speaks of form and how the substance of the world which is the entirety of objects determine the form only but not the material properties. He says they are first presented by the propositions. This is confusing.

If you work from the idea that he is doing a logical, not a metaphysical, analysis of the way we represent reality to ourselves in language, then it becomes a little clearer.

I hope my earlier comments helped out here.

[Bretty123]

Are you positive? In part 46 of his Philosophical Investigations he associates his 'objects' with Russell's 'individuals' and claims they are the primary elements.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well if you do that in the Tractatus, such objects will violate his own strict criteria.

And in 46 he merely says they are both primary elements, not that they are the same primary element.

[Bretty123]

I don't understand. He says they are both the elements he speaks of so I'm assuming they are the same elements.

What do you mean that they will violate the strict criteria?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty:


I don't understand. He says they are both the elements he speaks of so I'm assuming they are the same elements.

If I were to say that the fundamental elements of ancient matter theory and Daltonian Chemistry were the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) and indivisible atoms, you would not, I hope, conclude that these were the same, but that in each separate system these were the fundamental elements.

The criteria you ask about were that it does not make sense to say that these objects do not exist (for to do even that they would have to be presupposed in the attempt to say it), and that there is no conceivable world in which they did not exist.

This makes them logical not epistemological objects (since any knowledge claim must presuppose them as part of its logical structure).

It also means that 99% of what you read about them in the literature is wrong.

[Roger White's book, which I recommended on another post, gets this 100% right.]

There are other criteria (such that these objects automatically link together), which further distinguishes them from Russell's phenomenological 'objects'.

[stevensen]

only what the holy rosa recomends is right..rest all including lenin were lying when they said they found DM to be of great help

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Stevensen, who obviously thinks that the quantity of his inane comments will improve their quality:


only what the holy rosa recomends is right..rest all including lenin were lying when they said they found DM to be of great help

I am glad we have got that straight.

[bretty]

I'm about halfway through Roger White's book and it is a great book on the Tractatus.

Since you were right about that one, which book would you recommend for his Philosophical Investigations? As in which one elaborates and provides insights that are 'correct'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The best so far is Anthony Kenny's book.

I just hope Roger finishes his magnum opus on the Tractatus, and writes something similar on the Investigations before he smokes himself to death.