PRC-UTE
2nd November 2006, 04:40
Understanding St. Andrews – the no longer the Good Friday non-agreement
20 October 2006
John McAnulty
The key to understanding the St. Andrews agreement announced on Friday
13th of October lies in the name. The word agreement means that there was
no agreement. The St. Andrews prefix means that the Unionists, having
long ago successfully insisted that the British demolish the Good Friday
agreement, have now succeeded in losing the name as the last connection
with the former settlement. The British have handed the script over to the
DUP – down to the name change. Paisley said that he would never sign up to
the Good Friday agreement. Now he no longer has to.
Trumpeted as an agreement, the declaration has none of the characteristics
that go with the process. It was not the outcome of discussion between
the parties and Ian Paisley at no stage said that he accepted it. The new
‘historic’ agreement (so says secretary of state Hain – Blair has felt the
hand of history too often to experience it again without provoking
derision) in fact fits into the humdrum mould of all the preceding points
at which the Irish pacification process tweaks to the right. Sinn Fein
accept the defeats of earlier meetings, signs up for one final deal and
finds that the unionists have moved the goalposts and that the unionist
programme is now the programme of the British. Dublin stands firmly with
their London allies and closes the door on any Sinn Fein retreat.
The starting point of the present offensive was the demand that Sinn Fein
do more. Having decommissioned their arms and in the process of standing
down the IRA, they must now offer unconditional support for the police and
the British judicial system and formally pledge allegiance to it. Adams
and co had clearly signalled their willingness to do so, but as their last
throw of the dice, wanted the assurance that Paisley would do them the
honour of becoming first minister and allowing them back into the colonial
administration.
The substantive issue that prevented agreement was presented as the
policing issue. The DUP demanded unconditional support for the police and
the state. It was no longer enough for Sinn Fein to support the policing
boards. Now they would have to directly support the police at every
level, support all the laws, courts and the state structures and sum all
this up in an oath of allegiance. This of course is not something that
is demanded of citizens in a democracy. Democrats would be free to oppose
the structures and laws they live under. However this seemed to present
little difficulty to Sinn Fein, who constantly assured commentators that
they were at St. Andrews to reach agreement. Their call was for the DUP
to announce that they would join a new assembly. The DUP response was
that the policing issue was a precondition to further agreement.
To fully understand this difference one has to be familiar with the
workings of sectarianism in the North of Ireland. It is not the case that
the Loyalists seek full-blown apartheid. They are perfectly able to work
with nationalists. What they demand is that they do so from a position of
supremacy. A useful way of establishing this supremacy is through a
loyalty pledge. Every post in the old Stormont regime, down to the street
sweepers, required an oath of loyalty to the crown. Those who refused
could be excluded from employment. Nationalists who agreed had essentially
kow-towed to unionism and been ritually humiliated. It is just barely
possible to imagine Sinn Fein inside a Stormont government, but they would
have to be ritually humiliated in advance. The policing demand is just
one of a shopping list of changes, the major one being that the DUP be
given the power to expel the Shinners if they made a wrong move and
another being a time-table for transition to full-blooded unionist rule.
Blair played his part by making the significant change that transformed
the Good Friday agreement into the St. Andrews agreement – a new legal
instrument that restores a limited form of unionist majority rule. The
new executive would oversee minister’s decisions, making the decisions of
nationalist members subordinate to a unionist majority. A flood of other
bribes and concessions followed, designed to meet almost all the needs of
the DUP. Many are already in place – the UVF spokespeople on the policing
boards, the Orangemen on the Parades commission, millions promised to the
paramilitary groups. The new concessions included the final abandonment
of the Old GFA and its replacement by the St Andrews recognition of
unionist rule. A whole set of regressive social and economic policies
appear to have been granted to loyalist reaction – the retention of the
11+, a cap on rates to help the rich, deferral of business rates, a
reduction of corporation tax to 12.5 % and a new assembly to retain the
proceeds of the wholesale provision of public services. The return of the
political reaction would be matched by a massive transfer of wealth from
workers to bosses! One indication of the scandal and corruption of the
whole process is the claim by Paisley that he had been given the power to
retain the 11+ exam. The needs and rights of the education service and of
Irish children are subordinate to the task of placating this bigot!
The loyalists did not get the power to expel Sinn Fein. The major bribes
are conditional on them signing up to a new government and they have been
threatened with ‘plan B’ if they don’t sign up. However plan B does not
include the republican dream of joint rule of the North. This has been
explicitly ruled out by both governments. The Provos were given a
language law promising to enhance the status of Irish. Both British and
Irish governments then launched a pantomime reminiscent of the comedienne
Mrs Doyle in Father Ted and her catch line ‘Ye will, ye will’. Of course
the DUP would sign up – they more or less had already – no one could turn
down a deal like this – there had been an historic agreement and the new
assembly was on its way.
The calculation here is that the DUP are rational and that, given almost
all they asked for, would agree a settlement. The unionist business
community want the bribes and the extended influence. Many in the DUP
want the trappings of power. If Paisley could be persuaded to finally
endorse the deal his authority would be so great that no-one would be able
to challenge it. In reality the rule is that the Biggest Bigot rules, and
Paisley is all too aware of the danger of being attacked from the right as
a Lundy – a betrayer of the sectarian rights of the Loyalists. What
followed was reminiscent of the siege of Holy Cross school. At one point
in the seige the British, having smothered the Loyalists with concessions
and bribes, had to suspend meetings because the bigots could think of no
other demands than what they really wanted, which was to crush the
nationalists and strengthen apartheid.
The same process manifested itself after the talks. Paisley’s supporters
were not long in telling ‘the big man’ that he had sold out. A leading
DUP figure, Jim Allister, said that the IRA must be completely disbanded
and that Irish civil servants should not be eligible for jobs in the
North. The language act was a step too far and would represent a serious
assault on the Loyalists ‘Britishness’. At the same time Independent
unionist Bob McCartney and Ulster Unionist David Burnside both attacked
the proposed accord as a sellout – even worse than the GFA, claimed
Burnside. Paisley then needed to demonstrate again that he had cowed and
humiliated the Provos, and he responded by boycotting the first organising
meeting and demanding that Sinn Fein take an oath of allegiance
immediately and unconditionally.
The reason why there can be no stable agreement with Paisley is that he
would need to demonstrate Loyalist supremacy on a day-to-day basis. A new
assembly would be a cockpit where the one aim of the DUP would be to expel
the Provos. It is notable that a tiny sop to the republicans, promised
over and over again – the return of the ‘on the run’ activists who fled
the North to avoid charges – was withdrawn after Nigel Dodds of the DUP
labelled it a ‘dealbreaker’. The DUP are not in the slightest way
involved in this sidedeal between Brits and Provos. The fact that they
blocked it and that the British agreed shows what Sinn Fein can expect in
the future.
The failure of the first meeting of the St Andrews roadmap was
significant. It was significant because it failed not through Loyalist
boycott, but because the British, determined to achieve stability through
a reinvigorated sectarian state, immediately suspended the meeting to
provide cover for the DUP.
Sinn Fein present their defeat as a process of community reconciliation,
but their chief opponent is not the DUP but their British sponsors
supported by their Dublin allies. The pacification process is now a rout,
kept in existence by the headlong political retreat of the Provos. Even
that process will offer less as public humiliation is piled on humiliation
and their northern base decays.
The Good Friday agreement has accustomed the Republican leadership to a
political process contained within the bars of British rule, but it is
becoming yet again clear that imperialism, even with all the cards in its
hands, is unable to deliver a stable settlement in Ireland.
http://www.socialistdemocracy.org/RecentAr...gStAndrews.html (http://www.socialistdemocracy.org/RecentArticles/RecentUnderstandingStAndrews.html)
20 October 2006
John McAnulty
The key to understanding the St. Andrews agreement announced on Friday
13th of October lies in the name. The word agreement means that there was
no agreement. The St. Andrews prefix means that the Unionists, having
long ago successfully insisted that the British demolish the Good Friday
agreement, have now succeeded in losing the name as the last connection
with the former settlement. The British have handed the script over to the
DUP – down to the name change. Paisley said that he would never sign up to
the Good Friday agreement. Now he no longer has to.
Trumpeted as an agreement, the declaration has none of the characteristics
that go with the process. It was not the outcome of discussion between
the parties and Ian Paisley at no stage said that he accepted it. The new
‘historic’ agreement (so says secretary of state Hain – Blair has felt the
hand of history too often to experience it again without provoking
derision) in fact fits into the humdrum mould of all the preceding points
at which the Irish pacification process tweaks to the right. Sinn Fein
accept the defeats of earlier meetings, signs up for one final deal and
finds that the unionists have moved the goalposts and that the unionist
programme is now the programme of the British. Dublin stands firmly with
their London allies and closes the door on any Sinn Fein retreat.
The starting point of the present offensive was the demand that Sinn Fein
do more. Having decommissioned their arms and in the process of standing
down the IRA, they must now offer unconditional support for the police and
the British judicial system and formally pledge allegiance to it. Adams
and co had clearly signalled their willingness to do so, but as their last
throw of the dice, wanted the assurance that Paisley would do them the
honour of becoming first minister and allowing them back into the colonial
administration.
The substantive issue that prevented agreement was presented as the
policing issue. The DUP demanded unconditional support for the police and
the state. It was no longer enough for Sinn Fein to support the policing
boards. Now they would have to directly support the police at every
level, support all the laws, courts and the state structures and sum all
this up in an oath of allegiance. This of course is not something that
is demanded of citizens in a democracy. Democrats would be free to oppose
the structures and laws they live under. However this seemed to present
little difficulty to Sinn Fein, who constantly assured commentators that
they were at St. Andrews to reach agreement. Their call was for the DUP
to announce that they would join a new assembly. The DUP response was
that the policing issue was a precondition to further agreement.
To fully understand this difference one has to be familiar with the
workings of sectarianism in the North of Ireland. It is not the case that
the Loyalists seek full-blown apartheid. They are perfectly able to work
with nationalists. What they demand is that they do so from a position of
supremacy. A useful way of establishing this supremacy is through a
loyalty pledge. Every post in the old Stormont regime, down to the street
sweepers, required an oath of loyalty to the crown. Those who refused
could be excluded from employment. Nationalists who agreed had essentially
kow-towed to unionism and been ritually humiliated. It is just barely
possible to imagine Sinn Fein inside a Stormont government, but they would
have to be ritually humiliated in advance. The policing demand is just
one of a shopping list of changes, the major one being that the DUP be
given the power to expel the Shinners if they made a wrong move and
another being a time-table for transition to full-blooded unionist rule.
Blair played his part by making the significant change that transformed
the Good Friday agreement into the St. Andrews agreement – a new legal
instrument that restores a limited form of unionist majority rule. The
new executive would oversee minister’s decisions, making the decisions of
nationalist members subordinate to a unionist majority. A flood of other
bribes and concessions followed, designed to meet almost all the needs of
the DUP. Many are already in place – the UVF spokespeople on the policing
boards, the Orangemen on the Parades commission, millions promised to the
paramilitary groups. The new concessions included the final abandonment
of the Old GFA and its replacement by the St Andrews recognition of
unionist rule. A whole set of regressive social and economic policies
appear to have been granted to loyalist reaction – the retention of the
11+, a cap on rates to help the rich, deferral of business rates, a
reduction of corporation tax to 12.5 % and a new assembly to retain the
proceeds of the wholesale provision of public services. The return of the
political reaction would be matched by a massive transfer of wealth from
workers to bosses! One indication of the scandal and corruption of the
whole process is the claim by Paisley that he had been given the power to
retain the 11+ exam. The needs and rights of the education service and of
Irish children are subordinate to the task of placating this bigot!
The loyalists did not get the power to expel Sinn Fein. The major bribes
are conditional on them signing up to a new government and they have been
threatened with ‘plan B’ if they don’t sign up. However plan B does not
include the republican dream of joint rule of the North. This has been
explicitly ruled out by both governments. The Provos were given a
language law promising to enhance the status of Irish. Both British and
Irish governments then launched a pantomime reminiscent of the comedienne
Mrs Doyle in Father Ted and her catch line ‘Ye will, ye will’. Of course
the DUP would sign up – they more or less had already – no one could turn
down a deal like this – there had been an historic agreement and the new
assembly was on its way.
The calculation here is that the DUP are rational and that, given almost
all they asked for, would agree a settlement. The unionist business
community want the bribes and the extended influence. Many in the DUP
want the trappings of power. If Paisley could be persuaded to finally
endorse the deal his authority would be so great that no-one would be able
to challenge it. In reality the rule is that the Biggest Bigot rules, and
Paisley is all too aware of the danger of being attacked from the right as
a Lundy – a betrayer of the sectarian rights of the Loyalists. What
followed was reminiscent of the siege of Holy Cross school. At one point
in the seige the British, having smothered the Loyalists with concessions
and bribes, had to suspend meetings because the bigots could think of no
other demands than what they really wanted, which was to crush the
nationalists and strengthen apartheid.
The same process manifested itself after the talks. Paisley’s supporters
were not long in telling ‘the big man’ that he had sold out. A leading
DUP figure, Jim Allister, said that the IRA must be completely disbanded
and that Irish civil servants should not be eligible for jobs in the
North. The language act was a step too far and would represent a serious
assault on the Loyalists ‘Britishness’. At the same time Independent
unionist Bob McCartney and Ulster Unionist David Burnside both attacked
the proposed accord as a sellout – even worse than the GFA, claimed
Burnside. Paisley then needed to demonstrate again that he had cowed and
humiliated the Provos, and he responded by boycotting the first organising
meeting and demanding that Sinn Fein take an oath of allegiance
immediately and unconditionally.
The reason why there can be no stable agreement with Paisley is that he
would need to demonstrate Loyalist supremacy on a day-to-day basis. A new
assembly would be a cockpit where the one aim of the DUP would be to expel
the Provos. It is notable that a tiny sop to the republicans, promised
over and over again – the return of the ‘on the run’ activists who fled
the North to avoid charges – was withdrawn after Nigel Dodds of the DUP
labelled it a ‘dealbreaker’. The DUP are not in the slightest way
involved in this sidedeal between Brits and Provos. The fact that they
blocked it and that the British agreed shows what Sinn Fein can expect in
the future.
The failure of the first meeting of the St Andrews roadmap was
significant. It was significant because it failed not through Loyalist
boycott, but because the British, determined to achieve stability through
a reinvigorated sectarian state, immediately suspended the meeting to
provide cover for the DUP.
Sinn Fein present their defeat as a process of community reconciliation,
but their chief opponent is not the DUP but their British sponsors
supported by their Dublin allies. The pacification process is now a rout,
kept in existence by the headlong political retreat of the Provos. Even
that process will offer less as public humiliation is piled on humiliation
and their northern base decays.
The Good Friday agreement has accustomed the Republican leadership to a
political process contained within the bars of British rule, but it is
becoming yet again clear that imperialism, even with all the cards in its
hands, is unable to deliver a stable settlement in Ireland.
http://www.socialistdemocracy.org/RecentAr...gStAndrews.html (http://www.socialistdemocracy.org/RecentArticles/RecentUnderstandingStAndrews.html)