Wittgenstein's Blue book

[Bretty123]

I'm having trouble understanding the part where he talks about using the word 'know' and 'wish'?

Can you anyone expand on his thoughts and make it clear what he means by this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

If I am addressing the same passage you refer to, he is attacking Russell's theory of judgement and his account of 'mental acts', where there is a causal link between a mental state and the object of that state.

So, he poses this set of scientistic theories with an unanswerable challenge.

And that is why he says what he does.

These ideas are more clearly expressed, I think, in his Philosophical Remarks, a much neglected work of genius.

[Bretty123]

So he's saying that there is no thinking besides the thought of some thing?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, once again, he is concerned with Russell's Theory here, not with anything else.

He certainly is not trying to replace it with another theory.

[Bretty123]

I'm not familiar with Russell's theory. Do you know in which book he posits this? Or what is the theory summarised as?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think it is in his Analysis of Mind.

Summary?

I am not the one to ask; I have studiously avoided Russell's post 1915 work, since it is laregly worthless. His earlier stuff is classic.

[Bretty123]

Rosa, at the end of the blue book L.W. says that the kernel of our proposition is that that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a mental nature only. He is saying basically that these propositions using the word "I" make a philosophical statement confusing because we do not associate "I" with the characteristics of a certain body? I'm somewhat confused on his last point.


So in Cogito, Ergo Sum the I is puzzling because we do not associate to people besides their bodily characteristics, so it makes it seem like it is referring to something bodiless?

Am I correct in interpretation? Can you expand on this or clarify?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Bretty, my computer is playing up, so I cannot stay on long (the grahics card needs replacing, and the screen is all blurred).

He is engaging with his comments in the Tractatus about solipsism, but now endeavouring to look at the language we use to speak of ourselves and what we see/experience in all its complexity rather than lay down hard and fast rules to which language must conform.

These passages are experimental; you must recall that this documentt is not one he wanted to publish; in fact, had he had his way, it would have been burnt.

So, do not try to read too much into it.

His comments in the Investigations represent his more settled thoughts.

[Bretty123]

Rosa what do you think about Wittgenstein's brown book? I enjoyed his blue book because it's very straight forward and thats his strong point, but the brown book is very tedious at times.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Right, he perservates on language games ad nauseam; it is one of the poorest things attributable to him.

You are best skipping it.

The nest best thing to read now is F Waismann's 'The Principles Of Linguistic Philosophy'.

This captures W's changing ideas in the early 1930's. He partly wrote it with Waismann, but then disowned it. But it is still one of the best things you can find on this, and it's more like a proper book!

[Bretty123]

I'll take your advice and skip the brown book for now. I have a good idea what he is talking about in his philosophical investigations now. I think I will start reading that, since my budget doesn't allow me to expand my library at the moment.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You should be able to get it from the Library.

Second hand for £5 here:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/0...ie=UTF8&s=books (http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/0333089316/sr=1-2/qid=1162891989/ref=sr_1_2/202-0716619-9583823?ie=UTF8&s=books)