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Leo
28th October 2006, 23:58
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the peace treaty, was signed between newly formed Russian Soviet Republic and the German Empire on on March 3, 1918. On 29 October, a proletarian revolution would begin in Germany, led by Rosa Luxemburg and her comrades. If Brest-Litovsk wasn't signed, the Freikorps used by the SPD would still be waiting in the Russian Front. The German Revolution was perhaps the only chance for the survival of the proletarian character of the revolution in Russia. The discussions among the Bolshevik leaders and the positions held were quite interesting.

The head of the Soviet delegation during the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk between December 22, 1917 and February 10, 1918 was Trotsky. Bolsheviks were split on the issue; the "left", led by Nikolai Bukharin at that time, continued to believe that there could be no peace between a Soviet republic and a capitalist country and that only a revolutionary war leading to a pan-European Soviet republic would bring a durable peace.

Position held by the "left", led by Nikolai Bukharin was not wrong to oppose the signing of any treaty. However their idea of waging a revolutionary war clearly lacked an understanding on the nature of proletarian struggles and revolutions. A political siezure of power of the proletariat would have been real only if it was the proletariat that is under the authority of a specific nation-state overthtrows that nation-state because of the class consciousness it developed. Obviously proletarians should be internationally aided by all means, but a waging a revolutionary war would not have been revolutionary at all.

Lenin, who had earlier hoped for a speedy Soviet revolution in Germany and other parts of Europe, quickly decided that the imperial government of Germany would be an enemy too strong to make at the moment. Bolsheviks staying in power in Russia was more important to him than spreading the revolution to Europe. Lenin's position was understandable, and quite easily so. He wanted to conserve the power Bolsheviks had siezed and he did not want to take risks.

The most interesting, and perhaps the best position however was suprisingly (well, at least for me) held by Leon Trotsky however. Trotsky followed some sort of a "neither war nor peace" policy. He agreed with the Left Communists that signing a separate peace treaty with an imperialist power would be a terrible moral and material blow to the Soviet government, negating all of its military and political successes in late 1917-early 1918, resurrecting the notion that the Bolsheviks were secretly allied with the German government, and causing an upsurge of internal resistance. However he did not think it was realistic to wage revolution with war. In case of a German ultimatum, Trotsky argued, the best policy was to refuse to accept it, which had a good chance of being the last drop that would lead to an uprising within Germany or, at the very least, inspire German soldiers to refuse to obey their officers since any German offensive would be a naked grab for territories. Throughout January and February of 1918, Lenin's position was supported by 7 members of the Bolshevik Central Committee and Bukharin's by 4. Trotsky had 4 votes and since he held the balance of power, he was able to pursue his policy in Brest-Litovsk. When he could no longer delay the negotiations, he withdrew from the talks on refusing to sign on Germany's harsh terms. After a brief hiatus, Germany notified the Soviet government that they would no longer observe the truce after February 17. At this point Lenin again argued that the Soviet government had done all it could to explain its position to Western workers and that it was time to accept the terms. Trotsky refused to support Lenin since he was waiting to see whether German workers would rebel or whether German soldiers would refuse to follow orders. However Germany conducted sudden military operations in February 18, 1918, and Trotsky and his supporters in the Bolshevik Central Committee abstained. Lenin's proposal was accepted with a vote of 7-4, and peace with Germany was made.

Trotsky had gotten it right in this case. About six months after the treaty, in 29 October, German revolution started when the soldiers in the city of Kiel refused to obey their officers, refused to keep up the war and taken over the port in Kiel. By November 8, workers' and soldiers' councils had seized control of most German cities. Kaiser Wilhelm was forced to abdicate on 9 November. If he had not abandoned the policy he had been defending, the German Revolution could have happened much earlier and succeded. Unfortunately we will never know.

Vargha Poralli
29th October 2006, 17:24
That was the biggest mistake made by Lenin. Even Though six months is a very long gap given the material conditions of Russia at that time.Part of the mistake is also with the German proletariat which delayed the revolution.

Ironically Trotsky's stand in this issue was one among the other things used by the troika to marginalize him during Lenin's illness.

Leo
29th October 2006, 20:10
That was the biggest mistake made by Lenin. Even Though six months is a very long gap given the material conditions of Russia at that time.

Yes and no... Russia absolutely would have survived a German attack. They absolutely would have and the attack would have ended with a revolution in Germany, perhaps earlier than what Trotsky and his supporters (strongest one being Dzerzhinsky at that time) expected. White army was supported by of all major allied imperialist powers, and those imperialist powers also sent their troops to Russia, and they were winning over Germany and they were defeated. The were clearly stronger than Germany. Germany was in no condition to defeat Russia.


Ironically Trotsky's stand in this issue was one among the other things used by the troika to marginalize him during Lenin's illness.

History is full of ironies and some of are truly tragic.

Alf
29th October 2006, 20:48
Interesting post, Leo. In hindsight, the most important thing we can draw from the Brest-Litovsk episode is less about the tactics of the time and more about what class principles were involved. The Italian left (Bilan) did not have a problem with the idea of the soviet state negotiating with bourgeois states, providing this was conducted openly and on the basis of clear internationalist principles. The idea of a 'revolutionary war' was seen as deeply flawed for the reasons you give - it tends to replace the political extension of the revolution with a purely military conception. Bilan thus tended to see Lenin's position as the clearest, but in other respects they were critical of aspects of Lenin's approach, in particular the idea that the new power could form alliances with bourgeois regimes. Here is an extract from an article on Bilan's position on the transitional state which will appear in the next International Review and on our website:

The question of foreign policy

Bilan’s awareness of the conflict between the needs of the state and the international needs of the proletariat was also concretised in the way they dealt with the question of the relationship between an isolated proletarian power and the external capitalist world. There was no rigid utopianism in their approach. Lenin’s position on Brest Litovsk was supported, especially against Bukharin’s idea of spreading the revolution through ‘revolutionary war’. The experience of the Red Army’s advance into Poland in 1920 had convinced it that the military victory of the proletarian state over a capitalist state could not be equated with the real advance of the world revolution. By the same token, and unlike the German left, the Fraction did not reject in principle the provisional resort to an NEP-type economic policy as long as it was guided by general proletarian principles: thus, the possibility and even probability of trade between the proletarian power and the capitalist world was accepted. But a fundamental distinction was made between these inevitable concessions and the betrayal – usually in secret – of fundamental principles, as exemplified in the Rapallo treaty where Russian arms were used to quash the revolution in Germany.

“The solution which the Bolsheviks came to at Brest did not imply an alteration of the internal character of the Soviet state in its relations with capitalism and the world proletariat. But in 1921, at the time of the introduction of the NEP, and, in 1922, with the Treaty of Rapallo, there had been a profound change in the position occupied by the proletarian state in the class struggle on a world scale. Between 1918 and 1921 the revolutionary wave that burst upon the entire world made its appearance and was then reabsorbed; in the new situation the proletarian state encountered enormous difficulties, and the moment came when – no longer able to rely on the natural support of revolutionary movements in other countries – it had either to accept a struggle in extremely unfavourable circumstances or avoid this struggle and, as a result, accept compromises that would gradually and inevitably lead it along a path that would first adulterate and then destroy its proletarian function, culminating in the present situation where the proletarian state has become part of world capitalism’s apparatus of domination” (Bilan18, p611).

Here the Fraction was highly critical of some of Lenin’s views which contributed towards this involution -in particular the idea of temporary and tactical ‘alliances’ between the proletarian power and one set of imperialists against other imperialist powers:

“The directives exposed by Lenin, where he considered it possible for the Russian state to play off the imperialist brigands against each other, and even to accept the support of one imperialist constellation in order to defend the frontiers of the Soviet state from the threat of another capitalist group, testifies - in our opinion – to the gigantic difficulties encountered by the Bolsheviks in establishing the policy of the Russian state, given the lack of any prior experience that could have armed them to lead the struggle against world capitalism and for the triumph of the world revolution” (Bilan18, p609).

Severian
29th October 2006, 21:17
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] 28, 2006 04:58 pm
On 29 October, a proletarian revolution would begin in Germany, led by Rosa Luxemburg and her comrades. If Brest-Litovsk wasn't signed, the Freikorps used by the SPD would still be waiting in the Russian Front.
....
Unfortunately we will never know.
You got it right the second time. It's impossible to know - so this kind of "what if" is pretty useless.


Russia absolutely would have survived a German attack.

How do you know, oh great fortuneteller? What did they have to fight it off with? How far was the German army from Petersburg?

Against that reality, you can only point to - the eventual defeat of Germany by Allied imperialism. I might point out that in the spring of 1918 Germany was still on the offensive on the Western Front. Certainly the Russian revolution could not trust its defense to the Allies.

Slogans are not a substitute for a revolutionary army.

And of course every defeat for the Russian revolution was a defeat for the German revolution. You counterpose the two: "Bolsheviks staying in power in Russia was more important to [Lenin] than spreading the revolution to Europe." But in reality, the two go hand-in-hand.

Surviving was the most important thing the Bolsheviks could do to help the European and world revolution. And the precondition for doing anything else. Certainly a defeat for the revolution in Russia - set it back everywhere else.

(You want to play what if? What woulda happened if the German army had taken Petersburg? Would the Soviet government have survived? Would the German revolution have taken place at all - if it hadn't?

Or: what if Lenin's position had been adopted from the get-go? The German government occupied more territory due to the refusal to immediately sign the treaty...what if the Soviet government had still held that territory, and been in a stronger position, when the German revolution eventually arrived? What if Soviet Russia's border had been closer to Soviet Hungary's, etc.)

Of course all this is tactics, which you reject throughout your post. People who reject tactics have never made a revolution, never mind successfully defended one.

Instead, everything is proclaimed on principle. You reject on principle signing peace treaties with imperialist powers. You also reject revolutionary war on principle.

Of course, those are the real-world options. By rejecting both, you put yourself in limbo.

Trotsky's compromise position - neither war nor peace - at most could buy a little time. And that time had run out.


Position held by the "left", led by Nikolai Bukharin was not wrong to oppose the signing of any treaty. However their idea of waging a revolutionary war clearly lacked an understanding on the nature of proletarian struggles and revolutions. A political siezure of power of the proletariat would have been real only if it was the proletariat that is under the authority of a specific nation-state overthtrows that nation-state because of the class consciousness it developed. Obviously proletarians should be internationally aided by all means, but a waging a revolutionary war would not have been revolutionary at all.

No, they were wrong because there was no revolutionary army to wage a revolutionary war. They were wrong for the same reason you're wrong - they're not dealing with the real relationship of forces, including military force.

By rejecting this on principle, you're counterposing a schema to the real development of revolutions - which historically have often involved revolutionary wars.

"A political siezure of power of the proletariat would have been real only if it was the proletariat that is under the authority of a specific nation-state overthtrows that nation-state because of the class consciousness it developed." Well, isn't your main argument that the German workers made a revolution 6 months later? Not so lacking in class consciousness then, huh?

A revolutionary war is not counterposed to the revolutionary struggle within each country. Under the right conditions, it accelerates it. Defeat of the rulers generally does, for one thing....

Of course, there's also the danger of producing a nationalist backlash, but that's reduced when the Kaiser's government is clearly the aggressor against a peace-seeking Soviet government.

The only reason not to wage a defensive revolutionary war - is the problem, with what?

(And, of course, part of that problem of "with what" - is the massive sentiment for peace of the Russian soldiers, peasants, and workers. That sentiment was one reason why the old army was almost useless for war. The desire for peace, at all costs, was the major immediate factor raising the Bolsheviks to power - they could not ignore it.)

The Author
29th October 2006, 21:25
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] Oct 29 2006, 04:10 pm
Yes and no... Russia absolutely would have survived a German attack.

Really? You're absolutely certain of that?

Considering the state of Russia and its army after almost four years of war and economic ruin, if the Soviet Republic had not declared peace with the Germans, the army would be finished, the workers and peasants would lose total confidence in the revolutionary government and lean to the side of the whiteguard reactionaries, and any chance of developing socialism and communism would be lost. At least with peace, the nascent Soviet Republic would be able to recover economically and militarily, and be in a better position to provide assistance to other revolutions in other countries. Only the ultra-leftists would choose to ignore the objective elements of such a situation and thus create the conditions to make serious errors in strategy and tactics.

Leo
29th October 2006, 22:56
Severian;


How do you know, oh great fortuneteller? What did they have to fight it off with? How far was the German army from Petersburg?

What did they have to fight the allied invasion and the whites supported by the allies who were much stronger then the defeated German Empire which was already fighting in enoguh fronts? Napoleon, with all his strength had failed to take Russia. Heck, Hiter failed to take Russia? Do you actually think that Germany would have taken Russia, or are you simply trying to attack a "political enemy"?


Against that reality, you can only point to - the eventual defeat of Germany by Allied imperialism.

And the victory of Bolsheviks in the civil war, and the hardness of taking Russia. Is that enough?


I might point out that in the spring of 1918 Germany was still on the offensive on the Western Front.

Which had already turned out to be a really bad idea in the summer. Imagine there was one more front, Russia, and Russia is cold in the spring.


Certainly the Russian revolution could not trust its defense to the Allies.

Obviously, no one is saying anything against that. But it couldn't trust defense to the Germans either. Allies one over Germany, and not only was Russia lost to them but they were actively spending military and financial resources on re-claiming it.


Slogans are not a substitute for a revolutionary army.

Also true, but how were the Whites and the allied forces defeated if there weren't a revolutionary army?


And of course every defeat for the Russian revolution was a defeat for the German revolution. You counterpose the two: "Bolsheviks staying in power in Russia was more important to [Lenin] than spreading the revolution to Europe." But in reality, the two go hand-in-hand.

Well, yes and no. I say that continuation of Trotsky's policies was the Russian Revolution's greatest chance to spread the revolution in Europe and workers staying in power. Workers could not have stayed in power in Russia if the revolution wasn't spread to Europe, but saying that if the Russian Revolution failed there could be no revolution in Europe is simply ludicurous.


Surviving was the most important thing the Bolsheviks could do to help the European and world revolution.

But it was obviously not enough by itself. The revolution in Euroe was the only chance for the survival of the Russian Revolution. A strong "council-state" would obviously help the world revolution, but it ended up not helping it enough.


Of course all this is tactics, which you reject throughout your post. People who reject tactics have never made a revolution, never mind successfully defended one.

I don't reject tactics, it's just that you don't know anything about tactics. The whole post was about an abandoned "tactic" and how right it was. Where have you left your mind Severian?


Instead, everything is proclaimed on principle. You reject on principle signing peace treaties with imperialist powers.

I don't reject that on principle. It's just that in that situation, it was a bad, bad idea. All Bolshevik leaders said that the Russian Revolution could not survive if the revolution spread to Europe and the German Revolution proved to be the only material and actual chance for that period of time.


You also reject revolutionary war on principle.

Yah, that I reject in most cases as it an immature idea, not a serious tactic.


Trotsky's compromise position - neither war nor peace - at most could buy a little time. And that time had run out.

Maybe, maybe not. They were quickly convinced with a single attack of the German Army which happened merely in a day. I think it was a bluff. Germany would have fallen much earlier if it had went into the cold depths of Russia. The Kaiser didn't have much time for its very survival.


No, they were wrong because there was no revolutionary army to wage a revolutionary war. They were wrong for the same reason you're wrong - they're not dealing with the real relationship of forces, including military force.

Ah, I love baseless political accusations, especially if they done for political polemics only. The left actually cited the successes of the newly formed (January 15, 1918) voluntary Red Army against Polish forces of General Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki in Belarus, White forces in the Don region and newly independent Ukrainian forces as proof that the Red Army could successfully repel German forces, especially if propaganda and asymmetrical warfare were used. Left Communists didn't mind holding talks with the Germans as a means of exposing German imperial ambitions (territorial gains, reparations, etc) in hopes of accelerating the hoped for Soviet revolution in the West. :rolleyes: So they clearly didn't even think of the relationship of military forces! Just a friendly advise Severian, please don't make your useless polemics on depending on your prejudices.


By rejecting this on principle, you're counterposing a schema to the real development of revolutions - which historically have often involved revolutionary wars.

Assuming that you actually understood that Revolutionary War here ment Revolutionary Invasion, I'm going to ask you to give examples, and you will fail to do so.


Well, isn't your main argument that the German workers made a revolution 6 months later? Not so lacking in class consciousness then, huh?

My main arguement is that the Soviet government could have tried to hold Germans more and more in the Front, and gain more and more time. Even if Germany attacked, Bolsheviks probably would have won. Bolsheviks attacking, even if they did have a strong and organized revolutionary army, would have probably backfired. Soldiers usually fight with a greater enthusiasm as defenders than invadors.


A revolutionary war is not counterposed to the revolutionary struggle within each country. Under the right conditions, it accelerates it.

In the form of an invasion? No. It creates a conflict, a contradiction - it strengthens the national bourgeoise's hand ideologically. Obviously if the proletariat had took power somewhere, they should give as much support as they can to the other proletarians, but invasion doesn't work.


Of course, there's also the danger of producing a nationalist backlash, but that's reduced when the Kaiser's government is clearly the aggressor against a peace-seeking Soviet government.

If a revolutionary war policy was pursued, it wouldn't be a peace-seeking Soviet government. In fact it would seem as a war-seeking Soviet government and what you call nationalist backlash would have happened.


The only reason not to wage a defensive revolutionary war - is the problem, with what?

Defensive? That's different, of course and obviously that is different, in fact it has nothing to do with what I am talking about, but it is also mostly irrelevant on the revolutionary war debate. People who defended "Revolutionary War" obviously did not had a defensive war in their minds - they had entering Berlin with Red Army troops. As for Trotsky, his policy could have ended up with what you call a defensive revolutionary war, which most probably wouldn't have resuted in a German victory or rise of nationalim in Germany at all.


And, of course, part of that problem of "with what" - is the massive sentiment for peace of the Russian soldiers, peasants, and workers. That sentiment was one reason why the old army was almost useless for war. The desire for peace, at all costs, was the major immediate factor raising the Bolsheviks to power - they could not ignore it.

Yes... The desire for peace was undeniably great. But as great as it was, peace wasn't granted to the Russian soldiers, peasants, and workers anyway. Wether it was an invading German or a civil war with the whites and imperialists assisting them wouldn't have mattered.

Leo
29th October 2006, 23:09
Alf;

I absolutely don't say that Lenin's decision was not sensible and understandable, nor do I doubt his sincerity while making the decision. I would actually prefer his take to the take of Bukharin, as Bilan does. But the point of my thread was to show that there was another way, pursued by Trotsky on this case. I'm not really fond of Trotsky, but I think he was right on this case. Bukharin's way would have clearly backfired, not only externally but also internally. Lenin's way ended up leaving the German proletariat all alone. Perhaps Trotsky's way could have opened a door for succesful revolutions in Europe, at least I think it was the most likely one to help such revolutions.

Severian
30th October 2006, 00:32
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] 29, 2006 04:56 pm
Severian;


How do you know, oh great fortuneteller? What did they have to fight it off with? How far was the German army from Petersburg?

What did they have to fight the allied invasion and the whites supported by the allies who were much stronger then the defeated German Empire which was already fighting in enoguh fronts?
The Red Army. Which did not exist at the time they signed the Brest-Litovsk peace.

They were trying to hold off the Germans with the disintegrating old army, plus a few Red Guards here and there. When Soviets initially refused to sign the treaty, the German army renewed its offensive, as you mention. You neglect to mention - that the Russian army was unable or unwilling to put up any significant resistance.

Reminds me of this thread, (http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php?showtopic=45246) where Redstar basically denounced them for failing to send the nonexistent Red Army to aid the revolutionaries in Finland in early 1918.

Like the Great Guru, you categorically refuse to examine the actual situation at the time. Which is why I say: you reject tactics. Tactics is all about deciding what to do now based on the current situation.

Instead, you go on about Russian history generally: Napoleon, who I remind you did take Moscow, and Hitler, who was fought off by.....that Red Army, again.

Retreating into the vast interior of Russia was not an option for the Bolsheviks. They fought off the Whites from Petrograd and Moscow; but without Petrograd and Moscow.....even just without Petrograd, the revolutionary capital, which the German army was close to....

And in the Civil War, most imperialist powers were politically unable to intervene directly, with their own troops, on a large scale.

Do you really think the Bolsheviks coulda stopped the Kaiser's army, and again, with what? "or are you simply trying to attack a "political enemy"?"


saying that if the Russian Revolution failed there could be no revolution in Europe is simply ludicurous.

Really? After the fall of the Paris Commune, did a revolutionary wave spread across Europe?

No, the opposite happened. The workers' movement ebbed for decades.

A victory for a revolution inspires revolutions elsewhere - a defeat does the opposite.



Instead, everything is proclaimed on principle. You reject on principle signing peace treaties with imperialist powers.
I don't reject that on principle.

That wasn't clear from your original post:
Bolsheviks were split on the issue; the "left", led by Nikolai Bukharin at that time, continued to believe that there could be no peace between a Soviet republic and a capitalist country and that only a revolutionary war leading to a pan-European Soviet republic would bring a durable peace.

Position held by the "left", led by Nikolai Bukharin was not wrong to oppose the signing of any treaty.



No, they were wrong because there was no revolutionary army to wage a revolutionary war. They were wrong for the same reason you're wrong - they're not dealing with the real relationship of forces, including military force.

Ah, I love baseless political accusations, especially if they done for political polemics only. The left actually cited the successes of the newly formed (January 15, 1918) voluntary Red Army against Polish forces of General Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki in Belarus, White forces in the Don region and newly independent Ukrainian forces as proof that the Red Army could successfully repel German forces, especially if propaganda and asymmetrical warfare were used.

Issuing a proclamation is not forming an army. Only the first happened on January 15, 1918. The Red Army was formed over the whole course of the Civil War. What did I just say about slogans not being a substitute for an army?

Whatever "successes" "the left cited" as "proof" were small examples of what potentially could be done in the future....they did not substitute for the large and effective military force which the Soviet government simply did not have in early 1918.

Instead, you get this vague hope that revolutionary fervor will automatically translate into military success; at the time often bolstered with a lot of analogies to the French Revolution. Well, it ain't always that easy and it's definitely not quick.

So no, they were not and you are not dealing with the real relationship of forces, with the need for tactics. Heck, even your pretense to do so only comes as an afterthought, in response to criticism.

This wasn't Trotsky's approach, obviously. Whether it was worthwhile to stall under "neither war nor peace" is debatable; it did have the advantage of making it clear to everyone that the Bolsheviks were submitting to armed robbery, nothing else. Maybe did accelerate the German revolution in that sense. Against that, there's the loss of territory.

But Trotsky certainly didn't ignore the relationship of forces as you do; or pretend it was possible to continue bluffing indefinitely.


Assuming that you actually understood that Revolutionary War here ment Revolutionary Invasion, I'm going to ask you to give examples,

Just invasions? Canada, U.S. War of Independence. Canada and Florida, War of 1812. All over Europe, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Serbia and Croatia, Hungarian revolution of 1848. Georgia and numerous parts of the former Russian Empire, plus Mongolia, Khiva and Bukhara, Russian Revolution. Tibet and other places, Chinese Revolution. Cambodia and Laos, Vietnamese Revolution. For starters.

Some of those were more successful than others; some produced nationalist backlashes...some of those had lasting progressive effects anyway. E.g. the Napoleonic Wars knocked down a lot of feudal crap all over Europe.


and you will fail to do so.

Crystal ball on the blink, o great predictor of what would have been?


People who defended "Revolutionary War" obviously did not had a defensive war in their minds - they had entering Berlin with Red Army troops.

See, that's so extremely hypothetical, so far removed from the real relationship of forces - that I have a hard time even discussing what the result would be.

There's a lot of factors. For example, if you offer peace and that's rejected, but then you successfully take the offensive....will you still be viewed as an aggressor? Does a revolutionary movement break out before you get anywhere near Berlin - or are you hoping for one after?

WWII in Europe is analogous in military terms, but no revolutionary government was involved. Despite that, there was a bit of a revolutionary wave in response to the Red Army's victories, in some East European countries....but not in Germany. IIRC.

Anyway: all this is tactical - not a question of principle.


Yes... The desire for peace was undeniably great. But as great as it was, peace wasn't granted to the Russian soldiers, peasants, and workers anyway. Wether it was an invading German or a civil war with the whites and imperialists assisting them wouldn't have mattered.

Or they coulda had both. In any case, the Civil War involved fewer deaths than WWI; much smaller forces were involved. And there was time to recruit a new army, less permeated with a history of defeat and a burning desire to go home. And with a new command structure....

The Author
30th October 2006, 02:04
There are three writings by V.I. Lenin about the issue of the Brest-Litovsk Peace and how the ultra-leftists handled this matter:

On the History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace (http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/HUP18.html)

Strange and Monstrous (http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/SM18.html)

A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility (http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/SLSR18.html)

Very informative. Quite revealing about what was going on at the time.

Leo
30th October 2006, 07:11
The Red Army. Which did not exist at the time they signed the Brest-Litovsk peace.

Baseless... Not only was Red Army formed but it had achieved some victories, which was the whole base of the left's arguement. It wasn't big, and it was going to grow and get better organized, but it surely was existant.


They were trying to hold off the Germans with the disintegrating old army, plus a few Red Guards here and there. When Soviets initially refused to sign the treaty, the German army renewed its offensive, as you mention.

The renewal of the ofensive was simply a sudden strike which happened in a period of a day.


You neglect to mention - that the Russian army was unable or unwilling to put up any significant resistance.

You keep saying this, and I keep asking then how the fuck did they defeat the Whites with complete support of the allies and the allied invadors?


Instead, you go on about Russian history generally: Napoleon, who I remind you did take Moscow

But he didn't take Russia.


and Hitler, who was fought off by.....that Red Army, again.

Well, Hitler and his armies were a little strong too. No one thought he would lose.


Retreating into the vast interior of Russia was not an option for the Bolsheviks. They fought off the Whites from Petrograd and Moscow; but without Petrograd and Moscow.....even just without Petrograd, the revolutionary capital, which the German army was close to....

But how sure are you that taking the "reddest of the red" as forgeign invadors would be easy for Germany?

Besides there were other forces which aided the Bolsheviks during the civil war, such as Makhnovists in Ukraine. They could, with their guerilla tactics, turn Germany's invasion into hell.


And in the Civil War, most imperialist powers were politically unable to intervene directly, with their own troops, on a large scale.

Well, US started off sending 5,000 troops to Archangel and 10,000 to Vladivostok. 28,000 Japanese soldiers started a full scale invasion from the east and later their numbers increased to 70,000 only to be defeated by the Red Army. 50,000 Czechs, 4,000 Canadians, 12,000 Poles, 4,000 Serbs, 4,000 Romanians, 2,000 Italians and 1,600 British were also sent. Now add these numbers the White Army which was roughly about 250,000 men.


Do you really think the Bolsheviks coulda stopped the Kaiser's army, and again, with what?

They could have stopped the Kaiser in the way they stopped the allies and Whites, and remember that Germany did not have much time and was going to have a revolution in six months max.


Really? After the fall of the Paris Commune, did a revolutionary wave spread across Europe?

Well, no but the Bolshevik Revolution happened after the Paris Commune rigth? And If I'm not mistaken Lenin did take a great amount of inspiration from the Paris Commune.


A victory for a revolution inspires revolutions elsewhere - a defeat does the opposite.

Sometimes defeats are more inspiring than degenerated victories.


Issuing a proclamation is not forming an army. Only the first happened on January 15, 1918. The Red Army was formed over the whole course of the Civil War.

Obviously. But they were existant and had achieved victories which were the base for the left's ideas.


Whatever "successes" "the left cited" as "proof" were small examples of what potentially could be done in the future....they did not substitute for the large and effective military force which the Soviet government simply did not have in early 1918.

Those victories were were proof of the fact that Red Army could grow and gain strenth pretty rapidly. They actually turned out to be right on that. In 1919, they had more than 3,000,000 men under arms. By the end of the Civil war in 1921 they had 5,000,000 men in the army.


Heck, even your pretense to do so only comes as an afterthought, in response to criticism.

Did you even bother to read the original post?


Whether it was worthwhile to stall under "neither war nor peace" is debatable; it did have the advantage of making it clear to everyone that the Bolsheviks were submitting to armed robbery, nothing else. Maybe did accelerate the German revolution in that sense. Against that, there's the loss of territory.

Trotsky saw the German Revolution coming, perhaps more clearly than any other Bolshevik, he even saw how it was going to happen and tried to assist the forthcoming revolution tactically. He proposed holding on defenses if Germany attacked, so he was aware of, and accepting that possibility.


Just invasions? Canada, U.S. War of Independence. Canada and Florida, War of 1812. All over Europe, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Serbia and Croatia, Hungarian revolution of 1848.

Those are bourgeois revolutions.


Georgia and numerous parts of the former Russian Empire, plus Mongolia, Khiva and Bukhara, Russian Revolution.

Turned out to be a bad idea, didn't really work out.


Tibet and other places, Chinese Revolution. Cambodia and Laos, Vietnamese Revolution.

Those were no proletarian revolutions to begin with.


See, that's so extremely hypothetical, so far removed from the real relationship of forces - that I have a hard time even discussing what the result would be.

Well, you can see where theye were coming from. They saw the potential of the Red Army and their ideology, and their initial hope was quite obviously entering the heart of Germany with the Red Army after Germany had lost. They weren't hoping to be teleported to Berlin, if that's what you were wondering.


There's a lot of factors. For example, if you offer peace and that's rejected, but then you successfully take the offensive....will you still be viewed as an aggressor?

Probably you would be.


Anyway: all this is tactical - not a question of principle.

Yes but internationalist principles has to be involved in tactical policies.


Or they coulda had both.

Very unlikely. Quite the contrary, allies would be giving the support they gave the Whites to the Red Army.


And there was time to recruit a new army

Not more than the time to recruit a new army against a possible German attack. The Red Army was already bigger than 200,000. They managed to become 3,000,000 in a year of active fighting against Whites.

Vargha Poralli
30th October 2006, 08:52
Done some reading about the treaty in wikipedia.one thing we must note about it


The consequences for the Bolsheviks were worse, however, than anything they had feared the previous December: the Central Powers repudiated the armistice on February 18, 1918, and in the next fortnight seized most of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries. Through the ice of the Baltic Sea, a German fleet approached the Gulf of Finland and Russia's capital Petrograd. Despite strikes and demonstrations the month before in protest against economic hardship, the workers of Germany and Austria-Hungary failed to rise up, and on March 3 the Bolsheviks agreed to terms worse than those they had previously rejected.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk

note the line Despite strikes and demonstrations the month before in protest against economic hardship, the workers of Germany and Austria-Hungary failed to rise up

from Leon Trotsky article

After the Bolsheviks came to power, Trotsky became the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and published the secret treaties previously signed by the Triple Entente and the United States that detailed plans for post-war reallocation of colonies and redrawing state borders.

Trotsky was the head of the Soviet delegation during the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk between December 22, 1917 and February 10, 1918. At that time the Soviet government was split on the issue. Left Communists, led by Nikolai Bukharin, continued to believe that there could be no peace between a Soviet republic and a capitalist country and that only a revolutionary war leading to a pan-European Soviet republic would bring a durable peace. They cited the successes of the newly formed (January 15, 1918) voluntary Red Army against Polish forces of Gen. Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki in Belarus, White forces in the Don region and newly independent Ukrainian forces as proof that the Red Army could successfully repel German forces, especially if propaganda and asymmetrical warfare were used. Left Communists didn't mind holding talks with the Germans as a means of exposing German imperial ambitions (territorial gains, reparations, etc) in hopes of accelerating the hoped for Soviet revolution in the West, but they were dead set against signing any peace treaty. In case of a German ultimatum, they advocated proclaiming a revolutionary war against Germany in order to inspire Russian and European workers to fight for socialism. Their opinion was shared by Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who were then the Bolsheviks' junior partners in a coalition government.

Lenin, who had earlier hoped for a speedy Soviet revolution in Germany and other parts of Europe, quickly decided that the imperial government of Germany was still firmly in control and that, absent a strong Russian military, an armed conflict with Germany would lead to a collapse of the Soviet government in Russia. He agreed with the Left Communists that ultimately a pan-European Soviet revolution would solve all problems, but until then the Bolsheviks needed to be able to survive and stay in power. Lenin didn't mind prolonging the negotiating process for maximum propaganda effect, but, from January 1918 on, he advocated signing a separate peace treaty if faced with a German ultimatum.

Trotsky's position during this period was in between these two Bolshevik factions. Like Lenin, he admitted that the old Russian military, inherited from the monarchy and the Provisional Government and in advanced stages of decomposition, was unable to fight:[10]

That we could no longer fight was perfectly clear to me and that the newly formed Red Guard and Red Army detachments were too small and poorly trained to resist the Germans.

On the other hand, he agreed with the Left Communists that signing a separate peace treaty with an imperialist power would be a terrible moral and material blow to the Soviet government, negating all of its military and political successes in late 1917-early 1918, resurrecting the notion that the Bolsheviks were secretly allied with the German government, and causing an upsurge of internal resistance. In case of a German ultimatum, Trotsky argued, the best policy was to refuse to accept it, which had a good chance of being the last drop that would lead to an uprising within Germany or, at the very least, inspire German soldiers to refuse to obey their officers since any German offensive would be a naked grab for territories. As Trotsky wrote in 1925:[11]

We began peace negotiations in the hope of arousing the workmen's party of Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as of the Entente countries. For this reason we were obliged to delay the negotiations as long as possible to give the European workman time to understand the main fact of the Soviet revolution itself and particularly its peace policy.

But there was the other question: Can the Germans still fight? Are they in a position to begin an attack on the revolution that will explain the cessation of the war? How can we find out the state of mind of the German soldiers, how to fathom it?

Throughout January and February of 1918, Lenin's position was supported by 7 members of the Bolshevik Central Committee and Bukharin's by 4. Trotsky had 4 votes (his own, Felix Dzerzhinsky's, Nikolai Krestinsky's and Adolph Joffe's) and, since he held the balance of power, he was able to pursue his policy in Brest-Litovsk. When he could no longer delay the negotiations, he withdrew from the talks on (February 10, 1918), refusing to sign on Germany's harsh terms. After a brief hiatus, the Central Powers notified the Soviet government that they would no longer observe the truce after February 17. At this point Lenin again argued that the Soviet government had done all it could to explain its position to Western workers and that it was time to accept the terms. Trotsky refused to support Lenin since he was waiting to see whether German workers would rebel or whether German soldiers would refuse to follow orders.

The German side resumed military operations on February 18. Within a day, it became clear that the German army was capable of conducting offensive operations and that Red Army detachments, which were relatively small, poorly organized and poorly led, were no match for it. At this point, in the evening of February 18, 1918, Trotsky and his supporters in the Bolshevik Central Committee abstained. Lenin's proposal was accepted 7-4 and the Soviet government sent a telegram to the German side accepting the final Brest-Litovsk peace terms.

The German side didn't respond for three days, continuing its offensive and encountering little resistance. When the response did arrive on February 21, the proposed terms were so harsh that even Lenin briefly thought that the Soviet government had no other choice but to fight. In the end, however, the Bolshevik Central Committee once again voted 7-4 on February 23, 1918, which paved the way to the signing of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3 and its ratification on March 15, 1918. Since he was so closely associated with the policy previously followed by the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky submitted his resignation from his position as Commissar for Foreign Affairs in order to remove a potential obstacle to the new policy.

the article clearly says that even though red army existed it was weekly organized and poorly trained. more over the Bolsheviks came to power promising the people that they will get out of war so they are not in a position to fight or get the popular support for the fight at that time

In case of fighting the white army too there were initially many setbacks for the red army the wikipedia article details the events

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Civil_War

Severian
30th October 2006, 09:55
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] 30, 2006 01:11 am
The renewal of the ofensive was simply a sudden strike which happened in a period of a day.
You keep saying this so I looked it up.

February 18-March 4, 1918
German Offensive in Russia
In response to the Soviet declaration of peace, the Germans resumed their offensive in Russia. The Central Powers captured Dvinsk on February 18th, Minsk on February 21st, Dubno and Dorpat on February 24th, Reval on February 25th, Pskov on February 25th, Kiev on March 1st, and Narva on March 4th. German forces advanced to within 100 miles of Petrograd.
not exactly a Leninist source. (http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1918.htm)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Terretory_given_away_after_Brest-Litovsk.jpg/180px-Terretory_given_away_after_Brest-Litovsk.jpg
Map of the additional territory seized, from Wikipedia. (It's labelled additional territory ceded in the final treaty, but that was roughly equivalent to territory occupied. If you read the final treaty, it actually called for German army withdrawal from some areas.)

Now if you want to say the Germans managed to seize all that in one day, I won't argue with you, 'cause that military feat wouldn't exactly strengthen your argument.

Even in reality, where they took the Ukraine in a month....you're sure they couldn't have taken Petrograd and Moscow in another six?


Those victories were were proof of the fact that Red Army could grow and gain strenth pretty rapidly. They actually turned out to be right on that. In 1919, they had more than 3,000,000 men under arms. By the end of the Civil war in 1921 they had 5,000,000 men in the army.

Finally, an answer to my question: with what army were the Bolsheviks supposed to fight off the German offensive of early 1918? Apparently, with an army that didn't exist until 1919. All they needed was time-travel.

Or to buy time by signing a peace treaty.....

And BTW, those 5 million sound impressive - if you don't know the Russian army in WWI was about 3 times as large.



And there was time to recruit a new army
Not more than the time to recruit a new army against a possible German attack. The Red Army was already bigger than 200,000. They managed to become 3,000,000 in a year of active fighting against Whites.

What? Obviously that's more time. A year is more than...no time at all, the Germans were already attacking.

See, this is why I say you reject tactics - you consistently refuse to think about the real situation.


remember that Germany did not have much time and was going to have a revolution in six months max.

That's 20/20 hindsight, not knowable in advance. And of course that's when the German revolution broke out in this universe. In some alternate universe of "what if" there was no Brest-Litovsk peace...."we'll never know" as you say.

Assuming this discussion's supposed to have some relevance to the present and future:

Would you recommend revolutionary governments gamble their survival based on guesses about exactly when revolutions might take place in other countries?


Well, no but the Bolshevik Revolution happened after the Paris Commune rigth? And If I'm not mistaken Lenin did take a great amount of inspiration from the Paris Commune.

Yeah. 46 years later. And as you keep saying, the German Revolution - and others - broke out a year after the Russian Revolution.

That's the difference between victory and defeat.

Lenin wasn't just inspired by the Paris Commune - he learned from its mistakes.



And in the Civil War, most imperialist powers were politically unable to intervene directly, with their own troops, on a large scale.
Well, US started off sending 5,000 troops to Archangel and 10,000 to Vladivostok. 28,000 Japanese soldiers started a full scale invasion from the east and later their numbers increased to 70,000 only to be defeated by the Red Army. 50,000 Czechs, 4,000 Canadians, 12,000 Poles, 4,000 Serbs, 4,000 Romanians, 2,000 Italians and 1,600 British were also sent. Now add these numbers the White Army which was roughly about 250,000 men.

Uff da. You think that's a large scale? Many millions fought in WWI; heck millions died. (The Czechs, BTW, weren't "sent" - they were POWs caputured during WWI, then organized to fight against Austria-Hungary for Czech independence.)


Besides there were other forces which aided the Bolsheviks during the civil war, such as Makhnovists in Ukraine. They could, with their guerilla tactics, turn Germany's invasion into hell.

I knew you were going to use this argument: guerilla warfare as magic wand. Guerillas cannot stop conventional armies from taking areas and cities; it can only make their prolonged occupation expensive. And expensive relative to what? Not compared to the WWI death toll.


Trotsky saw the German Revolution coming, perhaps more clearly than any other Bolshevik, he even saw how it was going to happen and tried to assist the forthcoming revolution tactically. He proposed holding on defenses if Germany attacked, so he was aware of, and accepting that possibility.

Y'know, Trotsky was sometimes wrong but never an idiot. So I'm kinda tired of you trying to saddle him with responsibility for your diocy.

Let's see what Trotsky actually said - in 1918 - about the possibility of continuing the war. (http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1918/brestlitovsk.htm)
Do you remember, comrades, under what circumstances our delegation went direct from a session of the Third All-Russian Soviet Congress to Brest-Litovsk?
.....
When I left here, we were saying that we had no reason to suppose that this strike wave would wash away the militarism of Austria and Germany. Had we been so convinced we would, of course, gladly have made the promise that certain persons expected we should make, namely, that under no circumstances would we make a separate peace with Germany. I said then that we could not make such a promise. That would have meant to assume the task of overcoming German militarism. We do not possess the secret of accomplishing such a victory. And since we could not obligate ourselves to change in a short time the relative position of international forces, we declared, openly and honestly, that a revolutionary government may under certain conditions be compelled to accept the annexationist peace. The decline of such a government would have to begin at the moment it would try to hide before its own people the predatory character of such a peace—not because it might be compelled, in the course of such a struggle, to accept such a peace.
....
Then came the hour of decision. We could not declare war. We were too weak. The army had lost internal cohesion.....We are forced to give up this war and to lead the army out of this slaughter. But we do declare at the same time and in the face of German militarism: the peace you have forced upon us is a peace of force and robbery.

There is nothing there suggesting that he thought it was possible to wage a war against Germany. He hoped it might prove impossible for Germany to attack. Yes, he knew that it might turn out to be possible - in which case, he explained, there would be no choice but to sign the treaty.

Later, in his autobiography, he was even more explicit about this. (http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1930-lif/ch32.htm)

Even the official diplomatic declaration on withdrawal from the war, without signing the peace - stated publicly that the Russian army would be demobilized! (http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/foreign-relations/1918/February/10a.htm)



Just invasions? Canada, U.S. War of Independence. Canada and Florida, War of 1812. All over Europe, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Serbia and Croatia, Hungarian revolution of 1848.
Those are bourgeois revolutions.
....


Tibet and other places, Chinese Revolution. Cambodia and Laos, Vietnamese Revolution.
Those were no proletarian revolutions to begin with.

Those who refuse to learn from history, by declaring all inconvenient examples irrelevant......are doomed to repeat history as farce.

And aren't you declaring proletarian revolution irrelevant, by declaring it so rare (or even nonexistent?) in real history?

And...what, no acknowledgement, even, of your prediction that I wouldn't give examples of revolutionary wars?

Leo
30th October 2006, 11:37
In response to the Soviet declaration of peace, the Germans resumed their offensive in Russia. The Central Powers captured Dvinsk on February 18th, Minsk on February 21st, Dubno and Dorpat on February 24th, Reval on February 25th, Pskov on February 25th, Kiev on March 1st, and Narva on March 4th. German forces advanced to within 100 miles of Petrograd.

Soviet leaders were convinced to sign the treaty in February 18th. As you describe, they took Ukraine, and Soviet government was not strong at all in Ukraine to begin with.


Now if you want to say the Germans managed to seize all that in one day, I won't argue with you, 'cause that military feat wouldn't exactly strengthen your argument.

I actually said that the Bolsheviks decided to sign the peace treaty in a day.


Even in reality, where they took the Ukraine in a month....you're sure they couldn't have taken Petrograd and Moscow in another six?

I'm positive. If a place as vast as Ukraine was taken in a month in 1917, it ment that there was no ressistance. Do you actually think that there would be no resistance in Petrograd? Or do you think that even if Germans managed to take Petrograd, they would be able to hold it?


Finally, an answer to my question: with what army were the Bolsheviks supposed to fight off the German offensive of early 1918? Apparently, with an army that didn't exist until 1919.

Red Army did exist, it was small but it had a huge potential to grow rapidly, especially from the central-eastern Russia.


What? Obviously that's more time. A year is more than...no time at all, the Germans were already attacking.

See, this is why I say you reject tactics - you consistently refuse to think about the real situation.

Well, if you think all three million people joined the Red Army at the end of the year, you are the one who reject tactics. Red Armies numbers rised when they were actively in the civil war. If an army grows to three million in a year, this would mean that they grow roughly about 250,000 in a month. Not bad eh?


That's 20/20 hindsight, not knowable in advance.

Yes, but Trotsky guessed it was on its way.


And of course that's when the German revolution broke out in this universe. In some alternate universe of "what if" there was no Brest-Litovsk peace...."we'll never know" as you say.

Obviously.


Would you recommend revolutionary governments gamble their survival based on guesses about exactly when revolutions might take place in other countries?

It would depend on the situation, there is nothing that could be said in advance as a principle. Sometimes you have to put all you got to stay in the game, sometimes you rest. As you say, it's tactics.


You think that's a large scale?

No, but considering that it's was a civil war, it's not bad. It might even have been a harder gain. As we know the civil war lasted longer than the WW1. Morale of the soldiers do matter.


Guerillas cannot stop conventional armies from taking areas and cities; it can only make their prolonged occupation expensive.

That and it would cause a moral drop in invading soldiers.


There is nothing there suggesting that he thought it was possible to wage a war against Germany. He hoped it might prove impossible for Germany to attack. Yes, he knew that it might turn out to be possible - in which case, he explained, there would be no choice but to sign the treaty.

It is not suprising for Trotsky to admit he was wrong after his policy was refused. Before the treaty and the German offensive, Trotsky thought that "in case of a German ultimatum, Trotsky argued, the best policy was to refuse to accept it, which had a good chance of being the last drop that would lead to an uprising within Germany or, at the very least, inspire German soldiers to refuse to obey their officers since any German offensive would be a naked grab for territories." He surely didn't expect Germans soldiers to disobey the orders in day one. When the German response to the Soviets peace message arrived on February 21, the proposed terms were so harsh that even Lenin briefly thought that the Soviet government had no other choice but to fight.


Those who refuse to learn from history, by declaring all inconvenient examples irrelevant are doomed to repeat history as farce.

Except this time they are irrelevant.


And aren't you declaring proletarian revolution irrelevant, by declaring it so rare (or even nonexistent?) in real history?

No I'm saying that the revolutions you are talking about are not proletarian revolutions because none of them are based on class struggle.

Marx Lenin Stalin
30th October 2006, 14:48
The treaty was a necessity. They needed to sign that treaty or risk everything, the whole revolution, Lenin did the right thing and the only thing that a reasonable person could do at the time. Playing "what if" games are useful only for the revisionists and anarchists who want to find anything they can to nitpick the Soviets and Bolshevik policy.

chimx
30th October 2006, 18:14
i haven't read all the replies, so i don't know if you covered this Leo, but my question is what about the possibility of the bolshevik government falling not due to external german aggression, but because of internal apathy for continued war.

the ascendancy of the bolsheviks to power was based largely on their 'no war' platform, unlike other participants in the february revolution. this hit home soldiers, who by october 1917 were quite keen on simply fleeing their positions from the front line. this collapse of the military in the face of war was the reason for the kornilov coup. the peasant distaste was equally high, with the number not wanting to see their crops go to support a war growing.

what makes you think that the bolsheviks could have survived a continued war internally?

Leo
30th October 2006, 18:31
i haven't read all the replies, so i don't know if you covered this Leo, but my question is what about the possibility of the bolshevik government falling not due to external german aggression, but because of internal apathy for continued war.

As much as the soldiers who returned home wanted peace, the fact remains that they didn't have peace and indeed they did fight. Germany falled in six months, and there is no doubt that it would fall earlier if it attacked peaceful Russia. Yet the civil war went for a several years against Whites supported by victorious imperialist powers. Workers would have survived the German attack.


the ascendancy of the bolsheviks to power was based largely on their 'no war' platform, unlike other participants in the february revolution. this hit home soldiers, who by october 1917 were quite keen on simply fleeing their positions from the front line. this collapse of the military in the face of war was the reason for the kornilov coup. the peasant distaste was equally high, with the number not wanting to see their crops go to support a war growing.

As for the Bolsheviks however, there was a possibility for them to fall, but it was not a very likely one. If Germany attacked to a peaceful Russia, not only would the German soldiers be frusturated but also the Russians would be frustrated, but not at the Bolsheviks. After all Russian workers would think that they are defending their own 'DoP'. The risk of Bolsheviks losing political power was indeed greater for accepting the treaty, because of all the rumours about Lenin taking money from the Germans were used excessively (and suppressed brutally).

chimx
30th October 2006, 19:00
then do you think it was this fear, after the experience of 1917 ww1 experience and kornilov, that made the bolsheviks eager to sign the treaty? lenin didn't exactly have a good track record at predicting revolution (ie. feb rev). i think i could certainly understand their pessimism.

Leo
30th October 2006, 19:07
then do you think it was this fear, after the experience of 1917 ww1 experience and kornilov, that made the bolsheviks eager to sign the treaty? lenin didn't exactly have a good track record at predicting revolution (ie. feb rev). i think i could certainly understand their pessimism.

Pessimism, fear, conservatism (in the literal, not political sense of course)... The Bolsheviks were afraid of losing what they thought they had after all. I would agree that it was an understandable decision.

Severian
30th October 2006, 21:35
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] 30, 2006 05:37 am

In response to the Soviet declaration of peace, the Germans resumed their offensive in Russia. The Central Powers captured Dvinsk on February 18th, Minsk on February 21st, Dubno and Dorpat on February 24th, Reval on February 25th, Pskov on February 25th, Kiev on March 1st, and Narva on March 4th. German forces advanced to within 100 miles of Petrograd.

Soviet leaders were convinced to sign the treaty in February 18th.
And good for them. You kept going on about "one day" of German advances as if it was some kind of fluke, and it was an error for them to decide on that basis. But obviously it wasn't.

You do it again in this post:


[Trotsky] surely didn't expect Germans soldiers to disobey the orders in day one.

They didn't disobey orders on day 30, either. You're hauling in events six months after the decision when it suits you - but ignoring events the same month when it doesn't.



Even in reality, where they took the Ukraine in a month....you're sure they couldn't have taken Petrograd and Moscow in another six?
I'm positive.

Heh. You must have a direct pipeline to God, if you're sure what would have been.


If a place as vast as Ukraine was taken in a month in 1917, it ment that there was no ressistance. Do you actually think that there would be no resistance in Petrograd? Or do you think that even if Germans managed to take Petrograd, they would be able to hold it?

I think it would be idiotic to gamble, if you know you have nothing capable of stopping them from reaching Petrograd - and if they can't take it immediately, encircling and besieging it. Putting an untrained mass of already-hungry Petrograd residents up against an army of millions of trained German soldiers is not always such a great idea as it might sound like.

Look, revolutions are often produced by defeat, certainly that was the case during WWI. German soldiers winning huge victories against Soviet Russia would not be the most likely to rise up against their officers.

l
If an army grows to three million in a year, this would mean that they grow roughly about 250,000 in a month. Not bad eh?

Yes, that's bad. They needed an army of millions immediately. Obviously that's impossible.

And of course even when that army is raised, it's not instantly trained to the point of being able to stand up to the German army. Especially to the point of standing its ground as millions of soldiers from the old army are running away all around it.

You just don't get it. When you need an army now a promise of an army later is no good.

As Napoleon said "Ask me for anything but time." BTW, time is critical in politics as well as war.



You think that's a large scale?
No, but considering that it's was a civil war, it's not bad.
Considering nothing. You keep comparing their victory in the Civil War to supposedly being able to hold off the Germans. So put those armies from the Civil War into WWI and watch 'em disappear like a drop in the ocean.


Before the treaty and the German offensive, Trotsky thought that "in case of a German ultimatum, Trotsky argued, the best policy was to refuse to accept it, which had a good chance of being the last drop that would lead to an uprising within Germany or, at the very least, inspire German soldiers to refuse to obey their officers since any German offensive would be a naked grab for territories."

You're evading: what did Trotsky think was necessary if the German soldiers didn't refuse? He thought it was necessary to sign the peace.

Since, he explained, there was no army capable of fighting.



And aren't you declaring proletarian revolution irrelevant, by declaring it so rare (or even nonexistent?) in real history?
No I'm saying that the revolutions you are talking about are not proletarian revolutions because none of them are based on class struggle.

Oh, and here I thought all of recorded history was based on class struggle. Obviously all those revolutions were, both the bourgeois and proletarian ones.

Anyway, an evasion. To restate: If there's been no proletarian revolution since....(1871? 1917? Ever? What do you think, exactly?)......than do you think workers' revolution is relevant to real-world politics, and if so why?

Leo
30th October 2006, 22:13
They didn't disobey orders on day 30, either. You're hauling in events six months after the decision when it suits you - but ignoring events the same month when it doesn't.

A day was obviously not to be taken literally, but it was obvious that Germany would have fallen earlier than six months, and considering that they had pretty much lost the war in the summer, if they spent February, March and April in cold, cold Russia they might have lost their entire offensive in May.


I think it would be idiotic to gamble, if you know you have nothing capable of stopping them from reaching Petrograd - and if they can't take it immediately, encircling and besieging it.

And how the fuck did they have to defeat the Japanese invadors in Siberia? Or the whites who were keeping to come and come again? It is not hard to say that even if the German Army, which was already fighting in many fronts, took Petrograd in a cold cold time, freezing when Russians were feeling comfortable, it would be the end of their offensive and they would not be able to hold it in their hands.


Putting an untrained mass of already-hungry Petrograd residents up against an army of millions of trained German soldiers is not always such a great idea as it might sound like.

And ordering an army of worn and cold German soldiers to the depths of Russia in the winter is not always such a great idea as it might sound like.


Look, revolutions are often produced by defeat, certainly that was the case during WWI. German soldiers winning huge victories against Soviet Russia would not be the most likely to rise up against their officers.

Again, it is not easy to win when you are attacking the heart of a country after being spent almost four years in the most brutal war the world had ever seen to that date in the freezing Russian winter.


Yes, that's bad. They needed an army of millions immediately. Obviously that's impossible.

And of course even when that army is raised, it's not instantly trained to the point of being able to stand up to the German army. Especially to the point of standing its ground as millions of soldiers from the old army are running away all around it.

You just don't get it. When you need an army now a promise of an army later is no good.

As Napoleon said "Ask me for anything but time." BTW, time is critical in politics as well as war.

In anywhere else in Europe, yes. But in Russia, Bolsheviks had many tactical options because of the vast lands Russia had and because of its wheather. You are just trying to proove that invading and completely defeating a state which controls Russia is as simple as taking a babies candy. On many occasions, history had prooved otherwise.


Considering nothing. You keep comparing their victory in the Civil War to supposedly being able to hold off the Germans. So put those armies from the Civil War into WWI and watch 'em disappear like a drop in the ocean.


Obviously, but again, you don't understand the tactical differences between a civil war and an invasion. In a civil war, Bolsheviks in fact lose many tactical advantages they would have had against Germany, and the terms become more equal, even ideologically and concerning the morale of the soldiers.


Oh, and here I thought all of recorded history was based on class struggle. Obviously all those revolutions were, both the bourgeois and proletarian ones.

:blink: Well, okay but there is a difference between what we call bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions, you know?


Anyway, an evasion. To restate: If there's been no proletarian revolution since....(1871? 1917? Ever? What do you think, exactly?)......than do you think workers' revolution is relevant to real-world politics, and if so why?

I have never said that. I just said that all the examples you gave were not proletarian revolutions because they weren't dependent on the proletariat independent struggle against the bourgeoise. Is that clear? Good.

Now, back to what I think; I see in every proletarian struggle against the bourgeoise a chance for a revolution. Maybe not a big chance but whenever the proletariat struggles independently, "the sceptre of communism" is behind them. In every single struggle. There has not been a succesful and lasting proletarian revolution in history which had spread worldwide (as you know), so all revolutions are defeats and none managed to go farter enough, simply because the material conditions weren't allowing it, if nothing. Yet I regard all independent proletarian struggles against the bourgeoise in the last century symptoms for the world revolution.

Louis Pio
30th October 2006, 22:20
In anywhere else in Europe, yes. But in Russia, Bolsheviks had many tactical options because of the vast lands Russia had and because of its wheather. You are just trying to proove that invading and completely defeating a state which controls Russia is as simple as taking a babies candy. On many occasions, history had prooved otherwise

Just a small point. I think it would be incorrect to say the bolshevics controlled Russia. Yes they controlled parts, but not everything. Their power would be nothing if they hadn't been in control of first and foremost Petrograd and secondly Moscow.

Edit: since that's were the workers were located, the basis of the soviet state.

Leo
30th October 2006, 22:35
Just a small point. I think it would be incorrect to say the bolshevics controlled Russia. Yes they controlled parts, but not everything. Their power would be nothing if they hadn't been in control of first and foremost Petrograd and secondly Moscow.

Edit: since that's were the workers were located, the basis of the soviet state.

Yes, quite true. Yet there was no one in between them and Eastern, Northern, Southern and Central lands of Russia. The main problem came from the west, which is very important of course.

Vargha Poralli
31st October 2006, 06:19
Leo i think we all have been missing one crucial factor that turned the table in WW1.the American entry. the Germans miscalculated time of US army's arrival .they miscalculated that it would be many more months before large numbers of American troops could be sent to Europe, and that, in any event, the U-boat offensive would prevent their arrival. In fact, not a single American infantryman lost his life due to German U-boat activity. this explains why German workers didn't rise . they were expecting victory and didn't wanted to rise against their masters.after all at that time extreme nationalism has been in full force. every major decision's like combining the allied troops under one command which ensured the allied victory only after Russians signed the treaty.only after the humiliating treaty of Versailles's did the German workers rise.so already frustrated ex imperial army soldiers in the name of freicorps took out all their frustrations against Spartacus league.so te germans were in a part to blame.
[edit]
and for your case against Lenin: your argument(and my first post in this topic too) sounds like above international proletarian victory Lenin craved for power in Russia. but after the victory over the whites Lenin did tell Trotsky to invade Poland to link up with German workers thats even against Trotsky's advice and opinion.and the red army did but only this time they had been defeated at Miracle at Vistula (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish-Soviet_War).edit

Severian
31st October 2006, 23:53
Originally posted by Leo [email protected] 30, 2006 04:13 pm
A day was obviously not to be taken literally, but it was obvious that Germany would have fallen earlier than six months, and considering that they had pretty much lost the war in the summer, if they spent February, March and April in cold, cold Russia they might have lost their entire offensive in May.
I'm sorry, that's not obvious. This "what if" like others is full of uncertainty.

For example: if the German imperialists were still fighting on the Eastern Front, maybe they wouldn't have tried an offensive on the Western Front. That failed offensive cost many German casualties, weakened the German Western Front and set up the success of the following Allied offensive. Without it....could the German armies have actually held on longer? It was military defeat that produced the German revolution....

Who knows? We do know the course which the Bolsheviks actually did follow let them survive for a time, and continue aiding revolutions in other countries. That can't be said of most other revolutionary attempts. It can't be said of the Paris Commune. It can't even be said of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, or the Munich Soviet Republic, or the workers' insurrection in Berlin (Spartakus week), a couple years later.


And how the fuck did they have to defeat the Japanese invadors in Siberia? Or the whites who were keeping to come and come again?

From their base in Moscow and Petrograd, and the more industrially developed regions? They had the advantage of sitting in the center, with interior lines of communication, and being able to shift forces from one place to another.


It is not hard to say that even if the German Army, which was already fighting in many fronts, took Petrograd in a cold cold time, freezing when Russians were feeling comfortable, it would be the end of their offensive and they would not be able to hold it in their hands.

It's easy to say anything you like; that doesn't make it so. May I remind you the Bolsheviks' support was mostly urban, if they lose the main revolutionary cities.... They did not have majority peasant support initially. And the peasants desperately wanted peace, especially the peasant soldiers who were the key to gaining the rest of the peasantry.

For all these reasons, retreating into the vast interior space was not an option for the Bolsheviks; they could not lose Moscow and Petrograd.


And ordering an army of worn and cold German soldiers to the depths of Russia in the winter is not always such a great idea as it might sound like.

I'm sorry, but weather does not stop armies; armies stop armies. Weather can, at most, help them do so.



Oh, and here I thought all of recorded history was based on class struggle. Obviously all those revolutions were, both the bourgeois and proletarian ones. :blink: Well, okay but there is a difference between what we call bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions, you know?

Oh, absolutely. But when you say China, Vietnam, etc. are not proletarian revolution "because they're not based on class struggle", it's impossible to take you seriously.


Anyway, an evasion. To restate: If there's been no proletarian revolution since....(1871? 1917? Ever? What do you think, exactly?)......than do you think workers' revolution is relevant to real-world politics, and if so why?I have never said that. I just said that all the examples you gave were not proletarian revolutions because they weren't dependent on the proletariat independent struggle against the bourgeoise. Is that clear? [/quote]

No, you haven't answered my questions - even when was the last proletarian revolution, in your opinion.


There has not been a succesful and lasting proletarian revolution in history which had spread worldwide (as you know), so all revolutions are defeats and none managed to go farter enough,

Anything that's not total victory is defeat? No such thing as a step forward - or 2 steps forward, one back?


Yet I regard all independent proletarian struggles against the bourgeoise in the last century symptoms for the world revolution.

Why do you think so? How is that a reasonable conclusion, given your view of history?