emma_goldman
8th October 2006, 00:34
October 06, 2006
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1006/p01s04-woiq.html
How Al Qaeda views a long Iraq war
A letter from Al Qaeda leaders found in Iraq shows that the
group sees the war as a boon for its cause.
By Dan Murphy | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
In appearances across the US, President Bush has been
campaigning against withdrawing troops from Iraq, arguing
that to leave now would hand a historic victory to Al Qaeda
and inspire new generations of jihadists to attack the US.
But a letter that has been translated and released by the US
military indicates that Al Qaeda itself sees the continued
American presence in Iraq as a boon for the terror network,
which has recently shown signs of expanding into the
Palestinian territories and North Africa.
"The most important thing is that the jihad continues with
steadfastness . . . indeed, prolonging the war is in our
interest," says the writer, who goes by the name Atiyah. The
letter, released last week, was recovered in the rubble of
the Iraqi house where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, former leader of
Al Qaeda in Iraq, was killed by a US bomb in June.
If the letter is accurate, it provides a window into the
group's strategic thinking on Iraq that differs starkly from
the one the Bush administration has been expressing publicly
-- a view the president reiterated Wednesday when he said
that Al Qaeda believes that "America is weak, and if they
can kill enough innocent people we'll retreat. That's
precisely what they want."
While the letter was released only recently, Atiyah, thought
to be a senior Al Qaeda leader whose full name Atiyah Abd
al-Rahman, apparently wrote it last December from the
Pakistani region of Waziristan. It has surfaced among a
flurry of other communiqués from Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a videotape
this week in which he lashed out at Mr. Bush and Pope
Benedict XVI. On Sept. 28, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, believed to
have replaced Mr. Zarqawi as the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
published an Internet statement in which he reached out to
Sunni tribal leaders who have been in conflict with Al
Qaeda. And a new group claiming to be Al Qaeda in Palestine
issued a video attacking Palestinian political leaders.
But the Atiyah letter, reflecting as it does the candid
opinions of Al Qaeda, rather than the group's propaganda
statement crafted for public consumption, appears to offer
the most insight. It is largely focused on the fact that
Zarqawi's tactics were alienating Iraqi Sunni leaders, and
urges him to move with more caution.
He strongly warned Zarqawi against assassinating Sunni
leaders. Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization that has been
trying to use minority Sunni anxiety in Iraq to build
support. The letter also called the Zarqawi-organized
bombing of three hotels in Jordan in 2005 a "mistake,"
arguing that expanding Iraq's jihad beyond its borders too
soon will cost them public support.
At one point, Atiyah muses that perhaps Zarqawi should step
down from his leadership role, "if you find at some point
someone who is better and more suitable than you." Since
Zarqawi's death, a "more suitable" figure from Al Qaeda's
standpoint has indeed emerged.
"In order to understand this letter one has to see the
circumstances of when this letter was released," says Rita
Katz, the director of the SITE Institute, which is devoted
to tracking Islamist militant groups. "This followed after
Zarqawi had an audio message . . . in which he threatened
the tribes of the Sunnis who wouldn't cooperate with him.
That was a real turning point.
"The letter from Atiyah is basically his response to this.
He's telling him that instead of fighting Sunni opponents,
you should reach out with more peaceful solutions."
Ms. Katz says Mr. Muhajir's Sept. 28 statement shows he has
taken that advice to heart. She points out that a number of
Sunni tribes in Iraq's turbulent Anbar Province have turned
against Al Qaeda's main umbrella group in Iraq, the
Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in recent months.
"Al-Muhajir's latest speech was quite interesting, because
he basically said sorry to the heads of the Sunni tribes.
'We need you. We'll work together to defeat the enemy.'"
The day before his speech, Al Jazeera reported a statement
it said was delivered by Ahmad Naji al-Juburi, head of the
tribal council in Salahuddin Province north of Baghdad, in
which he lashed out at Al Qaeda for killing "civilians,
defenseless people, police and security men . . . Al Qaeda
said it came to Iraq for jihad and to liberate it from
occupation [but] what Al Qaeda is doing is utterly at odds
with what it announced."
Katz and others say Muhajir is eager to mend fences with
Sunni leaders, because he knows that if Al Qaeda loses the
support of Sunni tribes, it will be in a very tenuous position.
"Al-Muhajir took another step toward undoing some of the
alienation Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had created in Iraq's Sunni
community," Michael Scheuer, who ran the CIA's bin Laden
unit from 1996 to 1999 and is now a senior fellow at the
Jamestown Foundation in Washington wrote in a commentary on
Muhajir's and other recent Al Qaeda communications.
How long Muhajir will be in charge of Al Qaeda in Iraq is
unclear. Earlier this week, Iraqi National Security Adviser
Mowaffak al-Rubaie said security forces are close to
catching him. On Sept. 28, the US military caught a man it
described as his driver. But given the ease with which Al
Qaeda in Iraq weathered the killing of Zarqawi, analysts are
skeptical that killing Muhajir will have much impact on
Iraq's war.
"When Zarqawi was killed, people said that was the end of
the insurgency and the end of the mass killings. But in fact
we've seen mass killings increase dramatically since," says
Katz. "Al Qaeda in Iraq played an important role at the
beginning of the war. Zarqawi set up something that hadn't
existed before, but at this stage the infrastructure is set
up very nicely."
*****
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/100306.html
Al-Qaeda's Fragile Foothold
By Robert Parry
October 4, 2006
A newly disclosed internal al-Qaeda communiqué reveals a
divided organization with only a fragile foothold in Iraq,
hoping U.S. troops will stay long enough to give it time to
build alliances with often-antagonistic Iraqi insurgents and
other Sunni leaders.
The letter
[http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/What%20Extremists%20Say/Letter%20Exposes%20New%20Leader%20in%20Al-Qa%60ida%20High%20Command.aspx?PageView=Shared,
] dated Dec. 11, 2005, amounted to a warning from a senior
al-Qaeda operative known as "Atiyah" to the then-leader of
al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
The letter faulted Zarqawi for attacks on fellow Muslims
that had alienated key elements of the Sunni-led opposition
to the U.S. occupation.
Atiyah told Zarqawi that "the most important thing is that
the jihad continues with steadfastness and firm rooting, and
that it grows in terms of supporters, strength, clarity of
justification, and visible proof each day. Indeed,
*prolonging the war is in our interest*." [Emphasis added.]
Atiyah's assessment that "prolonging the war is in our
interest" flies in the face of President George W. Bush's
argument that a prompt U.S. military withdrawal would amount
to a major victory for al-Qaeda.
Indeed, the "Atiyah letter" -- like a previously intercepted
message attributed to al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman
Zawahiri -- suggests that a U.S. military pullout in 2005 or
earlier could have been disastrous for al-Qaeda's terrorist
bands, which are estimated at only about 5 to 10 percent of
the anti-U.S. fighters in Iraq.
Without the U.S. military presence to serve as a rallying
cry and a unifying force, the al-Qaeda contingent faced
disintegration from desertions and attacks from Iraqi
insurgents who resented the wanton bloodshed committed by
Zarqawi's non-Iraqi terrorists.
The "Zawahiri letter," which was dated July 9, 2005, said a
rapid American military withdrawal could have caused the
foreign jihadists, who had flocked to Iraq to battle the
Americans, to simply give up the fight and go home.
"The mujahaddin must not have their mission end with the
expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down
their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal," said the
"Zawahiri letter," according to a text released by the
office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.
'Still Weak'
The "Atiyah letter," which was discovered by U.S.
authorities at the time of Zarqawi's death on June 7, 2006,
and was translated by the U.S. military's Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, also stressed the
vulnerability of al-Qaeda's position in Iraq and the need to
mend fences.
"Know that we, like all mujahaddin, are still weak," Atiyah
told Zarqawi. "We have not yet reached a level of stability.
We have no alternative but to not squander any element of
the foundations of strength or any helper or supporter."
The letter strongly cautioned Zarqawi "against attempting to
kill any religious scholar or tribal leader who is obeyed,
and of good repute in Iraq from among the Sunnis, no matter
what. . . .
"The long and short of the matter is that the Islamic
theologians are the keys to the Muslim community and they
are its leaders. This is the way it is, whether you like it
or not. . . . If you appear before the community in the
guise of a pariah to the class of religious scholars,
contradicting them, disrespecting them, and insulting them,
then you will lose the people and you will fail in any call
[to religion] or political act. . . .
"It is highly advisable to be polite and to show complete
respect, regret, compassion, and mercy and so forth. You
must incline yourself to this, and be humble to the
believers, and smile in people's faces, even if you are
cursing them in your heart, even if it has been said that
they are 'a bad tribal brother,' and what have you."
Beyond the significance of Atiyah's wish for a "prolonged"
war, the letter underscores how tenuous al-Qaeda's position
in Iraq has been, especially when contrasted with Bush's
alarmist rhetoric about a smashing al-Qaeda victory if the
U.S. military withdraws.
Indeed, the "Atiyah" and "Zawahiri" letters suggest that one
of al-Qaeda's biggest fears is that the United States will
pull out of Iraq before the terrorist organization has built
the necessary political infrastructure to turn the country
into a future base of operations.
The Mythic Caliphate
Zawahiri was so concerned about the possibility of mass
desertions after a U.S. withdrawal that he suggested that
al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq talk up the "idea" of a "caliphate"
along the eastern Mediterranean to avert a disintegration of
the force.
To Zawahiri, the rhetoric about a "caliphate" was a case of
making empty promises to gullible followers, but President
Bush has seized on al-Qaeda's references to a "caliphate" to
justify an expanded war against Islamic militants.
Even with the two fretful al-Qaeda letters in hand, Bush has
continued to warn Americans about al-Qaeda's intent to
follow up a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq by turning the country
into a launching pad for a vast Islamic "empire" that would
spell the strategic defeat of the United States.
In a Sept. 5, 2006, speech, Bush declared, "This caliphate
would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all
current and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to
North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia," Bush
said. "We know this because al-Qaeda has told us."
Some of Bush's neoconservative advisers have referred to
this coming conflict with militants among the world's one
billion Muslims as "World War III" and a "clash of
civilizations."
On Sept. 26, 2006, Bush also rejected the argument that the
Iraq War has spurred the growth of Islamic terrorism.
"My judgment is, if we weren't in Iraq, they'd find some
other excuse, because they have ambitions," Bush said. "They
kill in order to achieve their objectives."
But a growing body of evidence, including the intercepted
al-Qaeda letters, appears to undercut Bush's conclusions
about both the prospects for "a totalitarian Islamic empire"
and a disconnect between the continuing Iraq War and terrorism.
According to a National Intelligence Estimate, representing
the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community in
April 2006, "the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
*lacks a coherent global strategy*, and is becoming more
diffuse." [Emphasis added.]
The NIE also concluded that the Iraq War -- rather than
weakening the cause of Islamic terrorism -- had become a
"cause celebre" that was "cultivating supporters for the
global jihadist movement."
Foundering Leadership
Still, while the Iraq War may have helped raise the tide of
Islamic militancy in Iraq and around the world, the
"Zawahiri" and "Atiyah" letters suggest that it has done
little to lift al-Qaeda's boats.
The letters depict a still-foundering movement whose only
real hope for success is that the United States continues to
overreact to the terrorist threat and thus generates a new
surge of recruits to al-Qaeda's cause.
According to the "Zawahiri letter," al-Qaeda remained so
disorganized that it even lacked a reliable means for
getting out its messages. Zawahiri complained that six of
his audio statements "were not published for one reason or
another."
The letter also asked if the embattled al-Qaeda operatives
in Iraq might be able to spare $100,000 to relieve a cash
squeeze facing the group's top leaders in hiding, presumably
along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The "Atiyah letter" contained similar references to the
weaknesses of the al-Qaeda leadership holed up in Waziristan
on the Pakistani side of the border. "Atiyah" claimed that
it was easier for Zarqawi to send an emissary to Pakistan
than it was for al-Qaeda leaders to dispatch someone to Iraq.
Al-Qaeda's leaders"“wish that they had a way to talk to you
and advise you, and to guide and instruct you; however, they
too are occupied with vicious enemies here," the "Atiyah
letter" said.
Despite these weaknesses and al-Qaeda's concerns about
desertions in Iraq if the United States withdrew, President
Bush has drawn nearly the opposite conclusions, insisting
that a U.S. pullout would represent a great boost to
al-Qaeda. But the facts seem to point the other way -- that
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 relieved pressure on
al-Qaeda leaders in hiding and gave them hope by attracting
a new generation of young Muslims to the extremist cause.
By extending the U.S. occupation of Iraq indefinitely, Bush
appears to be continuing to play into al-Qaeda's hands.
As "Atiyah" observed, it follows that the longer the U.S.
occupation drags on, the more time al-Qaeda will have to
strengthen ties to indigenous Iraqi insurgents, attract more
jihadists into its fold and harden its new recruits --
"prolonging the war is in our interest."
In that view, Bush's strategy is helping al-Qaeda, both in
Iraq and globally. But a prolonged war also has turned out
to be in Bush's interests.
Bush has skillfully exploited American memories of 9/11 and
residual fears of al-Qaeda to strengthen his political
position at home, achieving a one-party Republican
government since 2002. Citing the terrorism threat, he also
has engineered an unprecedented rollback of U.S.
constitutional liberties.
In September 2006, the Republican-controlled Congress
granted Bush the authority to ignore habeas corpus -- a
right to a trial by jury dating back to the Magna Carta of
1215 and one of the few rights expressly written into the
body of the U.S. Constitution.
Now, under a new counter-terrorism law, Bush will have the
power to jail indefinitely a person deemed an "enemy
combatant" or an individual "who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States"
or its military allies.
Since 9/11, Bush also has used the terrorist threat to
discredit political opponents in the eyes of many Americans.
In 2002 and 2004, Bush challenged the anti-terror
credentials of Democrats, paving the way to Republican
victories.
With Election 2006 only a little more than a month away,
Bush has fired up the terror rhetoric again, saying
Democratic criticism of the Iraq War has proved that "the
party of FDR and the party of Harry Truman has become the
party of cut and run."
But Bush's attack line ignores what appears to be the larger
reality, that the policy that is actually serving al-Qaeda's
interests is a policy of "stay the course."
[For more on this topic, see Consortiumnews.com's "Osama's
Briar Patch."]
Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the
1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest
book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from
Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at
secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at Amazon.com,
as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the
Press & 'Project Truth.'
*****
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1006/p01s04-woiq.html
How Al Qaeda views a long Iraq war
A letter from Al Qaeda leaders found in Iraq shows that the
group sees the war as a boon for its cause.
By Dan Murphy | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
In appearances across the US, President Bush has been
campaigning against withdrawing troops from Iraq, arguing
that to leave now would hand a historic victory to Al Qaeda
and inspire new generations of jihadists to attack the US.
But a letter that has been translated and released by the US
military indicates that Al Qaeda itself sees the continued
American presence in Iraq as a boon for the terror network,
which has recently shown signs of expanding into the
Palestinian territories and North Africa.
"The most important thing is that the jihad continues with
steadfastness . . . indeed, prolonging the war is in our
interest," says the writer, who goes by the name Atiyah. The
letter, released last week, was recovered in the rubble of
the Iraqi house where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, former leader of
Al Qaeda in Iraq, was killed by a US bomb in June.
If the letter is accurate, it provides a window into the
group's strategic thinking on Iraq that differs starkly from
the one the Bush administration has been expressing publicly
-- a view the president reiterated Wednesday when he said
that Al Qaeda believes that "America is weak, and if they
can kill enough innocent people we'll retreat. That's
precisely what they want."
While the letter was released only recently, Atiyah, thought
to be a senior Al Qaeda leader whose full name Atiyah Abd
al-Rahman, apparently wrote it last December from the
Pakistani region of Waziristan. It has surfaced among a
flurry of other communiqués from Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a videotape
this week in which he lashed out at Mr. Bush and Pope
Benedict XVI. On Sept. 28, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, believed to
have replaced Mr. Zarqawi as the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
published an Internet statement in which he reached out to
Sunni tribal leaders who have been in conflict with Al
Qaeda. And a new group claiming to be Al Qaeda in Palestine
issued a video attacking Palestinian political leaders.
But the Atiyah letter, reflecting as it does the candid
opinions of Al Qaeda, rather than the group's propaganda
statement crafted for public consumption, appears to offer
the most insight. It is largely focused on the fact that
Zarqawi's tactics were alienating Iraqi Sunni leaders, and
urges him to move with more caution.
He strongly warned Zarqawi against assassinating Sunni
leaders. Al Qaeda is a Sunni organization that has been
trying to use minority Sunni anxiety in Iraq to build
support. The letter also called the Zarqawi-organized
bombing of three hotels in Jordan in 2005 a "mistake,"
arguing that expanding Iraq's jihad beyond its borders too
soon will cost them public support.
At one point, Atiyah muses that perhaps Zarqawi should step
down from his leadership role, "if you find at some point
someone who is better and more suitable than you." Since
Zarqawi's death, a "more suitable" figure from Al Qaeda's
standpoint has indeed emerged.
"In order to understand this letter one has to see the
circumstances of when this letter was released," says Rita
Katz, the director of the SITE Institute, which is devoted
to tracking Islamist militant groups. "This followed after
Zarqawi had an audio message . . . in which he threatened
the tribes of the Sunnis who wouldn't cooperate with him.
That was a real turning point.
"The letter from Atiyah is basically his response to this.
He's telling him that instead of fighting Sunni opponents,
you should reach out with more peaceful solutions."
Ms. Katz says Mr. Muhajir's Sept. 28 statement shows he has
taken that advice to heart. She points out that a number of
Sunni tribes in Iraq's turbulent Anbar Province have turned
against Al Qaeda's main umbrella group in Iraq, the
Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in recent months.
"Al-Muhajir's latest speech was quite interesting, because
he basically said sorry to the heads of the Sunni tribes.
'We need you. We'll work together to defeat the enemy.'"
The day before his speech, Al Jazeera reported a statement
it said was delivered by Ahmad Naji al-Juburi, head of the
tribal council in Salahuddin Province north of Baghdad, in
which he lashed out at Al Qaeda for killing "civilians,
defenseless people, police and security men . . . Al Qaeda
said it came to Iraq for jihad and to liberate it from
occupation [but] what Al Qaeda is doing is utterly at odds
with what it announced."
Katz and others say Muhajir is eager to mend fences with
Sunni leaders, because he knows that if Al Qaeda loses the
support of Sunni tribes, it will be in a very tenuous position.
"Al-Muhajir took another step toward undoing some of the
alienation Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had created in Iraq's Sunni
community," Michael Scheuer, who ran the CIA's bin Laden
unit from 1996 to 1999 and is now a senior fellow at the
Jamestown Foundation in Washington wrote in a commentary on
Muhajir's and other recent Al Qaeda communications.
How long Muhajir will be in charge of Al Qaeda in Iraq is
unclear. Earlier this week, Iraqi National Security Adviser
Mowaffak al-Rubaie said security forces are close to
catching him. On Sept. 28, the US military caught a man it
described as his driver. But given the ease with which Al
Qaeda in Iraq weathered the killing of Zarqawi, analysts are
skeptical that killing Muhajir will have much impact on
Iraq's war.
"When Zarqawi was killed, people said that was the end of
the insurgency and the end of the mass killings. But in fact
we've seen mass killings increase dramatically since," says
Katz. "Al Qaeda in Iraq played an important role at the
beginning of the war. Zarqawi set up something that hadn't
existed before, but at this stage the infrastructure is set
up very nicely."
*****
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/100306.html
Al-Qaeda's Fragile Foothold
By Robert Parry
October 4, 2006
A newly disclosed internal al-Qaeda communiqué reveals a
divided organization with only a fragile foothold in Iraq,
hoping U.S. troops will stay long enough to give it time to
build alliances with often-antagonistic Iraqi insurgents and
other Sunni leaders.
The letter
[http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/What%20Extremists%20Say/Letter%20Exposes%20New%20Leader%20in%20Al-Qa%60ida%20High%20Command.aspx?PageView=Shared,
] dated Dec. 11, 2005, amounted to a warning from a senior
al-Qaeda operative known as "Atiyah" to the then-leader of
al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
The letter faulted Zarqawi for attacks on fellow Muslims
that had alienated key elements of the Sunni-led opposition
to the U.S. occupation.
Atiyah told Zarqawi that "the most important thing is that
the jihad continues with steadfastness and firm rooting, and
that it grows in terms of supporters, strength, clarity of
justification, and visible proof each day. Indeed,
*prolonging the war is in our interest*." [Emphasis added.]
Atiyah's assessment that "prolonging the war is in our
interest" flies in the face of President George W. Bush's
argument that a prompt U.S. military withdrawal would amount
to a major victory for al-Qaeda.
Indeed, the "Atiyah letter" -- like a previously intercepted
message attributed to al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman
Zawahiri -- suggests that a U.S. military pullout in 2005 or
earlier could have been disastrous for al-Qaeda's terrorist
bands, which are estimated at only about 5 to 10 percent of
the anti-U.S. fighters in Iraq.
Without the U.S. military presence to serve as a rallying
cry and a unifying force, the al-Qaeda contingent faced
disintegration from desertions and attacks from Iraqi
insurgents who resented the wanton bloodshed committed by
Zarqawi's non-Iraqi terrorists.
The "Zawahiri letter," which was dated July 9, 2005, said a
rapid American military withdrawal could have caused the
foreign jihadists, who had flocked to Iraq to battle the
Americans, to simply give up the fight and go home.
"The mujahaddin must not have their mission end with the
expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down
their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal," said the
"Zawahiri letter," according to a text released by the
office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.
'Still Weak'
The "Atiyah letter," which was discovered by U.S.
authorities at the time of Zarqawi's death on June 7, 2006,
and was translated by the U.S. military's Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, also stressed the
vulnerability of al-Qaeda's position in Iraq and the need to
mend fences.
"Know that we, like all mujahaddin, are still weak," Atiyah
told Zarqawi. "We have not yet reached a level of stability.
We have no alternative but to not squander any element of
the foundations of strength or any helper or supporter."
The letter strongly cautioned Zarqawi "against attempting to
kill any religious scholar or tribal leader who is obeyed,
and of good repute in Iraq from among the Sunnis, no matter
what. . . .
"The long and short of the matter is that the Islamic
theologians are the keys to the Muslim community and they
are its leaders. This is the way it is, whether you like it
or not. . . . If you appear before the community in the
guise of a pariah to the class of religious scholars,
contradicting them, disrespecting them, and insulting them,
then you will lose the people and you will fail in any call
[to religion] or political act. . . .
"It is highly advisable to be polite and to show complete
respect, regret, compassion, and mercy and so forth. You
must incline yourself to this, and be humble to the
believers, and smile in people's faces, even if you are
cursing them in your heart, even if it has been said that
they are 'a bad tribal brother,' and what have you."
Beyond the significance of Atiyah's wish for a "prolonged"
war, the letter underscores how tenuous al-Qaeda's position
in Iraq has been, especially when contrasted with Bush's
alarmist rhetoric about a smashing al-Qaeda victory if the
U.S. military withdraws.
Indeed, the "Atiyah" and "Zawahiri" letters suggest that one
of al-Qaeda's biggest fears is that the United States will
pull out of Iraq before the terrorist organization has built
the necessary political infrastructure to turn the country
into a future base of operations.
The Mythic Caliphate
Zawahiri was so concerned about the possibility of mass
desertions after a U.S. withdrawal that he suggested that
al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq talk up the "idea" of a "caliphate"
along the eastern Mediterranean to avert a disintegration of
the force.
To Zawahiri, the rhetoric about a "caliphate" was a case of
making empty promises to gullible followers, but President
Bush has seized on al-Qaeda's references to a "caliphate" to
justify an expanded war against Islamic militants.
Even with the two fretful al-Qaeda letters in hand, Bush has
continued to warn Americans about al-Qaeda's intent to
follow up a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq by turning the country
into a launching pad for a vast Islamic "empire" that would
spell the strategic defeat of the United States.
In a Sept. 5, 2006, speech, Bush declared, "This caliphate
would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all
current and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to
North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia," Bush
said. "We know this because al-Qaeda has told us."
Some of Bush's neoconservative advisers have referred to
this coming conflict with militants among the world's one
billion Muslims as "World War III" and a "clash of
civilizations."
On Sept. 26, 2006, Bush also rejected the argument that the
Iraq War has spurred the growth of Islamic terrorism.
"My judgment is, if we weren't in Iraq, they'd find some
other excuse, because they have ambitions," Bush said. "They
kill in order to achieve their objectives."
But a growing body of evidence, including the intercepted
al-Qaeda letters, appears to undercut Bush's conclusions
about both the prospects for "a totalitarian Islamic empire"
and a disconnect between the continuing Iraq War and terrorism.
According to a National Intelligence Estimate, representing
the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community in
April 2006, "the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
*lacks a coherent global strategy*, and is becoming more
diffuse." [Emphasis added.]
The NIE also concluded that the Iraq War -- rather than
weakening the cause of Islamic terrorism -- had become a
"cause celebre" that was "cultivating supporters for the
global jihadist movement."
Foundering Leadership
Still, while the Iraq War may have helped raise the tide of
Islamic militancy in Iraq and around the world, the
"Zawahiri" and "Atiyah" letters suggest that it has done
little to lift al-Qaeda's boats.
The letters depict a still-foundering movement whose only
real hope for success is that the United States continues to
overreact to the terrorist threat and thus generates a new
surge of recruits to al-Qaeda's cause.
According to the "Zawahiri letter," al-Qaeda remained so
disorganized that it even lacked a reliable means for
getting out its messages. Zawahiri complained that six of
his audio statements "were not published for one reason or
another."
The letter also asked if the embattled al-Qaeda operatives
in Iraq might be able to spare $100,000 to relieve a cash
squeeze facing the group's top leaders in hiding, presumably
along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The "Atiyah letter" contained similar references to the
weaknesses of the al-Qaeda leadership holed up in Waziristan
on the Pakistani side of the border. "Atiyah" claimed that
it was easier for Zarqawi to send an emissary to Pakistan
than it was for al-Qaeda leaders to dispatch someone to Iraq.
Al-Qaeda's leaders"“wish that they had a way to talk to you
and advise you, and to guide and instruct you; however, they
too are occupied with vicious enemies here," the "Atiyah
letter" said.
Despite these weaknesses and al-Qaeda's concerns about
desertions in Iraq if the United States withdrew, President
Bush has drawn nearly the opposite conclusions, insisting
that a U.S. pullout would represent a great boost to
al-Qaeda. But the facts seem to point the other way -- that
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 relieved pressure on
al-Qaeda leaders in hiding and gave them hope by attracting
a new generation of young Muslims to the extremist cause.
By extending the U.S. occupation of Iraq indefinitely, Bush
appears to be continuing to play into al-Qaeda's hands.
As "Atiyah" observed, it follows that the longer the U.S.
occupation drags on, the more time al-Qaeda will have to
strengthen ties to indigenous Iraqi insurgents, attract more
jihadists into its fold and harden its new recruits --
"prolonging the war is in our interest."
In that view, Bush's strategy is helping al-Qaeda, both in
Iraq and globally. But a prolonged war also has turned out
to be in Bush's interests.
Bush has skillfully exploited American memories of 9/11 and
residual fears of al-Qaeda to strengthen his political
position at home, achieving a one-party Republican
government since 2002. Citing the terrorism threat, he also
has engineered an unprecedented rollback of U.S.
constitutional liberties.
In September 2006, the Republican-controlled Congress
granted Bush the authority to ignore habeas corpus -- a
right to a trial by jury dating back to the Magna Carta of
1215 and one of the few rights expressly written into the
body of the U.S. Constitution.
Now, under a new counter-terrorism law, Bush will have the
power to jail indefinitely a person deemed an "enemy
combatant" or an individual "who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States"
or its military allies.
Since 9/11, Bush also has used the terrorist threat to
discredit political opponents in the eyes of many Americans.
In 2002 and 2004, Bush challenged the anti-terror
credentials of Democrats, paving the way to Republican
victories.
With Election 2006 only a little more than a month away,
Bush has fired up the terror rhetoric again, saying
Democratic criticism of the Iraq War has proved that "the
party of FDR and the party of Harry Truman has become the
party of cut and run."
But Bush's attack line ignores what appears to be the larger
reality, that the policy that is actually serving al-Qaeda's
interests is a policy of "stay the course."
[For more on this topic, see Consortiumnews.com's "Osama's
Briar Patch."]
Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the
1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest
book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from
Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at
secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at Amazon.com,
as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the
Press & 'Project Truth.'
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