deadk
4th September 2006, 01:13
After looking at Straussian ideology more indepth, I've concluded that this- the foundation of conservativism- is corrupt. This is my conversion back to a anarchist.
The nature of representation and obligation is relative to those who shape this relationship: when entitlement to representation is recognized by a system of government it is a declaration by that system of its ability to bestow rights of representation; hence the relationship is one of privilege and subject to the terms of its architects. Obligation and representation are linked in common origin; they are created products of class conflict. To what extent they are actually connected or disconnected varies in regard to the actions of their architects. The institution that arises is inherently self-serving. Thus the governing class determines its own obligation to the people it rules over; in this sense, obligation to the the governed is simply an illusion. It is the extent to which a government can pursue elite interests without causing unacceptable social turmoil.
None of this is to deny the power of the masses and is not intended to imply that society is excluded from influencing the terms of its own obligation. Through grassroots movements, constitutional assemblies, unions, and other defense mechanisms of subordinate classes, society has the ability to influence the governments obligation to them through outside, indirect means. The other aspect of obligation is that of the people to obey the government. Society obtains the motivation to disobey and revolt against a government when that government becomes obsolete or is created in such an elitist manner that it is obsolete at its birth. This government must be obsolete in two senses: it must have such a rift in class interests that it can not bind a people together, and the society must have out grown the need for the protection of its government. When this occurs a new obligation is established between the government and the society; inevitably following the same method of institutionalization as previously described. All governments process an elitist hierarchy which pursues self-interest, but the degree to which the publics interests are ignored varies in accordance with the magnitude of democratic institutions and social class mobility. The precursors to the American revolutionary war offer an insightful look into what, if any, obligation a society has to an obsolete government.
After the Seven Years War, British interests were vested in economically recuperating from successfully defending the British-American colonies from France. Parliament then took action to enforce existing taxes and to legislate new taxes upon the colonies to help compensate for Britains economic losses. It was in British interests to do this; even when weighted against American discontent. This is an example of a division in interests: elitist governmental interests at odds with the interests of subordinate classes. As this continued type action continued in principle but increased in magnitude, the class interest gap grew wider. The American societys response to a government that had become obsolete, in regard to its will to pursue American interests, was to address and attack that government on several levels (1). In understanding the roots of revolution it is important to note that prior to the Sugar Act, when the colonists interests were not at odds with British interests, the colonial population had voiced little discontent with the lack of representation. Under these circumstances public content rather than force suppressed representation until it became a burden for the colonists. The other ingredient for destroying the colonists obligation to Britain was also in existence. Having routed the French and pushed the natives of the land to the brink, the colonies had little practical need for a mother country to defend them; they were self-sufficient. With no need for dependency and the colonists at a conflict of interests with their original traditional caretakers, sufficient motivation existed for the colonists to discard their old obligation and to institute a new one which more clearly represented colonial interests.
To clarify the ideal of representation within this paradigm, one must recognize it as an abstract idea that varies in magnitude and degree. In understanding the nature of representation it is a useful exercise to expose the social, economic, and political mechanisms that cause variance in the degree of representation. The extent of flexibility and unobtrusiveness in imperialistic rule: militarily, economically, or otherwise acts to suppress calls for representation and thus self-determination by encouraging indifference: the Friendly Fascist appeal. Furthermore, to use the American colonial example, calls for representation by the colonists were not heeded for obvious reasons. Representation of the colonies in parliament would have interfered with consolidated power in Britain and consequently the ruling classs ability to pursue its own interests. The only argument for colonial interests which entered parliament was made by William Pitt, allegedly virtually representing the colonists. Parliament only entertained Pitt because the parameter for debate was clearly under the assumption that British interests need to be pursued (2). He did not make a case for America but rather an alternative case for Britain, thus discrediting any claims to virtual representation as mere coincidence. The American Revolution also serves to demonstrate how requests for greater representation increase in accordance with the rift in common interests (3). In this instance representation is connected to the non-principled obligation previously discussed in that both are forged out of a desire to pursue self-interest. This is the common origin: the pursuit of elitist interests versus the pursuit of subordinate interests. How these interests coincide or conflict is the common factor that determines obligation and representation.
As the American colonists demonstrated, a principled argument is the most convenient in that it merely requires a declaration of intent. Based on the pervious observations, a threatened society seems to be the most principled one; however this correlation is not arbitrary. By recognizing that calls for representation increase in accordance with discontent, one can come to the conclusion that a society does not pursue representation out of principle but rather out of self-interest. Representation was not truly a concern of the colonists until their government became obsolete to their needs; this is a clear portrayal of the primary colonial motivation: self-interest. Regardless of declarations of altruistic ideals: the simplest means of justification.
The issue of the governments obligation to those it presides over can be addressed by recognizing power as a means of establishing standards of obligation. Excessive democracy, as Alexander Hamilton called it, is the majority of the populous determining the obligation the government owes to them; this paradigms flaw is in its application. The opulent of a society are the most powerful and therefore possess the most efficient means of creating and enforcing social obligation. Thus the theory of a pure democratic system of government is typically irrelevant because it has no means of being enforced except through majority consent; which pales in comparison to raw power.
The thin principled argument that is used to justify the elite determining their own obligation to society is based on two points. First is the theory that elite interests represent those of the society as a whole. It is clear that the consolidation of wealth progresses with time as the ruling class uses the tools of the society to pursue its own interests. Thus an economic gap in society is created and grows. The disconnection between elite interests and the interests of a society also grow unless the elitists power is somehow checked by democratic means and other defense mechanisms of subordinate classes. The second point is that elitists must somehow protect government from excessive democracy; this point implies that elitists have some understanding of the world that is beyond the possible comprehension of the rest of society; that they are enlightened. The logic that upholds this justification is that they rule therefore they can rule best. Taking as evidence that which one seeks to justify: circular reasoning. Once again these arguments reiterate the point that a government has no obligation to society, but an obligation to itself. It is important to note that this pursuit of self-interest can be limited and checked by the practice of democratic influence. In essence obligation only exists to the extent that the populous is willing to pursue it.
While it is evident that obligation is self-serving and representation a means of achieving self-interest one cant negate the aspects of human nature that arent based on hegemony and selfishness. The ability to take action based on sympathy and the idea of human rights are very important ideals. While it is evident these ideals have and continue to act as a mask for self-interest; they also exist in a real and true manner. However, the capitalistic cultural goal is wealth. This allows for greed and self-interest to motivate humans as opposed to compassion and principle. Obligation and representation within a capitalist system are based upon self-interest. However this is specifically within the capitalist society. A brief examination of human nature reaffirms that this is not necessarily the case in other economic, social, and political systems that have yet to be fully explored.
Citations
(1) Otis and Dulanys call for legal, orderly, and prudent resentment Colonial Resistance page 59
Unorganized violent demonstrations B. Resort to violence: the Boston Riot of Aug. 26, 1765, as Recorded in the Diary of Josiah Quincy Jr. pages 61-63
(2) Debate in the House of Commons- Mr. Pitt spoke next page 68
(3) Introduction: The American Revolution. Page 1; paragraph 2.
The nature of representation and obligation is relative to those who shape this relationship: when entitlement to representation is recognized by a system of government it is a declaration by that system of its ability to bestow rights of representation; hence the relationship is one of privilege and subject to the terms of its architects. Obligation and representation are linked in common origin; they are created products of class conflict. To what extent they are actually connected or disconnected varies in regard to the actions of their architects. The institution that arises is inherently self-serving. Thus the governing class determines its own obligation to the people it rules over; in this sense, obligation to the the governed is simply an illusion. It is the extent to which a government can pursue elite interests without causing unacceptable social turmoil.
None of this is to deny the power of the masses and is not intended to imply that society is excluded from influencing the terms of its own obligation. Through grassroots movements, constitutional assemblies, unions, and other defense mechanisms of subordinate classes, society has the ability to influence the governments obligation to them through outside, indirect means. The other aspect of obligation is that of the people to obey the government. Society obtains the motivation to disobey and revolt against a government when that government becomes obsolete or is created in such an elitist manner that it is obsolete at its birth. This government must be obsolete in two senses: it must have such a rift in class interests that it can not bind a people together, and the society must have out grown the need for the protection of its government. When this occurs a new obligation is established between the government and the society; inevitably following the same method of institutionalization as previously described. All governments process an elitist hierarchy which pursues self-interest, but the degree to which the publics interests are ignored varies in accordance with the magnitude of democratic institutions and social class mobility. The precursors to the American revolutionary war offer an insightful look into what, if any, obligation a society has to an obsolete government.
After the Seven Years War, British interests were vested in economically recuperating from successfully defending the British-American colonies from France. Parliament then took action to enforce existing taxes and to legislate new taxes upon the colonies to help compensate for Britains economic losses. It was in British interests to do this; even when weighted against American discontent. This is an example of a division in interests: elitist governmental interests at odds with the interests of subordinate classes. As this continued type action continued in principle but increased in magnitude, the class interest gap grew wider. The American societys response to a government that had become obsolete, in regard to its will to pursue American interests, was to address and attack that government on several levels (1). In understanding the roots of revolution it is important to note that prior to the Sugar Act, when the colonists interests were not at odds with British interests, the colonial population had voiced little discontent with the lack of representation. Under these circumstances public content rather than force suppressed representation until it became a burden for the colonists. The other ingredient for destroying the colonists obligation to Britain was also in existence. Having routed the French and pushed the natives of the land to the brink, the colonies had little practical need for a mother country to defend them; they were self-sufficient. With no need for dependency and the colonists at a conflict of interests with their original traditional caretakers, sufficient motivation existed for the colonists to discard their old obligation and to institute a new one which more clearly represented colonial interests.
To clarify the ideal of representation within this paradigm, one must recognize it as an abstract idea that varies in magnitude and degree. In understanding the nature of representation it is a useful exercise to expose the social, economic, and political mechanisms that cause variance in the degree of representation. The extent of flexibility and unobtrusiveness in imperialistic rule: militarily, economically, or otherwise acts to suppress calls for representation and thus self-determination by encouraging indifference: the Friendly Fascist appeal. Furthermore, to use the American colonial example, calls for representation by the colonists were not heeded for obvious reasons. Representation of the colonies in parliament would have interfered with consolidated power in Britain and consequently the ruling classs ability to pursue its own interests. The only argument for colonial interests which entered parliament was made by William Pitt, allegedly virtually representing the colonists. Parliament only entertained Pitt because the parameter for debate was clearly under the assumption that British interests need to be pursued (2). He did not make a case for America but rather an alternative case for Britain, thus discrediting any claims to virtual representation as mere coincidence. The American Revolution also serves to demonstrate how requests for greater representation increase in accordance with the rift in common interests (3). In this instance representation is connected to the non-principled obligation previously discussed in that both are forged out of a desire to pursue self-interest. This is the common origin: the pursuit of elitist interests versus the pursuit of subordinate interests. How these interests coincide or conflict is the common factor that determines obligation and representation.
As the American colonists demonstrated, a principled argument is the most convenient in that it merely requires a declaration of intent. Based on the pervious observations, a threatened society seems to be the most principled one; however this correlation is not arbitrary. By recognizing that calls for representation increase in accordance with discontent, one can come to the conclusion that a society does not pursue representation out of principle but rather out of self-interest. Representation was not truly a concern of the colonists until their government became obsolete to their needs; this is a clear portrayal of the primary colonial motivation: self-interest. Regardless of declarations of altruistic ideals: the simplest means of justification.
The issue of the governments obligation to those it presides over can be addressed by recognizing power as a means of establishing standards of obligation. Excessive democracy, as Alexander Hamilton called it, is the majority of the populous determining the obligation the government owes to them; this paradigms flaw is in its application. The opulent of a society are the most powerful and therefore possess the most efficient means of creating and enforcing social obligation. Thus the theory of a pure democratic system of government is typically irrelevant because it has no means of being enforced except through majority consent; which pales in comparison to raw power.
The thin principled argument that is used to justify the elite determining their own obligation to society is based on two points. First is the theory that elite interests represent those of the society as a whole. It is clear that the consolidation of wealth progresses with time as the ruling class uses the tools of the society to pursue its own interests. Thus an economic gap in society is created and grows. The disconnection between elite interests and the interests of a society also grow unless the elitists power is somehow checked by democratic means and other defense mechanisms of subordinate classes. The second point is that elitists must somehow protect government from excessive democracy; this point implies that elitists have some understanding of the world that is beyond the possible comprehension of the rest of society; that they are enlightened. The logic that upholds this justification is that they rule therefore they can rule best. Taking as evidence that which one seeks to justify: circular reasoning. Once again these arguments reiterate the point that a government has no obligation to society, but an obligation to itself. It is important to note that this pursuit of self-interest can be limited and checked by the practice of democratic influence. In essence obligation only exists to the extent that the populous is willing to pursue it.
While it is evident that obligation is self-serving and representation a means of achieving self-interest one cant negate the aspects of human nature that arent based on hegemony and selfishness. The ability to take action based on sympathy and the idea of human rights are very important ideals. While it is evident these ideals have and continue to act as a mask for self-interest; they also exist in a real and true manner. However, the capitalistic cultural goal is wealth. This allows for greed and self-interest to motivate humans as opposed to compassion and principle. Obligation and representation within a capitalist system are based upon self-interest. However this is specifically within the capitalist society. A brief examination of human nature reaffirms that this is not necessarily the case in other economic, social, and political systems that have yet to be fully explored.
Citations
(1) Otis and Dulanys call for legal, orderly, and prudent resentment Colonial Resistance page 59
Unorganized violent demonstrations B. Resort to violence: the Boston Riot of Aug. 26, 1765, as Recorded in the Diary of Josiah Quincy Jr. pages 61-63
(2) Debate in the House of Commons- Mr. Pitt spoke next page 68
(3) Introduction: The American Revolution. Page 1; paragraph 2.