deadk
29th August 2006, 08:11
Hello all, I joined awhile ago. This is something you historicists might enjoy :P
Its not done, but the important part is the first part- Hegelian thought.
Hegelian thought is most fundamentally rooted within the concept of a rational and perceivable historical dialectic. The historical dialectic is embedded in the notion that all facets of the universal are not random and do not interact arbitrarily, but rather the entirety of the universe is interdependent and relates in a manner which exemplifies rationality and unity. Notably, this unison arrangement of all things is in perpetual and linear movement. This movement is the dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; more specifically, the conceptual notion that every thing creates its opposite leading to, Hegel termed it: contradiction. Once contradiction is established, an inevitable synthesis occurs in which the two facets of the contradiction are pitted against each other and transformed into something entirely unique. This results in the creation of a new concept, which will in turn create its opposite and perpetuate the cycle. This cycle, however, once arbitrating the root cause of human conflict, allows for a qualitative synthesis to occur. This final synthesis occurs when “Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes.” More generally, the constant progressive changes that are incremental and have limited results will, in their accumulative, ultimately lead to a much larger change. For example, a person might take slow and incremental steps toward a cliff that result in minor changes of condition, but once his quantitative steps have accumulated enough distance to reach the edge of the cliff: that person’s condition will fundamentally change.
The theory of the Hegelian dialectic can be logically extrapolation into the realm of the state, but from within the Hegelian paradigm these extrapolations should most certainly be viewed as inherent aspects of the historical dialectic. The founding of the Hegelian dialectic, and the necessary extrapolations it must make in order for the theory to logically sustain itself have, most notably, resulted in the elaborate paradigms of both Hegelian and Marxist end state theory. The Marxist adaptation of the Hegelian dialectic is called the materialistic dialectic, which essentially consists of Marx’s class conflict paradigm fulfilling the role of thesis and antithesis within Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel and Marx’s presumptions, as well as their necessary extrapolations merit an extensive exposé, which will serve to allow for analyze while adopting a stance that is detached from the presumptions with which the dialectic rest on. In this manner, the foundations and presumptions of the dialectic itself may be revisited in light of a better understanding of its origin and role.
Hegel’s dialectic is fundamentally derived from a critique of the process through which humans have conventionally understood history. The best conventional historians, according to Hegel, are monks and those occupying the upper classes of society. The monks fulfill this role well because they are detached from society to the greatest extent possible due to their life style and therefore interpreted society’s events with least amount of animosities, as humanly feasible, vested in the particular events. The upper most class of society fulfilled this role well due to their ability to “peer down” on subordinate social classes. Ultimately, one is to conclude that the best historian is the one who is completely detached from society. In order to completely understand history, Hegel then discusses the use of universally held truths as the means of most effectively convey history. In this, Hegel begins the merger of philosophy with history in order to form what is commonly known as historicism. For Hegel, universally held truths act as reference points for all peoples; and in turn, allow for an interpretation of history that transcends “Spirit” and time.
Through this process, Hegel has already laid out the foundation of his paradigm; namely, a system of interpreting history that utilizes truth in order to transcend both time and Spirit. The concept of time is plain enough, however the term Spirit is more complicated, and indeed the crux of Hegelian theory. The Spirit is both the means of achieving a universally assessable reference point through which history may travel, and the universal elements of humanity that history must be in relation to in order for correctness, and more generally truthfulness, to transcend human thought. The Spirit is the medium through which history travels outward from the past historian and is thereafter received inward by the present historian. In this, it becomes clear that the Spirit is the beginning and end of the methodology of historicism.
The essence of the Spirit is ever illusive and not properly manifested within the most linguistically correct manner of defining it; namely, reason. Hegel claims that: “To think is something we can’t help doing, in this we are separated from the animals” and makes several other reverences to the uniqueness of reason to humanity and its separateness from that which is most base. However, that is precisely the real question at hand and possibly the best manner in which to describe the Hegelian Spirit. What is human? What is humanity? Or even more specifically, what is the essence of humanity? The answer to these questions is the Hegelian Spirit which, of course, is just as dreadfully illusive as the questions themselves. However, it is clear that the Hegelian Spirit is not derived from animals or any psychoanalyst interpretation, which is consistent with the Christian dogma Hegel personally subscribed to. It is equally clear that the Spirit manifests itself most readily through the actualization of human reason; and therefore, one may understand that human reason does not firmly grip the Spirit, but it does have a grasp.
The origin of human reason is also revealed through the presumption that it sets humans apart from animals. More generally, human reason is not a natural extrapolation of our animalistic baseness, and must therefore have an element of divinity and metaphysics incorporated in its existence.
The Spirit, manifested in reason, acts as a means of establishing universally accessible reference points; through these points history passes while retaining its objectivity. The implication within this paradigm and, indeed, its most notable presupposition comes in the form of the conceptualization of history itself as rational. Confronting this Hegel wrote: “That Reason is the law of the world and that therefore, in world history things have come out rationally.” This expresses the extrapolation that rests on a necessary assumption; specifically, that if humans are rational, and humans can rationally perceive history, history must in turn be rational. This is so because one can not understand, rationally, that which is irrational, and consequently the assumption that history can be rationally understood through human reason relies equally on the rationality of humanity and the rationality of history. The former (the rationality of humanity) is the manifestation of the Spirit, and the later (the rationality of history) is established through the presumption of God; God being the rationality and truth that transcends and exists in both Spirit and time. Within the Hegelian paradigm, the dialectic is subordinate to God and it fundamentally exists in relation to God. These panicle presumptions themselves are the foundations of truth and also the means of obtaining truth.
In such a paradigm, there is a persistent association of reason in relation to notions of beginning and ending. Reason is presented as the alpha and omega of obtaining truth. Through the truth of reason, reason obtains truth; and therefore the self-evidence and nature of truth is presupposed within the Hegelian paradigm. This allows one to draw the paradoxical conclusion that the very assumptions which designate reason as the vehicle of obtaining truth are the very end of that vehicle. Spoken differently, the truth of reason discovers itself. This notion is all too blatantly expressed by Hegel when he claims that “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” In this, a fair question may be raised in regards Hegel’s presentation of the historical dialectic. Hegel presents the dialectic as a logical extrapolation from more easily acceptable premises. However, because Hegel’s presumptions are necessary to reach his conclusion, and it is determined that his conclusions are in essence his presumptions; the establishment of the Hegelian dialectic is not a process of establishing at all, rather it is itself the fundamental presumption.
The movement of Hegelian philosophy into the political realm is a necessary facet of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel’s paradigm insists that humanity only gains its true meaning through the individual negating his ‘subjective mind’, by this it is meant he leaves behind his immediate desires. Instead, one finds the true meaning of himself within the state to such a degree that the individual becomes an after thought at best. “Finding” is the most appropriate word to utilize, because Hegel’s approach to philosophy, and thus to the state, is not a means of determining the specific, or even general morality of philosophy; but rather it is the reason to inspire the revealing and understanding of the means through which true becomes apparent and predictable. This revealing and understanding rests on the presupposition that what is, is what ought to be. That which appears irrational, is actually rational due to the nature of history. After reason is established as the manner through which humanity can identify truth, it is only left to ourselves to determine in what manner the evidently irrational is truly rational. Ultimately, this is what allows Hegelian thought to enter into the political realm: the notion that the state exists as it should, and the only thing left to be done is to attain a rational understanding of it and its role in history. However, this begs the question of why, if the fate and function of the state are as they ought to be simply by virtue of their existence, one should concern himself with understanding that which nothing can be done about.
This question can be moved from the specific to the general, and can manifest itself in a more inclusive inquiry that has a broad effect on philosophy in its total. Truth is, by merit of its meaning, that which transcends time and humanity. Once the manner in which truth transcends time and humanity is clearly determined, what is left to reveal? What will be gained from this revealing? And indeed, one can only conclude that the since most fundamental base of philosophy is the question of truth; philosophy losses all relevance once this question is answered. And while Hegel is not so much guilty of this flaw, Marxian applications of the dialectic, which will be elaborated on, bring into question the validity of the dialectic under Marxist conditions, and indeed, even bring into question the sincerity of the use of Hegelian thought in Marxist philosophy.
Returning to the issue of the Hegelian end state theory and bearing in mind the question previously presented, the natural restoration of the Prussian state is the logical extrapolation of the dialectic into the political realm. Since the state exists as it should, no revolution or destruction of the state is necessary, however the need for an understanding of the logical and rational nature of the state remains. The state is established as the end of the individual. This refers to the Hegelian metaphor of the human body (add body parts metaphor) but even this stems from a more fundamental need for the state. It is through the state that morality can be “universalized.” The specifics of the morality itself are not of particular interest as that the existing morality is assumed to be logical and rational, existing as it should exist. However the need for uniform truth is the emphasis of the Hegelian state; because while truth can take different forms within the process of dialectic, it can not exist in different forms at the same time. The universality of morality is only actualized through the institution of laws. In this, Hegel parallels an ancient’s approach to morality, in that good laws would be the most appropriate manner creating good citizens. It is through this universal application of morality that the objective mind (the consciousness of the state) replaces the consciousness of the self within all individuals. It is through such a process that the individuals come to recognize their true purpose and the rationality within society. One of the more tragic off springs of Hegelian thought is the ideology of fascism, and it is easy to see how the need to universalize all morality within the state could be used to construct such an abusive ideology.
With that note aside, the oddity within this paradigm is the unconscious manner in which history acts rationally (add quote). This refers to individuals, acting logically but unconscious of their rational actions. By acting unconsciously rational, Hegel refers to the actions all individuals take in relation to their private life gaining rationality because they unintentionally conclude by allowing the organism of the state to function. However, referencing the problem previously established, one is confounded as to what it to be gained from the actors being conscious of their rationality, if they act in relation to immediate and untrue rationally for the sake of a false end which, in spite of all this, ultimately yields true rationality due to the nature of history.
Minding this detraction, to continue with Hegel’s end state theory; one particular implication is left to reveal. This is the state of nature from which Hegel’s rational state finds its origin. In this specific instance, Strauss and Cropsey offer a specifically useful insight by comparing the Hegelian state of nature to the Hobbs’ state of nature (quote Strauss). In both states of nature, humans are driven to government through the fear of death and the vanity of recognition. Hegelian interpretations of human nature are expressed in terms of the relationship between master and slave, and parallels Hobbs’s philosophical stance on human nature, however, it is the slave who finds meaning in working for something greater than himself. Hegel’s manner of addressing the nature of the state is more ancient and Aristotelian than modern and Hobbsian, as that it presupposes ‘family’ and ‘civil society’ and designates them as the primary makeup of the state entity. Family is self-exclamatory; however the civil society for Hegel was the “designation that phrase of human social life in which the needs and therefore the interests of the individual govern his relations with others.” In this, the Hegelian state of nature, to use the closest available expression, involves different families interacting meaningfully to achieve their common self-interest. Thus civil society and the family are viewed as almost metaphysical in nature: they are an ‘actual Idea’ as opposed to something more psychoanalytically basic. Hegel determines that “The actual Idea is mind, which, sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters upon its finite phase, but it does so only in order to rise above its ideality and become explicit as infinite actual mind.” Within this, the actual Idea allows the mind to be established as “infinite and actual” and thus Hegel’s “pantheistic mysticism” is quite evident as that the institutions of civil society and family occur within the actual Idea. They are necessary presumptions in order for the Idea to achieve actualization in the form of the state and are therefore the physical manifestations of the metaphysical will of the actual Idea.
To return to Hegelian state of nature, in relation to the slave and master, the slave immediately finds justification and rationality within the Hegelian paradigm through the previously established metaphor of the human organism. From within this specific perspective, it is therefore the slave and not the master who achieves higher meaning and purpose. This relationship of master and slave can also be addressed in relation to the dialectic very simplistically; the state acts as the means of synthesizing the dialectic of slave and master. Through the state, both master and slave (the thesis and antithesis) synthesize and arbitrate their desire for recognition with their fear of death: thus the state is clearly in direct relation to this synthesis.
From a pragmatic standpoint, logical conclusion of the Hegelian state
“can only be understood to mean that the laws and interests of the family and civil society must give way in case of collision with the laws and interests of the state, that they are subordinate to it, that their existence is dependent on it, or again that its will and its law appear to their will and their laws as a necessity.”
In light of this, Hegel’s reverence for the state and the status quo in general, has allowed him be commonly thought of as existing in political realm of a conservative. Additionally, his theory on the state certainly distinguishes him from the revolutionary extrapolations of his philosophy made by Marx and others. Ultimately, Hegel’s believes that the role of the state, the family and civil society, are an expression of divine will, or in other words the actualization of the Idea. Politically, the will is aimed at the purpose of allowing the state to exist. Through this understanding, a clear hierarchy of priority is established; the state, which serves the purpose of allowing morality to be established as universally applicable is a necessary step in the progression of history. The state’s subdivisions, the civil society and family, are necessary and thus rational. However, this rationality is only in relation to manner in which they allow for a state to exist, the end justifies the means. Thus civil society and the family are, though not entirely, primarily subservient to the state.
The most notable philosophical application of the Hegelian dialectic and end state theory is manifested through Karl Marx who oriented the dialectic around a class conflict paradigm. However, Marx, as well as later Marxists, have shunned Hegelian philosophy for its religious implications. In 1844, Marx discusses the existing problems of the Hegelian dialectic in relation to Hegel’s theology. Specifically, Marx claims
“the settling of accounts with Hegelian dialectic and Hegelian philosophy as a whole- to be absolutely necessary, a task not yet preformed. This lack of thoroughness is not accidental, since even the critical theologian remains a theologian. Hence he had to start from certain presuppositions of philosophy accepted as authoritative; or if in the process of criticism and as a result of other people’s discoveries doubts about these philosophical presuppositions have arisen in him, he abandons them without vindication and in a cowardly fashion…”
This serves to outline the most general incitement of Hegelian thought by Marx: the problem of Hegel himself as a theologian. In Marx’s mind, Hegel had discovered the scientific process of historicism, but was unable to place the dialectic in proper context. Hegel’s attempt to prove the rationality of history through the use of metaphysical notions such as Spirit and God were necessary presuppositions for the theologian, however Marx believed they corrupted the concept of the dialectic by placing it in a context that was build on top of the presumptions made by a false consciousness; specifically, the false consciousness of the theologian.
Marx's utilization of the dialectic did not in any manner resemble Hegel’s dialectic except in the principle of the dialectic itself, as Marx states in the preface of Das Kapital:
“My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking… is the demiurges of the real world, and the real world is only external… With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind.”
In this, Marx outlines the most basic difference between his application of the dialectic and Hegel’s application. Within Hegelian thought, the process of the dialectic is subordinate to ‘real world’, which would be an allusion toward a Platonic theory of Forms, or at least this theory’s application within the context Christian dogma. From this, the dialectic’s essence exists fundamentally in relation to the ‘real’ or ideal plain of existence. Marx rejects this fundamental assumption of Hegel’s; instead placing the dialectic within the material world. Thus it is termed the materialistic dialectic. With this clarified, the concern at the present moment is in regards to properly understand both Marx’s discrediting of the Hegelian dialectic as well as the establishment of the materialistic dialectic in its stead.
Negating generality, and focusing on the most fundamental differences between Marx and Hegel; one will discover the primary disconnect between the two in regards to the purpose for which the dialectic is aimed. Whereas Hegel viewed the dialectic as a process which is almost free from value judgments, and demands only the value of uniform understanding; Marx utilized it as a means of establishing the inevitable correction of a very fundamental injustice caused by the different manifestations of the means and instruments of production. This grave injustice for Marx was
“…the real estrangement- that which appears real- is from its innermost, hidden nature (a nature only brought to light by philosophy) nothing but the manifestation of the estrangement of the real essence of man, of self-consciousness.”
In summary, Marx believed that property had separated and “estranged” man from his original essence. That is to say, he believes property had reduced human interconnectedness to purely monetary terms. This estrangement was the long historical process of, in general, two competing economic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Both of these classes manifested themselves fully in the industrialized society, and were the end of a long historical process of developing class antagonisms. This historical process of developing was driving by “constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.” Thus, the means of production, for Marx, were the most fundamental aspect of human society; furthermore, it is clear that he believes that every aspect of society is linearly constructed on the means of production. Thus this replaces what Hegel ultimately determines as God’s will or ‘actual Idea’, as the driving force of the dialectic. By making this replacement, Marx hopes remove the metaphysical aspects of the Hegelian dialectic which he held the utmost contempt for, but still retain the dialectic in principle.
This materialistic dialectic has manifested itself within a class war that transcends time. Indeed, Marx claims that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” However, a more fundamental conflict exists that encompasses the class struggle but is not exclusive to it; specifically, “the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production.” This is to say that the proletariat of the industrial society, as well as its equivalent in past societies, has been engaged in a war that exists on these terms. The proletariat arranges his productive forces in order to arbitrate class inequality, but immediately after this is accomplished the “conditions of production” are altered by the bourgeoisie in order to destroy the proletariat’s ground for arbitration. This revolution in the conditions of production refers, in a broad sense, to the means of production. In totality, it refers to the technological, social, and political instruments used to extract labor and the methods through which labor is exchanged. This constant revolutionizing, by the bourgeoisie, of the stage on which labor rests strands the proletariat in a perpetual race to construct a platform of class arbitration within the context of the bourgeoisie’s economic stage. Once the proletariat builds this social mechanism that allows them to determine, in part, the terms under which their labor is extracted; the means of production are altered and thus the social construct of the proletariat is destroyed. Marx believed this process to be determinable in a scientific manner. In addition, Marx viewed, from within the context of the materialistic dialectic, the forces which induce this arbitration as reactionary because they “try to roll back the wheel of history” to a time when their platform of arbitration was meaningfully established.
Here is a sin committed by Marx that brings into question the sincerity of his use of the Hegelian dialectic. The nature of the materialistic dialectic is predestined by the forces of economic production. This predestination exists ultimately within the confines of Hegelian thought. More generally, within the materialistic dialectic the inevitability of the synthesis as well as the rationality of pervious and current conditions are still necessary presumptions in order to sustain the theory. Thus it is very difficult to understand how one could be “progressive” or “reactionary” from within such a context, and even more so, “revolutionary”. The former appear as contradictions because of the inevitability and predestination inherent within the dialectic. If something is inevitable, it must be totally devoid of human freewill. Even in regards to the manipulation of human nature in order to create an inevitable outcome; human nature itself is detached from humans in the sense that humans have no choice over their nature. Thus from within a serious application of the dialectic, the terms progressive and reactionary would become meaningless because neither could in anyway effect the inevitable outcome. The idea of “revolutionary” is even more confounding. As previously established, the dialectic rests fundamentally on the notion that what is, is what ought to be. That history and thus the present are ration in their nature. From this context, not only would one refuse to irrationally waste his efforts by attempting to change the unchangeable; but he would also have a certain amount of reverence for the status quo, much like Hegel himself did. Marx, who rejects all things traditional in a purely “revolutionary” stance, not only illogically attempts to change the unchangeable; but also refuses to recognize that the rationality of the past and present as the foundation on which his entire theory rests. Perhaps acknowledging this, contemporary Marxists have adopted a trend of avoiding the subject of Hegel. Indeed, a recent Marxist publication by Ralph Miliband, who is a professor at Leed University, totally avoids meaningful discuss of the materialistic dialectic in his book “Marxism and Politics”. In a brief and half-hearted attempt to answer these questions for Marx, Miliband states:
“Marx did believe that certain things must come to pass, notably the supersession of capitalism: but a belief in the inevitability of certain events is not the same as a belief in their particular ‘determination.” In context, this ‘determination’ is used to describe Hegelian philosophy’s notion of unavoidability. This issue is then dismissed in the next line with the statement that “The question then is not whether Marxism is an ‘economic determinism’. I take that it is not.” This is tragically the most meaningful attempt to reconcile Marx’s avant-garde politics with his historicism; and sadly it leaves one searching for a meaningful linguistic difference between “inevitability” and absolute “determination”. It would seem as though this task would come dangerously close to committing contradiction. Indeed, on a slightly more poetic note, one might justly “consider this critic a cretin, just resting on laurels completely invented: Word acrobatics performed with both harness and net.”
It is left to see, from within the confines of the proletariat versus bourgeoisie dialectic structure, how a qualitative change will occur. Marx first makes clear that “The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own pervious mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other pervious mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their won to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.” This refers to two very important steps toward revolution. First, it is a necessary condition for revolution that the proletariat abandons his attempts to arbitration or “their own precious mode of appropriation”, thus breaking step with the self-perpetuating dialectic. While the first acts as a means of stopping the dialectical process, the second step addresses how and why that process will reach a quantitative change. Specifically, the first step will occur after the proletariat has nothing to protect in a monetary sense, because once they have nothing; they have nothing to protect through the pervious means of arbitration.
This revolution will alter the all previously established conditions which allowed for the bourgeoisie to exist. Specifically, the elimination of private property and wage labor are primary targets of the revolution. The former eliminates the source of political conflict, because all political conflict is caused by conflicting interests that exist in relation to different social classes. Thus with the elimination of social classes: the elimination of political conflict. Wage labor, though it must exist in relation to private property, should be singled out because it is the manner in which man is alienated from himself. This is to say that man, and man’s labor are one in the same; and that to reduce man’s labor to monetary terms is to estrange the man from the essence of his being.
In regards to the role of the state under a Marxist paradigm, it is established that nature of the state exists exclusively in relation to the property owning members of society. Marx wrote that
“… private property corresponds the modern state, which purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it…”
Through this process, the pre-revolutionary state is revealed as simply a form which the bourgeois use to pursue their economic interests. The implications of this are manifold, the laws, courts, and social institutions of the state are all tainted. They are all micro manifestations of the ruling elite’s pursuit of self-interest, and thus the state inevitably represses of proletariat interests. More generally, the state is held inevitably bias in favor of the economic elites.
Its not done, but the important part is the first part- Hegelian thought.
Hegelian thought is most fundamentally rooted within the concept of a rational and perceivable historical dialectic. The historical dialectic is embedded in the notion that all facets of the universal are not random and do not interact arbitrarily, but rather the entirety of the universe is interdependent and relates in a manner which exemplifies rationality and unity. Notably, this unison arrangement of all things is in perpetual and linear movement. This movement is the dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; more specifically, the conceptual notion that every thing creates its opposite leading to, Hegel termed it: contradiction. Once contradiction is established, an inevitable synthesis occurs in which the two facets of the contradiction are pitted against each other and transformed into something entirely unique. This results in the creation of a new concept, which will in turn create its opposite and perpetuate the cycle. This cycle, however, once arbitrating the root cause of human conflict, allows for a qualitative synthesis to occur. This final synthesis occurs when “Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes.” More generally, the constant progressive changes that are incremental and have limited results will, in their accumulative, ultimately lead to a much larger change. For example, a person might take slow and incremental steps toward a cliff that result in minor changes of condition, but once his quantitative steps have accumulated enough distance to reach the edge of the cliff: that person’s condition will fundamentally change.
The theory of the Hegelian dialectic can be logically extrapolation into the realm of the state, but from within the Hegelian paradigm these extrapolations should most certainly be viewed as inherent aspects of the historical dialectic. The founding of the Hegelian dialectic, and the necessary extrapolations it must make in order for the theory to logically sustain itself have, most notably, resulted in the elaborate paradigms of both Hegelian and Marxist end state theory. The Marxist adaptation of the Hegelian dialectic is called the materialistic dialectic, which essentially consists of Marx’s class conflict paradigm fulfilling the role of thesis and antithesis within Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel and Marx’s presumptions, as well as their necessary extrapolations merit an extensive exposé, which will serve to allow for analyze while adopting a stance that is detached from the presumptions with which the dialectic rest on. In this manner, the foundations and presumptions of the dialectic itself may be revisited in light of a better understanding of its origin and role.
Hegel’s dialectic is fundamentally derived from a critique of the process through which humans have conventionally understood history. The best conventional historians, according to Hegel, are monks and those occupying the upper classes of society. The monks fulfill this role well because they are detached from society to the greatest extent possible due to their life style and therefore interpreted society’s events with least amount of animosities, as humanly feasible, vested in the particular events. The upper most class of society fulfilled this role well due to their ability to “peer down” on subordinate social classes. Ultimately, one is to conclude that the best historian is the one who is completely detached from society. In order to completely understand history, Hegel then discusses the use of universally held truths as the means of most effectively convey history. In this, Hegel begins the merger of philosophy with history in order to form what is commonly known as historicism. For Hegel, universally held truths act as reference points for all peoples; and in turn, allow for an interpretation of history that transcends “Spirit” and time.
Through this process, Hegel has already laid out the foundation of his paradigm; namely, a system of interpreting history that utilizes truth in order to transcend both time and Spirit. The concept of time is plain enough, however the term Spirit is more complicated, and indeed the crux of Hegelian theory. The Spirit is both the means of achieving a universally assessable reference point through which history may travel, and the universal elements of humanity that history must be in relation to in order for correctness, and more generally truthfulness, to transcend human thought. The Spirit is the medium through which history travels outward from the past historian and is thereafter received inward by the present historian. In this, it becomes clear that the Spirit is the beginning and end of the methodology of historicism.
The essence of the Spirit is ever illusive and not properly manifested within the most linguistically correct manner of defining it; namely, reason. Hegel claims that: “To think is something we can’t help doing, in this we are separated from the animals” and makes several other reverences to the uniqueness of reason to humanity and its separateness from that which is most base. However, that is precisely the real question at hand and possibly the best manner in which to describe the Hegelian Spirit. What is human? What is humanity? Or even more specifically, what is the essence of humanity? The answer to these questions is the Hegelian Spirit which, of course, is just as dreadfully illusive as the questions themselves. However, it is clear that the Hegelian Spirit is not derived from animals or any psychoanalyst interpretation, which is consistent with the Christian dogma Hegel personally subscribed to. It is equally clear that the Spirit manifests itself most readily through the actualization of human reason; and therefore, one may understand that human reason does not firmly grip the Spirit, but it does have a grasp.
The origin of human reason is also revealed through the presumption that it sets humans apart from animals. More generally, human reason is not a natural extrapolation of our animalistic baseness, and must therefore have an element of divinity and metaphysics incorporated in its existence.
The Spirit, manifested in reason, acts as a means of establishing universally accessible reference points; through these points history passes while retaining its objectivity. The implication within this paradigm and, indeed, its most notable presupposition comes in the form of the conceptualization of history itself as rational. Confronting this Hegel wrote: “That Reason is the law of the world and that therefore, in world history things have come out rationally.” This expresses the extrapolation that rests on a necessary assumption; specifically, that if humans are rational, and humans can rationally perceive history, history must in turn be rational. This is so because one can not understand, rationally, that which is irrational, and consequently the assumption that history can be rationally understood through human reason relies equally on the rationality of humanity and the rationality of history. The former (the rationality of humanity) is the manifestation of the Spirit, and the later (the rationality of history) is established through the presumption of God; God being the rationality and truth that transcends and exists in both Spirit and time. Within the Hegelian paradigm, the dialectic is subordinate to God and it fundamentally exists in relation to God. These panicle presumptions themselves are the foundations of truth and also the means of obtaining truth.
In such a paradigm, there is a persistent association of reason in relation to notions of beginning and ending. Reason is presented as the alpha and omega of obtaining truth. Through the truth of reason, reason obtains truth; and therefore the self-evidence and nature of truth is presupposed within the Hegelian paradigm. This allows one to draw the paradoxical conclusion that the very assumptions which designate reason as the vehicle of obtaining truth are the very end of that vehicle. Spoken differently, the truth of reason discovers itself. This notion is all too blatantly expressed by Hegel when he claims that “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” In this, a fair question may be raised in regards Hegel’s presentation of the historical dialectic. Hegel presents the dialectic as a logical extrapolation from more easily acceptable premises. However, because Hegel’s presumptions are necessary to reach his conclusion, and it is determined that his conclusions are in essence his presumptions; the establishment of the Hegelian dialectic is not a process of establishing at all, rather it is itself the fundamental presumption.
The movement of Hegelian philosophy into the political realm is a necessary facet of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel’s paradigm insists that humanity only gains its true meaning through the individual negating his ‘subjective mind’, by this it is meant he leaves behind his immediate desires. Instead, one finds the true meaning of himself within the state to such a degree that the individual becomes an after thought at best. “Finding” is the most appropriate word to utilize, because Hegel’s approach to philosophy, and thus to the state, is not a means of determining the specific, or even general morality of philosophy; but rather it is the reason to inspire the revealing and understanding of the means through which true becomes apparent and predictable. This revealing and understanding rests on the presupposition that what is, is what ought to be. That which appears irrational, is actually rational due to the nature of history. After reason is established as the manner through which humanity can identify truth, it is only left to ourselves to determine in what manner the evidently irrational is truly rational. Ultimately, this is what allows Hegelian thought to enter into the political realm: the notion that the state exists as it should, and the only thing left to be done is to attain a rational understanding of it and its role in history. However, this begs the question of why, if the fate and function of the state are as they ought to be simply by virtue of their existence, one should concern himself with understanding that which nothing can be done about.
This question can be moved from the specific to the general, and can manifest itself in a more inclusive inquiry that has a broad effect on philosophy in its total. Truth is, by merit of its meaning, that which transcends time and humanity. Once the manner in which truth transcends time and humanity is clearly determined, what is left to reveal? What will be gained from this revealing? And indeed, one can only conclude that the since most fundamental base of philosophy is the question of truth; philosophy losses all relevance once this question is answered. And while Hegel is not so much guilty of this flaw, Marxian applications of the dialectic, which will be elaborated on, bring into question the validity of the dialectic under Marxist conditions, and indeed, even bring into question the sincerity of the use of Hegelian thought in Marxist philosophy.
Returning to the issue of the Hegelian end state theory and bearing in mind the question previously presented, the natural restoration of the Prussian state is the logical extrapolation of the dialectic into the political realm. Since the state exists as it should, no revolution or destruction of the state is necessary, however the need for an understanding of the logical and rational nature of the state remains. The state is established as the end of the individual. This refers to the Hegelian metaphor of the human body (add body parts metaphor) but even this stems from a more fundamental need for the state. It is through the state that morality can be “universalized.” The specifics of the morality itself are not of particular interest as that the existing morality is assumed to be logical and rational, existing as it should exist. However the need for uniform truth is the emphasis of the Hegelian state; because while truth can take different forms within the process of dialectic, it can not exist in different forms at the same time. The universality of morality is only actualized through the institution of laws. In this, Hegel parallels an ancient’s approach to morality, in that good laws would be the most appropriate manner creating good citizens. It is through this universal application of morality that the objective mind (the consciousness of the state) replaces the consciousness of the self within all individuals. It is through such a process that the individuals come to recognize their true purpose and the rationality within society. One of the more tragic off springs of Hegelian thought is the ideology of fascism, and it is easy to see how the need to universalize all morality within the state could be used to construct such an abusive ideology.
With that note aside, the oddity within this paradigm is the unconscious manner in which history acts rationally (add quote). This refers to individuals, acting logically but unconscious of their rational actions. By acting unconsciously rational, Hegel refers to the actions all individuals take in relation to their private life gaining rationality because they unintentionally conclude by allowing the organism of the state to function. However, referencing the problem previously established, one is confounded as to what it to be gained from the actors being conscious of their rationality, if they act in relation to immediate and untrue rationally for the sake of a false end which, in spite of all this, ultimately yields true rationality due to the nature of history.
Minding this detraction, to continue with Hegel’s end state theory; one particular implication is left to reveal. This is the state of nature from which Hegel’s rational state finds its origin. In this specific instance, Strauss and Cropsey offer a specifically useful insight by comparing the Hegelian state of nature to the Hobbs’ state of nature (quote Strauss). In both states of nature, humans are driven to government through the fear of death and the vanity of recognition. Hegelian interpretations of human nature are expressed in terms of the relationship between master and slave, and parallels Hobbs’s philosophical stance on human nature, however, it is the slave who finds meaning in working for something greater than himself. Hegel’s manner of addressing the nature of the state is more ancient and Aristotelian than modern and Hobbsian, as that it presupposes ‘family’ and ‘civil society’ and designates them as the primary makeup of the state entity. Family is self-exclamatory; however the civil society for Hegel was the “designation that phrase of human social life in which the needs and therefore the interests of the individual govern his relations with others.” In this, the Hegelian state of nature, to use the closest available expression, involves different families interacting meaningfully to achieve their common self-interest. Thus civil society and the family are viewed as almost metaphysical in nature: they are an ‘actual Idea’ as opposed to something more psychoanalytically basic. Hegel determines that “The actual Idea is mind, which, sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters upon its finite phase, but it does so only in order to rise above its ideality and become explicit as infinite actual mind.” Within this, the actual Idea allows the mind to be established as “infinite and actual” and thus Hegel’s “pantheistic mysticism” is quite evident as that the institutions of civil society and family occur within the actual Idea. They are necessary presumptions in order for the Idea to achieve actualization in the form of the state and are therefore the physical manifestations of the metaphysical will of the actual Idea.
To return to Hegelian state of nature, in relation to the slave and master, the slave immediately finds justification and rationality within the Hegelian paradigm through the previously established metaphor of the human organism. From within this specific perspective, it is therefore the slave and not the master who achieves higher meaning and purpose. This relationship of master and slave can also be addressed in relation to the dialectic very simplistically; the state acts as the means of synthesizing the dialectic of slave and master. Through the state, both master and slave (the thesis and antithesis) synthesize and arbitrate their desire for recognition with their fear of death: thus the state is clearly in direct relation to this synthesis.
From a pragmatic standpoint, logical conclusion of the Hegelian state
“can only be understood to mean that the laws and interests of the family and civil society must give way in case of collision with the laws and interests of the state, that they are subordinate to it, that their existence is dependent on it, or again that its will and its law appear to their will and their laws as a necessity.”
In light of this, Hegel’s reverence for the state and the status quo in general, has allowed him be commonly thought of as existing in political realm of a conservative. Additionally, his theory on the state certainly distinguishes him from the revolutionary extrapolations of his philosophy made by Marx and others. Ultimately, Hegel’s believes that the role of the state, the family and civil society, are an expression of divine will, or in other words the actualization of the Idea. Politically, the will is aimed at the purpose of allowing the state to exist. Through this understanding, a clear hierarchy of priority is established; the state, which serves the purpose of allowing morality to be established as universally applicable is a necessary step in the progression of history. The state’s subdivisions, the civil society and family, are necessary and thus rational. However, this rationality is only in relation to manner in which they allow for a state to exist, the end justifies the means. Thus civil society and the family are, though not entirely, primarily subservient to the state.
The most notable philosophical application of the Hegelian dialectic and end state theory is manifested through Karl Marx who oriented the dialectic around a class conflict paradigm. However, Marx, as well as later Marxists, have shunned Hegelian philosophy for its religious implications. In 1844, Marx discusses the existing problems of the Hegelian dialectic in relation to Hegel’s theology. Specifically, Marx claims
“the settling of accounts with Hegelian dialectic and Hegelian philosophy as a whole- to be absolutely necessary, a task not yet preformed. This lack of thoroughness is not accidental, since even the critical theologian remains a theologian. Hence he had to start from certain presuppositions of philosophy accepted as authoritative; or if in the process of criticism and as a result of other people’s discoveries doubts about these philosophical presuppositions have arisen in him, he abandons them without vindication and in a cowardly fashion…”
This serves to outline the most general incitement of Hegelian thought by Marx: the problem of Hegel himself as a theologian. In Marx’s mind, Hegel had discovered the scientific process of historicism, but was unable to place the dialectic in proper context. Hegel’s attempt to prove the rationality of history through the use of metaphysical notions such as Spirit and God were necessary presuppositions for the theologian, however Marx believed they corrupted the concept of the dialectic by placing it in a context that was build on top of the presumptions made by a false consciousness; specifically, the false consciousness of the theologian.
Marx's utilization of the dialectic did not in any manner resemble Hegel’s dialectic except in the principle of the dialectic itself, as Marx states in the preface of Das Kapital:
“My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking… is the demiurges of the real world, and the real world is only external… With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind.”
In this, Marx outlines the most basic difference between his application of the dialectic and Hegel’s application. Within Hegelian thought, the process of the dialectic is subordinate to ‘real world’, which would be an allusion toward a Platonic theory of Forms, or at least this theory’s application within the context Christian dogma. From this, the dialectic’s essence exists fundamentally in relation to the ‘real’ or ideal plain of existence. Marx rejects this fundamental assumption of Hegel’s; instead placing the dialectic within the material world. Thus it is termed the materialistic dialectic. With this clarified, the concern at the present moment is in regards to properly understand both Marx’s discrediting of the Hegelian dialectic as well as the establishment of the materialistic dialectic in its stead.
Negating generality, and focusing on the most fundamental differences between Marx and Hegel; one will discover the primary disconnect between the two in regards to the purpose for which the dialectic is aimed. Whereas Hegel viewed the dialectic as a process which is almost free from value judgments, and demands only the value of uniform understanding; Marx utilized it as a means of establishing the inevitable correction of a very fundamental injustice caused by the different manifestations of the means and instruments of production. This grave injustice for Marx was
“…the real estrangement- that which appears real- is from its innermost, hidden nature (a nature only brought to light by philosophy) nothing but the manifestation of the estrangement of the real essence of man, of self-consciousness.”
In summary, Marx believed that property had separated and “estranged” man from his original essence. That is to say, he believes property had reduced human interconnectedness to purely monetary terms. This estrangement was the long historical process of, in general, two competing economic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Both of these classes manifested themselves fully in the industrialized society, and were the end of a long historical process of developing class antagonisms. This historical process of developing was driving by “constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.” Thus, the means of production, for Marx, were the most fundamental aspect of human society; furthermore, it is clear that he believes that every aspect of society is linearly constructed on the means of production. Thus this replaces what Hegel ultimately determines as God’s will or ‘actual Idea’, as the driving force of the dialectic. By making this replacement, Marx hopes remove the metaphysical aspects of the Hegelian dialectic which he held the utmost contempt for, but still retain the dialectic in principle.
This materialistic dialectic has manifested itself within a class war that transcends time. Indeed, Marx claims that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” However, a more fundamental conflict exists that encompasses the class struggle but is not exclusive to it; specifically, “the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production.” This is to say that the proletariat of the industrial society, as well as its equivalent in past societies, has been engaged in a war that exists on these terms. The proletariat arranges his productive forces in order to arbitrate class inequality, but immediately after this is accomplished the “conditions of production” are altered by the bourgeoisie in order to destroy the proletariat’s ground for arbitration. This revolution in the conditions of production refers, in a broad sense, to the means of production. In totality, it refers to the technological, social, and political instruments used to extract labor and the methods through which labor is exchanged. This constant revolutionizing, by the bourgeoisie, of the stage on which labor rests strands the proletariat in a perpetual race to construct a platform of class arbitration within the context of the bourgeoisie’s economic stage. Once the proletariat builds this social mechanism that allows them to determine, in part, the terms under which their labor is extracted; the means of production are altered and thus the social construct of the proletariat is destroyed. Marx believed this process to be determinable in a scientific manner. In addition, Marx viewed, from within the context of the materialistic dialectic, the forces which induce this arbitration as reactionary because they “try to roll back the wheel of history” to a time when their platform of arbitration was meaningfully established.
Here is a sin committed by Marx that brings into question the sincerity of his use of the Hegelian dialectic. The nature of the materialistic dialectic is predestined by the forces of economic production. This predestination exists ultimately within the confines of Hegelian thought. More generally, within the materialistic dialectic the inevitability of the synthesis as well as the rationality of pervious and current conditions are still necessary presumptions in order to sustain the theory. Thus it is very difficult to understand how one could be “progressive” or “reactionary” from within such a context, and even more so, “revolutionary”. The former appear as contradictions because of the inevitability and predestination inherent within the dialectic. If something is inevitable, it must be totally devoid of human freewill. Even in regards to the manipulation of human nature in order to create an inevitable outcome; human nature itself is detached from humans in the sense that humans have no choice over their nature. Thus from within a serious application of the dialectic, the terms progressive and reactionary would become meaningless because neither could in anyway effect the inevitable outcome. The idea of “revolutionary” is even more confounding. As previously established, the dialectic rests fundamentally on the notion that what is, is what ought to be. That history and thus the present are ration in their nature. From this context, not only would one refuse to irrationally waste his efforts by attempting to change the unchangeable; but he would also have a certain amount of reverence for the status quo, much like Hegel himself did. Marx, who rejects all things traditional in a purely “revolutionary” stance, not only illogically attempts to change the unchangeable; but also refuses to recognize that the rationality of the past and present as the foundation on which his entire theory rests. Perhaps acknowledging this, contemporary Marxists have adopted a trend of avoiding the subject of Hegel. Indeed, a recent Marxist publication by Ralph Miliband, who is a professor at Leed University, totally avoids meaningful discuss of the materialistic dialectic in his book “Marxism and Politics”. In a brief and half-hearted attempt to answer these questions for Marx, Miliband states:
“Marx did believe that certain things must come to pass, notably the supersession of capitalism: but a belief in the inevitability of certain events is not the same as a belief in their particular ‘determination.” In context, this ‘determination’ is used to describe Hegelian philosophy’s notion of unavoidability. This issue is then dismissed in the next line with the statement that “The question then is not whether Marxism is an ‘economic determinism’. I take that it is not.” This is tragically the most meaningful attempt to reconcile Marx’s avant-garde politics with his historicism; and sadly it leaves one searching for a meaningful linguistic difference between “inevitability” and absolute “determination”. It would seem as though this task would come dangerously close to committing contradiction. Indeed, on a slightly more poetic note, one might justly “consider this critic a cretin, just resting on laurels completely invented: Word acrobatics performed with both harness and net.”
It is left to see, from within the confines of the proletariat versus bourgeoisie dialectic structure, how a qualitative change will occur. Marx first makes clear that “The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own pervious mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other pervious mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their won to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.” This refers to two very important steps toward revolution. First, it is a necessary condition for revolution that the proletariat abandons his attempts to arbitration or “their own precious mode of appropriation”, thus breaking step with the self-perpetuating dialectic. While the first acts as a means of stopping the dialectical process, the second step addresses how and why that process will reach a quantitative change. Specifically, the first step will occur after the proletariat has nothing to protect in a monetary sense, because once they have nothing; they have nothing to protect through the pervious means of arbitration.
This revolution will alter the all previously established conditions which allowed for the bourgeoisie to exist. Specifically, the elimination of private property and wage labor are primary targets of the revolution. The former eliminates the source of political conflict, because all political conflict is caused by conflicting interests that exist in relation to different social classes. Thus with the elimination of social classes: the elimination of political conflict. Wage labor, though it must exist in relation to private property, should be singled out because it is the manner in which man is alienated from himself. This is to say that man, and man’s labor are one in the same; and that to reduce man’s labor to monetary terms is to estrange the man from the essence of his being.
In regards to the role of the state under a Marxist paradigm, it is established that nature of the state exists exclusively in relation to the property owning members of society. Marx wrote that
“… private property corresponds the modern state, which purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it…”
Through this process, the pre-revolutionary state is revealed as simply a form which the bourgeois use to pursue their economic interests. The implications of this are manifold, the laws, courts, and social institutions of the state are all tainted. They are all micro manifestations of the ruling elite’s pursuit of self-interest, and thus the state inevitably represses of proletariat interests. More generally, the state is held inevitably bias in favor of the economic elites.