Rosa Lichtenstein
15th August 2006, 21:18
Well, I was using the term 'nihilism' as Poellner was, so you perhaps need to pick a fight with him.
And the examples I gave you are metaphysical; if Nietzsche was purporting to reveal hidden truths to us, such as there is a will to power, which while he was trying to deny metaphysical truth (a metaphysical aim in itself), embroiled him in the very thing he was attacking.
I think your misunderstanding his will to power as something metaphysical, yet he is just commenting on our will as not just the will for life and sustenance but a will to control and live dangerously etc.
Exactly, he was trying to reveal a truth about ourselves, based on a few rather shaky arguments, and misapplications of the word 'will'.
Nietzsche he said happiness was the overcoming of external forces, so will is simply this.
Chalk up another metaphysical thesis.
I have to admit Rosa your ideas and more importantly wittgensteins ideas have produced alot of new opportunities and problems to explore and solve.
Well, W said it would take about 500 years before we got his point.
I myself am still trying to get my head around it.
And this is no surprise: if you are trying to bring an end to 2500 years of philosophical hot air (as W was), concerning issues that went right over the heads of some of the best minds humanity has yet produced, your message is not going to be well-received, nor will it sink in quickly.
It is very hard for comrades, too, to shake off ruling class forms of thought.
After all: the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.
As you can see at this site, comrades are quite happy to carry on posting all manner of a priori theses, about fundamental aspects of reality, derived from a few distorted words, compounded by some rather shaky logic.
And they continue to do this even after this has been pointed out to them.
Ruling ideas continue to rule....
Rosa Lichtenstein
15th August 2006, 21:53
Fist, if. like me, you believe that metaphysics is the most abstract expression of ruling-class ideology (i.e., that the universe is rational, that is has an a priori structure, accessible by thought alone, or by the use of suitably 'processed' language, that there is a natural order that underpins that of the state (which order seems to change with differing modes of production -- so get back to work, and doff your cap while you are at it!), then no, his ideas cannot become the next 'ruling ideas'.
You are right, though, he gave away his wealth, and he gave up his professorship at Cambridge University to work as a hospital porter in WW2 (he also worked as a school teacher in a state school in a small Austrian village in the 1920's).
I have just posted an essay on W, revealing little known facts about his left wing sympathies.
Here is the salient part (the references you can find at my site):
Most revolutionaries seem to regard Analytic Philosophy as something of a conservative or ideological phenomenon -- Wittgenstein's work perhaps being seen as a prime example. That view has partly been motivated by the widely held opinion that Wittgenstein was a conservative and that he pandered to mystical and religious ideas.
That this received picture is incorrect can be seen by reading Alan Janik's essays "Nyiri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" -- which was a reply to Nyiri (1998) --, and "Wittgenstein, Marx and Sociology", both reprinted in Janik (1985), pp.116-57. See also Crary (2000).
In fact, not only were many of Wittgenstein's friends and pupils prominent Marxists -- e.g., Pierro Sraffa, Maurice Dobb, Nicholas Bakhtin, George Thomson, Maurice Cornforth, David Hayden-Guest, and Roy Pascall (cf., Monk (1990), pp.343, 348; Rhees (1984), pp.x, 48; and Sheehan (1993), pp.303, 343) --, but one of his foremost 'disciples' (Rush Rhees) at one point contemplated joining the RCP (i.e., the 1940's Trotskyist version, not that recent right-wing joke of the same name, now happily defunct), and asked Wittgenstein for advice on this. [Cf., Rhees (1984), pp.200-09.]
Rhees and Monk record the many sympathetic remarks Wittgenstein made about Marxism, about workers and about revolutionary activity. While these are not in themselves models of 'orthodoxy', they reveal how close Wittgenstein came to adopting a very weak form of class politics in the 1930's -- certainly closer than any other major philosopher had done since Marx himself; cf., Rhees (1984), pp.205-09. [Cf., also Norman Malcolm's Introduction to Rhees's book, pp.xvii-xviii, and Monk (1990), pp.343-54.]
In fact, Monk reports a comment made by George Thomson on Wittgenstein's attitude to Marxism: "He was opposed it in theory, but supported it in practice", and notes another friend who remembers Wittgenstein saying that he was "a communist, at heart" (Monk (1990), p.343). He concludes:
"There is no doubt that during the political upheavals of the mid-1930's Wittgenstein's sympathies were with the working class and the unemployed, and that his allegiance, broadly speaking, was with the left….
"Despite the fact that Wittgenstein was never at any time a Marxist, he was perceived as a sympathetic figure by the students who formed the core of the Cambridge Communist Party, many of whom ([David] Hayden-Guest, [John] Cornford, Maurice Cornforth, etc.) attended his lectures." [Monk (1990), pp.343, 348.]
In Rhees's book, Fania Pascall -- who was another Marxist friend of Wittgenstein's, married to Communist Party intellectual Roy Pascall, translator of The German Ideology into English --, reports that Wittgenstein had actually read Marx (cf., Rhees (1984), p.44), but, the source of this information appears to be John Moran ( Cf., Moran (1972)). Garth Hallett's otherwise comprehensive survey omits reference to this alleged fact. [ Cf., Hallett (1977), pp.759-75.] But, if, as we will see, he had read Lenin, and all his close friends were Marxists, it is a safe bet that he had read Marx.
Rhees and Monk also note that when Wittgenstein visited Russia he met Sophia Yanovskaya, who was Professor of Mathematical Logic at Moscow University and one of the co-editors of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts. [Cf., Yanovskaya (1983), in Marx (1983).] She apparently advised him to "read more Hegel" (which suggests he had read some). [Monk (1990), p.351, and Rhees (1984), p.209.] In fact, Yanovskaya even went as far as to recommend Wittgenstein for the chair at Kazan University (Lenin's old college) and for a teaching post at Moscow University (Monk (1990), p. 351). These were hardly posts one would have offered to just anyone in Stalin's Russia in the mid-1930's, least of all to one not sympathetic to Communism.
Monk suggests that Yanovskaya formed the (false) impression that Wittgenstein was interested in DM (ibid.), but Drury (another of Wittgenstein's pupils) informs us that Wittgenstein had a low opinion of Lenin's philosophical work (but, which one this refers to we do not know; but this does indicate that Wittgenstein had at least read Lenin since he never passed comments on second-hand reports of other writers' work), but the opposite view of his practical endeavours:
"Lenin's writings about philosophy are of course absurd, but at least he did want to get something done." [Drury, quoting Wittgenstein from recollection, in Rhees (1984), p.126.]
Fania Pascall also records Wittgenstein's friendship with Nicholas Bakhtin (ibid., p.14), and notes that at one time he expressed a desire to go and live in Russia, as we have seen (ibid., pp.26, 29, 44, 125-26, 198-200). In fact he actually visited Russia in September 1935 (cf., Monk (1990), pp. 347-53), when he met the above Professor Yanovskaya. Like many other Cambridge intellectuals at the time his desire to live in the USSR was motivated by his false belief that under Stalin it was a Workers' State. In this regard, of course, his intentions were more significant than his mistaken views. One only has to contrast Wittgenstein's opinion of Russia with that of, say, Bertrand Russell -- his former teacher -- to see how sympathetic in comparison Wittgenstein was to revolutionary Marxism, even if, like many others, he finally mistook the latter for Stalinism. [Cf., Drury's memoir in Rhees (1984), p.144, and Russell (1962).] John Maynard Keynes (another of Wittgenstein's friends) wrote the following in a letter to the Russian ambassador Maisky about Wittgenstein's plans to live in Russia:
"I must leave it to him to tell you his reasons for wanting to go to Russia. He is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for." [John Maynard Keynes to Maisky, quoted in Rhees (1984), p.199. Also quoted more fully in Monk (1990), p.349.]
In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk plays down Wittgenstein's proposed move, and, relying on Fania Pascall's view of Wittgenstein's motives, interprets it as a reflection of his attachment to a Tolstoyian view of the Russian peasantry and the 'dignity of manual labour'. While this clearly was a factor, it cannot explain Wittgenstein's positive remarks about the gains he believed workers had made because of the revolution. On this, Rhees is clearly a more reliable guide; he knew Wittgenstein better than almost anyone else.
[The full details of Wittgenstein's desire to live in Russia, and his visit, can be found in Monk (1990), pp.340-54.]
His closest friend before he met Rhees was Francis Skinner, who had wanted to volunteer to fight in Spain as part of the International Brigade (he was finally rejected on health grounds). Alan Turing (who was also one of Wittgenstein's pupils for a brief period) was thought by Wittgenstein himself to have believed that he (Wittgenstein) was trying to introduce "Bolshevism" into Mathematics, because of his criticisms of the use on contradictions in mathematics. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.419-20; see also Hodges (1983), pp.152-54.]
"Turing does not object to anything I say. He agrees with every word. He objects to the idea he thinks underlies it. He thinks we're undermining mathematics, introducing Bolshevism into mathematics. But not at all." [Wittgenstein (1976), p.76.]
On this and Wittgenstein's 'radical Bolshevism', see Ray Monk's on-line essay, here.
"The changes Wittgenstein wished to see are...I believe, so radical that the name 'full-blooded Bolshevism' suggests itself as a natural way to describe the militant tendency of his remarks." [Monk (1995).]
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein himself declared that his later Philosophy had been inspired by conversations he regularly had with Pierro Sraffa (Gramsci's friend). The extent of Sraffa's influence is still unclear (however, see below), but Wittgenstein himself admitted to Rhees that it was from Sraffa that he had gained an "anthropological" view of philosophical problems. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.260-61. Cf., also Malcolm (1958), p.69, and von Wright (ND), pp.28, 213, and Wittgenstein (1998), p.16.]
In the Preface to what was his most important and work, Wittgenstein had this to say:
"Even more than this…criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book." [Wittgenstein (1958), p.viii. Bold emphasis added.]
This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century -- and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of Metaphysics -- claims that his most "consequential" ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist!
Attempts to reconstruct the influence of Sraffa on Wittgenstein are in their early stages, and they are not likely to progress much unless some hard evidence turns up; to date, these attempts are based largely on supposition and inference. On this, see Sharpe (2002), Davis (2002) and Rossi-Landi (2002), pp.200-04.
Now, it is not being maintained here that Wittgenstein was a closet revolutionary, only that he has been rather badly misrepresented; a demonstrably erroneous view of his political leanings has been fostered by some of his 'disciples', who have (or have had) their own political agendas to pursue.
However, this whole issue has taken a somewhat farcical turn recently with the publication of Kimberley Cornish's book The Jew of Linz. [Cornish (1999).] Basing his conclusions on flimsy evidence, Cornish attempts to construct a wild theory that Hitler was turned into an anti-Semite by his encounter with Wittgenstein at school -- remarkably, these two attended the same school at the same time! According to Cornish, Wittgenstein subsequently became the principal recruiting agent for Stalinist spies in Cambridge, and that he concocted his "no-ownership theory of the mind" (aimed at confounding Nazi ideology) in order to make amends for this earlier 'crime' (of turning Hitler into an anti-Semite) -- as well as aiming to promote socialist collectivism.
In fact, the reasoning in Cornish's book is so fanciful one almost expects (as predicted by one of the characters in Umberto Eco's book Foucault's Pendulum [Eco (1989)]) The Illuminati and The Knights Templar (now much more familiar from Dan Brown's novels) to put in an appearance at some stage. Perhaps the only thing missing from Cornish's book is a reference to Wittgenstein's ability/inability to control the Telluric Forces.
Nevertheless, Cornish's book does have at least one merit: it assembles all the available evidence (and there is a considerable amount, even if some of it is circumstantial) indicative of Wittgenstein's attitude toward revolutionary politics; cf. Cornish (1999), pp.40-87. Cornish claims that Wittgenstein was a "Stalinist", but his evidence is largely fanciful, inferential and indirect.
[Mysteriously, Goldstein, an otherwise fairly reliable interpreter of Wittgenstein, seems to have swallowed this unlikely tale; cf., Goldstein (1999), pp.164-65. But even Goldstein is silent about the connection that Cornish alleges to have existed between Wittgenstein's encounter with Hitler and his career as the main Stalinist recruiting agent at Cambridge in the 1930's --, and, for that matter, with Wittgenstein's supposed motives for inventing the "no ownership theory of the mind".]
In addition to conservative misrepresentations of Wittgenstein's views, there is an equally spurious idea that his work is identical to the "Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy" of Ryle, Austin, Warnock, Strawson, Urmson and Hampshire. Beyond a few superficial similarities, Wittgenstein's work bears no resemblance at all to "Oxford Philosophy". On this, see Cavell (1971) and Dummett (1960).
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Wittgenstein.htm
Kim Cornish has contacted me to say that the above assertions about his book are inaccurate and prejudicial, so in the original essay at my site they have been pulled.
Epoche
15th August 2006, 21:54
I'm not sure what you are alluding to with the term nihilism, he was not a nihilist yet he proposed that religion was nihilistic and jesus was a nihilist due to his concepts of abstraction within his teachings. He believed christian faith was nihilistic.
I propose an irony here. What Nietzsche called Nihilism was what he diagnosed as weak in Darwinistic terms; inferior physical specimens of a species. This kind of Nihilism is not metaphysical, but if the idea is based from the assumption that the purpose of evolution is the elimination of these weaker types, then the theory has moved into metaphysics.
It is one thing to say that subject X is weak and sickly, and another to say that that is "bad."
Who is to say what the purpose of evolution is? How does one determine which events on an evolutionary scale are negative and which are positive, without an end in sight?
I classify Nietzsche as one of the first explosive reactions to industrialized society. His campaign against religious values and idealism was one of ther first appearances of the challenge to ruling class ideas...that "opiate of the masses." What does Nietzsche tell the individual first and foremost? Do not fear such things as "gods." And what pacified the working class more than anything else? Religious resolve...rewards waiting for one after they died....do one's job and have faith in God...keep pushing that rock, Sisyphus, etc., etc..
I also think that Nietzsche's WTP is often quite simpler than what it is made out to be when it is argued against. Essentially, the WTP is like a "philosophical physics," if you will, and as a theory it must be careful to avoid falling into metaphor, where it becomes a matter of morality, rather than its original indifferent form as an all encompassing concept free from ethical constraints. Such to the point, as mentioned above, that eventually one cannot distinguish between what is positive and negative in a series of evolutionary advancements. The fact is, the WTP is a multi-purpose package much like Spinoza's. It is one of those philosophies that says everything, and leaves one standing there asking "what now?"
I think the most spooky of them all, regarding Nietzsche's metaphysics, is the Eternal Recurrance.
I would rather us not look into that abyss, at this moment. Many a Marxist have been swallowed up.
Rosa Lichtenstein
16th August 2006, 04:31
Jim, as usual, you are right. W did indeed do what you say.
Bretty:
There is a difference in saying will to power is a metaphysical truth that needs no scientific explanation compared to will to power being something he seemed to observe on a sociological basis. Do you agree? Why or why not Rosa?
If it is sociological, then there will be evidence, in the shape of data, surveys, observations, etc.
Is there any such?
No,
So, it is metaphysical.
I tend to agree with Jim here:
I would say that the guy was a genius, but wasn't always very consistent.
Bretty:
And how is denying metaphysics as true and sensical a metaphysical aim?
I do not think I did do this.
What I did say amounted to this, however:
Concerning any metaphysical 'proposition', "p", if "p" is nonsensical, so is "not p".
[Hence, the 'scare' quotes around the word "proposition".]
And if "p" is metaphysical, so is "not p".
So, to deny that reality is rational is just as metaphysical as saying that it is rational.
What I do -- following W -- is to say that both "p" and "not p" are nonsensical.
is it not an advocationf or antimetaphysics and materialism?
I could not follow this.
[Have you borrowed Hoopla's boxing gloves by any chance?]
Rosa Lichtenstein
16th August 2006, 11:53
Bretty:
dont start with the boxing glove jokes
Apologies, but that last sentence of your last post suggested you were receiving lessons from Hoopla.
And that allusion was not meant to be offensive; just a reminder to Hoopla to read what he has typed to see if it makes sense.
Same with you.
I'm not sure why you don't think there is evidence suggesting that life looks for more then a will to life
Well, it might be, or it might not be be; but if one bases this idea on anything other than evidence (as opposed to shaky argumnents, dependent on even shakier logic), then I think I am right to call it metaphysical.
Worse, I do not see how it would be possible to show (by means of evidence ) that what you say is always true.
If it is imposed on nature (as all such notions have to be), that is another matter.
Wittgenstein called such impositions 'forms of representation' -- Kuhn called them (somewhat misleadingly), 'paradigms' --, with the caveat that if they are then interpreted as universal truths, rather than as rules we employ to help us make sense of nature, then they become metaphysical.
Further how is stating you do not believe that metaphysics has any connection with reality and is complete abstraction make it a metaphysical claim? In fact if you've read his essay named Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral sense, he makes claims that basically say metaphysics is nonsensical, although he does not use the word nonsensical. But alludes to the same conclusion. Perhaps Wittgenstein was influenced by this concept of negating metaphysics altogether?
W probably got this idea from Frege, not Nietzsche. But I cannot say, since he did not.
But since Frege was by far and away the biggest influence on W, I suspect he got it from him.
And any attempt to say what all of reality is like, or is not like, is metaphysical (or it is a 'form of representation', and hence a rule, but not a truth).
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