Led Zeppelin
14th August 2006, 13:23
Islamic Presidential Elections, Outcome and Perspective
The elections show of Islamic republic regime that as a result of contradictions among the internal gangs of the ruling group, had dragged on to the second round, ended on 4 th June 2005 . Quarrels among the rival factions caused the heads of some of those factions to expose, although in a limited manner, the sham of those elections. From Ahmadi Nezhad's votes increasing by millions over night to the cities that the number of cast votes exceeded the number of eligible voters in those cities, and at the least, the individuals who each cast tens of votes into the ballot box demonstrate the sham elections.
The majority of Iranian people boycotted the false elections. At the end of the second round, on the contrary, the regime announced that from 47 millions eligible voters 29 millions participated in the elections and 17.5 millions voted for Ahmadi Nezhad. That was while the candidates who did not get to the second round, except for one who was at the lowest rank, the rest directly and indirectly supported the other candidate that is Rafsanjani. Nevertheless in one week Ahmadi-Nezhad's votes increased three folds from 6.5 to 17.5 millions. These figures alone are the evidence of what a joke and how false the elections of the Islamic republic regime are. We will point out, according to what has been exposed now, that Ahmadi Nezhad was not selected in June 2005 but in June 2003 he was appointed as the president to follow Khatami. Apart from all those problems, had the regime announced that instead of 60% about 80% to 90% of people had participated in the elections, still would not make a slightest difference in the reality that the elections under the rule of Islamic republic are anti-democratic, stage managed and false. Such elections must always be boycotted.
In a country where the most basic civil, democratic rights and political freedoms are denied to people and repression is the norm, fundamentally, speaking of elections is irrelevant.
In a country where a group of reactionaries select several persons from among the lackeys of the state and tell people you only have the right to choose a person from among the selected few- there is no elections it is appointment.
In a country where the women as half of the Iranian population are denied the right to be elected to the highest organs and state institutions and even the men from religious minorities too are denied this right, speaking of elections is a joke in true sense of the word.
In a country the threat and intimidation is the norm to force people to vote and an ID without the election stamp would result in unemployment and numerous deprivations, speaking of the number of votes is an empty word.
In the face of such realities, arguing about cheating is a secondary problem and more suites those whose problem would be solved by prevention of cheating in elections.
Who determined the president of the Islamic republic?
It is a fact that a section of the Iranian people participated in the ninth presidential elections. Before analysing the election we must see which persons determined Khatami's substitute before hand and why that person was no other that Ahmadi Nezhad.
Following the emergence of crisis in early 1990s, the Islamic republic realised its previous policies had failed and it could not rule the people by past methods. The events preceding Khatami's election and the groups referred to as Reformists were the ruling group's tactics to confront crisis and control the situation. A short while after the Reformist coming to power, it was clear to people and the rival faction that the Reformists were inept. The regime's situation got worse, peoples' struggles got broader and spread and the heads of the regime came under direct attack by the masses of people. Under such circumstances the faction lead by Khamenie resorted to new slogans, tactics and organisation. Exposed faces were moved back stage and new organisations with less known faces emerged. Most important of them were the group called the Cultivators whose members came from Basij corps, Guards corps and young Hezbollahies and other institutions connected to the state. They chose their slogans to be attractive to poor and toiling masses. Rafsanjani and Khatami's economic policies had accumulated wealth in the hands of capitalists and driven the masses of workers and toilers to poverty. Discontent was increasing daily. Even the traditional petty bourgeoisie of town and country who are considered as one of the pillars of the regime were affected by such economic policies. At the same time increasing corruption in the highest ranks of the government continuously exacerbated discontent. The new groups used the situation to their advantage and the Cultivators turned the two specific slogans of fight against poverty and corruption to their main slogans. Their centre of activity was mainly the mosques and Basij units and before anyone they attracted the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Of course traditional petty bourgeoisie's reactionary cultural tendency was also influential.
Therefore as Khatami's empty promises were exposed to the broad masses of Iranian people and no longer were anyone keen to participate in elections in their favour, the Cultivators were able to take the Islamic councils of cities and country from Khatami's supporters. From there they continued their advance to take the parliament of reaction and they did. The situation in the Middle East had also changed and the regime was feeling severe danger. Taking of all state institutions by Khamenie's supporters in order to overcome the internal contradictions, and through controlling internal crisis confront regional crisis and the policies of the US government also became one the most important problems for the regime. Taking all the executive power and appointing an unknown president, completely subservient to the leader and a Hezbollahi, were the next steps to be implemented. This president was selected even before the elections to the parliament of reaction and must be officially announced at 2005 elections. The secret was exposed unwittingly by one of leaders of regime's gangs and the deputy head of the Islamic reaction parliament. He said, basically the objective of appointing Ahmadi Nezhad as the mayor of Tehran was to train him for carrying out the duties of the president when in post. He must become the president after Khatami despite opposition of rival faction. The intelligence ministry being under Khatami's faction opposes his appointment as the mayor of Tehran saying he has a record and there is a problem. What the record is still unsaid and Bahonar quoting the intelligence minister says Ahmadi Nezhad has a record at Ardebil state. But certain news is leaked by Khatami's supporters indicating Ahmadi Nezhad was involved in Intelligence ministry's assassination during Rafsanjani's presidency. It is even said he was one of the assassins of the Abdolrahmun Ghasemloo, the general secretary of Kurdestun Democratic Party of Iran. It is at the meeting of Bahonar with the intelligence minister that the minister leaks the problem and states that Ahmadi Nezhad is our next president and he becoming the mayor is to warm him up.
Bahonar says: When it was proposed, the intelligence minister stated: It is no good for Ahmadi Nezhad to become the mayor of Tehran . He has a record in Ardebil state. I discussed this with Mr Yonesi. How does your inelegance system permit a person like Malek Madani who has a higher diploma in textiles become the mayor of Tehran and your inelegance team gives it to Ahmadi Nezhad. I told him at that time Ahmadi Nezhad is our president and becoming a mayor is just to warm him up. If you want to think of something, think of making him the president.
The statements clearly show, although there maybe differences of opinion as to who should be the regime's next president and these differences could even exist within the dominant faction of the regime, nevertheless groups of that faction had already decided Ahmadi Nezhad was to be the president after Khatami.
Close to election time, certain series of occurrences brings the differences within that faction to the fore and the differences intensify when under the pressure and support of groups connected to Khatami, some groups of the bourgeoisie opposition and also some world powers and of course a group of heads of the clergy apparatus, Rafsanjani signs himself up as a candidate. Rafsanjani was apparently not supposed to have got involved and becomes a problem for Khamenie's faction and advancement of their pre-determined policy. They tried to convince Rafsanjani not to sign himself up as a candidate. They even threaten him should he participate he would not get votes and from their point of view he would suffer damage to his credibility. But Rafsanjani does not accept. As this takes place, confusion reigns among Khamenie's faction as to whom they should prop up to confront Rafsanjani and each group introduces their own candidate. But the group of Cultivators that enjoys the support of Khamenie, Guards corps, Basij corps, the clergy under the command of Khamenie in the mosques and state centres continues to advance the pre-determined policy and finally compels the other groups to follow . And as decided two years ago they also pull the name of their president out of the ballot box.
Which classes and strata, with what aims and interests participated in the elections
The Iranian capitalist class for its class interests was actively present in the so called elections. Although the factions of this class, particularly in the second round, were supporting this or that candidate, but their main representative was Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani appeared as the representative of the capitalist and rich class blunt and clear and enjoyed the support of the international bourgeoisie. His economic programme was the continuation of policies started during his presidency term and continued by Khatami. Rafsanjani defended the policy of handing state institutions to the private sector and further simplification of internal and foreign investments. Political organisations that supported Rafsanjani, in spite of their utterances on freedom, in fact had lined up behind Rafsanjani's economic programme. Additionally, the modern and comfortable petty bourgeoisie strata were among his aware supporters and participated in the elections. The numerous layers of this stratum are a group of university lecturers, lawyers, artists, journalists and writers, middle and low ranking managers, a group of officers of state institutions and private sector and owners and staff of those sectors of services that their interests are tied to economic developments of the last 16 years. Additionally, the main part of the state bureaucracy and its top level managers, sections of the regime's armed forces and sections of top level clergy were his supporters. Some of his votes were obtained through buying votes for a lunch or dinner, especially in a region like Kermun which is in the hands of Rafsanjani dynasty.
Rafsanjani's political record is full of crime, slaughter and execution, assassination, imprisonment and torture of ten of thousands of Iranian people. As the commencer of implementation of the economic policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Iran , he drove millions of workers and toilers to the verge of poverty, hunger and unemployment. He did not get any kind of support from the working and toiling people or from aware intellectuals and students.
The rival faction to Rafsanjani and its candidate Ahmadi Nezhad too, although defend the interests of the capitalists and their oppressive system ruling Iran, during the elections enjoyed the support of another faction of the capitalists, but deceptively attempted to appear as the supporters of toiling and oppressed people and opposed to poverty, corruption and theft in state institutions. The mass forces supporting this faction were fundamentally the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the town and country who voted in favour of Ahmadi Nezhad.
The Islamic republic from the very start tried to absorb the Iranian farmers as a conservative force. The effort was made with a series of welfare measures and even financial facilities. The well-off and to an extent the middle farmers that were supporters of the Shah's regime to his very last days, gradually found their guardian in the Islamic republic. With the exception of regions like Kurdestun and Balochestun that national and religious contradictions operate simultaneously, generally that is the situation in other regions and the Islamic republic has a base among a stratum of farmers. They have a specific material interest. Not only they support the regime, but also they are basically the base of regime's paramilitary force, Basij corps. It is the villages that are the centres for recruitment to Basij corps. Also from the very beginning the more conservative faction of the regime has managed this relationship with the farmers. This is a section of the force that the regime obtains a considerable part of its votes from in any elections.
Traditional petty bourgeoisie of towns, who from the beginning as a conservative and religious force, were supporting the Islamic republic and in the beginning were supported financially by the regime, were gradually pushed to the peripheries during Rafsanjani's term and especially during Khatami's presidency. At this period the living and earning condition of this strata was made more acute, and at least it became a neutral force. Therefore they were opposed to the economic policies of Rafsanjani and Khatami and also the cultural changes were irreconcilable to their intensely conservative and religious state of mind. Therefore, through the process of new efforts of the Khamenie's wing to absorb and organise this strata, they were quickly absorbed and voted for Ahmadi Nezhad.
Other portion of votes for Ahmadi Nezhad were provided by the Guards corps, Basij corps, lower ranks of clergy and the net work of institutions and centres connected to this wing.
Ahmadi Nezhad and his supporters, especially recently, concentrated their propaganda and activities in the poor areas of towns and made efforts to at least get the votes of the poor residing in the peripheries of towns and even the poorest and ignorant of workers. Although in the second round they advanced that policy to a limit, nevertheless they could not have a considerable success in all. Tehran is a case in point. In a city intensely polarised to classes and the greatest number of poor living in its peripheries, according to regime's own admit ion, he got 1.5 million of the 8.5 million eligible number of voters. We must also point out that a group of people took part only to have their ID endorsed with elections stamp. They either dropped blank ballots into the box or voted for one of the two candidates. From what has been stated we draw the conclusion that the Iranian working class, a broad section of the toilers and intellectuals are seriously opposed to the Islamic republic, the existing system and boycotted the elections. This conclusion does not refute the problem that in some more backward regions of Iran , a group of workers took part in the elections and or in regions like Kurdestun the petty bourgeoisie boycotted the elections. An important point which was very apparent was the solid boycott of the elections by the students. Even the student organisation connected to the reformist wing was compelled to declare its non-participation in the elections. Women too, who at a time were Khatami's supporters widely boycotted voting. Only a group of women belonging to the capitalist class, traditional petty bourgeoisie and in a more limited numbers the modern petty bourgeoisie, cast their votes.
The perspective of development and crisis deepening
Now that the wing connected to Khamenie and at its helm the group named Cultivators, by taking all organs and institutions of the regime, has solved the question of power in its own interest, the nature of the problem will have a series of internal and foreign consequences.
As stated before, the main aim of the regime in concentrating power in the hands of one wing is to overcome the internal contradictions in order to confront the crises that surround the regime from within and without. Therefore, the problem must be assessed that what influences these developments would have on the political situation in Iran , class contradictions and struggle, the regime's situation, its international relations and questions of this kind? What policies would be adopted? And what would be the tactics and manoeuvres of the ruling group?
Groups connected to the regime's loser wing and some of the bourgeois opposition, by presenting superficial and journalistic publicity analysis, speak of return to the oppression of the early years of Islamic state, establishment of Taliban model of Islam in Iran , rule of fascism and military, and rule of the clerics of the Haghani School . These kinds of analyses, although during the period of electioneering of the two wings could have publicity mileage for them, in practice can be of interest to the regime and create illusions should the people not witness them in reality. The fact is, although these unknown persons that now under the title of Cultivators and so have been driven to front stage, are Guards, Basiji and Hezbollahi and such and Ahmadi Nezhad is also one of the black clad Hezbollahi hoards of the early years of the Islamic republic, but they are the implementers of a series of new policies and tactics of the ruling group. This is exactly as 8 years ago, when a group of Hezbollahies, Guards, agents of intelligence ministry and Basijies appeared in the role of state Reformers. At least from their point of view, they have not come to speed the process of Islamic republic's overthrow; their thought is to rescue the Islamic republic from crisis. Precisely, they are driven to the political front stage since the regime's policies in the first decade, second and to today have failed. Therefore, from now we must expect policies and manoeuvres they would resort to in order to create illusions among the toiling people specially. We must be prepared to neutralise them right from now.
Return to past, daily group executions, imprisoning thousands of people in struggle, rapid assassinations, slaughter of thousands of political prisoners in few days, establishment of repression at least for a period so no one dares to take a breath are no longer effective. Their days are gone. Active opponents of the regime, now not in dimensions of tens and hundreds of thousands, but in millions are facing the Islamic republic. The level of growth of class struggle and mass awareness no longer allows such permission. At the cultural level, personal and social ways of life too, no longer return to past is possible. As far as the economic policies are concerned this return to past is no longer possible either. So what are they going to do?
In short term, they would try to maintain the existing political and cultural situation under their control. But what would the main concentration of their central economic policy be? They would make efforts to reduce the degree of pressure and discontent among the broad masses of toiling people that arises from the acuteness of their material and living conditions or at least prevent intensification of acuteness. That to what extent they could progress that policy, of course depends on numerous parameters. They now speak of an economic programme and policy that their economic theorist, Tavakoli, defends as the Chinese economic model. But this capitalist economic model- a merger of state and private capitalism has been formed under the political leadership of a centralised bourgeoisie and is the product of economic and political processes specific to China completely differing to the economic and political conditions ruling Iran . Even at the height of nationalisation of production and services establishment in Iran , the private sector bourgeoisie was the other leg determining Iranian economic policies. This bourgeoisie has become such a power during Rafsanjani and Khatami's terms that can now buy the government and all its economic establishments in one go. It is on the basis of these realities and interests that even certain groups from the Khamenie's wing are opposed to this policy.
The Cultivators have opened an account on the colossal oil income, which during the past two to three years has increased three folds in price, to advance their economic policies. But that income is not stable and sustainable nor the rival wing, the private sector bourgeoisie would relent the income that it gets from oil. Precisely, this very problem would be the first issue for the quarrels of the factions connected to various wings of the bourgeoisie. Now some of the great share holders of oil, gas and petrochemicals establishments in Iran are the heads of groups called Reformists and managers and the government officials of Rafsanjani and Khatami's periods of presidency. In dealing and wheeling with the international oil monopolies they have become such a powerful oil Mafia that no one from among the ruling group can challenge. Finally even if the power of this Mafia is challenged, the Mafia of the opposite wing will take the loot and nothing would go to people.
The point is also clear that colossal economic policies are not determined in Iran by the likes of Tavakolies and Ahmadi Nezhads. The world large monopolies, international monetary establishments connected to them and imperialist world powers determine them.
Therefore the new economic policy would remain on paper and finally Khatami's policy would continue. Consequently, economic contradictions would not even adjust. But what about the other contradictions? The Iranian society is not facing one or several contradictions; it is facing a collection of acute social contradictions in economic, political and cultural arenas that must be solved. The solution to even a small section of these contradictions is not possible within the framework of the Islamic republic; because the main obstacle to solve these contradictions is the existing political superstructure. Hence, none of the regime's wings and no policy within such a framework are able to solve the contradictions. These contradictions, as long as the Islamic republic is in power, have no way other than daily intensification. These are the very contradictions that continuously intensify class struggle and deepen the political crisis.
Apparently today, it seems the regime has overcome its internal contradictions by consolidating power seamlessly, but in reality it is not so. So far we have observed umpteen times that apparently seamless gangs of the regime have continuously faced differences, internal contradictions and have engaged in quarrels. This problem has a tight connection to contradictions of the Iranian society, contradictions and economic interests of the powers within these gangs. Therefore, from within the current seamlessness of the regime too, permanent contradictions and gaps would appear and usual quarrels would continue. But the internal contradictions of the ruling group and the ruling class do not end here. The wing that has been swept off power, itself part of the power, would remain but at a different level and would continue its quarrels on a more open and acute level.
At the international arena too, there exists no factor indicating a reduction in regime's contradictions. Principally the make up of the ruling power and its policies are such that it must intensify these contradictions as a rule.
Considering the total of the contradictions referred to above, it can be concluded- although the regime would try to reduce the degree of people's discontent with some manoeuvres, tactics and even spread the illusion of improving the material and living condition of people, but it would not be able to solve the existing crises. These crises would continue to deepen and spread.
The elections show of Islamic republic regime that as a result of contradictions among the internal gangs of the ruling group, had dragged on to the second round, ended on 4 th June 2005 . Quarrels among the rival factions caused the heads of some of those factions to expose, although in a limited manner, the sham of those elections. From Ahmadi Nezhad's votes increasing by millions over night to the cities that the number of cast votes exceeded the number of eligible voters in those cities, and at the least, the individuals who each cast tens of votes into the ballot box demonstrate the sham elections.
The majority of Iranian people boycotted the false elections. At the end of the second round, on the contrary, the regime announced that from 47 millions eligible voters 29 millions participated in the elections and 17.5 millions voted for Ahmadi Nezhad. That was while the candidates who did not get to the second round, except for one who was at the lowest rank, the rest directly and indirectly supported the other candidate that is Rafsanjani. Nevertheless in one week Ahmadi-Nezhad's votes increased three folds from 6.5 to 17.5 millions. These figures alone are the evidence of what a joke and how false the elections of the Islamic republic regime are. We will point out, according to what has been exposed now, that Ahmadi Nezhad was not selected in June 2005 but in June 2003 he was appointed as the president to follow Khatami. Apart from all those problems, had the regime announced that instead of 60% about 80% to 90% of people had participated in the elections, still would not make a slightest difference in the reality that the elections under the rule of Islamic republic are anti-democratic, stage managed and false. Such elections must always be boycotted.
In a country where the most basic civil, democratic rights and political freedoms are denied to people and repression is the norm, fundamentally, speaking of elections is irrelevant.
In a country where a group of reactionaries select several persons from among the lackeys of the state and tell people you only have the right to choose a person from among the selected few- there is no elections it is appointment.
In a country where the women as half of the Iranian population are denied the right to be elected to the highest organs and state institutions and even the men from religious minorities too are denied this right, speaking of elections is a joke in true sense of the word.
In a country the threat and intimidation is the norm to force people to vote and an ID without the election stamp would result in unemployment and numerous deprivations, speaking of the number of votes is an empty word.
In the face of such realities, arguing about cheating is a secondary problem and more suites those whose problem would be solved by prevention of cheating in elections.
Who determined the president of the Islamic republic?
It is a fact that a section of the Iranian people participated in the ninth presidential elections. Before analysing the election we must see which persons determined Khatami's substitute before hand and why that person was no other that Ahmadi Nezhad.
Following the emergence of crisis in early 1990s, the Islamic republic realised its previous policies had failed and it could not rule the people by past methods. The events preceding Khatami's election and the groups referred to as Reformists were the ruling group's tactics to confront crisis and control the situation. A short while after the Reformist coming to power, it was clear to people and the rival faction that the Reformists were inept. The regime's situation got worse, peoples' struggles got broader and spread and the heads of the regime came under direct attack by the masses of people. Under such circumstances the faction lead by Khamenie resorted to new slogans, tactics and organisation. Exposed faces were moved back stage and new organisations with less known faces emerged. Most important of them were the group called the Cultivators whose members came from Basij corps, Guards corps and young Hezbollahies and other institutions connected to the state. They chose their slogans to be attractive to poor and toiling masses. Rafsanjani and Khatami's economic policies had accumulated wealth in the hands of capitalists and driven the masses of workers and toilers to poverty. Discontent was increasing daily. Even the traditional petty bourgeoisie of town and country who are considered as one of the pillars of the regime were affected by such economic policies. At the same time increasing corruption in the highest ranks of the government continuously exacerbated discontent. The new groups used the situation to their advantage and the Cultivators turned the two specific slogans of fight against poverty and corruption to their main slogans. Their centre of activity was mainly the mosques and Basij units and before anyone they attracted the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Of course traditional petty bourgeoisie's reactionary cultural tendency was also influential.
Therefore as Khatami's empty promises were exposed to the broad masses of Iranian people and no longer were anyone keen to participate in elections in their favour, the Cultivators were able to take the Islamic councils of cities and country from Khatami's supporters. From there they continued their advance to take the parliament of reaction and they did. The situation in the Middle East had also changed and the regime was feeling severe danger. Taking of all state institutions by Khamenie's supporters in order to overcome the internal contradictions, and through controlling internal crisis confront regional crisis and the policies of the US government also became one the most important problems for the regime. Taking all the executive power and appointing an unknown president, completely subservient to the leader and a Hezbollahi, were the next steps to be implemented. This president was selected even before the elections to the parliament of reaction and must be officially announced at 2005 elections. The secret was exposed unwittingly by one of leaders of regime's gangs and the deputy head of the Islamic reaction parliament. He said, basically the objective of appointing Ahmadi Nezhad as the mayor of Tehran was to train him for carrying out the duties of the president when in post. He must become the president after Khatami despite opposition of rival faction. The intelligence ministry being under Khatami's faction opposes his appointment as the mayor of Tehran saying he has a record and there is a problem. What the record is still unsaid and Bahonar quoting the intelligence minister says Ahmadi Nezhad has a record at Ardebil state. But certain news is leaked by Khatami's supporters indicating Ahmadi Nezhad was involved in Intelligence ministry's assassination during Rafsanjani's presidency. It is even said he was one of the assassins of the Abdolrahmun Ghasemloo, the general secretary of Kurdestun Democratic Party of Iran. It is at the meeting of Bahonar with the intelligence minister that the minister leaks the problem and states that Ahmadi Nezhad is our next president and he becoming the mayor is to warm him up.
Bahonar says: When it was proposed, the intelligence minister stated: It is no good for Ahmadi Nezhad to become the mayor of Tehran . He has a record in Ardebil state. I discussed this with Mr Yonesi. How does your inelegance system permit a person like Malek Madani who has a higher diploma in textiles become the mayor of Tehran and your inelegance team gives it to Ahmadi Nezhad. I told him at that time Ahmadi Nezhad is our president and becoming a mayor is just to warm him up. If you want to think of something, think of making him the president.
The statements clearly show, although there maybe differences of opinion as to who should be the regime's next president and these differences could even exist within the dominant faction of the regime, nevertheless groups of that faction had already decided Ahmadi Nezhad was to be the president after Khatami.
Close to election time, certain series of occurrences brings the differences within that faction to the fore and the differences intensify when under the pressure and support of groups connected to Khatami, some groups of the bourgeoisie opposition and also some world powers and of course a group of heads of the clergy apparatus, Rafsanjani signs himself up as a candidate. Rafsanjani was apparently not supposed to have got involved and becomes a problem for Khamenie's faction and advancement of their pre-determined policy. They tried to convince Rafsanjani not to sign himself up as a candidate. They even threaten him should he participate he would not get votes and from their point of view he would suffer damage to his credibility. But Rafsanjani does not accept. As this takes place, confusion reigns among Khamenie's faction as to whom they should prop up to confront Rafsanjani and each group introduces their own candidate. But the group of Cultivators that enjoys the support of Khamenie, Guards corps, Basij corps, the clergy under the command of Khamenie in the mosques and state centres continues to advance the pre-determined policy and finally compels the other groups to follow . And as decided two years ago they also pull the name of their president out of the ballot box.
Which classes and strata, with what aims and interests participated in the elections
The Iranian capitalist class for its class interests was actively present in the so called elections. Although the factions of this class, particularly in the second round, were supporting this or that candidate, but their main representative was Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani appeared as the representative of the capitalist and rich class blunt and clear and enjoyed the support of the international bourgeoisie. His economic programme was the continuation of policies started during his presidency term and continued by Khatami. Rafsanjani defended the policy of handing state institutions to the private sector and further simplification of internal and foreign investments. Political organisations that supported Rafsanjani, in spite of their utterances on freedom, in fact had lined up behind Rafsanjani's economic programme. Additionally, the modern and comfortable petty bourgeoisie strata were among his aware supporters and participated in the elections. The numerous layers of this stratum are a group of university lecturers, lawyers, artists, journalists and writers, middle and low ranking managers, a group of officers of state institutions and private sector and owners and staff of those sectors of services that their interests are tied to economic developments of the last 16 years. Additionally, the main part of the state bureaucracy and its top level managers, sections of the regime's armed forces and sections of top level clergy were his supporters. Some of his votes were obtained through buying votes for a lunch or dinner, especially in a region like Kermun which is in the hands of Rafsanjani dynasty.
Rafsanjani's political record is full of crime, slaughter and execution, assassination, imprisonment and torture of ten of thousands of Iranian people. As the commencer of implementation of the economic policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Iran , he drove millions of workers and toilers to the verge of poverty, hunger and unemployment. He did not get any kind of support from the working and toiling people or from aware intellectuals and students.
The rival faction to Rafsanjani and its candidate Ahmadi Nezhad too, although defend the interests of the capitalists and their oppressive system ruling Iran, during the elections enjoyed the support of another faction of the capitalists, but deceptively attempted to appear as the supporters of toiling and oppressed people and opposed to poverty, corruption and theft in state institutions. The mass forces supporting this faction were fundamentally the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the town and country who voted in favour of Ahmadi Nezhad.
The Islamic republic from the very start tried to absorb the Iranian farmers as a conservative force. The effort was made with a series of welfare measures and even financial facilities. The well-off and to an extent the middle farmers that were supporters of the Shah's regime to his very last days, gradually found their guardian in the Islamic republic. With the exception of regions like Kurdestun and Balochestun that national and religious contradictions operate simultaneously, generally that is the situation in other regions and the Islamic republic has a base among a stratum of farmers. They have a specific material interest. Not only they support the regime, but also they are basically the base of regime's paramilitary force, Basij corps. It is the villages that are the centres for recruitment to Basij corps. Also from the very beginning the more conservative faction of the regime has managed this relationship with the farmers. This is a section of the force that the regime obtains a considerable part of its votes from in any elections.
Traditional petty bourgeoisie of towns, who from the beginning as a conservative and religious force, were supporting the Islamic republic and in the beginning were supported financially by the regime, were gradually pushed to the peripheries during Rafsanjani's term and especially during Khatami's presidency. At this period the living and earning condition of this strata was made more acute, and at least it became a neutral force. Therefore they were opposed to the economic policies of Rafsanjani and Khatami and also the cultural changes were irreconcilable to their intensely conservative and religious state of mind. Therefore, through the process of new efforts of the Khamenie's wing to absorb and organise this strata, they were quickly absorbed and voted for Ahmadi Nezhad.
Other portion of votes for Ahmadi Nezhad were provided by the Guards corps, Basij corps, lower ranks of clergy and the net work of institutions and centres connected to this wing.
Ahmadi Nezhad and his supporters, especially recently, concentrated their propaganda and activities in the poor areas of towns and made efforts to at least get the votes of the poor residing in the peripheries of towns and even the poorest and ignorant of workers. Although in the second round they advanced that policy to a limit, nevertheless they could not have a considerable success in all. Tehran is a case in point. In a city intensely polarised to classes and the greatest number of poor living in its peripheries, according to regime's own admit ion, he got 1.5 million of the 8.5 million eligible number of voters. We must also point out that a group of people took part only to have their ID endorsed with elections stamp. They either dropped blank ballots into the box or voted for one of the two candidates. From what has been stated we draw the conclusion that the Iranian working class, a broad section of the toilers and intellectuals are seriously opposed to the Islamic republic, the existing system and boycotted the elections. This conclusion does not refute the problem that in some more backward regions of Iran , a group of workers took part in the elections and or in regions like Kurdestun the petty bourgeoisie boycotted the elections. An important point which was very apparent was the solid boycott of the elections by the students. Even the student organisation connected to the reformist wing was compelled to declare its non-participation in the elections. Women too, who at a time were Khatami's supporters widely boycotted voting. Only a group of women belonging to the capitalist class, traditional petty bourgeoisie and in a more limited numbers the modern petty bourgeoisie, cast their votes.
The perspective of development and crisis deepening
Now that the wing connected to Khamenie and at its helm the group named Cultivators, by taking all organs and institutions of the regime, has solved the question of power in its own interest, the nature of the problem will have a series of internal and foreign consequences.
As stated before, the main aim of the regime in concentrating power in the hands of one wing is to overcome the internal contradictions in order to confront the crises that surround the regime from within and without. Therefore, the problem must be assessed that what influences these developments would have on the political situation in Iran , class contradictions and struggle, the regime's situation, its international relations and questions of this kind? What policies would be adopted? And what would be the tactics and manoeuvres of the ruling group?
Groups connected to the regime's loser wing and some of the bourgeois opposition, by presenting superficial and journalistic publicity analysis, speak of return to the oppression of the early years of Islamic state, establishment of Taliban model of Islam in Iran , rule of fascism and military, and rule of the clerics of the Haghani School . These kinds of analyses, although during the period of electioneering of the two wings could have publicity mileage for them, in practice can be of interest to the regime and create illusions should the people not witness them in reality. The fact is, although these unknown persons that now under the title of Cultivators and so have been driven to front stage, are Guards, Basiji and Hezbollahi and such and Ahmadi Nezhad is also one of the black clad Hezbollahi hoards of the early years of the Islamic republic, but they are the implementers of a series of new policies and tactics of the ruling group. This is exactly as 8 years ago, when a group of Hezbollahies, Guards, agents of intelligence ministry and Basijies appeared in the role of state Reformers. At least from their point of view, they have not come to speed the process of Islamic republic's overthrow; their thought is to rescue the Islamic republic from crisis. Precisely, they are driven to the political front stage since the regime's policies in the first decade, second and to today have failed. Therefore, from now we must expect policies and manoeuvres they would resort to in order to create illusions among the toiling people specially. We must be prepared to neutralise them right from now.
Return to past, daily group executions, imprisoning thousands of people in struggle, rapid assassinations, slaughter of thousands of political prisoners in few days, establishment of repression at least for a period so no one dares to take a breath are no longer effective. Their days are gone. Active opponents of the regime, now not in dimensions of tens and hundreds of thousands, but in millions are facing the Islamic republic. The level of growth of class struggle and mass awareness no longer allows such permission. At the cultural level, personal and social ways of life too, no longer return to past is possible. As far as the economic policies are concerned this return to past is no longer possible either. So what are they going to do?
In short term, they would try to maintain the existing political and cultural situation under their control. But what would the main concentration of their central economic policy be? They would make efforts to reduce the degree of pressure and discontent among the broad masses of toiling people that arises from the acuteness of their material and living conditions or at least prevent intensification of acuteness. That to what extent they could progress that policy, of course depends on numerous parameters. They now speak of an economic programme and policy that their economic theorist, Tavakoli, defends as the Chinese economic model. But this capitalist economic model- a merger of state and private capitalism has been formed under the political leadership of a centralised bourgeoisie and is the product of economic and political processes specific to China completely differing to the economic and political conditions ruling Iran . Even at the height of nationalisation of production and services establishment in Iran , the private sector bourgeoisie was the other leg determining Iranian economic policies. This bourgeoisie has become such a power during Rafsanjani and Khatami's terms that can now buy the government and all its economic establishments in one go. It is on the basis of these realities and interests that even certain groups from the Khamenie's wing are opposed to this policy.
The Cultivators have opened an account on the colossal oil income, which during the past two to three years has increased three folds in price, to advance their economic policies. But that income is not stable and sustainable nor the rival wing, the private sector bourgeoisie would relent the income that it gets from oil. Precisely, this very problem would be the first issue for the quarrels of the factions connected to various wings of the bourgeoisie. Now some of the great share holders of oil, gas and petrochemicals establishments in Iran are the heads of groups called Reformists and managers and the government officials of Rafsanjani and Khatami's periods of presidency. In dealing and wheeling with the international oil monopolies they have become such a powerful oil Mafia that no one from among the ruling group can challenge. Finally even if the power of this Mafia is challenged, the Mafia of the opposite wing will take the loot and nothing would go to people.
The point is also clear that colossal economic policies are not determined in Iran by the likes of Tavakolies and Ahmadi Nezhads. The world large monopolies, international monetary establishments connected to them and imperialist world powers determine them.
Therefore the new economic policy would remain on paper and finally Khatami's policy would continue. Consequently, economic contradictions would not even adjust. But what about the other contradictions? The Iranian society is not facing one or several contradictions; it is facing a collection of acute social contradictions in economic, political and cultural arenas that must be solved. The solution to even a small section of these contradictions is not possible within the framework of the Islamic republic; because the main obstacle to solve these contradictions is the existing political superstructure. Hence, none of the regime's wings and no policy within such a framework are able to solve the contradictions. These contradictions, as long as the Islamic republic is in power, have no way other than daily intensification. These are the very contradictions that continuously intensify class struggle and deepen the political crisis.
Apparently today, it seems the regime has overcome its internal contradictions by consolidating power seamlessly, but in reality it is not so. So far we have observed umpteen times that apparently seamless gangs of the regime have continuously faced differences, internal contradictions and have engaged in quarrels. This problem has a tight connection to contradictions of the Iranian society, contradictions and economic interests of the powers within these gangs. Therefore, from within the current seamlessness of the regime too, permanent contradictions and gaps would appear and usual quarrels would continue. But the internal contradictions of the ruling group and the ruling class do not end here. The wing that has been swept off power, itself part of the power, would remain but at a different level and would continue its quarrels on a more open and acute level.
At the international arena too, there exists no factor indicating a reduction in regime's contradictions. Principally the make up of the ruling power and its policies are such that it must intensify these contradictions as a rule.
Considering the total of the contradictions referred to above, it can be concluded- although the regime would try to reduce the degree of people's discontent with some manoeuvres, tactics and even spread the illusion of improving the material and living condition of people, but it would not be able to solve the existing crises. These crises would continue to deepen and spread.