ethics: logically illegitimate

[The Sloth]

i want to continue a thread here, as the other one might be trashed.

ethics are based on our arbitrary conceptions of society. we want to see justice not because justice has some kind of logical necessity, but because we were inculcated with an ethical sense by our parents, or by whoever/whatever else.

ethics are never a priori, although they can be. but simply because a moral is a priori doesn't mean that it has logical precedence over any other kind of ethical conception.


Originally posted by [email protected] 13 2006, 05:36 AM
What basis do you, make this claim on?

on the basis of logic.

i should re-phrase my statement, then:

ethics have no logical justification. every "ought" is riddled with arbitrary social prejudices.

i propse something like this: we let go of every ethical judgment/value that is not necessary for maximizing people's happiness, people's general welfare, etc. maybe a lot of communists never expressed it in that way, but that's the basic thought behind "communist morality" -- namely, whatever is unnecessary should be laughed at. everyone knows this, even if they've never particularly thought it.

of course, this doesn't mean that our universal condemnation of murder and rape are automatically logical. this condemnation can never be logical.. we can only appeal to might, to the fact that most people are against murder and rape at any given time.

and, true, we might have a biological preference to not see others suffer, but, again, simply because it's part of our natural constitution doesn't imply that we should act according to our biology; simply because certain genes or body parts are there doesn't mean we have to use them in any particular way, or at all. this "ought" business is prejudiced in itself. logic has no say in our constitution, nor does it have any say in ethical considerations. the fact is, we shall never root our desire for justice in anything rational or concrete. ethics will always supercede the world of facts into the illegitimate (yet desirable) metaphysical realm we are in now.

[More Fire for the People]

ethics are based on our arbitrary conceptions of society. we want to see justice not because justice has some kind of logical necessity, but because we were inculcated with an ethical sense by our parents, or by whoever/whatever else.
I agree. Morality does not exist; the world lacks any a priori value. I think we should re-evaluate ethics and create something like a praxis-oriented rationalist version of ethics — something akin to Nietzsche’s concept of an übermensch: someone who uses creativity to overcome nihilism and re-evaluates and overcomes existing social ideals.

[hoopla]

Erm, i see no reason why an objective morality cannot exist (an argument from queerness, does not matter to me anymore), indeed, I think that morality is as observable as any natural law. E.g. value seems to be presupposed in alot of the arguments above. Indded, imho, if your going to rule out something like objective morality, then you don't have many resources with which to do philosophy, so...

Imho both Habermas and Levinas are valid responses to the probelm of the outlandishness of cognitivist ontology.

Tbh I don't know what good argumentation for a cognitivist ethics, exactly is :(
Maybe, simply that it runs parrallel with our everyday experience of the world, and our intutions on it. If so, then it is like any and all good philosophy.


I think we should :lol: ;)


ethics have no logical justification. every "ought" is riddled with arbitrary social prejudicesYou seem to be saying that ought is meaningless because it must contain prejudice. Can you expand on this logic, bearing in mind that I must discount any appeals to a value system...

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 13 2006, 06:20 PM
Erm, i see no reason why an objective morality cannot exist (an argument from queerness, does not matter to me anymore), indeed, I think that morality is as observable as any natural law. E.g. value seems to be presupposed in alot of the arguments above.
the problem with objective morality is this: what decides this objectivity? in other matters, logic can decide. in morality, i don't see how logic is applicable.

morality is observable, indeed, as a natural law.. animals and people in specific societies, time periods, and circumstances act in a certain way. yet this behavior changes from time to time; it adapts to the new circumstances that arise.

and since all of this is purely circumstantial, it's also arbitrary. that doesn't mean it's a bad thing.. i do think ethical considerations are important, regardless of whether they are logically justifiable.


You seem to be saying that ought is meaningless because it must contain prejudice. Can you expand on this logic, bearing in mind that I must discount any appeals to a value system...

meaningless, in what sense?

i do happen to think that logical judgments in the realm of morality are by definition incoherent.. but, they are not meaningless in the sense of social consequences. moral judgments, logically justifiable or not, do have social consequences; they have very physical, very real consequences. so, in the context of the world, in the context of society, these judgments very much pertain to our behavior.

but simply because i find such judgments incoherent doesn't mean they're necessarily meaningless, nor does it mean all of these judgments should be ignored.

as for moral judgments containing prejudice -- whenever we condemn or praise any kind of behavior, we are condemning or praising from the perspective of our particular, circumstantial, and arbitrary society. i did say above that natural moral law exists in a way, and that this law's defining feature is its volatility; it changes from time to time, from society to society, from circumstance to circumstance. and since it's so malleable, it can't possibly be concrete, it can't possibly be absolute. therefore, all moral judgments are made from our circumstantial prejudices, which are defined as the preference for certain behaviors, a preference that is set at the whims of a society.

and, even if this behavior is not set at the whims of a society, even if this particular behavior was and is universal to every culture, and it can't possibly be otherwise, logicially justifying this behavior would still be difficult. murder is a popular example.. why shouldn't i murder? where is the logical argument against that? one might say, for example, murder will create a situation that would be unpleasant for the murderer, such as imprisonment for the offense. yet the argument, again, assumes another prejudice, namely, the idea that people have a logical justification for avoiding (or not avoiding) whatever's that unpleasant.

most people don't try to do things they dislike, but if asked why, they can only answer: because i don't like it. that's not an argument, it's merely an appeal to a sensation or a feeling (discomfort).. again, it has no logical dimension.

[hoopla]

I see: The way in which I meant "meaningless" is, I think, summed ,well by "do not assert genuine propositions". You seem to be saying that ethical sentences still have a purpose - to orient action, maybe?

This is where I link to wiki: choose a theory! :lol:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta-ethics#M...thical_theories (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta-ethics#Meta-ethical_theories)

You sound like a non-cognitivist. Although this may be a type of scepticism, if it is then it is externally so, so that it seems that you would not have to change any of your moral convictions.

I think usually intuition is thought to be suitable to decide moral judgements. If this, indeed, analogous to seeing, then imo ethical decisions are not arbitary.

I have been advised that Ditezgen, is good for looking into morality, not sure what I got from this text, yet, but... http://www.marxists.org/archive/dietzgen/w...870s/ethics.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/dietzgen/works/1870s/ethics.htm)

Erm, if it turns out that you supposrt emotivism, I find it a bit wild that anyone would go around shouting their emotional reactions at people.

Iirc, the variability of morality is a problem for objectivists, but, maybe Dietzgen can help here, and... I dunno, there are lots of diagreements on other supposedly truth apt topics, e.g. the philosophy of history (apparently).

[hoopla]

I found what I was looking for: R.d. ( :huh: ) argues that moral statements ascribing to external scepticism, are indistinguishable from those ascribing to internal scepticism (that moral jusdgements are rediculous, and hence the beleiver must abandon her moral convictions). The argument states that external scepticism, cannot be, and is just internal: think I agree with this, from discussing external scepticism with socialists: I cannot see how their position differs from a moral nihilism (?).

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Ethics can be constructed for the benefit of human progress. I think the main argument is whether or not they should be constructed.

[hoopla]

If a future society run counter to our moral inuitions (if e.g. genocide was common) we would be disgusted -there would be no point in building socialism.

The argument from freedom presupposes that people do not perform immoral acts. If we say somethig like "but people have a natural need to not be immoral, so it will not happen" seems to me to be arguing still for a a post-revolution morality, just one that does not require any co-operation understanding or participation.

:unsure: Could go over my Habermas notes.. he is good.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Although i'l be the first to admit I can do nothing against your rationality, your argument calling ethics meaningless in effect means that all actions are equal. Which means that raping a newborn child is equal to saving lives. And even if I can't find a logical flaw in your argument, I just can't bring myself to accept that conclusion.

-Alex

[hoopla]

If you are reffering to Brooklyn, I guess I don't know, I don't see any argument there other than we have no way of making a judgement, and it changes alot. In reply, I have suggested that we do: intuition, and there are disagreements in other tpoics. It will take more than this to change my mind!

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Intuition... You're on shaky ground, hoop. It seems intuitive that the world is flat and unmoving, after all.

-Alex

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 13 2006, 09:08 PM
Intuition... You're on shaky ground, hoop. It seems intuitive that the world is flat and unmoving, after all.

-Alex
You cannot seriously beleive that you do not use intuition in your reeasoning - I don't think humans could think without using intuition.

My intution does not state that the earth is flat. It sounds almost as if you are suggesting that there is no scientific proof of objective ethics: positivist :angry:

Ffs, Brookly basically just says "its a silly idea"! Imho ( :unsure: ) there is not much "logic" to any of the reasoning on this thread.

Do you agree that external moral scepticism amount to internal?

How do you explain your unwillingness to concede that morality is meaningless?

Do you agree that Brooklyn's argument ammounts to the points I have made in my previous post.

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 13 2006, 08:36 PM
If we say somethig like "but people have a natural need to not be immoral, so it will not happen" seems to me to be arguing still for a a post-revolution morality, just one that does not require any co-operation understanding or participation.
i'm very much arguing for a specific kind of morality.. however, that doesn't mean i think my argument is rational. i have no illusions about this point: that my preferred morality has no logic behind it. it shall never be concrete. the same goes for any other kind of ethical judgment.

that doesn't prevent me, of course, from arguing for it. i can only make appeals to people's taste for freedom, and for our popular sense of justice, among other things. yet, as you can see, i'm appealing only to time-specific social prejudices, not to logic.

again, i have no problem with that.


Although i'l be the first to admit I can do nothing against your rationality, your argument calling ethics meaningless in effect means that all actions are equal. Which means that raping a newborn child is equal to saving lives. And even if I can't find a logical flaw in your argument, I just can't bring myself to accept that conclusion.

imagine that we are a bunch of robots.. meaning, entities without sensations, without a conscience. the actions that we would do to/for each other -- destruction, rape, help, and so on -- can only be broken down to their physical essence. indeed, that is what the non-sentient world comes down to: physical objects/physical action. there's really nothing else there.

however, when we observe, for example, a woman being hit by a man, it's not so much the physical action that interests us, it's not so much the making of the man's fist, the extension of his arm, the contact he makes with her face that disturbs us.. it's our subjective feeling about this violence that's terrible. we merely see something, and that "something" acts as a physical stimulus, and right then, we interpret the act through our personal metaphysical conceptions.. things like morality play a role, and our opinion of the act is formed. yet, anything can be a stimulus.. some people are frightened of ordinary objects such as paper bags and chairs. there is nothing inherently frightening or inherently bad about these chairs and paper bags.. but, it's our subjective interpretation of the facts and objects that matters. paper bags have no natural property of "awfulness".. whatever subjective (i.e., non-physical) property it has is fabricated and ascribed by our minds. that's true of everything.

we just happen to be sentient beings, and we just happen to be able to make these judgments. of course, our personal beliefs and moral judgments don't have any bearing on objective reality.. our personal beliefs don't imbue neutral objects (guns, bloody knives, dead children) with the physical property of "awfulness." those guns and bloody knives in a social vacuum would still have the same physical elements (color, mass, atomic structure, etc.) as they do in our world of humans and other sentient beings. obviously, it's not the physical properties of these objects that are so repulsive.. those properties are merely the stimulus, a stimulus that can cause many different feelings in many different people.

these moral properties, then, are metaphysical.. these objects are imbued with certain metaphysical properties by our minds: beauty, sexiness, awfulness, neutrality. of course, these metaphysical properties don't exist in the world of objects, which is why morality can never be a concrete, objective thing. maybe, then, it's not proper to speak of ethics as illogical.. ethics are not logical, but nor are they illogical; they are simply outside of such jurisdiction. thus, trying to impose a logical form upon an ethical question is not meaningless, but incoherent.


You cannot seriously beleive that you do not use intuition in your reeasoning - I don't think humans could think without using intuition.

what exactly do you mean by "intuition" ?

[TheGreatOne]

I believe that for sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt, we have a single set of morals which are absolute.

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 14 2006, 03:18 PM
I believe that for sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt, we have a single set of morals which are absolute.
-- emphasis added.

indeed.. yet, that preference is logically injustifiable. it's justifiable metaphysically, and only metaphysically.

sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt do have a specific set of morals.. in the same way that rapists who prefer being satisfied and sadistic have another set of morals. sure, those morals are absolute, but only for the specific group.. which, in the scheme of things, is not absolute at all. it's simply metaphysical, and subjective. it could never be concrete.

[TheGreatOne]

in the same way that rapists who prefer being satisfied and sadistic have another set of morals.

eh....no. raping another person will make that person unhappy (unless that person wants to be raped, in which case it's not rape at all), which makes it immoral. It doesn't matter what the rapist wants. It depends on what will make the other person happy or sad.

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 14 2006, 03:18 PM
I believe that for sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt, we have a single set of morals which are absolute.

eh....no. raping another person will make that person unhappy (unless that person wants to be raped, in which case it's not rape at all), which makes it immoral. It doesn't matter what the rapist wants. It depends on what will make the other person happy or sad.

-- emphasis added.

your first quote adds an important stipulation, which i bold-faced: "...sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt.."

thus, your absolute moral code is applicable only to those sentient beings who prefer being happy over being hurt. this preference on the part of most sentient beings is, of course, not a logical preference, as all preferences are non-rational (but not necessarily irrational) by definition.

my entire argument, however, was/is this: this preference for being happy over being hurt is simply that, a preference. it's not a preference formulated from logical analysis, nor is it a preference that's justifiable in any way except metaphysically. we, as good people, have an obligation to make sure that people's preferences -- freedom from poverty, from violence, etc. -- are secured for them, but this obligation does not arise from logical necessity, but from metaphysical deliberation. in fact, it is this metaphysical deliberation that imbues us with the physically non-existent property of "goodness" -- that we are, at bottom, good people, and want to do good things, and thus have humane obligations.

but, again, this does not arise from any logical necessity.

sure, my particular moral code happens to be your exact moral code: people should not be raped. however, there is no way i could consider this moral code "absolute," as my own ethical premises derive from metaphysical/subjective preferences and/or ideas, all of which are not at all, nor could ever be, grounded in anything rational, concrete, or absolute. this is applicable to every moral code. ethics are, by definition, non-rational, as they are never derived from logical analysis, but from tradition and adaptable/changing circumstances. it's nothing more than that.

[hoopla]

Intuition, is just knowing that something is right or wrong. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition_%28knowledge%29

Erm, not sure how your position makes sense, tbh... e.g. is soemthing not either rational or irrational... other things...

What do you make of the criticism I make above that the sort of scepticism that you ascribe it, the propositions that you put forward cannot be destinguished from the propositions put forth by an internal sceptic (e.g. someone who thinks that morality is a rediculous concept), who must logically abandon the things that she thinks are wicked.

PS: relativist :angry:

[hoopla]

Not sure exactly what you mean by ethics is not logical: that ethical statements cannot be true or false?

If you do not accept that we can know ethical truths through intution, how about rational discussion :huh:

[TheGreatOne]

I should clarify that by happy, I mean having done unto the person what he wants, and by being hurt, I mean having done unto him what he does not want. All sentient beings would rather have something done to them that they want than have something done to them what they do not want. It is a universal preference among sentients, and therefore there is a single set of morals which applies to how we interact.

[The Sloth]

Intuition, is just knowing that something is right or wrong. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition_%28knowledge%29

i don't know what this means, to "just know" whether something is right or wrong. whatever you "just know" (if you'd like to call it that) is probably a result of thousands of years of social activity and social evolution.. which means that this conception of right or wrong falls back to biology. and biology is not a logical justification for any ethical questions.


What do you make of the criticism I make above that the sort of scepticism that you ascribe it, the propositions that you put forward cannot be destinguished from the propositions put forth by an internal sceptic (e.g. someone who thinks that morality is a rediculous concept),

morality is a ridiculous, if you want to be purely logical and not metaphysical.


who must logically abandon the things that she thinks are wicked.

this doesn't necessarily follow. i think morality is logically ridiculous, yet i have no intention of abandoning the things that i consider wicked, nor do i have any intention of putting forward arguments in support of rape, or other things.

the idea that i "ought" to do something because it's the logical thing to do is an illogical argument, as "ought" usually implies an ethical consideration.. and ethical considerations are, at least in my view, purely metaphysical, and exist only according to popular demand. the only way to allow a certain brand of ethics to dominate society (such as, "murder is wrong") is through brute force and ignorance.

yet, i have no problem with that. certainly, i'd prefer ethics to be a logical consideration, yet that's simply not the case. so, i'd have to go with applying ethics through brute force and ignorance.. meaning, i'd punish rapists and murderers without offering a logical conception of my moral code, as that would be an impossible task. certainly, i'd offer a metaphysical explanation, but nothing more than that. and there's nothing wrong with that.

[hoopla]

the idea that i "ought" to do something because it's the logical thing to do is an illogical argument, as "ought" usually implies an ethical considerationIts not in this situation. That would be too simple.


which means that this conception of right or wrong falls back to biology. and biology is not a logical justification for any ethical questions.IMO that is equivalent to saying that: that fact that I know that when I drop an apple it will fall to the ground, is a fact of biology, and biology is not a logical justification for matters of physics :lol:
Futhermore, to argue that X can be explained by/can be reduced to Y, so therefore X is Y, (in this instance morality is a fact of biology) seems wrong. Or that because intution is composed of biology, and biology is not an ought, intution is not an ought - the fallacy of composition - perhaps - the atoms that make up this dog are not wet, yet the dog is wet, iyswim!

Akin, maybe, to saying that God could not have caused the universe to come into being, because the big bang did.

To sum: you are far to full of contradictory statements, to convince me that what you are saying is true. And it doesn't seem as if you've really considered alternative views, if you find them incoherent, and not simply lacking support.
:mellow:

[hoopla]

I mean to say: I don't find your position rediculous, but i don't agree with your argumentation. maybe it is the case, thagt you must be a non-naturalist to believein objective moral truths - but, maybe I do not think naturalismn is 100% true :o :lol:

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 17 2006, 04:38 AM
Its not in this situation. That would be too simple.
i'm not sure what you're referring to.


IMO that is equivalent to saying that: that fact that I know that when I drop an apple it will fall to the ground, is a fact of biology, and biology is not a logical justification for matters of physics :lol:

i'm not even sure what to make of this analogy. this could be taken in so many confused ways, that i'd rather not even touch it.

anyway, i do feel that biology is no logical justification for "action." for example, i have two hands.. but, why should i use them? why can't i just chop them off?

someone may respond, "because it goes against your interests.. it's easier to live with two hands."

it may very well go against my interests, but why should i act in my interests, and why shouldn't i subject myself to discomfort or misery or difficulty?

the answer will, undoubtedly, make another appeal to biology.. and so, we'll be back in that same vicious circle.


Futhermore, to argue that X can be explained by/can be reduced to Y, so therefore X is Y, (in this instance morality is a fact of biology) seems wrong.

i never made such an argument. you can't reduce morality to biological impulses, as that assumes an inherent value-driven "worth" in biological impulses. the world has no inherent value.



Or that because intution is composed of biology, and biology is not an ought, intution is not an ought - the fallacy of composition - perhaps - the atoms that make up this dog are not wet, yet the dog is wet, iyswim!

again, i don't know what this means -- "intuition is composed of biology." intuition wasn't properly defined for me, so i'm left to assume that it's an abstraction.


To sum: you are far to full of contradictory statements, to convince me that what you are saying is true. And it doesn't seem as if you've really considered alternative views, if you find them incoherent, and not simply lacking support.
:mellow:

there is no contradiction:

the world has no inherent value.

an "ought" is a value judgment.

applying logic to non-logical forms is incoherent.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 17 2006, 04:38 AM
Its not in this situation. That would be too simple.
i'm not sure what you're referring to.Erm, ought implying an ethical relation.

there is no contradiction:

the world has no inherent value.

an "ought" is a value judgment.

applying logic to non-logical forms is incoherent.I deny presmise 1 :o lol
You are contradicting yourself in all of your statements about how you act: if you believe that morality is inchoherent. You are acting on incoherent principles: you can expect no-one to be able to make sense of what you are doing, you cannot justify your behaviour, you can expect no punishment or reward, life becomes an intolerablly confusing place where nothing can function in any understandable way. I don't actually know what the argument to the idea that you must accept what you think wicked, is, but, its probably that it is impossible for you to destinguish between your them. To sum: you are unable to not accpet what you think wicked, whether or not you know so. You may think that you still despise murder, but you do not have that capacity - it is logically impossible for you to do so, iyswim

do feel that biology is no logical justification for "action." for example, i have two hands.. but, why should i use them? why can't i just chop them off?

someone may respond, "because it goes against your interests.. it's easier to live with two hands."

it may very well go against my interests, but why should i act in my interests, and why shouldn't i subject myself to discomfort or misery or difficulty?

the answer will, undoubtedly, make another appeal to biology.. and so, we'll be back in that same vicious circle.


Futhermore, to argue that X can be explained by/can be reduced to Y, so therefore X is Y, (in this instance morality is a fact of biology) seems wrong.

i never made such an argument. you can't reduce morality to biological impulses, as that assumes an inherent value-driven "worth" in biological impulses. the world has no inherent value.I think, this is just a restatement of your argument above.

i'm left to assume that it's an abstraction.What is an abstraction?

[Ol' Dirty]

Originally posted by Brooklyn-Mecca+Aug 13 2006, 12:19 PM--> (Brooklyn-Mecca @ Aug 13 2006, 12:19 PM) i want to continue a thread here, as the other one might be trashed.

ethics are based on our arbitrary conceptions of society. we want to see justice not because justice has some kind of logical necessity, but because we were inculcated with an ethical sense by our parents, or by whoever/whatever else.

ethics are never a priori, although they can be. but simply because a moral is a priori doesn't mean that it has logical precedence over any other kind of ethical conception.


[email protected] 13 2006, 05:36 AM
What basis do you, make this claim on?

on the basis of logic.

i should re-phrase my statement, then:

ethics have no logical justification. every "ought" is riddled with arbitrary social prejudices.

i propse something like this: we let go of every ethical judgment/value that is not necessary for maximizing people's happiness, people's general welfare, etc. maybe a lot of communists never expressed it in that way, but that's the basic thought behind "communist morality" -- namely, whatever is unnecessary should be laughed at. everyone knows this, even if they've never particularly thought it.

of course, this doesn't mean that our universal condemnation of murder and rape are automatically logical. this condemnation can never be logical.. we can only appeal to might, to the fact that most people are against murder and rape at any given time.

and, true, we might have a biological preference to not see others suffer, but, again, simply because it's part of our natural constitution doesn't imply that we should act according to our biology; simply because certain genes or body parts are there doesn't mean we have to use them in any particular way, or at all. this "ought" business is prejudiced in itself. logic has no say in our constitution, nor does it have any say in ethical considerations. the fact is, we shall never root our desire for justice in anything rational or concrete. ethics will always supercede the world of facts into the illegitimate (yet desirable) metaphysical realm we are in now. [/b]
I am interperating that you are saying that ethics are meant to be objective, and objectivity is pointless, because there is no-one to interperate their so-called orthodoxy. I agree. But, to take your argument with a grain of salt, subjective ethics, determined by society at large, are truly a great thing to have. Without them, the guidlines determined by society are non-existant, leading to complete chaos, societaly, culturaly, and individualy. Thusly, while objective ethics and morals are unnecesery, subjective ones are not.

[hoopla]

there is no-one to interperate their so-called orthodoxyWhat about rational discourse, free from ideology?

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 17 2006, 05:20 PM
I am interperating that you are saying that ethics are meant to be objective, and objectivity is pointless, because there is no-one to interperate their so-called orthodoxy.
i don't at all think ethics are meant to be objective.. they certainly might claim to be, sometimes, but most people recognize (i think!) that ethics are entirely subjective.


But, to take your argument with a grain of salt, subjective ethics, determined by society at large, are truly a great thing to have. Without them, the guidlines determined by society are non-existant, leading to complete chaos, societaly, culturaly, and individualy. Thusly, while objective ethics and morals are unnecesery, subjective ones are not.

i've never denied this.

if i didn't have subjective ethics, i would, obviously, see nothing wrong with arbitrary murder, capitalism, and et cetera.

the entire point of this thread was to clear up a misconception.. namely, that ethics can ever be considered objective, or concrete.

so, i agree with you completely.

[The Sloth]

deny presmise 1 :o lol

why?


You are contradicting yourself in all of your statements about how you act: if you believe that morality is inchoherent.

it is.


You are acting on incoherent principles:

i am.


you can expect no-one to be able to make sense of what you are doing,

i can't.


you cannot justify your behaviour, you can expect no punishment or reward,

you're right.


life becomes an intolerablly confusing place

hmm, i'm not confused though.. despite my illogical (and rightfully so) beliefs.

logic organizes the world into a fruitful, practical system. we read and think and know according to the systemic principles, according to this powerful organization.

however, i choose not to see all things from a logical perspective.. namely, ethics.

by employing a non-logical system, i can organize the world into sensible phenomena and act accordingly. this organization may not be rational, but it's systemic, and therefore, functional.. complete with rules and principles and frames of reference.

the problem is simply that i can't justify it logically.

that's okay, i have no problem with that.. although, of course, i do wish there was a logical argument against the evils of the world. despite my wishes, that's simply not the case.

and so, the metaphysics of subjective ethics goes on and on.


I don't actually know what the argument to the idea that you must accept what you think wicked, is, but, its probably that it is impossible for you to destinguish between your them.

through my non-logical system of thought, i can very easily distinguish between things and actions:

rape is wrong.

generosity is good.

a pen is neutral.

and so on.

just don't expect me to explain myself.. my premises are purely metaphysical.


You may think that you still despise murder, but you do not have that capacity - it is logically impossible for you to do so

i do despise murder, but i don't understand what you mean by "it is logically impossible for you to do so." well, there's not much to say here, except for the fact that i feel a profound sadness and physical revulsion when i hear of "wicked" things.

you say that those feelings are logically impossible, yet they are here.

what you meant to say is, probably, that i don't "analyze" these feelings, and in that you're right. i may reflect on them, but i don't analyze, as that implies some kind of logical methodology.

yet, since when do we need logical justifications for anything, including life? the neutral thing to do would be to kill ourselves. that's all nice and good, but such an argument, even though it's valid, will never convince me to suicide.



What is an abstraction?

intuition.

[hoopla]

"Generosity is good". The problem is, you have said "Generosity is fnbedcbucn", according to your logic: so you cannot possibly think it worthy (or "cenijmow", to subjectivists).

Why do I think there is objective value? Well, I choose not to ignore what is most real to me. And I don't think it has to imply an impossible metaphysics.

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 21 2006, 12:42 PM
"Generosity is good". The problem is, you have said "Generosity is fnbedcbucn", according to your logic: so you cannot possibly think it worthy (or "cenijmow", to subjectivists).

Why do I think there is objective value? Well, I choose not to ignore what is most real to me. And I don't think it has to imply an impossible metaphysics.
sure, generosity is fnbedcbucn.

but, you're acting as if that matters.. as if there's something wrong with that.

if we'd simply act according to the system that fnbedcbucn implies, there would be no problem.

unfortunately, fnbedcbucn is too much for many people.. that doesn't mean, however, that fnbedcbucn is irrelevant, unnecessary, or inconsistent.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Brooklyn-Mecca+Aug 22 2006, 04:18 AM--> (Brooklyn-Mecca @ Aug 22 2006, 04:18 AM)
[email protected] 21 2006, 12:42 PM
"Generosity is good". The problem is, you have said "Generosity is fnbedcbucn", according to your logic: so you cannot possibly think it worthy (or "cenijmow", to subjectivists).

Why do I think there is objective value? Well, I choose not to ignore what is most real to me. And I don't think it has to imply an impossible metaphysics.
sure, generosity is fnbedcbucn.

but, you're acting as if that matters.. as if there's something wrong with that.

if we'd simply act according to the system that fnbedcbucn implies, there would be no problem.

unfortunately, fnbedcbucn is too much for many people.. that doesn't mean, however, that fnbedcbucn is irrelevant, unnecessary, or inconsistent. [/b]
Ok. But, I mean, fnbedcbucn cannot imply any system, no meaningless sentence can. If you insist that fnbedcbucn imples a system, you must be mistaken about finding fnbedcbucn meaningless.

Ok. Say you insist on holding yourself to be a nihilist, but you do manage to get "meaningless" sentences to imply a sysytem. That is all well and good, but, I don't think it is possible that the senetences were meaningless.

Otherwise they could not imply anything.

I have to conclude that you are as able to reason ethically as anyone else (It would be pointless for me to try and show that I am, you would disregard "people are happy" as "laijvjkl"), and the fact that anyone can reason ethically (as you must be doing - you cannot be working out meaningful sentences from meaningless statements, as you profess), must mean that moral nihilism is incorrect, whether or not you believe it is.

[hoopla]

I suppose you could try and prove to me that nihilism is correct, by commiting horrible autrocities, but, plenty of people have probably tried that already.

[The Sloth]

Ok. But, I mean, fnbedcbucn cannot imply any system, no meaningless sentence can.

theological sentences are meaningless, for many reasons.

do they not imply some kind of system?


If you insist that fnbedcbucn imples a system, you must be mistaken about finding fnbedcbucn meaningless.

fnbedcbucn is meaningless, as it does not hold up to logical analysis; fnbedcbucn crumbles in the face of scrutiny.

regardless, we don't have to put fnbedcbucn through criticism. it could just be left alone, along with the metaphysics that it implies.


Ok. Say you insist on holding yourself to be a nihilist, but you do manage to get "meaningless" sentences to imply a sysytem. That is all well and good, but, I don't think it is possible that the senetences were meaningless.

i guess it depends on what you mean by "meaningless," then.. as far as i know, the incoherent, whatever it may be, can be organized systematically.

religion is organized systematically, and erupts in a most peculiar metaphysic.

that doesn't mean religion's defining sentences -- "god is separated into three, yet god is one" -- are comprehensible. "god is seperated..." refers to nothing at all, and it's impossible to make much sense of it.. unless, of course, one is merely interested in talking abstractions.

william blake was arguably the most complicated metaphysical poet.. he organized the dense, the incomprehensible, the opaque, the abstract, and the real into a system, regardless of whether this system could or could not hold up to logical analysis. fact is, it's there, and will probably stay there forever, unless we, at some point, lose interest in blake.. in the same way, of course, that we lose interest in a particular ethic.

the point is, those systems are there, are practical.. but circumstantial.


you would disregard "people are happy"

of course not. "people are happy" refers to a factual state-of-being.

some people are happy, some people are sad.. there's nothing there open to interpretation.


and the fact that anyone can reason ethically... must mean that moral nihilism is incorrect, whether or not you believe it is.

there is a limit to reason.. some things are outside of logical analysis.

also, the fact that anyone can "reason" ethically says nothing about nihilism.. and if by "reason" you mean they are able to reach objective conclusions on what's "right" or "wrong," i disagree, then, with your use of the word "reason." there's not much "reason" involved, except the application of a posteriori non-rational systems on to acts and situations.

as a matter of fact, anyone can profess any kind of morality, no matter how wicked, and there would be no inherent goodness or badness attached to it. anyone can come to whatever ethical conclusion just as arbitrarily as the next person.. nihilism merely states that these conclusions are, in fact, arbitrary.

it defines no special moral code, though, because it suggests no illogical "ought." it simply states what ethics are, not the behaviors that are or should be associated with any particular brand of morality. "are" is simply a matter of facticity.


I suppose you could try and prove to me that nihilism is correct, by commiting horrible autrocities..

why should i do that??

if nihilism is indeed "correct," i can be as "good" as i wish to be. and that means not commiting any atrocities at all.

your values have no inherent superiority. your values merely have popularity.

your values and my values are probably the same; whatever you consider wrong, i probably consider wrong as well. whatever you enjoy, i probably enjoy that, too.

the only difference, however, is that i make no claims that my values are "logical."

this is because my premises are non-logical.

i can "reason" out the conclusions of premises -- parents have no authority over kids, generosity is good, murder is wrong, etc. -- based on these premises. in that way, and in only that way, can the natural development of these values (and not the values themselves) be considered "objective".. the process of argument is, obviously, logical. this doesn't mean, however, that the premises were fine, or rational, or whatever. in metaphysics, it's the process that counts.

but, regardless of the process, the value system itself cannot make any claims to logic because the premises are always unjustifiable.

[hoopla]

regardless, we don't have to put fnbedcbucn through criticism. it could just be left alone, along with the metaphysics that it impliesImo, ethics does not have to imply an outlandish metaphysics
theological sentences are meaningless, for many reasons.

do they not imply some kind of system?No, I wouldn't think so. They may seem to, but I don't think its possible for the equivalent of "hvdjs" to imply anything. Maybe they have a kernel of truth, or something.



you would disregard "people are happy"

of course not. "people are happy" refers to a factual state-of-beingSo does, then, people are ethical? Both are "goods", moral and otherwise, so that both imply an ought :unsure:


if nihilism is indeed "correct," i can be as "good" as i wish to beHow can you wish to be a meaningless proposition (?)?

We don't seem to be converging on anything. Erm, I don't think that ethics must imply an outlandish ontology... if this is true do you agree that ethics is not logically illegitimate?

[The Sloth]

No, I wouldn't think so.

why not? christianity is a system. it has its own rules, its own outlook, all presented systematically.


but I don't think its possible for the equivalent of "hvdjs" to imply anything.

yet, we're using "hvdjs" as an example, aren't we?

hvdjs is simply a word or phrase that you made up.. it has no "system" in it because we haven't endowed it with a system yet. but, can't i form a religion around hvdjs and turn it into a concept, possibly even a religion? you can imagine all kinds of words and such, yet, until we give those words a particular meaning (even if that meaning is logically incoherent), a particular thing it implies and/or refers, those words are not even ideas yet; they are simply abstract, unconscious, and oblique notions floating through the air.

at the same time, christianity is, at bottom, in essence, hvdjs, if by "hvdjs" we mean a particular non-logical system (which is what christianity is: a unique, non-logical system). the only difference between hvdjs and christianity would be the non-logical particulars, the pecularities that make hvdjs unique.

the point is, we arbitrarily endow hvdjs, christianity, and "morality" with meaning. if humans were to die out and leave a single bible to the lions, koalas and giraffes, what could that bible possibly mean, what could it possibly refer to? absolutely nothing; there would be no "center," no point of reference, as that bible would simply be a physical object in a social vaccuum.

yet, the fact that our world isn't a social vaccuum has no bearing on objective reality; the only difference between our world and a vaccuum is the absence of any conscious agent that's able to endow an idea, feeling, or object with his own arbitrary, personal meaning.

the reason that things like "morality" are incoherent is because they have no inherent property that, by logical necessity, creates a unique and un-controversial meaning. we endow it with such meaning through non-logical contemplation, through our own arbitrary preferences.


So does, then, people are ethical?

of course you could say that "people are ethical" -- it would refer to a specific set of ideas and behaviors that a particular group of people share. it would, at bottom, refer to these people's common characteristics, which are nothing less than factual states of being or knowing or doing. those points are un-controversial.

why bring it up, then? my point is not to deny states of being, nor is it to deny any references to states of being.

my point is simply that the ideas within the ethical codes of "people that are ethical" are arbitrary, circumstantial, and indefensible logically. my point is not to deny that people hold these arbitrary, circumstantial, and logically indefensible ideas.


Erm, I don't think that ethics must imply an outlandish ontology... if this is true do you agree that ethics is not logically illegitimate?

outlandish, in what way?

defend this logically, without any appeals to people's sensitivity, without reference to anything except the rational and objective:

"generosity is good."

and, again, this doesn't mean that i wish generosity to end.. i do have an ethical code.. i simply recognize that this code isn't logical.

but, i maintain it nonetheless.

[hoopla]

and, again, this doesn't mean that i wish generosity to end.. i do have an ethical code.. i simply recognize that this code isn't logical.

but, i maintain it nonetheless.Look, your a nihilist. Ffs stop saying meaningless sentences! :angry:

:lol:

[hoopla]

defend this logically, without any appeals to people's sensitivity, without reference to anything except the rational and objective:

"generosity is good."You and me both think that generosity is good.

[hoopla]

but I don't think its possible for the equivalent of "hvdjs" to imply anything.


yet, we're using "hvdjs" as an example, aren't we?Simple. A meaningless senetnce cannot imply an action, if it did that senetnce would be a value sentence. 'Hvdjs' and 'hfskj' refer to the undifferentiated concept of meaninglessness, which in this instance gives my senetnce meaning. However, how can a meaningless undifferentiated glob, on its own, imply... what exactly do you think meaningless senetences imply - a set of factual statements free of value then how does it motaivte people... it doesn't - then how do meaingless senetnces have any affect.

A meaningless term does not refer to anything other than meaninglessness, surely.

So, aren't you left with a meaningless system that this meaningless concept implies :lol:

[gilhyle]

The key to a Marxist understanding of this question, I suggest, is to make a clear distinction between ethics and morality.

morailty is the short-hand of rule of behaviour that people in societies develop which are more or less ideological and subject to political criticism and political appraisal.

Ehtic is the attempt to 'ground' those moral postures in a framework that legitimises or rejects moral stances.

All ethics is philosophy and whether it seeks to identify a logical or merely pragmatic 'justification' for moral stances arising from the human condition, it fetishises morality in an illegitimate and ideological way.

It is the political and historical analysis of morality that is a valid gloss on morality, the kind of gloss carried out by Trotsky in Their Morals and Ours, by Kautsky in Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History and by Engels in the Anti Duhring.

[BTW its a ideological fiction that humans pursue happiness - as a matter of empirical observation it can only be made true by the concept of 'happiness' being allowed such various interpretations specific to individuals as to have only a circular meaning : 'all humans pursue happiness' is true iff 'happiness' is understood as the class of all possibel states that humans might pursue.]

[rouchambeau]

what decides this objectivity?

Well, what decides the Law of Non-contradiction? Nothing decided it. It just is.

The same goes for objective morality. It just is.

[hoopla]

difference between hvdjs and christianity would be the non-logical particulars, the pecularities that make hvdjs unique.If they imply different systems, then that is what they mean. Hence they are not meaningles. Unless christianity has a curnel of meaning etc.

Try and derive a meaningful system from "hvdjs"? Clearly impossible. Yet you think that you can derive a meaningful system from "hakf>"!

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 23 2006, 09:42 PM
Ehtic is the attempt to 'ground' those moral postures in a framework that legitimises or rejects moral stances.
Where do you get your definitions from?

Imo moral realism is not an ethical stand, as stated above ^ othwise you, too, would be ethical.

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 23 2006, 09:27 PM
Ffs stop saying meaningless sentences!
impossible.


You and me both think that generosity is good.

yes.. and there's nothing wrong with that.


A meaningless senetnce cannot imply an action..

why not? "god is one and god is three", to christians, implies an "ought," namely, that they must believe that "god is one and god is three."

yet, to make sense of this statement is impossible.


'Hvdjs' and 'hfskj' refer to the undifferentiated concept of meaninglessness,

what if in the language of hvrtzertyu the word "hvdjs" means chair? or god? or "god is one and god is three" ?


However, how can a meaningless undifferentiated glob, on its own, imply... what exactly do you think meaningless senetences imply - a set of factual statements free of value then how does it motaivte people..

because we give it that arbitrary meaning.

the word "cat" is a meaningless glob, perhaps a strange sound that comes out of somebody's mouth.

yet, it refers to something specific for us because we're able to endow it with such meaning.

so, to answer your question, meaningless sentences such as "god is good" imply an "ought" for whoever that's interested by providing them with a system: a system based on imaginary things, of course, but a system nonetheless.. a system, at least, that's able to arrange the world more or less consistently, while leaving out the more difficult (or contradictory) questions. in many cases, this organization isn't logical.


it doesn't - then how do meaingless senetnces have any affect...

of course it does motivate people. "god is good" motivates a lot of people, don't you think? it doesn't have to refer to anything tangible or even real.. the belief merely has to be held; that's the only criterion for motivation.

meaningless sentences have an affect because, at bottom, they are sentences. the fact that they are meaningless is only secondary. they are, at first, sentences; later on, it's up to the people to differentiate between tangible and purely conceptual or even dishonest sentences. however, this differentiation does not necessarily have to occur.. and, as people behave as if these meaningless sentences are real, the world is organized accordingly.

and all things fall into place, regardless of the logic.


So, aren't you left with a meaningless system that this meaningless concept implies..

indeed, but why the hell does it matter?

especially since we have conscious agents that can choose whether they will or will not differentiate the meaningless from the tangible?


Ehtic is the attempt to 'ground' those moral postures in a framework that legitimises or rejects moral stances.

yes!


Well, what decides the Law of Non-contradiction?

logic.

what else?


The same goes for objective morality. It just is.

no, morality cannot be objective, as it can't be logically analyzed.

if you can make statements -- without justification -- as to "what is, it just is", you might as well extend "it just is" to pretty much anything in the world.


If they imply different systems, then that is what they mean. Hence they are not meaningles.

of course the imply different systems.

i think the problem is that we have different conceptions of the "meaningless."

to me, anything is "meaningless" that doesn't refer to something logical. hence, while all systems are structures and thus nothing but facts, the particular properties of these systems aren't always logical. in that way, "god is one and god is three" refers to a specific belief, refers to a system, but those beliefs and systems are illogical, and therefore meaningless.

[hoopla]

'Hvdjs' and 'hfskj' refer to the undifferentiated concept of meaninglessness,


what if in the language of hvrtzertyu the word "hvdjs" means chair? or god? or "god is one and god is three" ?Then its not meaningless, is it :rolleyes:

Try and get a system, not arbitarily, from the word: "js;a"


i think the problem is that we have different conceptions of the "meaningless."I dunno. It seems that your problem ith ethics is that there is no way to decide on what is moral, there is: what people agree to in practical discourse.

In which case, I guess, that the question is more like "what makes this universal". Cannot remember :)

[rouchambeau]

no, morality cannot be objective, as it can't be logically analyzed.
Sure one can. Just look to Kant.


if you can make statements -- without justification -- as to "what is, it just is", you might as well extend "it just is" to pretty much anything in the world.

We don't justify trivial truths. Are you claiming that those are false?

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 25 2006, 05:05 AM
Sure one can. Just look to Kant.
i see nothing imperative about the categorical imperative.


We don't justify trivial truths. Are you claiming that those are false?

what kinds of trivial truths? causation?

regarding your question, you seem to be saying: "we don't need logic." this reminds me of, "come on, man, logic can't explain everything; christianity is about faith, not anything else." you can make that argument about anything.

sure we do; we simply don't need logic in special places, such as ethics.

[hoopla]

I mean, that Husserl would say that we accept 1+1=2, not because we have proved that 1+1=2, but because it is presented to us with self evidence.

I don't see what ethics has got to do with God. I'm not arguing for the reality of the imperative not to kill, rather the imperative to be moral. Not killing is one way to be good. Now I guess that you might argue that we have no logical way to ascertain whethe being good is good (this would be analogous to the claim that we have no logical way to ascertain whether not killing is ethical) - but that would be the case by definition. So the point is, not to prove that good is good, but that good is real.

Am I right in thinking that your problem with my argument is solely that there is no logical way to proove the reality of goodness? I have already argued that it would be wrong to ignore something which seems so real, and that it need no outlandish ontology. So, what are your arguments against the reality of goodness?

And by logic, I guess you mean the scientific method?

[The Sloth]

I mean, that Husserl would say that we accept 1+1=2, not because we have proved that 1+1=2, but because it is presented to us with self evidence.

indeed, that is self-evidence. people generally agree with the premises of "1", "2", et cetera; those numbers represent something specific. they the accepted terminology, and thus, it's easy to build on top of it. we can reach all kinds of conclusions, and we can easily test these conclusions through our understanding and/or general acceptance of the premises.

in that same way, ethics also start with premises.. these premises might include, "it is wrong to harm another human being," and "equality is good".. in that way, we can examine the logical process within the movement of these ethics.

(that is not to say, of course, that the ethical premises are justifiable; they are simply "there," and, regardless of whether they are right or wrong, they imply both sensible and senseless conclusions.. for example, if someone holds the idea that "equality is good", we can't logically justify that idea, that premise.. however, if he believes that equality is good but is also a racist, we may say that his racism is logically incompatible with his ethics, regardless of whether his initial ethics ("equality is good") are justifiable or not.)

in this way, people become commmunists, or whatever else. they formulate ethical premises, and, whether these premises are logically sound or not, they nonetheless form conclusions through the logical process of these premises.

it's the process that counts towards anything here.


I don't see what ethics has got to do with God.

you're right.. ethics may or may not have anything to do with god, depending on the person's particular brand of metaphysics.

regardless, while ethics may not be religious, ethics are always metaphysical.. they are always an appeal to the emotional.. they are also an appeal to the logical outcome of a logical process; they make sure that people's social/ethical conclusions are consistent with their ethical premises. this doesn't mean, however, that the logical process/conclusion implies a logical premise. in ethics, that's almost never the case.


So the point is, not to prove that good is good, but that good is real.

yes, to prove that good is real.

to prove that "good" exists as an intrinsic, physical property, rather than a title people bestow upon an act, an idea, or an object.


Am I right in thinking that your problem with my argument is solely that there is no logical way to proove the reality of goodness?

"reality of goodness," you need to be more specific. what about it, exactly?

there is a certain subjective interpretation of the world that gives a lot of social weight to moral ideas/goodness.. yet, there's nothing there that justifies it.


I have already argued that it would be wrong to ignore something which seems so real...

why is why i don't ignore it. i simply don't think it's logically justifiable.


So, what are your arguments against the reality of goodness?

well, there aren't many arguments.. just one, i think:

goodness exists only as a title people bestow upon an act, an idea, or an object.. it is not an intrinsic, physical property. the only difference between a knife wet with human blood and a knife wet with tomato juice is in the atomic structure of each substance.. this atomic structure, if thrown in a different context, with different emotions bestowed upon this different situation, will remain the same; nothing will be changed, except the qualitative interpretation of the objects.

yet, our interpretation or opinion or feeling on a certain matter does not bestow the matter with any tangible, physical property; the matter remains the same, as it merely forces different impulses to arise, impulses that have been developed through countless years of arbitrary social conditioning.


And by logic, I guess you mean the scientific method?

yes.

[rouchambeau]

what kinds of trivial truths?
The trivial ones. You know, the ones that we don't have to justify simply because they are true.

regarding your question, you seem to be saying: "we don't need logic."
I'm not. I'm saying that we don't need to justify what is trivial.

ethics are always metaphysical.. they are always an appeal to the emotional.
Not true at all. Ethics is about the laws of freedom and our duty to those laws regardless of our inclinations (emotions).

[The Sloth]

The trivial ones. You know, the ones that we don't have to justify simply because they are true.

hmm, we don't "have to" justify anything.

justification is only for those that are interested.

i'm not interested in justifying ethics, so i leave such justifications alone.

but, i'm not sure what kind of trivial truths you're talking about.


Not true at all. Ethics is about the laws of freedom and our duty to those laws regardless of our inclinations (emotions).

explain, please.

[rouchambeau]

I think we should start a bit of this over. I led the discussion away from what I was trying to address. You had said:

the problem with objective morality is this: what decides this objectivity?
What I was getting at was that objective morality isn't decided by any thing. Objective reality simply exists; just like the idea that 2+2=4 exists. No one decided that '2+2=4'; it simply is.


QUOTE
Not true at all. Ethics is about the laws of freedom and our duty to those laws regardless of our inclinations (emotions).



explain, please.

I'm not sure what you mean, but I'll give it a try. Rational beings have free will. Ethics is what tells us what we ought to do or not do with our freedom.

[Mare]

2 + 2 does not always = 4, as advanced calculus will teach you.

[rouchambeau]

Hows about you teachin' me?

[hoopla]

ethics are always metaphysicalHabermas' is a postmetaphysical theory of ethics, because it argues more for how we can become moral rather than what is (this may be a slight butchering of an argument).

He claims that the ideal speech situation is anticipated in acts, or we would be unable to reach understanding, and that the decisions we come to in the ideal speech situation are "ipso facto" true, so that if we decide we ought to not kill our brothers, in a free manner,
then this is true.

So, he argues, there is a procedure present in all acts, otherwise we would be unable to reach understanding, and this procedure guarntuees the truth of our rationally agreed moral judgements.

You might want to read this extract http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/...tive-ethics.htm (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/habermas/1998/communicative-ethics.htm)

:)

[Mare]

Blah, I can't think of anything more entertaining. Basically when you have a setup where you have the intergral from a to b of f(x) d/bx you notice there is an infinite amount of numbers between the "definite" numbers 2 and 3. When you claim to add 2 + 3 you are not actually accessing all the numbers in-between...So these "imaginary" numbers, theoretically, can add up beyond a definte number point. Example: 2i+2i = 4.1i-->5. Anyway, if you want more help, check out: Calculus Made Easy.

[gilhyle]

Whatever about 4i, that stuff by Habermas is precisely the stuff I was talking about - it is pure wishful thinking : there just are no such implications in the fact that people act or speak. Habermas is possibly the best modern example of the complete intellectual failure of the attempt from the left to ground the moral rules (or patterns) people observe in an ethical theory. Any left wing perspective that tried to start from habermas' views

the one thing I have never understood is how Habermas came from Adorno - its a long way down from Adorno's recognition of the essentially problematic nature of all ethical theorising.

[The Sloth]

well, i don't know what we're discussing here -- the terms of mathematical language, or the things that they refer to.

we have a certain number of objects, find more objects, and put them together. now, we have more objects than we started with.

math is simply here to put this physical reality as an abstraction.

and yes, objective reality simply exists. and objective morality isn't decided by anything. how can it be decided, since objective morality is non-existent?

i don't see how you made the leap, though. the abstract may refer to the physical. nothin' wrong with that. but how do we go from that harmless premise to something like, "objective morality just is" ?


I'm not sure what you mean, but I'll give it a try. Rational beings have free will. Ethics is what tells us what we ought to do or not do with our freedom.

i agree: ethics is what tells us what we ought to do or not do with our freedom.

who can possibly dispute this?

i only dispute the notion that ethics are logically justifiable.. that their premises (though not their processes) are open to logical analysis.

[The Sloth]

He claims that the ideal speech situation is anticipated in acts, or we would be unable to reach understanding, and that the decisions we come to in the ideal speech situation are "ipso facto" true, so that if we decide we ought to not kill our brothers, in a free manner, then this is true.

and, in turn, through emotional appeals and/or traditions, through new ethical processes that simply clarify, not change, the premises, we decide and pre-package the ideal.

and we're back to where we started.

[rouchambeau]

objective morality is non-existent?
We disagree here, but I will address this in a future post.

i don't see how you made the leap, though. the abstract may refer to the physical. nothin' wrong with that. but how do we go from that harmless premise to something like, "objective morality just is" ?
2+2=4 is just an example. You could replace it with any trivial truth.

My point is that objective morality isn't objective because it was decided, but because it just is. The same goes for statements like "2+2=4"; no being decided that. "2+2=4" is simply just true.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Brooklyn-[email protected] 27 2006, 01:42 PM

He claims that the ideal speech situation is anticipated in acts, or we would be unable to reach understanding, and that the decisions we come to in the ideal speech situation are "ipso facto" true, so that if we decide we ought to not kill our brothers, in a free manner, then this is true.

and, in turn, through emotional appeals and/or traditions, through new ethical processes that simply clarify, not change, the premises, we decide and pre-package the ideal.

and we're back to where we started.
I'm sorry, I don't understand what you are saying

:blush:

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 27 2006, 12:28 AM
Whatever about 4i, that stuff by Habermas is precisely the stuff I was talking about - it is pure wishful thinking : there just are no such implications in the fact that people act or speak. Habermas is possibly the best modern example of the complete intellectual failure of the attempt from the left to ground the moral rules (or patterns) people observe in an ethical theory. Any left wing perspective that tried to start from habermas' views

the one thing I have never understood is how Habermas came from Adorno - its a long way down from Adorno's recognition of the essentially problematic nature of all ethical theorising.
Mostly, opinion (/rhetoric) there, really. Your the third person in a week or so to say that sort of thing about Habermas :huh: I mean, he is quite well respected by professionals, and "the best left wing attempt to ground morality", is not worth any kind of bile. Especially considering grounding ethics is not pimarily his aim.

I don't get it, it sounds feasible enough. I mean, you ought to give an argument against it :)

I think that he captures how ethics is discursive. And he's more ethical than Kant, iyswim (and communitarian, iirc).

[gilhyle]

If it sounds like 'bile' - Ill try to change the tone. But from the bit of Habermas I have read, it does seem to me that the attempt to show that being communitarian is the only rational position is at the heart of his philosophy and he does seem to suggest that because we seek to communicate we are all in some way committed to human emancipation.....and that all seems to me quite unsustainable. It involves a completely idealistic conception of what communication is.

Morals are shorthand rules-of-thumb of behaviour that come from the structure of the society we live in. Sometimes they are good, sometimes - bacause they come from capitalism - they do more harm than good.

When it comes to politics, it seems to me that morality is sometimes good, sometimes mute or sometimes bad - but its not foundational for socialists, although many socialists have tried to suggest that it is.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 28 2006, 09:00 PM
It involves a completely idealistic conception of what communication is.
Erm, I guess that your argument rests on this, could you go into more detail?

Thanks

[The Sloth]

Originally posted by [email protected] 28 2006, 01:58 AM


I'm sorry, I don't understand what you are saying

:blush:
ethical conceptions of the "ideal" rest on value judgments.

the "ideal" is merely a process of this ethical analysis. it does nothing to solidify the metaphysical premises.

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by hoopla+Aug 29 2006, 10:56 PM--> (hoopla @ Aug 29 2006, 10:56 PM)
[email protected] 28 2006, 09:00 PM
It involves a completely idealistic conception of what communication is.
Erm, I guess that your argument rests on this, could you go into more detail?

Thanks [/b]
Im going into too much detail on Habermas. But the point is Habermas builds on the idea that communication is about trying to share ideas (roughly). This seems obvious, but its wrong. That is not what communication is, except in a formal sense. The purpose of communication is defined by the social relations within which it functions. Its not some sort of mind-melt, its an aspect of material processes of life. Sharing ideas can occur as part of communication, but that is not what communication IS.

There are no logical implications of this kind from communication - any 'implications' there are from communications are implications of the kind of social practice within which it occurs : and such social practices often rely on the failure of communication or on the only partial 'success' of communication (defined as Habermas would define it.

So if we were looking for implications from the behaviour that Habermas calls 'communication' we would have to analyse the social practices and social relations within which that behaviour occures. When we do that we end up doing the kind of analysis that Kautsky did briefly in Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History or that Trotsky did in 'Their Morals and Ours' or that Lenin did in his speech to the Youth Leagues concerning moral issues.

Then we uncover the policial and social 'logic' of the acts of communication by a policeman or a teacher or a foreman or a union official or a parent ........ or a Prime Minister anwering Parliamentary Questions and trying to avoid being understood.

[hoopla]

gilhyle: Habermas does say that there are strategic uses of action, but they are parasitic on understanding. If I were to aim to get you to give me £10 by lying to you about what it is for, this strategic use of language has you undertsnading my utterance as a precondition. To say that language has the lifeworld as a precondition is not o rule out Habermas' theories.

Brooklyn-Mecca: I'm still a little lost as to what you are saying, but, Habermas is a post-metahpyical ethical theorist.

[gilhyle]

I think it does rule out his views - he says it doesnt. I think he is wrong. That is where the criticism of philosophy and philosophical methods comes in.

But I'll frankly admit Im not sufficienty warmed up on Habermas to set it out here as applied to him.

Its a long time since I read him and I found it so unrewarding that it just doesnt motivate me to engage with it - its a bit like reading Kant, everyone tells you its marvelous, its full of gaps in the argument and yet you are meant to take it seriously. When that happens the ony reason to engage with it is to engage with others who engage with it and, in the case of Habermas, that isnt true of many people I come across.

[hoopla]

I would probably say that if you found alot of gaps, its because you didn't read enough. I am clearly, no expert though.

Aparently there is a strong pomo argument against him, and that people aren't sure if it is succesful.

I'm just interested in ethics, is all :wacko:

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by [email protected] 13 2006, 06:20 PM
Indded, imho, if your going to rule out something like objective morality, then you don't have many resources with which to do philosophy, so...


Which brings us back to 'Why'? (rhetorical question - its your own business)

I think you are right that without objectivist ethics, much of philosophy is gone.......I think that for Marxism, much of philosophy is gone.