rebelworker
31st July 2006, 19:59
A very good article.
Special Report: Why Hezbollah Fights
July 22, 2006 20 32 GMT
To understand Hezbollah, it is important to begin with this point: Almost
all Muslim Arabs opposed the creation of the state of Israel. Not all of
them supported, or support today, the creation of an independent
Palestinian state or recognize the Palestinian people as a distinct
nation. This is a vital and usually overlooked distinction that is the
starting point in our thinking.
When Israel was founded, three distinct views emerged among Arabs. The
first was that Israel was a part of the British mandate created after
World War I and therefore should have been understood as part of an entity
stretching from the Mediterranean to the other side of Jordan, from the
border of the Sinai, north to Mount Hermon. Therefore, after 1948, the
West Bank became part of the other part of the mandate, Jordan.
There was a second view that argued that there was a single province of
the Ottoman Empire called Syria and that all of this province -- what
today is Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the country of Syria -- is
legitimately part of it. This obviously was the view of Syria, whose
policy was and in some ways continues to be that Syria province, divided
by Britain and France after World War I, should be reunited under the rule
of Damascus.
A third view emerged after the establishment of Israel, pioneered by Gamal
Abdel Nasser in Egypt. This view was that there is a single Arab nation
that should be gathered together in a United Arab Republic. This republic
would be socialist, more secular than religious and, above all,
modernizing, joining the rest of the world in industrialization and
development.
All of these three views rejected the existence of Israel, but each had
very different ideas of what ought to succeed it. The many different
Palestinian groups that existed after the founding of Israel and until
1980 were not simply random entities. They were, in various ways, groups
that straddled these three opinions, with a fourth added after 1967 and
pioneered by Yasser Arafat. This view was that there should be an
independent Palestinian state, that it should be in the territories
occupied by Israel in 1967, extend to the original state of Israel and
ultimately occupy Jordan as well. That is why, in September 1970, Arafat
tried to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan. For Arafat, Amman, Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv were all part of the Palestinian homeland.
After the Iranian revolution, a fifth strain emerged. This strain made a
general argument that the real issue in the Islamic world was to restore
religious-based government. This view opposed the pan-Arab vision of
Nasser with the pan-Islamic vision of Khomeini. It regarded the particular
nation-states as less important than the type of regime they had. This
primarily Shiite view was later complemented by what was its Sunni
counterpart. Rooted partly in Wahhabi Sunni religiosity and partly in the
revolutionary spirit of Iran, its view was that the Islamic nation-states
were the problem and that the only way to solve it was a transnational
Islamic regime -- the caliphate -- that would restore the power of the
Islamic world.
That pedantic lesson complete, we can now locate Hezbollah's ideology and
intentions more carefully. Hezbollah is a Shiite radical group that grew
out of the Iranian revolution. However, there is a tension in its views,
because it also is close to Syria. As such, it is close to a much more
secular partner, more in the Nasserite tradition domestically. But it also
is close to a country that views Lebanon, Jordan and Israel as part of
greater Syria, the Syria torn apart by the British and French.
There are deep contradictions ideologically between Iran and Syria, though
they share a common interest. First, they both oppose the Sunnis. Remember
that when Lebanon first underwent invasion in 1975, it was by Syria
intervening on behalf of Christian friends and against the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Syria hated Arafat because Arafat insisted
on an independent Palestinian state and Syria opposed it. This was apart
from the fact that Syria had business interests in Lebanon that the PLO
was interfering with. Iran also opposed the PLO because of its
religious/ethnic orientation; moreso because it was secular and socialist.
Hezbollah emerged as a group representing Syrian and Iranian interests.
These were:
Opposition to the state of Israel
An ambiguous position on an independent Palestine
Hostility to the United States for supporting Israel and later championing
Yasser Arafat
Hezbollah had to straddle the deep division between Syrian secularity and
Iranian religiosity. However the other three interests allowed them to
postpone the issue.
This brings us to the current action. Three things happened to energize
Hezbollah:
First, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon under pressure from the United
States undermined an understanding between Israel and Syria. Israel would
cede Lebanon to Syria. Syria would control Hezbollah. When Syria lost out
in Lebanon, its motive for controlling Hezbollah disappeared. Syria, in
fact, wanted the world to see what would happen if Syria left Lebanon.
Chaos was exactly what Syria wanted.
Second, the election of a Hamas-controlled government in the Palestinian
territories created massive fluidity in Palestinian politics. The
Nasserite Fatah was in decline and a religious Sunni movement was on the
rise. Both accepted the principle of Palestinian independence. None made
room for either Syrian or Iranian interests. It was essential that
Hezbollah, representing itself and the two nations, have a seat at the
table that would define Palestinian politics for a generation. But
Hezbollah was more a group of businessmen making money in Beirut than a
revolutionary organization. It had to demonstrate its commitment to the
destruction of Israel even if it was ambiguous on the nature of the
follow-on regime. It had to do something.
Third, the Sunni-Shiite fault line had become venomous. Tensions not only
in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan were creating a
transnational civil war between these two movements. Iran was positioning
itself to replace al Qaeda as the revolutionary force in the Islamic world
and was again challenging Saudi Arabia as the center of gravity of Islamic
religiosity. Israel was a burning issue. It had to be there. Moreover, in
its dealings with the United States over Iraq, Iran needed as many levers
as possible, and a front in Lebanon confronting Israel, particularly if it
bogged down the Israelis, would do just that.
Hezbollah is enabled by both Syria and Iran. But precisely because of both
national and ideological differences between those two countries,
Hezbollah is not simply a tool for them. They each have influence over
Hezbollah but this influence is sometimes contradictory. Syria's interests
and Iran's are never quite the same. Nor are Hezbollah's interests quite
the same as those of its patrons. Hezbollah has business interests in
legal and illegal businesses around the world. It has interests within
Lebanese politics and it has interests in Palestinian politics. As a
Syrian client, it looks at the region as one entity. As an Iranian client,
it looks to create a theocratic state in the region. As an entity in its
own right, it must keep itself going.
Given all these forces, Hezbollah was in a position in which it had to
take some significant action in Lebanon, Israel and the Islamic world or
be bypassed by other, more effective, groups. Hezbollah chose to act. The
decision it made was to go to war with Israel. It did not think it could
win the war but it did think it could survive it. And if it fought and
survived, it would have a seat at the Palestinian and Lebanese tables, and
maintain and reconcile the patronage of Syria and Iran. The reasons were
complex, the action was clear.
Hezbollah had prepared for war with Israel for years. It had received
weapons and training from Iran and Syria. It had prepared systematic
fortifications using these weapons in southern Lebanon after Israel's
withdrawal, but also in the Bekaa Valley, where its main base of
operations was and in the area south of Beirut, where its political center
was. It had prepared for this war carefully, particularly studying the
U.S. experience in Iraq.
In our view, Hezbollah has three military goals in this battle:
1. Fight the most effective defensive battle ever fought against Israel by
an Arab army, surpassing the performance of Egypt and Syria in 1973.
2. Inflict direct and substantial damage on Israel proper using
conventional weapons in order to demonstrate the limits of Israeli power.
3. Draw Israel into an invasion of Lebanon and, following resistance, move
to an insurgency that does to the Israelis what the Sunnis in Iraq have
done to the Americans.
In doing this, the U.S.-Israeli bloc would be fighting simultaneously on
two fronts. This would place Jordan in a difficult position. It would
radicalize Syria (Syria is too secular to be considered radical in this
context). It would establish Hezbollah as the claimant to Arab and Islamic
primacy along the Levant. It also would establish Shiite radicalism as
equal to Sunni radicalism.
The capture of two Israeli soldiers was the first provocation, triggering
Israeli attacks. But neither the capture nor the retaliation represented a
break point. That happened when Hezbollah rockets hit Haifa, several
times, presenting Israel with a problem that forced it to take military
steps -- steps for which Hezbollah thought it was ready and which it
thought it could survive, and exploit. Hezbollah had to have known that
attacking the third largest city in Israel would force a response. That is
exactly what it wanted.
Hezbollah's strategy will be to tie down the Israelis as long as possible
first in the area south of the Litani River and then north in the Bekaa.
It can, and will, continue to rocket Haifa from further north. It will
inflict casualties and draw the Israelis further north. At a certain point
Hezbollah will do what the Taliban and Saddam Hussein did: It will
suddenly abandon the conventional fight, going to ground, and then
re-emerge as a guerrilla group, inflicting casualties on the Israelis as
the Sunnis do on the Americans, wearing them down.
Israel's strategy, as we have seen, will be to destroy Hezbollah's
infrastructure but not occupy any territory. In other words, invade, smash
and leave, carrying out follow-on attacks as needed. Hezbollah's goal will
be to create military problems that force Israel to maintain a presence
for an extended period of time, so that its follow-on strategy can be made
to work. This will be what determines the outcome of the war. Hezbollah
will try to keep Israel from disengaging. Israel will try to disengage.
Hezbollah sees the war in these stages:
1. Rocket attacks to force and Israeli response.
2. An extended period of conventional combat to impose substantial losses
on the Israelis, and establish Hezbollah capabilities to both Israel and
the Arab and Islamic worlds. This will involve using fairly sophisticated
weaponry and will go on as long as Hezbollah can extend it.
3. Hezbollah's abandonment of conventional warfare for a prepared
insurgency program.
What Hezbollah wants is political power in Lebanon and among the
Palestinians, and freedom for action within the context of Syrian-Iranian
relations. This war will cost it dearly, but it has been preparing for
this for a generation. Some of the old guard may not have the stomach for
this, but it was either this or be pushed aside by the younger bloods.
Syria wanted to see this happen. Iran wanted to see this happen. Iran
risks nothing. Syria risks little since Israel is terrified of the
successor regime to the Assads. So long as Syria limits resupply and does
not intervene, Israel must leave Damascus out.
Looked at from Hezbollah's point of view, taking the fight to the Israelis
is something that has not happened in quite a while. Hezbollah's hitting
of Haifa gives it the position it has sought for a generation. If it can
avoid utter calamity, it will have won -- if not by defeating Israel, then
by putting itself first among the anti-Israeli forces. What Hezbollah
wants in Israel is much less clear and important than what it opposes. It
opposes Israel and is the most effective force fighting it.
Fatah and Hamas are now bystanders in the battle for Israel. They have no
love for or trust in Hezbollah, but Hezbollah is doing what they have only
talked about. Israel's mission is to crush Hezbollah quickly. Hezbollah's
job is to survive and hurt Israel and the IDF as long as possible. That is
what this war is about for Hezbollah.
_______________________________________________
Main mailing list
[email protected]
https://nefac.net/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/main
Special Report: Why Hezbollah Fights
July 22, 2006 20 32 GMT
To understand Hezbollah, it is important to begin with this point: Almost
all Muslim Arabs opposed the creation of the state of Israel. Not all of
them supported, or support today, the creation of an independent
Palestinian state or recognize the Palestinian people as a distinct
nation. This is a vital and usually overlooked distinction that is the
starting point in our thinking.
When Israel was founded, three distinct views emerged among Arabs. The
first was that Israel was a part of the British mandate created after
World War I and therefore should have been understood as part of an entity
stretching from the Mediterranean to the other side of Jordan, from the
border of the Sinai, north to Mount Hermon. Therefore, after 1948, the
West Bank became part of the other part of the mandate, Jordan.
There was a second view that argued that there was a single province of
the Ottoman Empire called Syria and that all of this province -- what
today is Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the country of Syria -- is
legitimately part of it. This obviously was the view of Syria, whose
policy was and in some ways continues to be that Syria province, divided
by Britain and France after World War I, should be reunited under the rule
of Damascus.
A third view emerged after the establishment of Israel, pioneered by Gamal
Abdel Nasser in Egypt. This view was that there is a single Arab nation
that should be gathered together in a United Arab Republic. This republic
would be socialist, more secular than religious and, above all,
modernizing, joining the rest of the world in industrialization and
development.
All of these three views rejected the existence of Israel, but each had
very different ideas of what ought to succeed it. The many different
Palestinian groups that existed after the founding of Israel and until
1980 were not simply random entities. They were, in various ways, groups
that straddled these three opinions, with a fourth added after 1967 and
pioneered by Yasser Arafat. This view was that there should be an
independent Palestinian state, that it should be in the territories
occupied by Israel in 1967, extend to the original state of Israel and
ultimately occupy Jordan as well. That is why, in September 1970, Arafat
tried to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan. For Arafat, Amman, Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv were all part of the Palestinian homeland.
After the Iranian revolution, a fifth strain emerged. This strain made a
general argument that the real issue in the Islamic world was to restore
religious-based government. This view opposed the pan-Arab vision of
Nasser with the pan-Islamic vision of Khomeini. It regarded the particular
nation-states as less important than the type of regime they had. This
primarily Shiite view was later complemented by what was its Sunni
counterpart. Rooted partly in Wahhabi Sunni religiosity and partly in the
revolutionary spirit of Iran, its view was that the Islamic nation-states
were the problem and that the only way to solve it was a transnational
Islamic regime -- the caliphate -- that would restore the power of the
Islamic world.
That pedantic lesson complete, we can now locate Hezbollah's ideology and
intentions more carefully. Hezbollah is a Shiite radical group that grew
out of the Iranian revolution. However, there is a tension in its views,
because it also is close to Syria. As such, it is close to a much more
secular partner, more in the Nasserite tradition domestically. But it also
is close to a country that views Lebanon, Jordan and Israel as part of
greater Syria, the Syria torn apart by the British and French.
There are deep contradictions ideologically between Iran and Syria, though
they share a common interest. First, they both oppose the Sunnis. Remember
that when Lebanon first underwent invasion in 1975, it was by Syria
intervening on behalf of Christian friends and against the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Syria hated Arafat because Arafat insisted
on an independent Palestinian state and Syria opposed it. This was apart
from the fact that Syria had business interests in Lebanon that the PLO
was interfering with. Iran also opposed the PLO because of its
religious/ethnic orientation; moreso because it was secular and socialist.
Hezbollah emerged as a group representing Syrian and Iranian interests.
These were:
Opposition to the state of Israel
An ambiguous position on an independent Palestine
Hostility to the United States for supporting Israel and later championing
Yasser Arafat
Hezbollah had to straddle the deep division between Syrian secularity and
Iranian religiosity. However the other three interests allowed them to
postpone the issue.
This brings us to the current action. Three things happened to energize
Hezbollah:
First, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon under pressure from the United
States undermined an understanding between Israel and Syria. Israel would
cede Lebanon to Syria. Syria would control Hezbollah. When Syria lost out
in Lebanon, its motive for controlling Hezbollah disappeared. Syria, in
fact, wanted the world to see what would happen if Syria left Lebanon.
Chaos was exactly what Syria wanted.
Second, the election of a Hamas-controlled government in the Palestinian
territories created massive fluidity in Palestinian politics. The
Nasserite Fatah was in decline and a religious Sunni movement was on the
rise. Both accepted the principle of Palestinian independence. None made
room for either Syrian or Iranian interests. It was essential that
Hezbollah, representing itself and the two nations, have a seat at the
table that would define Palestinian politics for a generation. But
Hezbollah was more a group of businessmen making money in Beirut than a
revolutionary organization. It had to demonstrate its commitment to the
destruction of Israel even if it was ambiguous on the nature of the
follow-on regime. It had to do something.
Third, the Sunni-Shiite fault line had become venomous. Tensions not only
in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan were creating a
transnational civil war between these two movements. Iran was positioning
itself to replace al Qaeda as the revolutionary force in the Islamic world
and was again challenging Saudi Arabia as the center of gravity of Islamic
religiosity. Israel was a burning issue. It had to be there. Moreover, in
its dealings with the United States over Iraq, Iran needed as many levers
as possible, and a front in Lebanon confronting Israel, particularly if it
bogged down the Israelis, would do just that.
Hezbollah is enabled by both Syria and Iran. But precisely because of both
national and ideological differences between those two countries,
Hezbollah is not simply a tool for them. They each have influence over
Hezbollah but this influence is sometimes contradictory. Syria's interests
and Iran's are never quite the same. Nor are Hezbollah's interests quite
the same as those of its patrons. Hezbollah has business interests in
legal and illegal businesses around the world. It has interests within
Lebanese politics and it has interests in Palestinian politics. As a
Syrian client, it looks at the region as one entity. As an Iranian client,
it looks to create a theocratic state in the region. As an entity in its
own right, it must keep itself going.
Given all these forces, Hezbollah was in a position in which it had to
take some significant action in Lebanon, Israel and the Islamic world or
be bypassed by other, more effective, groups. Hezbollah chose to act. The
decision it made was to go to war with Israel. It did not think it could
win the war but it did think it could survive it. And if it fought and
survived, it would have a seat at the Palestinian and Lebanese tables, and
maintain and reconcile the patronage of Syria and Iran. The reasons were
complex, the action was clear.
Hezbollah had prepared for war with Israel for years. It had received
weapons and training from Iran and Syria. It had prepared systematic
fortifications using these weapons in southern Lebanon after Israel's
withdrawal, but also in the Bekaa Valley, where its main base of
operations was and in the area south of Beirut, where its political center
was. It had prepared for this war carefully, particularly studying the
U.S. experience in Iraq.
In our view, Hezbollah has three military goals in this battle:
1. Fight the most effective defensive battle ever fought against Israel by
an Arab army, surpassing the performance of Egypt and Syria in 1973.
2. Inflict direct and substantial damage on Israel proper using
conventional weapons in order to demonstrate the limits of Israeli power.
3. Draw Israel into an invasion of Lebanon and, following resistance, move
to an insurgency that does to the Israelis what the Sunnis in Iraq have
done to the Americans.
In doing this, the U.S.-Israeli bloc would be fighting simultaneously on
two fronts. This would place Jordan in a difficult position. It would
radicalize Syria (Syria is too secular to be considered radical in this
context). It would establish Hezbollah as the claimant to Arab and Islamic
primacy along the Levant. It also would establish Shiite radicalism as
equal to Sunni radicalism.
The capture of two Israeli soldiers was the first provocation, triggering
Israeli attacks. But neither the capture nor the retaliation represented a
break point. That happened when Hezbollah rockets hit Haifa, several
times, presenting Israel with a problem that forced it to take military
steps -- steps for which Hezbollah thought it was ready and which it
thought it could survive, and exploit. Hezbollah had to have known that
attacking the third largest city in Israel would force a response. That is
exactly what it wanted.
Hezbollah's strategy will be to tie down the Israelis as long as possible
first in the area south of the Litani River and then north in the Bekaa.
It can, and will, continue to rocket Haifa from further north. It will
inflict casualties and draw the Israelis further north. At a certain point
Hezbollah will do what the Taliban and Saddam Hussein did: It will
suddenly abandon the conventional fight, going to ground, and then
re-emerge as a guerrilla group, inflicting casualties on the Israelis as
the Sunnis do on the Americans, wearing them down.
Israel's strategy, as we have seen, will be to destroy Hezbollah's
infrastructure but not occupy any territory. In other words, invade, smash
and leave, carrying out follow-on attacks as needed. Hezbollah's goal will
be to create military problems that force Israel to maintain a presence
for an extended period of time, so that its follow-on strategy can be made
to work. This will be what determines the outcome of the war. Hezbollah
will try to keep Israel from disengaging. Israel will try to disengage.
Hezbollah sees the war in these stages:
1. Rocket attacks to force and Israeli response.
2. An extended period of conventional combat to impose substantial losses
on the Israelis, and establish Hezbollah capabilities to both Israel and
the Arab and Islamic worlds. This will involve using fairly sophisticated
weaponry and will go on as long as Hezbollah can extend it.
3. Hezbollah's abandonment of conventional warfare for a prepared
insurgency program.
What Hezbollah wants is political power in Lebanon and among the
Palestinians, and freedom for action within the context of Syrian-Iranian
relations. This war will cost it dearly, but it has been preparing for
this for a generation. Some of the old guard may not have the stomach for
this, but it was either this or be pushed aside by the younger bloods.
Syria wanted to see this happen. Iran wanted to see this happen. Iran
risks nothing. Syria risks little since Israel is terrified of the
successor regime to the Assads. So long as Syria limits resupply and does
not intervene, Israel must leave Damascus out.
Looked at from Hezbollah's point of view, taking the fight to the Israelis
is something that has not happened in quite a while. Hezbollah's hitting
of Haifa gives it the position it has sought for a generation. If it can
avoid utter calamity, it will have won -- if not by defeating Israel, then
by putting itself first among the anti-Israeli forces. What Hezbollah
wants in Israel is much less clear and important than what it opposes. It
opposes Israel and is the most effective force fighting it.
Fatah and Hamas are now bystanders in the battle for Israel. They have no
love for or trust in Hezbollah, but Hezbollah is doing what they have only
talked about. Israel's mission is to crush Hezbollah quickly. Hezbollah's
job is to survive and hurt Israel and the IDF as long as possible. That is
what this war is about for Hezbollah.
_______________________________________________
Main mailing list
[email protected]
https://nefac.net/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/main