Rosa Lichtenstein
25th July 2006, 05:45
B123:
Ah, if you are past the beginners' stage, then you might like to try more substantial books on Wittgenstein; try these:
Baker, G. (1988), Wittgenstein, Frege And The Vienna Circle (Blackwell).
Baker, G., and Hacker, P. (1983a), An Analytic Commentary On Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Vol. 1, Part 1 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1983b), Wittgenstein. Meaning And Understanding Vol. 1, Part 2 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1988), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity Vol. 2 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
Block, I. (1981) (ed.), Perspectives On The Philosophy Of Wittgenstein (Blackwell).
Bloor, D. (1997), Wittgenstein, Rules And Institutions (Routledge).
Carruthers, P. (1989), Tractarian Semantics (Blackwell).
--------, (1990), The Metaphysics Of The Tractatus (Cambridge University Press).
The above two books are the best yet on W's early work.
Crary, A., and Read, R. (2000) (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (Routledge).
Diamond, C. (1991), The Realistic Spirit (MIT Press).
Forster, M. (2004), Wittgenstein On The Arbitrariness Of Grammar (Princeton University Press).
Goldstein, L. (1999), Clear And Queer Thinking (Duckworth).
Hacker, P. (1993a), Wittgenstein. Meaning And Mind Vol. 3 Part 1 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1993b), Wittgenstein. Meaning And Mind Vol. 3 Part 2 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1996), Wittgenstein’s Place In Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell).
--------, (1997), Insight And Illusion (Thoemmes Press, 2nd ed.).
--------, (2000a), Wittgenstein. Mind And Will. Vol 4 Part 1 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
--------, (2000b), Wittgenstein. Mind And Will. Vol 4 Part 2 (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
Hallett, G. (1967), Wittgenstein’s Definition Of Meaning As Use (Fordham University Press).
--------, (1977), A Companion To Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (Cornell University Press).
Hutto, D. (2003), Wittgenstein And The End Of Philosophy. Neither Theory Nor Therapy (Macmillan).
Hyman, J. (1991) (ed.), Investigating Psychology. Sciences Of The Mind After Wittgenstein (Routledge).
Kitching, G., and Pleasants, N. (2002) (eds.), Marx And Wittgenstein. Knowledge, Morality And Politics (Routledge).
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein On Rules And Private Language (Blackwell). This book is a modern classic in its own right.
Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism, And The Foundations Of Mathematics (Oxford University Press).
Ostrow, M. (2002), Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. A Dialectical Interpretation (Cambridge University Press).
Shanker, S. (1987), Wittgenstein And The Turning-Point In The Philosophy Of Mathematics (State University of New York Press).
Sluga, H., and Stern, D. (1996) (eds.), The Cambridge Companion To Wittgenstein (Cambridge University Press).
Stern, D. (1995), Wittgenstein On Mind And Language (Oxford University Press).
Williams, M. (1999), Wittgenstein, Mind And Meaning (Routledge).
[I have left out of this list the many significant papers there are on Wittgenstein.]
Rosa Lichtenstein
25th July 2006, 17:29
Jim, I am amazed you mentioned Ayer's book; it is worse than poor.
As far as the other things you say are concerned, here is a post I added to an earlier thread (it is taken from an essay I might publish at my site in a year or so -- so you need to know the material below is unfinished):
[7] BOURGEOIS PHILOSOPHY
[7.1] Tu Quoque
[7.1.1] Wittgenstein And Marxism
Some readers might think that the relatively hard line adopted here toward the alien-class origins of DM sits rather awkwardly with the apparently uncritical acceptance of ideas drawn from Wittgenstein’s work, an allegedly bourgeois philosopher and mystic.
However, there is nothing in this work to suggest that everything that Wittgenstein wrote has been uncritically accepted. On the contrary, several open criticisms have been made of some of his ideas. Nevertheless, the full extent of the present author’s differences with Wittgenstein will not be aired here.[1]
What is being maintained in this work is that the application of Wittgenstein’s method to the tangled theses that have flourished in traditional Philosophy shows them up for what they are: theoretical weeds. Moreover, it also confirms that such theses do not have to be accepted by anyone with a healthy prejudice against the misuse of language. For Marxists this cannot be an unappealing prospect; indeed, something similar had been Marx’s aim - in his early writings, at least.[2]
Furthermore, the idea that Wittgenstein’s work is mystical and ‘conservative’ is, despite the remarks of certain of his disciples, completely wrong. The plain fact is that Wittgenstein was not a conservative mystic.[3]
More to the point, since Wittgenstein was not attempting to build yet another philosophical system, his approach breaks with 2500 years of ruling-class thought. In fact, he was the first major Philosopher to make this break (even if he did not see it this way).[3a]
Wittgenstein’s method is aimed at exposing the bogus nature of all philosophical theories by placing ordinary language at the centre. Again, for Marxists this linguistic turn cannot serve as a source of substitutionist thought, quite unlike the work of practically every other philosopher. In fact, the opposite is true; Wittgenstein’s method helps expose traditional ways of theorising, revealing them to be no more than the systematic capitulation to the misuse of words - and anti-materialist for all that. For reasons examined earlier, the approach adopted here complements HM seamlessly.[4]
In addition, it is not an accident that Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ordinary language occurred at or around the time when workers were entering the stage of history as an organised force - for all that DM-critics of Wittgenstein and “Ordinary Language Philosophy” have failed to notice this.[5]
Not only that, but it is worth pointing out that even though “Ordinary Language Philosophy” is often associated with Wittgenstein’s work, their identification is thoroughly misleading since it blurs the significant differences that exist between his method and that of the so-called “Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophers”.[6]
As he himself put it:
“Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language….
“[Philosophical problems] are not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language….
“What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use…. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language….
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain…. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree with them.” [Wittgenstein (1953), pp.43-50. Bold emphasis added.][7]
As it turns out, there are other equally important reasons for adopting Wittgenstein’s approach to Philosophy. These are considered below, and in Appendix D.
Finally, it is also argued that the emphasis placed on ordinary language by certain Analytic Philosophers (up until a few generations ago, at least) was not unconnected with the rise of the working class as a political force in history. The latter-day demise of this tradition in Analytic Philosophy (and the resurgence of Metaphysics, and particularly Hegelianism) is also linked to the change in the balance of class forces that has taken place over the last thirty years or so.
In fact, the modern home of 'monetarist' economic theory (the USA) was also the source of the most determined attacks on Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP). Over the same period, we have witnessed a resurgence of a plethora of right-wing ideas in science (for example, the rise of Sociobiology in the 1970's which later transmogrified into 'Evolutionary Psychology' in the 1990's, and arguably the re-emergence of the BBT). No coincidences these.
[BBT = Big Bang Theory.]
This is not to suggest that those working in OLP were revolutionaries, or that they saw things this way. It is to assert however that their emphasis on ordinary language had material roots, and that it did not just emerge out of thin air. Indeed, many of these thinkers were socialists of one sort or another. For example, as noted below, the vast majority of Wittgenstein's friends were Communists or were sympathetic to Trotskyism. Wittgenstein himself wanted to move to the USSR in the mid-1930's, and was offered the professorship at Kazan University (Lenin's old College), which tenure the Stalinists of the day would hardly have offered to an anti-red.
This, of course, makes the work of the most important philosopher working in OLP (i.e., Wittgenstein) crucially important for the defence of working-class politics.
[Although it is not maintained here that Wittgenstein saw things this way. These issues are spelled-out in much more detail in my thesis.]
So, why now?
The working class in previous centuries was far too small and weak to provide a materialist counter-weight to the Idealism found in all forms of ruling-class thought. This is no longer the case.
The larger the working-class has become, the less impact Dialectical Marxism has had on it.
Now we can see why.
These Essays perhaps represent the first attempt in the modern age to reshape working-class thought de novo, and thus Marxist Theory in toto.
Notes
1. In fact, in Appendix D, I explicitly criticise a tendency found in Wittgenstein’s later work that began to confuse the sense of a sentence with its use - an error that confounds the distinction we should surely want to draw between the meaning of a word and the sense of a sentence -, as an illegitimate extension of the idea that meaning can be explicated in terms of use. Other problems with his work include the following:
(1) Although Wittgenstein’s later work was anthropologically motivated, it has in fact no detectable historical or social content, which makes the direct appropriation of his ideas by Marxists problematic. However, this is not an insurmountable obstacle.
(2) Even though Wittgenstein was not a ‘religious’ man (in the sense that he practised no particular faith), he was ‘religious’ in temperament. However, several of his ideas have subsequently been used by some of his followers to defend various different brands of Christianity, etc. However, there are prominent Christian Wittgensteinians who totally ignore this aspect of his work - probably because of its theological naivety.
Although it is possible to mount a weak sort of defence of religious belief based on certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s work, the truth is that Wittgenstein’s method is inimical to all forms of religious and theological belief - as this essay has sought to show, and as was argued in P4. On this, see Cook (1988, 1993). That is, of course, a conclusion with which Wittgenstein himself would have taken great exception.
(3) One of the major difficulties with Wittgenstein’s work is that it is in fact impossible to settle upon an agreed or even an identifiably ‘correct’ interpretation of it. Naturally, this means that it is difficult to determine what he himself actually believed. But, paradoxically, this is also one of its strengths; he was concerned not to advance any philosophical ‘theses’ about language, reality or thought. His main aim was to establish a method that would bring traditional Philosophy to an end (by showing that it was thoroughly confused - replacing it with an entirely new concept of what philosophical investigation should be). This novel approach would limit Philosophy’s role to the clarification (and hence the unravelling) of confusions that arise because of a tendency we humans have to misunderstand language. However, philosophers who are still in the grip of traditional ways of thinking often see this approach to theory as a dereliction of duty; according to them, Philosophy should form part of a general attempt to understand the world (and for DM-fans, it should be part of their aim to change it). This view of Philosophy is seldom justified, perhaps because there is no justification for it over and above those explored earlier. Nevertheless, the traditional approach to Philosophy reflects a general belief held by Philosophers that they have special access to especially profound truths about reality – ones that just happen to be conducive to ruling-class interests. However, traditional world-views underlying Philosophy are largely predicated on the belief that reality is rational and that theorists can construct a super-scientific picture of the universe by the mere application of thought - or the use of a specially-concocted vocabulary.
However, as we have also seen (and as 2500 years of speculation have amply demonstrated), this ‘hard-headed’ approach to Philosophy has proven to be about as unsuccessful as any human endeavour could be: Philosophers are no nearer telling us what familiar things like apples and oranges really are, or what truth is - or even what knowledge is – than were Plato and Aristotle. This means that traditional Philosophy has advanced about as much as Theology has; but at least we know the latter is useless. ‘Hard-nosed’ theorists wishing to cling to the old way of going nowhere slowly might like to reflect on this disconcerting fact. On this, cf., Hacker (2001b).
This emphasis on ordinary language as a way of clarifying the mistakes we are prone to make does not imply that human beings do not understand how to use the vernacular. It is simply that when we try to theorise about it - or when we try to theorise by means of it - we go astray, creating empty philosophical puzzles and paradoxes as a result. On this see: Ambrose (1967), Cavell (1976), Hacker (1996, 1997, 2001b), Kenny (1973, 1998), Savickey (1999), Shanker (1987a, 1998), Stern (1995), and Suter (1989).
Unfortunately, this has meant that Wittgenstein’s work has had a negligible affect on Philosophy as a whole. Philosophers in general reject this approach out of hand (often for the flimsiest of reasons; witness Le Poidevin’s ‘argument’, in ####) since it represents a threat to their livelihood and their status. A few philosophers have attempted to absorb his ideas piecemeal into their own work, but they have done this in such a way that it is obvious that they largely reject his method. Such half-hearted Wittgensteinians still seem intent on searching for philosophical truths about language, ‘the mind’, truth, knowledge, the world, ethics, and so on. Either that or they have simply slipped back into doing traditional philosophy, re-joining those engaged in constructing a several more new routes to nowhere. [Cf., Philosophical Investigations, April 2001, and Hacker (1996).]
2. Cf., Manser (1973). This theme is explored at greater length in Rubinstein (1981), especially pp.121-38. The attempt to assimilate Marx and Wittgenstein’s work will be examined later; cf., Notes 3 and 4, below. See also Brudney (1998), and Labica (1980).
3. Most revolutionaries seem to regard Analytic Philosophy as something of a conservative or ideological phenomenon - Wittgenstein’s work perhaps being seen as a prime example. That view has partly been motivated by the widely held opinion that Wittgenstein was a conservative and that he pandered to mystical and religious ideas.
That this received picture is incorrect can be seen by reading Alan Janik’s essays “Nyiri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” - which is a reply to Nyiri (1998) -, and “Wittgenstein, Marx and Sociology”, both reprinted in Janik (1985), pp.116-57. See also Crary (2000).
In fact, not only were many of Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils prominent Marxists (e.g., Piero Sraffa, Maurice Dobb, Nicholas Bachtin, George Thomson, Maurice Cornforth and David Hayden-Guest [cf., Monk (1990), pp.343, 348; Rhees (1984), pp.x, 48; and Sheehan (1993), pp.303, 343], one of his foremost ‘disciples’ (Rush Rhees) at one point contemplated joining the RCP (i.e., the 1940’s Trotskyist version, not that recent right-wing 'party', now happily defunct), and asked Wittgenstein for advice on this. Cf., Rhees (1984), pp.200-09.
Rhees and Monk record the many sympathetic remarks Wittgenstein made about Marxism, about workers and about revolutionary activity. While these are not in themselves models of ‘orthodoxy’, they reveal how close Wittgenstein came to adopting a very weak form of class politics in the 1930’s – certainly closer than any other major philosopher since Marx himself; cf., Rhees (1984), pp.205-09. Cf., also Norman Malcolm’s Introduction to Rhees’ book, pp.xvii-xviii, and Monk (1990), pp.343-54. In fact, Monk reports a comment made by George Thomson on Wittgenstein’s attitude to Marxism: “He was opposed it in theory, but supported it in practice”, and notes another friend who remembers Wittgenstein saying that he was “a communist, at heart” (Monk (1990), p.343), and he concludes:
“There is no doubt that during the political upheavals of the mid-1930’s Wittgenstein’s sympathies were with the working class and the unemployed, and that his allegiance, broadly speaking, was with the left….
“Despite the fact that Wittgenstein was never at any time a Marxist, he was perceived as a sympathetic figure by the students who formed the core of the Cambridge Communist Party, many of whom ([David] Hayden-Guest, [John] Cornford, Maurice Cornforth, etc.) attended his lectures.” [Monk (1990), pp.343, 348.]
In Rhees’ book, Fania Pascall (who was also a Marxist and another of Wittgenstein’s friends, and who was married to Communist Party intellectual Roy Pascall), reports that Wittgenstein had actually read Marx [cf., Rhees (1984), p.44], but, the source of this information appears to be John Moran: cf., Moran (1972). Garth Hallett’s otherwise comprehensive survey omits reference to it; cf., Hallett (1977), pp.759-75. Rhees and Monk note that when Wittgenstein visited Russia he met Sophia Yanovskaya [Professor of Mathematical Logic at Moscow University, one of the co-editors of Marx’s Mathematical Manuscripts; cf., Yanovskaya (1983), in Marx (1983)], who apparently advised him to “read more Hegel” [Monk (1990), p.351 and Rhees (1984), p.209]. In fact, Yanovskaya even went as far as to recommend Wittgenstein for the chair at Kazan University (Lenin’s old college) and for a teaching post at Moscow University (Monk (1990), p. 351). These are hardly posts one would offer to just anyone in Stalin’s Russia in the mid-1930s, least of all to one not sympathetic to Communism. Monk suggests that Yanovskaya formed the (false) impression that Wittgenstein was interested in DM (ibid.), but Drury (another of Wittgenstein’s pupils) records that Wittgenstein had a low opinion of Lenin’s philosophical work (but, which ones we do not know; but this indicates that Wittgenstein had at least read Lenin since he never passed comments on second-hand reports of other writers’ work), but the opposite view of his practical endeavours:
“Lenin’s writings about philosophy are of course absurd, but at least he did want to get something done.” [Drury, quoting Wittgenstein from recollection, in Rhees (1984), p.126.]
Fania Pascall also records Wittgenstein’s friendship with Nicholas Bachtin (ibid., p.14), and notes that at one time he expressed a desire to go and live in Russia (ibid., pp.26, 29, 44, 125-26, 198-200). In fact he actually visited Russia in September 1935 [cf., Monk (1990), pp. 347-53], when he met the above Professor Yanovskaya. Like many other Cambridge intellectuals at the time his desire to live in the USSR was motivated by his false belief that under Stalin it was a Workers’ State. In this regard, of course, his intentions are more significant than were his mistaken views. One only has to contrast Wittgenstein’s opinion of Russia with that of, say, Bertrand Russell (his former teacher) to see how sympathetic in comparison Wittgenstein was to revolutionary Marxism - even if, like many others, he finally mistook the latter for Stalinism. Cf., Drury’s memoir in Rhees (1984), p.144. John Maynard Keynes (another of Wittgenstein’s friends) wrote the following in a letter to the Russian ambassador Maisky about Wittgenstein’s plans to live in Russia:
“I must leave it to him to tell you his reasons for wanting to go to Russia. He is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for.” [John Maynard Keynes to Maisky, quoted in Rhees (1984), p.199. Also quoted more fully in Monk (1990), p.349.]
In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk plays down Wittgenstein’s proposed move, and relying on Fania Pascall’s view of Wittgenstein’s motives, interprets it as a reflection of his attachment to a Tolstoyian view of the Russian peasantry and the ‘dignity of manual labour’. While this clearly was a factor, it cannot explain Wittgenstein’s positive remarks about the gains he believed workers had made because of the revolution. On this, Rhees is clearly a more reliable guide; he knew Wittgenstein better than almost anyone else. The full details of Wittgenstein’s desire to live in Russia, and his visit there, can be found in Monk (1990), pp.340-54.
His closest friend before he met Rhees was Francis Skinner, who had wanted to volunteer to fight in Spain as part of the International Brigade (he was finally rejected on health grounds). Alan Turing (who was also one of Wittgenstein’s pupils for a brief period) accused Wittgenstein of trying to introduce “Bolshevism” into Mathematics, because of his criticisms of the LEM and the LOC; cf. Monk (1990), pp.419-20; see also Hodges (1983).
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein himself declared that his later Philosophy had been inspired by conversations he regularly had with Pierro Sraffa (Gramsci’s friend). The extent of Sraffa’s influence is still unclear (however, see below), but Wittgenstein admitted to Rhees that it was from Sraffa that he had gained an “anthropological” view of philosophical problems. Cf., Monk (1990), pp.260-61. Cf., also Malcolm (1958), p.69, and von Wright (ND), pp.28, 213, and Wittgenstein (1998), p.16.
In the preface to what was his most important work, Wittgenstein had this to say:
“Even more than this…criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book.” [Wittgenstein (1958), p.viii. Bold emphasis added.]
This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century - and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of Metaphysics - claims that his most “consequential” ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist!
Attempts to reconstruct the influence of Sraffa of Wittgenstein are in their early stages, and they are not likely to progress much further unless some hard evidence turns up; anyway, to date, these attempts are based largely on supposition and inference. On this, see Sharpe (2002), Davis (2002) and Rossi-Landi (2002), pp.200-04.
Now, it is not being maintained here that Wittgenstein was a closet revolutionary, only that he has been rather badly misrepresented; a demonstrably erroneous view of his political leanings has been fostered by some of his ‘disciples’ who have (or have had) their own political agendas.
However, this whole issue has taken a somewhat farcical turn recently with the publication of Kimberley Cornish’s book The Jew of Linz. [Cornish (1999).] Basing his conclusions on flimsy evidence, Cornish attempts to construct a wild theory that Hitler was turned into an anti-Semite by his encounter with Wittgenstein at school (remarkably, these two attended the same school at the same time!). According to Cornish, Wittgenstein subsequently became the principal recruiting agent for Stalinist spies in Cambridge, and, moreover, that he concocted his “no-ownership theory of the mind” (aimed at confounding Nazi ideology) in order to make amends for this earlier ‘crime’ - as well as to promote socialist collectivism. In fact, the reasoning in Cornish’s book is so fanciful one almost expects (as one of the characters in Umberto Eco’s book Foucualt’s Pendulum predicts) The Illuminati, The Masters Of The Universe and The Knights Templar to put in an appearance at some stage. Perhaps the only thing missing from Cornish’s book is a reference to Wittgenstein’s ability to control the 'Telluric Forces'.
Nevertheless, Cornish’s book does have at least one merit: it assembles all the available evidence (and there is a considerable amount, even if some of it is circumstantial) indicative of Wittgenstein’s leanings toward revolutionary politics; cf. Cornish (1999), pp.40-87. Cornish claims that Wittgenstein was a “Stalinist”, but his evidence is largely fanciful, inferential and indirect. [Mysteriously, Goldstein, an otherwise fairly reliable interpreter of Wittgenstein, seems to have swallowed this unlikely tale; cf., Goldstein (1999), pp.164-65. But even Goldstein is silent about the connection that Cornish alleges exists between Wittgenstein’s encounter with Hitler and his career as the main Stalinist recruiting agent at Cambridge in the 1930’s, and Wittgenstein’s supposed motives for inventing the “no ownership theory of the mind”.]
In addition to conservative misrepresentations of Wittgenstein’s views, there is an equally spurious idea that his work is identical to the “Oxford Ordinary Language” Philosophy of Ryle, Austin, Warnock, Strawson, Urmson and Hampshire. Beyond a few superficial similarities, Wittgenstein’s work bears no resemblance at all to “Oxford Philosophy”. On this, see Dummett (1960).
3a. In his early work, Marx was beginning to show signs of making a similar break from traditional thought, but this petered out somewhere in the 1850’s. Almost the same can be said of Engels (who was by no stretch of the imagination a competent philosopher), although he later slipped back into what can only be described as an amateurish dalliance with ruling-class (if not mystical) ‘styles of though’ in his work on DM, ones that have now been ossified into sacred texts. Lenin and Plekhanov certainly never gave the slightest hint that they were aware that a break with traditional thought-patterns was essential if a proletarian ‘world-view’ was to be developed - and neither did Trotsky. More or less can be said for subsequent DM-theorists; all have trooped in the same alien-class direction.
4. I will not substantiate this assertion in this essay. Nevertheless, as might seem reasonably obvious from the tone set in this review, the present author does not share Wittgenstein’s respect for ancient metaphysical systems. Although Wittgenstein sought to show these schemes were the result of the systematic misuse of words, he still held them in high regard; the exact opposite opinion should rightly be attributed to the present author.
Attempts to marry the work of Wittgenstein and Marx have not in general been entirely convincing. Gavin Kitching’s work [Kitching (1988, 1994)] represents perhaps the most concerted effort in this direction so far. Unfortunately, Kitching operates with a superficial understanding of Wittgenstein, which he uses to outline an even less accurate one of Marx. Unwisely, he also employs his own implausible and inconsistent version of an ‘occasionalist’ theory of meaning (destructively analysed in Appendix D).
Several other authors have also tried to link the work of Marx and Wittgenstein; cf., Brudney (1998), Eagleton (1982), Pleasants (1996, 1999), and Rubinstein (1981). A much more promising attempt has recently been made in this direction in Kitching and Pleasants (2002). However, as D. Cook [in D. Cook (1984)] quite correctly points out, the differences between Marx and Wittgenstein are far more profound than are their apparent similarities. I examine this topic in much more detail in Appendix D, along with other related issues in the Philosophy of Language.
5. Nor is it coincidental that the decline in Wittgenstein’s influence over the last thirty years or so was initiated by attacks on his method spearheaded largely by American Philosophers, from the 1950’s to the 1980’s – concurrent with the Cold War and the retreat of the working class movement internationally.
6. On this see the end of Note 3, above.
7. John Cook has sought to question whether Wittgenstein actually did redirect our thought to a consideration of more ordinary ways of saying things, as opposed to his merely asserting that this was what he intended to do without fulfilling that aim; cf., Cook (1994, 1999). Naturally, this is not the place to go into this dispute. It is sufficient to note that Cook’s own brand of ‘ordinary language’ Philosophy is not inconsistent with that of Wittgenstein’s; it is just rather parochial and inconsequential in comparison. Cf., the review in Philosophical Investigations, April 2001.
Nevertheless, it is in fact a myth (put about by certain of his disciples) that all that Wittgenstein was interested in was ordinary language. Because Cook accepts this fairy tale, the Wittgenstein he constructs is a figment of his own imagination. Wittgenstein was continually experimenting with new ways of looking at familiar problems. Many of his half-formed thoughts have been ossified by his epigones and turned into eternally true statements that supposedly represent his ‘official position’, even though they are generally expressed in side comments found in private notebooks, not intended for publication. Indeed, his last major work [Wittgenstein (1958)] was under constant revision right up until his death, and remained incomplete. It was ‘completed’ by his literary executors on what now appear to be unsound lines. On this, see Stern (1995, 1996). On the difficulties of interpreting Wittgenstein, see Cavell (1967, 1996), Heal (1995), Stern (1996) …
If you want to know the references, let me know.
I will read Michael's Essay, but I have read so much of this stuff (I actually began reading philosophy by studying the philosophy of religion, progressing onto W's ideas soon after, and that of all the prominent Wittgensteinians who have written on this (Phillips, Winch, Holland, Dilman, Rhees, etc etc.), both for and against. I find it all highly tedious.
I follow John Cook on this aspect of W's views (with Feuerbachian overtones).
Cook, J. (1988), ‘Wittgenstein And Religious Belief’, Philosophy 63, pp.427-52.
--------, (1993), ‘Religious Belief’, in Canfield and Shanker (1993), pp.147-61.
[Canfield, J., and Shanker, S. (1993) (eds.), Wittgenstein’s Intentions (Garland Publishing).]
W was a man with religious sentiments (very Tolstoyian -- he and Simone Weil would have got on like a house on fire) but he did not like the church, that is why he requested what he did.
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