Spot The Difference

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

See if you can tell which of these is the greater mystic:


CHAPTER X POLARITY "Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled." -The Kybalion.

The great Fourth Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Polarity-embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree''; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything....

Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing, with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C' you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two extremes. The scale of color is the same-higher and lower vibrations being the only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative. So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull. Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees between them....

CHAPTER IX VIBRATION "Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates." - The Kybalion.

The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles. This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.

The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences' between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL, in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter. Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes of vibration.

Modern Science has proven that all that we call Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion. Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in matter and energy.

In the first place, science teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of Vibration.

Compare that with this:


The Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites

Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental religions, as in the idea of the ying and yang in China, and in Buddhism. Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma), maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and discord together underlie the whole of existence....

In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly balanced out....'

The question is: how does it happen that a plus and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.

Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits, beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction, unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion cannot be easily dominated....

Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract....

Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light, radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction, which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to 'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun’s rays evaporate water from the ocean. Banesh Hoffmann states: 'It is still a strange and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....'

The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges—positive and negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the relationship between them....

This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change—the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.

The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.

'Everything Flows'

Everything is in a constant state of motion, from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving, rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day. The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds....

The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas traditional formal logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought embraces it. Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites.... [Woods and Grant Reason in Revolt (1995), pp.64-68; pp.45-47.]

The first can be found here:

http://www.gnostic.org/kybalionhtm/kybalion10.htm

http://www.gnostic.org/kybalionhtm/kybalion9.htm

The second here:

http://www.marxist.com/rircontents.htm

Or, did I get these the wrong way round?

[More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2...-7-14.htm#Essay (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-7-14.htm#Essay) Fourteen]

[Hit The North]

So they're both either true or untrue? I don't get what point you're making.

[Dyst]

I think Rosa thinks they are both gibberish.

She tries to redicule dialectics by showing how equal it is to hermeticism.

[Monty Cantsin]

What did you think about all thoses physicists who compare modern theories of the universe to eastern mysticisms like taoism with it's dialectical monism?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


So they're both either true or untrue? I don't get what point you're making.

They are both mystics.

[They are both far too confused even to be described as false.]


What did you think about all those physicists who compare modern theories of the universe to eastern mysticisms like taoism with it's dialectical monism?

Not a lot.

It's all part of the ruling ideas that always rule, and have done of thousands of years, in all modes of production (expressed in different idioms in each), and across the planet.

The fact that some scientists go in for it merely shows how widespread this genre is.

In Quantum Mechanics this is not surprising, since, as even Lenin noted, modern Physics has largely capitulated to Idealism.

[hoopla]

Rosa: I find it strange that you have no problem with, linguistic analysis.

It can be said, that linguistic analysis does not allow for critique, as there is no recognition of the larger context speech acts occur in, much like most current "rationality".

Linguistic analysis can only lead to academic controversy.

Its also a bit authoritarian to e.g. state that philosophy musy not intefere with the use of words. Or, in your particular case, that so much of philosophy is idealism and as such false.

So, its just "one-dimensional" philosophy.

It can also be said that its not the mystical which mystifies now, but rationality, or more precisely incomplete rationality - rationality isolated from context.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Well, they both fried my brain on sight. Still, I have to agree that it shouldn't matter how they are worded. Although you could make the point that this makes them so confused they aren't worth bothering with... Oh, I don't know. I'll be an un-decided.

-Alex

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

The difference between them is that mystical hermiticism uses less grandiose and puffed-up language in order to cover up it's philosophical vacuity.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion; as usual you manage to say, in about 1% of the space I usually take, all that needs saying!

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And Burn: they are both valueless (at least to us materialists).

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Hoopla:


Rosa: I find it strange that you have no problem with, linguistic analysis.

Where did you get that strange idea from?

It depends on the analysis.


It can be said, that linguistic analysis does not allow for critique, as there is no recognition of the larger context speech acts occur in, much like most current "rationality".

Well, I think you are trying to say. in your own sweet way (forgive me if I adopt your strategy for a minute and try to impose on you what I think you are saying!), that we should analyse language historically.

I whole-heartedly agree with this Marxist approach.

The more the better (that is partly why I rejected 'determinism').


Linguistic analysis can only lead to academic controversy

Says who?

[It can lead to clarity.]


It's also a bit authoritarian to e.g. state that philosophy must not interfere with the use of words.

Those are not my thoughts, so you should not direct them at me.

[They are of course a paraphrase of Wittgenstein -- and he put things slightly differently.]

[In fact, even if they were my words, they would be eminently anti-authoritarian -- it is a view that is opposed to philosophers telling us what our words 'really' mean.]


So, its just "one-dimensional" philosophy.

Well, I do not know what the 'it' here is, but the sort of analysis I go in for spells the death of the subject; so if anything, it is zero-dimensional.

[And good riddance.]


It can also be said that its not the mystical which mystifies now, but rationality, or more precisely incomplete rationality - rationality isolated from context.

True -- but only by someone who has drunk too much beer.

[Hit The North]

Posted by Rosa:

Well, I do not know what the 'it' here is, but the sort of analysis I go in for spells the death of the subject

What does that mean, exactly; could you elaborate?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, it depends on what Hoopla meant by 'it'.

But the sort of 'philosophy' I go in for is aimed at killing-off this parasitic 'discipline'.

My analysis sees all Philosophy as a ruling-class form of thought, and based on an attempt to derive a priori truths from the alleged meaning of a few carefully-selected words.

Check out the determinism thread where I elaborate some more.

German Ideology, but more particularly on Wittgenstein's work.]

[BurnTheOliveTree]

QUOTE
It can also be said that its not the mystical which mystifies now, but rationality, or more precisely incomplete rationality - rationality isolated from context.



True -- but only by someone who has drunk too much beer.



Oh, my. :lol: That is precious.

-Alex

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 26 2006, 10:50 PM
an attempt to derive a priori truths from the alleged meaning of a few carefully-selected words.

What about attempting to derive a priori truths from phenomena as they are given 8)

:lol:


See if you can tell which of these is the greater mysticI am finding, having read a few pages of hermeneutics, a similarity between interpreting texts and the dialectic! ;)
Could it just be because dialectics is, also, a method of interpretation, or at least the related (?) concept of explanation. Could it even be because hermeneutics involves change, esp change from psychical acts ;)

What exactly is the issue with mysticism, why are these tools mystical? Because they don't measure things, they rely on a certain amount of intuition? Isn't this just scientism - everything must be understood with the methods of natural science?

What exactly do you mean by "mystical" when the rhetoric has been taken away.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop:


What about attempting to derive a priori truths from phenomena as they are given 8)

Well, if these alleged 'phenomena' were propositional, and true, to boot, you might be able to do that (but I would classify such 'truths' as nonsensical).

Otherwise not.

But, who wants to stare at 'true', token indicative sentences? Speaking for myself, I'd rather watch my toenails grow.


I am finding, having read a few pages of hermeneutics, a similarity between interpreting texts and the dialectic!
Could it just be because dialectics is, also, a method of interpretation, or at least the related (?) concept of explanation. Could it even be because hermeneutics involves change, esp change from psychical acts

Hermeneutics and hermeticism are not the same.

So I think you have got this muddled up.


What exactly is the issue with mysticism, why are these tools mystical? Because they don't measure things, they rely on a certain amount of intuition? Isn't this just scientism - everything must be understood with the methods of natural science?

What exactly do you mean by "mystical" when the rhetoric has been taken away.

No rhetoric, I am merely following Marx when he said there was rational core to Hegel, once you have stripped away the mystical shell.

Except, I claim it is mystical all the way down.

a priori truths from a few words -- as you saw above -- implying that reality is linguistic, hence mind, and that the human mind can link up with this 'cosmic' mind by thought alone.]

[hoopla]

Sorry, I didn't even read the piece.

I did wonder why evryone was mis-spelling hermeneutics (sp?) so badly, but did not expect a discussion on heremticism iyswim.

I had to study hermes. Didn't it help push along science a bit?


But, who wants to stare at 'true', token indicative sentences? Speaking for myself, I'd rather watch my toenails grow.Tbh I find it more interesting than listening to people insult each other ;) (Seems to pass for philosophy here)


implying that reality is linguistic, hence mind, and that the human mind can link up with this 'cosmic' mind by thought alone
So how do we link up to reality?

[hoopla]

since it attempts to derive a priori truths from a few words -- as you saw aboveWhy does this imply reality is linguistic? Which essay is this, all of them? :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop:


Why does this imply reality is linguistic? Which essay is this, all of them?

This was actually the one idea I found the hardest to work out myself (I sort of felt it was correct, but could not account for it -- I think I can now), and this is not surprising since, until Wittgenstein's work, our ability to spot this age-old error was nigh on impossible.

It is not easy to explain in a single thread, but it is now very late; I will try to say something tomorrow.

OK?

I outline the argument in several places at my site, but the best places to look are here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2...-3-10.htm#Essay (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-2-3-10.htm#Essay) Two

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

Especially the second of these.

[hoopla]

I am merely following Marx when he said there was rational core to HegelIn what way was Hegel mystical?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Rosa, I can see why you criticize dialectical materialism, but I am curious as the the context of your criticism. You say dialectical materialism is mystic? I might be inclined to believe dialectical materialism has flaws, along with a limited applicability to modern day situations. Where you accuse it of mysticism is beyond me. During the time it was invented, philosophy was about finding universal methods of analyze things that explain everything. If we compare mysticism and the philosophical circles of the time we can say:

A. Both religions and secular philosophies attempted to explain things in all encompassing manners. They sought to create single, unifying theories.
B. Religion based its unified theories on faith while secular philosophies attempted to use reason.
C. The similarities of religion and secular philosophies of Marx's time we similiar in A - not B. However, B is the root of what most people would consider mysticism.

Finally, modern philosophy is skeptical of theories that are unified or applicable to all circumstances. Therefore, criticisms of religion are popular in modern philosophy while criticisms of universal theories are becoming more prevalent - rather than just criticisms of faith.

The philosophy of our time has moved forward, but I hardly think dialectical materialism deserves to be considered mysticism. If you are using the word more liberally than I am, I would certainly appreciate it if you could elaborate the context by which you use it.

[Shredder]

Spot the difference? I'll play.

The first discusses esoterical meaningless concepts like 'vibrations' and 'energy' in a non-scientific context. These concepts are not abstracted from from observations in reality, but are asserted from the outset and it is prophecied that one day people will realize the truth about it.

The second one discusses certain classifications of phenomena found in reality, such as phase transitions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


In what way was Hegel mystical?

Hoop, I cannot answer all your questions -- this is basic stuff.

Mysticism (on certain definitions) involves the mystical (i.e, secret/hidden and known only to those involved) union of human beings with God (which, in a different form, was the main problematic of German Idealism after Kant -- 'subject/object identity' as they called it). Hegel 'solved' this by making the subject an aspect of the the developing absolute as it comes to know itself more fully. [Complete b*llocks, I grant you, but that's dialectics for you....]

Hegel's theory was just a high-blown version of the mystical union we see in classical hermetic philosophy and Neoplatonism.

However, I define it slightly more widely. More about that later (I am at work right now, but I will post something later tonight -- as I said in an earlier response).

But see my answer to Dooga, below.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Where you accuse it of mysticism is beyond me.

On mysticism, see my answer to Hoopla.

My main criticisms of dialectical materialism are not that it is mystical, but that none of its theses stand up to scrutiny, or make any sense.

But, I also unmask its ruling-class pedigree: from its origin in mystical hermetic ideas. To support this I develop a materialist account of the origin of important strands of ruling-class ideology, and show how they too arose from ancient mystical ideas connected with the alleged divine creation of the universe (from language/thought -- hence the biblical idea that God commanded things to come into existence, and in the beginning was 'the word/logos', etc. etc., -- a Greek notion directly derived from such mystical dogmas). I also show how this view of nature was consonant with the contingent view of language held by ruling-class hacks and how they connected the nature of the state (and thus class power) with the nature of reality and with 'god/nature's will' etc. etc.

All this is developed in those links above -- the full details will appear at my site later this year.

I will be posting a slightly fuller account of this here later today.


During the time it was invented, philosophy was about finding universal methods of analyze things that explain everything.

Exactly -- and this is connected with how they saw the state (it is up front in Plato and other leading Greek and Roman theorists – and later thinkers too). The state reflects the divine/natural order (and it has to be unquestioned, so and theory supporting it must be a priori, and not susceptible of empirical disproof – hence it must be based on logic/language alone, and be ‘self-evident’, so no material evidence is needed to support it).

You can see these theories change as different modes of production emerge – but they all have in common the endeavour to derive a priori theses from language alone (and specially doctored language, or just plain jargon, defined stipulatively), which are then imposed on nature.


Finally, modern philosophy is skeptical of theories that are unified or applicable to all circumstances. Therefore, criticisms of religion are popular in modern philosophy while criticisms of universal theories are becoming more prevalent - rather than just criticisms of faith.

This is right to some extent – but you will note that philosophers, by and large, and depending on what traditional the belong to, still endeavour to derive necessary truths from language alone – to develop theses that are true in all possible worlds (as the modern jargon has it), or in which no world is imaginable without their being true (which puts the same point differently). Again, no material facts can count against them.


The philosophy of our time has moved forward, but I hardly think dialectical materialism deserves to be considered mysticism. If you are using the word more liberally than I am, I would certainly appreciate it if you could elaborate the context by which you use it.

This is connected with an updated version of my answer to Hoopla above – if the universe has a divine or a natural rational structure (capable of being accessed by thought alone), and human beings can access this by a quirky use of language which suggests that nature is mind, or run by a cosmic will (see my comments on ‘determinism’ earlier), and true knowledge consists in the correspondence of our ideas with these a priori truths about/in nature (whose validity is thus mysterious, it is ‘just the way thought works’, or ‘language works’, or a ‘brute fact about nature’), then we have a modern correlate of mysticism. The world is governed by mysterious forces which we cannot alter, that determine the natural state of the world, to which we have to conform, and which, surprise surprise, justify the continued status quo….

This then links in with class power, and the way that ruling-class theorists have always seen nature (as the mystical product of mind); see above (i.e., my answer to Hoopla).

Dialectics is just a rather poor version of the same: born of hermetic philosophy, thoroughly mystified by Hegel, and bowdlerised by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and others.

Hence my implacable opposition to it.

[Of course, the argument is far more involved than this suggests, and cannot reasonably be summarised in a thread here; which is why I set my site up, to develop these ideas at great length.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Shredder:


The first discusses esoterical meaningless concepts like 'vibrations' and 'energy' in a non-scientific context. These concepts are not abstracted from from observations in reality, but are asserted from the outset and it is prophecied that one day people will realize the truth about it.

The second one discusses certain classifications of phenomena found in reality, such as phase transitions.

Well done!

And Woods and Grant discuss meaningless concepts, too: such as 'dialectical contradictions', and 'unities of opposites'.... Different language, same mysticism.

Except, Woods and Grant also commit all the errors I note above, and even more (which are logged at my site) -- and they impose their fourth rate a priori mystical ideas on reality, just like those hermetic theorists I quoted.

The similarities are more revealing than are the minor differences.

[hoopla]

a materialist account of the origin of important strands of ruling-class ideology, and show how they too arose from ancient mystical ideas connected with the alleged divine creation of the universeCan't the same claim be made of modern science? Hermes appears in history of science courses.
The world is governed by mysterious forces which we cannot alter, that determine the natural state of the world, to which we have to conform, and which, surprise surprise, justify the continued status quo….Constructivist toward evberything?
Spot the difference? I'll play.... These concepts are not abstracted from from observations in reality, but are asserted Wasn't hermeticism all about interpreting Hermes Tresmigatus' texts?
implying that reality is linguistic, hence mind, and that the human mind can link up with this 'cosmic' mind by thought aloneIs the answer to this still to come?
this is basic stuff.Sorry :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga, in order to answer your question, I have lifted several key passges from a few scattered Essays of mine, and pasted them together.

The first installment sets this topic up (recall, this compresses my argument almost to the level where it is distorted):


For over two thousand years traditional Philosophers have been playing on themselves and their audiences what can only be described as a series of complex verbal tricks. Since Greek times, metaphysicians have occupied themselves with deriving a priori theses solely from the meaning of a few specially chosen (and suitably doctored) words. These philosophical gems have then been peddled to the rest of humanity, dressed-up as profound truths about fundamental aspects of reality, peremptorily imposed on nature -- often without the benefit of a single supporting experiment.

In fact, traditional theorists went further; their acts of linguistic legerdemain allowed them to uncover Super-theses in the comfort of their own heads, doctrines they claimed revealed the underlying essential nature of existence, which were supposedly valid for all of space and time. Unsurprisingly, discursive magic of this order meshes rather well with ambient ruling-class forms-of-thought (for reasons that are explored in detail in Essays Twelve and Fourteen), chief among which was the belief that reality is rational.

Clearly, the idea that the world is ultimately rational must be imposed on nature since nature is not Mind. Nevertheless, it is far easier to justify the imposition of a hierarchical and grossly unequal class system on 'disorderly' workers if ruling-class ideologues can persuade one and all that the 'law-like' order of the natural world actually reflects, and is reflected in turn by, the social order from which their patrons just so happen to benefit -- one that is grounded in 'rationality', the fundamental aspects of which none may legitimately question.

Material reality may not be rational, but it is certainly rational for ruling-class "prize-fighters" to claim it is....

This style-of-thought was invented by ancient Greek theorists who spoke, wrote and thought as if reality were both rational and linguistic -- i.e., the product of Logos. Since their day, every branch of traditional Philosophy has done likewise, but in its own idiom. This tradition has formed the backdrop and created the theoretical climate-of-opinion that sets the limits to, and the fixes parameters of, 'acceptable thought'. Thus, if a theory isn't based on some form of word-juggling -- the more baroque the better --, it isn't really 'proper' Philosophy.

Dialecticians have naively swallowed this ancient marketing ploy. This is why so many of them express genuine incredulity when it is suggested that Marxism does not need a philosophy of any sort, shape or kind -- never mind the traditional ruling-class theory they lifted from Hegel. DM-fans are so neck-deep in this tradition (that sees a priori knowledge as a legitimate goal) that they can't help but defend it against radical attack (like that mounted here).

Small wonder then that Marx declared that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class. [Dialecticians accept this saying, but point the finger at everyone else, scarcely noticing the conservative provenance of their own a priori theses in Hermetic thought.]

...In addition, the idea that truths about fundamental aspects of reality can be uncovered by an examination of how human beings reason is highly suspect in itself; but, like most things, so much depends on what allegedly follows from that assumption. As we shall see, the line taken on this issue sharply distinguishes materialist thought from Idealist myth-making. Unfortunately to date, DM-theorists have been more content with following traditional Philosophers in supposing that FL can function as a sort of earth-bound cosmic code-cracker -- capable of unmasking theses about hidden aspects of reality -- than they have been with bothering to justify this entire line of 'research'. Nor have they been keen to examine the motives that gave birth to this aristocratic approach to Super-Knowledge in Ancient Greece....

However, if in the end materialists are to reject Hegelian Ontology -- as surely they must -- then the idea that FL is a part of science becomes much harder to sustain. How can language reflect the logic of the world if the world has no logic to it? If the development of nature is not in fact the disguised development of Mind, how can concepts drawn from the development of Mind apply to nature, unless it is Mind?

...It is instructive to recall that over the last few hundred years or so humanity has (largely) learnt to separate religion from science -- to the extent that the sorts of things that used to be said about science (for example, that it was the "systematic study of God's work", etc.) look rather odd today. In a similar fashion, previous generations of logicians confused logic with science and the "Laws of Thought" (and they did this for theological/ideological reasons, too); one would have thought that avowed materialists (i.e., dialecticians) would be the last ones to perpetuate this ancient confusion. Clearly not.

Indeed, as will be argued at length later, only if it can be shown (and not simply assumed) that nature has a rational structure would it be plausible to suppose that there is a connection between the way human beings think and reason and the ultimate -- or even the superficial -- structure of reality. Short of that, the idea that there is a link between the way we draw conclusions and fundamental aspects of reality loses all credibility. Why should the way we knit premises and conclusions together mirror the structure of the universe? Why should our use of words have 'ontological' implications? And, how is it that certain metaphysical truths are derivable only from Indo-European grammar? Was this group of humans blessed by the gods? Are there really "subjects" and "predicates" in nature -- features that only a tiny proportion of our sentences use.

On the other hand, if it could be shown that the universe does have an underlying 'rational' structure, then the conclusion that nature is Mind (or that it has been constituted by Mind) would be difficult to resist. If all that is real is indeed rational, then the identification of rules of inference with the "rules of thought" -- and with metaphysical truths about "Being" -- becomes more all the more natural.

As the history of Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism has shown, from such esoteric assumptions, it is but a short step to the derivation of truths from thought alone. A priori thesis-mongering and Idealism thus go hand-in-hand; if nature is Ideal, then truths can follow from thought/language alone. In other Essays posted here we will see that this is a step DM-theorists (and metaphysicians of every stripe) have been only too happy to take -- and many times.

Nevertheless, there is precious little evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to this implication of the idea that DL reflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., that it clearly implies that reality is Ideal. If logic does indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then 'Being' must be Mind.

This conclusion only strengthens further the suspicion that the much-vaunted materialist "inversion" supposedly carried out by early dialecticians on Hegel was merely formal --, which can only mean that DM is just an inverted form of Idealism. If this is so, then questions about the nature of Logic cannot but be related to these serious doubts about the scientific status of DM. In that case, if Logic is capable of revealing scientific truths about nature -- as opposed to its being a systematic study of inference, and only that -- then it becomes harder to resist the conclusion that DM is indeed a rotated form of Idealism. Inverted here as in a camera not so very obscura, to paraphrase Marx....

Consider an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra Of Revolution.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not. However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing they are false). In fact, anyone denying their truth would risk being accused of not understanding them. This links their truth directly with meaning, but not with material confirmation.

In that case, understanding T1 is independent of the evidence that could confirm or refute it (indeed, it would be impossible to do either if T1 had not already been understood).

In contrast, T2 and T3 need no evidence in their support; their truth-values follow from the meaning of the words they contain (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words). Hence, their truth-status is independent of the evidence. [The implication of these observations will now be spelt-out in more detail.]

So we have here two sorts of indicative sentence that have a radically different relation to reality. In the first sort (i.e., those like T1), their understanding is independent of their truth-status, but their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world. In the second (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows from the words they contain.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2, and, as will be agued, T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world, which tactic is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover "underlying essences", revealing nature's "hidden secrets". Theses like this are necessarily true (or necessarily false), and are thus considered to contain genuine knowledge, unlike contingent propositions like T1, whose truth can alter with the wind.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, super-empirical truths, ones that cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood, which as we have seen hides the modal form of the verbs underlying their content. Thus, as they picture things, they do not just happen to be this way or that, they cannot be otherwise; the world must be as they assert. [This accounts for the use of modalities (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") when their status is questioned.]

In contrast, if someone were to question the truth of T1, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of The Algebra of Revolution" would be highly inappropriate (unless T1 was the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement, perhaps). But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

With respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; their truth-values (true or false) can be ascertained independently -- and in advance -- of the way the world happens to be, unlike ordinary empirical propositions. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) are derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words they contain (or from the 'concepts' the latter somehow express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or falsehood, since these can be ascertained from the meaning of the words they contain. They are true a priori.

So, with metaphysical theses, to understand them is to know they are true (or know they are false). That is why, to their inventors, they seem so certain and self-evident. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their status -- their veracity follows either from the concepts they supposedly express or from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, attest to their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces these theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and one whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test).

Nevertheless, it is now possible to see exactly why DM-theses can be (and are) so readily imposed on nature (as we saw was repeatedly the case in Essay Two): the internal certainty they seem to generate means that no material fact could possibly gain-say them. However, they cannot be read from nature, since that would undermine their certitude, turning them into ordinary, common-or-garden empirical propositions. They thus have to be based on non-material abstractions, on entities that inhabit an immaterial world like the gods of old.

Naturally, this accounts for the easy slide into apriorism witnessed among metaphysicians and DM-theorists alike. So, in like manner, the truth of DM-propositions is ascertainable from the alleged meaning of the words they contain, not from the way the world happens to be.

For example, the conclusions Engels drew about motion command assent from the supposed meaning of words like "move", "same time" and "place", and they can be safely extrapolated to all of reality because they guarantee that what Engels asserted applied to every single instance of motion in reality, past, present or future. That is why, if pressed on this, dialecticians cannot appeal to evidence to support this thesis (as we saw in Essay Five, no evidence could show that an object is in two places in the same instant), and must rely on the meaning of the words Engels (or Hegel) used.

This also explains why dialecticians find it hard to disagree with Engels, Lenin or Hegel; this is because their conclusions were based on meanings not on evidence. Hence, the rejection of what, for example, Engels said seems to conflict with fundamental aspects of language (thus making their opposites "unthinkable") -- except, of course, dialecticians see his words as picturing fundamental aspects of reality, having now thoroughly confused linguistic theses with empirical truths.

We will soon be in a position to see how and why this occurs, and what makes all traditional thinkers do the same.

In Essays Three to Six, we will see that this thesis follows from Hegel's idiosyncratic analysis of subject/predicate propositions, wherein the subject is allegedly different from the predicate, which meant to Hegel that our words/concepts had alteriety or difference (and hence negativity) built into them. [Certain modern French Philosophers make a big deal of this too -- likewise confusing a contingent linguistic fact with a profound ontological truth.] So, from words and/or concepts alone we get SuperFacts. All thoroughly traditional.

Lenin, too, felt he could declare that motion without matter was "unthinkable" well in advance of the unimaginably large body of empirical evidence that would be needed to justify even a weaker form of this thesis -- because matter and motion are inter-defined in DM (the latter being a "form" of the former).

As is abundantly clear from the record, Lenin did not first review the evidence in favour of his thesis (that motion without matter is "unthinkable") before he delivered this semi-divine pronouncement, he merely derived it from what he took the words "matter" and "motion" to mean.

We have also seen that Lenin was able to ascertain from a simple sentence about "John" most of the deep structure of reality. This is a magical skill dialecticians can claim for themselves because of the social space that traditional thought has opened up for them -- and which, because of their own class position, encourages them to use it. So, DM-acolytes are playing this age-old game according to the rules, deriving a priori theses from words alone.

The only problem is that these rules were laid down by our class enemies.

Hence, Lenin and other DM-theorists could safely ignore any evidence that disconfirmed their claims, since DM-theses weren't empirical claims to begin with -- despite their indicative veneer.

Unfortunately, as noted above, this means that dialectical-metaphysical theses can form no part of a material account of reality. They follow from abstract ideas, and are thus thoroughly Idealist; no amount of spin can give them a radical or materialist make-over.

This also explains why DM-theorists to this day ignore anything (material) that contradicts their theses (in fact, like the benighted souls in Galileo's day, who would not even look down his telescope, many simply refuse to read these Essays -- exactly why this is so will be explored in Essay Nine). This also accounts for their cavalier approach to FL, the ideas of their opponents and the watery-thin evidence in favour of their own theses. Hence, if DM-theses are self-evident (or follow from the sort of immanent 'logic' one finds in Hegel), then it licences the knee-jerk high-handedness practically all dialecticians display. This is indeed reminiscent of the theologically-motivated arrogance displayed by certain Protestants sects.

[Anyone who has met, say, a devout Protestant from Northern Ireland will know of what I speak.]

Thus, if your beliefs have been sanctioned by the sort of impenetrable logic found in Hegel, or indeed the equally impenetrable will of God, you are going to think and act as if you are special. And, this accounts for the sectarianism dialectics encourages in all who allow it to colonise their brains. [More on this below in Essay Nine.]

Since DM-theses are not materially-based, nothing in material reality could possibly disconfirm them. That is why some dialecticians consider it a waste of time reading demolition-jobs like this. Once saved, always saved.

As is well-known, every single DM-thesis owes its life to the Idealist speculations of anti-materialist thinkers like Hegel, not to empirical research. [On this, see Essay Fourteen.]

If you ate till interested, I will post some more later.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Can't the same claim be made of modern science? Hermes appears in history of science courses.

Well, I did say that the ruling ideas were always those of the ruling class, so no surprise if they have dominated the development of science.

But science has progressively shaken this off, mainly because it has to interface with material reality to work -- and that is enough to undermine important strands of the idealist theories that have infected it over the years.

When hermeticism meets the material world, and ordinary language, it melts even faster than Bush's 'popularity'.


Constructivist toward evberything?

Eh?


Wasn't hermeticism all about interpreting Hermes Tresmigatus' texts?

I think you mean 'Hermes Trismegistus', but you are partially right. It involved important ideas from Neoplatonism, NeoPythagoreanism, Orphism, Gnosticism, Kabbalism and Alchemy.


Is the answer to this still to come?

Posting it now, you are just slowing me up.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is the central part of my argument (but it is still highly compressed -- in the full version it is over 100, 000 words long, and I back uo my bald assertions here with referencers to hundreds of other works which develop these ideas further, or which substantiate what I say). It contains hints at some of my most original ideas:


However, in spite of the rich metaphysical pickings that this a priori approach to knowledge seems to bring in its train, the search for apodictic 'certainty' of this sort is invariably done on the cheap, as it were. No expensive equipment is required, no elaborate or time-consuming experiments need be performed. Anyone with a flair for jargon, a love of prolixity, and of course sufficient leisure time, can do it. Even better: no empirical evidence is required to substantiate the bold theses that effortlessly roll off the page since they have been condensed from thought alone.

Metaphysical theories were originally invented by thinkers who (in the main) displayed an aristocratic contempt for ordinary language and empirical knowledge -- and hence for the manual labour on which both are based. Ordinary language and empirical knowledge are grounded in communal life, which means that they are ultimately based on collective labour and common understanding.

Traditional thinkers were indirectly alienated from this communal aspect of the human condition by the social division of labour that scarred early class society. Early thinkers were quite open in their contempt for the 'semi-animal' existence they attributed to working people, and the superiority of their 'culture'. [There is a very clear echo of this in Plato's Republic.]

In that case, the universal inclination DM-theorists have for deriving substantive truths about reality from language alone (i.e., from 'thought experiments', or from a priori theses and trite maxims, etc.) is no surprise. Philosophical theorists have been doing this for millennia; it is now part of the philosophical furniture. Since ruling-class hacks have always done this in their contribution to traditional thought, when DM-theorists copy them it seems to them a perfectly normal way to theorise -- so normal that no one (until recently) has either noticed it or analysed its ideological provenance.

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]

Their appropriation of traditional thought-forms (outlined throughout this site) thus locates DM-theorists in a philosophical current possessed of excellent ruling-class bona fides, one consequence of which is that DM is itself a form of LIE.

LIE, is in fact a family of doctrines which share many things in common:

A distortion of the vernacular; the distillation of substantive theses about nature from 'thought experiments' alone; the promulgation of what seem to be empirical propositions, but which are applicable throughout all of reality, for all of time; the invention of empty neologisms and abstract terms where words drawn from everyday language will not do; the derivation of 'necessary truths' that supposedly reveal the "essential" aspects of "Being", obtained from words alone; the confusion of rules of grammar and logic with empirical propositions (which allows theorists to derive 'scientific laws'' from what are in fact contingent features of language); hasty generalisations based on a strictly limited number of examples (all of which are unrepresentative, distorted or specially selected); the 're-interpretation' of everything else so that it fits this a priori picture.

Metaphysicians (and DM-theorists) not only take it for granted that reality has an underlying rational structure, they arrogate to themselves the sole right to study its occult form.

As noted above, the truth-values of ordinary empirical propositions can only be determined by an interface with material reality; their truth-status is materially-driven.

With metaphysical theses, on the other hand, the opposite is the case: the underlying state of the world is determined by them. They do not reflect the world -- it reflects them. The way the world has to be is determined by what they say; they stand out as philosophical tableaux, delineating the conceptual boundaries of reality (or 'Being'), as lone theses and foundational principles which trace out the logical or essential form of any possible world. That is why no evidence is needed, and none is ever sought. No world is conceivable in which they do not apply. That is of course why Lenin considered the opposite of Engels's thesis so "unthinkable".

Which is also why they can safely be imposed on nature. In fact, it would be unthinkable not to.

In order to substantiate these allegations, a detailed analysis is undertaken (in Essay Twelve) of Lenin's claim:

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318.]

As we will see, this readily collapses into incoherence. Oddly enough, even though Lenin had to think these very words (i.e., "motion without matter") to make the point that they were "unthinkable", that did not stop him from concluding that what he himself had just done (i.e., think these words) could not in fact be done by anyone -- which clearly must have included himself!

In purporting to deliver a particularly profound truth about matter and motion (the adamantine nature of which is such that its opposite is not just false, it is "unthinkable" -- i.e., no world is imaginable where there is motion without matter), Lenin had to engage in a practical refutation of his own words. So 'profound' were they that in communicating them to us Lenin had to do the opposite of what they themselves said could not be done!

This shows that it is not possible to relate the content of Lenin's claim to anything that could be found (or that could happen) in material reality, since it was based on concepts knitted together in defiance of material reality (on which topic, see below).

The paradoxical nature of Lenin's words illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all theorists experience whenever they try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic principles on which it is based -- ones, for example, that ordinary speakers use to state truths or falsehoods about the world without any such fuss.

Intractable logical problems soon emerge with putatively empirical propositions if any attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities: truth and falsehood. This happens, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, necessarily the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a necessary truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis. As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might once have had.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why they can be understood before this is known.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when they are said to be 'necessarily' true or 'necessarily' false -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on purely linguistic (or syntactic) grounds, they can be ascertained in this way if the proposition is metaphysical.

Conversely, this means that if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established by such structural factors alone (i.e., from the supposed meaning of its constituent terms/concepts), it can't have been empirical to begin with -- nor can it relate to the material world or anything in it. Otherwise its truth or falsehood would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning-, or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of a metaphysical propositions goes hand in hand with knowing its truth (or its falsehood) -- it is based on thought alone, not the material world.

It is now possible to see why Lenin's claim above rapidly encounters problems. In this instance, in order to declare a proposition containing the phrase "motion without matter" necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained, even if this is immediately rejected. This is because, if the truth of this claim is to be permanently excluded (by holding it as necessarily false), whatever would have made it true has to be ruled out conclusively.

But, that just means that whoever propounds such a thesis would have to know what "motion without matter" rules in so that he/she knows exactly what it rules out as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if "motion without matter" is "unthinkable". If a proposition containing the phrase "motion without matter" is necessarily false (i.e., if its truth "unthinkable") a logical charade of this sort cannot be carried out, since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could possibly count as making it true. However, because the truth of the original proposition (i.e., "Motion without matter is unthinkable") cannot even be conceived, anyone propounding it would now be in no position to say what was being excluded. But, if it is not possible to say under what conditions such a proposition could be true, then it is impossible to say what would make it not true -- for what was being ruled out could not be specified since this has been declared "unthinkable".

Unfortunately, this now prevents any account being given of what would make a proposition containing "motion without matter" false, let alone necessarily false, or "unthinkable". Because no account can be given of what would make it true, none can be given of what would make it not true (i.e., false).

Hence, such a proposition would be necessarily false if and only if it was not necessarily false -- that is, only if what would make it true could not in fact be entertained just in order to rule it out!

But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make this defective proposition true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if its truth -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- can't be conceived, neither can its falsehood, for we should not know what was being excluded. In that case, the negation of this defective proposition could neither be accepted nor rejected, for no one would know what its content committed anyone to, in order that it might be accepted or rejected. In that case, this proposition would lose any sense it might once seem to have possessed, since it could not under such circumstances be true or false -- or even so much as capable of being entertained.

Such Super-empirical theses collapse under the weight of their own defective use of language.

[An appeal to the falsity of the LEM here (as a way of diffusing these dialectically-disconfirming conclusions) would be of little help, for not even Lenin would have accepted that it was both true and false to say that "motion without matter is unthinkable" -- clearly because to do so he would have had to think the proscribed words!]

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

Since the truth-values of such defective sentences are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. They have to be declared necessarily true or necessarily false (this is ostensively 'derived' from the meaning of the words they contain). Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a Philosopher, or perhaps a Dialectical Magus. Metaphysical decrees of this sort are as common as dirt in traditional thought -- and, alas, also in dialectics, as we can now see.

Hence, the truth-value of each metaphysical thesis is not determined by the way the world is but has to be bestowed on them by their inventors. Isolated theses like these have truth or falsehood granted them as a gift. In that case, instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, they are compared with other related theses (or more often, they are compared with yet more jargon). Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal.

The normal cannons determining when something is true or false have to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- which in DM is often carried out after the event, and only applied to a very narrow range of examples (as we found with Trotsky's 'analysis' of the LOI and Engels's account of motion, etc.) -- or, if this is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a 'thought experiment', or perhaps as part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.

As far as traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what took place as the subject developed. But with respect to DM, its class-compromised origins mirror this ideological degeneration. As is well-know, dialectical doctrines were lifted from Hegel (allegedly given a materialist spin), but his ideas were not based on experimentation of any sort, they were not derived from material reality, he merely borrowed them from earlier mystics.

It is only after the event that evidence is ever sought by dialecticians to substantiate these a priori theses -- and, as we will see in the Essays posted here, this 'evidence' is not just wafer-thin, what little there is of it does not support DM anyway.

In this way, therefore, DM-theses are quintessentially Idealist and thoroughly anti-materialist.

Indeed, Engels went further than Lenin:

"Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself." [Engels (1976), p.74.]

However, in this particular case, not only is it easy to speak about motionless matter (using materially-grounded ordinary language -- several examples are given in Essays Five and Twelve) -- up until recently human beings actually managed to think about it. Indeed, motionless matter was a fundamental tenet of Aristotelian Physics.

Beware Greek Philosophers Bearing Metaphysical Gifts -- Or Why Words Have Power

DM is thus situated in an ancient metaphysical tradition, one that was (and still is) based on the systematic misuse and denigration of ordinary material language. The vernacular was (and still is) variously regarded as theoretically limited, paradox-friendly, the repository of unreflective 'commonsense', ideologically-compromised, and subject to the appearance/reality dichotomy.

The original, ideologically-motivated attack on 'vulgar' speech began with the inception of class society. From the historical record I show how Greek thinkers incorporated abstract terms into their theories because they could not make ordinary words say what they wanted them to say. In so doing they were quite open about their aims and about their contempt for ordinary human beings, their language, beliefs, experience and culture. The class-confidence of these early thinkers meant they did not have to hide their ideas behind any metaphysical spin; in fact their thoughts began life ad-mixed with several genuine scientific ideas.

Science itself began long before class society reared its ugly head (on this see Conner (2005); once the latter emerged, science became all to easily encrusted with the results of Idealist speculation. Nevertheless, when more practically-orientated human beings started to take a closer note of the material world, and also of the physical constraints this imposed on speculation (i.e., when they began to experiment, test and dovetail their theories with observation and improved technique, etc.), science was able to make steady progress. In this way, science was able to pull itself out of this intellectual quagmire; in order for it to work it has to take material reality (and hence contingency) into account. Traditional Philosophy could not do this. Hence, science was able to distinguish itself from the Idealism that surrounded it by its constant contact with the material world and with developing technology.

[Of course, the situation here is vastly more complex than this suggests, but this is a summary essay (!). More details will be published in the Additional Essays section of this site.]

In contrast, DM-apologists, are happy to remain neck deep in dialectical mud, clacking their tongues and pointing their grimy fingers at anyone who advises others to pull themselves free of this ruling-class cesspit.

However, the original traditional 'philosophical' exercise in 'linguistic surgery' was undertaken in order to transform earlier, aristocratically-motivated myths and theogonies into secular and/or metaphysical 'truths' so as to provide a de-personalised (but now rational) legitimacy for the new forms of state power emerging in and beyond the sixth century BC.

Clearly, such traditional notions helped justify the formation and reproduction of ruling-class hegemony; if the latter "reflects" the underlying rational/'objective' order of reality (as ruling-class hacks have historically claimed), then not only must all anti-metaphysical thought be in error, all opposition to the state must be irrational and thus "evil" -- and (morally) ought to fail. The moral order was thus linked to the rational order of reality. Indeed, the ethical state of the soul and the orderly nature of the State were not just accidentally linked in Plato, they were constitutive of the whole cosmos and of rightful governance on earth.

In earlier societies, opposition to Royal authority was viewed as tantamount to resisting the will of the 'gods'; in later class societies to resist the State (or established religion, or the status quo) was to struggle against 'natural law', or even the rational order of reality. These days, it is to fight against "Western values".

[Early Philosophers were quite open about this; it is only recently that these notions have retreated into the background. However, they are now making a strong come-back, and just in time for a new wave of Imperial aggression in the Middle East. Now we have "Islamofascists" where once there were "barbarians".]

Of course, the principles behind -- and the intentional objects of -- these theoretical flights-of-fancy are, and always were and always will be, inaccessible to sense perception, 'commonsense' and ordinary material language/evidence. And rightly so: only in a genuine democracy would mundane things like these really count for much.

Social Being Creates The Philosophy Of 'Being'

Superimposed on all this, the extrapolation from language to truths about the world was an extension of, and justification for, each traditional theorist's own idiosyncratic view of reality; these were en masse derived from an alienated depiction of 'Being', ultimately predicated on an earlier division of labour in nascent class society.

As is well-known by Marxists, in their attempt to free themselves from the constant oppression of nature, humanity found that it not only had to enslave itself to political and social forms over which it lost control, it also had to submit to ideologies that parasitized and rationalised this alienation. Ruling-class ideas thus came to rule because there was no material counter-weight to their Ideal view of reality.

Superscientific truths derived solely from the meaning of words thus matched the intellectualist view of nature adopted by this new layer of theorists in ancient Greece, just as they reflected their daily experience of class society. In this way, their mode of being mirrored their view of 'Being'. The life of these idlers was largely one of leisure bought at the expense of the necessary labour time of those whose language and experience they now denigrated. In order to give expression to this form of estrangement, these theorists developed an anti-materialist language deliberately set in opposition to the 'debased' language of those who had to work for a living.

In ancient Theogonies, conflict was inter-personal between the 'gods', whose verbal wrangles became the model on which later Hermetic thinkers based their ideas. In that way, anthropomorphic ideas took on cosmic significance.

Unfortunately for humanity, this also meant that it became 'natural' for later theorists (like Anaximenes, and Heraclitus) to see conflict in conceptual, logical and linguistic (but not material) terms, which of course set this new form of discourse in direct opposition to the material language of everyday life. This alienated thought-form was bequeathed to all subsequent generations of thinkers, since they largely shared these privileged material conditions, and hence the ideological predispositions that came with this slice of the intellectual market.

In this artificial world inhabited by indolent thinkers, words appeared to carry with them hidden authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed capable of moving slaves, servants, and workers effortlessly about the place. Codified into law, words also appeared to possess their own coercive power, which masked the class domination on which it was based. Naturally, this superficial aspect of official language would blind those who benefited from it to its material roots in class society. They would see in a conventionalised social form essential aspects of Being.

The spurious power that words seemed to possess would naturally suggest to these 'theoretical drones' that if certain forms of language underpinned both their own authority and the power of the State, and if the State mirrored Cosmic Reality, then the universe itself must run along discursive lines.

In that case, such theorists would 'naturally' see reality as not just rational, but ultimately as linguistic, constituted by the word of some 'god', or other. Hence, the 'Deity' spoke and everything not only sprang into existence, it jumped to attention, too. Seemingly inert matter had the capacity therefore to obey orders as if it were intelligent, and possessed of a will. Nature was thus enchanted, and this was directly or indirectly linked to State Power.

Indeed, as early theorists saw things, nature was powered by opposing forces: good and evil, light and dark, order and chaos, love and hate, hot and cold -- all were either personified (as good/evil intelligences) or viewed as discursive in form (i.e., as 'logical' principles). These ideas appear in all ancient creation myths, in Greek Philosophy, and in Buddhist and Chinese thought (in the latter as Yin and Yang, for instance). The internal source of universal movement was thus linguistic or was based on intelligence/will (and thus on language again), and all of this was intimately linked with class hegemony.

Matter was thus not so much congealed energy as condensed language, equally the slave of 'God' as human servants were those of the state. Ruling ideas were thus derived from the alienated ideas of those who ruled, and these ideas were held to rule the universe because of that -- or the other way round. Ruling ideas ruled society just as they supposedly ruled the world. As above, so below; the microcosm mirrors the macrocosm.

Few traditional thinkers strayed far from this ancient thought-form, even if they expressed these ideas in different forms, in a new idiom.

This represented perhaps one small step for alienated mankind, but a major step backward for oppressed humanity.

Feuerbach's Half-Finished Project

In that case, Feuerbach uncovered only half the truth: it's not just 'God' who is an alienated projection of human nature. The classical view of reality (inherited by and large by all subsequent thinkers) is in fact an alienated projection of human society -- purposely carried out by the ideologues of those whose interests this served.

The real universe (i.e., that underlying appearances) was thus a huge externalisation of class society. In this way, specially codified language was linked to the continuing order of the Cosmos and the State. Justice became a cosmic issue, as did property, exchange, debt, ransom, value, law, conflict, legal argument (in Hegel, the latter two resurfaced as "contradiction" -- so, an anthropomorphised verbal expression now powered the universe).

Sometimes these were overlaid with openly religious themes -- just think of the concepts that Christians use: inherited sin, ransom, debts paid to 'God', all believers slaves of 'God', redemption, 'mediation', and so on --, sometimes they weren't. At any rate, discourse of a mystical and legalistic bent had a magical quality imputed to it, but only because it had an Ideal basis in an Ideal and logically-structured State/Universe.

Hence, a superficial social form (i.e., the ability to issue orders, to promulgate and enforce laws, etc.) was inverted to become the medium that enabled philosophers to unmask the secrets underlying 'appearances' -- the master key capable of unlocking the essential structure of 'Being'.

In later metaphysical systems this open mysticism became hidden behind an overt or covert reference to the logical principles that 'must' underlie nature -- depersonalised now as cosmic "essences", "dialectical logic" or "natural law". The Logos became Logic, and Logic ran the world.

This being so, it would be 'natural' for such theorists to conclude that not only is logical, rational, and conceptual analysis capable of revealing genuine truths about reality, nothing else can. In that case, only a priori knowledge was real knowledge; it alone was reliable. Anything else was not 'proper Philosophy', and so fit only for derision.

[This is one of the reasons why the attack on the roots of all forms of Western thought (mounted at this site) is so difficult for comrades to accept (or even to grasp): in their heads ruling ideas are still dominant -- in this case, in the shape of dialectics. They can't see this because they accept the traditional, a priori approach to knowledge as a 'natural' way to think. Hence, for them, only a priori speculation (backed up with little or no evidence -- it is not needed since this sort of 'knowledge' follows from words/'concepts', and is 'self-evident') can possibly qualify as genuine philosophical knowledge. Materially-based scientific knowledge is not enough; Marxism needs a Philosophy. This idea is so firmly lodged in comrades' heads that it rules almost by divine right. (Why this is so will be examined more fully in Essay Nine; summary here.) In this way, ruling-class ideas rule militant minds.]

However, rationally obtained knowledge (of this sort) is far removed from material reality -- in fact it has been abstracted away from it, and is conveniently hidden far beneath surface appearances, and thus safe from material refutation. This only served to confirm the further idea that such knowledge is occult, mystical, and esoteric -- which helps account for the popularity of occult thought among traditional thinkers (and many individual members of the ruling-class, for example, these days the Masons) right the way through history. [This includes, of course, Hegel, a Hermetic thinker of the worst possible kind.]

The major ideological turn to this new conception of reality clearly mirrored the pseudo-democratisation that took place classical Greece in and around the fifth century BC -- based as the latter was on slavery.

It was now expedient to transform the earlier personified powers of the 'gods' into impersonal forces and laws in order to provide a more relevant and persuasive rationale for these new forms of class domination (wherein Kings and Queens no longer featured, these having been replaced by Oligarchies, dictatorships or an early form of Republic). Warring, envious and capricious gods had to be tamed and turned into impersonal forces, principles and laws (but, where necessary, still under the control of a single supreme 'Deity', or supreme rational principle, an Absolute), since a properly ordered Polis had to reflect a similarly rational cosmic order. Nevertheless, this change still preserved the anthropomorphic and animistic overtones of the old way of seeing things, even though these were now much harder to see.

This novel, class-motivated world-view was clearly aimed at demonstrating why nature and society had to be the way they were, linking the power of the State to the necessary structure of 'Being'.

Hegemony so easily derived from Hermeneutics.

[It is worth recalling here that Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek God Hermes, the founding figure of Hermetic Philosophy -- the system that Hegel bequeathed to our movement. Hermes was 'himself' based on the Egyptian god Thoth, who invented language and Philosophy (aka 'wisdom') -- and who made the world out of language --, from whom the Greeks derived their word for 'God' (Theos -- and hence Theology), and we our word "theory".]

Ordinary Language Denigrated By Class-Conscious Theorists

As a result, not only did the first wave of ruling-class warriors find that they had to dismantle primitive communism physically, their ideological "prize-fighters" also had to mount a pincer assault on communal language and common experience, centuries later. This is no mere invention; the historical record fully supports this observation. [Details will be given in the full Essay, when it is published.]

They were forced to do this because the vernacular does not allow the formation of a single coherent metaphysical thought (for reasons outlined above, and explained in detail in several of the Essays posted at this site), and it cannot be used to confirm the a priori theses metaphysicians invent as the mood takes them.

This accounts for their need to create 'abstract ideas' to help rationalise these newly emerging class hierarchies. If these 'concepts/categories' control all of reality, even though it is not possible to detect them by any means whatsoever, then no ordinary human being could possibly disprove they 'existed', nor question their validity. Indeed, if anyone were foolish enough to try to do so, that would be evidence enough on its own that they did not understand the precursor to dialectics -- i.e., the Neo-Platonic/Hermetic ideas that would later help sink Hegel (and thus Marxism) into its dogmatic slumber.

In the West, this ancient, aristocratic world-view found expression in the use of specially-tailored jargon -- wherein nature is just a reification of Indo-European grammar. So, subjects, predicates, and practically any vaguely relevant word -- especially participles of the diminutive verb "to be" (i.e., "is" and "being") --, were imbued with profound ontological importance. Sentence structure was now capable of revealing the underlying structure of the universe; thus, if language contained negation, so must reality.

[That would of course mean that nature must also contain prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions; thus, not only must Marx and Engels have existed to provide referents for the phrase "Marx and Engels", so must the word "and".]

In these new social settings, the analysis of specially modified linguistic forms was not only metaphysically revealing, it was financially rewarding; patronage was available only to those who theorised along the 'right' lines and who drew the most useful conclusions.

Abstract thought could thus find a home for itself in a world where those who performed material work could find none -- for their thoughts and experiences were denied a home.

The material language of those who had to work to stay alive was thus doctored and distorted, since it represented the 'debased' experience of those directly alienated by these new social forms, but whose self-organisation could still threaten the "rational order", the "fabric of society" -- or, again of late, "Western values".

Hence, not only was materialism regarded as a dangerous ideology, the material language by means of which it alone can be expressed had to be continually denigrated.

In any subsequent rebellion against the State, however, the material language of everyday life rapidly became the focus for expressing the grievances and pressing the demands of those now in revolt. To be sure, justification for this was often couched in religious forms (a classic example being the work and activity of Thomas Müntzer), but the demands and tactics of such groups could not fail to be expressed in everyday terms if support were to be won among ordinary folk. No matter how fervent one's belief in 'God', without the right tactics, weaponry and communication -- all material constraints --, a revolt cannot help but flounder.

Thus it is struggle from below (in the last few centuries) that has gradually begun to invert the Ideal forms of domination that had been imposed for millennia on the majority, making the social world subject to increasing material and collective control. Again, while this might have been expressed in religious terms centuries ago, it now appears in more overt material language. [That is, of course, why revolutionary papers have to use ordinary language.]

And it is also why the present age is unique; we now do have a materialist counter-weight to help bring an end to the domination of ruling-ideas.

Indeed, the ideas represented here were only made possible when the working-class entered the stage of history as a material force. [The details will be given in the main Essay, when it is published.]

This explains why the larger the working-class, the less relevant dialectics becomes, and the smaller the impact of Dialectical Marxism on it.

True, in Hegel the Ideal stands proudly on its feet, Absolute master of all; but the theories of Engels, Lenin or Trotsky were not responsible for upending it (as dialecticians themselves claim). If anything, they put it on a cart and paraded it about the place celebrating it as the work of "genius".

On the contrary, the material struggle of ordinary working people has helped cut this metaphysical Frankenstein off at the knees, for they alone can provide the material counterweight to Idealism. Marxist intellectuals and/or activists (no matter how devoted they are to the revolution) cannot do this, for obvious reasons. That is why the spin they claim to have performed in Hegel's system cannot possibly have worked.

Last part to follow later.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OK, and mercifully, here is the last part:



[b]Ordinary Language And Workers

In that case, no revolutionary movement can succeed without employing the material language of ordinary life, ditching the Ideal. Revolutionaries who think otherwise not only align themselves with those who still to this day benefit from class rule, they guarantee the further alienation from Marxist politics of those already estranged by the class-motivated deformation of their lives, language and experience -- the majority of workers.

The ideas of the ruling-class can rule in no other way, but it helps significantly if erstwhile radicals internalise their elitist ideology and thought-forms, parroting it back at workers. Indeed, those who adopt this tactic -- and who should know better -- merely help spread and confirm this alien-class hegemony.

Clearly, this makes the defence of ordinary material language a class issue.

Alienated Thought -- Fetishised Language

Everyday language had originally been developed by ordinary human beings who interfaced with one another and with the material world in collective labour. In contrast, as noted above, ruling-class ideology is suffused with the sort of jargon that can only interface with yet more jargon. Indeed, in such circumstances jargon-juggling (i.e., Metaphysics) becomes the norm, with traditional thought resembling what one imagines a long and detailed commentary on the nature, temperament and predilections of the Jabberwocky might look like

[This accusation can be levelled, too, against much that passes for academic Marxism. Small wonder then that it has so far had no detectable impact on the class struggle (other than a negative one, that is). On this, see Essay Nine; summary here.]

In this way, traditional theorists readily mistook a social form (language) for the material world itself, inverting the products of social relations until they mirrored and then constituted a suitably Ideal form of reality, one that reflected in turn their mode of being.

As a result, these theorists developed an alienated and fetishised view of language: what had once been the product of the relations between human beings thus became inverted in an ideological form as an expression of the real relation between things, or even as those things themselves (to paraphrase Marx).

This inversion has real material roots in the alienation from collective labour (and the language that arises from it) that class division has forced on ruling-class hacks -- and, indeed, on contemporary dialectical hangers-on.

For traditional thinkers, the proper function of language was representational: it must picture "Being", and it must re-present outer essences as inner certainties -- thus assisting class-ideologues in their rationalisation of 'social order'. There would be no point to Metaphysical language if it could not do this.

Theoretical and philosophical language was thus transformed into a specialised code that represented the essence of metaphysical reality (hence the need for all that jargon -- and then more jargon to 'explain' the original jargon -- and, of course, to ensure that this mutant medium remained the exclusive property of elite 'thinkers'). This is indeed one of the central tenets of Hermetic thought; just as Hermes interpreted the Gods, so a suitably arcane language could help interpret/represent 'god's thoughts' (the inner linguistic microcosm would thus represent the outer Ideal macrocosm), but only to those of the right 'social standing'.

Discourse was not seen as a social tool created simply to facilitate communal life and collective labour; no, its primary function was to represent 'concepts' and ideas in the heads of those with far too much leisure time on their hands for their own good.

Intellectualist metaphors connected with sight thus came to dominate theory; you either 'saw' the truth (by "intuition", or by divine illumination), or you were part of the problem -- or, latterly: you did not 'understand dialectics'. Hence, ideas connected with perception seeped into all areas of traditional epistemology as representational theories swept the board; they were the only game in town.

Representationalism and the Inner Bourgeois Individual

However, if only small sections of the population were capable of representing divine ideas to themselves, then that automatically excluded the majority from genuine knowledge, and thus from power. As is well-known, the ruling-class has always preferred secrecy and mystery. No less so here.

On the other hand, if language is indeed primarily communitarian (and hence, if its main function is communication), mystery-mongering like this becomes impossible.

Nevertheless, according to the metaphysical or representational view of language, human beings have to learn to represent the world to themselves first before they can communicate their ideas to anyone else. Naturally, this makes this theory anti-democratic, since it is predicated on exclusivity and individualism. It is also why any theory that allows for the existence of a priori theses -- whose truth-values flow from the alleged meaning of words (which is in turn based on the idea that language can directly represent parts of reality that cannot be communicated, or accessed, by empirical means, which renders such knowledge esoteric and exclusive) --, will always appeal to traditionalists (and dialecticians). Representationalism and metaphysics go hand-in-hand.

Representationalism was much clearer in its early modern incarnation, concocted at or about the time of the last major change in class power, in the 17th and 18th centuries. This view of language and mind still dominates traditional thought today (indeed, it typifies the bourgeois/individualist view of 'mind', and has hardly advanced much in 300 years).

However, if representationalism is correct, accounting for communication becomes problematic (why this is so is detailed in Essay Three Part Two), and yet if abstract ideas and jargon dominate knowledge, it is not difficult to see why this is so.

How would it be possible, for example, to explain the meaning of a newly invented piece of jargon if that jargon only represents things in its inventor's head? Others may pretend to follow what is said (or imagine they can), but beyond that, what content would there be to such pretence? Indeed, in such circumstances one might as well be talking about the Jabberwocky again.

Worse, how would anyone be able to explain this jargon to themselves? With no social constraints on an individual's language, anything could mean anything (which would mean it meant nothing).

Representationalism thus not only threatens the status of knowledge, it undermines socially-conditioned meaning. The communicational model does not do this. Here, meaning emerges in social interaction, not isolated mental processing.

Of course, representationalism not only makes it impossible to account for the social nature of knowledge, it helps create the spurious 'problem' of other minds -- for it now becomes obvious that, short of a miracle, no two individuals could share the same ideas about anything, or even so much as a single "abstraction". Far worse: no one could share the same idea about the 'same idea'.

In contrast once more, by its very nature material language is communitarian; only during (but mostly after) socialisation is it possible for human beings to begin to form beliefs about the world or express them in a comprehensible form (even to themselves). Children have to be taught language by parents, carers and peers communicating with them; only then is it possible for them to represent anything to themselves.

Just as labour creates value, socialisation based on collective labour creates meaning.

In contrast to this, abstract metaphysical language is individualistic, divisive, atomistic and representational; if language were primarily of this nature, communication would be impossible. Language, instead of being a free medium of exchange, would thus become a prison trapping thought in a solipsistic dungeon. In fact no thoughts could be formed given this view. [Why this is so will be explained in a later Essay, where some of the above claims will also be defended.]

Hence, according to the traditional view (in its modern form), there is a surrogate inner bourgeois in us all. Representationalism itself suggests that we all have an 'inner spectator' in our heads, for how else could we make sense of these 'inner representations' to 'consciousness'? What is the point of using the word "represent" if there is no one to whom things are represented? If this word means what we ordinarily take it to mean (that is, if we do not misrepresent its meaning!), then this account clearly depends on an homunculus theory of the mind. The verb, "to represent" is transitive.

At this point, the atomistic drift of this traditional line of thought should be obvious, for the 'explanatory' core of this approach to language presents us with what looks suspiciously like an isolated individual -- beloved of bourgeois thought -- lodged in each head. This oracular, cranial lodger -- who differs from the Cartesian soul in name only -– is, on this account, far removed from the affairs of communal life. Such a speechless atom would have no need of a public language -- nor would it require socialisation. Its 'discourse' (if such it may be called) cannot be social, it is just inner and private. But, it must be said, private property in the means of language production sits rather awkwardly with an avowedly Marxist account of language.

Representationalism thus has to anthropomorphise the human brain, installing an inner bourgeois in us all.

The individual strikes back and is living in a skull near you.

Small wonder then that ruling-class ideas have always ruled; every head contains its very own bourgeois ideologue -- or, rather, all are led to believe they form ideas as separate, isolated individuals. This seems so natural, few question it. DM-epistemology merely reinforces this misconception. The Roman Empire perfected divide and rule; bourgeois hegemony now perfects divided, and thus ruled, ideas.

Thus was born Engels's classic 'problem' of the relation between "thinking and being" [Engels (1888), p.593], which is in fact a 'problem' only for those who accept the validity of representationalism.

In stark contrast to the traditional view of language, the vernacular is already part of material being; hence any thoughts expressed in ordinary language need no further relating to material reality -- the vernacular is thus able to capture material reality in all its accessible forms (and it does this while at the same time as denying intellectual oxygen to ruling-class, Idealist thought).

Seen this way, another classic 'problem' evaporates.

The Ideological Heart Of The Heartless World

Nevertheless, as a result of profound changes that took place in parts of Southern Europe in the sixth century BC, Metaphysics emerged as an alienated form of ruling-class consciousness: the theory that gave heart to those who ran this heartless world, the ideology that rationalised power and served as the intellectual source of the opiate of the oppressor.

To bring this condition to an end will require the end of the conditions that require it. The criticism of Metaphysics thus becomes one with the criticism of the ideas of those who have imposed their system on the rest of us -- and one with the criticism of the ruling ideas that have been imported into Marxism (in the form of dialectics).

To be sure, this criticism must assume material form in the class struggle, but that cannot possibly succeed if those who claim to be its most focussed cadres ape these alien thought-forms. Instead of such comrades trying to reform this condition, occupying it and altering it from within (as they have hitherto tried to do, forming their own version of traditional thought (this being the philosophical equivalent of Reformism)), Marxist theoreticians should aim rather to smash it.

There is thus no room in revolutionary socialism for any form of Philosophical Entryism.

This particular Tiger cannot be de-clawed one clause at a time.

In view of the above, the aim must now be to return Marxist Philosophy to its roots in the material language of working people; that is, to the language developed by human beings who interface with material reality every day.

This accounts for the heavy emphasis placed on the vernacular in this study -- and hence, too, this explains its implacable opposition to all forms of traditional Philosophy.

'Jargonitis'

In fact, the language used by traditional thinkers (like Hegel) actually insulates the mind from material reality (since it is not based on a material interaction with it -- either in communal life or in collective labour), just as it insulates the minds of comrades who to this day still think Marxism is a ringing success. [That is how good a job it has done on them!]

As the historical record shows, Hegel's impenetrable jargon was cobbled-together from (im)material supplied to him by theorists and mystics working within an ancient metaphysical tradition -- but plainly not from those who interacted with the physical world in communal labour.

Traditional theorists interface with material reality only in their spare time (and seldom in communal labour); most of the time they enjoy the communion of books, Ideas and Concepts. Small wonder then that such thinkers (i.e., those who speak fluent jargon) had to develop a specialised vocabulary, one that is suffused with words that have no material roots, in order to give expression to their own particular alienated form of life.

Over the last 2500 years, theorists have developed and elaborated this Ideal view of reality, one that is based on a systematic attempt to derive "necessary truths" from the alleged meaning of a few words (such as, "Being", “mediation”, "cause", "contradiction", "substance", "reality", "infinite", etc., etc.). This approach to theory underlies all forms of ruling-class thought, in every Mode of Production, achieving a different form-of-expression in each.

This being so, there can be no philosophical theory that is not Ideal (here, at least, Hegel was right), and there can be none that is free from ruling-class concepts and priorities. These sweeping claims are not left as bald assertions, they are thoroughly substantiated in the Essays posted here (and in my thesis).

Philosophical Language -- Not Of Merchantable Quality

The claim that ordinary language cannot cope with change is also subjected to detailed refutation. In fact, and on the contrary, it is Hegelian jargon that cannot account for the dynamism we find in material and social reality -- it spectacularly fails to do what had been advertised for it. If there were a Sale of Philosophical Goods Act, Hegelian jargon would be Exhibit A for the prosecution.

Ordinary language contains countless words that express every conceivable sort of change, in whatever level of detail is required; practically every verb and adverb stand as clear testimony to that fact. [A long list of such words is given in Essay Six, with more detail in Essay Four.]

In contrast, Hegelian jargon is wooden, opaque and lifeless, having had its spirit removed without anaesthetic during abstraction.

Unfortunately, DM-theorists have been more intent on repeating the ill-considered criticisms of the vernacular that litter traditional philosophy; their reliance on the opinions of a card-carrying mystic and purveyor of ruling-class forms-of-thought (i.e., Hegel) as justification for their denigration of ordinary material language thus implicates them in a metaphysical tradition which includes in its ranks some of the very worst apologists of class rule.

The LIE Detector At Work

In the event, I explain why DM suffers from all the failings of any metaphysic based on a ruling-class view of reality. The latter is in fact a family of views whose members hold several things in common; as already noted, chief among these is the belief that reality is 'rational', controlled by a 'Mind' (of some sort), or mind-like 'laws', or is governed by mysterious forces that only the initiated are capable of understanding. For its successful depiction, this approach requires a specialised and impenetrable vocabulary, whose terms work rather like the words of the old Latin Mass: they are intended to mystify, and guarantee exclusivity for the elite.

This esoteric language allegedly enables those engaging in 'conceptual analysis' (or, more accurately, the systematic production of empty jargon) to un-mask the hidden "essences" that lie 'behind' appearances, way beyond the reach of the "common herd". Naturally, the superscientific theses that traditional thought manages to weave together are incapable of being confirmed by anyone living in the material world --, which fortunately renders them safe from refutation, and thus beyond democratic control.

Although others have argued along apparently similar lines (pointing out the implications of the traditional idea that reality is rational, etc.), the emphasis placed in these Essays is somewhat different. Here both the assertion that reality is rational and its denial are criticised. Both are metaphysical theses based on Ideal forms-of-thought.

The upshot of this approach is that the last 2500 years of traditional thought (i.e., Metaphysics) is little more that ruling-class hot air.

These Essays supply the reader therefore with a rather large material pin.

Wittgenstein's method is then enlisted to assist in the removal of this poison (DM) from HM. His approach, despite what many of Wittgenstein's epigones claim for it, is neither relativist nor anti-realist. This is because Realism, Relativism, and anti-Realism are all metaphysical theories, and hence are equally non-sensical (i.e., they are all based on non-materially-grounded language).

The tactic adopted here thus seeks to destroy Metaphysics in order to make scientific knowledge possible (to paraphrase Kant). In Marxist terms, I do not aim to reform traditional Philosophy from within, but help terminate it.

This therefore brings to a close the work Feuerbach initiated, for now it is possible to see all forms of alienated human thought for what they really are: the product of a fetishised view of class society -- one based on the assumed powerlessness of working people (and the more to keep them that way).

Why All This Now?

Finally, it is also argued that the emphasis placed on ordinary language by certain Analytic Philosophers (up until a few generations ago, at least) was not unconnected with the rise of the working class as a political force in history. The latter-day demise of this tradition in Analytic Philosophy (and the resurgence of Metaphysics, and particularly Hegelianism) is also linked to the change in the balance of class forces that has taken place over the last thirty years or so.

In fact, the modern home of 'monetarist' economic theory (the USA) was also the source of the most determined attacks on Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP). Over the same period, we have witnessed a resurgence of a plethora of right-wing ideas in science (for example, the rise of Sociobiology in the 1970's which later transmogrified into 'Evolutionary Psychology' in the 1990's, and arguably the re-emergence of the BBT). No coincidences these.



This is not to suggest that those working in OLP were revolutionaries, or that they saw things this way. It is to assert however that their emphasis on ordinary language had material roots, and that it did not just emerge out of thin air. Indeed, many of these thinkers were socialists of one sort or another. For example, the vast majority of Wittgenstein's friends were Communists or were sympathetic to Trotskyism. Wittgenstein himself wanted to move to the USSR in the mid-1930's, and was offered the professorship at Kazan University (Lenin's old College), which tenure the Stalinists of the day would hardly offer to an anti-red.

This, of course, makes the work of the most important philosopher working in OLP (i.e., Wittgenstein) crucially important for the defence of working-class politics. [Although it is not maintained here that he saw things this way. These issues are spelled-out in much more detail in my thesis.]

So, why now?

The working class in previous centuries was far too small and weak to provide a materialist counter-weight to the Idealism found in all forms of ruling-class thought. This is no longer the case.

The larger the working-class has become, the less impact Dialectical Marxism has had on it.

Now we can see why.

These Essays perhaps represent the first attempt in the modern age to reshape working-class thought de novo, and thus Marxist Theory in toto.

In which case, the Owl of Minerva can get stuffed.

[For those who do not know what the dialectics that is about, Hegel wrote in the Preface to his Philosophy of Right: "The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk" ([Hegel (2005), p.xxi] -- my paraphrase), meaning that philosophical wisdom will only appear at the end of a certain period of history; more details at:

Owl of Minerva, by Peter Singer

And:

Philosophy - The Owl of Minerva

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Owl_of_Minerva

The last link contains the full quotation.

The Owl of Minerva is also the official journal of the Hegel Society of America, and Minerva was the name of the Masonic journal (which espoused radical French Jacobin ideas) that Hegel read in Berne in 1794 -- according to a letter he wrote to Schelling, 24/12/1794. There is no evidence that Hegel became a Mason, but he was employed at that time by a prominent Mason, Jean Gogel, to tutor his children -- and many of his friends were Masons, as were those who influenced him. It is worth noting that Masonic lodges, especially those in Germany, were heavily steeped in Hermetic Philosophy.]

The live links above can be found at my site here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

And where the above can read in much larger type.

[lawnmowergoWHUMMM]

:blink:

[hoopla]

Tbh I will read that later.

Thanks for putting the time in

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lawnblahblah:

:P

[l33tnao]

Subject:bf2 hacks cs hacks cod2 hacks
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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

133:

How true....

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 6 2006, 01:41 AM

since it attempts to derive a priori truths from a few words -- as you saw aboveWhy does this imply reality is linguistic? Which essay is this, all of them? :)
I skimmed read the last two cut and pastes.

Erm, I am not disappointed with the general ethic behind the push for an end to philosophy. In my ignorance, at the moment I look at historical analyses that see currents as bourgeois, as revealing motives, and not other type of truths (Though perhaps Foucoult has something to say on this :lol: ).

Think I've confused myself there. What I mean is, with historical questions like "philosophy grew out of the bourgeois", it seems like neither side can be said to be definetly correct. So there :P I've just been reading some Gdamer who suggets, I think, that we can not interpret history without prejudice.

I certainly think that historical truths are not certain though

Not sure what the crux of the argument for a priori truths implying that reality is linguistic, is though?

So far I have this
1. So 'profound' were they that in communicating them to us Lenin had to do the opposite of what they themselves said could not be done!

This shows that it is not possible to relate the content of Lenin's claim to anything that could be found (or that could happen) in material reality

This is because, if the truth of this claim is to be permanently excluded (by holding it as necessarily false), whatever would have made it true has to be ruled out conclusively.

2. In fact, the language used by traditional thinkers (like Hegel) actually insulates the mind from material reality (since it is not based on a material interaction with it -- either in communal life or in collective labour)

This being so, there can be no philosophical theory that is not Ideal
1. I guess I could argue that just because something can be imagined, does not mean the something is possible in this world. To argue otherwise, to me, would sugest that nothing is impossible or necessary! Do you think that, if water is H2O, it is necessraily H2O? Do you think that what follows from the laws of logic is necessarily true? Does 'If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal' not express a logically necessary truth?
2. What do you mean by material interaction with reality, is this some kind of reference to Marx's thesis on Feurbach (?)? If not, then aren't you implying that there is a kind of interaction with reality, that is not material!

Also, I'm sure you know that Krpike has argued that a priori truths need not be necessary, or visa versa. Not sure if a greater emphasis on this would make any lkind of difference to your argument.

I presume you have read some Korsch? What do you think?

I will get the bottom of this anti-dialectics (If my brain doesn't give in)! Have you read any open Marxism, they are against DM etc.

Is the falsity of DM a necessary truth?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Erm, I am not disappointed with the general ethic behind the push for an end to philosophy.

Well, it is only what Marx wanted to do.

Hoop, I thought you were going to stop making stuff up:


What I mean is, with historical questions like "philosophy grew out of the bourgeois",

Where do I say that?


Do you think that, if water is H2O, it is necessarily H2O?

Well, we have now set up rules that enable us to classify reality, and rules cannot be either true or false.

So, it is not a question whether water is 'necessarily' H2O (which it isn't -- why I say that I will leave annoyingly mysterious for now), it a question of, if in order to pass exams in chemistry, do effective science etc., and you do not apply this rule correctly, you will fail your exams, screw up your experiments, and reveal your ignorance.


Do you think that what follows from the laws of logic is necessarily true?

Well, you will need to give me an example, so I can form an opinion.

[I have to say, that since the 'laws of logic are not 'laws', but rules, prospects for finding an answer that will satisfy you are not looking good.]


What do you mean by material interaction with reality,

I am sorry, I find it hard to believe that a material being like you needs to ask this.

Every time you touch something ask yourself: Is what I am touching material or imaginary?

The answer to that might help you answer your own question.

[Plus it brings in things we might want to add from historical materialism.]


Also, I'm sure you know that Kripke has argued that a priori truths need not be necessary, or visa versa. Not sure if a greater emphasis on this would make any kind of difference to your argument.

Yes, but he is wrong, and I can prove it.

I do that in a later essay.


Is the falsity of DM a necessary truth?

As I have said several times already, DM is far too confused to be assessed for truth or falsity; it does not make it that far.

Korsch is OK, but far too brief.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 7 2006, 09:42 AM

What I mean is, with historical questions like "philosophy grew out of the bourgeois",

Where do I say that?Where do I say that you do?
I'm not sure of the point of saying that philosophy is un-democratic, but, thats a kind of historical question. And I was merely guessing that its not a certain truth.
Tbh I'm a bit confused between necessary, certain, and not defeasible, so...



Do you think that what follows from the laws of logic is necessarily true?

Well, you will need to give me an example, so I can form an opinion.

'If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal' not express a logically necessary truth?You are very evasive

I guess I could argue that just because something can be imagined, does not mean the something is possible in this world. To argue otherwise, to me, would sugest that nothing is impossible or necessary!

Korsch is OK, but far too brief.Thats the impression I got.



What do you mean by material interaction with reality,

I am sorry, I find it hard to believe that a material being like you needs to ask this.

Every time you touch something ask yourself: Is what I am touching material or imaginary?So, yeah, you're not saying that we interact non-materially with reality. It wasn't very important.



Is the falsity of DM a necessary truth?

As I have said several times already, DM is far too confused to be assessed for truth or falsity; it does not make it that far.Sorry, is the the incoherence of DM a necessary truth?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Where do I say that you do?

Forgive me this time for making things up!!! It was an understandable error though, in view of the line you were taking; but I should have been more careful.


Tbh I'm a bit confused between necessary, certain, and not defeasible, so...

Well, you should be; these terms are bandied about by philosophers with the utmost lack of clarity.

But, are you asking me how I am using the word 'necessary', though? [See below.]


'If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal' not express a logically necessary truth?

Well, it is a conditional proposition, and so expresses the use of a rule, in this case.

It would be counted as a tautology (or rather, a particular substitutional instance of a tautological entailment), and thus a necessary truth, by many philosophers; but I reject this Platonistic view of logic.




I guess I could argue that just because something can be imagined, does not mean the something is possible in this world. To argue otherwise, to me, would sugest that nothing is impossible or necessary!

This is not a quote from me.


So, yeah, you're not saying that we interact non-materially with reality. It wasn't very important.

On the contrary, I was asking why you, who, unless you are insane (which you are not!!), would ask this.

[I passed no comment on what my views were.]

Check out my answer to you on that other thread as to what I think about the word 'real'.

[So I reject the word 'reality' as in any way meaningful, when used philosophically.]


Sorry, is the the incoherence of DM a necessary truth?

Incoherence is a [i]contingent state brought about, in this case, by an excess of trust in hermetic thought.

It may be cured by a swift dose of ordinary material language

So, not only is it not a necessary truth, there are no necessary truths (that term is vacuous) -- unless, of course, we tinker around with the word 'truth', and, say, confuse it with 'provable' in logic or mathematics. Then it is not vacuous.

So your question is impossible to answer (or rather it lacks a sense) since it contains an empty phrase -- 'necessary truth'.

In that case, you might as well have said:

'Sorry, is the the incoherence of DM a bububu?'