My usual philosophy.....

[Connolly]

This thread is really just to see if my general argument and philosophy is right.

I would like your comments and if I am wrong, please, please tell me.

So far it has worked when arguing with the opposition :lol:

Basically, when someone mentions human nature, and how communism is not possible due to greed, I usually respond with,

"our actions are defined by our material conditions, and, in terms of society, our material conditions are defined by the economic mode of production, and therefore, if it is not a function of the mode of production, we wouldnt be greedy"

Now, this sounds too simple to be true. Am I overestimating the flexibility of what humans are actually capable of? Too "pliable"?

From this, I usually state also that our thoughts and actions are defined by material circumstances, and that, when placed in certain situations, we will act in certain ways.

I have been called a determinist for that. Rightfully?

Not only have I been called determinist, but, I feel iv been drifting that way too.

I mean, why just stop at being limited by material circumstances, why not go down the determinist route and say our actions are pre determined with exact material interactions?

What should be my limits when discussing such things, am I making things overly simple?

Im just having doubts.

Thanks TRB

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red (i.e., Connolly), since only things with minds can determine other things, and since nature is not mind, no natural event can determine any other.

Determinism is based on an animistic view of the material world, which sees causes in nature as surrogate acts of will.

We have the language available in the vernacular to express causes of limitless complexity, sophistication and subtlety (you only have to read a good novel to be convinced of that), so why we take any notice of the anthropomorphic and useless terminology traditional philosophy has dumped on us beats me.

Hence, it is possible to give a historical-materialist account of why people do, or do not do, whatever they do, or do not do.

The response to make to the 'human nature' (clichéd) objection to Marxism is to point out that it is in or nature to change both ourselves and our circumstances. That, I venture to suggest, is one of the best-attested facts about ourselves there is (outside of banal truths such as we all come from our parents, and live on planet earth!).

Now this view of 'human nature' is one I think we can live with, just as it is based on a more balanced view of the course of human history and the reassuringly wide variety of human behaviours anthropologists have so far recorded.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

"Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. No mysterious miracles or wholly random events occur."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

There is nothing entirely religious about determinism. Determinism itself would advocate an atheist or pantheist worldview. It is a philosophy based on philosophical and scientific observation. I find the following quote a helpful explanation:

"A body in motion or at rest must be determined for motion or rest by some other body, which, likewise, was determined for motion or rest by some other body, and this by a third and so on to infinity" (Spinoza, 1673).

Determinism is a philosophy opposed to free will, for the most part. In fact, Marx himself displayed some views against free will:

"Free will is the belief or the philosophical doctrine that holds that humans have the power to choose their own deeds. (The concept has also been extended on occasion to animals or artificial intelligence in computers.) Such a belief has been supported as important to moral judgment by many religious authorities and criticized as a form of individualist ideology by writers such as Spinoza and Karl Marx."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga, determinism was based on a theistic view of the world, and an allegedly 'atheistical' version of it can only be made to work by using anthropomorphic/animistic terminology, as one event 'determines' another, or one set of events 'determine' the outcome of others.

You might like to ask yourself how unintelligent events and processes are capable of deciding what other events should or should not do, and why these other events should do what they are told.

Spinoza was a noted mystic, so no wonder he was a determinist.

So was Hegel, and so was Engels. Marx was a little too sophisticated, I think.

We do not need this ancient, mystical language to depict nature or society; we have the resources in ordinary language that allow us to depict natural and social causes to any level of detail and sophistication we need, and they do this non-mystically.


Determinism is a philosophy opposed to free will, for the most part. In fact, Marx himself displayed some views against free will

And it does this by projecting that will onto inanimate matter itself.

So determinism actually achieves the opposite of what you say; it takes 'free will' away from us and applies it to nature; so nature decides things, we do not. Which is a bit odd, since we are the intelligent agents here (excusing George Dubbya, of course), not nature. [There are political reasons why this doctrine took hold after the Renaissance, ones I explore at my site.]

Finally, the term 'free will', as it is used in philosophy is devoid of sense, so determinism cannot take away from us something that is empty of content.

[RevolverNo9]

Red, since only things with minds can determine other things, and since nature is not mind, no natural event can determine any other.

Sounds a bit Sartrean..

Aren't you missing the point though? At a fundamental level, material existence involves particle motion and collision. How possibly can a human being be any different? Are you suggesting that the mind is some 'superphysical' organ that rises above nature and 'determines' nature itself? There is no rational argument for that. So... unless quantum theory holds true, all our actions are determined (and if so we are just 'random machines').

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Revolver, no I am not suggesting that. Read what I posted: all I am saying is that to make this obscure doctrine work, philosophers have to use terminology that suggests that nature is intelligent.

That is all.

I am not sure what quantum mechanics has got to do with this, though.

[Connolly]

Thank you Rosa, Dooga and Revolver9 for those comments, they have been helpful. :D

Im still a little confused about determinism though.

Quite simply, are events pre-set?

When someone commits a murder, did they have a choice of action with certain material limits or was that action inevitable, that they have acted in the only way they could based on those material circumstances?

An example I have used in the past was this, "a bit futuristic though".........

We are acting and thinking based on what our senses tell us about our material surroundings. At the moment, we can sense the ground beneath us, and detect no movement, the walls are not moving by us etc...
Then, all of a sudden we have been teleported a thousand feet up intothe sky. We would then act based on what our senses are telling us about our material surroundings and start screaming, heartbeat rises, hands waving around etc etc as we fall.

I doubt we can not act in that way given the circumstances, so is that not something pre-determined/set? or do we have choice given those conditions?

Please excuse my ignorance :unsure:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red, the only things that are inevitable are things we cannot effect, through choice or circumstance.

So, sunrise is inevitable (but that does not mean it must happen, just that, if it fails to occur, we will have had nothing to do with it).

But, poverty is not inevitable, because we can do something about it.

Inevitabilitity is connected with human agency; if we cannot affect something, and unless some other agent intervenes, then whatever it is, it will be inevitable.

So, in the example you give (the murder), you will have to supply more details if we are to decide.

Your other example is fanciful, and so not worth commenting on.


so is that not something pre-determined/set?

Set by whom?

Once again, since only agents can determine anything: is there an agent here who decides one's fate?

I would say 'no', so the subsequent fall is not determined by anyone.

But, he/she will fall nonetheless, because unsupported objects near the surface of the earth do this sort of thing.

But no one has decided this before it happens. Sure, you can predict it will happen because of your knowledge of the world, but that does not mean your prediction determined it.

Determinism only works if nature is mind, or is controlled by mind.

This does not mean that indeterminism holds sway; if determinism makes no sense, then its opposite does not either.

Nature is neither deterministic nor non-deterministic, since nature is not an agent.

[Connolly]

Thank you for that Rosa, you have explained perfectly what I needed to know :D

I will have to read up on things a little better.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red, well I have to tell you that my ideas on this you will find nowhere else, I suspect; they are original to me.

Having said that, they are a development of ideas found in Wittgenstein, Bertrand Rusell and several others working in this tradition in philosophy.

So, I do not think that there is anything else on this anywhere -- except perhaps an obscure article in the philosophiccal journal called 'Mind' from the late 1950's, written by David Gallop, called 'On Being Determined', which was the other biggest influence on my ideas -- I do not have the exact reference since I am posting this from work. This article established the point to my mind successfully, that the word 'determined' can only sensibly be used in connection with human agents.

The only other things worth reading are: an article on Natural Law, posted here:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/natlaw.htm

and:

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/

This page contains a link to a whole book on this subject (the best there is -- if you ignore the metaphysics), downloadable as a PDF file.

If you can, try and read Bertrand Russell's article on causation in his book Mysticism and Logic; it was from this essay that my ideas on this topic began to develop over 20 years ago.

[RevolverNo9]

Revolver, no I am not suggesting that. Read what I posted: all I am saying is that to make this obscure doctrine work, philosophers have to use terminology that suggests that nature is intelligent.

Sorry maybe I misunderstand you... but then on what grounds do you object to determinism? Any distinction between 'nature', matter and our minds is obviously utterly fallcious. The actions that an individual takes are also merely the complex result of 'cause' and 'effect', no different fundamentally from flipping dominoes or placing imput into a compute.

I'm not concerned here with heremetic or religious ideas of determinism or 'pre-destination' or 'nature-as-mind'. I agree with you entirely on that point. But rudimentary comprehension of physics leaves no room for free will. Our actions are determined - unless quantum theory holds valid and there is indeed such a thing as a random event.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Revolver:


but then on what grounds do you object to determinism?

Forgive me, but I thought I had been clear: in order for their 'theory' to work, determinists have to use terminology that implies that nature is intelligent, that it is an agent, and that it (not us) has a will.

I am not claiming that it is a false theory, only that this loose use of language makes it senseless.

So, it does not make it far enough even to be assessed as true or false.


The actions that an individual takes are also merely the complex result of 'cause' and 'effect', no different fundamentally from flipping dominoes or placing imput into a compute.

Well, I'd like to see your evidence for this.

Of course, dominoes are not agents, so how they fall is not at all like how you make a decision (unless you subscribe to an odd theory about intelligent dominoes, that is...).


But rudimentary comprehension of physics leaves no room for free will.

Once again, I do not see the relevance of physics here.

And, please do not imagine I am defending 'free will' (as this obscure notion is phrased by philosophers), I am not. That doctrine is just as confused as determinism is.


Our actions are determined

Once again, they are only if nature is intelligent.

I hope you are not suggesting that it is.

Sure, you can determine what you do, and so can I. But that is the only sense in which our actions are determined.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Nature is only being personified for the purpose ot the argument. Something can be determined due to laws of mathematics - or science. Determinism simply argues that all things are influenced by such laws. Therefore, on one truly has free will as it is the result of determinism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Something can be determined due to laws of mathematics - or science.

Well, now you are shifting the anthropomorphism from nature onto an abstract system (mathematics).

That is, if anything, a backward step.


Determinism simply argues that all things are influenced by such laws.

That can only mean that these 'laws' are agents too, and are capable, all of their own, of bullying material objects, forcing them to do their bidding.

It also implies that unintelligent objects can obey these laws, a bit like you can obey traffic laws.

Once more that attributes to material objects a will, while it denies such a will to us.

I hope you can see that this gets everything the wrong way round: nature is fetishised; we are de-personalised.


Therefore, no one truly has free will as it is the result of determinism.

So, you are still happy to personalise nature; but now you want to extend this to the laws we use to depict it, and also to the abstract systems we employ to study it?

Fine, but in that case you are an Idealist -- or worse, an animist.

[mikelepore]

A lot could be said on this subject.

(1) If we really were as greedy as we should be, we would want all that we produce, instead of a mere fraction of what we produce. Therefore, the actual presence of greed in our genes would inspire us to adopt a nonprofit economic system.

(2) Greed doesn't dominate most behavior under capitalism. Greed dominates the behavior of the one percent of the population who are the capitalist class. However, the working class 99% work to get paid by the hour to feed their families. For most people, there is no "climbing" of any "social ladder", therefore no need to explain such "climbing."

(3) The opposite of greed is shown by the behavior that poor people can see their families go hungry, and nothing but a pane of glass a few millimeters in thickness separates them from a display of wealth in a store window, and yet most people don't break the glass. What we are doing is setting aside biological needs because of the power of ideology: the law is sacred, the ruling class is holy, the rich and famous are gods.

(4) It's the continued operation of class-divided society that requires a library shelf of law books, police, courts and jails. Capitalism has to be coercively forced into existence every moment of every day. Where's the presence of "human nature" in a way of life the continuation of which has to be actively forced by artificial institutions?

Mike Lepore
lepore at bestweb dot net

[hoopla]

FFS my post got deleted.


So, sunrise is inevitable (but that does not mean it must happen, just that, if it fails to occur, we will have had nothing to do with it).Your using 2 different definitions of the word ineviatble. By saying that nothing is inevitable in the sense that nothing is certain to happen you're agreeing with indeterminism. But only humans can be certain etc :rolleyes:

All you seem to be doing is arguing about the evolution of 'determinism'.
Maybe it would be more convincing if you could show that 'will' could not be excluded from 'determinism'.

Not very convinced that this isn't just indeterminism, if all your saying is that the word is suspect, as I have given a definition of the term "inevitable", suggested what in fact you are arguing, and argued that even if no concept exists for a non animistic determinism, one cannot be constructed.

:unsure:

[RevolverNo9]

Rosa, I still think you've 'missed the mark'. As luck would have it, this has been discussed in a thread in Philosophy a couple of places down. Maybe the essay there will explain better than I have been able to.

http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php...opic=50132&st=0 (http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php?showtopic=50132&st=0)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Your using 2 different definitions of the word ineviatble.

I am in fact not using any defintion of 'inevitable'.


By saying that nothing is inevitable in the sense that nothing is certain to happen you're agreeing with indeterminism.

On the contrary, I think the word 'indeterminism' is meaningless.

You need to read what I posted, and refrain from reading into what I say, what you think I say.


Maybe it would be more convincing if you could show that 'will' could not be excluded from 'determinism'.

These words, when used philosophically, are devoid of meaning (I defy you to show otherwise), so I cannot do what you ask, even if I wanted to.


as I have given a definition of the term "inevitable"

I must have missed it...; all I can see is that you tried to give a vague explanation of 'nothing is inevitable', but failed.


[I] and argued that even if no concept exists for a non animistic determinism, one cannot be constructed.

Eh?

Determinism only gets off the ground because of a sloppy use of langauge; I did not expect you to try to prove me right; but thanks!

[RevolverNo9]

determinists have to use terminology that implies that nature is intelligent, that it is an agent, and that it (not us) has a will.

Well one cannot distinguish between nature and man anyway. The very many different ways that matter composes itself is merely the result of coincidence. You must ask yourself - if an iris flower is merely reacting to stimuli in a determined way, how possibly is a human being not?


Well, I'd like to see your evidence for this.

The only way this could not be the case would be if the human mind had a metaphysical quality to it that was able actually to rise above physical laws and freely affect particles in the body. Since there's no reasonable evidence for such a thing, we must assume determinism.


Once again, I do not see the relevance of physics here.

Because everything material boils down to particle motion. Any understanding of this demonstrates the determined nature of reality. Since humans are physical beings, we are also determined. How can we not be?


Once again, they are only if nature is intelligent.

No. We are reacting to stimuli from within ourselvs and others as well as the material environment in which we live in. We just 'reason' that our actions are intelligent... really its just part of the meaningless trend of universal energy and matter.


Sure, you can determine what you do, and so can I. But that is the only sense in which our actions are determined

How on earth can you do that?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Revolver:


Rosa, I still think you've 'missed the mark'. As luck would have it, this has been discussed in a thread in Philosophy a couple of places down. Maybe the essay there will explain better than I have been able to.

Thanks for that, but I was aware of it; I did not join in that thread because, if you will forgive my directness, I could not see much there that made any sense.

And, I did not set the present thread up, but I joined it to try to try to stem the flow of empty words.

This is not to pick on the comrades posting here; the last 2400 years of traditional philosophy has largely been an exercise in the production of empty words, including the countless thousands devoted to 'determinism' etc.

OK:


Well one cannot distinguish between nature and man anyway.

If this means we are part of nature, how could I disagree?

If it means there are no significant differences between humans and, say, rocks, plants and asteroids, I have to part company with you.

Marxists do not try to agitate and organise tulips, nor do we even so much as attempt to propagandise buses, lakes or river esturies.

This suggests that in practice, even us Marxists distinguish between nature and humanity.


You must ask yourself - if an iris flower is merely reacting to stimuli in a determined way, how possibly is a human being not?

But you have yet to say what you mean by "an iris flower is merely reacting to stimuli in a determined way".

Do you mean it is thinking about it, acting with purpose and resolve, unfliching in its actions?

But that is how we use the word 'determined' in such contexts.

If I were to say of you, that you were acting in a determined way, I think we'd all understand that to mean that you were acting with resolve, and that nothing would deflect you from your goal.

So, how is it possible for an iris to do this?

Now, you might be using the word 'determined' here in an idiosyncratic way, but since you have not yet said what that is, I cannot understand your point (except in the way I outlined above -- i.e., that you think that plants can act with resolve).


The only way this could not be the case would be if the human mind had a metaphysical quality to it that was able actually to rise above physical laws and freely affect particles in the body.

Of course, this isn't evidence; it is in fact a superstition.

Why do I say that?

Well it attributes agency to hidden things (which you call 'laws', that have no physical being, and no material structure) that allegedly control the universe -- a bit like the gods of old. [So, 'laws' push the planets around the sun, like the angels used to....]

I recognise this is how many people think about 'laws' but many people are superstitious too.

You might like to ask yourself who wrote these 'laws', what they are made of, how they exercise their irresistabe power, and why they are so intelligent -- and, indeed, why anything else has to obey them. Do you honestly think the universe is run like a capitalist state, with laws written by a cosmic government that all have to obey or go to metaphysical jail?


Because everything material boils down to particle motion

Well, so you say, but how do you know?

Perhaps they are superstrings, or branes, or waves, or....

Since physicists are always changing their minds, I suggest you do not rely on what they say to decide if the universe is the subject to a universal will or not (which is what your other statements seem to imply).

But even if you are right, how does that affect the point at issue? How do particles force their will onto other particles and make them do what they want them to? And why do other particles always do as they are bid? The word 'determine' suggests that each and every particle in the universe should be able to do that.

[This was in fact Leibniz's theory, except he was more consistent and posited the existence of infinitely small minds in the place of material particles; it is in fact the only way to make the universe run on lines you suggest. There is an excellent summary of his ideas here (written by one of my old teachers):

http://www.etext.leeds.ac.uk/leibniz/leibniz.htm]

[R: a piece of advice: you will not solve this 'problem' by an appeal to science -- this is because this quandary has been created by an odd use of words.]


We just 'reason' that our actions are intelligent... really its just part of the meaningless trend of universal energy and matter.

Well, so you say; but again, where is your evidence?

But, once more, even if you were right, it would still suggest that nature is intelligent, while we are not. [Your use of 'determined' gives you away again.]

So, in a future socialist society, I expect you to argue that it is useless sending children to school, and instead we should educate grass, stones and meterorites -- since they are intelligent and we are not.

Now in response to this comment of mine:


Sure, you can determine what you do, and so can I. But that is the only sense in which our actions are determined

You say:


How on earth can you do that?

I wasn't sure what you were asking.

[hoopla]

So, sunrise is inevitable (but that does not mean it must happen, just that, if it fails to occur, we will have had nothing to do with it).

Your using 2 different definitions of the word ineviatble.

I am in fact not using any defintion of 'inevitable'.
Eh? "sunrise is ineviatble" means in that sentence "ldjcybndhyxbsyabayxbagaxvb". That is just a lie on your part.

By saying that nothing is inevitable in the sense that nothing is certain to happen you're agreeing with indeterminism.

On the contrary, I think the word 'indeterminism' is meaningless.
Of corse you have to show that.

as I have given a definition of the term "inevitable"

I must have missed it...; all I can see is that you tried to give a vague explanation of 'nothing is inevitable', but failed.
Something is inevitable if it is certain to happen

and argued that even if no concept exists for a non animistic determinism, one cannot be constructed.

I did not expect you to try to prove me right; but thanks!
Sorry, obvious typo - "one can be constructed"

You need to read what I posted, and refrain from reading into what I say, what you think I say.
Eh? Do you mean my point that
All you seem to be doing is arguing about the evolution of 'determinism'.? Well, if this is not your argument, then you've been unclear and you have a duty to clearly state your arguement again.
Determinism is based on an animistic view of the material world, which sees causes in nature as surrogate acts of [i]will... only things with minds can determine other things (as only they have will)... ('Determinsm' is) anthropomorphic and useless terminology

[hoopla]

If there are no laws what causes regularites.

Derterminsim - all events are effects of earlier events.

Is the probelm with 'event' or 'effect'?

If 'effect' then nothing radical here - just a Humean denial of cause!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Something is inevitable if it is certain to happen

Well, now you have just transferred the animism from ‘inevitable’ to the word 'certain': do you mean nature (in its own mind) is certain that it will happen? If not, what does this use of that word mean in such a context?


Eh? "sunrise is inevitable" means in that sentence "ldjcybndhyxbsyabayxbagaxvb". That is just a lie on your part.

I am sorry Hoopla, you are going to have to use an earthling language here. Your Martian is beyond me.


Of course you have to show that.

Well, I specifically said that I was referring to the philosophical use of this word, but I like the way you can help yourself to all manner of things, but you require me to demonstrate whatever I say. How even-handed of you!

Nevertheless, at my site, I demonstrate that all philosophical uses of any words are meaningless. It is a long and involved argument; you are invited to see if you can follow it.

In the meantime, you are also invited to say what that word means (since it is you who wants to use it, not me) in language that does not imply that nature is intelligent.

It's your word, mate; you defend it -- if you can....


Well, if this is not your argument, then you've been unclear and you have a duty to clearly state your argument again.

So, I am guilty of a dereliction of duty now? Can I thank you for reminding me of my obligations?

However, since this is your theory, I'd have thought you would be able to defend it.

If you can't, then you are not alone -- no one can (without descending into idealism).



If there are no laws what causes regularites?

That reminds me of the cartoon of two fish; one says the other "Well, if there is no God, who feeds us, then?"

Whatever causes the regularities in nature (if anything does), it cannot be laws, since laws are not material beings. Do you imagine that there is a written code that runs nature, forcing it to do the cosmic will? If you do, you are an idealist. No problem with that, but at least be open about it.

If not, what sense is there to your use of the word 'law' here?


Determinsim - all events are effects of earlier events.

H, determinism is a much stronger doctrine than this. There are certain forms of indeterminism that hold to this view.


If 'effect' then nothing radical here - just a Humean denial of cause!

I have no problem with any of the words you use, when they are not being employed philosophically (except perhaps, technical terms that have been invented and given a spurious role to play, like 'determinism', etc.).

And my argument does not owe anything to Hume; just to ordinary language.

[hoopla]

A determinism that states "every event is an effect of an earier event". Why is this incoherent?

Its not incoherent because all of the words can be understood without a notion of will. Scientists explain cause EXPLICITLY without the use of anthropomorphism. So, 'effect' does not require human agency. Nor event...

The positing of laws is not generally considered idealism, realism maybe. What definition of idealism are you working with?

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Just to interject here: physical "laws" are not laws like the ones found on the lawbooks - they are simply a descriptor - they are names for physical phenomena which occur with enough predictability in nominal conditions to the point which they can be predicted mathematically.

Of course these "laws" are subject to elaboration - for example, Newton's Laws of Gravitation do not hold up well at high fractions of lightspeed, hence the need for Einstein's Theories of Relativity.

But since most of the universe isn't travelling at high fractions of C, Newton's Laws are still valid, a "best-fit" solution that is simpler than using Relativistic calculations when Newtonian ones will do just as well.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


A determinism that states "every event is an effect of an earlier event". Why is this incoherent?

Well, you need to learn to read what I posted more carefully; that particular event (i.e., your failure to do so) certainly was not caused by my attempt to be clear, even though it followed it.


It’s not incoherent because all of the words can be understood without a notion of will.

I merely said that both determinism and indeterminism are meaningless (I cannot recall using the word 'incoherent', but it will do), and imply that nature is governed by a cosmic will.

I invite you to try to say what determinism is without such an implication.

[Good luck, you will be the first person in human history to do so.]

Merely posting a sentence with which a card-carrying indeterminist could agree (as you have just done -- and as I pointed out to you above, had you read with any care what I typed) will not do.

So, what is it about an unintelligent event (say, E1) that forces the result it does, so that no other event (say E2) could have followed, other than the one that did, and which determines (i.e., plans ahead) what the next event must do, and so ensures that it does so do; and what is it about, say, E2, that makes it do as it is told (which description is a little closer to determinism than your rather weak 'attempt' managed).

And if you do not like my use of animistic terms here, you can try to re-write the above, and stay true to determinism (but not to that watery-thin version you tried to sell us above), without them. I say it cannot be done.

Prove me wrong.


Scientists explain cause EXPLICITLY without the use of anthropomorphism

I have no problem with scientists, nor with what they tell us about the facts of nature (as I noted above -- you need new glasses, I fear), but scientists are not experts when it comes to philosophy (and they certainly are no more expert than competent speakers of the language are over the meaning of ordinary words for causation, and how these are rightly used), and it is here that I claim the problem arises.

So, your point about scientists is irrelevant.


So, 'effect' does not require human agency. Nor event...

Where do I say that they do?

You need to stop inventing....


The positing of laws is not generally considered idealism, realism maybe.

Well you can call it what you like, but you need to explain how a non-material being, such as a law, can make anything do anything. Can you? I doubt it

Go on, I challenge you....


What definition of idealism are you working with?

It is a family of notions, and no one specific definition. But, the idea that 'Mind' controls nature will do for starters.

[I.e., the implications of determinism.]

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

So, Rosa, are you arguing against determinism because the results of it, in your opinion, create a way of thinking that is immoral, or? Honestly, I don't mean to be offensive, but I don't see you refuting anything people are saying here. It seems like you are mixing together random thoughts to create some incoherent proof that makes sense only to you. On the other hand, I may just not be understanding you correctly. Either way, if you wouldn't mind simplifying what you are trying to say, it would be appreciated.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


So, Rosa, are you arguing against determinism because the results of it, in your opinion, create a way of thinking that is immoral, or?

No, just read what I posted -- nothing there remotely about 'morality'.


Honestly, I don't mean to be offensive, but I don't see you refuting anything people are saying here.

I have no intention of refuting this idealist doctrine -- one can only refute something capable of being true, and this 'theory' is too confused to make it that far.

However, I have laid down a challenge to those who argue here along traditional, conservative lines (which is rather odd, for self-styled 'radicals') to say exactly what they mean when they use such animistic terms to depict nature.

So far, no one has been able to do this (which is not surprising, given the fact that this is how this topic has been framed for millennia -- given its religious roots in Greek ideas about the goddess of 'fate', etc. controlling us and nature with her will).

At least my 'solution' (which is to argue that the 'problem' is bogus, and depends on a quirky use of language) attempts to be radical, and original.

Those you say I cannot 'refute', they are the ones stuck in the mud, content to retail traditional ideas, without explaining clearly what they mean by their loose use of language.


It seems like you are mixing together random thoughts to create some incoherent proof that makes sense only to you.

I am not trying to prove anything; where on earth did you get that idea?

I am merely trying to expose the superstitious theories you have all swallowed.

And, you will find my sentences are far better constructed than most that are posted here against me, and they are informed by a more sensitive approach to the language used.

So, why you call my thoughts 'random', I haven't a clue.

I suspect that this is the only thing you could think of to throw at me, since it is clear that not one of you can say in clear English what this Idealist doctrine means without using anthropomorphic language.

So, you attempt to distract from that.


Either way, if you wouldn't mind simplifying what you are trying to say, it would be appreciated.

Well, what I have said is not full of technical language (it is pretty ordinary, and direct), and I posted links (and not to my site, for a change!) that expand on these ideas.

I am not sure what else I can do.

Recall, I am not offering an alternative theory (since I hold that all philosophical theories are nonsensical); my criticisms are thus entirely negative, and aimed at exposing the inappropriate use of language this 'theory' thrives on.

This is a relatively new technique, invented by a handful analytic philosophers (and thus not widely known -- hence the consternation shown by most people who read my posts), which is aimed at letting the hot air out of traditional philosophy, and showing that this 2500 year-old 'project' has been a total waste of ruling-class time.

I just put it to use more generally, and push it much further than anyone else has ever tried before.

In that case, here and at my site, if I am right (and I might not be) you are witnessing something entirely new.

[hoopla]

I have given an example that I do not think relies on animalism, now show that it does "every event is an effect of an earlier event". If it does not, not all determinism is incoherent.

Out of interst, why are laws any more suspect that the dialectic? Is the dialectic real, like some would say laws are, or is it just a method, in which case I still wonder how events are caused, or why the world is the way it is iyswim

[Comrade-Z]

Well you can call it what you like, but you need to explain how a non-material being, such as a law, can make anything do anything.

But the regularities (laws) of the universe are indeed material. Gravity is a material force, for instance.

So, you are trying to argue that the laws of the universe do not affect the universe? So does gravity exist, in your mind? Why do masses fall towards each other, then?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I have given an example that I do not think relies on animalism, now show that it does "every event is an effect of an earlier event". If it does not, not all determinism is incoherent.

Well, as I have already noted, you need to read more carefully -- I have responded to that.

To save you saying the same thing again, I'll do it for you:


I have given an example that I do not think relies on animalism, now show that it does "every event is an effect of an earlier event". If it does not, not all determinism is incoherent.

Now, move on....


Out of interst, why are laws any more suspect that the dialectic?

Laws are not suspect, they just can't do anything.

And the dialectic has its origins in the same anthropomorphisation of nature. Hence all those 'negations' and 'contradictions' everywhere.


Is the dialectic real, like some would say laws are, or is it just a method, in which case I still wonder how events are caused, or why the world is the way it is iyswim

That last Martian word lost me.

As I have already said, we have thousands of words in ordinary language that can account for why things happen. You use them every day (indeed, you used some here). That is why we do not need a philosophical theory why things happen. And if scientists want to explain why things happen, as oppopsed to merely describing what takes place, they have to use these words too (or employ a metaphorical extensions to their usual use).

And the dialectic is entirely bogus as a philosophy or as a method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


But the regularities (laws) of the universe are indeed material. Gravity is a material force, for instance.

Well, Newtonians struggled for two hundred years trying to explain how forces could make anything move (we still lack an account of how they can do this), and so it has been replaced by the motion of objects along geodesics in Relativity -- no more force of gravity. Goodbye, and good riddance.

Now regularities are material (or they are part of our material description of things), but laws are not (unless they are regularities).

And, as I note, regularities are descriptions. I hope you are not suggesting that 'regularities' make things happen -- they are summaries of those things.



So, you are trying to argue that the laws of the universe do not affect the universe?

I am saying that even if 'laws' existed, written down somewhere from before we evolved (for that is what a law is (unless you know different)), they could not do anything, unless they were intelligent, or the product of Mind, which I reject.

There is nothing to stop you using this word if it makes you happy, but don't kid yourself that 'laws' can cause anything -- they are not material bodies.


So does gravity exist, in your mind? Why do masses fall towards each other, then?

Well we do not need scientists to tell us that objects fall if we do not support them, and that it is not a good idea to jump off tall buildings.

But, as I noted above, scientists have now dropped this force.

As to why masses move toward one another, I have no theory -- please note I am not trying to do any science here, merely let the hot air out of determinism.

But, I will note that scientists cannot explain why bodies move toward one another -- sure they can describe these events with great accuracy, but they still lack an account of what exactly moves things.

Saying things move along geodesics in an energy gradient is not an explantion of why things have to do that, but it is a description.

[hoopla]

Rosa, you are a fuckwit ;) And talking complete shit. But I've met bigger fickwits who have a doctorate.


I have given an example that I do not think relies on animalism, now show that it does "every event is an effect of an earlier event". If it does not, not all determinism is incoherent.

Well, as I have already noted, you need to read more carefully -- I have responded to that.This is the accepted defintion of determinsim according to the oxford companion to philosophy. To say that some forms of determinsim is not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism aren animalistic.

What are you saying? That 'determinism' relies on antropomorphic principles, this is because nature (which laws ARE part of) cannot determine, effect, anything, all that can is our minds. Funny how succesful scientists have been using notions of law, if they don't exist!

Your entire argument relies on directing us to your website. I can't be bothered.

Your not FUN.

[hoopla]

So Rosa, you have shown that some outdated models of determinism cannot be true. So what, they're outdated.

Note: She might not have, but I doubt she can show that the accepted defintion, th defintion that is used by me, is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla, so your best argument is abuse (if I were to post this, CYM would be warning me before you could say 'Hoopla is running scared'):


Rosa, you are a fuckwit And talking complete shit.

So, apart from name-calling, that is the best you can do, is it?


This is the accepted defintion of determinsim according to the oxford companion to philosophy

As you would know, if you knew much about the subject, there are no 'accepted definitions' in Philosophy (everything is up for grabs), especially if those 'definitions' express ideas that an indeterminist could agree with.

So, I suggest you either re-read the rest of what it says, or you contact the editor and point this out to him/her.


To say that some forms of determinsim is not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism aren animalistic.

The word is 'animism'; 'animalistic' means they behave like animals, and I certainly do not think that.

Anyway, I fail to see your point. What good is a 'definition' if it also picks out ideas that the opposite doctrine agrees with?

If you can't see that, I am not surprised you accept this loopy 'theory'.


What are you saying? That 'determinism' relies on antropomorphic principles, this is because nature (which laws ARE part of) cannot determine, effect, anything, all that can is our minds.

I am saying what I said; read it again more carefully.

[Is your first language English? I only ask because many of your sentences are all over the place, and difficult to follow.]


Funny how succesful scientists have been using notions of law, if they don't exist!

Where do I say that 'laws' do not exist?

Why do you persist in making things up?

And success is no sure guide to truth, either; Ptolemy's theory was successful for over a thousand years (four times longer than Newton's), and it became more accurate over time; but it was still wrong for all that. There are no crystalline spheres.

And now there is no 'force of gravity' (according to Relativity theory); but Newton's laws were still successful.


Your entire argument relies on directing us to your website. I can't be bothered.

Well, it doesn't (I merely directed you there to answer a specfic point); it depends on challenging you to explain determinism without using terms that imply nature is Mind.

You duck and you dive, but you still can't do that.

I wonder why?

And, so what if you can't be 'bothered'? Stay ignorant -- see if I care.


You're not FUN.

Good; but I am right, which is all that counts.

Get your 'fun' in the chit-chat section....

But there is more:


So Rosa, you have shown that some outdated models of determinism cannot be true. So what, they're outdated.

Well, 'un-outdate' them, if you can.

Go on, I challenge you.



Note: She might not have, but I doubt she can show that the accepted defintion, the defintion that is used by me, is.

If your definition picks out things the opposite theory agrees with, I would have thought that you would want to ammend it, not stick with a defective definition.

But, if that makes you happy, if that is 'FUN' to you, who am I to disturb your reverie?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sorry, Noxion, I did not see your helpful post:


Just to interject here: physical "laws" are not laws like the ones found on the lawbooks - they are simply a descriptor - they are names for physical phenomena which occur with enough predictability in nominal conditions to the point which they can be predicted mathematically.

I agree, but the way this has been posed here suggests that others think 'laws' can act causally, and force things in a certain direction.

And, although what you say about Newton and Einstein is in line with the standard acount, I have to disagree with it.

I will not say why here; I have enough on my plate as it is!!

[To give the game away, I follow Kuhn on this point.]

[hoopla]

So, apart from name-calling, that is the best you can do, is it?It was tongue in cheek. Jeez :rolleyes:
:lol:

[hoopla]

Why not engage with the debate, and tell me what is missing from my definition of determinism. Would it go against your principles?


Anyway, I fail to see your point. What good is a 'definition' if it also picks out ideas that the opposite doctrine agrees with?SOME versions of the opposite doctrine.

When I say laws "exist" I mean, are real. You don't think laws are real, fine, I might agree with you. But I disagree that ALL statements of the thesis of determinsism use anthropomorphic language. To check, this is your complete argument, isn't it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Why not engage with the debate, and tell me what is missing from my definition of determinism. Would it go against your principles?

I thought I did.

Perhaps you have lost the ability to read things with due care.


When I say laws "exist" I mean, are real. You don't think laws are real, fine,

Where do I use the word 'real' in connection with 'laws'?

Why do you persist in making stuff up?


But I disagree that ALL statements of the thesis of determinsism use anthropomorphic language.

Of course, it is up to you to agee or disgree with what you like, but as you have so far failed to say what this misbegotten word/thesis means without using animistc language, I can only draw my own conclusions about the content or otherwise of your rejection.


To check, this is your complete argument, isn't it?

Well, it can't be an argument if it consists only of challenges (that those who subscribe to this doctrine say what their own theory means without implying that nature is Mind) and of attempts to unmask the systematic misuse of words here.

So it's not my 'complete argument', since it is not an argument to begin with.


It was tongue in cheek. Jeez

Forgive my over-reaction, but I am on the recieving end of much abuse here; and I often give as good as I get, or better.

[Comrade-Z]

Well, Newtonians struggled for two hundred years trying to explain how forces could make anything move (we still kack an accout of how they can do this), and so it has been replaced by the motion of objects along geodesics in Relativity -- no more force of gravity.

Okay, my mistake.

But still I have the question: why do masses move along geodesics? Why don't we see them not moving along geodesics every once in a while?

And furthermore, I have no idea what you are trying to say by the fact that there is neither determinism nor indeterminism.

Do humans have "free will"? Do snakes? Trees? Bacteria? Viruses? Amino acids? Electrons?

What we are trying to figure out is why the universe occurs in the way that it does.

Why does this particle travel to here instead of there? If the particle doesn't have free will, and it's not being acted on by other forces, then how do you explain it?

[RevolverNo9]

Rosa:


I did not join in that thread because, if you will forgive my directness, I could not see much there that made any sense.

Why not?


If this means we are part of nature, how could I disagree?

Well quite.


If it means there are no significant differences between humans and, say, rocks, plants and asteroids, I have to part company with you.

Well we aren't. Any significant difference between a human and a rock can only be understood with reference to arbitrary, human conventions that understand individuals to have special qualities. Physically, however, there is no distinction - both a rock and man are both a collection of particles. In that respect they do not differ at all.


Marxists do not try to agitate and organise tulips, nor do we even so much as attempt to propagandise buses, lakes or river esturies.

But that's already within the framework of certain human conventions. Human projects require that we neglect relativising certain contingent facts about our universe.


This suggests that in practice, even us Marxists distinguish between nature and humanity.

Yes, exactly - in human practice. If a physicist distinguished between the two I hope you'd agree that he or she was acting quite wrongly.


So, how is it possible for an iris to do this?

The actions of an iris are determined in that each physical phenomenon that occurs in its processes is the result of a previous phenomenon. If two gas particles hit each other at a certain speed and at a certain angle, we can calculate in which direction and at what speed they travel. Just because a physical phenomenon - be it occurring in a flower, a test-tube or a human being - is more complex than that doesn't mean that it is ultimately any less predictable... unless quantum theory is valid and a 'random event' truly does exist.

A human being exists physically, just as a flower or a rock does. Unless there is something metaphysical in the human mind that can direct matter, that is. :rolleyes:


Well it attributes agency to hidden things (which you you call 'laws', that have no physical being, and no material structure) that allegedly control the universe -- a bit like the gods of old. [So, 'laws' push the planets around the sun, like the angels used to....]

No it doesn't. It's entirely material. From empirical evidence we know how far a said number of Newtons will push a body of a certain mass. Unless you're going to tell me that the result is actually random.


How do particles force their will onto other particles and make them do what they want them to? And why do other particles always do as they are bid? The word 'determine' suggests that each and every particle in the universe should be able to do that.

The interaction of foces on materials. There may indeed be such a thing as 'random' in our universe, as I have posited in all of my posts. If this is the case though, the actions of humans are still just as much a part of the flux of matter and energy as rocks, air, fires.

Anything else is anthropocentric and idealist.


Well, so you say; but again, where is your evidence?

If this were not the case, there would have to be a metaphysical agency that could somehowe 'rise above' physics.


But, once more, even if you were right, it would still suggest that nature is intelligent, while we are not. [Your use of 'determined' gives you away again.]

No. That would first of all posit the essential seperation between 'nature' (which I must say is rather an imprecise term) and humans; between man and the rest of existence! The reality is, in physical terms, humans differ in no way to the rest of material existence. It's not that 'man' is determined by 'nature'. It is that every physical phenomenon is caused by a previous one (unless, as I keep on saying, a random event does in fact exist).


So, in a future socialist society, I expect you to argue that it is useless sending children to school, and instead we should educate grass, stones and meterorites -- since they are intelligent and we are not.

Now come on Rosa, that is a completely specious repost (and you go on about the ruling-classes playing 'word games' on the rest of us?) None of existence (why you insist on making these arbitrary divisions I still don't understand) is intelligent - it is completely arbitrary... unless you've recently jumped on a deist wagon.

However, since in social science I do discriminate between human beings and the rest of existence (because I want to further the interests of myself and the rest of my race), I would treat humans and inert objects differently... in practice. I still know that I am making entirely arbitrary distinctions though.


Sure, you can determine what you do, and so can I. But that is the only sense in which our actions are determined

You can't determine your actions. Your actions are the collective result of countless physical phenomena (again, allowing for the existence of a random event). Anything else is metaphysical phallacy.


hoopla:


Rosa, you are a fuckwit And talking complete shit. But I've met bigger fickwits who have a doctorate.

That's just plain unnecessary... offensive language is invariably a kneejerk reaction to cover a complete lack of skills to reason with.

[hoopla]

:)

as you have so far failed to say what this misbegotten word/thesis means without using animistc language, I can only draw my own conclusions about the content or otherwise of your rejection.
every event is an effect of an earlier event
To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism aren anthropomorphic.

[Dyst]

Personally I think human beings act depending on/as a result of the material situation. This goes for anything.

Therefore, nothing is random, as everything affects everything.

I think it is interesting how the universe follows certain patterns, without the patterns themselves being something animate (allthough manifested into material). If anyone has any great theories about this, please elaborate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Why don't we see them not moving along geodesics every once in a while?

Well, how do we know they don't do that?

Do we have tabs on every single particle in reality?

[And recall, scientists completely change their minds every so often, so in a hundred years time we will probably be debating a different tale.]



And furthermore, I have no idea what you are trying to say by the fact that there is neither determinism nor indeterminism.

I do not think I said that; what I did say was that neither of these theories makes sense unless one thinks nature is mind.

[And even then they make no sense, since it fails to tell us how mind can move anything, without it being material!!! In other words, this is a complete dead end.]

Recall, I am not offering an alternative philosophical theory (since I reject all philosophical theories).


Do humans have "free will"? Do snakes? Trees? Bacteria? Viruses? Amino acids? Electrons?

Well, you keep trying to get me to pass a philosophical comment, which I refuse to do (not out of cussidness, but because I claim that no philosophical comment makes any sense).

Your question, therefore is senseless because it contains an empty phrase: "free will".


What we are trying to figure out is why the universe occurs in the way that it does.

Beyond a scientific account, there is no why (unless you think nature is controlled by a mind).

So, stop worrying about it!


Why does this particle travel to here instead of there? If the particle doesn't have free will, and it's not being acted on by other forces, then how do you explain it?

I do not try to; I leave it to scientists fo find better theories to account for the phenomena.

End of story.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Revolver, apologies for the slow response, but while the World Cup is on, it is very difficult for me to access this site (I do not know if everyone else is having similar problems).


Any significant difference between a human and a rock can only be understood with reference to arbitrary, human conventions that understand individuals to have special qualities.

I presume then that what you say is the result of an arbitrary convention that allows you to say what you do (or are you above such things?). So, for all you know it might not be true.

In fact, your attempt to say that human beings are no different in certain respects from rocks is no less arbitrary.

But, then if what you say is not arbitrary, then what I say isn't either.


The actions of an iris are determined in that each physical phenomenon that occurs in its processes is the result of a previous phenomenon. If two gas particles hit each other at a certain speed and at a certain angle, we can calculate in which direction and at what speed they travel. Just because a physical phenomenon - be it occurring in a flower, a test-tube or a human being - is more complex than that doesn't mean that it is ultimately any less predictable... unless quantum theory is valid and a 'random event' truly does exist.

'Determined' by whom? God?

If not, what does your use of this word mean?

If you intend it in a new sense, say what that is, or I will only misunderstand you.


No it doesn't. It's entirely material. From empirical evidence we know how far a said number of Newtons will push a body of a certain mass. Unless you're going to tell me that the result is actually random.

So, Newtons can push things can they? More agency, but now you pass that onto forces.

Here's how I defused this response in Essay Eight at my site:


And this much was clear to Leibniz, too.

As George Ross summarised things:

"As significant as his critique of Descartes' mechanics was Leibniz's attack on Newton's account of force. In the Principles, Newton limited himself to describing interactions between bodies in terms of general mathematical laws. This limitation was both a strength and a weakness. Newton succeeded in making the complexities of nature amenable to mathematical description only by simplifying the phenomena: by treating material particles as if they were infinitely hard yet infinitely elastic, concentrated at points, capable of exchanging any amount of force all at once, connected by forces operating instantaneously at a distance, and so on. Leibniz complained that this made Newton's system an idealised abstraction, which could not possibly be true of the real world. In reality, nothing was absolutely hard or elastic, nothing happened instantaneously, and every causal interaction was mediated by a complex mechanism. In general terms, Newton would have agreed with Leibniz's comment. He too believed in underlying mechanisms, but he refused to speculate about them in the Principles (his famous, 'I do not invent hypotheses')....

"Much later, in his Specimen of Dynamics (1695), Leibniz tried to give an account of the mechanism which mediated exchanges of force between colliding bodies. In real collisions (unlike Newton's idealisations), there had to be a finite period during which one body slowed down and the other picked up speed. This implied that bodies had a certain size, and were not absolutely hard or elastic, since the only conceivable mechanism for transfer of force was that bodies were first squashed together, and then gradually sprang back from each other once all the kinetic energy had been taken up. However, as soon as it is accepted that transfer of force between every day objects must be mediated by a mechanism, there is no point at which you stop needing smaller and smaller sub-mechanisms. At no level can you suddenly say that force is transferred directly.

"Elasticity is itself a phenomenon requiring explanation in terms of pushings of particles. At the first instant of impact, the outermost particles of each colliding body push against their neighbours, and these in turn push against their neighbours, and so on right through each body. But then each of these pushings needs to be explained by the compression of sub-particles, and so on to infinity. The conclusion Leibniz drew was that, ultimately, forces were not really transferred at all. All action was, as he put it, spontaneous. The energy required for a body's motion on the occasion of an impact, had to be drawn from its own resources, since it could not actually take up any energy from bodies impinging on it....

"An even more significant aspect of the theory was its abandonment of the traditional notion that matter was essentially inert. Leibniz saw that if the only function of matter was as a passive carrier of forces, then it had no role to play in scientific explanation. Its only role would be the metaphysical one of satisfying the prejudice that forces must inhere in something more substantial than themselves. He maintained that matter was nothing other than the receptive capacity of things, or their 'passive power', as he called it. Matter just was the capacity to slow other things down, and to be accelerated rather than penetrated (capacities which ghosts and shadows lack) -- in other words, inertia or mass, and solidity. So, taking also into account 'active powers' such as kinetic energy, Leibniz reduced matter to a complex of forces. In this he was anticipating modern field theory, which treats material particles as concentrated fields of force –- an anticipation duly recognised by its founder, the Italian mathematician Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-87)." [Ross (1984), pp.40-44.]

We will be examining these ideas in more detail in Part Two of this Essay. On this, see Boscovich (1966), and Whyte (1961b).

The serious problems that any naïve materialist account of forces faces are spelled out in detail (with admirable clarity and engaging style) in Schelling (1995), particularly pp.161-69. Schelling is clearly writing in the tradition of Leibniz, Boscovich and the early Kant (of The Physical Monadology [reprinted in Kant (2003), pp.47-66]; even so, in the end Schelling still cannot account for the interaction of forces. Why this is so will be outlined in the second half of this Essay.

However, there is a distinct echo of all this in Nietzsche's analysis of forces (which I develop in a more consistently anti-metaphysical direction in Part Two), outlined in Poellner (2000).

Of course, this is partly why it is so difficult to understand the nature of forces -- their detection seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on instruments (or, rather, a 'force' is just the way scientists depict certain relationships between bodies, as Engels, in a more sober mood, would have put it; on this, see Note 4).

However, if forces are viewed as particulate (that is, if certain particles are viewed as the 'bearers' of forces), the problem simply reappears at a new level, and we are no further forward -- a fact Leibniz was, I think, the first to point out.
Now, this sort of confrontation between forces could only take place if they were particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of resistance to one another. If, on the other hand, they were not particulate, it would be equally hard to see how they could interact in any way, let alone 'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no impenetrability to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a figurative extension to particulate interaction, after all).

But, there are well-known, classical problems associated with the idea that forces are particulate (referenced above) -- not the least of which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of reaction, and so on, that held them together) so they could act on other particulates (and not disintegrate), initiating an infinite regress. That is, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would need to appeal to forces internal to bodies to stop, say, one body penetrating the other, or to prevent distortions tearing that body apart, etc. But, if the forces internal to bodies are particulate too (as it seems they must be), we would thus need further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new force particles, and so on. Alternatively, if these internal forces are continuous (or non-particulate), they would not be able to provide such inner coherence (since they have no rigidity).

In the end nothing would be accounted for, since at each level there would be nothing to provide the required resistance/coherence.

So, reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies means that particles could not 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate forces on their operands -- which would once again mean that such entities were incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.

Even the exchange of particles (in QM) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were reaction forces internal to bodies which were themselves the result of rigidity, cohesion, contact, etc, to stop the force carrier passing right through the target particle. Of course, Physicists these days appeal to fields, energy gradients and the like, but if these are continuous, the above problems just re-emerge at this new level. If they are particulate, this merry-go-round merely takes another spin around the floor, as it does too if they are not.

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

Of course, it could be objected that the above adopts an out-dated mechanistic view of interaction, and hence is completely misguided. However, the 'modern' mathematical approach surrenders the possibility of giving a causal, or physical account of forces -- or, at least, one that does not itself depend on a figurative use of the sorts of verbs we employ in everyday life (to give a material account of why things happen in the macro-world).

So, if a particle is seen as a 'carrier' of a force and that 'force' can be given no physical content, but is still regarded as being capable of 'making' things happen, 'forcing' particles to 'divert' from their line of action (etc.), then those very words must themselves lose contact with seemingly identical everyday words like "make", "force", "divert", as and when they are used to depict macro-phenomena.

Now there is no problem with this, but then such an account would thereby become merely descriptive, not explanatory. Differential equations and vectors cannot make things move, or alter the path of a single particle; we can describe such things, and make sure the physical 'books' balance using mathematical models, but the downside to this is that such models cannot explain why anything actually happens in the physical world. [For more recent qualms on this, see Note 30.]

You can follow up the references at my site, should you so wish.


If this were not the case, there would have to be a metaphysical agency that could somehow 'rise above' physics.

Which is exactly what I claim you do with the language you use.


You can't determine your actions. Your actions are the collective result of countless physical phenomena (again, allowing for the existence of a random event). Anything else is metaphysical phallacy.

So you say, once again; but you have to extrapolate way beyond anything we now know (and are ever likely to know) to arrive at this piece of superscience; in fact, and because of this, you have to project agency onto nature (it determines what we do) and deny it of us (so that when I determine, say, the time of a train from a timetable, I do not really do this).

You fetishise nature and de-humanise human beings.

[Apologies, once again, I did not respond to every single one your comments, because they covered the same old ground or I think I have handled them above.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla, you are beginning to repeat yourself:


every event is an effect of an earlier event

To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism are anthropomorphic.

There is not much point to your doing that unless you address the things I say.

I can repost the above for you to save you the trouble of saying the same things, over and over. See it is quite easy:


every event is an effect of an earlier event

To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism are anthropomorphic.

Or are you determined (irony intended) to bore us all to death?

[Now that use of 'determined' is OK!]

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Rosa, are you arguing that determinism humanizes nature while dehumanizing people? If so, the idea that determinism makes nature into something it isn't is untrue - as determinism simply constructs what nature is for the purpose of explaining a concept. As for the issue of dehumanizing people, I fail to see how determinism does that. Language is simply a construction used create a foundation for thought and examination of our world. It can hardly be used as an objective method of criticizing philosophical theories.

Furthermore, your argument that determinism fails to prove itself is debatable. Others deem the arguments for it sufficient, and, consequently, you can't simply say it fails to prove itself when it has legitimate arguments in favor of it.

Also, determinism is not an inherently animistic belief. Condemning philosophy itself is hardly a revolutionary idea. I would be interested in being directed to these analytical philosophers developing this technique. Basically, you suggest that if the people here knew of that philosophy, and understood it, they would agree with you.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 19 2006, 05:31 PM
Hoopla, you are beginning to repeat yourself:


every event is an effect of an earlier event

To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism are anthropomorphic.

There is not much point to your doing that unless you address the things I say.

I can repost the above for you to save you the trouble of saying the same things, over and over. See it is quite easy:


every event is an effect of an earlier event

To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL determinism are anthropomorphic.

Or are you determined (irony intended) to bore us all to death?

[Now that use of 'determined' is OK!]
:lol:
I keep making a logical refutation of your argument, and you just quote what I say, and say that I'm reapting myself? What is this?

Do have have no communication skills at all, seriously :lol:

The point of repeating myslef is to point out that unless you have a reply (that is a refutation of what I say, using an argument and not just rhetoric about how many times I have made the same point), then I have shown you to be wrong.

I won't even dignify this with a :rollseyes

Or, was that a attempt at a dignified climb-down at the end?
Could be a bit more explicit to all those earnest people you've misled.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


as determinism simply constructs what nature is for the purpose of explaining a concept

Well this now attributes to determinism the ability to construct things!

I am sure you might want to re-word this differently.


As for the issue of dehumanizing people, I fail to see how determinism does that.

Well, if you examine what people say here (including yourself), I think you will come to the opposite conclusion: nature wills things to happen (it determines them), but we do not.


Language is simply a construction used create a foundation for thought and examination of our world.

On the contrary language is a means of communication; it represents things rather badly (as you can see from the difficulty Hoopla and others are having explaining themselves).

As Engels said, humans had to eat first before they could think, and we created language as part of our endeavour to cater for those basic material needs (it grew out of collective labour); only later did ruling-class hacks attempt to twist language (in the way I have indicated) so that it represented their view of the world and in a mystical form (as part of their mystification of class power), and which in that form better served their own interests.

So, and later, determinism became the secular version of the old Greek goddess Moira. Only now 'nature' wills things instead of her.

I suggest we do not go along with them in this.


Furthermore, your argument that determinism fails to prove itself is debatable.

I did not say this, and I'd like you to find where I even remotely suggested it.

So this is not relevant:


Others deem the arguments for it sufficient, and, consequently, you can't simply say it fails to prove itself when it has legitimate arguments in favor of it.

And others say the same for belief in god.


I would be interested in being directed to these analytical philosophers developing this technique.

Done in a previous post on this thread.


Basically, you suggest that if the people here knew of that philosophy, and understood it, they would agree with you.

Where do I suggest this?

And I would not, since many analytic philosophers have read this material and do not accept it.

But that is because they are Idealists.

I hope you are not.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I keep making a logical refutation of your argument, and you just quote what I say, and say that I'm reapting myself?

I suspect you have confused two English words here: 'repetition' and 'refutation'.

What can I say; get a dictionary....


Do have have no communication skills at all, seriously

Eh?

Well you are the one who cannot type correctly.

So, I do not think you are in any position to point fingers.


The point of repeating myslef is to point out that unless you have a reply (that is a refutation of what I say, using an argument and not just rhetoric about how many times I have made the same point), then I have shown you to be wrong.

Already done.

In your haste to repeat your words of stunning wisdom (in case we missed them the last 20 times), I suspect you missed it.


I won't even dignify this with a :rollseyes

You should not be so hard on yourself.


Or, was that a attempt at a dignified climb-down at the end?
Could be a bit more explicit to all those earnest people you've misled.

Eh?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I figured you'd compare determinism to belief in God. Again, though, belief in God has no valid arguments. Determinism does have valid arguments in favor of it, and these arguments are typically rooted in scientific or philosophical belief.

As for when I referred to things you said, they are found in the post before last of yours (the one answering my earlier questions).

Our environment, or nature (whatever you wish to call it), does cause things to happen within our world. In that sense, I don't see what is wrong with determinism. Everyone decision people make is the result of what circumstances that previously happened and made them who they are. People are the result of environmental circumstances. Deterministic aspects of life have been observed within science.

Again, in an earlier post you mentioned that analytical philosophers (or at least some of them) support your viewpoint. I am interested in knowing who these philosophers are - as I have researched determinism before and never before encountered anyone arguing against determinism because it anthropomorphizes nature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Again, though, belief in God has no valid arguments. Determinism does have valid arguments in favor of it, and these arguments are typically rooted in scientific or philosophical belief.

I beg to differ.


Our environment, or nature (whatever you wish to call it), does cause things to happen within our world

I am not denying causation; I am just questioning the anthropomorphic language that has to be used to depict determinism.


People are the result of environmental circumstances. Deterministic aspects of life have been observed within science.

Well the first part of this is unexceptional, but I'd like you to tell me the observations that have picked out determinism.

What has been observed are the causes of people's actions, and the reasons for them; but determining causation cannot be observed, unless it is under human control (as the word suggests), and even then it depends on a certain sort of description.


Again, in an earlier post you mentioned that analytical philosophers (or at least some of them) support your viewpoint. I am interested in knowing who these philosophers are - as I have researched determinism before and never before encountered anyone arguing against determinism because it anthropomorphizes nature.

I have answered that; what more can I tell you?

Read my last response to you!

I have even posted several links on an earlier post on this thread (on page 1).

[Comrade-Z]

Beyond a scientific account, there is no why (unless you think nature is controlled by a mind).

So, stop worrying about it!

Very well, let me replace the word "why" with "how." How does the universe function?

And you can't just say "Stop worrying about it!" If we don't know how the universe works, we won't be able to make reasoned predictions about how it will work. That means goodbye science.


since I reject all philosophical theories

So, what things about philosophy do you not reject? :wacko:


And even then they make no sense

So you are saying that determism and indeterminism both make no sense. I still don't understand.


I am not denying causation

Causation IS determinism! That's what we mean by determinism! The entire universe functions through causation!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


How does the universe function?

What can I say: check out the latest discoveries of science (but do not expect what it has to say to remain the same for long....).***

Since I am not a scientist, I can help you no more.


"Stop worrying about it!" If we don't know how the universe works, we won't be able to make reasoned predictions about how it will work. That means goodbye science.

Ok, keep worrying about it (but I won't be); but check out my earlier comment.***

Our ability to predict the future (based on the past) is not affected by anything philosophers have to say.


So, what things about philosophy do you not reject?

As I said, everything.


So you are saying that determism and indeterminism both make no sense. I still don't understand.

As I noted in an earlier thread (in a 'debate' with Chrysalis), if I 'assert':


Twas brillig, and the slithy toves

And then you say:


Twas not brillig, and the slithy toves

neither of us would be making any sense.

The 'negation' of nonsense is still nonsense. Determinisn and indeterminism are like this.

More details on my take on Philosophy in this thread:

http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php...opic=50499&st=0 (http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php?showtopic=50499&st=0)


Causation IS determinism!

Well then you have 'solved' this problem by insisting on a new linguistic convention.

But why should we accept that convention, and not its opposite, or some other (like, causation is just the succession of events).

Not that I am advocating that, but you see what I mean.

Of course there is no such thing as causation, just countless different types of cause, all depicted by thousands of different verbs.

This is something that traditional philosophers failed to notice (something our ancestors programmed into material language), so no wonder their theories fail to explain anything -- and can only be made to work if the universe is Mind -- a useful ruling-class ploy.

[hoopla]

This is the last time I am going to say this. Determinism say that every event is an effect of an earlier eventTo say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial, because you want to show that ALL conepts of determinism are anthropomorphic. This is a refutation of determinsim being anthropomorphic. If you can show that the language I have ued in bold is anthropomorphic, then I perhaps you are right. If not the you are WRONG. Simploe reasoning Rosa :rolleyes:
I am not denying causation; I am just questioning the anthropomorphic language that has to be used to depict determinism.

:D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


This is the last time I am going to say this. Determinism say that every event is an effect of an earlier event. To say that some forms of determinsim are not covered by this, is inconsequntial,

Well, at least we can be spared the repetition; we still need to wait for the clarity though. Any sign of that any day soon?


because you want to show that ALL concepts of determinism are anthropomorphic.

I rather think you have helped me do that.

Especially since you keep mis-defining it.


This is a refutation of determinsim being anthropomorphic.

I thought you were going to consult a dictionary to find out the difference between 'repetition' and 'refutation'?


If you can show that the language I have ued in bold is anthropomorphic, then I perhaps you are right.

It would help if you defined the term correctly (if that is possible).


If not the you are WRONG. Simploe reasoning Rosa

I am not too sure what 'simploe' reasoning is; perhaps it has something to do with substituting wishful-thinking for reasoned argument?

[Are you using a really, really cheap dictionary, I wonder?]

And, since you are now using CAPITAL letters, I reckon I have underestimated you for far too long; you are a far more formidable opponent than I took you for when you just used namby pamby lower case.

Please do not use italics, or I will be completely lost.

[hoopla]

If you just want to chat shit Rosa, why not bother off the general forum.

You say that my definition is false. But you cannot show me why its wrong, or where it is wrong, because you think the concept is meaningless.

I think I'll stick with the definition out of my HIGHLY REPSECTED encyclopedia of philosophy, rather than listen to you, surprisingly.

Go on, do your thesis on this, it would be hilarious :lol:

;)

Edit: Do you think that my definition is false because it doesn't cover all forms of determinsm? - this isn't necessary IMO, if you agree that there are several disitinct forms of determinism that do not rely on each other to make sense - which seems to be the case as I can clearly make sense out of the definition I have used. Not sure if you'll be able to though.

Say I wanted to show that all materialism is senseless. If someone showed that dialectiucal materialism was not senseless, I would be proved wrong, wouldn't I.

Unless you want to qualify your original arguemnt and say that some forms of determinism are anthropomorphic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


If you just want to chat shit Rosa, why not bother off [??? RL] the general forum.

No, I think we can discuss your sort of cr*p here.


You say that my definition is false. But you cannot show me why its wrong, or where it is wrong, because you think the concept is meaningless.

I did, but in your haste to abuse me, you must have missed it.


I think I'll stick with the definition out of my HIGHLY RESPECTED encyclopedia of philosophy, rather than listen to you, surprisingly.

1) The argument from authority is the weakest in philosophy. It seems to be the strongest you have to hand, unfortunately.

2) Stop using capitals; they make your argument unanswerable. [Thank goodness you can't add colours, or I'd be done for...!]


Go on, do your thesis on this, it would be hilarious

Well, it will be when I incorporate your brainless comments.


Edit: Do you think that my definition is false because it doesn't cover all forms of determinsm? - this isn't necessary IMO, if you agree that there are several disitinct forms of determinism that do not rely on each other to make sense - which seems to be the case as I can clearly make sense out of the definition I have used. Not sure if you'll be able to though.

I have already told you what I think of your/that 'definition'; unlike you, I do not repeat myself over and over. I suggest that you either drop out of this discussion, if you have nothing new to add -- or you re-read what I posted earlier, and address that.


Say I wanted to show that all materialism is senseless. If someone showed that dialectical materialism was not senseless, I would be proved wrong, wouldn't I.

Conversely, if I showed that all forms of Idealism were senseless, then that would show that all forms of determinism were too.

It is possible to do the first (indeed, I have already done that at my site -- or will have when Essay Twelve is published -- the summary I have already posted outlines the argument), so that leaves determinism in the trash can of history.

Of course, you can ignore all I ever write, or have written, or you can totally disagree with everything I say, but then you are going to have to produce arguments several leagues above your present level if you want to refute what I have to say, even if you cannot see that.

Check it out if you do not believe me:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

[This is a 10,000+ word Essay that summarises one that is 120, 000+ words long. When I do something, I do it thoroughly. Learn from that. And I except nothing on authority, unlike you.]


Unless you want to qualify your original argument and say that some forms of determinism are anthropomorphic.

No, I'll stick with my initially correct diagnosis.

[hoopla]

From the moment this thread started, it was obvious that you were just going to insult me and pull rank, because "you won't repeat things". Jeez, maybe you should go into teaching.
I searched the article for the word determinism and its not there. How can you explain that?

"All events are effects of earlier events."

What is the defnition of determinism that you are working with? I'm sure that you looked it up in a book, and didn't discover it through insight. You can't discover what determinism is by reasoning alone, any more than you discover what the definition of 'a cat' is through reasoning, without reference to other peoples concept of 'a cat'. How would that process work?

[Epoche]

Rosa, you say that "nature must be intelligent" for things to be determined.

This denotes that nature might or might not be intelligent, that the two are not mutually inclusive, or else "nature" and "intelligent" would be synonomous.

Then you say that humans are intelligent, having a property that nature might or might not have. Accordingly, you are indirectly proposing that human intelligence is not natural, since human intelligence, or "anthropomorphism," originates the concept of determinism, something which nature does not possess itself.

See what you have done?

This is dualism in the strictest Cartesian sense. For if you are intelligent, then you are not natural, because nature is not determined, according to your logic here, and therefore also not anthropomorphic.

Am I missing something here?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla now throws a tantrum:


From the moment this thread started, it was obvious that you were just going to insult me and pull rank,

But, this is what you said to me on your second post (and totally undeserved):


That is just a lie on your part.

{Your emphasis.}

Now, you may be used to your women-folk giving in to your abuse, and pandering to your tantrums, but I do not, and I fight back if attacked.

If you do not like it, stop calling me a liar.


I searched the article for the word determinism and its not there. How can you explain that?

1) It is a summary;

2) It is about dialectical materialism, not determinism;

3) It is also about all forms of Idealism/ruling-class thought (which takes in the sort you defend, and others I do not mention).

And so much for your promise not to repeat things:


"All events are effects of earlier events."

Is this meaningless?

So, this means that when you said (on this very page):


This is the last time I am going to say this.

you either did not know what you were saying, or told your own porky.

And who said it was meaningless? Check out what I did say about it.

Once more, you might like the sound of your own posts, but I do not repeat myself (unless I have to).

[hoopla]

What is the defnition of determinism that you are working with? I'm sure that you looked it up in a book, and didn't discover it through insight. You can't discover what determinism is by reasoning alone, any more than you discover what the definition of 'a cat' is through reasoning, without reference to other peoples concept of 'a cat'. How would that process work? How would it be any truer?

What is oppressive about idealism, out of interest?

[Epoche]

Don't wanna dance with me, eh Rosa?

Well ain't this some shit. Here I sit in a coffee shop drinking a mocha that costs more than the shoes on my feet, pressured by the owners to buy five honey-buns so that I might earn my right to use their internet service, while waiting for you to reply to my post.

For every minute I spend in here, and for every honey-bun I have to eat so that I am not "loitering," I'm sending you the bill.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, thankyou for your perceptive comments (yet again!):


This denotes that nature might or might not be intelligent, that the two are not mutually inclusive, or else "nature" and "intelligent" would be synonomous.

Well, I am drawing out the consequences of what I take to be another's belief; just as I can say, so you think this: 'It was brillig and the slithy toves did gimble in the gire' eh? That implies that they are capable of gimbling.....

One can draw out the consequences of nonsense without admitting any of it makes sense -- perhaps to reveal its absurd consequences, and change the mind of the one who talks this way.

Same here.



However, speaking for myself, and dropping the mystical terminology of traditional thought, I can make no sense of anyone who says that non-human nature, say below the level of insects, is intelligent. If anyone can, then they must be understanding this word in a way that I am not, and communication cannot proceed until one or both of us has clarified what we mean.


Then you say that humans are intelligent, having a property that nature might or might not have.

Well, now I am not using metaphysical language when I say this, but trying to bring the language others have used down to earth (as Wittgenstein would say), bringing it back to its ordinary use.

In doing that I am not proposing a theory, just reminding people of how they usually use certain words.

So there is no conflict here.


See what you have done?

On the contrary, do you see what I have done?


This is dualism in the strictest Cartesian sense. For if you are intelligent, then you are not natural, because nature is not determined, according to your logic here, and therefore also not anthropomorphic.

Nice try, and it would work if I were speaking metaphysically, which I am not in that case.

And as you will no doubt know, if you have read up on the theroy of mind as seen by Wittgensteinians (like Kenny, or Hacker), that the word 'intelligent' hides a whole host of distinctions itself, which we would do well to observe to avoid the temptation to 'theorise' about it based on its assumed [i]single meaning.

And the same goes for 'nature', and many other words others have used.

If we do not employ a certain word usually in any of the ways you or others attempt, I have to say you are changing its meaning. Now there is no problem with that, but then it becomes very difficult to decide what such words mean in that case, or keep track of an argument if words are used loosely.

Hence my seeming pedantry; philosophers have got away with all kinds of loose talk before (and the looser the more amazing the 'truths' they seem to be able to 'discover'), because they settle on one use of a word and extrapolate that into inappropriate areas, or they change the meaning of a word and do not notice that the conclusions they thought followed do not.

Ep:


Don't wanna dance with me, eh Rosa?

On the contrary, I cannot bash out complex replies in ten seconds; it would show profound disrespect to you if I did.

And bill me....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla, this is like a recurring dream; you asked me this a zillion posts ago:


What is the defnition of determinism that you are working with?

I am not working with any, since it is not my 'theory' and I do not care to define it.

But, I take great pleasure in pulling apart anyone else's attempt to define this meaningless word.


You can't discover what determinism is by reasoning alone, any more than you discover what the definition of 'a cat' is through reasoning, without reference to other peoples concept of 'a cat'.

If you have to look up the 'definition' of cat, then you are either a sad loser or someone who is a stranger to the English language.

You do not need to be able to define a cat to be able to use that word perfectly well. That word is in ordinary language, and is fine as it is.

We cannot say the same for that misbegotten word you are so fond of.


What is oppressive about idealism, out of interest?

It hides a ruling-class view of the world that there is a natural order to reality (but hidden under and beyond appearances -- governed by 'essences' or 'laws') that decides on one's station in life (in its older form) or which decides what it is natural for you to do (now expressed genetically/socially -- that is what, say, 'evolutionary psychology' is trying to do as we type), but accessible only to the 'educated' among us, specialist thinkers who can, using quirky language, penetrate beyond the material world to the world of concepts, ideas and essences, because the world is really condensed language (you see that in the Bible: 'And God spoke' and things just popped into existence -- it is also behind the Hermetic Idea that the 'Logos' (the abstract form of Hermes himself) created the world out of language), later generalised by Hegel -- hence all those anthropomorphic words.

You can't fight it so get back to work, and doff your cap while you are at it....

It is, as Marx said, a ruling idea.

Why it even controls the thinking of some of those here who claim to be socialists.....

'The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class....'

[Epoche]

I like to do it like this.

When we imply a thing is "determined," we don't, and cannot, mean that it is teleological, or, if you prefer, a instance of external agency and design; X was going to happen because God wanted it to happen. This of course is nonsense.

Our originations of the term "determined," in our shared language, has its basis in tacit agreement; everytime an apple fell from a tree branch...a caveman made a sound with his mouth which another caveman heard. This sound represented the instance and became a medium for passing information between language speakers. It is simply habitual. Outside of this communication, the idea of determinism cannot exist (cue Hume's induction fallacy), but neither is causality dependent on language to "happen." (now, throw away Hume)

This is confusing to me so I avoid it.

I would rather call "intelligence" a "movement of information," whether it be monistic atomic activity, or a Cartesian "ghost in the machine," But I cannot assume that some transcendent activity can exist which isn't dependent on the phenomena, the "object," which it interogates. This is to say again that granting the title "intelligence" to "human mind" is a bit of a misnomer, because without the object there would be no interogation, no "thinking."

Either existence is intelligent, that is, a manifestation of information, or it is not intelligent, and the human mind is not an epiphenomenon....it is transcendent.

Don't you prefer the former option?

[Epoche]

It hides a ruling-class view of the world that there is a natural order to reality (but hidden under and beyond appearances -- governed by 'essences' or 'laws') that decides on one's station in life (in its older form) or which decides what it is natural for you to do (now expressed genetically/socially -- that is what, say, 'evolutionary psychology' is trying to do as we type), but accessible only to the 'educated' among us, specialist thinkers who can, using quirky language, penetrate beyond the material world to the world of concepts, ideas and essences, because the world is really condensed language (you see that in the Bible: 'And God spoke' and things just popped into existence -- it is also behind the Hermetic Idea that the 'Logos' (the abstract form of Hermes himself) created the world out of language), later generalised by Hegel -- hence all those anthropomorphic words.

Fantabulous pearls of wisdom!

Pay attention kids...this is the good stuff.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, forgive me for saying this (since you keep saying nice things of me), but I cannot make much sense of this as it is full of quirky language.



Our originations of the term "determined," in our shared language, has its basis in tacit agreement; everytime an apple fell from a tree branch...a caveman made a sound with his mouth which another caveman heard. This sound represented the instance and became a medium for passing information between language speakers. It is simply habitual. Outside of this communication, the idea of determinism cannot exist (cue Hume's induction fallacy), but neither is causality dependent on language to "happen." (now, throw away Hume)

This is confusing to me so I avoid it.

I would rather call "intelligence" a "movement of information," whether it be monistic atomic activity, or a Cartesian "ghost in the machine," But I cannot assume that some transcendent activity can exist which isn't dependent on the phenomena, the "object," which it interogates. This is to say again that granting the title "intelligence" to "human mind" is a bit of a misnomer, because without the object there would be no interogation, no "thinking."

Either existence is intelligent, that is, a manifestation of information, or it is not intelligent, and the human mind is not an epiphenomenon....it is transcendent.

Now, you see why I said that the ideas of the ruling-class rule, because we all, if we are given half a chance slip back into looking at language as a key to unlocking supertruths about reality.

Marx said that anarchists were like the alchemists of the revolution (I am not bothered whether he was right or wrong here) in that they thought the right formula, or chemical (in a bomb) could change reality, and create a classless society.

Well, we are all prone to be alchemists of the word too: the right linguistic formula, concocted in the privacy of our minds, like the little bourgeois we were all brought up to be, and we can magic truths into existence out of less than thin air, and save ourselves having to do hard science.

I suspect you have not quite got the message yet: stop trying to find the 'Philosophers Stone' -- the right formula to turn base language into metaphysical gold.

It's a ruling idea; you need to smash that bourgeois state of thinking, and set up a materialist collective in its place.

No more philosophical reformism, purleese.

There are no quick alchemical paths to truth....

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I am still lost on how you question the validity of determinism because it uses anthropomorphic language. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity is an article containing such language, but the contents are a widely accepted theory. Gravity itself causes things to fall using force, but it is not a human entity.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


but the contents are a widely accepted theory. Gravity itself causes things to fall using force, but it is not a human entity.

We have already covered that in this thread, Dooga; to summarise: Newtonians struggled for 200 years trying to explain how something non-material, like a force, could affect anything at a distance (as if by magic), so modern Physics (in the form of relativity theory) has written this force out of nature, replacing it with the movement of objects along geodesic lines in spacetime, under an energy gradient.

No forces, no determinism.

And, the 'accepted theory' of one generation becomes the dustbin fodder of another.

It used to be the 'accepted theory' that fate ran the universe, in the shape of Moira, the goddess of fate; and then it used to be 'accepted theory' that the earth was at the centre of the universe....

Same with determinism, not that it is a scientific theory anyway (it is a carry over from the superstitious phase of human history).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


but the contents are a widely accepted theory. Gravity itself causes things to fall using force, but it is not a human entity.

We have already covered that in this thread, Dooga; to summarise: Newtonians struggled for 200 years trying to explain how something non-material, like a force, could affect anything at a distance (as if by magic), so modern Physics (in the form of relativity theory) has written this force out of nature, replacing it with the movement of objects along geodesic lines in spacetime, under an energy gradient.

No forces, no determinism.

And, the 'accepted theory' of one generation becomes the dustbin fodder of another.

It used to be the 'accepted theory' that fate ran the universe, in the shape of Moira, the goddess of fate; and then it used to be 'accepted theory' that the earth was at the centre of the universe....

Same with determinism, not that it is a scientific theory anyway (it is a carry over from the superstitious phase of human history).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


but the contents are a widely accepted theory. Gravity itself causes things to fall using force, but it is not a human entity.

We have already covered that in this thread, Dooga; to summarise: Newtonians struggled for 200 years trying to explain how something non-material, like a force, could affect anything at a distance (as if by magic), so modern Physics (in the form of relativity theory) has written this force out of nature, replacing it with the movement of objects along geodesic lines in spacetime, under an energy gradient.

No forces, no determinism.

And, the 'accepted theory' of one generation becomes the dustbin fodder of another.

It used to be the 'accepted theory' that fate ran the universe, in the shape of Moira, the goddess of fate; and then it used to be 'accepted theory' that the earth was at the centre of the universe....

Same with determinism, not that it is a scientific theory anyway (it is a carry over from the superstitious phase of human history).

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira. I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them. Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira. I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them. Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira. I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them. Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga, finally we reach the bottom of the barrel -- when you run out of reasons, abuse your opponent:


Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira.

Well the etymology of determinist language, the arguments used, the tradition from which it arose and the animistic terminolgy employed (and the fact that you have to resort to abuse) all suggest that I am right.

Of course, if you do not know enough to prove me wrong, feel free to abuse me some more.


I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Well, I suggest it did.

But that would not be a problem if it weren't for the fact that the materialist part did not (which it did not), while the dialectical part did (which it did -- in fact it arose fron the same determinist Hermetic ideas as determinism itself did -- remember: the 'ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class').

So, bad example, comrade....


Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

No, read what I said (you can do that, can't you??); modern science has got rid of the force of gravity.

Not me, modern science.

And, I know why they had to do it (forces cannot be made to work -- why? see an earlier long post of mine on page two), so I predict that all forces in Physics will disappear one day, to be replaced with relative motion, and the exchange of momentum.

Oops, I forgot, it has already happened....

As Max Jammer notes:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

References here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm


Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them.

It's called 'knowing what you are talking about' -- you should give it a try some time....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga, finally we reach the bottom of the barrel -- when you run out of reasons, abuse your opponent:


Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira.

Well the etymology of determinist language, the arguments used, the tradition from which it arose and the animistic terminolgy employed (and the fact that you have to resort to abuse) all suggest that I am right.

Of course, if you do not know enough to prove me wrong, feel free to abuse me some more.


I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Well, I suggest it did.

But that would not be a problem if it weren't for the fact that the materialist part did not (which it did not), while the dialectical part did (which it did -- in fact it arose fron the same determinist Hermetic ideas as determinism itself did -- remember: the 'ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class').

So, bad example, comrade....


Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

No, read what I said (you can do that, can't you??); modern science has got rid of the force of gravity.

Not me, modern science.

And, I know why they had to do it (forces cannot be made to work -- why? see an earlier long post of mine on page two), so I predict that all forces in Physics will disappear one day, to be replaced with relative motion, and the exchange of momentum.

Oops, I forgot, it has already happened....

As Max Jammer notes:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

References here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm


Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them.

It's called 'knowing what you are talking about' -- you should give it a try some time....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga, finally we reach the bottom of the barrel -- when you run out of reasons, abuse your opponent:


Your posts are just a crackpot theory about determinism carrying on from Moira.

Well the etymology of determinist language, the arguments used, the tradition from which it arose and the animistic terminolgy employed (and the fact that you have to resort to abuse) all suggest that I am right.

Of course, if you do not know enough to prove me wrong, feel free to abuse me some more.


I could cite a passage from most religions to try and claim communism originates from religion, but it wouldn't be right to do so.

Well, I suggest it did.

But that would not be a problem if it weren't for the fact that the materialist part did not (which it did not), while the dialectical part did (which it did -- in fact it arose fron the same determinist Hermetic ideas as determinism itself did -- remember: the 'ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class').

So, bad example, comrade....


Are you saying gravity is incorrect now - because it requires the use of certain language?

No, read what I said (you can do that, can't you??); modern science has got rid of the force of gravity.

Not me, modern science.

And, I know why they had to do it (forces cannot be made to work -- why? see an earlier long post of mine on page two), so I predict that all forces in Physics will disappear one day, to be replaced with relative motion, and the exchange of momentum.

Oops, I forgot, it has already happened....

As Max Jammer notes:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

References here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm


Furthermore, you continously overcomplicate your ideas as to stop anyone from refuting or making any sense of them.

It's called 'knowing what you are talking about' -- you should give it a try some time....

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible.

Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.

I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible.

Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.

I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible.

Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.

I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I predicted, more abuse:


What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

You make your own mind up; whatever I say will just make you more abusive.


I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

Done it; if you don't like it, you should say exactly where it is wrong, not just reject it.

Or not.

I careth not very much.


I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible

Yeah, and my dad is bigger than yours.

The argument from authority is the weakest in philosophy, which you would know if you knew much about the subject.


Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Einstein.

Good enough?

No, I suspect not; this determinsin is a religion to you isn't it?

Anyone who threatens to upset your tidy world, and you'd call down lightning if you could.

More abuse (I think that this is your strong point, and not Philosophy):


Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.


I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Clearly not.

I can help you no more, any simpler and even the dust on my computer screen will get the point.


Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Or: you are a ding bat.

I wonder which it is?


Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

'The name of what I am talking about', that makes sense....

You like authority don't you?

You should join the Catholic Church.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I predicted, more abuse:


What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

You make your own mind up; whatever I say will just make you more abusive.


I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

Done it; if you don't like it, you should say exactly where it is wrong, not just reject it.

Or not.

I careth not very much.


I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible

Yeah, and my dad is bigger than yours.

The argument from authority is the weakest in philosophy, which you would know if you knew much about the subject.


Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Einstein.

Good enough?

No, I suspect not; this determinsin is a religion to you isn't it?

Anyone who threatens to upset your tidy world, and you'd call down lightning if you could.

More abuse (I think that this is your strong point, and not Philosophy):


Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.


I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Clearly not.

I can help you no more, any simpler and even the dust on my computer screen will get the point.


Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Or: you are a ding bat.

I wonder which it is?


Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

'The name of what I am talking about', that makes sense....

You like authority don't you?

You should join the Catholic Church.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I predicted, more abuse:


What the fucking hell? Was your entire argument based on frustrating people so you can accuse them of failing to refute your claims?

You make your own mind up; whatever I say will just make you more abusive.


I don't have to make any refute of your Moira claims as you haven't proved them to any degree. My example wasn't refuted at all because your counterargument relies on your claim (about determinism) being true, and you have failed to prove that claim. Provide some credible evidence please.

Done it; if you don't like it, you should say exactly where it is wrong, not just reject it.

Or not.

I careth not very much.


I can cite sources and legitimate philosophers to back up determinism. Does anyone actually agree with you, from the perspective you are using, and, if so, please provide some proof. I've never even heard of your argument before, and the sources you provided are hardly credible

Yeah, and my dad is bigger than yours.

The argument from authority is the weakest in philosophy, which you would know if you knew much about the subject.


Give me a source that says modern science has got rid of gravity. I can cite plenty of sources that say the contrary. Max Jammer is an individual. Cite the actually theory or idea (as a mainstream movement) that he is suggesting.

Einstein.

Good enough?

No, I suspect not; this determinsin is a religion to you isn't it?

Anyone who threatens to upset your tidy world, and you'd call down lightning if you could.

More abuse (I think that this is your strong point, and not Philosophy):


Your last part is utter bullshit. You criticize me for ad hominem, which I didn't use (I simply stated what I believe), and then you use it, at the very least, in the same way you accused me of doing.


I am perfectly willing to learn new perspectives. I have repeatedly asked you to simplify or "dumb down" the content you are expressing, and you refuse to do so. I have no reason to believe any of your claims if you have the inability to simplify them in a way I can understand.

Clearly not.

I can help you no more, any simpler and even the dust on my computer screen will get the point.


Either what you are arguing is extremely complex (which I doubt because you have yet to produce a mainstream example of what you are talking about) or untrue.

Or: you are a ding bat.

I wonder which it is?


Give me the name of what you are talking about, the main individuals in the field, and some simplified explanations. Otherwise, you are just talking to yourself.

'The name of what I am talking about', that makes sense....

You like authority don't you?

You should join the Catholic Church.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Sources are not an argument from authority. I am simply asking for qualified individuals and their opinions on the issue. Seeking sources from individuals with qualifications in a particular field is common sense - and therefore a legitimate appeal for authority. You don't cite a farmer when talking about nuclear physics - you cite an authority on the matter.

I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

However, this might prove interesting:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/BookNotes/Max_Jammer.shtml

If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Sources are not an argument from authority. I am simply asking for qualified individuals and their opinions on the issue. Seeking sources from individuals with qualifications in a particular field is common sense - and therefore a legitimate appeal for authority. You don't cite a farmer when talking about nuclear physics - you cite an authority on the matter.

I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

However, this might prove interesting:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/BookNotes/Max_Jammer.shtml

If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Sources are not an argument from authority. I am simply asking for qualified individuals and their opinions on the issue. Seeking sources from individuals with qualifications in a particular field is common sense - and therefore a legitimate appeal for authority. You don't cite a farmer when talking about nuclear physics - you cite an authority on the matter.

I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

However, this might prove interesting:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/BookNotes/Max_Jammer.shtml

If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga (an abuse-free zone at last!):


Sources are not an argument from authority.

They are when you refuse to accept an argument without them; it is common knowledge among scientists that relativity has edited the force of gravity out of nature. If you refuse to accept this except some authority figure confirm it, then I can only marvel at your poor education.


I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

Well, as I was not trying to prove anything, this is hardly news. And if you are counting the heads of the ignorant, I rather think I will ignore the figures (not that you have produced any).


All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

No, gravity is not a force in Relativity. Objects move along geodesics, along their world-lines, in a four dimensional manifold, in an energy gradient.

Read any of the physics books I cite at my site, or any book on Relativity. Or PM Comrade Red, who will confirm this....


If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

I know Einstein was a determinist; this idea or its opposite have dominated 99% of thought since Greek times.

'The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.'

I am happy to be in a vanishingly small minority, rejecting both. And so I shall remain, and for excellent reasons: I am not an Idealist.


Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

I agree, at least on the first bit; I only raised this because you seemed to think the force of gravity was crucially important here.

Determinism makes no sense whatever cause you rope in -- unless you anthropomorphise it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga (an abuse-free zone at last!):


Sources are not an argument from authority.

They are when you refuse to accept an argument without them; it is common knowledge among scientists that relativity has edited the force of gravity out of nature. If you refuse to accept this except some authority figure confirm it, then I can only marvel at your poor education.


I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

Well, as I was not trying to prove anything, this is hardly news. And if you are counting the heads of the ignorant, I rather think I will ignore the figures (not that you have produced any).


All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

No, gravity is not a force in Relativity. Objects move along geodesics, along their world-lines, in a four dimensional manifold, in an energy gradient.

Read any of the physics books I cite at my site, or any book on Relativity. Or PM Comrade Red, who will confirm this....


If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

I know Einstein was a determinist; this idea or its opposite have dominated 99% of thought since Greek times.

'The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.'

I am happy to be in a vanishingly small minority, rejecting both. And so I shall remain, and for excellent reasons: I am not an Idealist.


Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

I agree, at least on the first bit; I only raised this because you seemed to think the force of gravity was crucially important here.

Determinism makes no sense whatever cause you rope in -- unless you anthropomorphise it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga (an abuse-free zone at last!):


Sources are not an argument from authority.

They are when you refuse to accept an argument without them; it is common knowledge among scientists that relativity has edited the force of gravity out of nature. If you refuse to accept this except some authority figure confirm it, then I can only marvel at your poor education.


I don't have to reject what you've failed to prove. I, as well as other people, have already pointed out how you have failed to prove certain things.

Well, as I was not trying to prove anything, this is hardly news. And if you are counting the heads of the ignorant, I rather think I will ignore the figures (not that you have produced any).


All I want is simple explanations and legitimate sources. I appreciate you providing the information on Einstein. According to him, gravity is not a force but the result of the spacetime being curved by the presence of mass. There - you gave me the information and I learned something. It was simple.

No, gravity is not a force in Relativity. Objects move along geodesics, along their world-lines, in a four dimensional manifold, in an energy gradient.

Read any of the physics books I cite at my site, or any book on Relativity. Or PM Comrade Red, who will confirm this....


If that source is correct, Max Jammer himself admits that Einstein was a determinist.

I know Einstein was a determinist; this idea or its opposite have dominated 99% of thought since Greek times.

'The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.'

I am happy to be in a vanishingly small minority, rejecting both. And so I shall remain, and for excellent reasons: I am not an Idealist.


Furthermore, I hardly think the idea that gravity is not a force refutes determinism. Gravity itself is being caused by something, and that cause is resulting in something else happening. Determinism in a nutshell.

I agree, at least on the first bit; I only raised this because you seemed to think the force of gravity was crucially important here.

Determinism makes no sense whatever cause you rope in -- unless you anthropomorphise it.

[hoopla]

I'm going to leave this discussion alone now.
But, before I go...

I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary :lol:

And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

No abuse, please!

[hoopla]

I'm going to leave this discussion alone now.
But, before I go...

I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary :lol:

And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

No abuse, please!

[hoopla]

I'm going to leave this discussion alone now.
But, before I go...

I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary :lol:

And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

No abuse, please!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Well, they can't be wrong or right, since their terms have no meaning (except perhaps a sentimental/emotional one).

No archaeology here, just an appeal to the vernacular, i.e., the material language of the working-class.


Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary

I do not accept this Saussurian typology (which reduces all words to names, or models them all on the naming relation).


And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

Well I reject all philosophy (not just 99% -- all), so I am not concerned to try to make any philosophical terms clear, or to 'define' them.

I will however pull apart any attempt by you, or anyone, to define them.

Meaningless terms cannot be defined, except stipulatively; and then that just amounts to a new convention, which is philosophically uninteresting, if not inconsequential.

Stipulatively I could 'define' "God" as 'that being that everyone believes exists despite their claims to the contrary', but I do not think you would be inclined to accept it, or regard it as a proof of 'his' existence.

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.


No abuse, please!

Well, don't give any and you won't get any back. I always give as good as I get, or worse.

[You are the one who called me a 'liar', out of the blue, with no provocation from me.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Well, they can't be wrong or right, since their terms have no meaning (except perhaps a sentimental/emotional one).

No archaeology here, just an appeal to the vernacular, i.e., the material language of the working-class.


Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary

I do not accept this Saussurian typology (which reduces all words to names, or models them all on the naming relation).


And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

Well I reject all philosophy (not just 99% -- all), so I am not concerned to try to make any philosophical terms clear, or to 'define' them.

I will however pull apart any attempt by you, or anyone, to define them.

Meaningless terms cannot be defined, except stipulatively; and then that just amounts to a new convention, which is philosophically uninteresting, if not inconsequential.

Stipulatively I could 'define' "God" as 'that being that everyone believes exists despite their claims to the contrary', but I do not think you would be inclined to accept it, or regard it as a proof of 'his' existence.

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.


No abuse, please!

Well, don't give any and you won't get any back. I always give as good as I get, or worse.

[You are the one who called me a 'liar', out of the blue, with no provocation from me.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I really don't think that philosophy can be wrong about the meaning of a term it invented. Sounds like you're performing some kind of archeaology.

Well, they can't be wrong or right, since their terms have no meaning (except perhaps a sentimental/emotional one).

No archaeology here, just an appeal to the vernacular, i.e., the material language of the working-class.


Also, isn't the relationship between signifier and signfed arbitary

I do not accept this Saussurian typology (which reduces all words to names, or models them all on the naming relation).


And if you won't accept defitions of philosophical terms from text, how on earth do you expect to construct them? How did you come by the definition you use? Not to mention that you haven't, shown an argument for the definition I use being inadequate (and I can't see you being able to).

Well I reject all philosophy (not just 99% -- all), so I am not concerned to try to make any philosophical terms clear, or to 'define' them.

I will however pull apart any attempt by you, or anyone, to define them.

Meaningless terms cannot be defined, except stipulatively; and then that just amounts to a new convention, which is philosophically uninteresting, if not inconsequential.

Stipulatively I could 'define' "God" as 'that being that everyone believes exists despite their claims to the contrary', but I do not think you would be inclined to accept it, or regard it as a proof of 'his' existence.

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.


No abuse, please!

Well, don't give any and you won't get any back. I always give as good as I get, or worse.

[You are the one who called me a 'liar', out of the blue, with no provocation from me.]

[Guest1]

Words are not entirely exclusive categories that cannot be used to represent metaphores.

You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

[Guest1]

Words are not entirely exclusive categories that cannot be used to represent metaphores.

You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

[Guest1]

Words are not entirely exclusive categories that cannot be used to represent metaphores.

You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CYM:


You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

In fact I do the opposite, as well you would know if you cared to pass an opinion on my work from a position of knowledge, as opposed to one of almost total ignorance.



Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

As I have said to you before, unless you know of some other means of communication, language is crucially important.

[Were you perhaps thinking of telepathy, semaphore or Aldis lamp?]

And I can well understand why you would want to advocate the sloppy use of words, since that is the only way philosophy can get off the ground (and that includes, shock horror(!), dialectics).

It is not a case of what a word suggests to me, it is more a case of getting determinists to say what they mean without using anthropomorphic language, which they have so far failed to do.


I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

Well, you might like to explain how material conditions can 'determine' anything if they are not already conscious (do they deliberate before they act, as the word suggests?).

Good luck, no one has been able to do this for over 2000 years.

Give it a go, you might get lucky....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CYM:


You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

In fact I do the opposite, as well you would know if you cared to pass an opinion on my work from a position of knowledge, as opposed to one of almost total ignorance.



Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

As I have said to you before, unless you know of some other means of communication, language is crucially important.

[Were you perhaps thinking of telepathy, semaphore or Aldis lamp?]

And I can well understand why you would want to advocate the sloppy use of words, since that is the only way philosophy can get off the ground (and that includes, shock horror(!), dialectics).

It is not a case of what a word suggests to me, it is more a case of getting determinists to say what they mean without using anthropomorphic language, which they have so far failed to do.


I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

Well, you might like to explain how material conditions can 'determine' anything if they are not already conscious (do they deliberate before they act, as the word suggests?).

Good luck, no one has been able to do this for over 2000 years.

Give it a go, you might get lucky....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CYM:


You say you reject philosophy, yet you have set out on a path to adopt the most obscure practices of traditional idealist philosophy, to attribute the character of words themselves to the argument that uses them.

In fact I do the opposite, as well you would know if you cared to pass an opinion on my work from a position of knowledge, as opposed to one of almost total ignorance.



Language is not as all-important as you make it out to be, and you cannot dismiss an entire philosophy based solely on what a word it uses makes you think of.

As I have said to you before, unless you know of some other means of communication, language is crucially important.

[Were you perhaps thinking of telepathy, semaphore or Aldis lamp?]

And I can well understand why you would want to advocate the sloppy use of words, since that is the only way philosophy can get off the ground (and that includes, shock horror(!), dialectics).

It is not a case of what a word suggests to me, it is more a case of getting determinists to say what they mean without using anthropomorphic language, which they have so far failed to do.


I'm not a pure determinist, but clearly, materialist determinism does not take as its starting point an intelligent determination. Instead, it's much like Marx said "material conditions determine consciousness". In the same way, no process in nature is a spontaneous result of nothingness, it is the resolution of a complex web of causes. That is the "determination" spoken of, and attributing anthropomorphic attribute to that word is a fault of yours, not of the philosophy or the word.

Well, you might like to explain how material conditions can 'determine' anything if they are not already conscious (do they deliberate before they act, as the word suggests?).

Good luck, no one has been able to do this for over 2000 years.

Give it a go, you might get lucky....

[hoopla]

OK. Last time I try

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.Where? You just say its meaningless. Don't you? But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event". You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this? I can't see it in any of the words.

[hoopla]

OK. Last time I try

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.Where? You just say its meaningless. Don't you? But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event". You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this? I can't see it in any of the words.

[hoopla]

OK. Last time I try

And as for your perseverating on the 'definition' you have tried to sell us many times (even though you keep saying you won't mention it again), I have responded to it; once again, in your haste to read into what I have posted what you want to see there, you missed it.Where? You just say its meaningless. Don't you? But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event". You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this? I can't see it in any of the words.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Where have I heard this before?


OK. Last time I try

Oh, yes it was Hoopla, in 'his' last 'last' post.

Seems you are determined (note the correct use of this word!) to contradict yourself.


You just say its meaningless. Don't you?

Nope. In fact I said the opposite.


But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event".

Nothing at all, but it is eminently vague.

So, according to this useless 'formula' every event (the big bang, your contradicting yourself, my trying vainly to get you to think, the US invasion of Iraq, the 1905 Californian earthquake, the demise of the dinosaurs, every event that ever there was, and ever there will be) was the effect of one special event.

And what could that special lone event have been, I wonder?

If it does not mean this (but how do you know? -- you did not invent it), then it is still consistent with indeterminism, and is therefore useless.

So agent NN's free decison, say, to go on a demonstration was the effect of, say, the US invasion of Iraq. NN took that decision, and it was uncaused by anything (it was defined as 'free'), but it was the 'effect' (this word now left suitably vague) of that invasion (i.e., it was part of her reason for going).

[Recall, I am not advocating this, just pointing out that this 'brilliant' 'definition' is compatible with indeterminism -- not that either doctrine makes a blind bit of sense.]

You see, if you twist words far enough (which has been the constant trick in traditional philosophy -- which is why I reject it, it is just word-juggling), you can 'derive' any conclusion you like.


You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this?

Once you try to fill in the details (I went through these earlier), that is where the animism comes in.

I have also posted links to articles where this is worked out in more detail (and they were not to Essays at my site!).

Now, can we move on? Or are you determined (note the correct use of this word again) to contradict this:


OK. Last time I try

once more?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Where have I heard this before?


OK. Last time I try

Oh, yes it was Hoopla, in 'his' last 'last' post.

Seems you are determined (note the correct use of this word!) to contradict yourself.


You just say its meaningless. Don't you?

Nope. In fact I said the opposite.


But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event".

Nothing at all, but it is eminently vague.

So, according to this useless 'formula' every event (the big bang, your contradicting yourself, my trying vainly to get you to think, the US invasion of Iraq, the 1905 Californian earthquake, the demise of the dinosaurs, every event that ever there was, and ever there will be) was the effect of one special event.

And what could that special lone event have been, I wonder?

If it does not mean this (but how do you know? -- you did not invent it), then it is still consistent with indeterminism, and is therefore useless.

So agent NN's free decison, say, to go on a demonstration was the effect of, say, the US invasion of Iraq. NN took that decision, and it was uncaused by anything (it was defined as 'free'), but it was the 'effect' (this word now left suitably vague) of that invasion (i.e., it was part of her reason for going).

[Recall, I am not advocating this, just pointing out that this 'brilliant' 'definition' is compatible with indeterminism -- not that either doctrine makes a blind bit of sense.]

You see, if you twist words far enough (which has been the constant trick in traditional philosophy -- which is why I reject it, it is just word-juggling), you can 'derive' any conclusion you like.


You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this?

Once you try to fill in the details (I went through these earlier), that is where the animism comes in.

I have also posted links to articles where this is worked out in more detail (and they were not to Essays at my site!).

Now, can we move on? Or are you determined (note the correct use of this word again) to contradict this:


OK. Last time I try

once more?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Where have I heard this before?


OK. Last time I try

Oh, yes it was Hoopla, in 'his' last 'last' post.

Seems you are determined (note the correct use of this word!) to contradict yourself.


You just say its meaningless. Don't you?

Nope. In fact I said the opposite.


But what is meaningless about "every event is an effect of an earlier event".

Nothing at all, but it is eminently vague.

So, according to this useless 'formula' every event (the big bang, your contradicting yourself, my trying vainly to get you to think, the US invasion of Iraq, the 1905 Californian earthquake, the demise of the dinosaurs, every event that ever there was, and ever there will be) was the effect of one special event.

And what could that special lone event have been, I wonder?

If it does not mean this (but how do you know? -- you did not invent it), then it is still consistent with indeterminism, and is therefore useless.

So agent NN's free decison, say, to go on a demonstration was the effect of, say, the US invasion of Iraq. NN took that decision, and it was uncaused by anything (it was defined as 'free'), but it was the 'effect' (this word now left suitably vague) of that invasion (i.e., it was part of her reason for going).

[Recall, I am not advocating this, just pointing out that this 'brilliant' 'definition' is compatible with indeterminism -- not that either doctrine makes a blind bit of sense.]

You see, if you twist words far enough (which has been the constant trick in traditional philosophy -- which is why I reject it, it is just word-juggling), you can 'derive' any conclusion you like.


You've said that you don't have a problem with the words, you've asked someone to define determinism using words that are not anrthpomorphic, where is the anthropomorphism in this?

Once you try to fill in the details (I went through these earlier), that is where the animism comes in.

I have also posted links to articles where this is worked out in more detail (and they were not to Essays at my site!).

Now, can we move on? Or are you determined (note the correct use of this word again) to contradict this:


OK. Last time I try

once more?

[Epoche]

but I cannot make much sense of this as it is full of quirky language.

I'm saying the same thing about your language.

And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Determinism, in the scientific field, is strictly instrumental, that is, nobody cares if X causes Y to move, but this doesn't mean that they don't notice it.

It was in the moment that one class wanted to blame another for a problem that the moral sphere of freewill and determinism came into existence. Sin and guilt are not natural phenomena proper, but only metaphors used to indicate social doctrine.

"We still have faith in God because of language"- Fritz

...and I might add, we still have faith in responsibility because of language.

Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

[Epoche]

but I cannot make much sense of this as it is full of quirky language.

I'm saying the same thing about your language.

And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Determinism, in the scientific field, is strictly instrumental, that is, nobody cares if X causes Y to move, but this doesn't mean that they don't notice it.

It was in the moment that one class wanted to blame another for a problem that the moral sphere of freewill and determinism came into existence. Sin and guilt are not natural phenomena proper, but only metaphors used to indicate social doctrine.

"We still have faith in God because of language"- Fritz

...and I might add, we still have faith in responsibility because of language.

Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

[Epoche]

but I cannot make much sense of this as it is full of quirky language.

I'm saying the same thing about your language.

And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Determinism, in the scientific field, is strictly instrumental, that is, nobody cares if X causes Y to move, but this doesn't mean that they don't notice it.

It was in the moment that one class wanted to blame another for a problem that the moral sphere of freewill and determinism came into existence. Sin and guilt are not natural phenomena proper, but only metaphors used to indicate social doctrine.

"We still have faith in God because of language"- Fritz

...and I might add, we still have faith in responsibility because of language.

Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


I'm saying the same thing about your language.

Well, what can I tell you? I am trying to make some sort of sense of 2400 years of impenetrable jargon, sliding between that use of langauge and the vernacular -- no wonder you are not sure how I am using certain words.

But you will need to be a little more precise if I am to help you.


And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

If so, send me a copy, I'd like to read it...

But, I have to say that you continue to post material that suggests you did not read your own book too carefully, hence my need to keep reminding you not to back-sass.


The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Well, maybe so, but I am not too sure what this has to do with what we are debating here.

a priori theses.]


Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

How could I? But how we use language to depict what we see, and understand, can, if we are not careful, force a certain picture on us that traps us (as Wittgenstein noted).

I just refuse to accept the picture bequeathed to us by mystics and animists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


I'm saying the same thing about your language.

Well, what can I tell you? I am trying to make some sort of sense of 2400 years of impenetrable jargon, sliding between that use of langauge and the vernacular -- no wonder you are not sure how I am using certain words.

But you will need to be a little more precise if I am to help you.


And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

If so, send me a copy, I'd like to read it...

But, I have to say that you continue to post material that suggests you did not read your own book too carefully, hence my need to keep reminding you not to back-sass.


The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Well, maybe so, but I am not too sure what this has to do with what we are debating here.

a priori theses.]


Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

How could I? But how we use language to depict what we see, and understand, can, if we are not careful, force a certain picture on us that traps us (as Wittgenstein noted).

I just refuse to accept the picture bequeathed to us by mystics and animists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


I'm saying the same thing about your language.

Well, what can I tell you? I am trying to make some sort of sense of 2400 years of impenetrable jargon, sliding between that use of langauge and the vernacular -- no wonder you are not sure how I am using certain words.

But you will need to be a little more precise if I am to help you.


And you don't need to continue to remind me that "philosophy" is a construct of the ruling class. I know all about it cuz I wrote the book.

If so, send me a copy, I'd like to read it...

But, I have to say that you continue to post material that suggests you did not read your own book too carefully, hence my need to keep reminding you not to back-sass.


The point of the argument between freewill and determinsim is a catalyst for political pragmatism; nobody ever bothered with this argument until its substance became a matter of moral consequentialism. (Nietzsche handled all this in his Genealogy of Morals)

Well, maybe so, but I am not too sure what this has to do with what we are debating here.

a priori theses.]


Nonetheless, the fucking billard ball moves when the other one bumps into. Call it what you want, but it happens and you cannot deny it. This event is not contingent to language...it has nothing to do with "words." It is a phenomenological experience.

How could I? But how we use language to depict what we see, and understand, can, if we are not careful, force a certain picture on us that traps us (as Wittgenstein noted).

I just refuse to accept the picture bequeathed to us by mystics and animists.

[hoopla]

Erm, I think that you are a "epistemic realist", in that you think that theories answer for their truth to a world independent of our awareness (not an idealist) and we can know if they are true (not a sceptic).

I also think that you do not deny that there are regularities in nature. You do not think, that there is nothing in any circumstances that makes upon dropping an apple it fall to the floor? There is no Humean denial of cause: realist lawlessness.

Is that right?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop:


I think that you are a "epistemic realist"

Wrong, I am not an anythingist, since I reject all philosophical theories.

If you can show otherwise, I will abandon that belief on the spot, beg forgiveness, and repent at length.


in that you think that theories answer for their truth to a world independent of our awareness (not an idealist) and we can know if they are true (not a sceptic).

Nope, I do not think (scientific) theories are capable of being either true or false. They have a different logical role.


I also think that you do not deny that there are regularities in nature. You do not think, that there is nothing in any circumstances that makes upon dropping an apple it fall to the floor?

Well you do an awful lot of thinking about what I am thinking, and not enough about what you should be thinking (or typing, as it turns out**).

The phrase 'regularities in nature' is too vague to respond to. So I can form no opinion of it.

The second half of what you say is too badly typed to make much sense of.**

And this is devoid of sense too:


There is no Humean denial of cause: realist lawlessness.

So when you ask this:


Is that right?

I cannot answer, since I do not know what you are asking.

And, what about this from your last but one post?


OK. Last time I try

Ok, last time I believe you....

[hoopla]

OK. Last time I try

Ok, last time I believe you....
I'm not trying to convince you of determinism, this is just interestig for my degree, like.

Nope, I do not think (scientific) theories are capable of being either true or false. They have a different logical role.What is their role
:)


Wrong, I am not an anythingist, since I reject all philosophical theories.

If you can show otherwise, I will abandon that belief on the spot, beg forgiveness, and repent at length.You'd have to answer my questions for that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop, you are going to have start making yourself clearer or it is a waste of time responding to you.


You'd have to answer my questions for that.

I cannot understand them, as I pointed out to you.


What is their role

I refuse to say on the grounds that you will misread it.


I'm not trying to convince you of determinism, this is just interestig for my degree, like.

You are going to have to be clearer, or you won't pass -- unless it's a degree in modern French Philosophy.

In that case, you're a natural.

[hoopla]

Seriously? Well I am failing! :(

I should apologise, I thought that you were just using rhetorical flourushes when you said that you didn't understand. That you were just showing that all philosophy is meaningless. I'll take your word for it :unsure:

It would be interesting to know what, you think, "logical role laws play".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop:


It would be interesting to know what, you think, "logical role laws play".

I follow Wittgenstein, and argue there are no such laws.

And when I said I did not understand your recent posts, that was becasue (as I said) they were so badly typed, it was impossible to tell what you were trying to say. [It had nothing to do with my beliefs about traditional Philosophy.]

I did say this (that I could not read with understanding your badly-typed sentences), so you can see my reluctance to answer any of your questions.

You fail to read what I do post, but read into what I don't what you would like to see there.

So, either your first language is not English, or you are permantently pissed.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein+Jun 30 2006, 01:58 PM--> (Rosa Lichtenstein @ Jun 30 2006, 01:58 PM)

Rosa wrote earilier
I am just questioning the anthropomorphic language that has to be used to depict determinism.


I follow Wittgenstein, and argue there are no such laws.

[/b]
Rosa, sorry, late and new to this thread,

I am curious if you follow Wittgenstein, how you get the impression that any language use is not anthropomorphic?

Would it not be advisable to follow Nietzsche's observation that Science is but the most exact humanization? There is no such thing as non-anthropomorphic language.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto:


I am curious if you follow Wittgenstein, how you get the impression that any language use is not anthropomorphic?

Well, I am not sure what you mean. You will need to be more specific before I can comment.


Would it not be advisable to follow Nietzsche's observation that Science is but the most exact humanization? There is no such thing as non-anthropomorphic language.

I am no follower of Nietzsche (except, I generalise his anti-metaphyscs -- he whimped out --, but in an Wittgensteinian direction).

There are countless examples of non-anthropomorphic uses of langauge; here are a few:

The Nile is longer than the Thames.

A mountain is bigger than a hill.

Cats and dogs are animals.

Trees grow in water.

[Note; I do not need to use true sentences to illustrate this point].

How do I get to Tokyo?

A car goes better if you put oil in the engine.

Tulips are insects.

A quarter is a fraction.

The earth orbits the Sun.

Water is a cabbage.

-------------------------------

Need I go on?

Anthropomorphic language implies, suggests or pre-supposes human agency. I do not think any of the above do that.

[Are you Jim Farr in disguise???]

[Auto-metabole]

xxx

[Auto-metabole]

It seems you don't follow Wittgenstein except in the broadest of terms. In (latter) Wittgenstein words mean how they are used. Words are tools by which games are played. They are anthropomorphic because anthropoi give them morphoi by using them.

Spinoza, who you discount broadly as a "mystic", simply argued that the concept of a freedom of the will is an ignorance of causes. It is falling under the illusion that oneself is the cause. If you are going to dismiss determinism because of anthropomorphic projections, (what is imagining what the world and its framing is if not an antropomorphic projection unto our uses), then certainly you grasp and acknowledge the religious foundations and antecedents of such concepts as "choice", "freedom" and "self", all of them grounded in the concept of "soul" and its corrolate "guilt". Spinoza was simply following Aristotle's rather acceptable, "to know an effect one must understand its cause". This is not far from Marxist conceptions of false-consciousness. People in the grips of a false (class) consciousness, who imagine that they are freely and obviously perceiving reality as it really is, are simply, in Spinozist terms, ignorant of the causes of their perception. Becoming aware of causes is becoming more, but never completely, autonomous.

But, following Wittgenstein, these are just public language games. The game of "causes", their identification and manipulation, is a pragmatic concern, learning to play the right games that grant one the most power. But there is no non-anthropomorphic language (including language games that use the word "cabbage"). To label one set of games anthropomorphic, and others "x" is to obscure the human and public construction of power relations in the first place.

Or do you draw some other conclusion from Wittgenstein's concept of language games, and the game of "causes"?

[Epoche]

Spinoza, who you discount broadly as a "mystic", simply argued that the concept of a freedom of the will is an ignorance of causes. It is falling under the illusion that oneself is the cause.

I think Spinoza uses causality ambiguously...it becomes a negative; everything but me causes such and such. However a problem still remains. It is no less of an induction fallacy to suppose one "chooses" something, rather than cancelling out the ego and supposing impersonal causes. Spinoza only commits an induction fallacy on a grander scale. If the impersonal cause which he claims produces effects that are determined despite the illusion of "choice," cannot be demonstrated, his proposition is nonsense.

The anthropological presence of causality exists only where there is a conscious negation of meaning. A consciousness in the process of mental imaging, thinking, contemplation, etc., and is therefore entirely contingent. From such a perspective it is impossible to experience a necessary state that is something more than a sensation. That is, a mental concept cannot ever be certain, but dependent on constant deferral and reference to other words. Language games are such a process, and so therefore any concept that originates from the use of a word cannot be "determined" impersonally, or caused by anything other than the contingency of the conscious negation.

In simpler terms, it is a pragmatic impossiblity to experience causality, and if you did, you would be trapped in a reductio ad absurdem.

I think the flavor of a determinism/freewill argument often changes from a strictly logical concern to a psychological concern. I might say that it is impossible to know whether or not freewill exists, in a transcendent sense, but at the same time, I wouldn't say that if it did, it would make people responsible. Thinkers tend to make the measure of the value of this subject the extent of their conscience; they judge actions as if they were "good" and "bad," when in reality they are only "correct" or "incorrect," depending on the end in mind.

This argument no longer has religious currency.

[Epoche]

There are countless examples of non-anthropomorphic uses of langauge; here are a few:

Not so fast, Rosanator. Each statement you offered had no evaluation in it. If "ice cream is not good tasting" is false because it involves a quality, then it would be impossible for me to make the claim, but I am: Ice cream tastes good.

There...I said it.

Now, either what I say is not true, or, statements with evaluations can be true and anthropological, but also, statements without evaluations must also be anthropological, only without quality.

What say ye?

[Auto-metabole]

Sorry, this is just watered down Humean non-sense. In Spinoza the conception of a cause is not a question of Inductive proof, but the power to act, as ideas prove more or less adequate in that capacity. And if you ever want to experience a cause directly, sit in a dark room for a while, then have someone unexpectedly turn on the light, and you will experience the light directly (that is non-inductively) causing your eyes to blink. Or if you want to experience it from the other way around, smack the next pitbull on the street you see, and his non-inductive direct experience of the cause of his pain will be manifest in the bitemarks he leaves on you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/J:


In (later) Wittgenstein words mean how they are used. Words are tools by which games are played.

Well, it seems you have only read popularisations of Wittgenstein. He specifically says that use is only one facet of meaning; explanation of is another.

And it is not just any old use that he was concerned with. This use had to be based on what he called practice, and be consonant with our form of life -- so that we could communicate with one another.

And again, any old use will not do:

So, if I use this sentence to confuse you: "Jim Farr has just square rooted his foot" (and it does so surprise you) that use would not lend to that sentence a meaning, just because it had that effect, was intended to have that effect, and was used too for that reason.

So, use is not a good guide to meaning.

[This is, of course, to compress much detail into a few paragrapghs.]

And the alleged Marxist concept of 'false consciousness' is a bogus notion, since Marx never used this phrase, and Engels used it only once, late in life, and in a letter. On that see here:

http://marxmyths.org/joseph-mccarney/index.shtml

And, please do not quote any more Spinoza at me (directly or indirectly), I want to hang onto my dinner a bit longer.


Or do you draw some other conclusion from Wittgenstein's concept of language games, and the game of "causes"?

See above.

W's use of this term is perhaps the least interesting (but most overly-used) part of his work -- it is seized-on mainly because it is the easiest area of his work for social scientists (and amateur W students) to grasp.

He merely used it as a point of comparison and to experiment with ways of understanding how we might use language. He progressively abandoned this metaphor.

Even so, I certainly do not regard it as dogma, or even as generally useful (at my site, I never once refer to it) -- and since W set his face against any attempt to give general accounts of anything, he would have agreed with me.

The fact that a 'game is played' is of no interest to me. If people talk nonsense (and anthropomorphise nature) then that is their problem.

But I will continue to expose it for what it is: ruling-class ideology.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


Each statement you offered had no evaluation in it.

But Jim/Auto said:


There is no such thing as non-anthropomorphic language.

Now, if you want to talk about 'evaluative language' (a misbegotten phrase if ever there was one, but that is a different matter).

But Jim/Auto wsn't, and I wouldn't.


What say ye?

Irrelevant.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 3 2006, 09:48 PM
If "ice cream is not good tasting" is false because it involves a quality, then it would be impossible for me to make the claim, but I am: Ice cream tastes good.

Now, either what I say is not true, or, statements with evaluations can be true and anthropological, but also, statements without evaluations must also be anthropological, only without quality.
Huh?

;)

[Epoche]

Auto, the instances you suggest for proof of causality are sensible, empirical, and have no dependence on psychologism. They are neither logical, "true," or "false," because they are independent from language. Light and dog bites are experienced, but again, according to Spinoza, neither the switch on the wall or the muscles in the dog's jaw could have caused the effect.

Watch. Say you could talk to the dog. You say, "hey, you just bite me," and the dog says "impossible...I am a Spinozean, and that means that I am only an adequate knowledge of the causes which forced "me" to bite you." You then say, "fine, let me talk to the muscle fibers in your jaw."

Upon asking the jaw muscles, the jaw replies "impossible...I am a Spinozean, and therefore I did not cause the dog to bite you. It was, rather, whatever caused me to cause the dog to bite you, that is responsible for the bite."

After about five minutes you will get tired of this and wonder why you are talking to a dog.


In Spinoza the conception of a cause is not a question of Inductive proof, but the power to act, as ideas prove more or less adequate in that capacity.

Dude, you almost quoted a Spinozean I used to hang with, verbatim. Tell me, do they sell these party slogans with the book, or is it just a kinda Spinozean lingo and "wurd on da street"?

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 09:55 PM
Auto/J:


In (later) Wittgenstein words mean how they are used. Words are tools by which games are played.

Well, it seems you have only read popularisations of Wittgenstein. He specifically says that use is only one facet of meaning; explanation of is another.

And it is not just any old use that he was concerned with. This use had to be based on what he called practice, and be consonant with our form of life -- so that we could communicate with one another.

And again, any old use will not do:

So, if I use this sentence to confuse you: "Jim Farr has just square rooted his foot" (and it does so surprise you) that use would not lend to that sentence a meaning, just because it had that effect, was intended to have that effect, and was used to for that reason.

So, use is not a good guide to meaning.

[This is, of course, to compress much detail into a few paragrapghs.]

And the alleged Marxist concept of 'false consciousness' is a bogus notion, since Marx never used this phrase, and Engels used it only once, late in life, and in a letter. On that see here:

http://marxmyths.org/joseph-mccarney/index.shtml

And, please do not quote any more Spinoza at me (directly or indirectly), I want to hang onto my dinner a bit longer.


Or do you draw some other conclusion from Wittgenstein's concept of language games, and the game of "causes"?

See above.

W's use of this term is perhaps the least interesting (but most overly-used) part of his work -- it is seized-on mainly because it is the easiest area of his work for social scientists (and amateur W students) to grasp.

He merely used it as a point of comparison and to experiment with ways of understanding how we might use language. He progressively abandoned this metaphor.

Even so, I certainly do not regard it as dogma, or even as as generally useful (at my site, I never once refer to it) -- and since W set his face against any attempt to give general accounts of anything, he would have agreed with me.

The fact that a 'game is played' is of no interest to me. If people talk nonsense (and anthropomorphise nature) then that is their problem.

But I will continue to expose it for what it is: ruling-class ideology.
You seem to be under the misguided conception that I am Jim Farr. Is this a sign of your ability to draw conclusions? If you are to understand "use" in Wittgenstein, you must understand that use is public, and that even the non-sense you tried to create by sentence is not inherently non-sense, for language games can be created by users such that they play "square-rooted" means "stubbed" in a kind of slang. Language games, as are all human uses, are provisional, not fixed. When you say that "use is not a good guide to meaning" either you barely have read Wittgenstein, or barely "follow" him. Public "use" is a guide to meaning, not "use". If he moved away from this metaphor, it was not due to its disfuction, but because he moved from questions of meaning to questions of epistemology. But since you are capable of broadsiding interpretations (anthropomorphic, mystic, amateur, emetic, as opposed to your objective, realistic, professional, gorging ideas) and not really discussing them, I grant you that space.

I am fully aware of the antecedents of "false consciousness" and nowhere do I claim that Marx used such a term. I suppose you are in the habit of reducing Marxist to Marx. I am not. Althusser's "Marxist" approaches to Ideology and hegemony (hold onto your dinner), facilitated by his reading of Spinoza, certainly are arguable "Marxist" positions (whether you appreciate them or not)--arguing the "rightful" inheritance of dogma and a founder's ideas is of course a preoccupation of the religious and not the Thinking.

No matter. I was just curious how you reconsiled these two positions. Always willing to learn.

[Auto-metabole]

Sorry Epoche. That was all just gibberish to me. No doubt it sounded good when you were typing it.

[Epoche]

No problem. The concept is empty, I shouldn't be bothering with it anyway.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/Non-J:


Is this a sign of your ability to draw conclusions?

Well, when I asked, you simply blew kisses; so what is a girl to think?


If you are to understand "use" in Wittgenstein, you must understand that use is public, and that even the non-sense you tried to create by sentence is not inherently non-sense, for language games can be created by users such that they play "square-rooted" means "stubbed" in a kind of slang.

Which is why metaphysics does not count as a sensible use of language.

[And are you really suggsting that all of W's language game examples were of actual uses of language?]


When you say that "use is not a good guide to meaning" either you barely have read Wittgenstein, or barely "follow" him.

I am sorry, my PhD was on W.

[Have a read of Garth Hallett's book on this, for the fine distinctions I think you have missed.]

I gave you my reasons why use is no sure guide; you need to address those not attack me.


I suppose you are in the habit of reducing Marxist to Marx.

But you are in the habit of using cast-off phrases only Engels used once in his life (and in a letter), and making a big deal of them, when the term itself makes no sense.


Always willing to learn.

Clearly not.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 10:28 PM

I am sorry, my PhD was on W.


Then how come you missed the rather obvious move from meaning to epitemology, that accompanied this shift in metaphor? This is rather Wittgenstein 101. I suppose flaunting PhD.'s rather than exhibiting them is a habit.

My "habit" is speaking from an Althusserian reading of Ideology as Spinozist cause.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/Non-J:


Then how come you missed the rather obvious move from meaning to epitemology, that accompanied this shift in metaphor?

I didn't because I deny W moved into epistemology.


I suppose flaunting PhD.'s rather than exhibiting them is a habit.

Well, if it's snide remarks you want, then I coud say I suppose that abuse is your habitual way of disguising your ignorance.

But I won't, since it is not my habit.


My "habit" is speaking from an Althusserian reading of Ideology as Spinozist cause.

That explains a lot, then.

I should not mock the afflicted.

Apologies.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 10:28 PM

I gave you my reasons why use is no sure guide; you need to address those not attack me.

Sorry I missed this bit. Who said anything about a "sure guide". There is no "sure guide" to meaning, and it is useless, and perhaps meaningless to pursue. If your doctorate is in Wittgenstein, I can't understand how you can make such a claim of certainty as a marker. One can only know that one is following a rule through one's interactions with others. But there is no "surety" as meaning is arbitrary, in that it is always publically arbitrated.

If you feel that I have attacked you, it was not my intent. I questioned a few of your determinations, for instance your appeal to a concept of anthromorphism and an appeal to Wittgenstein on logic, and sought their coincidence. That you came flying out defending yourself, (and imagining that I am an old foe of yours), really says more about you. If you are going argue agency and cause, (and its appropriate assignment) then one has to come to grips with causation in general, and understand that the concept of agency itself is a religious derivative. If you are going to cut down the tree that bears some fruit you don't like (determination), cut down the whole tree.

[hoopla]

If "ice cream is not good tasting" is false because it involves a quality, then it would be impossible for me to make the claim, but I am: Ice cream tastes good.

Now, either what I say is not true, or, statements with evaluations can be true and anthropological, but also, statements without evaluations must also be anthropological, only without quality.Can someone explain the reasoning behind this? It has completely gone over my head.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 10:42 PM

I didn't because I deny W moved into epistemology.

No. You showed ignorance of the fact by implying that he "progressed" from the language game metaphor, due its inadequacy, rather than a change in the kind of question being asked.


He progressively abandoned this metaphor.

Either you are so familiar with Wittgenstein you decided to hide this fact in order to make a rhetorical point, or as I suspect, you simply were broadsiding, assuming that others don't understand what you are taking about, and having not much idea yourself. He "abandoned" it because he asked a different kind of question. His ruminations in On Certainty, conceptions of "axis" and "riverbeds" give you no more footing than do "language games", in fact they give even less. For they mark out the unquestionable nature of some assumptions (certainly applicable to concepts of ideology), outside the category of knowledge.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto:


There is no "sure guide" to meaning, and it is useless

Which is what I was trying to say.


If your doctorate is in Wittgenstein, I can't understand how you can make such a claim of certainty as a marker.

Eh?


One can only know that one is following a rule through one's interactions with others.

So, on a desert isand, you could not follow a rule?


If you are going argue agency and cause, (and its appropriate assignment) then one has to come to grips with causation in general

I restrict myself to the ordinary language use of words connected with causation (extending the ideas of Elizabeth Anscombe).

What other philosophers said about this does not concern me (even though I know what they said).


If you are going to cut down the tree that bears some fruit you don't like (determination), cut down the whole tree.

Quite wrong -- I aim to destroy the entire forrest, and uproot the plantation.

The whole of traditional philosophy, I contend, is bogus -- a house of cards, to quote W.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop: forgive me but you are one to talk:


Can someone explain the reasoning behind this? It has completely gone over my head.

I think Epoche is off-form tonight and has been whooped with a nonsense stick.

It means zippo.

Hence I ignored it.

[Epoche]

Hoopla, the point I am showing is that according to "objective" truth in statements, which must be thought of as universally true and not "anthropologically bound," a subjective evaluation should not exist; there should be no such thing as "good tasting ice cream," but there is. Now, either all statements are anthropological and at best intersubjective (shared language), or no statement can be anthropological, must be universally true, and evaluations should not exist (no private language).

The statements Rosa gives as examples are not representatives of all possible anatomical statements. "The bridge is over there" does not depend on opinion, but, some statements are representations of opinions, and are therefore subjective references. Personal and anthropological, based soley on the fact that I couldn't possibly know if the ice cream I think tastes good...tastes bad to you.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 10:56 PM


So, on a desert isand, you could not follow a rule?




My goodness, how long ago did you get your PhD? Have you no familiarity with his Private Language argument? You cannot follow rule privately, and know that you are following a rule. This is ABC Wittgenstein. The difference in thinking that one is following a rule, and actually following one, is one's interaction with others.


Quite wrong -- I aim to destroy the entire forrest, and uproot the plantation.

Then give up the absurd idea of personal agency, other than a pragmatic game of attribution and prediction, as its as much a pernicious vestige of religious thought as anything in our culture. If there is any concept more "ruling class" than agency, I don't know of it.

[Epoche]

I think Epoche is off-form tonight

[ahem]

I'm sorry....I don't have my thesarus handy.

[Epoche]

Alright kids, I think I know this Auto person. His style and grammer habits are familiar to me, and I should let you know that if Auto is this person, he is a keeper.

This means that you, Rosa, are going to have to work with him cause we need em. And the same goes for you, Auto. I want you two to find something you can agree on before you start wrestling.

mmkay?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/Non-J:


No. You showed ignorance of the fact by implying that he "progressed" from the language game metaphor,

I did not use those words, so I think the finger you point at me, is directed at you.

What I said was:


He progressively abandoned this metaphor.

Nothing there about how he:


"progressed" from the language game metaphor

If you check out the Blue and Brown Books, especially the latter, he uses it everywhere and all the time. By the Investigations it appears much less, and less so as the book develops.

He has moved beyong this transtitional form into a far more sophisticated take on language, one wherein a general notion like 'language game' is out of place.


Either you are so familiar with Wittgenstein you decided to hide this fact in order to make a rhetorical point, or as I suspect, you simply were broadsiding, assuming that others don't understand what you are taking about, and having not much idea yourself.

So, you are determined to be offensive.

Well, I can give as good as I get.

You are beginning to sound like Epoche:


He "abandoned" it because he asked a different kind of question. His ruminations in On Certainty, conceptions of "axis" and "riverbeds" give you no more footing than do "language games", in fact they give even less. For they mark out the unquestionable nature of some assumptions (certainly applicable to concepts of ideology), outside the category of knowledge.

Not being fluent in Martian, I could not follow this.

I suggest you take your boxing gloves off before you begin to type in future.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


This means that you, Rosa, are going to have to work with him cause we need em. And the same goes for you, Auto. I want you two to find something you can agree on before you start wrestling.

I see no 'have to' here.

[Auto-metabole]

I suppose you should take out your On Certainty again. Or perhaps you don't recall that work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


My goodness, how long ago did you get your PhD? Have you no familiarity with his Private Language argument?

I am very familiar with it, but my question was not about that, but about your assertion:


One can only know that one is following a rule through one's interactions with others.

So, if you got stranded on a desert island, you could not know whether you had followed a rule.

No mention of 'private use' here, notice?


Then give up the absurd idea of personal agency, other than a pragmatic game of attribution and prediction, as its as much a pernicious vestige of religious thought as anything in our culture. If there is any concept more "ruling class" than agency, I don't know of it.

Eh?


I suppose you should take out your On Certainty again. Or perhaps you don't recall that work.

What has that got to do with anything I said?

I suggest you look up the meaning of the word "relevant".

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 3 2006, 11:19 PM



I suppose you should take out your On Certainty again. Or perhaps you don't recall that work.

What has that got to do with anything I said?

I suggest you look up the meaning of the word "relevant".
I am coming to notice that your claims to knowledge and comprension are pure bluster. Sadly so. You do not seem to understand the barest consequeces of Rule Following and the Private Language Argument. And I have not the patience to explain the most elementary of Wittenstein to a supposed PhD.

As to On Certainty, and the "progressive" abandonment of the "language game" metaphor. Off the cuff I count over forty uses of the term "language game" in his last work. Of the first 24 propositions, 5 uses the term. Here are the first examples for your convenience:

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

18. "I know" often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind.

21. Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise', 'doubt', 'be convinced' in that the statement "I know..." can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion. And here the form "I thought I knew" is being overlooked. - But if this latter is inadmissible, then a mistake in the assertion must be logically impossible too. And anyone who is acquainted with the language-game must realize this - an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything.

24. The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off.

If this is progressive abandonment of an idea, or an example of what happens when you are "familiar" with a work or a thinker, I would have to sadly say that your claims to know are rather humorous or tragic. I hate to think what you have say when are aren't familiar.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


I am coming to notice that your claims to knowledge and comprension are pure bluster.

What is "comprension"?


You do not seem to understand the barest consequeces of Rule Following and the Private Language Argument.

What has the PLA got to do with anything I said?

Are you in need of new glasses?


Off the cuff I count over forty uses of the term "language game" in his last work. The of the first 24 propositions, 5 uses the term. Here are the first examples for your convenience:

And I did not mention OC, so why you bring it up is a mystery.

Perhaps you will now go and count the number of times it occurs in The Brown Books; a lot more than your measly 40.

So this is unfortunate, in the circumstances:


If this is progressive abandonment of an idea, or an example of what happens when you are "familiar" with a work or a thinker, I would have to sadly say that your claims to know are rather humorous or tragic. I hate to think what you have say when are aren't familiar.

I suggest, now, you get your brain checked, and not just your eyes.

[Auto-metabole]

Pure disingenuousness. You painted a picture of a gradual dismissal of the idea of language games, that ended with its absence from the end of PI, due to its lack of sophistication.


If you check out the Blue and Brown Books, especially the latter, he uses it everywhere and all the time. By the Investigations it appears much less, and less so as the book develops.

He has moved beyong this transtitional form into a far more sophisticated take on language, one wherein a general notion like 'language game' is out of place.

Bizarrely this "abandoned" and "transitional" term runs through his last work. Amazingly, this "out of place" concept in fact opens and proves a central aspect in his discussion of certainty. You simply are lost and confused. To read you is to imagine that by the end of PI he had given up this primative term. What I realize though is that this is probably your usual way of argument, attempting to bully people into silence with broad claims and grandiose aims, not to mention brandishing a PhD. on a thinker you have almost no understanding of. I certainly respect your passion, but your means and "understanding" are much less interesting.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


You painted a picture of a gradual dismissal of the idea of language games,

Now you are inventing.

Find where I used those precise words; go on, make yourself useful.


Bizarrely this "abandoned" term runs through his last work.

I stand by that (and I wrote 'progressively abandoned', not 'totally abandoned' -- perhaps you do not know the difference?), and I note you have not tried to exercise your one real skill (the ability to count a few words) with respect to the Brown Books: it would not just run into scores, but the metaphor is used ad nauseam, over most of the work.

Since OC is not like this, you figure it out for yourself.

You seem bright enough....

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 4 2006, 12:00 AM

I stand by that (and I wrote 'progressively abandoned', not 'totally abandoned' -- perhaps you do not know the difference?)...
The question remains, Do you have any idea what you are talking about? Or do you know what the word "abandoned" means?

I count 64 index references to the term “language game” in Philosophical Investigations, a work of approximately 196 pages, (part I finished in 1945).

I count 61 uses of the term “language game” in On Certainty, in only 98 pages, (his last work finished approximately 1950).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


Do you have any idea what you are talking about?

More than you seem to have about your own words.


Or do you know what the word "abandoned" means?

Unqualified, or qualified, as I used it?

Ah, your only skill reappears:


I count 64 index references to the term “language game” in Philosophical Investigations, a work of approximately 196 pages, (part I finished in 1945).

And have you tried the same in the Blue Books?

No, because that would prove my point. W bangs on about this metaphor page after page after page.

So, he progressively abandons this metaphor, as your figures prove.

Thanks!

You are a pal.

Next wild goose chase please....

[Auto-metabole]

All I can say is that when a writer uses a term, in his last work, on the average of more than once on every other page, to speak of his abandonment of it, is not only bizarre, it is a pathetic inability to admit error. Yep, he was just about to give the "unsophisticated" term up, but it kept popping up every other page, how strange.

When of course one is in discussion with someone so entrenched and afraid of admission in such obvious cases, one understands how less clear occasions of error will be handled in the future. More bluster, more prevaricating, more declaration.


Sad.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


All I can say is that when a writer uses a term, in his last work, on the average of more than once on every other page, to speak of his abandonment of it, is not only bizarre,

If that was all you could say, why all the earlier blather?

You should have said this at the beginning and saved us the trouble of having to trawl through your lengthy perseverations.

Anyway, according to your figures, W used this metaphor less in 1950 than in the mid-1930's.

Progressive abandonment, as I said.

Now, can we move on?


More bluster, more prevaricating, more declaration.

Well if we must, let's hear it....

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 4 2006, 01:36 AM


Now, can we move on?


When using a term every other page of a text is a sign of its "abandonment" or its "transitional" status, or its "out of place"ness, or its lack of "sophistication" (let's see, how many other inane observations of yours I can stuff into this), one wonders how you have an ounce of crediblity. With people like you calling for a revolution, I suspect that the ruling class is about as happy and safe as ever. By all means move along.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


When using a term every other page of a text is a sign of its "abandonment" or its "transitional" status, or its "out of place"ness, or its lack of "sophistication" (let's see, how many other inane observations of yours I can stuff into this), one wonders how you have an ounce of crediblity. With people like you calling for a revolution, I suspect that the ruling class is about as happy and safe as ever. By all means move along.

So, it wasn't 'all you could say'?

I hope I live to see the day you actually get something right.

And when your own figures support my claim that W progressively abandoned this metaphor, and you still moan, I think the word 'in(s)ane' applies to you, sonny.

And, I do not 'call' for a revolution; again, you resort to making things up.

I have no need to call for one; they happen whatever I say.

That would be like calling for the sun to rise.

So, have you any more nasty things to say, or have you used all the bilious words you know?

You might like to use 'Spinoza' again; that always makes me queesy.

[Incidentally, in his last work, 'On Colour', W uses the phrase 'language game' and/or the word 'game' associated with language, 16 times in 63 pages. Slowly abandoning its use, as I said. In 15 years this metaphor went from being a dominant concept, practically filling the whole of the first half of the Brown Books, and much of the second half, to being an illustrative device, wheeled out now and again.]

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 4 2006, 08:04 AM

[Incidentally, in his last work, 'On Colour', W uses the phrase 'language game' and/or the word 'game' associated with language, 16 times in 63 pages. Slowly abandoning its use, as I said. In 15 years this metaphor went from being a dominant concept, practically filling the whole of the first half of the Brown Books, and much of the second half, to being an illustrative device, wheeled out now and again.]

As usual the idiocy of your "scholarship". The title of the work is Remarks On Colour. It is no more a "last work" than On Certainty which is filled with the uses of "language game". Your silly idea that notebooks that record the development of an idea, to its actual established use by Wittgenstein to uncover and explicate other new ideas, in terms of frequency is juvenile at best, and just plain stupid at worse. Be that as it may, both "last works" were worked on between Feburary and April as they were drawn from the same manuscript pages, 1951. Moronic.


1951
On 29 January Wittgenstein made a new will in Oxford. He made Rush Rhees his executor and his friends Rush Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright adminsitrators of his literary estate.
On 8 February Wittgenstein was back in Cambridge, with Dr. Bevan, continuing his work on MS 175, and starting MS 176 on 21 March. The manuscripts 172 to 177 were for the most part published. Part I of Remarks on Colours, Oxford 1977, came from manuscript 176, Part II from MS 172, and Part III from MS 173. In the volume On Certainty, Oxford 1970, comments 1 to 65 came from MS 173, 66 to 192 from MS 174, 193 to 299 from MS 173 and 300 to 676 from the MSS 176 and 177.
On 25 April Wittgenstein began work on the last manuscript, MS 177. The last entry is dated 27 April:
On the evening of 28 April, Wittgenstein loses consciousness. He dies the following morning, 29 April 1951.

I think you need to get your money for your supposed "PhD." back. You seem incriminatingly uneducated.



That would be like calling for the sun to rise.

There you go, sounding like a good Determinist should.

Read Antonio Negri's prison study of Spinoza The Savage Anomaly, and wake up out of your ideological slogan malaise.

[Auto-metabole]

As to the centrality of language games to even Remarks on Colour, read professor of philosophy at Bloomburg University of Pennsylvania, Wendy Lynne Lee, the author of On Marx: A Critical Introduction (Wadsworth, 2001), as I just happen to be in the midst of this essay,


Consider the following passage from Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour in light of the question, How can we articulate partial perspective? “What is there in favour of saying that green is a primary colour and not a mixture of blue and yellow? Is the correct answer: ‘You can only know it directly, by looking at the colours?’ But how do I know that I mean the same by the words ‘primary colours’ as someone else who is inclined to call green a primary colour? No, here there are language games that decide these questions.” In this passage as in many others, Wittgenstein portrays a specific linguistic practice, or language game. His purpose, however, is not merely to exhibit such games but to prod his readers to question what they take to be given in them...

Hence, the question “What is in favour of saying that green is a primary colour?” is “decided” by a language game in which we must be able to answer a prior question: “How do I know I mean the same as someone else?” The answer to this question is not simply given because “there is no such thing as the pure colour concept,” samples of which can be found by looking directly. We know that we mean the same as someone else only insofar as “it is a fact that we can communicate with one another about the colours of things.” Similar use exemplifies the agreement fundamental to playing this language game; in other words, it exemplifies a game’s grammar—its communicative “form of life,” through which “things are put in a certain order.” Were it not for this agreement, “our concept (of colour) would not exist” for then there would be nothing in which this communication could consist. What Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest is that agreement concerning how words are used is fundamental not only to colour language but to all language games...

For Wittgenstein, "practices give words their meaning," they situate us with a context (para 317). Hence to say that I mean "the same as someone else" is to say not only that we both know the rules for playing a particular language game, but that we share a linguistically mediated perspective, the grammar of which "permeates our life".

- “Wittgensteinian Vision and ‘Passionate Attachments’


One doesn’t even have to do a frequency count, and pretend to measure it against notebooks written 15 years before. One doesn’t even have to rely upon professor Lee’s common reading (this is basic Wittgenstein 101 really). Just look at the quote, “there are language games that decide these questions.” This is painfully obvious that the concept of language games is central to understanding his meaning. Not only is it not a concept being abandoned, but an integral part of his explanitory vocabulary. That I’m debating this is actually absurd, but I suppose that not only Raskolnikov can dream of beating a dead horse.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:

Oh dear, you really are determined to show yourself up:


It is no more a "last work" than On Certainty which is filled with the uses of "language game".

Well according to the editors of 'On Colour', he was writing it up until he died, so if that is not a last work, I am not sure what is.

You can pick a fight with them if you want; but I think they are all dead - but do not let that stop you!. You seem to like banging your head against brick walls.

[I am quite happy to acknowledge that OC was also his last work (as were other MSS), since both books were cobbled-together from notebooks/MSS he was working on until he died. So in that sense both books were his last work. Where's the big deal?]

And although you have shown he uses the language game idea (I did not deny this, I merely said he was progressivley abandoning this metaphor), you have also shown that I was right (since the metaphor is no longer dominant as it was 15 years earlier).

So, if you have shown I was right, what are you banging on about?

[Quoting secondary sources merely shows how desperate you have become. It is still fashionable to say these things, especially among Wittgensteinian amateurs like you, and this prof it seems, for the reasons I pointed out earlier: it is a nice easy idea to simplify W's philosophy -- ignoring the difficult areas of his thought.]

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 4 2006, 08:35 PM

Well according to the editors of 'On Colour', he was writing it up until he died, so if that is not a last work, I am not sure what is.





He was writing both of the texts before he died, as I showed in reference to MSS numbers. That you take one to somehow mysteriously supercede the other, and don't even realize that each text is a creation of heavy editing from manuscript pages, is only one more mark of your misunderstanding, let alone your ability to actually read each text and see the centrality of the concept "language game".

Its not "dominant" whatever that means because he is no longer fashioning it. He is using it, and using it heavily. He is relying on it for its explantory value, in the context of his earlier explications. It is not "dominate", it is foundational to what he is saying. (You cannot understand what he means "language games decide the issue" if you don't accept "language games" as a secure method of explantion). To have to explain this to you is a joke, as it is taken as a commonplace in all Wittgenstein interpretation I have ever read, no matter how diverse the authors. What you call progressive abandoment, is really integrated and centralized vocabulary. Read the texts.

As to why I go on banging on about it, I favor showing frauds for what they are. I would like others to realize that when you have no idea what you are talking about, you still go one blathering away as if you do. This cast discredit to all your like-minded means. Call it a public service announcement.

Secondary sources, primary sources, any sources. Your argument and interpretation is laughable.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto/non-J:


He was writing both of the texts before he died, as I showed in reference to MSS numbers. That you take one to somehow mysteriously supercede the other, and don't even realize that each text is a creation of heavy editing from manuscript pages, is only one more mark of your misunderstanding, let alone your ability to actually read each text and see the centrality of the concept "language game".

Is this the same head-banger who asserted this a few posts ago (about 'On Certainty')?


Bizarrely this "abandoned" and "transitional" term runs through his last work.

I do believe it is.

Don't you look stupid now?

I did try to warn you....


Its not "dominant" whatever that means because he is no longer fashioning it. He is using it, and using it heavily. He is relying on it for its explantory value, in the context of his earlier explications. It is not "dominate", it is foundational to what he is saying. (You cannot understand what he means "language games decide the issue" if you don't accept "language games" as a secure method of explantion). To have to explain this to you is a joke, as it is taken as a commonplace in all Wittgenstein interpretation I have ever read, no matter how diverse the authors. What you call progressive abandoment, is really integrated and centralized vocabulary. Read the texts.

[Nice try for an angry amateur who has been found out - except it isn't.]

I wonder if you can highlight the substantive points in the above paragraph of yours (unless you now want to disown it); I could not find any.


As to why I go on banging on about it, I favor showing frauds for what they are. I would like others to realize that when you have no idea what you are talking about, you still go one blathering away as if you do. This cast discredit to all your like-minded means. Call it a public service announcement.

We are getting cross aren't we?

And what a noble 'public servant' we have here; never mind the war in Iraq, never mind world poverty, our Auto-mouth is doing a 'public service'.

And that service is: showing himself up.

Auto-Fume: We can do this all day long if you want -- or longer.

Here is the script; mark it well:

You say I was wrong; then you produce the figures to show I was right.

Then you accuse me of something you had already done (i.e., said that OC was W's last work).

Then you throw a tantrum, and show how few abusive words you know.

Curtain.

Next showing soon....

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Throw your toys out of the pram all you like, sonny, you still end up looking childish.

[Auto-metabole]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 4 2006, 09:54 PM


Is this the same head-banger who asserted this a few posts ago (about 'On Certainty')?


I do believe it is.


What a joke. It was his "last work" when compared with PI and others, i.e. it was written last, none written after. Whether its material was written in contemporaneously with other material was meaningless to my point, which was that until the very last months, the term "language game" was a major part of his philosophical vocabulary. That you tried to infer that "Remarks On Colour" was really his last work, written after On Certainty (and via some decreasing frequency count--disregarding what was actually being written--somehow showed an "abandonment" trend--talk about amateur philosophy), shows that you had no clue as to the time frame of the writing of either, and shows a blantant inability to actually read the text.


I wonder if you can highlight the substantive points in the above paragraph of yours (unless you now want to disown it); I could not find any.

No doubt due to your already painfully obvious inablity to comprehend a text. Try understanding the rather simple reference to the quoted material from Remarks on Colour, and the centrality of the concept of "language games" as a explantory concept. I feel like I am arguing with a five year old. Is your grasp of all authors this feeble?

[Auto-metabole]

Actually I'm done wasting my time with this idiot.



Ciao.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Auto-Clanger:


What a joke.

I know, so stop exposing yourself so publicly, and so often.

And so, our little play starts again.

Curtain:

An angry child kicks and screams:


the term "language game" was a major part of his philosophical vocabulary

A calm adult replies:

But, dear, your own figures showed it was in steep decline.

Now some more toys fly out of the pram:


No doubt due to your already painfully obvious inablity to comprehend a text. Try understanding the rather simple reference to the quoted material from Remarks on Colour, and the centrality of the concept of "language games" as a explantory concept. I feel like I am arguing with a five year old. Is your grasp of all authors this feeble?

Curtain

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And, don't forget to tune in again for a re-run any minute now.

Oh no: the season has been unexpectedly cut short:


Actually I'm done wasting my time with this idiot.

A nice, calm, well-reasoned exit.

He will be missed.

He provided so many laughs.

[Epoche]

So Rosa and Auto are arguing whether or not Wittgenstein changed his mind at some point in his theory. Am I right?

This amounts to a language game attempting to usurp the meanings of a language gamer involved in a game of language to demonstrate language games. Throw in a few deconstructionists and presto, you got one helluva party.

I want to ask each of you this: what is language for?

(notice I didn't bother asking what it is, and for good reason)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


I want to ask each of you this: what is language for?

Well, you can ask me, but Auto-egg-on-face has, I think, gone back to kindergarden.

Primarily: for communication, which it does well, except on such discussion boards (!!), secondarily representation, which it does badly, unless it is handled with some sensitivity - as Wittgenstein noted.


So Rosa and Auto are arguing whether or not Wittgenstein changed his mind at some point in his theory. Am I right?

It began somewhat differently, and descended rapidly into a slugging match, where Auto-destruct provided evidence that contradicted what he asserted, but he got very tetchy when I kept pointing this out, and then he stormed off.

And W did not have a 'theory'.


This amounts to a language game attempting to usurp the meanings of a language gamer involved in a game of language to demonstrate language games. Throw in a few deconstructionists and presto, you got one helluva party.

Well put -- I think!

However, Auto-lytic took 'his' ball home.

[Epoche]

The advantage I have by not being very familiar with Wittgenstein is the fact that I witness the effects of his "philosophy" in the world of literature from an external position-- I don't see a major difference in the world after Wittgenstein, from the world before Wittgenstein. But neither am I looking at the subject of philosophy...I am looking at the material conditions of the world, its mode of production.

In one fell swoop I might call four hundred years of philosophy a waste of time, indeed, how can a nonempirical entity such as a "word" ever do anything other than bring someone a paycheck?

At some point, Rosa, human vocabulary made a gigantic leap, but this leap had been, and will always be, subject to the conditions of economy. Language philosophers tend to forget that mental ideas and words are formed from empirical impressions, from a world, which is completely independent from the mind. Independent only in the sense that nothing more is created when words are spoken; the content is always there first. As all speakers are mortal..so to are their words. But this objective world remains through every generation...and if it evolves, this is not due to language propaganda, it is due to the conditions of the world at its point of producing the capacity to speak and use language.

With this in mind, it should be remembered that much of that language can be extraneous and not immediately necessary for succeeding a function it is thought to facilitate; contemplation that is a luxury is irrelevent, since language evolved as a tool. Words that do not work to organize physical efforts between people are uneccessary-- "how was your day, today"-- is a completely useless question-- "do you believe in God"-- is a completely useless question-- "I think this is wonderful"-- is a completely useless statement-- "you've been very bad"-- is completely nonsensical, etc., etc.

But it happens...conversation like this truely astounds me. I can't imagine what, or why, rather, the brain finds it necessary to engage in such activity. What is the kernal behind all this...there has to be a cost/benefit ratio that the brain is working out with precisions which we could not possibly comprehend. Nothing is in vain. So why has our language expanded as it has? What the fuck does an argument about whether or not a rhinosarus is in the room have anything to do with our mode of production?

Do they get paid to talk about that kinda shit?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, I think this post of yours suggests you need to learn a little more modern philosophy of language :D :


Language philosophers tend to forget that mental ideas and words are formed from empirical impressions, from a world which is completely independent from the mind.

Well that depends on who you are referring to, but I put it to you that only the most Phillistine/ignorant of these 'forget' this, the rest just ignore it as 17th pseudo-science.

We are all taught what our words mean; we do not decide this for ourselves. Anyone who does not learn them aright will fail to make themselves understood not only to others, but to themsleves.

Sure the world is important, but you/me were taught how to appropriate that world as we were inducted into a speech community.

The way you phrase things makes us all seem like linguistic atoms -- recall the 'inner bourgeois' I alluded to earlier? No wonder the theory you outlined arose in the 17th century.


But this objective world remains through every generation...and if it evolves, this is not due to language propaganda, it is due to the conditions of the world at its point of producing the capacity to speak and use language.

Well, I am not sure what point you were trying to make, but whatever the world does, you/I/anyone will only be able to understand it when we have appropriated it into language (ordinary or scientific -- but not philosophical).

Sure language changes over time, but that just underlines the above point, it does not neutralise it.

The rest of what you say, I cannot comment on.

I have to say, and forgive me if this is my fault, but I could not for the life of me detect a point to your last post.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by [email protected] 6 2006, 03:33 PM
Words that do not work to organize physical efforts between people are uneccessary-- "how was your day, today"-- is a completely useless question-- "do you believe in God"-- is a completely useless question-- "I think this is wonderful"-- is a completely useless statement-- "you've been very bad"-- is completely nonsensical, etc., etc.
WTF

Language that doesn't improve our physical conditions "astounds you"

:lol:

What is "organize physical efforts" supposed to mean.

The function is discourse is to let something be seen, not any Trotskyite (?) obsession with improving the forces of production.

What about leisure? Empathy? Individuality? Art? Are these uselss?

[lawnmowergoWHUMMM]

Correct me if I'm simply restating what has already been said, but I'm trying to straighten things out here.

You, Rosa, claimed that determinism is ALWAYS based on declaring nature a free agent, correct?

If that is the case, I disagree. The determinism I talk about has nothing to do with that. Indeed, physical laws/nature may determine everything, but the physical laws and nature are not choosing to determine everything - it is simply what they do, no choice involved.

My argument against free will is that for the most part people have recognized the mind as being a product of the brain - a physical, biological organ subject to natural laws. Otherwise we'd have to give the mind some metaphysical attribute, which I'm not doing...not right now anyway.

The chain of logic goes like this

natural laws determine atomic/molecular particles

atomic/molecular particles determine brain cells

brain cells determine overall brain activity

overall brain activity determines choices

So, like all else, we are simply wind-up toys - but far more complicated wind-up toys than most things.

There's no divine will here, no God pointing out commands, as you insisted determinism required. Perhaps we should not say natural laws determine behavior, but that behavior will always act in accordance with natural laws.

Now I get what you're saying about "determinism" and "indeterminism" being all full of hot air and the fact that we don't have to use such big words to talk about everyday life, but if "determinism" describes this "everything is an effect of earlier processes" idea, then it is indeed a useful word.

Finally, Comrade-Z, is your avatar a pic of you? Which one is you?

[Chrysalis]

Jesus! Just finished wading through three pages of this thread.

And I must admit, Auto-metabole got a good grip on Wittgenstein.


Here is one quote that actually misses the point of "meaning is in use":


Originally posted by Rosa
So, if I use this sentence to confuse you: "Jim Farr has just square rooted his foot" (and it does so surprise you) that use would not lend to that sentence a meaning, just because it had that effect, was intended to have that effect, and was used to for that reason.

So, use is not a good guide to meaning.
What the phrase "meaning is in use" explains is that the context allows you to determine the meaning of the statement or an utterance in normal, reasonable conditions, and also including determining whether it is nonsensical because the person talking is insane or delusional, or that the utterance must be of a different meaning than ordinary because the person talking is a philosopher, perhaps Moore is on the phone, etc.

So, to take the example above: Jim Farr has just square rooted his foot, the listener should be able to determine or say, he does not understand the statement, or that the statement is nonsense, or unintelligible.

Therefore, use is a good guide, and will always be the determinant, of meaning.

Wittgenstein never abandoned ordinary-language philosophy. He died with it.

Ordinary-language philosophy never flourished beyond Wittgenstein and one or two other philosophers. But, it should be straight forward and be understood easily by anyone who takes the time reading Wittgenstein: or else, Wittgenstein himself would be admitting the inadequacy of ordinary language to explain meaning or the logic of everyday language and practices.

The proof is in the pudding.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lawnetcetc:


You, Rosa, claimed that determinism is ALWAYS based on declaring nature a free agent, correct?

I do not think you will find those words (or that implication) in anything I posted.

I merely said that to make determinism work, one has to use anthropomorphic language. [And your post has confirmed that.]


Indeed, physical laws/nature may determine everything, but the physical laws and nature are not choosing to determine everything - it is simply what they do, no choice involved.

We have been through all this; I suggest you read the thread.


The chain of logic goes like this

natural laws determine atomic/molecular particles

atomic/molecular particles determine brain cells

brain cells determine overall brain activity

overall brain activity determines choices

So, like all else, we are simply wind-up toys - but far more complicated wind-up toys than most things.

Well, this would be a nice piece of a priori superscience (for which there is anyway scant evidence -- but I'd put it lower than even that), if you got rid of that anthropomorphic word 'determine'.

Then it would just be a priori make-believe.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, thanks for that characteristically light-weight intervention -- but who are you addressing? Auto-screwup has stormed off after his figures showed I was right, and 'he' could not cope with that fact.


What the phrase "meaning is in use" explains is that the context allows you to determine the meaning of the statement or an utterance in normal, reasonable conditions, and also including determining whether it is nonsensical because the person talking is insane or delusional, or that the utterance must be of a different meaning than ordinary because the person talking is a philosopher, perhaps Moore is on the phone, etc.

Well that is the populist view of Wittgenstein, but once you factor in his core method (i.e., his attempt to uncover the logical grammar of our use of words), it falls apart.

My example was aimed at revealing the clash between these two views of his work, and you missed it (as did auto-mouth).

Better luck next time.


So, to take the example above: Jim Farr has just square rooted his foot, the listener should be able to determine or say, he does not understand the statement, or that the statement is nonsense, or unintelligible.

But I was using it in the context of trying to show Auto-whatever was ignorant of W's work, so if meaning is determined by context, then my sentence should mean 'Auto-whatever is ignorant of W'.

Now, either you failed to spot this from the context, or context is far too vague a notion to help anyone ascertain meaning, except in a few cliched cases.

And, to make things worse, you failed to spot that there is a world of difference between the meaning of the words we use and the sense of the sentences in which they occur. [That one new to you too?] My example was aimed at revealing that as well.

And guess what? Auto-destruct missed it just like you.

One of the great weaknesses of W's later work was that he could never quite make his mind up about this one; I claim that this is why he began to abandon the language game metaphor, which blurs this distinction quite badly -- but this left his work seriously exposed, so he kept toying with it.

I am sure he would have addressed this had he lived; there are signs in 'Remarks on Colour' that he was returning to the views he held in the early to mid-1930's (expressed so clearly in, say, 'Philosophical Remarks', but less so in 'Philosophical Grammar'), where logical grammar looms large.

But, you missed that, too; I wonder why?

[And, I note you did not address your 'comments' to me -- scared eh?]

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by Rosa
Well that is the populist view of Wittgenstein, but once you factor in his core method (i.e., his attempt to uncover the logical grammar of our use of words), it falls apart.

I am sure he would have addressed this had he lived; there are signs in 'Remarks on Colour' that he was returning to the views he held in the early to mid-1930's (expressed so clearly in, say, 'Philosophical Remarks', but less so in 'Philosophical Grammar'), where logical grammar looms large.
No. That isn't the populist view of W, as you continually assert. That is the correct view of W. The failure on your part, or rather failure to grasp on your part is: just because W still maintains "grammatical logic", doesn't mean "meaning is use" has been compromised. In fact, we could just say "Stop!", without any other words in that utterance, and we know what it means, and whether it's an order, or an assertion, etc.

In fact, if I really want to expose your intellectual insincerity on this forum, I would say who exactly pointed out the "logic" in ordinary-language game that you mentioned twice above. I know who that poster is. I know that it's been mentioned before : you did not get that from reading W, you got it from someone else. And you applied it in your post here to refute Auto. Which you have failed to do since, the logic of grammar only helps out in determining the meaning in use, not undermining it. You used "logic of grammar" to say that use of language, therefore, is not a good guide to meaning.

Yup. Continue your inanities and asinine comments. We are amused.

Rosa, I believe that Auto and I aren't the only ones seriously doubting your Phd, and your education. Your understanding of many philosophical issues are erroneous, and you are ignorant most of time. Though, I'm not surprised given your confession that you reject philosophy altogether. So, what is your business discussing philosophy here? You don't understand it, you reject it, you fail to get the gist of what's being said.

Tsk, tsk.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, out of her pupa, and waving her flimsy wings:


No. That isn't the populist view of W, as you continually assert. That is the correct view of W.

Populist.

Oh dear, I said it again. Somebody stop me....


The failure on your part, or rather failure to grasp on your part is: just because W still maintains "grammatical logic", doesn't mean "meaning is use" has been compromised. In fact, we could just say "Stop!", without any other words in that utterance, and we know what it means, and whether it's an order, or an assertion, etc.

Eh?


In fact, if I really want to expose your intellectual insincerity on this forum, I would say who exactly pointed out the "logic" in ordinary-language game that you mentioned twice above. I know who that poster is. I know that it's been mentioned before : you did not get that from reading W, you got it from someone else. And you applied it in your post here to refute Auto.

Proof?

Oh, sorry, you don't do that....


Which you have failed to do since, the logic of grammar only helps out in determining the meaning in use, not undermining it. You used "logic of grammar" to say that use of language, therefore, is not a good guide to meaning.

So you think of logical grammar as a separate entity that controls us:


the logic of grammar only helps out in determining the meaning in use

In other words, you have to anthropomorphise 'grammar' to make this half-baked idea work. Or are you merely playing a new, and appropriately convenient, 'language game' here?

I like your style: meaning controlled by this disembodied being 'grammar', but meaning is still use.

Er...run that past me again....

But how does this 'being' determine what we use our words for? And how does that connect the meaning of words with the sense of sentences?

[I noticed you dodged that one -- I would too if I were you.]

And that is the problem Wittegenstein faced: how do you modify an account that seems to make the meaning of a word the same as the sense of a sentence?

But, the sense of an indicative sentence, say, cannot depend on use, as it can with words (and even then the latter is so only to a certain extent) -- if you'd like an introduction to these more, shall we say, 'challenging' but less populist areas of W's work (i.e., why this is so), you only have to beg.

These two metaphors cannot work together. I'd like to see you try to make them; your initial attempt annoyingly fell before the first hurdle.

I do not doubt that if W could not solve this, we won't here; but it does not help if you cannot even see the difficulty.

Why does that still not surprise me?


Yup. Continue your inanities and asinine comments. We are amused.

I am sorry, I did not know I was addressing royalty.

I will be even less respectful from now on.


Rosa, I believe that Auto and I aren't the only ones seriously doubting your Phd, and your education. Your understanding of many philosophical issues are erroneous, and you are ignorant most of time. Though, I'm not surprised given your confession that you reject philosophy altogether. So, what is your business discussing philosophy here? You don't understand it, you reject it, you fail to get the gist of what's being said.

An old tactic -- you lose an argument, so you make personal attacks on the opposition. Auto-mouth did the same.

However, my lovely, you need to win at least one argument (just one will do, but like auto-destruct, you always slope off), and my 'obvious' intellectual inferiority will not just be down to wish-fulfilment on your part.

And good luck -- we are all pulling for you.

It is time I was taken down a peg or two.

Think you are up to it?

[hoopla]

Rosa, what is real?

Can we access what is real?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Rosa, what is real?

Well, the word 'real' is used as a qualifying term, as in 'real money' (i.e., not counterfeit), 'real leather' (i.e., not imitation), or 'real gold' (i.e., not iron pyrites).

I know that that will disappoint you, but that is what the word means.


Can we access what is real?

Yes indeed; next time you see a real dog (and not a porcelain one), you have access to it....

[A lot of people do not like ordinary language philosophy because it prevents metaphysical speculation; I think that it is its greatest strength.]

[hoopla]

Are there any questions which philosophy tries to answer that aren't meaningless?

Can you tell me the answers to them?

What about: how is it that I can imagine, and yet this rock cannot?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Are there any questions which philosophy tries to answer that aren't meaningless?

[I should charge for this service....]

Answer: I have yet to find one.

[I am, of course, referring to traditional philosophy, not the new approach pioneered by Wittgenstein.]


Can you tell me the answers to them?

There aren't any, so far as I am aware, so the above does not even arise.


What about: how is it that I can imagine, and yet this rock cannot?

That is either a scientific question (and I think a scientist would tell you that you are alive and have a central nervous system, whereas a rock isn't and hasn't, and then he/she would have you tested for drugs for asking such an odd question), or it is a sign that you have too much leisure time on your hands, and are somewhat confused over the use of words.

[hoopla]

you have too much leisure time on your hands, and are somewhat confused over the use of words.I refuse to believe that anyone can sensibly say that the fact that I expereince a flux of perceptions, and that rocks do not, is a non question. What does Witt make of this question? I will refuse to take him seriously/read him, if he thinks that its a non-question.

[hoopla]

No, like, IMHO philosophical problems can be dissolved in ways other than ignoring them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


No, like, IMHO philosophical problems can be dissolved in ways other than ignoring them.

Indeed, but many can be ignored as inconsequential or obviously confused (like your 'sensitive' rock query).

Deeper confusions need far more work to defuse; I do this at my site, for example, in Essay Three Part One, and In Essay Four, note 13 -- but in many other places, too.

There I expose what I take to be 'the heart of the beast', and trace its origin to a simple but profound syntactical error committed by Greek philosophers, one that has cast a 2500 year long shadow over subsequent work -- and I try to explain why and how it has done this, and how it motivated and thuis vitiated dialectics (as Hegel copied this very same error, but made it worse), in Essay Twelve.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I refuse to believe that anyone can sensibly say that the fact that I expereince a flux of perceptions, and that rocks do not, is a non question

Well, all I can say is that either you are bonkers, or you do not know any science.

You choose.


What does Witt make of this question?

As far as I know he never considers it; he had better things to do.


I will refuse to take him seriously/read him, if he thinks that its a non-question

I am sure he'd be really upset about that....

[hoopla]

I refuse to believe that anyone can sensibly say that the fact that I expereince a flux of perceptions, and that rocks do not, is a non question

Well, all I can say is that either you are bonkers, or you do not know any science.Well, I might study this next year, and in a way you might be right. But, I don't believe that science can say that this is a non-question. And I doubt it will continue to do so. But, this is just my "intuition".



What does Witt make of this question?

As far as I know he never considers it; he had better things to do.

Fair enough

Tbh I think I may have gone mad on non-naturalism

:rolleyes:

Why not give us the name of the number 1 ordinary language "philosopher", in your opiniion. Barring Wittgenstein.

:)

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 9 2006, 12:55 PM
Deeper confusions need far more work to defuse; I do this at my site, for example, in Essay Three Part One, and In Essay Four, note 13 -- but in many other places, too.
You almost make it sound interesting . If, anyone else is interested, I would like to hear a synopsis.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop, you must at least try to read what I post carefully:


But, I don't believe that science can say that this is a non-question.

I did not say that science could do this.

It is only a question for those who are mad or for those who are having problems with language (or who have too much time to kill, and who like to string words together in odd ways).


Why not give us the name of the number 1 ordinary language "philosopher", in your opinion. Barring Wittgenstein.

There are not many of these left these days (for reasons I try to explain in Essay Twelve).

But, do you mean the number One living philosopher in this area?

If so: Stanley Cavell, probably.

Otherwise, it would have to be Gilbert Ryle and John Austin (both dead).

[Recall: I am not advocating their work, I am just answering your question.]

Or, were you asking for the greatest influence on me, other than Wittgenstein?

Answer (after the first two, in no particular order): Karl Marx, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Peter Geach, Roger White, Peter Long, Guy Robinson, Peter Hacker, Cora Diamond, Burton Dreben, Rhush Rhees, Peter Winch, Elizabeth Anscombe, Norman Malcolm, Roy Holland, Anthony Kenny, Michael Dummett, Stuart Shanker, David Bloor, Juliet Floyd, Mathieu Marion....


If, anyone else is interested, I would like to hear a synopsis.

I'll post one later.

[hoopla]

Should probably stop posting, but I need to learn something before I go back to uni!

It is appreciated, any of those people philosophers of science?

Edited

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

They are not all 'geezers'.

Some have worked in this area; the philosophers of science who have influenced me the most are: Norwood Hanson, Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Removed on edit

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is a centrally important part of Essay Three Part One (recall it is out of context, the introduction to this Essay sets this section up, and all the footnotes (these are indicated the numbers that appear at the end of sentences throughout) have been left out -- they explain many of the ideas more fully --; and the links to other sites and other essays have been left out, too, as have all the emphases):



DM-Epistemology: Set In Concrete?

The reason why the dialectical juggernaut cannot begin to roll is connected with the answer to the following questions:

(1) What would happen if it turned out that instead of beginning with abstract general terms to help refine experience, dialecticians without exception actually started with particulars -- or from terms that named abstract particulars --, and only ever advanced from there by using particulars?

(2) What if, instead of using abstract general terms to account for wider and more general connections in nature, DM-theorists used nothing but the names of abstract particulars, ones that were incapable of accounting for anything?

As should seem obvious, unhelpful answers to these questions would deepen the suspicion that DM cannot account for knowledge. If so, not only would DM-epistemology have run off the road and into a ditch, scientific knowledge would be in a similar hole, too.

A Name By Any Other Name -- Is Still A Name

Readers who are sympathetic to DM might be forgiven for thinking that this must be wrong; dialecticians do not do this. They do not remain stuck in a 'particularist' rut, as the above insinuates.

Nevertheless, as will soon become apparent, the process of abstraction, far from assisting in the formation of knowledge of essential features of reality underlying appearances, actually prevents it. It does this by transforming what had once been general terms into singular expressions -- that is, into the names of 'abstract' ideas, categories or concepts.

If this is so, the claim that DM begins with the general in order to interpret the particular would be the opposite of the truth.

In fact, what really happens (as we will soon see) is that DM-theorists begin with the names of abstract particulars (ones they inherited from traditional theorists like Hegel); they then make a ham-fisted attempt to link these with the names of material particulars, all the while failing to note that generality went out the dialectical window long ago. It is this initial muddle that stalls the DM-juggernaut on the starting grid.

This false step finds DM-theorists, following Hegel's example, interpreting sentences containing subject and predicate (general) terms as disguised identity statements.

Because of this inept start, DM-apologists begin by eliminating the general terms they claimed were necessary in order to refine particulars, and which were essential to anyone who wanted to loop the very first dialectical loop. Naturally, this just leaves them with a handful of lifeless abstract singular terms.
This re-write of predicative sentences as propositions expressing identity changes the general terms they contain into the names of abstract particulars.13 That then circles back, undermining DM-epistemology. Instead of beginning with the general to account for the particular, DM-theorists start with the proper names of abstract particulars (i.e., those of classes, universals, categories or concepts) in their bid to account for concrete particulars -- an impossible task even in its own terms.
This explains the presence of all the convoluted language found in the attempts made by DM-theorists to outline what they regard as the "process of cognition"; it has to be convoluted because of the impossibly difficult problem they have saddled themselves with.14

DM-theorists are of course not the only ones to have erred in this way; it is a common fault that runs through traditional epistemology. Its ubiquity is easily explained since this false move is, it seems, difficult to spot.

Well..., not really: it is actually staring us in the face!

As will be demonstrated presently, familiar everyday features of language have to be wilfully ignored, distorted or re-configured to make this ancient trick work. What had been in full-view all along -- the ordinary use of general terms in material language, invented by those who do not make such crass errors (i.e., workers) -- highly educated people managed to miss, confuse and/or deliberately mangle.

Dialecticians are thus in bad company -- and, as they should know, bad associations spoil good epistemological habits.

It is ironic therefore that in order to account for concrete particulars with the use of general terms, this inept dialectical detour means that general terms feature nowhere at all in their theory -- the names of abstract particulars having been substituted for them.15 Hence, dialecticians have to hand just two different types of particulars as they begin the dialectical circuit: the abstract sort and the concrete variety. Of course, the latter of these is now left without the general backdrop that had previously been touted for it; this is because that general background has been transmogrified into a particular itself.

Hence, the DM-juggernaut not only lacks a starter motor (i.e., it has no general terms), its way is blocked by a huge slab of concrete.

The rest of this Essay is aimed at substantiating these seemingly wild allegations.

Are Indicative Sentences Just Disguised Lists?

In order to justify the above claims, it is important to see why such a re-write goes badly wrong, and why it cannot work even after running repairs have been attempted.

As we will see, the answer to these questions is connected with the reason why not all words are names and why indicative sentences cannot be regarded as mere lists of names.

Although DM-epistemology supposedly begins with the general in order to qualify and refine the particular, the way that dialecticians frame their concepts denies their theory the capacity to do either. Because DM-theorists begin with named abstract particulars, and not general concepts, DM-epistemology cannot begin to loop the first dialectical loop.

In order to motivate this novel criticism, we must once again make a small detour, but one that uses a method of analysis that will look rather odd to those unfamiliar with Analytic Philosophy. Its superiority over traditional methods will emerge later on. The readers' temporary indulgence is therefore required.

[Those not particularly interested in the minutiae may skip this section.]

--------oOo--------

First, a brief word of explanation: expressions such as "x is comrade", or "x is a supporter of George Bush" are particularly useful schemas that help illustrate specific features of language, ones with which we are all familiar. So, from such expressions, employing singular terms to replace the gap marker, "x", we may form an indefinite number of simple predicative propositions, some of which will be true, and some false (if we but knew it). The gap marker is essential, for by suitably defining it, legitimate substitution instances may be specified clearly. A genuine gap will not do, since, of course, gaps cannot be defined. So: " is a comrade" is no good.15a

[In the original Essay, the "x" here is a the Greek letter "xi", but the formatting here will not reproduce it.]

Now there is nothing in language or logic that forces this form of analysis on us, it just turns out to have rather useful 'side-effects', as it were; ones that recommend it (that is, in addition to the more formal advantages it possess and which allows modern logicians to study inferences more precisely. More of these later.

So from this schematic proposition "x is comrade" we can form the following:

F1: Ernest Mandel is a comrade.

F2: Tony Cliff is a comrade.

F3: Tony Blair is a comrade.

And so on. As noted above, some of these will be true, some false. However, these propositions all share a common pattern which is brought out by "x is comrade" stencil.

However, consider an example of an object given in experience -- indeed, one to which Lenin himself referred -- a simple glass tumbler. We might want to say the following of it:

E1: This tumbler is made of glass.

E1 appears to express a fact about a particular, but the latter is not yet concrete, so key features of the dialectical process must be applied to it. According to the above dialectical circuit, we must interconnect this particular with other aspects of reality by employing (or refining) an already constructed abstract general concept.

Now, E1 already contains a use of a general concept "x is made of glass", which, of course, is not the name of anything. The subsequent connections that dialecticians have in store for the said tumbler cannot alter the logical role that is now fulfilled by the use of this general concept expression. Moreover, the sentence formed by combining the singular demonstrative term "This tumbler" with the concept expression "x is made of glass" is not a name, either.16
In that case, in E1 we do not yet have a particular upon which we can even begin to inflict some dialectics.

Hence, we need to qualify or replace this general concept expression if E1 is to pick out a concrete particular.17

Perhaps the following might suffice:

E2: This tumbler is made of this lump of glass.

Now, the phrase "lump of glass" still contains a general term, namely, "glass".18

Maybe, then the following will work?

E3: This tumbler is composed of these n Silicon atoms.

Once more, E3 contains general terms (like "atoms").

We need not labour this point; indeed, it is one that dialecticians also accept, when it is framed in Hegel-speak.

There is a fundamental logical principle at stake here that cannot be side-stepped. Whatever is done to try to identify and/or describe any particular will always involve the use either of general terms or relational expressions.19

But against this, it could be argued that particulars might be referred to by means of an identifying indexical description, such as the following:

E4: This is a tumbler.

But, the problem with E4 is that the word "tumbler" is now a general term. Even a pointing gesture followed by the word:

E4a: "Tumbler"

would be of no use. Unless Proper Names, and only Proper Names, are used to pick out such concrete particulars, there is no way around this obstacle. No one supposes that the word "Tumbler" is the name of only that piece of glassware; i.e., that it is its Proper Name!

This means we face a logical (not an epistemological or ontological) barrier before the aspiring dialectician can even begin to loop the first dialectical loop -- a logical condition they at least accept on the surface.

As noted above, one way to avoid this difficulty might be to be to try to represent concrete particulars by the use of Proper Names (which tactic DM-theorists themselves unwittingly adopt when they introduce the names of abstract particulars; that explains why I asserted earlier that dialecticians only accept this logical condition superficially).

Unfortunately, Proper Names only function as such in combination with other linguistic expressions that do not so operate. Letters or sounds on their own cannot work as names without the right sort of linguistic backdrop.

Some might find this point difficult to appreciate because as regular language users they automatically recognise the use of names in ordinary homophonic settings, and hence they readily spot the occurrence of linguistic items conventionally assigned to that grammatical category -- even when they are used in isolation. Many jokes trade on this fact.20

However, mere sounds in the air and marks on the page cannot count as names when totally divorced from the sort of background noted above. Rule-governed, socially-sanctioned sentential contexts are required to turn such uninterpreted marks or noises into words with a meaning, and thus into names.21

Objects or processes in nature are by themselves incapable of determining the meanings of any marks or sounds we use to talk about whatever we do talk about.

This is of course because such natural objects and processes lack social organisation, practical skills and intellect. History is not the product of a classification war between words.

Naturally, that is just a roundabout way of saying that uninterpreted objects and processes cannot determine a rule; only human beings can do that, since language is a feature of our social being, not an aspect of its own syntactical being.

Not even a series of Proper Names (whether or not these turn out to be the alleged names of abstract general concepts, ideas or universals) can pick out anything true of concrete particulars (or of anything at all, for that matter), of the sort that dialecticians require. This is because such a series would at best form a list, not a sentence (still less a proposition). Consider, for example, the following:

E5: London, Lenin, Amazon, Venus, Socialist Worker, Coronation Street, Tony Benn, Proxima Centauri.

A list like this says nothing -- even if it has a use, as here, to make that very point. We could, perhaps, imagine a sense for E5, but only by articulating it with general terms or with words that function other than as names.

Moreover, even if this list of the Proper Names of objects and individuals were replaced by another list formed out of the names of concepts or abstract general terms, it would make no difference; it would still say nothing -- as the next two examples illustrate:

E6: Identity, Substance, Matter, Form, Flux, Space, Time, Part, Whole, Mode, Particular, Absolute, General, Essence, Trope, Appearance, Entity, Thing-in-Itself.

E7: Women, glass, redness, anger, jealousy, knowledge, change, cause, honesty, eigenvector, humanity, isomorphism.

E6 and E7 have no meaning, since they are both lists. Again, in order to gain a meaning their terms would need to be articulated with expressions that do not function as names.

At this point it could be argued once more that we might be able to pick out a targeted particular by the use of its Proper Name, in the following manner.

E8: Karl Marx.

Undoubtedly, this Proper Name names the individual Karl Marx, but this is only because of all the socially-sanctioned stage-setting that already surrounds its normal use. That background involves the use of sentences like the following:

E9: Karl Marx is the author of Das Kapital, and was born in Trier in 1811….

Without this, the word "Karl Marx" could be the name of the man at the delicatessen, or the name of a new brand of Vodka or that of the winner of the three-thirty at Newmarket. In fact, it might not even be a compound word, let alone a name.22

The detour ends at this point; back to the main feature.

--------oOo--------

We are now in a position to see why dialecticians turn all predicate expression into the names of abstract particulars, and cannot fail to do so, and thus inadvertently transform sentences into lists.

For those caught up in Traditional Philosophy it was clear that Concepts, or the referents of general terms, could not be picked out in the material world, unlike the referents of the names of genuine material objects. But, it seemed plain to them that concepts and general terms must relate to something. However, despite the fact that concepts and general terms (or their referents) do not exist in the real world to point at or identify, if some sense was to be given to them, then access to them must be modelled on the way we denote things in the material world: by naming them. If a theorist was looking for non-material 'entities' (ethereal or otherworldly objects to which concept/general words referred), the obvious thing to do would be to use methods that were ready to hand in the material world, since there were/are no others.

That is why abstractions had to be named, since named objects do exist; we see them around us all the time. So, by naming abstract concepts it seemed to many traditional theorists that they could be pinned down, and some account could be given of them (only now transmogrified into Forms, Universals, Concepts, or Ideas, etc.); naming was thus taming. This accounts for the fact that in every traditional theory of Universals, this is precisely what happened (and still does).

Of course, if a theorist believes in a supremely rational 'God', then the temptation will be overwhelming to regard the names of concepts as the names of corresponding Ideas held in 'His' mind -- or at least as the names of Forms that live in Heaven with 'Him'. This is overt in Plato, as it is in later Christian Platonists -- like St Augustine, St Anselm, St Bonaventure -- (and quasi-Platonists like Leibniz), and thinkers who influenced scientists like Newton. These Ideas, of course, came to life in Hegel (or so he thought), as he animated them to make up for the fact that earlier philosophers had killed them stone dead.22a

Unfortunately, by doing this, traditional Philosophers destroyed the capacity language has for expressing generality --, or at least they did so with respect to their jargonised substitute for it.

As we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), early Greek Philosophers found that there were no words in ordinary language they could use to name the rarefied abstractions they needed. So they just invented their own, or borrowed others form earlier myths and Theogonies. Words like "Being", "Logos", "Fate", "The unlimited", and so on, were co-opted and put to no good.

To cope with the many forms of generality there are, however, they had to appropriate words that were already in use in ordinary language -- but they nominalised them, and began to talk about "Justice", "Knowledge", "Beauty", or about "The table", "Man", "Manhood", or "the equal" -- naming these general terms, and hence particularising them. Thus was born the so-called "problem of Universals", an empty set of conundrums predicated only on this quirky use of ordinary language. More about this in Part Two.

However, this deceptively minor linguistic adjustment had profound implications on the logic traditional theorists now had to work with. The point of departure of much of subsequent philosophy revolved around this syntactical re-write.22b

In the end, and a couple of thousand years later, it was this grammatical faux pas which forced the philosophical 'logic' Hegel used in a certain direction (he merely took it to its extreme -- as a sort of unintended reductio ad absurdum). This was a direction which Aristotle himself began to take in his mature logical writings, and one that was subsequently inflated into a full-blown theory by medieval Catholic logicians, as part of what came to be known as the Identity or Essential Theory of Predication.22c

It is this theory that lies at the heart of dialectics, and of much of traditional philosophy.

It is indeed, one of the "ruling-ideas".

Identifying The Problem

So, when dialecticians buy into the analysis of subject/predicate sentences that developed in this ancient tradition, they not only turn their own propositions into lists (as we will soon see), they prevent the names they think they are using from being names. This is because this set of moves destroys the capacity language has of expressing generality, which as we have just seen is essential if names are to function as names and language is to function at all and arise above the immediate.

However, this wrong turn introduces problems into the language we already use to speak about things that we can point to or identify in reality, and about which we can say certain (general) things.

So, given the Identity Theory of Predication, in order to be able to refer to concepts or abstractions, predicate expressions are turned into names.22d In that case, a simple sentence like:

E10: Blair is a man.

has to become:

E11: Blair Manhood.23

Or, perhaps:

E11a: Blair is Manhood

But, E11 is a list, and lists cannot say anything.24

This can be seen by examining E11a; if both terms ("Blair" and "Manhood") are singular, then despite appearances, no predication has taken place. Nothing has been said of Blair. Of course, it might seem that something has been said of Blair, but this is where the Identity Theory kicks in. More on this presently.

Now, a predication like that expressed in E10, which says something of a named individual, seems all too insubstantial. Ascriptions like this appear to pick out nothing in the material world that is attributable to Blair. On the one hand we have the material object named "Blair", but on the other what is said of him seems to be something altogether immaterial. Since we can't point to anything in the world called "man" it looks like E10 is not really saying anything of Blair. But neither are E11 and E11a. So we need a new 'theory'.

It is important to note that this quandary has arisen because of the idea that words only gain meaning if they are names, and since "...is a man" is not a name, it was thought that it cannot be attributing anything to Blair unless it was a disguised name (a "Term").

But, we need to find something nameable that whatever is true of Blair actually names; so a referent for the predicate "...is a man" had to be found.

However, in order to account for propositions that contained two names (a subject such as "Blair", and whatever its predicate named, i.e., "man" or "manhood" as in E11) something more powerful than the mere copula "is" (of predication -- used in E10) must be introduced to link these terms, allowing E10 to say something of Blair that we can point to, at least abstractly. This new linking word must relate the subject to the named object that the predicate referred to; so it had to be a relational term.

This is because, if the "is" of predication in E10 is simply that, i.e., just an "is" of predication, then E10 would be asserting one individual of another. That is, it would be asserting that the object that is the referent of the predicate was true of the subject. In this case, it would be asserting a link between "Blair" and "Man", or "Manhood". But when this happens in ordinary language, as we will see in E12 below, we clearly have a statement of identity, not predication. So, despite appearances, and only as a result of this quirky analysis, the "is" of predication must really be an "is" of identity.

So, out of this tortured grammar, out pops a new theory, one driven by another theory working in the background -- which is that all words are names, and these names represent things to us in material reality or abstract reality.

This then implies that if we cannot actually see the things language reflects or represents to us, they must be hidden, perhaps behind appearances. From this it is but a short step to the idea that all knowledge is actually of the occult, secret and non-material world, hence essential and Ideal -- but not the proper concern of common folk, whose 'defective', materially-grounded language created this 'problem' in the first place.24a

Incidentally, this view also creates serious problems understanding the nature of falsehood, a topic explored in Part Three of this Essay.

Hence, following the lead of Ancient and Medieval logicians (like Buridan -- and, of course, from a more modern period, Hegel himself), DM-theorists hold that since no particular can be predicated of any other, the articulation of names by the use of the connective "is" (in sentences like E11, and then E11a) must mean this diminutive verb in fact expresses a relation between a named individual and another named abstraction -- now interpreted as an abstract particular, Manhood.25

Since particulars can stand in relation to each other, this appeared to solve the problem created by the 'disappearing predication' noted above. That is why in DM, under Hegel's influence, the "is" of predication becomes the "is" of identity.

[As we shall see, the usual justification given for these moves is little more than window dressing.]

It is worth noting here that all this has arisen from a simple syntactical error, that of confusing predicate expressions with names!

For example, consider the following:

E12: Cicero is Tully.

E12a: Cicero is identical with Tully.

In E12, the "is" is genuinely one of identity (brought out in E12a). Both of these are arguably instances of the relational expression "x is identical with z".

[However, it would be wise for us not to ask (yet!) what the "is" in E12a means; as we will see this diminutive verb gave birth to this theory, and will, as we shall also see, kill it stone dead. A neat inner 'contradiction', if ever there was one....]

However, problems arise if this relational form is now seen as an archetype that all ('philosophical') propositions must instantiate. If it is, E11 will have to be re-written as:

E13: Blair is manhood.

[E11: Blair Manhood.]

Which should then be interpreted as:

E14: Blair is identical with Manhood.

The identity relation between Blair and the abstract particular Manhood is now plain to see. The particular is now the universal, according to this doctored sentence.

In this way, abstractions were conjured into existence as an other-worldy correlate of the abstract nouns found in ordinary language, or the jargon that Philosophers were fond of inventing -- all engineered by 'innovative' grammar like this.

If names in this world name material particulars, then abstract nouns must name abstractions, which exist, well... where?

This sort of reasoning initiated a futile two thousand year-long search for these alien beings -- motivated, as we will see, by alienated ruling-class thought.

In Essay Twelve, I provide the first materialist account of just how this process began in ancient Greece. [Summary here.]

Now, defective reasoning like this could only be expressed in an Indo-European language, where Subjects and Predicates abound. Different language groups had to rely on still other linguistic tricks to give life to ruling ideologies. More of that later, too.

However, because of this syntactical segue, generality was killed-off; dialectically murdered, as it were. This is because in E14 we no longer have the general term "x is a man", but the name of an abstract particular "Manhood". This can be seen from the fact that it would make no sense to view E10 as asserting an identity between Blair and a predicate:

E10: Blair is a man.

How could Blair (a human), or his name (if we avoid the 'use/mention' bear trap here), be identical with a minor grammatical feature of the Indo-European family of languages?

But it does seem to make some sort of sense to see it as expressing an identity between Blair and an abstract concept, or abstract particular, something the predicate is now taken to have named.26

Unfortunately, our consideration of the malign consequences of the idea that all words are names has not yet run its full course. If all words are names, then this "is" must name the identity relation -- which is supposed to exist between these particulars -- i.e., that this "is" is either a name for Identity or a name for the relation of Identity (the subtle differences here need not detain us).

But neither of these could be correct. This can be seen if we attempt to treat this "is" as one or the other, replacing it with its supposed name:

E15: Cicero Identity Tully.

E16: Cicero Identity Relation Tully.

[E12: Cicero is Tully.]

[Here, in E15 and E16, the "is" in E12 has been replaced by its supposed name in both cases.]

As we can see, E15 and E16 cannot say anything, for they are both lists.27

Admittedly, in many contexts, the word "is" works quite happily as a relational expression (for identity), as we saw it do in E12. But even then, the "is" of identity names nothing, since it is clearly not a name. Treating it as one turns sentences into lists.

But if this use of "is" is not a name, then predicates cannot be names either. [More of this later, too.]

E10: Blair is a man.

Now, to sum up: in E10, where a clear predicative use of general terms has been expressed, a misreading of the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity in fact simply reveals that an earlier misinterpretation of general predicative expressions as names of abstract particulars has already taken place. In that case, a metaphysical theory has motivated a linguistic re-write. [Why this was done forms the subject of Essay Twelve.]

Now, it is this move (and not the attempt to perform the un-performable process of abstraction -- nor the attempt to access pure concepts and categories of the understanding, or of speculative reason, or whatever the jargon says, nor yet is it the re-christening of the diminutive verb "is" as a name (of "Being", or of "Identity")) --, it is this syntactic segue, motivated by clearly identifiable ruling-class interests, that destroys ordinary propositions and wrecks their ability to express generality, and which kick-started traditional Philosophy.28

"John" And The Entire Universe

No Entity Without Identity

Thus, the mythical process of abstraction was motivated by nothing more than a syntactically inept re-write of general terms as Proper Names --, and it is not based on an uncheckable, semi-occult ability some claim to possess of being able to process concepts in their heads at the flick of a noun.

This false move originally arose (and it still arises) from the actual abstraction (removal, cutting-off, or alienation) of concept expressions from their usual material/concrete contexts in ordinary, everyday propositions.

By abstracting ordinary predicative expressions from simple sentences like E10, and turning them into the names of abstract particulars, traditional Philosophers, and now dialecticians, were able to construct a whole new branch of Super-Knowledge: Metaphysics. So just as science studied the material world, Philosophy studied this hidden world, a world of Super-Facts, and Super-Duper Laws (i.e., 'Essences' and 'Necessities').29

Of course, in doing this, traditional Philosophers (and their latter-day conservative progeny: dialecticians) paid no heed to how such expressions are actually used in everyday material contexts. Ancient, aristocratic theorists had excellent, class-motivated reasons for doing this (these are explored in Essay Twelve, summary here); dialectical traditionalists also had first-rate (petty-bourgeois) reasons, too, to copy them (these are detailed in Essay Nine, summary here).

This ideological and politically-inspired re-analysis was something to which the early Marx and Engels themselves drew attention (see Note 30).

However, traditional moves like these were (and still are) justified by the essentialist knowledge they seemed to deliver. The fact that they did this cheaply (no experiments, or expensive equipment were required) was an added advantage.

The profound ramifications of this politically-motivated wrong-turn need not concern us here, but their effect on DM-epistemology can be highlighted by examining this error (i.e., the misconstrual of the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity) in more detail as it applies more locally.

As will soon become clear, this syntactic segue affects every major DM-thesis. This is the heart of the Dialectical Monster, its inner demon, for here we have found the repository of the Dialectical Dilithium Crystals.

So, the Identity Theory of Predication (with added Hegelian nuances) features in the dialectical criticism of the LOI, in the belief that reality is contradictory (and that everything is a UO), in the idea that true knowledge is only of the infinite, in the thesis that everything is interconnected, in the claim that motion and change are inherent properties of matter, in the belief that there are no real falsehoods, just closer approximations on the Absolute truth -- and thus in the idea that truth is the Whole --, and finally in the doctrine that freedom is just the dialectical flip-side of necessity.

So, from this logical blunder, a whole host of intricately knotted DM-theses have been woven by generations of eager dialectical hands.

[UO = Unity of Opposites; LOI = Law of Identity.]

However, as noted above, this initial false-step arose from an inept analysis of ordinary predication, which transformed it into a disguised form of identity, of naming, or of linking named particulars. In turn, that move itself encouraged the idea that general terms in fact refer to concepts, ideas, essences or abstractions.

Alongside this ran the notion that the process of abstraction enabled each adept to make a series of surprisingly easy discoveries -- related to fundamental aspects of reality, to which suitably distorted ordinary general words were said to 'refer' -- without leaving his or her armchair.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Theses from thought; Dogma from daydreams.

This approach itself was based on three main ideas:

(1) There are things called "essences" that underlie objects and processes in nature. These have a rational structure and can be apprehended by the application of thought alone.

(2) When viewed aright, general terms are disguised names, and they name these "essences".

(3) Ordinary words are unsuitable for expressing deeper, essential truths -- even if they dimly hint at them (to the "understanding", perhaps). A more muscular approach to theory is therefore required; "speculative thought" once engaged upon enables those brave enough to venture forth to gain knowledge of these "essences". But, "essences" can't be pointed at (nor can they be "eaten, or tasted or…."), but they are exist nonetheless -- traditional philosophy tells us so. Indeed, their existence cannot be confirmed by any known physical method, which means that their actuality can only be 'verified' by "indirect means". While we cannot see them, or detect them in any way, shape or form, the logical structure of our sentences tells us they really do exist.

Naturally, that means these "essences" have to be imposed on the material world, their reality taken on trust.

They cannot be read from the world, but they can be read from suitably 'doctored' propositions.30

Normally (i.e., to a normal, materially-orientated human being -- like, say, a worker) the occurrence of the word "is" in an everyday sentence would usually herald an incipient predication, i.e., that someone was about to say something about someone or something else, such as: "The boss is a crook". Plainly, this does not mean that the boss is identical with a crook! (Which one?) Or even the boss is identical with the essence of Crook!

A sentence like this would not be taken as hinting at the presence a profound philosophical truth hidden in the linguistic undergrowth, capable of being tracked down only by a gaggle of suitably-trained traditional philosophers.

Indeed, predication itself would not normally be taken to be about the alleged occult "essences" underlying appearances, which can only be picked out by the use of a super-duper "is" of identity. Of course, that is plainly why no worker would come up with such a 'theory', and it is why in its modern and most sophisticated form only an arch Idealist and Hermetic Philosopher (i.e., Hegel) actually did.

[What this has to do with Hermeticism will be examined later.]

In stark contrast -- and on the basis of (1)-(3) above --, those much less in tune with material reality than ordinary folk are (i.e., ruling-class hangers-on -- aka: "traditional philosophers") found they could with ease spot such coded messages mysteriously hidden in the use of everyday material words. All they had to do was "reflect" on them, re-write them in their 'correct' philosophical form, and the need to test the resulting theses in repeatable experiments could be avoided.

Of course, this is easy to do if you have more leisure time on your hands than is good for you.

In this way then, and only to the select few, it was plain that each diminutive "is" always hides an identity statement expressing a relation between an individual and an invisible "essence" -- camouflaged by its otherwise innocent-looking outer façade.

For ease of reference, let us call the above approach to language: the "Language Implies Essence" view -- or, LIMPE, for short.31

Mythocondrial John

{This term is explained in Note 31a}

The disastrous philosophical impact on dialectics of just such a retreat from the material-, into a LIMPE-, world can best be appreciated by a consideration of the use dialecticians themselves made of the following overworked predication (in this case, taken from Lenin):

H1: John is a man.

Given the truth of LIMPE, H1 is not just saying something of John -- as only the 'vulgar' might rashly conclude.

No, it alerts the Philosopher to a relation that exists between two named entities, i.e., John and the abstract universal Man (Humanity, Mankind or Manhood). But, since it is not possible to predicate one individual thing of another, the original predication must then be re-configured so that it now re-emerges as an ascription of one or more of the following:

(a) A class inclusion relation between an individual and a named group, class, category, collection or set.

(b) An identity relation between a named individual and another named particular, individual or named 'general' concept, class, category, collection or set.

© An identity relation between two classes, groups, concepts or ideas.

(d) A partial or complete 'containment' relation between subject and predicate terms.32

Ever since at least Plato and Aristotle's day, metaphysicians of every stripe have seized on one or more of the above as the 'correct' analysis of superficially simple sentences like H1 -- a sentence, note, that wouldn't even fool working-class children.

One or more of the above now serve to motivate the allegation DM-theorists make that FL is based on the LOI. The implied reasoning appears to be the following:

(1) All predications are disguised identity statements.

(2) Identity statements cannot adequately reflect changing reality since they attribute unchanging identities to individuals, or to the relations between them -- in the present case, that which supposedly exists between John and Manhood. Language and FL thus put things into unchanging categories.

(3) Therefore, ordinary language and FL are ultimately defective; this is because they are based on the idea that things do not change. Ordinary language and FL attribute "this" or "that" unchanging property or nature to things in reality, and assert that, for example, John is identical to a universal.

[LOI = Law of Identity; FL = Formal Logic.]

Now, the 'correct' DM-analysis of such propositions reveals the following deeper truth: even though ordinary language alludes to an identity between subject and predicate names, this cannot be correct because no particular can be identical to a universal. So, John is not-identical to this predicate.

So, this has led "speculative reason" "dialectically" to the opposite conclusion that the subject of such an ascription of identity is not (and cannot be) identical with the said predicate (here interpreted as a named abstract individual). And yet, this cannot be so, since John is essentially a man, and this then leads to the final result that John is not not-identical to Manhood, since that represents an essential truth about him. So everything contains negativity within itself, and that is what powers the universe, as each thing is paired with its own unique 'other'.

That is why this approach to 'logic' was called the source of the Dialectical Dilithium Crystals; Super-Science from Science Fiction.

In that case, LIMPE encourages dialecticians to the inevitable conclusion that not only do our words and concepts contain contradictions ("John is both identical with, and not identical with, Manhood"), concepts themselves change dialectically as a result of this internal development -- as "Reason" reprocesses them at a higher level, reflecting parallel changes in Ideal reality (or if given a materialist flip, which reflect the changes that in fact take place in material reality).

This means that concepts not only have 'negativity' and hence "movement" built into them, they develop as "new content" emerges (via the NON). This further implies that things and processes (now irreversibly confused with words) possess "identity-in-difference", rather than mere identity. This is because no subject could literally be identical with a predicate, no individual could be the same as a universal. But, individuals have to be identified (that is, they have to have qualities predicated of them) -- in order for them to have an essential, determinate nature. But that just means that they must both be identical with and not be identical with whatever it is that the relevant predicate denotes. This therefore does not undermine the LOI, it shows how it dialectically transforms itself.

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

So, after having been suitably processed (i.e., dialectically mangled), all our words seem to have dialectics built into them.

Concepts are, as it were, metaphysically 'fitted up': words are forged and evidence planted, or invented, as part of an elaborate 'thought experiment' to give substance to this 'philosophical frame-up'.

Thus, not only is "thought" driven to an opposite pole in its bid to differentiate an object like John from all others (that is because, clearly, John is not Peter, not Fred, not Tarquin…), it is forced to conclude that no individual object could be a universal, either (i.e., John is not mankind!).

At this stage of the proceedings, Spinoza's 'principle' is sent into play, and we are told that every determination is also a negation. Hey presto, everything in existence has negativity programmed into it because mangled language like this says so.

But, if you are going to tell a lie, tell a big one; negativity lies not just at the heart of John in his relation to his over-hyped Manhood, it exists right at the heart of everything in existence (visible, invisible, essence, accident -- it matters not), and this is simply because the dialectical logic inherent in our sentences declares that whatever something is, it both is and is not, and additionally it is double not (i.e., the NON, again).

More interestingly, for dialecticians at least, if H1 is examined in more detail, in a "speculative" sort of way, free from the usual constraints material or social reality place on language -- hence, if 'Reason' is alienated from social being, or if language "goes on holiday", to paraphrase Wittgenstein -- we may now rightly conclude that John could not possibly be identical with all men. From there it is but a short step to the derivation of the aforementioned dialectical contradiction: according to H1, John both is and is not identical with all men -- the same and yet different from the pack. But, because of the NON, he is also not not identical with all men; he is thus identical with his own 'other', his Ideal Alter-Ego, this artificial abstraction that has no material correlate.

This now traps the hapless John in the dialectical machinery, which also powers the rest of the entire universe, since he is now a unity of opposites. He must of necessity undergo dialectical change as a result of the logical properties LIMPE has put into him. This is the key to the self-movement of everything in nature (as Lenin put it).

However -- to spoil the metaphysical fun --, the only evidential support that this creative word-juggling enjoys is this inappropriate re-write of ordinary language, the inner 'logic' of which itself turns out to depend on a crass misreading the surface grammar of a sub-set of sentences found only in the Indo-European family of languages -- and nothing more.

John should appeal his case.

The Dialectical Menagerie

Several other myth-begotten creatures of DM-lore owe their existence to this error of original syntax, one of these being the quasi-mystical "Totality". A reading of the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity motivates the idea that everything must be inter-related.

The 'reasoning' runs thus:

If, as in H1, John is both identical and not identical to a universal, and this universal has the infinite built into it (otherwise it would not be a universal), then John is only himself when he is viewed in infinite dialectical connection with everything else of this sort. If John is now put in a similar relation with all the predicates applicable to him (including all the negative ones expressed in propositions like "John is not a wombat", or "John is not the Crab Nebula"), then he is in fact only an individual of the sort he is because of the seemingly endless and infinite connections he actually has with everything in existence, which give him a determinate nature (if we but knew it). All these things are "internally related" to John -- not materially, but 'logically'.

John thus assumes truly cosmic significance; the whole of reality is linked to him and makes of him what he is. Not only that, but everything else is conditioned in like manner by John in return. John is now at the centre of a web of identity and difference spanning across all that exists; he is now situated at the very heart the meaning universe (and, to be fair to others, so is everyone and everything else). All of Being depends on him to a small extent, and he depends on it for everything, and vice versa.

All this from a single sentence written in Indo-European grammar. Who'd have thought it? Hermes himself could have done no better.

In truth, John has achieved his inter-galactic status fraudulently; it is entirely bogus. Because of the misinterpretation of a diminutive word (viz., "is"), John's dialectical bona fides are as genuine as a Blair smile.

Even so, if we ignore that boring/'crude' aside, one small step for John is a huge step for mankind. Innovative logic of this sort cannot be restricted to one individual; it has definite imperial aspirations as humanity itself now assumes universal significance The fate of our entire species now takes centre stage in John's meaning universe -- all guaranteed by the semi-Divine Logic built into DL. Thus, whatever happens to humanity is interconnected with everything in reality, and vice versa. Could the Book of Revelation have put it any better/worse?32a

[DL = Dialectical Logic.]

Not only is John related to the Whole, he is what he is because that diminutive verb implies he both is and is not identical with an infinite concept. Indeed, everything else is what it is because of what John is.33 Every person, each speck and dot in the universe, and every process in nature, for all of time, has thus assigned to it, its rightful mediated place in the Infinite Whole, each identical and not identical with its 'other', guaranteed by a 'logic' that smuggled identity into sentences in place of boring old material predication.

In this new Gospel of John; in the beginning was a mangled word: "is".

Thus, the grammar of subject and predicate connects John to infinite reality in ways that devotees of Eastern religious cults will one day learn to envy -- had they not already done something rather similar centuries before Hegel put pen to misuse.

This view of reality sees the logical structure of sentences mirroring the logical essence of Being. Those who accept LIE and LIMPE hold that every object is simultaneously at the centre of an infinite web of relations; all are insignificant and all cosmically important at the same time. Part and Whole are thus interlinked and inter-determine one another.34

Moreover, while John is not all of mankind, he is somehow dialectically united with it. This fact allows necessity and contingency to enter into the picture. John is contingently a man in that he is an individual, but he is also necessarily a man because the abstract universal so identifies him as one. In fact he is a UO: he is both man and non-man (i.e., not all men), revealing his essence as identity-in-difference. However, the essential nature of each particular (such as John) is not immediately apparent to the senses, since this essence exists as an abstract concept/idea. Nevertheless, the logical properties essential to each individual (predication/identity, unity/difference) still underlie appearances. The former may shine forth through the latter -- but, naturally, only to those who have the right sort of eyes to see.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

This means that John is in reality other than he seems, to those who rely on superficial sense perception: John's material properties appear to be only contingently interrelated to those of other objects he might encounter. This misperception is either the result of a 'commonsense' failure to see things in the abstract -- i.e., essentially --, or it is because of a failure to connect the abstract with the concrete in dialectical union. However, below the surface, where eyes cannot pry, the necessary connections that exist between individuals and universals may easily be ascertained if they are viewed in the right manner (i.e., essentially, again, but not materially). They are revealed to the adept, not by observation and experiment, but merely by the 'careful' dialectical analysis of words/sentences about John. In this way, those versed in these esoteric arts are able discover truths unavailable to those lost in the mists of 'commonsense'.

Dialectical adepts can now extrapolate from nouns to necessity and from concepts to contingency, arguing that necessity and chance govern nature because -- sure as eggs both are and are not eggs -- these de-personified Greek gods (the old Moira and Tyche) rule words and concepts relating to John. Thus, the conundrum that connects chance with necessity is both created and solved by innovative grammar that somehow maps out everything in the entire universe.

Through all of this, dialecticians imagine that they are examining reality itself, and not just words about it. In fact, and contrary to what one would expect of those who still claim to have the word "materialist" somewhere in their title, expert 'dialectical insight' like this is not based on careful empirical work; it is the result of the exercise of a rare gift, the ability to view ordinary sentences in two distinct ways, all at one go:

(1) Superficially, as composed of subjects and predicates -- mirroring the surface appearance of things, which is adequate enough for materially-bound individuals, like workers. And:

(2) More profoundly, as identity statements that allude to the underlying identities-in-difference located at the heart of all objects and processes -- reflecting the abstract-concrete structure of nature -- the special preserve of Super-Scientists, i.e., those with the dialectical equivalent of a Third Eye.

Hence, a sort of dialectical gestalt-switch operates in the thought of dialecticians, a handy sort of knack based on the ability to hop back and forth between two differing interpretations of the role of the word "is", as it features in just a tiny a sub-set of sentences found in just one family of languages.

Thus, given the truth of LIE, words in effect contain a logical code that hides a cosmic secret -- the dialectical equivalent of the Kabbalah.35

Dialectics, far from being the "Algebra of Revolution", is more like its "Abracadabra".

Guilty As Charged

In that case, this grammatical hocus pocus represents the real dialectical "path of cognition" -- the logical route to enlightenment along which all aspiring dialecticians must pass at least once in their lives.

This is not just my invention; it is easy to confirm by a consideration of the following passages:

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]

"The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident." [Engels (1954), pp.214-15.]

Engels clearly saw no problem with his derivation of scientific conclusions from an idiosyncratic interpretation of the logical structure of a handful of sentences. While he might have thought he was analysing nature, he was in fact merely reproducing Hegel's own misinterpretation of the logical properties of a sub-section (and not an important one either) of Indo-European grammar.

The fact that he was deluding himself can be seen from his use of the phrase "self-evident". Substantive truths about the world may be evident following upon an investigation that uncovers the relevant evidence, but they cannot be self-evident -- not unless they can attest for themselves.

In that case, Engels's use of the phrase "self-evident" is either hyperbolic, or it is an unconscious give-away. When something is self-evident it provides evidence on its own behalf. Naturally, that would make such entities self-authenticating and auto-interpreting, implying that they were in fact agents of some sort, and therefore quasi-human. If Engels was serious in his use of this word -- and it must be recalled that this passage comes from unpublished notebooks, so they might not represent his final thoughts --, it would reveal just how deep his Idealism went. Here, he seems to attribute intelligence to the linguistic expression of data and not just to the humans who produce it.

Self-evidence, of course, emerges (if it does) from a 'conceptual' or linguistic analysis of certain words, phrases or propositions, and for which extraneous evidence is irrelevant (as the phrase itself suggests). Now this epistemological state could only arise from a linguistic expression if it were tautological, where, perhaps, its content would strike an appraiser as a trivial, linguistic 'truth'. So, if things were as Engels said, then nature could only contain self-evident truths if it were a huge tautology, or, indeed, if it had true sentences plastered all over it.

However, nature is not made of subjects and predicates, nor has it been fly-posted with indicative sentences by a mischievous agent of the Lord. Engels surely knew this. The only conclusion possible therefore is that he too had been deceived by LIE, as it seems have all subsequent dialecticians.

Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks also contain similar passages that illustrate yet more innovative 'logic'. A particularly good example (and one which almost single-handedly commits all of the gaffes outlined above) is the following:

"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60. Emphases in the original.]

Admittedly, Lenin did go on to mention the general support that the sciences provided for this view, but he failed to say how that could possibly confirm the truth of any of his sweeping generalisations.36 For example, linguistic juggling excepted, what confirmatory evidence could there be for the following?

"[O]pposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc…. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence…." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]

In fact, Lenin was quite open and honest about the real source of the above dialectical chicanery -- it follows from what Hegel thought was true about what we say:

"Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized)…. [F]or when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other…. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]

Lenin is quite clear here: dialectics follows from the logical properties of sentences, from what we say (or, rather from what Hegel says we say) -- not from a "careful" study of the world, and as it now turns out, not even from a careful study of what we in fact do say!

Is Reality Covered In Dialectical Fingerprints?

It could be objected to this that propositions are quite uncontroversially used to convey information; human cognition reflects reality accurately when this information is drawn from nature and tested in practice. Hence, it could be argued that Lenin was simply spelling-out the consequences of this view, pointing out that the logical structure of language could not help but mirror deeper form if language is part of the world. That being the case, human beings may legitimately infer substantive truths about reality from the nature of language, since the dialectical structure of reality will already have been 'programmed' into discourse as a result of the interplay between reflection and practice, carried out in previous generations.

If this is so, why then all the pretence that DM-theses are only acceptable if they have passed rigorous empirical tests? If truths about nature can be obtained so easily -- that is, if they can be ascertained merely from the structure of sentences --, why all that pointless rigmarole of trying to deny that DM is a "master key" that can open the vaults of knowledge?

Indeed, if language did in fact contain truths about reality (programmed into its structure, say) then it could well serve as just such a key, and there would be no quibble. We could then openly admit our Idealism, loud and proud -- an admission that substantive truths are easy to obtain from thought alone, which would make the Idealism implicit in DM all the more explicit. It would then be clear that DM is based -- not on an inversion of Hegel -- but on a wholesale reversion to Hegel.

Nevertheless, this picture of the relation between thought an language was in fact committed to canvass long before the required evidence was to hand -- metaphysical casuistry like this began with Thales, and reached classical form in the writings of Greek Philosophers (like Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, Pseudo-Dionysius and Iamblichus -- the real ancestors of DM). To be sure, empirical evidence did not (and could not) prompt the idea that reality is mirrored in discourse, nor could it reveal that there were essences in nature, or that everything is interconnected, or that everything is a UO and riddled with 'contradictions'.36a

However, a commitment to LIE -- motivated by the idea that reality possesses a logical form that just happens to match ancient Greek, and later European grammar -- permits all this dialectical dogmatism. If this is so, the whole sordid affair begins to make more sense. The fact that there are clear political and ideological reasons why thinkers who belonged to (or who were dependant on) the ruling-class were pre-disposed to making such moves only serves to underline this point.37

Again, it could be argued that since human knowledge has grown over the centuries, the input of practical activity cannot fail to have been reflected in language. If so, DM-theorists are only extracting from language what had already been put there.

This response has the merit of acknowledging the truth of the allegations made above and in Essay Twelve: like other systems of Metaphysics, DM is based on a fetishisation of language. That is, it is predicated on the view that language, far from being a means of communication, is really a secret code, which contains within it profound truths about nature and society. In that Essay, this approach to knowledge will be shown to be based on something called the RRT. Further discussion of it will be postponed until then.

[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]

Nevertheless, the situation here is far worse than the above might suggest: Lenin made unqualified claims about all of reality for all of time (without exception) based on an examination of a few simplistic and unrepresentative sentences. Even if the heroic labours of past abstractors had encoded into language all that they knew, or thought they knew, about anything whatsoever, Lenin's claims actually applied to all of reality for all of time, way beyond the meagre knowledge of ancestral abstractors. His bold extrapolation of dialectics went into areas that our ancestors knew nothing about, and so could only have amounted its imposition on nature, since they could not have programmed into language what they did not and could not have known.

But, even worse still: How would it be possible for anyone to guarantee that the information allegedly encoded in language was correct if there is no conceivable way of checking it? For all Lenin knew, this inbuilt linguistic 'data' could have been totally wrong. [In fact, on this view there is no way to distinguish truth from error. More on this in Part Three of this Essay.] But, no amount of evidence could prove sufficient to substantiate the sort of claims Lenin made above (or those recorded in Essay Two); the conclusions he drew about the nature of the entire world (from a single sentence) were of a type and order that puts them way beyond any conceivable verification. As such, his theses could only have been based on a thoroughly traditional, a priori view of reality, subsequently reflected back onto it, with just a tiny 'linguistic fig-leaf' for cover.

However, if Lenin had gone about his daily agitational business uttering the kind of sentences he considered metaphysically significant (such as "John is a man"), comrades would rightly have thought his sanity was in doubt. Just why such agitationally-challenged sentences are deemed dialectically significant is, therefore, entirely mysterious.38

Compare Lenin's conclusions about "John" with the following sentence, which presumably DM-theorists will want to reject as false:

H2: God is a father.

This is because H2 perhaps expresses an ideologically-motivated belief for which there is not a shred of evidence. But, if so, to be consistent, we should also repudiate the following for a similar lack of evidence:

H3: The individual is the universal.

H4: The opposites are identical.

There is no evidence for the truth of any these sentences that is not itself based on an ancient mis-analysis of their alleged grammatical structure, and only on that.

Indeed, it is worth recalling that given certain definitions of the word "God", H1 is in fact a tautology. However, the logical status of H2 would not be sufficient to force its acceptance as a profound truth; no dialectician in his or her left mind would accept an argument that claimed that the whole truth of theology is contained in such propositions. We would not let assorted priests and mystery-mongers argue that the past endeavours of intrepid abstractors and linguistic pioneers had programmed into language truths about the nature of the 'Godhead', forcing us to accept this piece of Divine Logic.

The same should be concluded about H1, H3 and H4. In fact, DM-theorists should only feel confident about deriving truths from such sentences if they are prepared to acknowledge the validity of Anselm's infamous "Ontological Argument" for the existence of "God" -- for that 'argument' manages to wring 'profound' truths about divine reality from some equally tortured prose, but far less shaky grammar.

OK! Reach For The Prozac

Despite this, there are several other serious problems with Lenin's reasoning -- ones that require resolution before questions can even be raised about the support his theses gain from what little evidence there is.

Lenin clearly interpreted the "is" in H1 as an "is" of identity (and later perhaps as an "is" of class inclusion), but because it plainly is not one of identity in the vernacular, he was then able to 'derive' several counter-intuitive conclusions from the incongruity he had thus artificially introduced.39 However, instead of concluding perhaps that Hegel's "genius" had misled him -- or that this was not the only way (or even the most obvious or natural way) to interpret such simple sentences -- Lenin proceeded to weave several lengths of dialectical cloth from a few threads of woolly thought.

The fact that the "is" of H1 is not that of identity can be seen from Lenin's own use of it. Consider one of his sentences:

H5: "[T]he opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical."

From this we can extract two further sentences:

H4: The opposites are identical.

H6: The individual is opposed to the universal.

[H4 plainly contains a cognate of "is" -- namely, "are".]

However, if "is" always indicated identity -- and could be interpreted as an expression of the form "x is identical with z" -- then we should be able to re-write H4 and H6 in the following manner:

H7: The opposites are identical with identical.

H8: The individual is identical with opposed to the universal.

[In H7, the verb "are" (from H6), and in H8 the verb "is" (from H6), have been replaced by "are identical with" and "is identical with", respectively.]

It does not take any dialectical logic at all (and certainly no bourgeois prejudice whatsoever) to see what nonsense results from this 'brilliant' Hegelian insight. Nor is it difficult to foresee the infinite task Lenin's 'analysis' holds open as he (or anyone else) tries to say what the meaning of each "is" (or the meaning of each "are") is that recurs in "is identical with" (or in "are identical with") in H7 and H8, now made explicit in H9 and H10:

H9: The opposites are identical with identical with identical.

H10: The individual is identical with identical with opposed to the universal.

Lest someone thinks this unfair to Lenin, they are invited to try to say for themselves what the "is" in "is identical" itself means. Neutral onlookers can only wish such brave souls plenty of luck, and hope they are blessed with boundless patience, limitless supplies of paper and ink -- and, of course, plenty more Prozac.

It is worth recalling, though, that the above challenge only arose because DM-theorists insist that the "is" of predication is really an "is of identity" -- that it is the same as "is identical with". In assuming this (again, with no proof), they themselves have to use another "is" to reveal the good news to the rest of us -- as in:

H11: The "is" of predication is the "is" of identity.

But the middle "is" in H11 cannot -- ex hypothesi cannot -- be one of mere predication. It, too, has to be one of identity. In that case we obtain:

H12: The "is" of predication is identical with the "is" of identity.

H13: The "is" of predication is identical with identical with the "is" of identity.

As each alleged "is" of predication is suitably replaced by an "is identical with" that it is supposed to be identical with itself.

On the other hand, those who hold that the "is" of predication is in reality just that (i.e., one of predication) are not faced with such an infinite and morale-sapping task. This is because they seek neither to revise nor to re-write ordinary material language in such Idealist terms, replacing the ordinary "is" with another sort of "is", one that allows metaphysicians to think they can change predicates into the names of abstract particulars as and when they want.

So, when genuine materialists say things like "Blair is a warmonger", they are not saying that Blair is identical to a warmonger (which one?), they are merely saying that the description "warmonger" applies to the individual named "Blair". No "is" anywhere in sight.

So, you can put the Prozac away, comrades.40

Don’t Break The Circle

It could be objected here that this completely misses the point. DM-theorists do not argue that knowledge begins with the "isolation of particulars in thought"; in the search for knowledge human beings do not have to start from scratch, as the above suggests. On the contrary, as TAR notes:

"[I]t is impossible simply to stare at the world as it immediately presents itself to our eyes and hope to understand it. To make sense of the world, we must bring to it a framework composed of elements of our past experience; what we have learned of others' experience, both in the present and in the past; and of our later reflections on and theories about this experience." [Rees (1998), p.63.]41

"[A]ll science generalizes and abstracts from 'empirically verifiable facts.' Indeed, the very concept of 'fact' is itself an abstraction, because no one has ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard a 'fact,' which is a mental generalization that distinguishes actually existing phenomena from imaginary conceptions. Similarly, all science 'deductively anticipates' developments -- what else is an hypothesis tested by experimentation? The dialectic is, among other things, a way of investigating and understanding the relationship between abstractions and reality. And the 'danger of arbitrary construction' is far greater using an empirical method which thinks that it is dealing with facts when it is actually dealing with abstractions than it is with a method that properly distinguishes between the two and then seeks to explain the relationship between them." [Ibid., p.131.]

These passages appear to show that the criticisms of the dialectical process presented here are flawed from beginning to end.42 They clearly demonstrate that no dialectician of any intelligence would imagine that in the search for knowledge, human beings just look at objects and processes divorced from historical, social or linguistic contexts, and blurt stuff out. As Engels himself noted:

"…[T]he concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Conrad Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]

This means that the dialectical circuit cannot simply be joined at any point -- cut into, as if this were some sort of a dance. Hence, it could be claimed that this is where the above analysis goes completely wrong: it assumes that the DM-circuit begins at a particular point, and because it cannot do this the incorrect conclusion is then drawn that DM-epistemology is fundamentally flawed. As a matter of fact, the objection could continue, knowledge arises out of a historical process. Humans do not just go about "identifying particulars" (etc); they use whatever historical, social, linguistic and epistemological resources they have to hand to advance knowledge and refine technique (a process that is nevertheless distorted by the class struggle, and ruling-class ideology, etc.). To paraphrase Marx: human beings make their own concepts, but they do not do so under social or logical circumstances of their own choosing. DM-theorists highlight this fact; they do not ignore it -- or, so this response could go.

Unfortunately, this reply is not strictly relevant since it confuses the logical point being made in this Essay with what is in fact an epistemological fairy tale. That legend arises out of the mythical nature of the process of abstraction, unfortunately omitted from the response volunteered above. If abstraction cannot take place, then 'its' results cannot be passed on from one generation to the next, nor can they be built upon by later dialecticians. The myth of the 'original abstraction' (on which this fable depends) -- like Adam's legendary fall from grace -– fails to provide DM with the explanation it needs, since (once again to paraphrase Marx) it itself requires explanation. Hence, the logical points made above cannot be neutralised by an extrapolation into the mists of time.

To paraphrase once more (but this time Lessing): the accidental truths of history cannot provide a secure foundation for ignoring the normative rules of Logic.43

Worse still, even if they could, the chronicles of past heroic abstractions still won't pass muster. This is because this myth is, like other metaphysical yarns, devoid of sense -- as we shall see in the next Part of this Essay.

This is about 1/8 of the whole Essay.

More here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm

[hoopla]

I'll try again.
Can consciousness be described scientifically?

Why does consciousness emerge at all when the neural state correlated with, say an itch, occurs?

:ph34r:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Can consciousness be described scientifically?

There is no such thing as 'consciousness'.



Why does consciousness emerge at all when the neural state correlated with, say an itch, occurs?

Read my earlier comment.

So, your two questions are empty.

[hoopla]

There clearly is. A constant flux of perception. To deny it, seems very very very foolish.

I will not be prised away from phenomenology easily.

I read the last 2 posts, and, if you care about feedback from the likes of me, I can&#39;t help :P It would take so long to work out if you have destroyed dialectics, has anyone tried <open question>?

I don&#39;t even know what f****** dialectics is :lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


A constant flux of perception. To deny it, seems very very very foolish.

Once again, read what i posted: all I denied was there was such a thing as consciousness.

I did not deny that you, for example, are aware of your surroundings.


I will not be prised away from phenomenology easily.

Well you are welcome to it.

I could not follow this:


I read the last 2 posts, and, if you care about feedback from the likes of me, I can&#39;t help It would take so long to work out if you have destroyed dialectics, has anyone tried <open question>?

I don&#39;t even know what f****** dialectics is

"Tried..." what?

Have you been talking to those rocks again???

[hoopla]

Why does an individuated (in the way that you can have experience which I am not aware of) experience emerge at all when the neural state correlated with, say an itch, occurs?

I was asking if anyone at revleft had read enough of your work to form a critical opinion on whether you had been sucessful at demolishing philosophy/DM. Are there better attempts to :D ;)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla, what am I, some sort of sage, who sees all, answers all....???


Why does an individuated (in the way that you can have experience which I am not aware of) experience emerge at all when the neural state correlated with, say an itch, occurs?

I don&#39;t know, maybe it is no longer scared, or it grew tired of hiding.

[Ask a scientist, not me&#33;]


I was asking if anyone at revleft had read enough of your work to form a critical opinion on whether you had been sucessful at demolishing philosophy/DM. Are there better attempts to

Look, you are going to have to stop ending your sentences abruptly or you might find

[hoopla]

I don&#39;t think that science will be able to answer that question. So, either you treat it as a brute fact, or you accept that as there is such a question that is to be answered, a non-naturalist philosophy might be needed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I don&#39;t think that science will be able to answer that question.

Well, stop asking it, then.

[Unless you have a direct line to &#39;god&#39;.]


So, either you treat it as a brute fact, or you accept that as there is such a question that is to be answered, a non-naturalist philosophy might be needed.

Or I treat it as a

[hoopla]

Rosa: Do you have a reason why philosophy cannot tell us anything about being? Sorry if this is old ground.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Do you have a reason why philosophy cannot tell us anything about being?

Because it is the present participle of the verb &#39;to be&#39;, and that is the job of linguists.

[hoopla]

Prove that it is the job of linguists and no-one else. Sorry if you already have.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Prove that it is the job of linguists and no-one else.

No need to, unless you happen not to know that they are language specialists.

But, did you really need me to tell you that &#39;being&#39; is a participle of the verb &#39;to be&#39;?

If you did, then are you in any position to understand the word &#39;prove&#39;?

[And, of course, as usual, the use of the words &#39;no one else&#39; here is your own invention. I did not use them.]

[hoopla]

Man Rosa, are you trying a genuine insult for a change.

I was slightly unsure of what &#39;participle&#39; means if you really wanted to know how "bright" I was.

Why don&#39;t you engage with the damn question. You clearly think that only certain types of analytic philosophy and science can answer questions concerning what exists and how it exists, ontology, being, whatever. Bit vague for you. Ha ha, good joke.

I think that philosophy can explain what exists, being, and you, I am obliged to assume, think otherwise. Just get to the point.

Get to the point.

Why?

:unsure:

And I didn&#39;t ask about &#39;being&#39; I asked about "being". Unless you hold that signs only refer to other signs or some rubbish.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


I was slightly unsure of what &#39;participle&#39; means if you really wanted to know how "bright" I was.

You do know, since you used the word &#39;being&#39;.


Why don&#39;t you engage with the damn question. You clearly think that only certain types of analytic philosophy and science can answer questions concerning what exists and how it exists, ontology, being, whatever. Bit vague for you. Ha ha, good joke.

I did; that is the only sense I can make of the word &#39;being&#39;.

If you know of any other, please let me know.


I think that philosophy can explain what exists, being, and you, I am obliged to assume, think otherwise. Just get to the point.

Get to the point.

Once again, I did.

And, you are welcome to your beliefs; they agree with the dominant ruling ideas.

As a Marxist, I would rather want to disown them (even if they made any sort of sense).


[b]And I didn&#39;t ask about &#39;being&#39; I asked about "being".

I am sorry, I did not realise that double quotation marks were that important to you.

OK, I will try again:

Because "being" is the present participle of the verb "to be", and that is the job of linguists.

Happy now??


Unless you hold that signs only refer to other signs or some rubbish.

What have the contents of a dustbin got to do with this?

[hoopla]

Because "being" is the present participle of the verb "to be", and that is the job of linguists."Being" is the entity that the term "being" refers to. A verb is a term. So unless you are saying that the term "being" refers to another term, and not a non-linguistic entity; you are typing meaningless sentences, I think.

I would like to ask, what proof do you have, that philosophy can not teach us about the subject of ontology, or being, or things, or real entities, or existence?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


"Being" is the entity that the term "being" refers to.

On the contrary, as I tried to tell you, "being" is part of a verb, and verbs are not the names anything (they work in other ways in sentences, as I tried to argue in that long post you said you worked through), so they cannot refer to anything.

They can only refer if they are changed into names -- which confirms my allegation that metaphysics can only be made to work if you misuse language.

So your characterisation is defective.


A verb is a term. So unless you are saying that the term "being" refers to another term, and not a non-linguistic entity; you are typing meaningless sentences, I think.

As I pointed out, your use of this verb makes your sentence an empty one (since it contains at least one meaningless term -- "being" as you seem to be using it).

Now, here is how "being" is used properly (I am surprised I have to tell you): "This thread is being used to trash metaphysics"; "Being late too often will get you sacked"; "Being confused is Hoopla&#39;s main hobby."

There, that sorts things out.

Now stop misusing langauge, or no one will be able to follow what you say.


I would like to ask, what proof do you have, that philosophy can not teach us about the subject of ontology, or being, or things, or real entities, or existence?

Re-read that long thread I posted earlier, locate any errors I made (if there are any), and then get back to me.

Of course, if you can&#39;t be bothered to do that, or have no time, OK.

But stop asking such questions of me then.

[If "Being" is an &#39;entity&#39;, where is it? On the Moon? Or in your pocket...?]

[hoopla]

:angry:

I genuinely don&#39;t know which post answers the question: what proof is there that philosophy cannot teach us about the subject of ontology, or things. Surely you don&#39;t expect me to read every single one of your posts to answer a single question.

I apologise for not looking up participle.

:mellow:

A would have thought that Being, thought of as an entity, is all entities; so yes, it is on the moon, in my pocket etc.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


what proof is there that philosophy cannot teach us about the subject of ontology, or things.

Well, I do not know what to tell you, except that the word &#39;ontology&#39; (with or without double quotation marks) is an empty term, so not even &#39;god&#39; can teach us about it.

And as far as &#39;things&#39; are concerned, the word is far too vague for me even to comment on.

So I suggest, once more, that you make your questions clearer, or you stop using empty words, otherwise I cannot help you.

For example, what the dialectics does this mean?


A would have thought that Being, thought of as an entity, is all entities; so yes, it is on the moon, in my pocket etc.

[Guest1]

The only role philosophy can still play that is not mystical newage bullshit is organizing thoughts. That&#39;s all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CYM:


The only role philosophy can still play that is not mystical newage bullshit is organizing thoughts. That&#39;s all.

Pity it has not worked with you.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Che y [email protected] 12 2006, 09:30 PM
The only role philosophy can still play that is not mystical newage bullshit is organizing thoughts. That&#39;s all.
Mystical new age bullhit. My, you sound well informed :lol:

;)

[hoopla]

Rosa: Erm,
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain what exists and what doesn&#39;t.
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain the nature of being (I think I&#39;ve tried asking you that question before)
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain anything
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain anything about the nature of the objective world - what exists in the objective world and how are the things therein related
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain reality (i.e. that which is more real than our sense impressions).

Any of these questions make sense to you? If so, can you direct me to the post which answers them?

I will try again if you don&#39;t give an answer.

Proof, Rosa :lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain the nature of being (I think I&#39;ve tried asking you that question before)

No need to ask: I thought we had decided it was a participle.

Your other attempts to show you know how to spell &#39;proof&#39; I think I covered in that article you failed to read properly.



I will try again if you don&#39;t give an answer.

Let me save you the trouble:


Rosa: Erm,
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain what exists and what doesn&#39;t.
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain the nature of being (I think I&#39;ve tried asking you that question before)
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain anything
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain anything about the nature of the objective world - what exists in the objective world and how are the things therein related
Proof that philosophy can&#39;t explain reality (i.e. that which is more real than our sense impressions).

Any of these questions make sense to you? If so, can you direct me to the post which answers them?

I will try again if you don&#39;t give an answer.

Proof, Rosa

OK, now can we move on?

[hoopla]

What a load of bull****

For over a week now I have been trying to get you to explain why you think philosophy can&#39;t answer any questions about the nature of the objective world - what exists in the objective world and how are the things therein related.

If it&#39;s your philosophy that causes you to relate to me in this way, I suggest that we have reached a conclusion - we need philosophy to be able to engage in basic conversation, or to relate to each other

What a load of rubbish :angry:

:lol:

And, I&#39;ve been very polite, really I have.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


What a load of bull****

You should not be so hard on yourself.


For over a week now I have been trying to get you to explain why you think philosophy can&#39;t answer any questions about the nature of the objective world - what exists in the objective world and how are the things therein related.

And the rest of us have been asking similar things of philosophers for 2500 years.

So far, no answers.

So, now you know how us human beings feel about this bogus subject, oh Great One.


If it&#39;s your philosophy that causes you to relate to me in this way, I suggest that we have reached a conclusion - we need philosophy to be able to engage in basic conversation, or to relate to each other
What a load of rubbish

As I said, stop being (that is, the participle &#39;being&#39;) so hard on yourself.

While I do not agree with the comments I have highlighted in bold, they were most definitely not &#39;rubbish&#39; as you rashly described them.


And, I&#39;ve been very polite, really I have.

Now you see, you can use participles of the verb &#39;to be&#39;, namely "been".

So, there is some hope for you yet.

Now, try to get to grips with &#39;being&#39; (or "being"), it is just as easy.

Let me know if you need help....

[hoopla]

Again, you seem to have misunderstood what I was saying :lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoopla:


Again, you seem to have misunderstood what I was saying

I think I learnt that trick from you.