Theoretical objects vs. observable objects.

[Chrysalis]

It's been said that there really isn't a difference when we refer to theoretical objects and when we refer to observable, perceptible objects. Both enjoy the same status as objects of reference in what we say about the world.

Observable (perceptible) objects are those we can directly and "clearly" see and denote: tables, trees, people, chemicals. In fact, it is often said these are objects of immediate thought. Theoretical objects, on the other hand, are those that theorists posit or postulated, the sort they say in physics, for instance, elementary particles neutrinos, muons, gluons. They require postulating because the "observable" relies heavily on the "behaviour" and the resulting phenomena in the supposed presence of these particles. And then, of course, there is the objects of mathematics where the postulated and axiomated objects aren't the sort we observe, rather we "see" them in proofs, a long series of postulates and theorems.

Now to the question and thesis: it doesn't matter, when it comes to referrence, that they are theoretical or directly observable. It doesn't matter that they have tactile, visual, audio, olfactory qualities. Or that they can only be posited and their "presence" can only be supposed given some conditions surrounding a given a space. It doesn't matter that they exist in "proofs". They all enjoy the same status when we talk about them. The key board I am currently using to type up this post is not in any way "especial" just because I am touching it and creating statements and expressing my thoughts through it.

Why? Because, at the end of the day, we still use our conceptual tool, our way of knowing, our linguistics limitation, the limits of our logic to express them. The buck stops where our mind starts apprending them, and making sense of them, and assigning meaning to them, and viewing the world in a certain way.

What do you think, then, of unicorns and satyrs and Santa Claus?

Does Renè Magritte's This is not a pipe ring any bell?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:


Why? Because, at the end of the day, we still use our conceptual tool, our way of knowing, our linguistics limitation, the limits of our logic to express them. The buck stops where our mind starts apprending them, and making sense of them, and assigning meaning to them, and viewing the world in a certain way.

Well, so you say, but how do you know that you have this 'tool', and that you are competent to use it?

[Did you go to night school for training, for example? And what did you use to help you learn to use it -- a conceptual tool tool?]

[Chrysalis]

:lol: :lol:

You are an ignorant wanna-be philosopher. Until you have learned how to argue logically, I will not discuss with you.

Thanks for the reply.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, I also note that, like many on this board, when you cannot answer an objection, you resort to name-calling.

I rather think that this tactic of yours, and not my materialist objections to your idealist 'apercus', smacks of 'ignorance'.

Thanks for the proof....

[Chrysalis]

To those who might have a say about my opening post, there is a far more radical, but rather disturbing idea to infer from it. That is, if you agree with the thesis first. But, I'd like to hear about what you think before I pop the next question.

This argument, by the way, can be easily googled. But, it's the conclusion we can get out it I'm more interested about.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

C:


But, I'd like to hear about what you think before I pop the next question.

You already have; so you can save that question until after you have answered my unanswerable objection.

[Leo]

Chrysalis, wow, that was a hard and dense read, I might have misunderstood you, correct me if I'm wrong...


It's been said that there really isn't a difference when we refer to theoretical objects and when we refer to observable, perceptible objects. Both enjoy the same status as objects of reference in what we say about the world...

It doesn't matter that they have tactile, visual, audio, olfactory qualities. Or that they can only be posited and their "presence" can only be supposed given some conditions surrounding a given a space. It doesn't matter that they exist in "proofs". They all enjoy the same status when we talk about them. The key board I am currently using to type up this post is not in any way "especial" just because I am touching it and creating statements and expressing my thoughts through it. Why? Because, at the end of the day, we still use our conceptual tool, our way of knowing, our linguistics limitation, the limits of our logic to express them. The buck stops where our mind starts apprending them, and making sense of them, and assigning meaning to them, and viewing the world in a certain way.


So you are saying that when we talk about 'things' it doesn't matter if we have proofs, we treat all in the same way, we all express them with the same logical (and in fact material too if we are not psychichs :lol: ) tools. Here, I would say that it doesn't matter what we say about them, instead of it doesn't matter wether we have proofs or not. We can, for example, say that we can fly, we can say that we have wings, and we can believe that we have wings, and in the little world we have in our minds, us having wings can become reality, but when we jump off a cliff to fly, we die.


What do you think, then, of unicorns and satyrs and Santa Claus?

Sure, why not?! Glue an ivory to the head of a white horse and then you have a unicorn. Dress a cute fat old man with the red costume, invent a sledge that flies and there you have Santa Claus. Do you know how the first human who flied did it? He literally made himself wings that could actually fly, he strengthened his body and he flew from one side of the Bosphorus to the other side, from Asia to Europe in Constantiple.

[Epoche]

What do you think, then, of unicorns and satyrs and Santa Claus?

As an epiphenomenalist (or so I claim), I expect that "thought" is not a form of transcendence, that is, it does not involve any activity that is not impressionable in the world. If it does, and we are some sort of duel Cartesian substance, one cannot trust anything but what is thought anyway, and we fall into complete idealism.

I suppose that "experience" can be considered "reflective" in the Sartrean sense that it isn't an "object," as are the things its has as its conception, its "thinking," and so can be treated like a parallelism, but it is not ontologically distinct-- the cogito is not a "self" but an intentional activity.

The consciousness is dependent on the object but not vice-versa, hence the epiphenominalism.

From there I suspect that concepts and objects which afford concepts are similiar in their context as types of "existents," so that a thought about an object and an object itself are both incidents of "being," while consciouness of each is not "being" but a negation of it; all following attributes assigned to objects are intentional and occur in language.

So Santa Clause is real, because the attributes of the concept are real and placed metaphorically, intentionally, into a scheme. For example, we associate the color red, the big belly, the beard, the hoilday, the gifts, the sled, etc., etc., with a grand narrative scheme, while we have never actually experienced Santa Clause as he is projected in our minds and thoughts. But how different, then, is the thought of something we assume we experience? A tree before me bears various attributes which I assign to it, but what if I asked the same about those attributes themselves?

Eventually it becomes an identity problem. There would have to be a set of essential predicates for everything that existed, which could not be reduced to elementary parts, so on and so forth ad infinitem. So to use "experience" as a proof of what as real, as opposed to what is merely thought, breaks down into nonsense. Both objects and thoughts have attributes and a description is no different than what is described.

We'd have to "get out of language" to escape this web, and I don't think we can do that. Kant tried to distinguish between the process of analytics and synthetics, for instance, by asserting that there must be a priori structures for experience, ....problem is, he said it, and now its no longer analytical. Wittgenstein should of loaned Kant his ladder.

Thanks to Marx I no longer bother myself with these puzzles and endless mazes. History and material is where its at babe, and if God and spirit/cogito exist...good for them.

Let us not concern ourselves with "philosophy" lest we become obscene post-structuralist/nihilists with nothing better to do than write a useless book that is manufactured by the indigenous people of Argentina for sixteen cents a day and read by oblivious college students everywhere in the cesspool of global capitalistic endoctrination.

[Chrysalis]

Okay, in the spirit of good comradeship, I will grant you your wish, dear girlfriend.


Originally posted by Rosa+--> (Rosa)Well, so you say, but how do you know that you have this 'tool', and that you are competent to use it?[/b]

How do I know? the evidence lies in the fact that you, Rosa, responded and even asked (!) a question to what I just said, hence giving credence to meaning and the attribute of being understood when I say something, and also presupposing that there is something that I am saying which you can respond using your own concepts, knowing, understanding, etc. The only way to prove me wrong about our having conceptual tool is to totally ignore me and act as if I, this thread, this forum do not exist, or it cannot be understood, it is nonsensical, and unintelligible. By responding, you are providing me with "support" or evidence and proves my point exactly and absolutely. This is the logic of your decision to try to negate me.

To exist is to be attacked, insulted, understood, agreed with, disagreed with. To exist is to be negated and refuted. To exist is to be attibuted with meaning.


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)So you are saying that when we talk about 'things' it doesn't matter if we have proofs, we treat all in the same way, we all express them with the same logical (and in fact material too if we are not psychichs tools. Here, I would say that it doesn't matter what we say about them, instead of it doesn't matter wether we have proofs or not. We can, for example, say that we can fly, we can say that we have wings, and we can believe that we have wings, and in the little world we have in our minds, us having wings can become reality, but when we jump off a cliff to fly, we die.[/b]
Leo, you aren't disagreeing with me, you are, in fact, supporting my view. It has nothing to do with "proofs", whatever this means. The level of observation we make of reality boils down to one thing: we are limited to what we have. If we know that drinking poison, or jumping off a cliff kills us, and if we know that gluons attached quarks, we know them using our mind. Simple as that. All the positing and reasoning, all the commonsensical and practical decisions and judging we make will all have to be made using our mind, our senses, our language to express them.

The fact that we can touch an object like apple, the fact that we could get seriously hurt or die when jumping off a cliff, have as much truth and reality as our "concept of god" or our "concept of the number two", or the "concept of a mirage" we "see" on the road when the weather is hot. The fact that you acknowledge something like "a mirage as just an illusion" says that you do have a "concept" of a mirage: and that's real.


[email protected]

Chrysalis

What do you think, then, of unicorns and satyrs and Santa Claus?


Sure, why not?! Glue an ivory to the head of a white horse and then you have a unicorn. Dress a cute fat old man with the red costume, invent a sledge that flies and there you have Santa Claus. Do you know how the first human who flied did it? He literally made himself wings that could actually fly, he strengthened his body and he flew from one side of the Bosphorus to the other side, from Asia to Europe in Constantiple.
:rolleyes:
Very funny. But, I'm sure you know what I mean by the above. Don't lie, I have read some of your posts and I know you are more than competent.



Epoche:


That post is why I am still drooling over you after all this time. I can't......touch it. A very solid judgment that burns. I am infected with a disease: I cannot get rid of this desire to not articulate reality using philosophy, more specifically metaphysics. You have articulated well what I meant and that just made me more feeling wanting more.

Philosophy is at once an enemy and a friend. Philosophers before Marx had told him things, in their works. But, one cannot reject something reasonably without at least understanding it. So, Marx drinks the poison that could potentially kill him, with the intention that he'd spit it back out once he feels what it does. And he did. Philosophy didn't kill Marx, it made him stronger in his conviction because now he can reject metaphysics and know the reason why. Know thyself, but also, know thy enemy.

Luv ya, babe.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, so you are going to debate with me, despite your earlier tantrum (all that stuff about shoving things up my Khyber Pass)?


the evidence lies in the fact that you, Rosa, responded and even asked (!) a question to what I just said, hence giving credence to meaning and the attribute of being understood when I say something, and also presupposing that there is something that I am saying which you can respond using your own concepts, knowing, understanding, etc.

In other words, you don't know, you just like to knit words together randomly.

As to whether my responding to your earlier post implies your words mean anything, I can only say that just as I can enquire of the author of the Jabberwocky, if this is the case:


Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

who was it exactly who taught those slithy toves to gyre and gimble (and in the wabe while it was brillig, for goodness sake!), without it implying that a word of this passage makes sense.

Of course, I would not ask this of Lewis Carroll (even if he were alive), since he does not post such material here. But you do (and you seem to believe it means something, but for the life of you, you cannot say what that is).

Same with traditional thought (with which you are so enamoured).

So, you are welcome to waste your time on this ruling-class word-juggling, i.e., with the likes of Descartes, Plato and Kant, but I rather think I will learn much more about reality from finding out just how and why those pesky borogroves were quite so mimsy.

Any suggestions? This sort of meaningless twaddle seems right up your street; so you might be just the person to help me out here.


To exist is to be attacked, insulted, understood, agreed with, disagreed with. To exist is to be negated and refuted. To exist is to be attibuted with meaning.

And your evidence for this is what? Oh yes, I see, more tortured words.

In that case, these might help:


"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought --
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

"And, has thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!'
He chortled in his joy.

`Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

Hugs....

[Leo]

Leo, you aren't disagreeing with me, you are, in fact, supporting my view. It has nothing to do with "proofs", whatever this means. The level of observation we make of reality boils down to one thing: we are limited to what we have. If we know that drinking poison, or jumping off a cliff kills us, and if we know that gluons attached quarks, we know them using our mind. Simple as that. All the positing and reasoning, all the commonsensical and practical decisions and judging we make will all have to be made using our mind, our senses, our language to express them.

The fact that we can touch an object like apple, the fact that we could get seriously hurt or die when jumping off a cliff, have as much truth and reality as our "concept of god" or our "concept of the number two", or the "concept of a mirage" we "see" on the road when the weather is hot. The fact that you acknowledge something like "a mirage as just an illusion" says that you do have a "concept" of a mirage: and that's real.

I wasn't disagreeing with what you said, I was disagreeing with what you thought about what you said. You say it ends in our minds, that's what matters, I say what matters is the reality no matter what we think about it or how we see it. This is an ancient dilemma, subjective vs. objective and I'm supporting the second point of view.


Very funny.

I tried :) :D :lol:


But, I'm sure you know what I mean by the above. Don't lie, I have read some of your posts and I know you are more than competent.

Well, thank you but I wasn't just trying to be funny, I was also trying to make a point: what matters is the material reality, and what is truly intersting is not how we understand the material reality, that is in fact a simple (but also a very hard) procedure, yet after all it is a natural procedure. We naturally understand the material reality, this is how the human species survived. Of course there are levels of this understanding, first one was probably instinctive, and we are progressing in a way that this understanding is scientific. What is really interesting is how we appy our thoughts to the material world. Our imagination is really the only limit of our actions, of our actual freedom and it is a limit which always expands, so that it is more like a horizon. The old situationist slogan is really meaningful: "All power to imagination!"

[Epoche]

That post is why I am still drooling over you after all this time.

Impossible. Your drooling is post hoc drooling then, because if I only recently posted, and you were already drooling....how could the recent post account for the previous drooling?

Sophistry!

Seize her at once!

[Epoche]

(double post...please delete)

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by Epoche+--> (Epoche)Impossible. Your drooling is post hoc drooling then, because if I only recently posted, and you were already drooling....how could the recent post account for the previous drooling?[/b]
:rolleyes: Incorrigible wild boy. The undomesticated kind. *drools*

Anticipation of something that's coming results to drooling even before that something arrives, and even if triggered by another thing unrelated in meaning to that something. Of course, I'm still wrong, and you still make the point even if I invoke the Pavlovian drool.

So, hmm, how should I make this right. I slept with you once???


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)You say it ends in our minds, that's what matters, I say what matters is the reality no matter what we think about it or how we see it. This is an ancient dilemma, subjective vs. objective and I'm supporting the second point of view.....

......I was also trying to make a point: what matters is the material reality, and what is truly intersting is not how we understand the material reality, that is in fact a simple (but also a very hard) procedure, yet after all it is a natural procedure. We naturally understand the material reality, this is how the human species survived.
[/b]
Hmmm, rather vague and I cannot think of something to say. Okay, I'll try this. It's the implication I'm after, not whether reality if subjective or objective. "Objective-subjective" is the common philosophical way of looking at reality, yes. But for all we know, there isn't a difference anymore, and it doesn't matter anymore. To pronounce something objective and other things subjective would not affect how we think much: by "much" I mean the significance, if there is any difference, the significance of this difference is rather philosophcally and practically useless. Physical objects would be reduced anyway, theoretical objects would be reduced anyway.

A political state could be ruled with lots of posits and postulates, possiblities and probabilities. A religion lasts for thousands of years without one single empirical evidence to back it up. Physics is as strong as ever in theory building. The subconscious is still the stronghold of psychology. Sociology abstracts from individual to a generalization that many of us can never ever experience. We believe in the truth of the "possibility" of a cure, "possibility" of life-after death, "possibility" of self-destruction of entities.

The "possibilities" are as real to us as the computer monitor in front of us. Memories are as real. Concepts have the stronghold in our seeing the "reality". It doesn't matter whether it's subjective or objective, material or metaphysical, epistemological or public opinion, practical or theoretical, empirical or a priori.

To continue to view reality in the objective and subjective sense is nonsense and futile.



[email protected]
Chrysalis, so you are going to debate with me, despite your earlier tantrum (all that stuff about shoving things up my Khyber Pass)?
Well, I can change my mind can't I? Like I said, in the spirit of comradeship I will respond to you civily. Although, I do not expect any agreement between you and me, as this is not my goal here. All I want is, you're coming here in the philosophy forum, so please understand some philosophical notions being mentioned and some logical way of saying things. That's all I ask.

And here's an example why I consider you a troll in philosophy discussions:


Rosa
In other words, you don't know, you just like to knit words together randomly.
This statement reeks of ignorance of philosophical logic, more specifically Witttgenstein and other language philosophers. At best, it is irrational. At least during the days when I was discussing with Red che, even though he admitted he didn't know much, or at all, about the philosophical words, he had the attitude that he truly did want to discuss and try to understand some things. And that to me is very admirable. Leo, here is also showing he is open to understanding what others, like me, say. And for that I thank him. I am not looking for agreement (though, it would help my case), I am looking for an argument and a willingness to understand.

Rosa, since the time we have discussed Descartes I have given up on discussing with you philosophically, or at all. I always believe, there is futility in discussing with someone who just tries to question everything, including the meaning of what others say, in spite of the fact that she herself asks, makes critiques, refutes what's been said, etc. All these, Rosa, points to the fact, and therefore, evidence, that you pretend to doubt and question, and behave as if you there isn't one single validity to what I say. Feigned ignorance betrays you, Rosa, as you have repeatedly shown there is something to what I say worth responding.

You keep name-dropping Wittgenstein. Do you even understand the point of his philosophy? Because Wittgenstein's logic of "language game" could be shown to work in form discussion like this. And I did use it when you accused Descartes of not questioning everything including the meaning of what he says. Well, duh, Rosa, the fact that you were able to respond to Descartes self-refutes your assertion. Now, if you cannot get this very simple logic of language game, then heaven help you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:


Rosa, since the time we have discussed Descartes I have given up on discussing with you philosophically, or at all. I always believe, there is futility in discussing with someone who just tries to question everything,

You mean, like Descartes did? Shock, horror....

Well, shut my mouth and call me frequently.


All these, Rosa, points to the fact, and therefore, evidence, that you pretend to doubt and question, and behave as if you there isn't one single validity to what I say. Feigned ignorance betrays you, Rosa, as you have repeatedly shown there is something to what I say worth responding.

Ah, well, like Socrates, I aim to show you that I know only one more thing than you: that I know you know nothing, but you do not know that yet.

The response above suggests that you still have far to go, my dear. Do not fear, Rosa will assist you in your own reverse education....


You keep name-dropping Wittgenstein. Do you even understand the point of his philosophy? Because Wittgenstein's logic of "language game" could be shown to work in form discussion like this.

Well, apart from the fact that my PhD was on W, I suspect I know nothing about him, except this one thing: you know even less than me about Wittgenstein.

However, the whole point of his language game analogy was to expose the conventions we actualy use (or could use) in real life, not these Mickey Mouse, badly-worded 'word-games' you indulge in here (wtf does: "as if you there isn't one single validity to what I say" mean, for goodness sake?).

However, I defy you to find a single example in his work where he indulged in the juvenile word-games you seem to think mean anything.

By the way, how's the Jabberwocky coming along?

Have you been able to determine yet whether he/she/it is a secondary substance, a haecciteuos singular predicate, an adventitious accident, or a figment of Lewis Carroll's imagination...??

Or is this particular 'word-game' too revealing of the meaningless stuff you like to post here?

Huggs....

[Epoche]

I slept with you once???

What?

[scratches head]

Are you sure?

Who's house were we at and was there a keg?

Just kidding.

Please excuse us, Rosa. I believe that Chrysalis is, or was, rather, a member at another forum. She won't tell me who she is, and now that she asks the above, its possible that she is someone who I actually know in person (old girlfriend? I showed these sights to a few ladies I had ...[ahem]..."relations" with in the past), and has become a member here.

Sorry for disrupting this thread. I'll continue this in PMs.

[Leo]

Hmmm, rather vague and I cannot think of something to say. Okay, I'll try this. It's the implication I'm after, not whether reality if subjective or objective. "Objective-subjective" is the common philosophical way of looking at reality, yes. But for all we know, there isn't a difference anymore, and it doesn't matter anymore. To pronounce something objective and other things subjective would not affect how we think much: by "much" I mean the significance, if there is any difference, the significance of this difference is rather philosophcally and practically useless. Physical objects would be reduced anyway, theoretical objects would be reduced anyway.

Let's persume that we are watching a football (soccer) game. After a point, we would start 'supporting' one team or another, and we would want them to win for some reason, maybe because we like the color of their jersey, maybe because we like their style etc. At this point we start looking at the objective reality in a subjective way, identifying with one of the teams. Objectively, the team that wins in the end was going to win anyways, but if the team we supported wins we will be happy, if it loses we won't be. If we didn't support a team, we would only be enjoying the game itself. This example seems unimportant, but imagine millions of people feeling sad, even angry and millions of people feel incredibly happy after a match, and then imagine those two groups of people facing each other in the same street. Imagine those people bringing knives and guns to use against each other. Imagine this happening every fucking week. Now, do you think it is not significant?


We believe in the truth of the "possibility" of a cure, "possibility" of life-after death, "possibility" of self-destruction of entities.

The "possibilities" are as real to us as the computer monitor in front of us. Memories are as real. Concepts have the stronghold in our seeing the "reality". It doesn't matter whether it's subjective or objective, material or metaphysical, epistemological or public opinion, practical or theoretical, empirical or a priori.


But it does, my point is that whatever we believe, it doesn't matter. We might believe in the possibility of a cure, but objectively there is a cure or there isn't a cure, and we will try to find it. As I said, what matters is not how we see things, what matters is not what we believe in, we instinctively realize critical material reality.


To continue to view reality in the objective and subjective sense is nonsense and futile.

Well, it is not. In fact it is the best way to combat nationalism and racism etc. The reason why an ordinary american values life of an invading soldier in Iraq more than a dead child is the subjective point of view. Subjective point of view creates antagonisms that are not real and hides antagonisms that are real. Reality is objective, and it is necessary to combat the subjective view, always.

[Chrysalis]

:blink: :o :(

Okay, I just typed up a response, but I've lost it somehow. I've got to go but I will re-type it, hopefully I get to remember what I said there. I'll be back.

[rouchambeau]

I disagree. Assuming our senses are not fooling us and are reliable in telling us what is real, observable objects are known to be real. Theoretical objects (like elementary particles or, better yet, unicorns) that cannot be experienced are not necessarily real as they are not experienced.

[Chrysalis]

rouchambeau:

I am including my response to you in my response to Leo as you have the same concern as he does. Below:


Leo: I think you and I are using the objective-subjective in different ways. You have two things going on in your soccer scenario. (One), philosophically, the things that are considered objective are facts, state of affairs, and events. It is a fact that the teams exist, that soccer fans exist, it is a fact that soccer games exist. State of affairs are: two teams being in the game, one team being the winner, million of people being in the stadium and watching the game. Event: two teams are playing soccer while millions of people are watching. Now, when fans start "picking" their preference or favorite, then we're talking about (Two) judging ethically which team is better and who should win. This latter is usually contentious and often considered by ethicists to be subjective. Ethics is subjective. While facts, events, state of affairs are objective. So, now tell me: didn't you just demonstrate to me, in that soccer scenario, that both subjective and objective beliefs of reality have the same effect, the same force, and produce consequences in our actions that affect us all?


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)But it does, my point is that whatever we believe, it doesn't matter. We might believe in the possibility of a cure, but objectively there is a cure or there isn't a cure, and we will try to find it. As I said, what matters is not how we see things, what matters is not what we believe in, we instinctively realize critical material reality.[/b]
Here, when you say "we instinctively realize critical material reality" you mean the physical reality, empirically real, immediately obsevable has a primary or "special" status over and above other things we believe in, like theoretical entities, memories, mirages, and Santa Claus. This is what I disagree with. Mathematical and physical entities posited by mathematicians and physicists are no more "learned" by us and made part of our belief system, through habits and customs (that is, through association with other human beings) than "immediate" objects of thoughts, like an apple, a skin sore or bruise, a computer, this chair, that door that we could very well touch, feel, smell, and use functionally. Perceptible objects are just as learned through habitiual interactions with others.
(rouchambeau: I hope the above and below, particularly, addresses your post)



Leo
Well, it is not. In fact it is the best way to combat nationalism and racism etc. The reason why an ordinary american values life of an invading soldier in Iraq more than a dead child is the subjective point of view. Subjective point of view creates antagonisms that are not real and hides antagonisms that are real. Reality is objective, and it is necessary to combat the subjective view, always.
Again, you seem to forget that the point of my thread is to point out that what's commonly considered to be subjective and objective beliefs have the same "reality" and each one has as much effect to us, and they are equally thought of, equally affect our existing beliefs, and equally admitted to our system of beliefs. Here's what you're saying: nationalism and racism, two beliefs held by some people, are subjective and erroneous and harmful (evidenced by your use of the word "combat"). No problem there. I agree. And to value the life of a soldier invading Iraq more than a dead child is subjective and erroneous and harmful. Again, I won't argue against it. But, notice how these "subjective, erroneous, harmful" beliefs are as threatening, hence, as "real" to our belief system as the threats of anthrax, cancer, and the AIDs virus, things considered to be really, really, real and verifiable empirically. Subjective, erroneous beliefs bring about the same impact as true beliefs. They cause us to act a certain way, to make decisions now and to make predictions of the future, etc.

[Epoche]

Yeah so I read a few of your old exchanges, ladies (Rosa and Chrysalis), regarding Descartes, and I can't figure out what you two are on about.

If you would be so kind and summarize the details of your disagreement, I might have a better understanding of how you interpret Frenchy, and perhaps get involved myself. The fight was glorious but a bit short. Something about square circles, was it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


If you would be so kind and summarize the details of your disagreement,

Basically, I claim (following Wittgenstein) that all philosophical theses are nonsensical (and I go further, that they derive from a ruling-class view of the world (laid down in ancient Greece), and are part of what Marx called the ruling ideas that always rule), and Chrysalis seems to think some sense can be made of them (but never quite manages to say what that is, and now appears to be sulking).

And can we have less of the 'ladies', please (i.e., zero)?

My reasons for saying this can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

[Leo]

You have two things going on in your soccer scenario. (One), philosophically, the things that are considered objective are facts, state of affairs, and events. It is a fact that the teams exist, that soccer fans exist, it is a fact that soccer games exist. State of affairs are: two teams being in the game, one team being the winner, million of people being in the stadium and watching the game. Event: two teams are playing soccer while millions of people are watching. Now, when fans start "picking" their preference or favorite, then we're talking about (Two) judging ethically which team is better and who should win. This latter is usually contentious and often considered by ethicists to be subjective. Ethics is subjective. While facts, events, state of affairs are objective.

Oh my, Chrysalis did you really had to translate my arguement that was completely in language from everyday-life into that jargon? I mean that was a painful read despite the fact that I was the one who wrote the scenario in the first place!


So, now tell me: didn't you just demonstrate to me, in that soccer scenario, that both subjective and objective beliefs of reality have the same effect, the same force, and produce consequences in our actions that affect us all?


Again, you seem to forget that the point of my thread is to point out that what's commonly considered to be subjective and objective beliefs have the same "reality" and each one has as much effect to us, and they are equally thought of, equally affect our existing beliefs, and equally admitted to our system of beliefs. Here's what you're saying: nationalism and racism, two beliefs held by some people, are subjective and erroneous and harmful (evidenced by your use of the word "combat"). No problem there. I agree. And to value the life of a soldier invading Iraq more than a dead child is subjective and erroneous and harmful. Again, I won't argue against it. But, notice how these "subjective, erroneous, harmful" beliefs are as threatening, hence, as "real" to our belief system as the threats of anthrax, cancer, and the AIDs virus, things considered to be really, really, real and verifiable empirically. Subjective, erroneous beliefs bring about the same impact as true beliefs. They cause us to act a certain way, to make decisions now and to make predictions of the future, etc.

Well yeah, what's so amazing about that? Of course both subjective and objective beliefs of reality have the same effect, the same force, and produce consequences. Objective perspective shows us the reality, subjective is an alternate perspective that makes us blind, both perspectives effect the objective reality. Naturally subjective perspective exists. Why do you think I am so 'full of rage' about the subjective perspective? Do you think I would bother to do anything about it if it didn't effect the objective reality? (The answer is no :rolleyes: )


Here, when you say "we instinctively realize critical material reality" you mean the physical reality, empirically real, immediately obsevable has a primary or "special" status over and above other things we believe in, like theoretical entities, memories, mirages, and Santa Claus. This is what I disagree with. Mathematical and physical entities posited by mathematicians and physicists are no more "learned" by us and made part of our belief system, through habits and customs (that is, through association with other human beings) than "immediate" objects of thoughts, like an apple, a skin sore or bruise, a computer, this chair, that door that we could very well touch, feel, smell, and use functionally. Perceptible objects are just as learned through habitiual interactions with others.

I am not saying that they have a special status, they have a primary status because they are mostly urgent, and had been urgent for survival. We learned them first, we learned them instinctively. Now, we are advancing in another method, a conscious method to learn theoretical knowledge which is science. Yes they are both 'knowledge' in our minds, by definition if nothing else, they are both learned, yet I can't see what's so amazing about that. They are so 'different' kinds of knowledge that had been aquried in so different ways and the fact that they have 'information' status in our minds doesn't really mean much. Think a computer for example, Internet Explorer and Power Point are both bytes after all, but it doesn't really matter for us.

[Epoche]

And can we have less of the 'ladies', please (i.e., zero)?

Yes ma'a...um, I mean...yes Rosa. I didn't mean to sound patronizing...it was a sign of respect.

Your site is excellent and I have read some of your stuff, before joining the site.

Without going into details I agree that a percentage of the use of rationalism has been geared toward the subordination of classes, beginning as far back as the order of sophists, the academy, and the dialogue form of both written literature and dramatization. The original basic forms of governmnet were established in theory at the time in which the practice of diplomacy was not only specialized but also now public. This resulted in propaganda and the "science of rhetoric," and it required the assistance of metaphysics (the origins of despotism) in order to create and manipulate authority over the science division of the academy. The "politican" was born the moment he dropped his shovel and "talked his way out of work," so to speak, (so to speak).

Enter rationalism. You know the deal, Plotinus, Anslem, Scotus, Aristotally, the whole gang. Traitors to the working man.

Viva la phenomenological revolution.

Concerning the possibility of practicing philosophy, we must comprehend a question in so far as we have an understanding of what we are trying to define, first. What is "philosophy" before we decide it doesn't exist.

I suspect that Chrysalis' point might be that the distinction between the subject and the object is no longer discernable, absolving many problems with "absolute" and "relative" truth states, but that the rationality or the process of philosophy is a logical discourse that is not contingent to the particular cases of fact. Then the method of philosophical discourse would be dialectic (I know you hate that), but only in form.

The square circle you prove to exist in a dimension at a time on a piece of paper is nothing more than a set of hypothetical mathematical axioms at work with one another-- just as a true triangle cannot possibly exist empirically and avoid being rigid. The line cannot move straight and is warped. Is the object then ideal?

The idea then must either be psychologistic, where it is strictly empirical and impressionable (in the Lockean sense), and the conclusion to the argument regarding the square-circle ends at a tacit agreement in language, an intersubjective web of nonsense and agreed premises, i.e. beliefs are founded by more beliefs, etc., and each of your experiences of a square circle or anything related to that would be solipsistic, or it must be analytical (in the Kantian and Humean sense), where the logical truth of the object concieved is noumenal and transcendent and is objectively true but not possible in experience. As in inductive reasoning.

This is one helluva problem, but as a good marxist that I try to be...I should ignore it. I do not wish to be that dog chasing his tail lest I start a revolution....literally.

Anyway, the importance of Descartes is minimal when he is contrasted with Spinoza, for instance, and I think his popularity was a matter of "timing" more so than metaphysical pioneering. I like what Sartre did with Descartes, personally.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, thanks for those comments, but I am not sure what to say about the things you have posted in response since I do not accept that the philosophical use of the words you employ is legitimate; that is why I posted the 'Jabberwocky' material, which, to my mind makes marginally more sense.

Now if Chrysalis and others want to play pointless games with this jargon, I suggest they devote more time to finding out just why those annoying toves were quite so slithy.

Sure that would be an equal waste of time, but then that would be clear to them, and they could then stop pretending that their discussion actually establishes anything.

This kind of stuff, you see:


The square circle you prove to exist in a dimension at a time on a piece of paper is nothing more than a set of hypothetical mathematical axioms at work with one another-- just as a true triangle cannot possibly exist empirically and avoid being rigid. The line cannot move straight and is warped. Is the object then ideal?

just makes me wonder why you indulge in it.

It is no surprise that such questions have no answers (and have never been answered); this is not because they are too difficult, but because they rest on a distortion of language.

So, you might as well ask why you can't be off-side in swimming, or score a goal in tennis.

Now I ask awkward questions (ones that Chrysalis misinterprets as cussedness, which it is not) in the vain Socratic hope that I can expose this crass linguistic behaviour.

But most people cling onto it, since, for them, this pursuit works as a surrogate religion: so, if there is an a priori structure to reality, then perhaps life has point, after all. It returns people to (or rather, it keeps them trapped in) a sort of pre-Copernican view of reality: humanity might no longer exist at the centre of the physical universe, but they still exist at the centre of the meaning universe. So language is the key to reality.

Now (so the reasoning might go), if we can tap into that meaning by the use of specialised language, then we can solve the problem of existence. This is also wedded to the idea that the world has a linguistic structure (this is overt in Greek, Hebrew and Egyptian thought: God speaks and things spring into existence; 'in the beginning was the Word', etc., etc.). I call it 'Linguistic Idealism'.

So, no matter how much meaningless rubbish is produced they continue to pootle about with empty words. And no matter how many times this is pointed out to them, they still prefer this meaningless twaddle. The only way to account for that is to point to the psychological function this language serves (it is connected, I would claim, to our alienated condition in class society, so I give it a Feuerbachian slant): it makes them feel important and part of a deeper cosmic meaning.

Dialectics itself does this, except it provides Marxists will a spurious exclusivity; it is their philosophy, which gives their revolutionary existence meaning (in the face of constant failure – so they cling onto it like grim death, no matter how many times I trash it).

I say away with these idols; we do not need them, just good and then better science.

[And Spinoza was even more confused than Descartes; so I personally would not touch his ideas with an extendable barge pole.]

Of course, if you have to cover this stuff at college etc., then you can't avoid it. But, I suggest you keep a level head, and realise how empty a pursuit it is.

[Epoche]

Its cool. I don't actually have any issues here other than a few details wich could be toyed with a bit, although only to rehash the classical dilemmas, and I'm sure you don't want re-runs. Just thought I would barge into this conversation and try to stir something up.


I claim (following Wittgenstein) that all philosophical theses are nonsensical

Its a little difficult to determine where "regular" thinking stops and "philosophical" thinking begins, but I agree if you mean that ultimately "language" causes nothing and is only an effect-- that the royal "Philosophy" hasn't done anything, or better yet, that language did not have in mind "philosophical discourse" when it evolved.

Essentially all philosophy is specialized vocabulary when it is textual, and analytical when it is cogitated. But one might ask "don't we think with words...so why the division?"

It is a matter of placing points in an evolution in their correct order-- linguists like to pretend that "there is nothing outside of text," while many theorists speculate the existence of organized civilization before language had even evolved. I put my money on the latter.

Granting such importance to language and all the Davidsonean triangulated intersubjective hubbub is a crock. Stuff to fill books with.

Death to the philosopher. Do not trust a man who talks more than he works.


just makes me wonder why you indulge in it.

It is no surprise that such questions have no answers (and have never been answered); this is not because they are too difficult, but because they rest on a distortion of language.

Oh come on. That's a classic. You know how many famous principles and axioms are employed in the issue with that triangle? The law of idenity, xeno's paradox, plato's forms/ideas dichotomy, the uncertainty principle of QM, einstein's relativity, and probably more. Is the idea of a triangle a priori or is it a posterior? Let's hear it. You say yes, I say prove it. You say no, I say show me a perfect triangle.


But most people cling onto it, since, for them, this pursuit works as a surrogate religion: so, if there is an a priori structure to reality, then perhaps life has point, after all. It returns people to (or rather, it keeps them trapped in) a sort of pre-Copernican view of reality: humanity might no longer exist at the centre of the physical universe, but they still exist at the centre of the meaning universe. So language is the key to reality.

Beautifully said, and with a hammer!

You and me are going places, Rosa.


So, no matter how much meaningless rubbish is produced they continue to pootle about with empty words. And no matter how many times this is pointed out to them, they still prefer this meaningless twaddle. The only way to account for that is to point to the psychological function this language serves (it is connected, I would claim, to our alienated condition in class society, so I give it a Feuerbachian slant): it makes them feel important and part of a deeper cosmic meaning.

Oh....I'm in love. That was like butter.


Dialectics itself does this, except it provides Marxists will a spurious exclusivity; it is their philosophy, which gives their revolutionary existence meaning (in the face of constant failure – so they cling onto it like grim death, no matter how many times I trash it).

And it is here that I point toward Spinoza. Dialectics is, I believe, a dichotomous movement through method toward truth. Hegel borrowed Aristotle's law of the excluded middle and set up a model of thesis/anti-thesis/synthesis, proclaiming all existence as a progress of reconciling opposites. But opposites do not exist in a teleological sense....claims Spinoza, because there are an infinite number of attributes in existence. There is no ontological difference between true and false because there is no single finite existing thing of a teleological nature-- it is contingent to a perspective.

What Spinoza did was unseat the traditional Platonic substance dualism from ontology, which had been operating up through Descartes, and this is in fact complimentary to your efforts against dialectics, I think. Don't be fooled by the "God intoxicated man," as they called him. Spinoza's epistemology only borrows the current vocabulary of the time, while he was in reality a pantheist, having no room for transcendent cogitos and the dogmas of metaphysics. Everything was "God" for Spinoza, but this was not some detached creator of the universe...it was an immanent process.


Of course, if you have to cover this stuff at college etc., then you can't avoid it.

Funny you mention that. Just recently I have decided to pursue a degree in the arts and humanities and I was complaining about how "religion" is always a necessary course next to philosophy, without the opportuinity to skip it altogether. This is rather inconvenient.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


Its a little difficult to determine where "regular" thinking stops and "philosophical" thinking begins, but I agree if you mean that ultimately "language" causes nothing and is only an effect-- that the royal "Philosophy" hasn't done anything, or better yet, that language did not have in mind "philosophical discourse" when it evolved.

I think there is some truth in that, but I handle this point at my site thus (this is an edited part of Essay Twelve, which has not been published yet):


'Ordinary Language Is Not A Theory

It could still be objected to this that if ordinary language is inadequate when applied in most scientific and technical contexts (let alone metaphysical ones), it surely needs either reforming or supplementing in some way.

And yet, science has managed to make significant progress over the last four hundred years without having to reform the vernacular, even if scientists have had to develop specialised and technical languages of their own. The 'problem' (if such it may be called) only occurs when attempts are made to translate scientific concepts into ordinary terms. Since there is no scientific need to do this (although there may be several powerful ideological and economic reasons why some might want to do it, as will be argued below), the alleged clash with ordinary language is completely fictional.

Of course, no one is suggesting that ordinary language can be used in highly complex theoretical areas of study, but that is no more a limitation on the vernacular than it is a defect of Das Kapital that it can't predict lottery winners.

Metaphysicians originally invented the idea that there were such things as philosophical 'problems' concerning aspects of reality and human existence that only they were capable of solving (or of understanding). Keith Thomas notes a similar tactic among 16th century magicians:

"It would be tempting to explain the long survival of magical practices by pointing out that they helped provide many professional wizards with a respectable livelihood. The example of the legal profession is a reminder that it is always possible for a substantial social group to support itself by proffering solutions to problems which they themselves have helped to manufacture. The cunning men and wise women had an undoubted interest in upholding the prestige of magical diagnosis and may by their mere existence have helped to prolong a mode of thinking which was already obsolescent." [Thomas (1972), p.295.]

Even though Thomas finally rejects this as an adequate explanation of this phenomenon, he notes that the 'special' facility these magicians arrogated to themselves (of being able to solve problems they had in fact invented) gave them a level of prestige and social standing they would not otherwise have had.

Of course, with respect to magic, Marxists must take account of the alienated lives and beliefs of susceptible audiences -- the latter of which would have included many ordinary people.

Clearly, this is not true of Metaphysics, which was (and still is) practiced almost exclusively by rather more 'select' social groups. Hence, Thomas's reason for rejecting his own tentative explanation of the persistence of magical beliefs (on the grounds that magicians provided a service that ordinary people actively sought) does not apply to Metaphysics. Moreover, his account explains neither the overwhelming influence Metaphysics has had on almost every aspect of Western thought for 2500 years (it is indeed a "ruling idea"), nor the longevity of theoretical Philosophy (with precious little to show for it, so it cannot be justified on economic grounds). Of course, Thomas's comments were not designed to do this.

However, the reason usually given for the prevalence of such metaphysical beliefs is that everybody (including ordinary folk) at some time in their lives has metaphysical thoughts of some sort, or asks metaphysical questions, which is supposed to show that philosophical problems enjoy universal appeal and legitimacy. Hence, the argument could go: if everyone thinks metaphysically, its existence cannot be the result of its invention by an elite group of thinkers.

However, it is worth noting the following four points in response to this:

(1) It is important to distinguish the confused musings (on such things as the nature of space, time, God and human existence) that most individuals indulge in from time to time from the systematic study of metaphysical questions by those who have the necessary leisure time to do so (i.e., professional philosophers and theorists, rich or sponsored 'amateurs').

(2) It is not being suggested here that metaphysical beliefs were invented by the ruling-class (or their hangers-on), only that the systematic study of Metaphysics is the sole preserve of those who have (knowingly or not) promoted a theoretical view of reality that is conducive to the interests of the powerful. [On this, see essay Twelve.]

(3) The fact that ordinary people do or do not indulge in amateurish metaphysical musing from time to time no more makes Metaphysics a legitimate pursuit than it alters the nature of religious/theological thought when and if they do the same. Ordinary people are not somehow turned into theologians if they wonder if there is a God. And this does not legitimate Theology.

(4) The confusion inherent in both groups (that is, professional, leisured metaphysicians and ordinary/lay amateurs) derives from one source: the misconstrual of socially-sanctioned forms of representation as if they stood for the real relations among things, or those things themselves. [This analysis is substantiated in Essay Twelve, too.]

However, it is only 'professional metaphysicians' who would want to project these social norms back onto the world as fetishised reflections of the nature of reality in a systematic fashion (since it mirrors the world as they see it). 'Lay metaphysicians' have no motivation to fetishise their own language in such a way since to do so would clash with the way they use the vernacular when they interface with material reality and with each other every day. In fact, if they were to talk like metaphysicians in their everyday life they could find themselves regarded as psychotic, or delusional. The insular existence of professional metaphysicians in fact protects them from themselves (as it were). It is only when the latter have to engage in everyday practical activity alongside the rest of us that their metaphysical theories look decidedly weird, if not eminently ridiculous, even to them. Clearly, that is because this is where the alleged clash with 'commonsense' actually occurs and really matters. When metaphysicians have to behave like 'common folk' in the real world, their metaphysical notions lose all credibility; in ordinary surroundings this Emperor looks naked even to traditional theorists. [On this, see Cowley (1991).]

Since ordinary language has developed in an unplanned way over tens of thousands of years it can be imprecise and ambiguous, and it is manifestly 'non-scientific'. Not only that, its vocabulary is suffused with vagueness and its grammar allows for the formation of potentially misleading sentences (but they are this only to the unwary).

However, this does not mean that ordinary language is defective in any way. Far from it, ordinary language was founded on conventions and material practices our species has developed over tens of thousands of years, during which period it has functioned perfectly well as a means of communication. The vagaries of ordinary language enable its users to communicate effectively over a much wider area of discourse than would otherwise be the case if it were overly precise. When needed, however, precision is relatively easy to achieve; indeed, at the risk of extreme pedantry, almost any degree of accuracy is attainable. In addition, the potentially misleading grammatical forms the vernacular contains only mislead its users when they attempt to reflect on language itself (which we/they are ill-equipped to do -- why this is so will be explained in Essay Twelve), as opposed to when they apply it in every day life. In the normal course of events such potentially misleading grammatical forms do not interfere with communication.

These considerations not only account for the vibrancy of ordinary language, they shed light on the source of many of the 'paradoxes' and 'philosophical problems' created by its misuse. While ordinary language could not function without these features -- vagueness, ambiguity, metaphor, synonymy, antonymy, etc. --, they can encourage misunderstanding if they are not handled with due sensitivity, and, dare I say it, common sense. Nevertheless, these aspects also give language sufficient space to enable a seemingly limitless expansion of its expressive and communicative power -- in literature, for example.

However, the downside of this is that it is all too easy to misconstrue ordinary language when its users reflect on it theoretically -- i.e., when language "goes on holiday" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein) --, when it is employed in areas that are far removed -- or insulated -- from everyday material practice, or when its representational forms are misconstrued with its communicational forms, and vice versa. As noted in Essay Twelve, 'philosophical problems' arise whenever certain grammatical forms are interpreted as if they represent substantive features of the world (DM-theorists do this with the word "not", for example). Whenever language is viewed primarily as representational and its grammar fetishised, LIE is born. [The development and substantiation of these allegations form one of the main topics of my thesis.]

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]

As far as the conflict between the vernacular and philosophical or metaphysical language is concerned, since metaphysical theories invariably make no sense there can be no real incongruity between them -- that is, no more than there is a genuine clash between, say, the nonsense rhymes of Edward Lear and ordinary discourse.

Admittedly, ordinary language has changed in countless ways over the course of history. Indeed, we are now capable of forming sentences and expressing thoughts that our ancestors could not. Doubtless this process will continue. But, ordinary language remains the highest and final court of appeal for human beings in their efforts to understand anything.(15) This is because the historically-conditioned conventions within which we learn and apply the vernacular express and delimit our capacity to comprehend anything whatsoever.

This claim might appear somewhat dogmatic, but it isn't. It is based on the simple observation that words like "understand", "comprehend", "know" and "grasp" are themselves ordinary language terms, and they gain whatever meaning they have from the conventions and practices governing their use at present. They do not receive this from an imaginary or ideal usage, nor do they obtain it from abstractions that are accessible only to philosophers and scientists -- or even Party intellectuals. Words like these cannot themselves be challenged without such attempts collapsing into incoherence -- as was illustrated above and will be elsewhere at this site.

Consequently, while scientists may quite properly invent new terms to suite their needs, scientific language itself cannot confront (or reform) ordinary language without undermining itself.

Moreover, ordinary language is not a theory; it neither encapsulates a "folk ontology" nor a "folk metaphysics". It is not identical with common sense, but it is not unconnected with it.

The vernacular is not a theory since every empirical proposition in ordinary language is pairable with its negation (and both of these could be true or false, but clearly not together). No theory can have all its propositions so mapped (or have them so semantically accommodating).

This means that Rees is wrong when he asserts that:

"Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'…." [Rees (1998), p.45.]

Ordinary language cannot assume anything -- it is human beings who "assume" things; clearly, they do this by means of language. Unless language had the capacity to allow for the possible truth or falsehood of the said assumptions and/or their negations, then no "assuming" could begin. This is, of course, because assumptions can be wrong as well as right.

Moreover, ordinary language allows the "assumption" to be made that objects can and do change -- and in complex ways, too. Indeed, it goes further; ordinary language enables its users to speak of change in seemingly limitless detail. A long (but greatly shortened) list of some of the words in the vernacular enabling this was given earlier. Hence, and despite what Rees says, the sophisticated nature of ordinary language permits the formation of the following sentences that readily depict change:

H78: This is increasing in size as we watch.

H79: That is becoming too heavy to carry.

H80: This venue is now too small for our meetings.

H81: This spider's web has just broken.

H82: This train has just been re-painted.

H83: This light is defective; it keeps flickering.

H84: This is how to lose weight rapidly.

H85: This dispute is no longer about working conditions.

H86: This continent is moving closer to Asia.

H87: That is how to break an egg.

H88: This is how to change workers' minds.

H89: In an instant the pickets had re-grouped.

Many of the above sentences are somewhat stilted because they have been deliberately tailored to use the words "this" and "that" (i.e., the form of words that Rees employed to caricature the vernacular) in order to show that "things and ideas" are not "assumed" to be stable -- contrary to Rees's assertion. However, this list at least demonstrates that even using this unlikely and highly restrictive phraseology, ordinary language is capable of expressing material changes that Hegel's tortuous prose could not cope with -- that is, not without re-employing terms taken from ordinary language to assist it do this.(19)

Even given this highly constrained form of language, the above list of sentences can be extended indefinitely. Of course, if the full range of devices available to ordinary speakers were called upon (H89 being just one example of such), then it would be possible to form a potentially infinite set of sentences of far greater sophistication depicting changes of every imaginable type. This shows that ordinary language is capable of depicting (and explaining) change in the real world far better than any technical or philosophical language yet devised.

Now, this is not something that a sophisticated user of English (like John Rees) should have to have pointed out to him -- even though my having to do just that is a sad comment on the intellectual decay that dialectical thought induces in those so afflicted.(20)

Ordinary Language And 'Commonsense'

'Commonsense' is often confused with ordinary language. Unfortunately, the term "commonsense" is rather vague.(22) Bertrand Russell once claimed it encapsulated the "metaphysics of cavemen", but even he would have been hard-pressed to say what it was, let alone how he knew so much about it.(23)

If the word has any clear meaning, it appears to denote an inchoate (but changing) set of beliefs and opinions that most (all?) human beings are supposed possess (whether they are conscious of them or not). But, if this were so it would imply that these beliefs must have been communicated telepathically from individual to individual, one generation and one community to the next, across the planet and down the centuries. How else are we to account for the alleged universality of 'commonsense'? At no point in life has a single human being ever been tutored in 'commonsense'; no one runs through the list of its canonical ideas at school, at their parents' knee or even behind the bike sheds with their friends. Nobody studies 'commonsense' at college, nor do they take tests in it or receive a diploma proving their competence.

One thing is clear therefore about 'commonsense': it cannot be all that common or we would all be experts at identifying its core ideas and saying where they have come from.(23a)

Moreover, if 'commonsense' is encapsulated in ordinary language, it is remarkably well hidden, for, as noted above, no one seems to be able to list its main precepts. In that case, no society in history could ever have agreed over what should be included within 'commonsense', and what should be left out. Hence, the idea that 'commonsense' today is the same as was ten thousand years ago (or last week), and identical across cultures, if correct, must be one of the best kept secrets in history. If so, how it succeeds in being disseminated is a profound mystery. How does one generation pass 'commonsense' on to the next if no one ever talks about it and no one knows what it includes? Is it in the water? Is it genitally encoded? But if that were true, we would all possess the same set of 'commonsense' beliefs; but we do not, apparently. [Or, rather, none of us can say whether we do or not all share the same set since no one can list the 'commonsense' beliefs held by everyone -- or indeed anyone -- else.](24)

Typically, the sorts of beliefs some associate with 'commonsense' include ideological, metaphysical, religious, 'folk', mystical and superstitious notions, and the like. But, this list of likely candidates varies according to who is telling the tale.

In that case, one is tempted to say that the belief in 'commonsense' is itself a "scientistic folk belief" since it is not based on any clear evidence --, at least none that remains un-tainted by the very same ideas some would themselves include in 'commonsense'.(24b)

However, since nobody appears to know which beliefs are on the favoured list, the word itself is something of a misnomer. If 'commonsense' had have lived up to its name (at least), we would all be much clearer about its content; it would after all be eminently common.

Even so, almost invariably the relationship between 'commonsense' and ordinary language is assumed to be reasonably straightforward; indeed, the latter is supposed to contain or express the former. So clear is this link imagined to be, and so universally is it held, that no one (literally no one (!) -- as far as I have been able to ascertain) questions it (even Wittgenstein makes this mistake!).

But, while no competent language-user is in much doubt about his or her own language, not a soul seems to be able to say what 'commonsense' is. Even if not all of us have a mastery of speech equal to that of its most accomplished practitioners, no one (novice or adept alike) seems to know what 'commonsense' is. This is quite remarkable if the two are as intimately connected as we are led to believe.

The case for identifying the two is in fact no less questionable. As noted above, ordinary language is supposed to contain or express 'commonsense' ideas. However, pressed to supply details those wishing to lump the two together are often reduced to making a few vague references to things like sunrise, solid objects, colour vision, the possession of two hands, an imprecise collection of psychological or 'mental' dispositions and/or 'processes', an assortment of perceptual conundrums, a handful of proverbs and 'wise' sayings, a few vague moral notions and political inanities, and the odd superstition or two.

In fact, the haste to identify the two is not just unwise, it is ideologically motivated (as will be demonstrated in Essay Twelve).

On the other hand, had more than a moment's thought been devoted to this pseudo-identity, its absurdity would have been immediately obvious: if ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', it would be impossible to gainsay any of its alleged deliverances in the vernacular. However, the fact is we can. And easily.

Not only are we able to deny that tables are solid, that the sky is blue, that the earth is flat, round or cucumber-shaped, that NN believes (for most p) that p, that sticks do not bend in water, that Queen Elizabeth II is sovereign in Parliament, that water falls off a duck's back, that Rome was built in a day, that an apple a day will deter doctor's visits, that φ-ing is wrong (for any conventional φ), we can do all of these in every known language that possesses the relevant vocabulary. That, of course, is the whole point of the negative particle.(25) If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', none of this would be possible.

To be sure, many of the beliefs entertained by our ancestors we no longer accept, but as far as the connection with the vernacular is concerned, sentences drawn from it gain their sense from the conventions set by social practices. Although we can express our beliefs in ordinary language, the sense of a sentence does not arise from any of the beliefs we have, nor from any we have inherited from the past. This is because beliefs themselves are dependent on language and its capacity to articulate accordingly. And we can be sure of that fact if language is social, otherwise beliefs could not be communicated, let alone formed.(26)

Just as social practices themselves cannot be altered individualistically, the conventions underpinning language cannot be revised at will by any one individual or group (except at the margins).(27) The conventions we have at any point in time of course change and grow in accord with the rules governing social development. They are, at basis, an expression of our "species being" and are intimately connected with our relationship with the world, with one another and with previous generations.(28)

Hence, just as it would it be impossible for an individual to bury, hide or incorporate a set of beliefs in ordinary language in order to form the backbone of 'commonsense', it would be equally impossible for a group to do so.

In that case, it really isn't up to a revolutionary or group of revolutionaries (or anyone else, for that matter) to disparage such a vitally important expression of our collective (but changing) nature as human beings. Even so, that is plainly up to them, but the penalty for attempting to do so is not always immediately obvious. Nevertheless, the ideas of anyone who does endeavour to do this soon descend into incoherence (as was demonstrated above, and throughout this site). In that sense, it is not an option to attack the vernacular.

This means this is not an ethical issue -- but, it is a logical and political one. The latter half of that assertion will now be substantiated....

Notes

15. Since the application of ordinary language underpins our understanding of anything whatsoever, it is, as noted above, a court of last appeal, which, although not democratic in one sense (we do not determine what something means by counting heads), it is in another: language is materially grounded in the practice of the majority, those who, through their labour, interface with material reality and one another. This means that certain features of ordinary language cannot be 'reformed' without ipso facto undermining our ability to comprehend anything, and it helps explain why metaphysical attempts to do so are fundamentally undemocratic (in the second sense), and how, in Marxism, this is connected with substitutionist thinking. Cf., Wittgenstein (1974). [More on this in Essay Nine.]

Moreover, key scientific concepts have themselves been developed from ordinary language by analogical and metaphorical extension (etc.), as noted above. Indeed, even though it is possible to comprehend a scientific theory without having to translate it into the vernacular, the former cannot succeed in undermining the latter without also compromising that very attempt. This slide into incoherence was illustrated above, and will be considered again in more detail later.

19. Anyone who doubts this is welcome to try to express in 'Hegel-speak' what sentences H78-H89 manage to say quite easily without any such assistance.

20. Max Eastman's words spring to mind here:

"Hegelism (sic) is like a mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you've got it." [Eastman (1926), p.22.]

These words were, of course, written when Eastman still regarded himself as a Leninist.

[I first encountered Eastman's work after about four and a half years into this project. Some of the ideas in the Essays posted here had been anticipated in his writings, but most had not.]

22. It needs underlining here that these comments are not aimed at the ordinary use of the term "common sense", just its philosophical deployment, highlighted in the text as "commonsense". The original meaning of the term "common sense" (i.e., that which occurs in Aristotle's work) is not relevant to the discussion in the text since the philosophical import of this term parted company with Aristotle's meaning long ago.

23. As Michael Dummett points out [in Dummett (1979), pp.390-93] there is no such thing as "the commonsense" view of the world.

23a. If 'commonsense' beliefs were culturally 'relative' -- and while there might be some overlap --, each generation would possess a different or slightly different set of 'commonsense' beliefs. In that case, of course, there would be no such thing as 'commonsense'. It would still be a mystery, however, how such beliefs were passed on if no one knows what they are.

24. Again, since I do not accept the philosophical use of this term I will not try to solve this intractable problem for those who do.

24b. By that I mean that anyone attempting to show that 'commonsense' beliefs are accepted by all or most human beings would have to use evidence that was itself contaminated with allegedly commonsense beliefs: for instance, that there are medium-sized objects in the world called human beings, that there are such things as colours (so that, for example, claims that human beings believe there are colours is not itself an empty claim), just as there are edges, corners, surfaces and holes, that the words by means of which such ideas are expressed have a meaning, and so on. In short, if this evidence is to make any sense to the rest of us (and to those hoping to sell it to us), it would have to take for granted many of the ideas it was allegedly about.

25. On the sophisticated use to which us humans are capable of putting the negative particle, at least in English, see Horn (1989).

26. This is a controversial claim; it is examined in more detail in my thesis, parts of which will be published at this site at a later date.

27. Unless, of course, this is done to extend language. This aside, the abrogation of the rules of language results in the production of non-sense; naturally, both of these aims could form part of the intent of an aspiring abrogater. However, the creative extension of language undertaken by writers and poets (etc.) still has to make some sort of sense. Think of the work of James Joyce; Joyce did not just write total gibberish, or randomly tap away at his typewriter.

Again, this does not undermine the comments made in the text above. While language does develop, those responsible for helping it on its way do not do so by undermining the use of words we already have; if anything, they do this by extending language, developing novel uses for it and augmenting their/its vocabulary.

However, on certain aspects of the imaginative extension of language, see R White (1996), and Guttenplan (2005).

[The commentator above alluded to metaphor in language, as if philosophical and scientific language were somehow free from it, or as if it were a defect of some sort.

Neither is true. Hence, the said commentator will need to produce something a little more substantial if his comments are to merit serious attention.]

28. Spelled out more fully, this would provide some grip for the word "material" as it is used in many of these Essays. That will be attempted when this project is finished....

The above ideas about ordinary language and common sense are developed and defended in the following: Button, et al (1995), Cowley (1991), Cook (1979, 1980), Ebersole (1967, 1979a, 1979b), Hacker (1982a, 1982b, 1987), Hanfling (1984, 1989, 2000), Ryle (1960), Macdonald (1938) and Stebbing (1958). [It has to be said that, as far as can be ascertained, all of these authors confuse ordinary language with common sense. Or, at least, they do not distinguish them as starkly as I do.]

The ruling-class and their hacks have always denigrated ordinary language and the common experience of ordinary folk. It is even less edifying to see Marxists (like this commentator, if he is one) do the same thing.

More details on this will be given in Essay Twelve, but an excellent recent account can be found in the opening sections of Conner (2005).'
Bibliography and the rest of this Essay, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm

So, even though the distinction between night and day is indistinct, night and day are still easy to tell apart.

Same with metaphysics.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Now for your other points:


But one might ask "don't we think with words...so why the division?"

Well, it depends on what you are trying to do with those words, and the logic they reveal or mask, as the case may be. Forgive me once again, but this is how I put this at my site (this will the last time I will do this in this thread, honest!!):


In MEC Lenin quotes the following words from Engels:

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318.]

Here, Lenin is making a typically metaphysical statement. Naturally, DM-theorists will reject this assertion; nevertheless, it is the aim of this Essay to substantiate this claim and to explore the effect that other metaphysical theses have on DM as a whole.

[MEC = Materialism And Empirio-Criticism.]

It is worth noting at the outset that theses like M1 purport to inform us about fundamental aspects of nature, albeit in this case disguised as part of Lenin's admission of his own incredulity. Nevertheless, we are not to conclude from M1 that Lenin was merely recording his own personal views. On the contrary, Lenin certainly believed that matter and motion were fundamental aspects of "objective reality"; that they were inseparable and that this was an objective fact. In fact, like Engels, he held the view that motion was a form of the existence of matter -– that is, he believed that matter could not exist without motion, and vice versa. Motion is thus one of the ways in which matter expresses itself.

Now, the metaphysical nature of Lenin's declaration can be seen by the way that it obviates the need to find any supportive evidence. Even if humanity had access to information about motion and matter many orders of magnitude greater than is available today, it would still not be enough to show that the separation of matter from motion was unthinkable. No amount of data could substantiate that.

But as we will see, Lenin's declaration has much more serious problems to contend with than lack of any evidence backing it up.

The superficially-profound nature of theses like M1 derives from something rather more mundane, that is from features of the sort of language with which they have to be expressed: the main verb they use is invariably in the indicative mood. Sometimes this is beefed-up with modal qualifiers (such as "must" and "necessarily") -– which, incidentally, help create even more of a false impression. This misleadingly innocent-looking outer aspect hides their deeper logical form -- something that only becomes plain when they are examined more closely.

As noted above, sentences like these look as if they expressed profound truths about reality since they resemble empirical propositions, which also use the indicative mood; in the event, they turn out to be nothing like them.

Consider an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra Of Revolution.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not. However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing they are false). In fact, anyone denying their truth would risk being accused of not understanding them. This links their truth directly with meaning, but not with material confirmation.

In that case, understanding T1 is independent of the evidence that could confirm or refute it (indeed, it would be impossible to confirm it if it had not already been understood).

In contrast, T2 and T3 need no evidence in their support; their truth-values follow from the meaning of the words they contain (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words). Hence, their truth-status is independent of the evidence. [The implication of these observations will now be spelt-out in more detail.]

So we have here two sorts of indicative sentence that have a radically different relation to reality. In the first sort (i.e., those like T1), their understanding is independent of their truth-status, but their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world. In the second (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows from the words they contain.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2, and, as will be agued, T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world, which tactic is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover "underlying essences", revealing nature's "hidden secrets". Theses like this are necessarily true (or necessarily false), and are thus considered to contain genuine knowledge, unlike contingent propositions like T1, whose truth can alter with the wind.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, super-empirical truths, ones that cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood, which as we have seen hides the modal form of the verbs underlying their content. Thus, as they picture things, they do not just happen to be this way or that, they cannot be otherwise; the world must be as they assert. [This accounts for the use of modalities (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") when their status is questioned.]

In contrast, if someone were to question the truth of T1, the following response : "Tony Blair must own a copy of The Algebra of Revolution" would be highly inappropriate (unless T1 was the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement, perhaps). But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

With respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; their truth-values (true or false) can be ascertained independently -- and in advance -- of the way the world happens to be, unlike ordinary empirical propositions. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) are derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words they contain (or from the 'concepts' the latter somehow express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or falsehood, since these can be ascertained from the meaning of the words they contain. They are true a priori.

So, with metaphysical theses, to understand them is to know they are true (or know they are false). That is why, to their inventors, they seem so certain and self-evident. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their status -- their veracity follows either from the concepts they supposedly express or from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, attest to their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces these theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and one whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test).

The rest of this essay can be found here (this is a summary of Essay Twelve, which will be published later in the year):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-12.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


It is a matter of placing points in an evolution in their correct order-- linguists like to pretend that "there is nothing outside of text," while many theorists speculate the existence of organized civilization before language had even evolved. I put my money on the latter.

I do not disagree with this, in fact I endorse this view in my Essays.

[And I reject the idea that there is nothing outside the text, not because it is false, but because it is a metaphysical theory, and hence non-sense.]


You know how many famous principles and axioms are employed in the issue with that triangle? The law of idenity, xeno's paradox, plato's forms/ideas dichotomy, the uncertainty principle of QM, einstein's relativity, and probably more. Is the idea of a triangle a priori or is it a posterior? Let's hear it. You say yes, I say prove it. You say no, I say show me a perfect triangle.

Again, and forgive me for this, but this is too confused to comment upon (except the scientific ideas, which I do not question -- but what they are doing in such disreputable comapny I cannot imagine).

Now that you have fallen for me, I hate to disagree with you:


Hegel borrowed Aristotle's law of the excluded middle and set up a model of thesis/anti-thesis/synthesis,

This is Fichte's system, not Hegel's.


But opposites do not exist in a teleological sense....claims Spinoza, because there are an infinite number of attributes in existence. There is no ontological difference between true and false because there is no single finite existing thing of a teleological nature-- it is contingent to a perspective.

Spinoza's epistemology only borrows the current vocabulary of the time, while he was in reality a pantheist, having no room for transcendent cogitos and the dogmas of metaphysics. Everything was "God" for Spinoza, but this was not some detached creator of the universe...it was an immanent process

I am aware of all this, and that is why I said he was worse than Descartes.

[Please, do not inflict any more of this on me; it was bad enouigh having to write Essays on this b**llocks at university...pah!]

Hence, that passage you very kindly posted for me makes not a blind bit of sense.

More Jabberwocky lore, I'm afraid.

[Chrysalis]

Leo, sorry, I was busy and couldn't visit the site and write my response sooner. Life is ruining my quality forum time. :P :wub: Sun gets very hot nowadays and it's good to get out and do fun stuff besides philosophy.

Anyway:


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)Oh my, Chrysalis did you really had to translate my arguement that was completely in language from everyday-life into that jargon? I mean that was a painful read despite the fact that I was the one who wrote the scenario in the first place![/b]
Yes, I did have to do that insofar as you also insist on making a distinction between objective and subjective reality. Here's what philosophical discussion is about: once you bring in description of reality (objective, subjective), we have to put it in context. In fact, you have been discussing philosophically all thoughout this whole thread. So, I am responding in kind, as this is the purpose of this thread. Mine was not jargon. It's how things are discussed in forums like this, and undergrad level discussion with very few "technical" stuff. So, relax. It was the "normal" stuff insofar as you understand what objective-subjective means.


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)Well yeah, what's so amazing about that? [/b]
Because you seem to think that making that distinction would make us react or act differently. And I say, we don't react differently to "reality" if it were a mere posit or postulate and if it involved sensible objects like a chair. That's what's amazing about that. The objective and subjective distinction which you insist on making presupposes that something like tangible objects could move us much more, and in a different way, than a mere hypothesis of something. This is simply unsubstantiated assumption.



[email protected]
Objective perspective shows us the reality, subjective is an alternate perspective that makes us blind, both perspectives effect the objective reality. Naturally subjective perspective exists. Why do you think I am so 'full of rage' about the subjective perspective? Do you think I would bother to do anything about it if it didn't effect the objective reality? (The answer is no :rolleyes: )
And here again is what I'm trying to tell you: posits and hypotheses, subjective notions like some ethical beliefs, including belief in a diety or god or some spirit no more make us blind than empirical, tangible, perceptible objects. With or without the actual weapons of mass destructions or bio-chemical hazard, the fear we would feel would be the same if a government could provide enough persuasion that there is something to fear.

You just think we are being affected differently: but both, equally affect our decision, both equally could cause us to make mistakes, to make bad decisions, to make guesswork, to make wishful thinking, and both equally could make us fearful. How do you think running a political state become possible?


Leo
I am not saying that they have a special status, they have a primary status because they are mostly urgent, and had been urgent for survival. We learned them first, we learned them instinctively.
And we don't learn some intangible entities right away? We do. Survival depends both on known and unknown entities, on the so-called empirical and inferential information. On making theoretical posits and empirical hypothesis. There is no such thing as "learning objects first" then learn other non-tangible things later. We learn the whole system of beliefs. Survival requires that.

To start a state, or found a state, one must rely heavily on hypothesis, postulates, and posits, in fact there is very little to say about objects, as these are learned and ingrained daily. People react to something non-tangible, non-perceptible as powerfully as they react to the presense of a chair by sitting on it.

[Leo]

Chrysalis;


Leo, sorry, I was busy and couldn't visit the site and write my response sooner.

Oh don't worry about it, I found some threads to post while waiting for your response :P :wub:


Life is ruining my quality forum time.

Yeah, it tends to do that sometimes :) :D :lol:


Sun gets very hot nowadays and it's good to get out and do fun stuff besides philosophy.

That is the exact reason why I've been trying to stay home for the last month during the day. As a true nocturnal, a hot sun is like torture for me, it is truly disturbing. Luckily its been cloudy and a little rainy around here lately so I did manage to go out during the day :lol:

Anyway:


Yes, I did have to do that insofar as you also insist on making a distinction between objective and subjective reality.

I didn't know those two were related.


Here's what philosophical discussion is about: once you bring in description of reality (objective, subjective), we have to put it in context.

That is not actually true. I never said there was two forms of reality, one being subjective and one being objective. I said those were perspectives. Subjective perspective is bound to make one blind to reality. Objective perspective is bound to show the reality as it is, therefore reality is objective. That was what I said.


In fact, you have been discussing philosophically all thoughout this whole thread.

If you view materialism as a philosophy, yeah. Actually I was quite fascinated by philosophy in general before I realized it was too much like getting drunk, so it might still be in me somewhere, yet I don't allow it to go up when I am thinking about earthly matters, and all I think about is earthly matters.


It's how things are discussed in forums like this

Sounds like a rule to me... aren't the rules only there to be broken? :) :D :lol:


Undergrad level discussion with very few "technical" stuff. So, relax. It was the "normal" stuff insofar as you understand what objective-subjective means.

Then I am truly glad that I am not a philosophy student. It wasn't anything I didn't understand, it was just... dense, tiring and something I have already written much simply before...


Because you seem to think that making that distinction would make us react or act differently.

Indeed it would, to understand the results of subjectivism in the real world, such as football (soccer) fans killing each other after a match, we need to make the distinction between the perspective that views the material reality as it is and the perspective that puts the person in the center of the world, and again, only when we make the distinction can we choose the view the world as it is.


The objective and subjective distinction which you insist on making presupposes that something like tangible objects could move us much more, and in a different way, than a mere hypothesis of something. This is simply unsubstantiated assumption.

No! Of course it doesn't say something like that! It says hypothesis are valuable only if they are based on material reality, therefore it says things such as 'god' 'devil' 'hell' 'heaven' are not real and a piece of stone we can hold in our hand and throw at a fascist is real.


And here again is what I'm trying to tell you: posits and hypotheses, subjective notions like some ethical beliefs, including belief in a diety or god or some spirit no more make us blind than empirical, tangible, perceptible objects. With or without the actual weapons of mass destructions or bio-chemical hazard, the fear we would feel would be the same if a government could provide enough persuasion that there is something to fear.

You just think we are being affected differently: but both, equally affect our decision, both equally could cause us to make mistakes, to make bad decisions, to make guesswork, to make wishful thinking, and both equally could make us fearful. How do you think running a political state become possible?

There isn’t really anything I object here; I just can’t see the relationship to my argument. You say that governments use or pervert objective reality to manipulate the masses as much as they use the subjective perspective, you are right of course, nice catch. Yet the usage of knowledge isn’t necessarily related to the knowledge itself, if used in well, everything can and usually is manipulated to brainwash the masses.


And we don't learn some intangible entities right away? We do. Survival depends both on known and unknown entities, on the so-called empirical and inferential information. On making theoretical posits and empirical hypothesis. There is no such thing as "learning objects first" then learn other non-tangible things later. We learn the whole system of beliefs. Survival requires that.

Every intangible entity must have a material basis if it is to be true. And don't just think of a chair for example when we are talking of an object. Everything in the world is an object or is based on an object.


To start a state, or found a state, one must rely heavily on hypothesis, postulates, and posits, in fact there is very little to say about objects, as these are learned and ingrained daily. People react to something non-tangible, non-perceptible as powerfully as they react to the presense of a chair by sitting on it.


Those hypotesis must completely rely on the material conditions, objects and (object related) events. People wouldn't be afraid of a nuclear bomb if they didn't know what it was, if it wasn't described. Those 'non-tangibles' might present themselves as independent from the material reality, but they are in fact dependent to the core of their existance to that reality.

[Chrysalis]

Leo:


Oh don't worry about it, I found some threads to post while waiting for your response
Poseur! :P


That is the exact reason why I've been trying to stay home for the last month during the day. As a true nocturnal, a hot sun is like torture for me, it is truly disturbing. Luckily its been cloudy and a little rainy around here lately so I did manage to go out during the day
True. I hate hot, hot sun also. I think I enjoy winter more. Nice time to spend at a cafè, or just visiting some people.


Originally posted by Leo+--> (Leo)
Chrysalis
Yes, I did have to do that insofar as you also insist on making a distinction between objective and subjective reality.
I didn't know those two were related.[/b]
:huh: The words "objective" and "subjective" are really philosophical notions. And you have been using them philosophically.


That is not actually true. I never said there was two forms of reality, one being subjective and one being objective. I said those were perspectives. Subjective perspective is bound to make one blind to reality. Objective perspective is bound to show the reality as it is, therefore reality is objective. That was what I said
Jesus, Leo, you're making this harder than it is. Those aren't forms of reality. Those are "notions" or ahh....what's the word when describing "reality". For example, ethical beliefs are said to be subjective, while empirical observations are objective. These are both part of reality. "People making hypothesis" is part of reality, just like "scientists tests DNA" is part of reality. Whether a belief is subjectively or objectively held, or an observation is subjective or objective is something that philosophy deals with.


If you view materialism as a philosophy, yeah.
Yeah, it is a philosophy. It is a view on "reality". Even "historical materialism" is a philosophy.

Now on to the heart of your objection:
(I'm not going to answer quote by quote, but I'll try to be comprehensive)

I think you understand what I've tried to explain about making the distinction between objective-subjective: this is a futile distinction, whether it's knowledge (of all sorts) we're talking about, or metaphysical view on reality, if what we're trying to accomplish is the pragmatic or practical appeal to reality. They are both as powerful and as effective in causing us to act. But, I also think that we've come to a standstill as you would not try to observe and think of examples happening today and those that have happened in the past (historical) to see that they fit my assertion. You like to believe that there is a great significance in us seeing something perceptibly, tangibly (and believing in them), on the one hand, and us believing in some hypothesis, some theoretical posits, some postulates that some experts or leaders hand down to us, on the other.

It's not that we are "manipulated" in some cynical or malicious way, my idea is to merely point out that when it concerns us, perceptible objects pose no more problems or produce no more benefits or advantage, than merely posited entities. They both are equally important and significant.

A hypothesis "based on observable object" is still not the object itself. Of course, before we can understand something, we must have something already understood. We hypothesize that the sun rises every morning: it is based on the past observation, but the belief itself is not at all material, not at all actual, it is just a hypothesis. Now think of other fitting examples, think of something that can affect an entire society. Think of the possiblities: the whole world could be run on hypothesis alone. And we would all gladly submit.


Note: I am thinking of turning this idea into a master's thesis. It would require substantial research, I understand. But, I think it would make for a great paper.

[Leo]

True. I hate hot, hot sun also. I think I enjoy winter more. Nice time to spend at a cafè, or just visiting some people.

Indeed...


The words "objective" and "subjective" are really philosophical notions. And you have been using them philosophically.

:blink: That wasn't what I meant. I asked if your re-phasing my soccer example and my usage of obvetctive-subjective relevant.


Jesus, Leo, you're making this harder than it is. Those aren't forms of reality.

No they aren't, they are perspectives. That's what I wrote. One is a true perspective, one is a wrong perspective.


Those are "notions" or ahh....what's the word when describing "reality".

Perspectives? :) :D :lol:


For example, ethical beliefs are said to be subjective

Not true, there is a discussion going on ethical beliefs, and one side says that they are 'objective', the other side says that they are 'relative', subjectivity of ethics is actually an extreme.


These are both part of reality. "People making hypothesis" is part of reality, just like "scientists tests DNA" is part of reality. Whether a belief is subjectively or objectively held, or an observation is subjective or objective is something that philosophy deals with.

Everthing is real, naturally, what matters about a perspective, however, is how he makes one observe reality.


Yeah, it is a philosophy. It is a view on "reality". Even "historical materialism" is a philosophy.

It (historical materialism) is only common sense for me. If it is going to be described as a 'philosophy' it is the only one.


I think you understand what I've tried to explain about making the distinction between objective-subjective: this is a futile distinction, whether it's knowledge (of all sorts) we're talking about, or metaphysical view on reality, if what we're trying to accomplish is the pragmatic or practical appeal to reality. They are both as powerful and as effective in causing us to act. But, I also think that we've come to a standstill as you would not try to observe and think of examples happening today and those that have happened in the past (historical) to see that they fit my assertion. You like to believe that there is a great significance in us seeing something perceptibly, tangibly (and believing in them), on the one hand, and us believing in some hypothesis, some theoretical posits, some postulates that some experts or leaders hand down to us, on the other.

Well, we do agree actually (I think), trying to accomplish is the pragmatic or practical appeal to reality is made by a perspective, there are perspectives, one is objective, one is subjective. You just don't call them with that name. Now, an objective perspective is not only seing tangible objects, it is finding the roots of non-tangibles, thoughts, therefore ethics for example, in objects, that object in the specific example being our brain. So we want the same perspective, but call it with a different name, is that correct?


It's not that we are "manipulated" in some cynical or malicious way, my idea is to merely point out that when it concerns us, perceptible objects pose no more problems or produce no more benefits or advantage, than merely posited entities. They both are equally important and significant.

Naturally, I didn't say it was otherwise. But remember, every posited entity is based on an object, and is in fact only an object (like those neuron? things hangin' out in our brains) too small to be detected or too complex to be understood - yet. So they are not only equally important, but are initially the same: I call them objects, you can call them whatever you want, it would be the same thing.


A hypothesis "based on observable object" is still not the object itself. Of course, before we can understand something, we must have something already understood. We hypothesize that the sun rises every morning: it is based on the past observation, but the belief itself is not at all material, not at all actual, it is just a hypothesis. Now think of other fitting examples, think of something that can affect an entire society. Think of the possiblities: the whole world could be run on hypothesis alone. And we would all gladly submit.


It actually is if we will agree that the idea is in our brain, literally. A belief, a thought, is an object. Just something very hard to notice. And it is not independent from us, that hyposthesis we know is initially a part of us, another, a bigger object.


I am thinking of turning this idea into a master's thesis. It would require substantial research, I understand. But, I think it would make for a great paper.

I don't know... Discussing it is fun but a master project? Why are you going to do this to yourself? :) :P
Edit: I realized I should be supportive of such projects after I drank some tea and woke up a little bit, it doesn't sound that painful when I am more...awake so I say go for it. I hope you insert a nice little revolutionary message in it. Situationists said 'Art is revolutionary, or it is nothing'. Same thing goes for research papers :) :D :lol:

I apologize if my post today wasn't really good, I am kind of sleepy (that's what happens if you sleep at four and wake up at six), World Cup is currently owning my life, I might have missed some stuff, or I might have totally misunderstood what you were trying to say so correct me if I'm wrong.

[Chrysalis]

Leo:


That wasn't what I meant. I asked if your re-phasing my soccer example and my usage of obvetctive-subjective relevant.
Yes, they are relevant. My putting it the way I did is to put it how, philosophically, objective-subjective perspectives are discussed. If not, then we would be talking past each other and there'd be nothing that we could even get close to understanding. It is similar to defining terms before discussion begins: at least this should make the discussion more focused.


Perspectives?
More than that. But, what the heck, I'll just forget about this.


Not true, there is a discussion going on ethical beliefs, and one side says that they are 'objective', the other side says that they are 'relative', subjectivity of ethics is actually an extreme.
Since this is not primarily an ethics discussion, I will not dwell into this, though I'd love to get into it deeper. Let me say this, talk of objective-subjective is one way to discuss ethics when what we what to inquire about is whether, there are absolute (true) ethical facts, or there aren't. But, this is for another discussion.

Anyway, like I said, I think I'm done with this discussion, though I enjoyed it truly. You have brought up interesting points that helped with my developing it.

One more word: "objects" is one category of existence. There are other entities or existents that aren't objects. This is what I want to say about this, as the topic of Objects can cover one whole book.



I don't know... Discussing it is fun but a master project? Why are you going to do this to yourself?
Just so I could feel relevant. :P :lol: :o


Edit: I realized I should be supportive of such projects after I drank some tea and woke up a little bit, it doesn't sound that painful when I am more...awake so I say go for it. I hope you insert a nice little revolutionary message in it. Situationists said 'Art is revolutionary, or it is nothing'. Same thing goes for research papers
Thanks for your words. Yes, that's the idea, to tie it up with some revolutionary ideas: like founding a new societal arrangement that does not recognize power through wealth or capital. Art is revolutionary, or it is nothing, indeed. Good quote.


I apologize if my post today wasn't really good, I am kind of sleepy (that's what happens if you sleep at four and wake up at six), World Cup is currently owning my life, I might have missed some stuff, or I might have totally misunderstood what you were trying to say so correct me if I'm wrong.
No. You're posts are well-received (by me) and I can tell, you do value good discussion. World cup, I watched it. 3 - 1. Mexico and Iran. I thought Iran would win. So, Mexico was at the top of its game.

[Leo]

Since this is not primarily an ethics discussion, I will not dwell into this, though I'd love to get into it deeper. Let me say this, talk of objective-subjective is one way to discuss ethics when what we what to inquire about is whether, there are absolute (true) ethical facts, or there aren't. But, this is for another discussion.

Hopefully we will discuss that sometime in the future.


One more word: "objects" is one category of existence. There are other entities or existents that aren't objects. This is what I want to say about this, as the topic of Objects can cover one whole book.

Maybe I'll write it someday :) :D :lol:


Anyway, like I said, I think I'm done with this discussion, though I enjoyed it truly. You have brought up interesting points that helped with my developing it.

Good, I'm glad I've been helpful :)


No. You're posts are well-received (by me) and I can tell, you do value good discussion.

Thanks, so do you.


World cup, I watched it. 3 - 1. Mexico and Iran. I thought Iran would win. So, Mexico was at the top of its game.

You should watch Czech Republic playing, they are team full of wonders, it is a pleasure to watch them. (Today's game: Czech Republic 3-0 USA)


Thanks for your words. Yes, that's the idea, to tie it up with some revolutionary ideas: like founding a new societal arrangement that does not recognize power through wealth or capital. Art is revolutionary, or it is nothing, indeed. Good quote.

It seems like you would really like Situationists, they have billions of quotes like that. Here, I'll write links to two key Situationist texts, they are (unfortunately) a little philosophical but I think this is something you will like, right?

Society of Spectacle by Guy Debord

http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/pub_contents/4

Revolution of Everyday Life by Raoul Vaneigem

http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/pub_contents/5

[Chrysalis]

Anyway, summertime. Today it's just blech.

Have you ever thought of making love to someone, imagining the details of it, like it's real, you could almost feel his breath, his hair, and you could almost trace his lips with your finger? I do. Last night. Shit, here I am pouring my heart out to you, and I don't even know you.

But it's time to wake up. And I think I did. I've had a conversation with Fate, and she was very condescending. So, basically I'm screwed. It's not gonna happen, she says. Not in a million years. Fuck.

Anyway, I've got more things to say, but I won't. Not now. Not that it matters. Hell, what does it matter when we're here in cyberspace and no one gives a fuck.

Enjoy the summer and see you someday.




~Chrysalis, signing off.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You write like a man trying to sound like a woman, C.

And I see you have given up serious thought, as I suggested a few weeks back..

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You write like a man trying to sound like a woman, C.

And I see you have given up serious thought, as I suggested a few weeks back..

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You write like a man trying to sound like a woman, C.

And I see you have given up serious thought, as I suggested a few weeks back..

[Epoche]

You are a hopeless romantic, Chrysalis. Consumer fetishism. You watch too many soap operas. You don't like your boyfriend because he's not as smart as you, so you flirt with me through PM's. Then, as soon as I show an interest...you dissapear.

You are suffering a minor form of Sartrean bad-faith. (please see "Patterns of Bad-Faith" in "Being and Nothingness.")

So we get together...we have sex....we finish, and suddenly all the hype dissappears. I know this in advance, so I don't romanticize it like you do. Oh it was good alright...but it was only sex.

I'd give you my phone number but my phone is outta minutes right now.

Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

[Epoche]

You are a hopeless romantic, Chrysalis. Consumer fetishism. You watch too many soap operas. You don't like your boyfriend because he's not as smart as you, so you flirt with me through PM's. Then, as soon as I show an interest...you dissapear.

You are suffering a minor form of Sartrean bad-faith. (please see "Patterns of Bad-Faith" in "Being and Nothingness.")

So we get together...we have sex....we finish, and suddenly all the hype dissappears. I know this in advance, so I don't romanticize it like you do. Oh it was good alright...but it was only sex.

I'd give you my phone number but my phone is outta minutes right now.

Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

[Epoche]

You are a hopeless romantic, Chrysalis. Consumer fetishism. You watch too many soap operas. You don't like your boyfriend because he's not as smart as you, so you flirt with me through PM's. Then, as soon as I show an interest...you dissapear.

You are suffering a minor form of Sartrean bad-faith. (please see "Patterns of Bad-Faith" in "Being and Nothingness.")

So we get together...we have sex....we finish, and suddenly all the hype dissappears. I know this in advance, so I don't romanticize it like you do. Oh it was good alright...but it was only sex.

I'd give you my phone number but my phone is outta minutes right now.

Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

[Epoche]

(double post)

[Epoche]

(double post)

[Epoche]

(double post)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, are you sure she is a 'she'....?

She writes like man trying to write like a woman.


Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

I could send you a picture to convince you I was a man....

It's very easy to fool you guys once we know how to flatter your egoes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, are you sure she is a 'she'....?

She writes like man trying to write like a woman.


Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

I could send you a picture to convince you I was a man....

It's very easy to fool you guys once we know how to flatter your egoes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche, are you sure she is a 'she'....?

She writes like man trying to write like a woman.


Rosa, Chrys is a woman, I've seen her picture. She looks like WonderWoman kinda, but she doesn't carry a magic rope or wear tights.

I could send you a picture to convince you I was a man....

It's very easy to fool you guys once we know how to flatter your egoes.

[Epoche]

I am aware of all the possible motives for people who engage in internet discussion. I know it is possible to post false pictures...I know it is possible to conform one's style of speech to sound like a man or a woman.

Chrys, on the other hand, is someone I trust. Her and I go back way back. Maybe I'm wrong. But if I am, I've lost nothing but what time I have spent bothering myself with her.

Unfortunately, this is the second time she has pulled this on me-- sending me PM's and then vanishing. This is strike two. One more and she's out.

Hey batta, batta, batta...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Epoche:


Chrys, on the other hand, is someone I trust. Her and I go back way back. Maybe I'm wrong. But if I am, I've lost nothing but what time I have spent bothering myself with her.

Fair enough.

Try to get her to think seriously, if you can.

She is wasting her talents on empty musings, more akin to metaphysical poetry.

[Chrysalis]

And all that jazz.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:


And all that jazz.

Yes, I'd stick to music if I were you.

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by Epoche+Jun 24 2006, 02:56 PM--> (Epoche @ Jun 24 2006, 02:56 PM)
Unfortunately, this is the second time she has pulled this on me-- sending me PM's and then vanishing. This is strike two. One more and she's out.

[/b]
I didn't vanish. I'm still here. :mellow:




Rosa
Yes, I'd stick to music if I were you.
Are you musically inclined, Rosa? coz that's kinda surprising given your....brick-layer stature.

What music do you listen to?



:o You and Epoche are ruining my sojourn away from the comp, I'm supposed to be gone now and here I am spending a lot of time today here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:


I didn't vanish. I'm still here.

Who said that....?

[Chrysalis]

Epoche thought I vanished....again. I was going to, but.....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:


Epoche thought I vanished....again. I was going to, but.....

Again, who said that?

[Chrysalis]

:wacko: ROSA, you leprechaun, I TOLD YOU ALREADY!!!

What the hell are you talking about?


I'm gonna be gone, tell Epoche I'll be back or something. Deck the halls with boughs of holly.

So, fa la la lal la la la.