Nihilism - Your Thoughts?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

To me, nihilism is the acceptance the life, as we know it, is based on our subjective constructions of reality. Nihilism, in itself, is a subjective construction, but the contradictory nature between nihilism and truth is caused by the failure of modern logic to reconcile the rational truth with logical proof, and this may never be possible.

As you can see, I don't have a lot of understanding about this topic. Do you think nihilism is a legitimate philosophy, a transition between religion and true communism, or just reality?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well Dooga, if you are right, then there would seem to be no point asking for anyone else's ideas, since, according to what you say, everything we could tell you would be subjective, and of no objective help to you.

On the other hand, if you do want our objective help, then there would be no point asking for it, since the subject of your query would have just refuted itself.

Either way, you might want to re-think asking us. [You can accept that as a subjective response, or otherwise.]

Now, as far as truth itself is concerned (although I do not like to refer to it thus), any attempt to deny that we are capable of attaining it will itself either be true or otherwise (if it is neither, then it ceases to be a denial).

Hence, that claim itself must now self-destruct, for if it is true, it is false -- but if it is false, it should be rejected.

Thus, Nihilism is either uninteresting (since it is hoplessly subjective), or suicidally false/self-destroying.

[Now do you see how logic can achieve results?]

[Chrysalis]

A nice and logical response from Rosa.

And that, indeed, is the problem with views like nihilism. If a nihilist denies everything to have existence or objective sense, he can't even ask whether nihilism is a legitimate philosophy: it wouldn't matter and it wouldn't make sense. It's a view that can be refuted with one single logical statement.

[JimFar]

It's curious how words can subtly change their meanings over the years. Now a days when we speak of nihilists and nihilism, we usually mean people who believe in nothing. However, back in the 19th century, the term nihilist referred to young Russian intellectuals who rejected traditional ideas in religion and politics in favor of ideas based on modern science and materialism. Although the term had already been around for quite some time, it was the Russian novelist, Ivan Turgenev, who popularized the term in his novel, Fathers and Sons, with his character, the young medical student, Bazarov, as the archetypical nihilist. He is presented in the novel as a staunch opponent of traditional ideas in religion, politics, culture, and even within his own field of medicine. For him, the only acceptable ideas, are ones that can be verified by the methods of natural science. In other words, Bazrov is a strict positivist and materialist.

In fact, Turgenev was using his novel to comment on intellectual trends among the youth of his day. Turgenev is said to have based the character of Bazrov on a young Russian doctor that he had met in London, while most of the ideas that are spouted by Bazrov in the novel, were taken from the writings of Nikolai Chernyshevski, a sometime friend of Turgenev. Chernyshevski was one of the major radical thinkers in Russia of the mid-19th century, a man who Karl Marx thought well of, and was the author of the novel, What is to be done?, a work that helped to shape the values and attitudes of several generations of Russian revolutionaries, including the young Lenin.

Although Russian Nihilism can be seen as a failure in terms of being able to change Russia in the 19th century, it did have a profound effect on that country's intellectual life by helping to popularize a pro-science, materialist outlook that helped to pave the way for the introduction of Marxism into Russia.

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by JimFar
It's curious how words can subtly change their meanings over the years....

....Although Russian Nihilism can be seen as a failure in terms of being able to change Russia in the 19th century, it did have a profound effect on that country's intellectual life by helping to popularize a pro-science, materialist outlook that helped to pave the way for the introduction of Marxism into Russia.
This cannot be stressed enough. Ideas gain prominence, acceptance, dominance and most of us would just there and watch as human activities change. Ideas and concepts have profound effects in our practical life: they show themselves in what we do, what we're willing to do for an ideology, and what we could believe falsely.

[RebelDog]

I have always thought of nihilism as not seeing any point to anything, even sexual reproduction. I often think that if I wasn't a socialist then I would be deeply nihilist and misanthropic. I think nihilism's roots are in despair.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dissenter, I think you are right, but this doctrine seems to afflict the petty-bourgeois (workers, if they have time to fall into despair, tend to suffer from depression and/or alcoholism (or nowadays, they might choose another drug)).

Jim: thanks for those comments; as usual you are right, the word has changed meaning over the years. I was, of course.merely addressing Dooga's worries.

[Decolonize The Left]

On Nihilism:

I have several problems with nihilism. The first is that it takes skepticism to the extreme, which seems somewhat absurd. To deny all existence is to deny the existence of the mind, which as Descartes (the founder of skepticism) noted, is the only thing which we can know exists. So there seems to be a contradiction here.
The second is that nihilism leaves us in a situation where action seems unnecessary. If all values, morals, etc... are worthless, and for all we know nothing exists, then why act at all? It seems as though action, in this sense, it not only totally worthless, but it is also unnecessary and a complete waste of time. It seems as though one would be better off commiting suicide, as at least this way you can escape this world of nothing and perhaps discover what lies beyond.
Does that sound absurd to anyone else?

And yet, I don't think that any nihilists here have that in mind. I think what a nihilist might wish to be seeking is Humanism. This is a philosophy which concentrates on the human being, its value and worth. If one was to choose this philosophy over nihilism, one could retain the subjective appeal of nihilism (which is another problem to be addressed later) while also preserving some desire for action.

-- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

August, you probably recall that Descartes used scepticism to arrive at his famous conclusion (which, wasn't, as you put it, that the mind exists, but that he could not doubt he was a thinking substance), but Descartes did not extend his scepticism far enough, since he never doubted the meaning of any of the words he used.

And this is important, for it would have shown Descrtes that his own use of words was radically confused.

The problem with Nihilism, therefore -- as with Catesianism, as with any form of philosophical 'knowledge' -- is that theorists who go in for this stuff have to play word-tricks on us and on themselves to make their 'theories' work, which, because they have done that, means that those theories make no sense at all, having been based on a systematic misuse of language.

It's as if someone wondered when and where, say, the king and queen in chess got married, and built a whole theory on the suposition that they never did, and then tried to challenge the legitimacy of their title to the throne. The nonsense is obvious here, it is less so in traditional philosophy, but it is nonetheless hot air for all that.

Why do we take this stuff seriously?

I think I can answer that question, but not here.

Here:

http://www.anti-dialectics.org

[Summary to Essay Twelve.]

[black magick hustla]

Interesting subject.


I don't think there are any mainstream philosophers that throw themselves toward nihilism in its totatility. Nietzche, the most famous "nihilist" saw nihilism as a symptom of decadence, something that men should later overcome. Russian nihilists were utopian socialists, they weren't into the whole deal of destruction. Hell, Max Stirner is considered a nihilist and yet he doesn't embraces nihlism completely, because he finds that his Ego should be absolute over everything, something he finds as an objective fact.

I certainly have some nihilistic traits, but I am not an absolute nihilist. It is impossible to be a total nihilist, it would imply self-destruction as Rosa said.

[Decolonize The Left]

Rosa:

August, you probably recall that Descartes used scepticism to arrive at his famous conclusion (which, wasn't, as you put it, that the mind exists, but that he could not doubt he was a thinking substance), but Descartes did not extend his scepticism far enough, since he never doubted the meaning of any of the words he used.

Indeed his conclusion was that he could not doubt that he was a thinking substance (which he labeled the mind). And yet, the very point of that exercise was to determine what (if anything) he knew. He concluded that if one could doubt something, one could not know it due to the discrimination principle. And yet, as you said, he could not doubt his mind, and therefore knew he had one, or was one.

Your second point, that he never took skepticism far enough because he never doubted his words, seems foolish and destined for infinite regress. If one doubts the very words one is using to explain the concept of doubt, then one has nothing, and so all is futile. And yet that very phrase can be doubted in regards to meaning of words, and this one, and this one, etc...


The problem with Nihilism, therefore -- as with Catesianism, as with any form of philosophical 'knowledge' -- is that theorists who go in for this stuff have to play word-tricks on us and on themselves to make their 'theories' work, which, because they have done that, means that those theories make no sense at all, having been based on a systematic misuse of language.

I'm not sure what "word-tricks" you are refering to here. Descartes most certainly was not clear on many things, and got other things completely wrong, but much of his work has some merit. Skepticism, while absurd when taken to the limits, is none-the-less a marvelous tool to employ in everyday life and in philosophical arguments.

You say that those theories "make no sense at all, having been based on a systematic misuse of language." I'm not sure 1) if you provide any evidence of a misuse of language, 2) what a proper use of language is (you fail to define this as well), or 3) that that is an argument at all. If you are attempting to label Cartesian theories as categorical mistakes, this appears to be difficult indeed. We can easily see what Descartes was trying to prove, where he went wrong, and where he had some solid points. Yet to dismiss it all as a misuse of language is not only infantile, but seemingly worthless. It almost seems nihilistic in the sense that 'it doesn't even matter and therefore should be dismissed'.


Why do we take this stuff seriously?

Because we are thinkers, not dogmatists.

-- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

August:

"Your second point, that he never took skepticism far enough because he never doubted his words, seems foolish and destined for infinite regress. If one doubts the very words one is using to explain the concept of doubt, then one has nothing, and so all is futile."

Well, that is the point; he could not do that, but should have.

But, in a way, he did do this (which is why I said that this should have shown him he began to go wrong when he started using words in odd ways) -- in doubting his senses, he used words to depict them that he would not have done in ordinary life, and so doubted the deliverance of a set of distorted words.

His 'proof' that he was a thinking substance was entirely bogus, therefore. [See below.]

"I'm not sure what "word-tricks""

You only have to read what he says, or what any philosopher says, to see that they are using words in odd ways. [It is very clear, for example, in Anselm's Ontological Argument, Hegel's 'deduction' of 'Nothing' from 'Being' etc., and Hegel's confusion of the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity, etc. etc. There are countless examples.]

So, referring to the 'mind' is part of that trick. The word appears in language in many different ways, but Descartes treats it like a sort of container (of ideas etc), or a substance.

But, in language, the word is not used like this.

Sure, in 'philosophical' language it is, but that is my point. To get their theories off the ground, Philosophers have to use words in odd ways. [That accounts for my chess story.]

"but much of his work has some merit."

Well, his mathematical work is excellent, so is much of his science. But his philosophical work is all dross (based as it is on an idiosyncratic use of words, and god-awful reasoning -- see below). Word-trickery, as I said.

"We can easily see what Descartes was trying to prove.."

I deny that. I can't see it, and I suggest you can't. [What for example is a 'substance'? I know what the metaphysical brochure says (in fact, it says many different things); I just doubt any of it makes sense, and challenge anyone to prove differently. What, for another insatnce, is 'God'?]

I think we have been far too accommodating for too long with these ruling-class word-jugglers.

"You say that those theories "make no sense at all, having been based on a systematic misuse of language." I'm not sure 1) if you provide any evidence of a misuse of language, 2) what a proper use of language is (you fail to define this as well), or 3) that that is an argument at all."

Well, that would need a PhD to prove!

Fortunately, I am doing just that; my thesis is indirectly about this topic.

You can read some of the results at my site.

"Because we are thinkers, not dogmatists."

I suspect other reasons, but even if you were right, these 'thinkers' were dogmatists themselves.

For example, from a few badly described examples (perspectival quandaries, pieces of wax, a supericial examination of dreams, etc) Descartes declares we (or he) cannot trust our senses, or possibly cannot.

He then relies on God (who he 'proves' exists by a weaker form of Anselm's 'proof', based on yet more word-juggling) to under-write 'the light of reason', so he can then go on to trust some of the things he believes, and then he proudly declares he knows he is a thinking substance. [He does not tell us what this odd phrase means, he assumes we all know, when I suggest we do not. Sure he is using terms he learnt from his Jesuit teachers, and from medieval Philosophers, but I further suggest that they were using empty terms too.]

Dogmatic conclusions based on yet more dogma -- and very poor reasoning (compounded by the use of empty jargon, and the misuse of words).

No respect at all for this bumbler.

[It might help you to see where I am coming from if you know I am a Wittgensteinian.]

http://www.anti-dialectics.org

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 6 2006, 06:19 PM
August, you probably recall that Descartes used scepticism to arrive at his famous conclusion (which, wasn't, as you put it, that the mind exists, but that he could not doubt he was a thinking substance), but Descartes did not extend his scepticism far enough, since he never doubted the meaning of any of the words he used.

And this is important, for it would have shown Descrtes that his own use of words was radically confused.


Rosa, I disagree with this. Descartes was using doubt logically, that is, first there should be something that one is certain of before one can doubt. The same way that there should be something that one is certain of before one can say he has made a mistake. Wittgenstein has repeatedly said this in his On Certainty. If Descartes doubted even the "meaning of any of the words he used", he would then be considered something similar to a nihilist: nothing really has existence or reality.

This is the point of the "language game": we cannot doubt everything all at once, but we can doubt things at different times. Certain things hinges on other things.

Sorry to go off-topic.

[Decolonize The Left]

Firstly Rosa, let me say that I am in college, minoring in philosophy. It is clear that you are much more well-versed on the topic then I, and it is also clear (as I will point out later) that we agree on many points. So I will avoid your posts for which my response would contribute nothing of value, and focus on the points which are pertinant to this thread, and ones to which I think I can rationally respond.


But, in a way, he did do this (which is why I said that this should have shown him he began to go wrong when he started using words in odd ways) -- in doubting his senses, he used words to depict them that he would not have done in ordinary life, and so doubted the deliverance of a set of distorted words.

Yet one must convey one's ideas to the reader. If one is to doubt the very words one is writing, then one writes nothing, and we have a dead end. Given that this in not the conclusion we wish to reach (if it is say otherwise), we must make some acceptance that the words in question are valid. They can be questioned, and refined, but there must be words in order to communicate ideas.


So, referring to the 'mind' is part of that trick. The word appears in language in many different ways, but Descartes treats it like a sort of container (of ideas etc), or a substance.

Indeed. I do not believe the mind to be seperate from the body.


I just doubt any of it makes sense, and challenge anyone to prove differently. What, for another insatnce, is 'God'?]

God is a concept.


He then relies on God (who he 'proves' exists by a weaker form of Anselm's 'proof', based on yet more word-juggling) to under-write 'the light of reason', so he can then go on to trust some of the things he believes, and then he proudly declares he knows he is a thinking substance.

Indeed, he takes God as a given with poor justification. This is a huge hole in his argument.


I suspect other reasons, but even if you were right, these 'thinkers' were dogmatists themselves.

We are all dogmatic to some exent.

Please excuse the brevity of my reply, I have to go to class. Perhaps I'll come back to this later.

-- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I am away from home at present, so I cannot comment on these responses.

I get back Monday, so I will reply then.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:

"Descartes was using doubt logically..."

Precious little logic in Descartes, I am afraid -- and what little there is amounts to a garbled form of Aristotelianism (created by medieval 'term' logicians, who misconstrued Aristotle's theory of predication, and had no theory of quantifiers to pick up the slack).

But anyway, even that 'logic' cannot be applied where D wanted to apply it.

I cannot disagree with much else you said, mainly because it underlines what I had asserted earlier.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

August:

"Yet one must convey one's ideas to the reader."

Well, I do not wish to get into a long discussion of the ideas of that grade A bumbler, Descartes (in fact, I'd rather watch my toenails grow), so I will just refer you back to what I said earlier.

"God is a concept."

Says who? And, if it is, what does that concept mean? I doubt you can say.

"This is a huge hole in his argument."

In fact, his 'argument' is all holes.

"We are all dogmatic to some exent."

Maybe so, but I was specifically addressing ruling-class dogma (i.e., a priori 'superscience' -- or metaphysics).

[tambourine_man]

i'm a nihilst and i'm not "petty-bourgeois." so what?

[Chrysalis]

Hi Rosa:


Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 11 2006, 12:11 PM

"Descartes was using doubt logically..."

Precious little logic in Descartes, I am afraid -- and what little there is amounts to a garbled form of Aristotelianism (created by medieval 'term' logicians, who misconstrued Aristotle's theory of predication, and had no theory of quantifiers to pick up the slack).



Well, actually, it's not just Aristotelian, and you're venturing into "poisoning the well" fallacy if you reject it just because you also find it in Aristotelian thought.

Doubting itself is subject to logical analysis because this is what we do in ordinary reasoning and thinking, as well as in philosophizing. If you notice, we aren't really taught how to doubt: we are taught what there is from the time we're learners. And anything else we say after, whether it's denying that there is, also known as negation, as in, The ball is not in the drawer; or admiting mistake, such as, I counted 250, but I miscalculated, all hinges in what we know there is. So does doubting.


But anyway, even that 'logic' cannot be applied where D wanted to apply it.
How so? I'm not sure what you mean, Rosa.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tamby, pamby:

"i'm a nihilst and i'm not "petty-bourgeois." so what?"

So, you are a very confused punter, for if you are right, then you are wrong.

[If there is no truth, and it is true you are a nihilist, then there is at least one truth, namely this one....]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:

"Well, actually, it's not just Aristotelian, and you're venturing into "poisoning the well" fallacy if you reject it just because you also find it in Aristotelian thought."

What other logic was there in his day?

If you mean he was using a sort of 'discursive logic' (the other things you say suggests you do), I deny even that.

And, I am not poisoning the wells; Descartes poisoned his own.

"How so? I'm not sure what you mean, Rosa."

Well, do you find any Aristotelian syllogisms in his work?

And denying is not the same as negation: denying is what we do with words; negation is what we do to words.

"whether it's denying that there is, also known as negation, as in, The ball is not in the drawer."

I might be agreeing with you that the ball is not in the drawer. We can just as easily use negation to state truths: e.g., "dialectics makes no sense"; "Marx did not write the 'Da Vince Code'", and so on.

Denial is a pragmatic feature of language; negation isn't, but it allows us to make assertions and denials -- it even allows us to hypothesise, where no assertion or denial is implied (as in: "if Paris is not in France, then my Atlas is wrong")

[This explains why we have a symbol in language for negation, but not one for assertion or denial.]

[tambourine_man]

So, you are a very confused punter, for if you are right, then you are wrong.

[If there is no truth, and it is true you are a nihilist, then there is at least one truth, namely this one....]


on the other hand, to contradict myself is my whole intention. and i say that with a clear head.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tamby:

"on the other hand, to contradict myself is my whole intention. and i say that with a clear head..."

In which case, I was right: you are a confused boy, even if you do not yet know it.

Forgive for trying to help you....

[Chrysalis]

Rosa:


What other logic was there in his day?

If you mean he was using a sort of 'discursive logic' (the other things you say suggests you do), I deny even that.

And, I am not poisoning the wells; Descartes poisoned his own.
Discoursive logic or philosophic logic uses the same principle: the reasoning must be such that if I explained something to you, not only it makes sense, but also that you can't deny its truth. Ex: Nothing is round and square at the same time. We understand what it means to be round, and what it means to be square. So, with this understanding, the statement can only be true, and if you deny that this statement is true, then there's something wrong with your understanding, not with the logic of the statement itself.

Descartes uses the same principle to arrive at his unshakeable certainty. We can't doubt all and everything at once, for if doubting is a mental act, then who is doing this mental act? At least one thing must be certain. Can he really doubt that he is doubting? What is "doubting everything" would look like? He knew he couldn't. It would be nonsense, and unintelligible. How could he doubt the meaning of the words he says before he was certain that the words were meaningful to begin with?What do "meaningful words" sound like?

No, I didn't mean to say you were poisoning the well. It is a fallacy that says we can't reject something, in this case Descartes's use of logic, just because the Aristotelians were doing it and we don't agree with the Aristotelian philosophic view. It is like saying the Aristotelians poisoned the well, or "damned the source".


And denying is not the same as negation: denying is what we do with words; negation is what we do to words.......
Denial is a pragmatic feature of language; negation isn't, but it allows us to make assertions and denials -
Well, I was demonstrating both the formal as well as the grammatical of saying "It is not....." In philosophical logic, we certainly can say that: denial.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, your example of discursive logic isn't (an example -- or at least a clear example):

"Nothing is round and square at the same time." (C1)

It is easy, discursively, for something to be round and square at the same time: for example, take a piece of paper, draw a square and a circle on it.

I hear you say, 'Not fair', but you are assuming that in discursive 'logic' things are well-defined, when they are not.

So, I just misused the words you chose, which is exactly what Descatres did with the words he employed.

Hence, I deny D argued discursively, or if he did he misused language.

"and if you deny that this statement is true, then there's something wrong with your understanding, not with the logic of the statement itself."

Now you are assuming langauge controls us; there is no such thing as the 'logic of the statement itself'. Many philosphers bully or bamboozle us into accepting their whacko ideas on the basis of this claim (it lies behind, but then tries to underpin, their implicict Linguistic Idealism -- language controls us, since it was laid down by 'God', or the world has a logic to it that language 'reflects' (in 'necessary' or 'essential' truths) etc.).

We can take things any way we please, but we may be misusing certain words if we so choose.

So, again, if I fiddle with the meaning of 'same time' I can make C1 false.

Make a square out of plastic, then in the same week melt it down and form it into a circle.

So, at the same time (in the same week) something is round and square.

Who is to say what 'same time means' in such unusual contexts?

Again, D can only make his 'arguments' work by similarly screwing around with ordinary usage.

"Descartes uses the same principle to arrive at his unshakeable certainty."

Ah, but he doesn't, as I noted. He bends words to suite his purpose. All traditional philosphers do the same.

Hence my use of the chess example in an earlier post (granted, taken from an area of language that is more 'regimented', but I chose it so that this feature of his misuse would be more apparent).

"We can't doubt all and everything at once, for if doubting is a mental act, then who is doing this mental act?"

Well, I doubt D used the phrase 'menat act', but even if he had have done, what does it mean? Yes I know that traditionally we all go along with the 'great minds' of this world and assume that if they are using certain words, they mean something.

Here I deny these words have any meaning. And I have yet to meet anyone who can convince me otherwise, or who can persuade me they know what they mean.

Or if they do mean anything, they do not mean what you suggest.

'Mental act', to someone not seduced by the slippery use of words, suggests an action (in the world) that is crazy: as in 'mental disease'.

And I know that philosophers use this phrase all the time. I just suggest that when they use it (and when we stupidly follow them and allow their word-tricks to work on us) they use it stipulatively (they lay down a new use, which they themsleves either do not realise, or if they do, they have to bury it in jargon, which then requires more jargon to 'explain' it, and we end up with pages of new words, none of which have any clear meaning, since they now relate to words only, not to anything in material reality, or to anything in established social use).

In this way, and here, we are seduced into accepting a picture (as W put it) of a ghost in a machine (as Ryle put it), which is sold to us in (introductory) courses in Philosophy to convince us how profound these ancient bumblers were.

I merely point out that this non-emperor has no clothes on.

So nothing follows from a set of words, like the ones you (or D) use, if they are meaningless.

In a similar way, I might try to derive some 'discursive' 'truths from the Jabberwocky:

"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe."

http://www.jabberwocky.com/carroll/jabber/jabberwocky.html

I might conclude that these 'slithy toves' (being plural) are discrete entities, and their ability to 'gyre' suggests intentionality in some form; that their habitat (the 'wabe') must be large enough to allow them to do this -- so they live in space, and the use of verbs suggests also in time. As for the 'borogroves', their capacity to be universally 'mimsy' impies a collective identity of some sort....

You get the picture.

But none of this follows, since it is all mere jargon. Words about words.

The same applies to practically everything you read in D (and also, I might add, to everything in the vast bulk of material you find in that verbal quagmire called 'philosophy').

All empty words, which we take seriously because of its spurious social standing -- the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.

In this case, they rule us because we abandon our grip on ordinary material language far too easily.



"Well, I was demonstrating both the formal as well as the grammatical of saying "It is not....." In philosophical logic, we certainly can say that: denial."

Again, you will find sloppy philosophical logicians doing this all the time, but that is no reason for us to follow them; negation and denial must be separated or you get the problems I noted earlier -- we can deny something and end up agreeing with someone, stating truths, assuming truths, proving things.

That is why, in ordinary language, we have a symbol for negation (but not denial), which we can use not to deny things, but to assert things, if we want.

That would be impossible to explain unless we saw denial as a [i]pragmatic feature of discourse, and negation as syntactical.

Similar mistakes are made over many other things (but not in the same way); for example over the sloppy use of words like 'same', 'different', 'equal', and 'identical' -- much of recent French Philosophy can be consigned to the bin just on the basis of this confusion alone.

And, as I point out at my site, much of what Hegel wrote on the so-called 'Law of Identity', too.

I deconstruct Engels's sloppy use of langauge here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2005.htm

And Trotsky's (and thus Hegel's) here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm

[Chrysalis]

Rosa:


Chrysalis, your example of discursive logic isn't (an example -- or at least a clear example):

"Nothing is round and square at the same time." (C1)

It is easy, discursively, for something to be round and square at the same time: for example, take a piece of paper, draw a square and a circle on it.

I hear you say, 'Not fair', but you are assuming that in discursive 'logic' things are well-defined, when they are not.

What I was trying to explain is this: in discoursive logic or philosophic logic, the explanation must have logical reasoning. If we make a judgement, like Descartes does, we back it up with logic. My example of "Nothing is round and square at the same time" is meant to be explained such that its persuasiveness relies on semantics (definitions of the term) as well as our understanding of physical objects and time. You can do a lot with that statement alone. Surely, that statement refers to a 1) physical object, that is supposed to exist 2) spatiotemporally. If you understand this, then you understand the truth of the statement. So, no, there isn't such an object that is both square and round.

The claim that an object exist by drawing it on paper, let alone an object that is both round and square at the same time, is due to confusion, just because we can make up imaginary objects on paper or in our minds when we daydream. I can draw a unicorn. Have I, or anyone seen, a unicorn existing in spacetime? So far no. And though I say "so far", can we really make a judgement now that there is such an animal? NO. Your drawing does not qualify because it (the very object itself) does not exist in spacetime. Object in spacetime has defined boundaries, texture, shape, size, color (if you'd like). This is the big difference.

As far as things "being well-defined" in discoursive logic, I'm not saying that they are, only that the philosophers attempt to delineate, define, distinguish things that we don't commonly do in ordinary ways of speaking. And I believe they have met successes. This is what's good about using logic in general. Using ordinary ways of saying things is such that there are ambiguities, confusion, equivocation that we are not very concern about, if at all.


Now you are assuming langauge controls us; there is no such thing as the 'logic of the statement itself'.
It's not the way you put it: "language controls us" is not the way to put it. Think of a language game. The things we say shows its logic. Like a game where there are "rules", so does language, whether we're speaking ordinarily or philosophically. If Descartes say "I doubt that this chair I'm sitting in exists", are we suppose to take him, as an ordinary person having a conversation, or a philosopher, seriously? In both cases, no. And he knew this. Because he is sitting in it (!). Am I really going to believe you when you say you don't believe that the bed you're lying in is there? No. Because your action shows that you don't really believe it. Otherwise, you would not have done so. Unless, of course, both you and Descartes are mental cases, then, you're out of the game, so to speak.

Rosa, you'd like to think that logic itself is some "creation" (emphasis on hidden agenda) for philosophers to dodge some issues or argue for a view. This is an unfounded, pessimistic view. If this charge is at all true, then look no further than in what we say ordinarily. The philosophers would like a clearer view of what we mean when we talk ordinarily. And often, we find we aren't really clear on what we mean ordinarily, except, we just get persuaded, out of assumptions that we never question. Talk to Hume on this issue, btw.

If Descartes is trying to make a case arguing for some certainty, he is just using the same principle we are using but with a back-up: logical reasoning. He never re-defined "doubt" to suit his purpose. He is using doubt the way doubt should be used.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis, I think you are now beginning to confuse discursive logic with other things; philosophical logic is the highly complex study of the principles we suppose to underlie things like the nature of truth-bearers (statements, propositions, spoken-token indicative sentences, etc.), validity, semantics, the structure of propositions themselves, the nature of quantifiers, sets, and so on.

Discursive logic cocerns what we might take to be our intuitive use of reasoning in more ordinary circumstances.

Of course, like most things, you can call these what you like, but I think the way you are arguing is merely going to confuse you further.

Now, I gave you some examples of the way we can misconstrue the sorts of patent truths you refer to (but I would rather call these grammatical rules -- they reveal how we actually use the words we employ, etc.), and how Descartes does exactly this to 'obtain' the results he thought he had.

I am not sure you have grasped this point.

"My example of "Nothing is round and square at the same time" is meant to be explained such that its persuasiveness relies on semantics (definitions of the term) as well as our understanding of physical objects and time. You can do a lot with that statement alone. Surely, that statement refers to a 1) physical object, that is supposed to exist 2) spatiotemporally. If you understand this, then you understand the truth of the statement. So, no, there isn't such an object that is both square and round."

"Your drawing does not qualify because it (the very object itself) does not exist in spacetime. Object in spacetime has defined boundaries, texture, shape, size, color (if you'd like). This is the big difference."

But, how do you know? There are objects scientists now study which they tell us can be in several places at once (but we knew that already -- for example, any extended body is already in several places at once) and that certain particles travel 'backward in time', and so on.

So why can't an object be round and square?

It's no use appealing to what these words mean (for if you do, then you concede the conventional nature of the 'truth' you appealed to -- that it is based on the way we actually use words); and don't say (as you do) that it is about the objects we speak about (for that will merely prompt me into repeating my claim above, about how you know what you claim you do -- have you examined every body there has been, is, or could be?).

Now I gave you a few ways a body could be both round and square, and I rejected my own examples based on rules we use already (not on any alleged facts about the world -- although these rules are obviously connected with how we take the world to be, and our practical interaction with it).

Descartes can only get away with his 'arguments' by ignoring these social sanctions. Hence my reference to him as a 'bumbler'.

Your reference to 'definition' is peculiar too. Defined by whom? And why must we agree with it? As I note, scientists are all the time stretching the boundaries of knowledge. How do you know that they have not, as we speak, found a round and square object?

Your reference to the unicorn is also defective. If, on the same piece of paper, I draw a circle and a square, then by virtue of that fact these would be three-dimensional objects (they are extended in the x/y plane, and have a very slight extension in the z-plane (if I colour them in, for example), and so the obejct they form together is thus both round and square.

By drawing a unicorn you do not creat a unicorn. By drawing the above you do create a round square object.

Now, you could respond by saying that the drawing of the two parts of this object do not occupy the same spatio-temporal zones, but that depends on how you now slice these up.

For exampe they occupy the same piece of paper and they do so at the same time.

The only way you can prevent this latest claim is to descend into set theory (or its equivalent) and start talking about ordered n-tuples, and the fact that my example violates non-coincident sets of the latter.

But, to define an n-tuple you have to refer to the ordering rules by means of which they are defined, and if you do that, you would be relying on yet another convention.

So, to set up a 4-tuple <x1, y1, z1, t1> to locate a point mass, say, for part of your non-round/square object at a certain time, you would have to refer to (or use) strict ordering principles, and reject my use of the same 4-tuple to depict any object I claim violates your strictures.

Hence, you would have to be able to say that, for instance, <x2, y1, z1, t1> was not the same as <x1, y1, z1, t1> since "x1" and "x2" cannot occupy the same space in the 4-tuple at the same time, and to do that you would then have to appeal to notions of space and time you had hoped your 4-tuple would define for you.

But this is the very point at issue; if I claim that these two variables can occupy the same space at the same time (which they can (and do: there they are, on your screen (same space), now (same time) -- they are also in the same space in another way, these two variables are both first in their respective 4-tuple (same place, i.e., first)) at the same moment), then you would have no way of responding that did not also appeal to the same point at issue.

You would now only be able to defuse these claims by referring me to the way we ordinarily understand these ordering rules at present (since I have just shown you that the &#39;world&#39; (or our ways of depicting it, at least) can be made to violate even these precise rules (on your screen, right now), if the way we describe it is read in certain ways), and as soon as you do that you concede my point (that social constraints on the way we express knowledge lie behind how we use even this aspect of precise language), nothing in reality (so to speak) forces us to do so.

This is the point at issue in Kripke&#39;s analysis of Wittgenstein&#39;s &#39;rule-following considerations&#39; -- even though Kripke gets W wrong. We can take any rule any way we please (some are crazy -- like D&#39;s use of certain words), some are vaguely plausible (like my reference to those round squares above, but that is a matter of opinion, of course -- or my more serious point about those 4-tuples), but we discriminate among these by reference to how we would normally take these rules -- and in no other way.

"As far as things "being well-defined" in discoursive logic, I&#39;m not saying that they are, only that the philosophers attempt to delineate, define, distinguish things that we don&#39;t commonly do in ordinary ways of speaking."

Well I dispute that; no one ordinarily uses the words D employs in the way he does. [Ryle showed this in D&#39;s case, and if you read Kenny&#39;s book on D, you will see him underline this point, and extend it).

My examples above (about the round square object, and the n-tuples) show that using certain words, in certain ways (all vaguley plausible) you can argue for the &#39;truth&#39; of practically anything.

I did this to expose the bogus nature of D&#39;s own use of words.

"If Descartes say "I doubt that this chair I&#39;m sitting in exists", are we suppose to take him, as an ordinary person having a conversation, or a philosopher, seriously? In both cases, no. And he knew this. Because he is sitting in it (&#33;). Am I really going to believe you when you say you don&#39;t believe that the bed you&#39;re lying in is there? No. Because your action shows that you don&#39;t really believe it. Otherwise, you would not have done so. Unless, of course, both you and Descartes are mental cases, then, you&#39;re out of the game, so to speak."

Well, I think you are now trying to sell D to us, but it won&#39;t wash.

I note your use of W&#39;s analogy with games (something I try to avoid doing, for reasons I won&#39;t enter into here), but yourr own use of this analogy undermines D, not me.

He is out of the &#39;game&#39; (as you put it); so why do you take anything he says seriously?

"Rosa, you&#39;d like to think that logic itself is some "creation" (emphasis on hidden agenda) for philosophers to dodge some issues or argue for a view. This is an unfounded, pessimistic view."

Again, I spend a lot of time at my site trying to show that the reverse of this is true, so I won&#39;t repeat all that here.

I invite you to read it (or you can ignore it, it matters not); but I do have good reason for saying the things I say. You may not agree with me (that is your right), but you need to stop saying my views are unfounded.

They are actually based on W&#39;s work (allied to Marx&#39;s; but I draw on a whole host of other work -- all referenced), and I have worked my ideas out in painstaking detail (and in my thesis I am pushing this to PhD level, and hopefully later beyond).

You can see that from the tiny snippet above about n-tuples. Whether you agree with it or not (or follow my point), I hope you can see that I do not make baseless assertions.

"The philosophers would like a clearer view of what we mean when we talk ordinarily..."

Well I deny this is so, and I can prove it.

Here is a post I appended on this toipic on another thread (but dealing with Hegel and &#39;change&#39; -- but, it would be easy to extend this to any randomly-selected traditional philosopher, and to any terms they use/misuse):

"&#39;This is how John Rees put things:

"Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either &#39;this&#39; or &#39;that&#39;. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel&#39;s dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes." [The Algebra of Revolution (1998), p.45.]

The problem with this passage is that it gets things completely the wrong way round. It is in fact our use of ordinary language that enables us to refer to change. Technical and philosophical jargon (and especially that which was invented by Hegel) is practically useless in this regard since it is wooden, static and of indeterminate meaning, despite what Rees asserts.

As is well-known by Marxists, human society developed because of its constant interaction with nature and as a result of the struggle between classes. In which case, ordinary language could not fail to have developed the logical multiplicity to record changes of limitless complexity.

This is no mere dogma; it is easily confirmed. Here is a greatly shortened list of ordinary words (restricted to modern English) that allow speakers to refer to changes of unbounded complexity:

Vary, alter, adjust, amend, mutate, transmute, modify, develop, expand, swell, flow, differentiate, fast, slow, rapid, hasty, melt, harden, drip, cascade, fade, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, lost, age, flood, crumble, disintegrate, erode, corrode, flake, tumble, cut, crush, grind, shred, fall, rise, spin, oscillate, rotate, wave, quickly, slowly, instantaneous, suddenly, gradually, rapidly, sell, buy, lose, win, ripen, rot, perish, grow, decay, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, slowly, quickly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, continuous, continual, push, pull, jump, break, charge, assault, dismantle, replace, undo, reverse, repeal, quash, hour, minute, second, instant, destroy, annihilate, boil, freeze, thaw, liquefy, evaporate, solidify, condense, protest, challenge, expel, eject, remove, overthrow, expropriate, defeat, strike, revolt, riot, march, demonstrate, rebel, campaign, agitate and organise….

Naturally, it would not be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally tens of thousands of words all capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail. It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by Rees, and others) that ordinary language cannot express change. On the contrary, it performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that was not broken.

Dialecticians, it seems, would have us believe that because of the alleged shortcomings of the vernacular, only the most recondite and abstruse terminology invented by Hegel (the meaning of much of which is unclear even to Hegel scholars) is capable of telling us what we already know -- and have known for tens of thousands of years -- that things change&#33;

Of course, as Rees himself implicitly conceded, Hegel&#39;s leaden language has to be translated into &#39;ordinary-ish&#39; sorts of words for the rest of us to be able to gain even a dim appreciation the obscure message it contains (that was the whole point of his précis of a key Hegelian &#39;deduction&#39; (discussed in Essay Twelve); pp.49-50 of TAR: The Algebra of Revolution) --, which was that we could not understand change without such assistance&#33; But, if we already have ordinary terms (like those listed above) that enable us to talk about and comprehend change, what need have we of Hegel&#39;s prolix terminology? Conversely, if according to Rees ordinary language is inadequate when faced with the task of translating Hegel&#39;s observations into something we can understand, how would anyone be able to grasp what Hegel meant -- or even determine whether he meant anything at all?

On the other hand, if we are capable of comprehending Hegel&#39;s obscure ideas only when they are written in ordinary terms, why do we need his opaque concepts to reveal to us what our language can or cannot express anyway -- when, manifestly, it must have been adequate enough (on this supposition) for just such a successful re-casting of Hegel&#39;s ideas? If ordinary language can capture what Hegel meant, in what way is it defective? If it can&#39;t, then how might we understand Hegel?

Not surprisingly, if Hegel were correct, no one (including Hegel himself) would be able to understand Hegel, for, ex hypothesi, his words would not then be translatable in terms anyone could comprehend. Conversely, once more, if Hegel&#39;s words are translatable, that must mean that we already have the linguistic resources available to understand change (etc.) perfectly well. Naturally, this implies that on the one hand, if Hegel were correct, no one would be able to understand him, while on the other, if he were incorrect -- and we could understand him enough to be able to say that much -- no one need bother.

The idea that ordinary language cannot cope with slow or rapid change may be summarised by the following sentence:

H1a: Ordinary language cannot account for or depict change.

But, the question is: Is H1a itself written in ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask what the word "change" in H1a actually means. If we, as ordinary speakers, do not understand this word, what precisely is it that Hegel and Rees are presuming to correct? We may only be educated if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we already know what change is (so that we can at least say that our word "change" does not match this ideal). But, ex hypothesi, we are not supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area.

Contrast H1a with the following:

H1b: Ordinary language cannot account for or depict quantum phenomena.

The situation is not at all like that presented in H1b, where a technical area of knowledge is involved. "Change" as it appears in H1a cannot be an example of a technical use of language, if it is in the vernacular. Of course, if H1a is not in the vernacular, then the word "change" it uses will need to be explicated in terms of the ordinary word "change", so that we might grasp what this typographically identical technical word means. If so, the ordinary word "change" will have to feature in just such an explication, and we would be back to where we were in an earlier paragraph.

Without that explication, if we don&#39;t know what the technical term "change" means, H1a must be incomprehensible; it contains at least one word that no one -- not a single human being -- yet understands, apparently. Unfortunately, this now means that our re-education cannot be initiated by means of H1a (or indeed any other sentence that uses the as-yet-to-be-explained word "change"). Of course, that would also mean that the &#39;dialectical&#39; development of this &#39;word/concept&#39; cannot begin either, for as yet, all we have is an empty word. For all the good it does, it might as well be replaced by "slithy tove".

It could be objected here that while our ordinary terms partially grasp the nature of change, Hegel&#39;s use of language provides the wherewithal to comprehend the concept more fully -- &#39;dialectically&#39; and &#39;scientifically&#39;, as it were. Perhaps then Rees meant the following:

H2a: Ordinary language cannot fully grasp change.

H2b: Specially created terminology is required to enable its comprehension.

But, once again, what does the word "change" in H2a mean? Is it being used in the same way that we use the ordinary word "change"? Or does it possess its own &#39;special&#39; technical sense which has yet to be explained? If it does mean the same as the ordinary term, then where does our common understanding of this word fall short? Why do we need a theory to explain something we already understand?

On the other hand, if the common understanding of this word is defective -- if users of this word do not understand it -- then H2a is incomprehensible, since it contains a word that no one understands. Until we know the extent of our ignorance all the technical/dialectical terminology in the world is of no use.

Alternatively, if the word "change" in H2a has its own special meaning, what is it? And, if that is the case, then what sort of criticism of ordinary language do H2a and H2b represent, if they do not use it? If in H2a the word "change" has a technical sense, how can that word with its special sense be used to criticise the ordinary word (or point out its limitations) if the ordinary word is not itself being used?

Furthermore, if the word "change" has a &#39;dialectical meaning&#39;, how could that meaning possibly help anyone correct the ordinary word if we still do not understand the ordinary word? And how might dialecticians explain to themselves what this special &#39;dialectical meaning&#39; is if all they have is the defective ordinary word "change" to go on? This side of a clear answer to these questions, H2a is as devoid of sense as H1a ever was.

Again, in response to this it could be argued that H2a is not about our understanding of the meaning of a word; it is merely reminding us that ordinary language cannot be expected to operate outside its legitimate sphere of application (i.e., "beyond certain limits"). No one expects ordinary language to cope with complex issues found, say, in the sciences or in philosophy; this does not impugn common understanding, it simply reminds us of its limitations.

Doubtless this is correct, but unless we are told in what way the ordinary term "change" -- as we now understand it -- falls short, a dialectical extension to our knowledge cannot even begin. This shows that despite suggestions to the contrary, H2a is directly about our understanding of this word, for if the word "change" (as it is used in H2a) does not mean what the ordinary word "change" means, then the meaning of H2a itself must be indeterminate. Not only that, if our understanding of the word "change" is even slightly defective, we certainly cannot use it while pretending to correct it. We cannot feign comprehension of a word for the sole purpose of correcting or revising its current (defective) meaning. This is not because this would be a difficult trick to pull off, it is because it is no more of an option than, say, pretending (to oneself) to forget a word.

Conversely, if the word "change" has no meaning (or if it is unclear what it means), neither that word nor its meaning may be corrected by the use of any sentence that also contains that &#39;suspect&#39; word (such as H2a). And, if it is true that our grasp of this word is defective (in any way), then those very same linguistic imperfections must apply to anyone who seeks to correct it by the use of sentences like H2a. Clearly, in that case, such prospective revisers would not be able to comprehend what they themselves were trying to reform, since they would be in the same position as the rest of us, using a word with unspecified shortcomings. On the other hand, if such aspiring reformers understand the word "change" differently from the rest of us then any proposed modification to ordinary language would clearly apply to their own special use of that term -- i.e., to a word that is only typographically similar to the ordinary term "change" (and which special word is still of undisclosed meaning) --, but not to the word "change" as it is used in ordinary language.

The claim here, therefore, is that with respect to the word "change", it is not possible for anyone even to begin to say in what way it fails to mean what it is ordinarily taken to mean (or falls short of it), or even to entertain the possibility that it might do this, without using that word in a way that cannot be subject to such doubts.

Consider the following &#39;attempt&#39; to revise the word in question:

H3: Change does not mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe. It means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces acting as parts of a mediated totality."

If this is so, then H3 should be re-written as follows:

H4: Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces acting as parts of a mediated totality does not mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe. It means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces acting as parts of a mediated totality."

The replacement of the word "change" in H4 with what it allegedly &#39;means&#39; just creates an incomprehensible sentence (and the same would happen with respect to any of its cognates -- indeed, Hegelians can replace the proposed &#39;dialectical meaning&#39; of "change" in H3 with whatever formula they please, the result will not change (irony intended)).

If it is now objected that the above is unfair then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary material words for change fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without him or her actually using the word "change" (or one of its synonyms) anywhere in that attempt. Short of doing that, that objector&#39;s use of this word (or one of its cognates) to express his or her own objection (howsoever mild or nuanced, or dialectically motivated) will be subject to the very same unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself must fail for lack of meaning.

In that case, the objector will be as much in the dark as the rest of us allegedly still are -- only he/she will now be unclear, not just about our ordinary words for change, but about the application of his/her own non-standard, jargonised (dialectical) replacement for it, since he/she would be unclear what it was supposed to be replacing. [That was the point of the ridiculous example given in H4.]

This is why we can be confident that not even Hegel understood this part of his own theory. This is not because it is a difficult theory, or because it employs special technical terms that are completely incomprehensible to the untrained mind. Nor is it because Hegel did not use H3 (or anything like it), it is because of the fact that as soon as any attempt is made (by anyone -- even a person of "genius") to correct ordinary language -- or, just as soon as the vernacular is dismissed as defective or even slightly flawed, and its terms are held to be deficient when applied beyond "certain limits", requiring that they be "surpassed", by-passed or revised -- all meaning disappears.

To repeat, it is not possible to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "change" and then claim that it is defective (whether "speculative reason" initiates such an attempt, or not). Either the objector&#39;s understanding of this word is defective -- and the ordinary term is alright as it is --, or the ordinary word is defective and no one (including that objector) actually understands it. Again, in the latter case, there would then be nothing left to modify; in the former, no one need bother.&#39;"

[Taken from Note 19 at:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm]

So, I hope you do not now think what I say is &#39;unfounded&#39;.

[Djehuti]

Nihilism derives from the latin word "nihil" that means nothing. Nihil est = nothing is. The term became popular after the russian author Ivan Turgenev used is in his novell "Fathers and Sons" from 1862, and through the nihilist movement that grew forth in Russia at the same time (1860-1917). It was a revolutionary movement that rejected the authority of the state, church and family. Instead it advocated a rational organisation of society, materialism as the only source of knowledge and individual freedom as its formost goal. Because they were materialists, they saw all forms of religion and "spirituality" as a direct opposite to freedom. In his novell, Turgenev defines a nihilist as "a person who don&#39;t bow to authorities, who don&#39;t accept the belief in any princip, however high held it may be." (quoted from mind, not an exact quote). But the word nihilist soon became associated with destruction and chaos in general, and was used as an insult within the russian establishment for all who were engaged in some sort of revolutionary struggle (just as the word anarchist in the rest of Europe).


"It was the same with the name of the Nihilists, /.../ the press and the public would not describe the Russian revolutionaries by any other name. Anyway the name was by no means badly chosen, for again it sums up an idea; it expresses the negation of the whole of activity of present civilisation, based on the opression of one class by another - the negation of the present economic system. the negation of government and power, of bourgeois morality, of art for the sake of the exploiters, of fashions and manners which are grotesque or revoltingly hypocritical, of all that present society has inherited from past centuries: in a word, the negation of everything which bourgeois civilisation today treats with reverence."
Peter Kropotkin - On order

Philosophicly, nihilism stands close to the sceptics, who in their most extreme form deny the possibility to reach knowledge and truth. But extreme-scepticism is just meaningless crap. Nihilism does not deny science; rather the opposite. Nihilism denies faith, because faith includes abandoning rational thought, critical analyzis and common sense. The early philosophical nihilism during the first half of the 19th century was developed as a direct opposition (negation) to the then dominating hegelian idealism.

Put short, you can say that there is three forms of nihilism:
Political, moral and existential.

Political nihilism is the opinion that the destruction of all the existing political, social and religious institutions and ideologies is a prerequisite to even be able to make society and/or our own lives better. Or as Bakunin expressed it: "the lust for destruction is a creative lust".

Moral nihilism means that you deny the existens of objective and/or universal moral and ethical values. Good and evil is delusions, and the values that orbits around these are only products of social context (class interest, indoktrination, sentimental ties, etc).

Existential nihilism is the understaning that life lacks a goal and meaning, and that there because of that, is no other meaning with life except the one we might give it.

In my opinion you can also say that nihilism in its extention involves the destruction of philosophy, the negation of idealism, the opposition to mythology and the destruction of all the confusion and perplexation this creates in humans; together with the abolisation of all "experts" that interpreter (read: produces) the insanity - priests, psychologists, economs, politicians, philosophers, journalists, authors, professors, ideologs, and other "understanders" (a.k.a the "middle class"). But the nihilist "awakening" can of course result in many different conclusions; and my interpretation is colored by my socialist counciousness and class analyzis. If you lose your illusions without having anything constructive to put in its place, the result risks to be cynicism and self destruction, etc.


"Nihilists constantly feel the urge to destroy the system which destroys them. They cannot go on living as they are. Soon, most realize that they must devise a coherent set of tactics in order to transform the world.

But if a nihilist does not recognize the possibility for the transformation of the world, his or her subjective rage will ossify into a role: the suicide, the solitary murderer, the street hoodlum-vandal, the neo-dadaist, the professional mental patient... all seeking compensation for a life of dead time.

The nihilists&#39; mistake is that they do not realize that there are other nihilists with whom they can work. Consequently, they assume that participation in a collective project of self-realization is impossible."


The quote is from &#39;The Revolutionary Pleasure of Thinking for Yourself&#39;. A short and clear description on how nihilism and collective class struggle are connected; how you break with political alienation and how you create an undogmatic revolutionary theory, etc.
http://deoxy.org/rst.htm

[JimFar]

Djehuti wrote:


Nihilism derives from the latin word "nihil" that means nothing. Nihil est = nothing is. The term became popular after the russian author Ivan Turgenev used is in his novell "Fathers and Sons" from 1862, and through the nihilist movement that grew forth in Russia at the same time (1860-1917). It was a revolutionary movement that rejected the authority of the state, church and family. Instead it advocated a rational organisation of society, materialism as the only source of knowledge and individual freedom as its formost goal. Because they were materialists, they saw all forms of religion and "spirituality" as a direct opposite to freedom. In his novell, Turgenev defines a nihilist as "a person who don&#39;t bow to authorities, who don&#39;t accept the belief in any princip, however high held it may be." (quoted from mind, not an exact quote). But the word nihilist soon became associated with destruction and chaos in general, and was used as an insult within the russian establishment for all who were engaged in some sort of revolutionary struggle (just as the word anarchist in the rest of Europe).

I said pretty much the same thing in my earlier post in this thread. Nihilism in Russia of the 1860s meant something rather different from what the word means today. The Russian Nihilisits, as you say, rejected religion, and what they regarded as the false values of the state and family, but they very much believed in science and in the possbility of using science to reconstruct the existing social order. Some of the Nihilists like Chernyshevski were quite political. In fact, he was one of the founders of the revolutionary socialist tradition in Russia. Some of the other Nihilists like Pisarev were avowedly apolitical, stressing the values of self-cultivation.

Many historians have often drawn comparisons between Russian Nihilism as it existed in the 1850s and 1860s and the counterculture movement that existed in Western societies during the 1960s. Both movements were driven by a strong sense of rebellion among the youth of the day. In both Russia of the 1860s, and the Western countries of the 1960s, there was a strong sense that there was a profound conflict going on between the older and younger generations. Both movements involved both cultural radicalism and political radicalism with some people emphasizing the political side while others emphasized more the cultural side. In both movements, there was a strong interest in alternative forms of social organization, in creating communes and collectives (see Chernyshevski&#39;s novel, What is to be done?. Among both the Russian Nihilists of the 1860s and the Western counterculture of the 1960s, there were definite lifestyles associated with these movements, including styles of dress for instance.

On the other hand there are some noticeable differences between the two movements. The Russian Nihilists worshipped science. Many of the Nihilists were students of the natural sciences or of disciplines like medicine that were becoming increasingly science-oriented. The Russian Nihilists looked to Western thinkers of a materialist or positivist bent like Buchner, Darwin, Comte, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Feuerbach, Herbert Spencer etc. for inspiration. The Western counterculture of the 1960s, on the other hand, drew instead on the romantic tradition that has long existed in the West. Much of the counterculture was quite hostile to science, viewing it as a source of alienation, and they looked to Eastern religions and the spiritual traditions of indigenuous peoples for inspiration instead.

[Chrysalis]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 14 2006, 02:36 AM

Of course, like most things, you can call these what you like, but I think the way you are arguing is merely going to confuse you further.


Rosa:

I don&#39;t think we really can come into an agreement. I have argued the way everyone is supposed to understand a logical argument: in Descartes&#39;s case, his use of doubt.

So, although I&#39;ve enjoyed this discussion, because it made me think and improve my writing on the subject, I&#39;d like to end it here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chrysalis:

"I have argued the way everyone is supposed to understand a logical argument: in Descartes&#39;s case, his use of doubt."

You are right -- most people have tried to &#39;understand&#39; D this way, but since W&#39;s work, we can now see that this was not a viable option and, as he put it, it all amounts to mere castles in the air.

I would just add, "mere ruling-class castles in the air".

[LoE]

yayyyy <_<

you wrote a lot eh?

I&#39;m sorry I couldn&#39;t read all these posts (because my motherlanguage is Turkish and I&#39;m only 16 so it&#39;s really hard to understand all these words) so I&#39;ll not discuss something but only tell my ideas:

1) I&#39;m a nihilst, and also a communist

2) According to nihilism all the things were known in late 1800s were only our lies about life now those in 2006...

3) yes there&#39;s my opinions: Nihilism is to believe that there&#39;s no importance of your own life not rassional universe itself, the place that you stand is NOTHİNG if you think all the universe, the time you live is NOTHİNG if you think all the endlessness of the time itself, and there fore you are NOTHİNG according to LİFE itself...

so that means: a) I&#39;m no one born for nothing and will, probably, die for nothing
b) all the things I do I suffer I work for I love is NOTHİNG
c) I&#39;m a part of the NOTHİNGness so if I love myself (yes I do that because it&#39;s me andI love myself no matter what I&#39;m [wheter NOTHİNG or not] I MUST loe myself because there&#39;s a truth that you cannot deny [eventhough you are nihilst] there are lots of rules with İF in the world these are containing two other situations with each other and if you want to do something you MUST do something there&#39;s no way out so: IF YOU WANT TO LIVE YOU MUST LOVE YOURSELF therefore I love myself) I love all the NOTHİNGless that I belong to because I&#39;m only a tiny part of this Nothingness.

AND SO:

I&#39;m a nihilst who loves and/or adores all the universe because I&#39;m only a reflection of this NOTHİNGness

and so I&#39;m a pollyana eh??

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 5 2006, 11:07 PM
Well Dooga, if you are right, then there would seem to be no point asking for anyone else&#39;s ideas, since, according to what you say, everything we could tell you would be subjective, and of no objective help to you.
Rosa, I know this was the content of the previous thread, but as most of this thread moved onto scepticism in general, and the last thread was a debate between just too members before it was closed I will try and give an answer to your objection that most in this thread have accepted.

This doesn&#39;t mean it is my view, when it comes to things like this I see them as intellectual games, and make decisions outside of them using logic as much as possible (because it works)...

Anyway:
Now, as far as truth itself is concerned (although I do not like to refer to it thus), any attempt to deny that we are capable of attaining it will itself either be true or otherwise (if it is neither, then it ceases to be a denial).
Not necessarily. By assuming that there is only two possible states; true or untrue, you are presupposing the conclusion. If you start without either truth or falseness then bring it in you assume that everything is one or the other, and arguments to deny it do fail, but if you never make reference to it then it doesnt matter.


Hence, that claim itself must now self-destruct, for if it is true, it is false -- but if it is false, it should be rejected.
You are required to invoke truth or false here to assess the claim, and by doing so you obviously refute the claim as it denies them. If the claim is that there is no truth it cannot be thought of in terms of true or false because this assumes that they exist. Likewise to understand a proposal as false because it isn&#39;t "tru" assumes truth existing.

These two views seem to go past each other, they are incomensurable, and discussion about them is fairly pointless. If you take nihilism as your view then Rosa&#39;s criticisms aren&#39;t fatal, however they do illustrate why nihilism it a little pointless to a materialist who needs to see things as true or false to make sense of and understand the world.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LOE:


and so I&#39;m a pollyana eh??

No just rather confused.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


By assuming that there is only two possible states; true or untrue, you are presupposing the conclusion.

Well I am assuming nothing remotely theoretical (philosophically that is, and if you can show I am, I will withdraw it immediately, and hang my head in shame).

So my opinion pressupposes nothing.

It merely sits back and watches any denial of it self-destruct.

And I did not understand this:


If you start without either truth or falseness then bring it in you assume that everything is one or the other, and arguments to deny it do fail, but if you never make reference to it then it doesnt matter.

As soon as you make it clear, I will help it disintegrate.


If the claim is that there is no truth it cannot be thought of in terms of true or false because this assumes that they exist.

Well, once again, (1) if this is true, it self-destructs. (2) If it is false , we can ignore it.

If it is neither, then it asserts nothing, and so I refer you back to the conclusion to (2).

Are there any other options?

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 8 2006, 09:49 PM
Heg:
Well I am assuming nothing remotely theoretical (philosophically that is, and if you can show I am, I will withdraw it immediately, and hang my head in shame).

So my opinion pressupposes nothing.

It merely sits back and watches any denial of it self-destruct.

If it is neither, then it asserts nothing, and so I refer you back to the conclusion to (2).

Are there any other options?
Your only assumption would be that truth exists and that its existance is true.


And I did not understand this:Scrap that, that was likely reading Hegel, drunk, in the dark, on a bad day :P ;)

I agree with ignoring it, but not because it is false...but rather for the reasons you posted there^ and because as those interested in material changes such an intellectual parlour game of this sort makes no real impact on the world.

I find this ideas useful only as stimulation, but I feel that I must try and do them justice. Your second conlusion (not in reference to it being false, but rather it asserting nothing) represents the view better than the impression I got from your earlier response, that is all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


Your only assumption would be that truth exists and that its existance is true.

No, I am no assuming that.

To show that I am, you need to assume it.

To show that I am not, you need to assume it, too.

You are the one assuming things.


I find this ideas useful only as stimulation,

You need to get out more, if you find this intellectual waste of thime stimulating. ;)

No offence, but I find this sort of &#39;game&#39; tedious in the extreme.

I only engage in it in order to help bring to an end 2500 years of this sort of stuff.

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 9 2006, 09:36 AM
No, I am no assuming that.

To show that I am, you need to assume it.

To show that I am not, you need to assume it, too.

You are the one assuming things.


Actually it should be self evident, as you asserted it in your criticism. Although I cannot argue this from within the position I am "defending" I can do it from outside of it. From within the position any attempt to argue the same point that I suggested a second ago would result in an infinite regress.


You need to get out more, if you find this intellectual waste of thime stimulating. ;)
I guess that having studied worse areas of philosophy that I can find enjoyment here.


No offence, but I find this sort of &#39;game&#39; tedious in the extreme.
Each to their own ;) Personally I find dialectics a little droll and the arguments relating to them. I realise that you take this as a serious issue, I simply do not. I don&#39;t really see nihilism as serious either for that matter, but slightly more enjoyable than slating dialectics.


I only engage in it in order to help bring to an end 2500 years of this sort of stuff.
We arrived where we are today as a result of those 2500 years...some of it was a waste of time, but without hindsight we couldn&#39;t have known all of that. Philosophical development is important just as current philosophy is in the same way the history of science is relevant. We do not use outdated theories in science, but we take stock of them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


Actually it should be self evident, as you asserted it in your criticism.

Well, if it were self-evident, I would not need to assert it; so either I did not assert it or it is not-self-evident.

Which?


Although I cannot argue this from within the position I am "defending" I can do it from outside of it.

You make it sound as if such &#39;positions&#39; were like containers of some sort. I deny you can do what you say you are doing, since they are not.

What you can do however is assume something for the purposes of an argument, and as soon as you do that you enter the world (I prefer "practice" here) of truth and falsehood.

Of course, if you want to deny that, you must do so in that same world.

Either way, you (not me) have to assume truth and falsehood (or better, you accept that either of these is an aim of what you say) to criticise it, even if you are doing so insincerely.

That applies to nihilists and solipsists too.

In contrast, my position does not start from there (i.e., a theoretical approach to truth etc.), but from the practice of truth-telling (etc), which is not an assumption (as I am sure you know, if you know your Wittgenstein).


Philosophical development is important just as current philosophy is in the same way the history of science is relevant.

Well, philosophy (as traditionally praticed) is a 100% waste of time (which is why only time-wasters employed by the ruling class indulged in it). Science isn&#39;t. I only indulge in the former to help rescue Marxism from it so that revolutionary socialism can benefit more fully from the latter.


We do not use outdated theories in science, but we take stock of them.

Correct, but what has that got to do with my total antipathy toward philosophical theories (which are not even remotely like scientific ones)?

[rouchambeau]

I&#39;m pretty nihilistic. I don&#39;t accept the idea there is no truth because simple synthetic propositions like "2+2=4" is inherently true. I do not however, believe in morality, and I&#39;m fairly skeptical about any analytical "knowledge".

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 9 2006, 05:35 PM
Well, if it were self-evident, I would not need to assert it; so either I did not assert it or it is not-self-evident.

Which?


By making the very statement that critisised my views, your statement had to be true, other wise it falls to the same argument you are using about denial of truth in the first place. For this to be true you have to invoke truth.

Essentially this could go round a very long, possibly infintie route without achieving much. That is what I meant when I said they were incomensurable.


What you can do however is assume something for the purposes of an argument, and as soon as you do that you enter the world (I prefer "practice" here) of truth and falsehood.
Which is exactly what I meant when I said I couldn&#39;t argue from "within" the position I defended. However in your attack you rely upon your statement being true, which is subject to what I stated above.

I never said my statemt would be workable if seriously and properly implemented...


Well, philosophy (as traditionally praticed) is a 100% waste of time (which is why only time-wasters employed by the ruling class indulged in it). Science isn&#39;t. I only indulge in the former to help rescue Marxism from it so that revolutionary socialism can benefit more fully from the latter.
Logic? Political philosophy? OK most of it is only indirectly useful, but the use of it is in developing one&#39;s powers of reason and skills at argument. I don&#39;t see this as a waste of time. There are also references to much of it in literature, or art, or other walks of life...it isn&#39;t essential knowledge, but it can add to enjoyment of other things, as well as be enjoyable in itself.


Correct, but what has that got to do with my total antipathy toward philosophical theories (which are not even remotely like scientific ones)?
Well not a lot if that is the way you feel...but what has the history of science got to do with a strict religious dogmatist that rejects all science?

[Zaleusoqe]

"No just rather confused"

Rosa, who the fuck are you to say that?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


By making the very statement that critisised my views, your statement had to be true, other wise it falls to the same argument you are using about denial of truth in the first place. For this to be true you have to invoke truth.

Well, we can go round like this until you decide, as you did with Fist, that we are getting nowhere.

I invoked nothing, I merely pointed out that by doing certain things with words, you and others shot yourselves in the foot.


Essentially this could go round a very long, possibly infintie route without achieving much. That is what I meant when I said they were incomensurable.

Forgive me, but are you tipsy again? This made no sense to me.


Which is exactly what I meant when I said I couldn&#39;t argue from "within" the position I defended. However in your attack you rely upon your statement being true, which is subject to what I stated above.

Since you are the one playing games, you are the one who needs to invoke the theoretical position you attribute to me.

On the other hand, I merely remind you what your use of words commits you to.


I never said my statement would be workable if seriously and properly implemented...

Since instructions, orders or plans are workable, but not statements, this makes little sense either.


OK most of it is only indirectly useful, but the use of it is in developing one&#39;s powers of reason and skills at argument.

The evidence of those who indulge in traditional thought, including one or who two at this board who attempt to emulate it, suggests that they would probably reason a whole lot better if the subject (traditional philosophy) had never been invented,

Especially if like you they regard it as a mere game.


There are also references to much of it in literature, or art, or other walks of life

And the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class. This just confirms it.

Perhaps now you see why.


but what has the history of science got to do with a strict religious dogmatist that rejects all science?

I must look up the meaning of the word "relevant".

Or, at least, one of us must....

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Rosa, who the fuck are you to say that?

Someone who knows what the English word "confused" means.

Next stupid question....?

[Zaleusoqe]

Are you a radical, Rosa?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Are you a radical, Rosa?

2 stupid questions in one week.

Nice going....

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 10 2006, 12:21 AM
Well, we can go round like this until you decide, as you did with Fist, that we are getting nowhere.

I invoked nothing, I merely pointed out that by doing certain things with words, you and others shot yourselves in the foot.


Well yes it will go round and round.


Forgive me, but are you tipsy again? This made no sense to me.
Possibly, but that would have little bearing on my ability to structurethe argument, I would have to be smashed out of my brains not to grasp this. What I mean was simply, and this is not defending truth denial anymore, that just as truth denial self destructs in front of someone that accepts truth, truth acceptance invokes something that isn&#39;t accepted by someone denying it....in other words there can be little communication between these "theories" (I would use a better word..)

I understand fully your position Rosa, and I do not disagree with it, but to understand the position that you are attacking I have to be able to see it from that point of view. I can also appreciate why some people hold onto theories even when they have been "destroyed" and this is valuable, I know you may not think so.


Since you are the one playing games, you are the one who needs to invoke the theoretical position you attribute to me.

On the other hand, I merely remind you what your use of words commits you to.
Playing a game has nothing to do with it, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that I temporarily adopted a different mode of thinking. Invoke the position I attributed to you? Why would I invoke that if I am denying that?


Since instructions, orders or plans are workable, but not statements, this makes little sense either.
Yes you are right, but this was kind of my point. Aside from being merely a word game this has little relevance in the real world, and I haven&#39;t denied that.


The evidence of those who indulge in traditional thought, including one or who two at this board who attempt to emulate it, suggests that they would probably reason a whole lot better if the subject (traditional philosophy) had never been invented,

Especially if like you they regard it as a mere game.
Is that because I accepted the almost impossible challenge of trying to defend truth denial as far as possible even though it is fairly ridiculous? I assure you that I respond well to things that happen in the real world as well, and that my mind has not been poisoned by philosophy. I think perhaps yours may have been poisoned against anyone that remotely induldges in it as well as the practice itself.

Being able to represent a view you do not agree with to the best of your ability means that your argumentative ability is not limited merely to what you currently consider true, and also means you better understand problematic views that you may well have to attack. I don&#39;t know if you have discovered this yourself, but I find that by empathising initially with a view that I disagree with I better understand it, and therefore better understand how to get through to someone that can&#39;t see past it. I simply find this more effective that attacking them because they hold the view, or poking fun at them when the case may be that without help they may not see past it.

Anyway this isn&#39;t about individual members and their right to use philosophy, and their reasons to do so. This is the philosophy forum and this is what it is meant for, there are scientific forums, on online classes if that is more to your liking.


And the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class. This just confirms it.

Perhaps now you see why.
Those ideas are not ones that we should agree with, but it is important to understand them. I hate to say this, but we live in a world where a ruling class still exists, and we need to have awareness of not only a world that we invisage, but the world as it exists currently.


I must look up the meaning of the word "relevant".

Or, at least, one of us must....
My point was quite obvious, or at least I thought it was. That when accepting a particular world view, if one refuses to acknowledge other world views then the history of them is irrelevant. Personally I take interest in several views because I may have to deal with people that accept them.

Rosa this is supposed to be a light-hearted discussion, I was simply exercising myself in debate, and as you are older and more versed in philosophy perhaps thought I may even learn something new...but I find it hard to learn something new when all I get is a violent representation of a view I am familiar with already. This is what I meant when I said philosophy is a "game" or is useful for improving reasoning, if you don&#39;t feel this way then that is fair enough, but I think you will find that quite a few members that post in the philosophy forum appreciate philosophy and that s why the forum exists.

Zaleusoqe: stop spamming please.

[Zaleusoqe]

Is that a yes?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Is that a yes?

Make that three; you are clearly going for the record.

-----------------------

Heg, I will get back to you later.

[Hegemonicretribution]

Originally posted by [email protected] 10 2006, 12:12 PM
Is that a yes?
Everyone is a "radical" here, it is called revolutionary left. Of course that depends what you mean by the term. I have warned you for spam and sent you a PM. Keep it on topic please.

Rosa, I am off to college now anyway, but I await your response, just ignore Zaleusoqe if they can&#39;t contribute anything worth while.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


What I mean was simply, and this is not defending truth denial anymore, that just as truth denial self destructs in front of someone that accepts truth, truth acceptance invokes something that isn&#39;t accepted by someone denying it....in other words there can be little communication between these "theories" (I would use a better word..)

In a way I think you are right, but that only works if the terms used are from different areas of discourse; if in this case each is using the ordinary words for truth and falsehood, then the nihilist&#39;s &#39;theory&#39; self-destructs.

If they are not using the terms in the same way (and I readily accept that this is possible), then I think you are right.


I temporarily adopted a different mode of thinking

Again, I grant you think you have, but since that mode of thinking makes about as much sense as an Edward Lear novel, I suspect you haven&#39;t (since there is nothing for you to adopt).

Naturally, if nihilists are using terms in odd ways, then there is equally nothing for you to adopt, except an odd way of talking. And why would you want to do that? [I can appreciate if you have to do that for college, though&#33;]


I assure you that I respond well to things that happen in the real world as well, and that my mind has not been poisoned by philosophy.

Naturally, I am prepared to take your word for that, but it is a good job you have me here to keep you on the &#39;straight and narrow&#39;. :)


Being able to represent a view you do not agree with to the best of your ability means that your argumentative ability is not limited merely to what you currently consider true, and also means you better understand problematic views that you may well have to attack.

Absolutely; I cannot disagree with this. I just think much (if not all) of it is a waste of time.

But that is just my personal view (naturally&#33;).


Anyway this isn&#39;t about individual members and their right to use philosophy, and their reasons to do so. This is the philosophy forum and this is what it is meant for

Quite, and thus I am at liberty to put my views and others can accept them or reject them. And if my view is that 100% of traditional philosophy (I exclude logic here, and areas of philosophy connected with it) represent ruling-class hot air, and others want to study it, who am I to stop them (even if I could)?

But, I can at least help deflate the pretensions of traditional philosophy (as I have done, and will continue to do) so that others might see that my objections are not without reason (even if they end up disagreeing with me still).


but I find it hard to learn something new when all I get is a violent representation of a view I am familiar with already.

Well, I think you meant &#39;forceful&#39; and not &#39;violent&#39;.

I plead guilty to the former, but reject the latter.


but I think you will find that quite a few members that post in the philosophy forum appreciate philosophy and that s why the forum exists.

Well, just as revolutionary socialists wish to smash the bourgeois state (as I do), I argue that radical philosophers should aim to smash all ruling class thought (as I do), and not be &#39;centrists&#39; about this either.

Once more, others can accept or reject that view, but I hope you will appreciate that I cannot argue otherwise here or anywhere else.

As you no doubt know, Wittgenstein wanted to alter the meaning of the word &#39;Philosophy&#39; so that it meant the practice of letting the hot air out of traditional thought (but he might not have put it like that -- he called it &#39;therapy&#39;).

So, a forum devoted to that would still be called a &#39;philosophy forum&#39;.

Not that I expect that to happen any day soon, but I can make it a goal at least.

Or can&#39;t I?

[Hegemonicretribution]

Well Rosa all I can say is, apart from a few little linguistic matters that I thin we can overlook we generally agree on most points. The fact that it took over a page of lengthy responses illustrates the nature of most philosophy, that it is either nonsense or manipulation of words.

I still think that political philosophy, logic, philosophy of science (if you seperate this from logic) and philosophy of language are important, or at least of some relevance.

Wittgenstein, is very important, and what he achieved by (at least I think) the age of 32 was awe-inspiring. I can see where he was coming from with regards to philosophy, although I admit my knowledge of him is not fantastically detailed. (Of course I am reasonably acquiainted with him)

I don&#39;t think I have little to add to the debate, as I think both of us accept that at best a strong defence of truth denial might intrigue someone who is not familiar with such at ideas, and at worst waste a lot of time.

[Zaleusoqe]

Radical? as in..sitting on your pc all day?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:

Is that what you do, sit on your PC all day?

It explains the dopey questions.

[Hegemonicretribution]

Seen as how we have we have reached a consensus of sorts, and there has been little input from other members on this topic for some time I will close it before Zaleusoqe&#39;s attempts at starting a flame war come to anything.

Zaleusoqe why not do something productive with your apparently plentiful time?

Feel free to continue a different discussion on nihilism or the likes in another thread :)