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View Full Version : NEPAL: Interview with US Ambassador/Pig



Red Heretic
3rd March 2006, 23:27
The following is a disgusting interview with the ambassador and represenative of the interests of US imperialism in Nepal.

I think we can learn alot from it. As Chairman Mao Tse Tung said, "I hold that it is bad as far as we are concerned if a person, a political party, an army or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for in that case it would definitely mean that we have sunk to the level of the enemy. It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black and without a single virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves but achieved a great deal in our work."

This interview proves that the people of Nepal have become a real threat to US imperialism, and become a base-area for the next wave of the world revolution.





Question: So, there have been strong reactions to your speech last week.

(As far as Maoists are concerned) Their actions and the words of Mr. Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai require us to be harsh on the Maoists. I would hope that the people will think about what the Maoists are doing. You have seen two of your ancient historic cities had their centres (Dhankuta and Tansen) destroyed and innocent ordinary people murdered by the Maoists. For what reasons? Not for military advantage, but to spread "terror." [quotes added]

Question: In the 12-point accord with the parties, the Maoists have pledged to return to peaceful political mainstream. You still criticize the accord.

I did not say anything about the 12-point agreement until after the Maoists broke their ceasefire and began saying what their true intentions are and began by showing by their actions what their true intentions are. Again if you talk about their being willing to lay down their weapons, Mr. Prachanda has made it very clear that they would put down their arms for a while under the supervision of not foreign troops but some sort of presumably unarmed individuals and they would keep their weapons and then they would form the core of the new national army. He said very specifically that the RNA would be disbanded; the Maoists and their people’s liberation army would become the core of the new army. Under the conditions, anybody who thinks you could have free and fair elections to a constituent assembly is being very optimistic.

Question: The Maoists have talked about letting the people decide their fate through a peaceful and democratic means, i. e., the constituent assembly. What’s wrong with that?

On one hand, Mr. Prachanda says, he wants free and fair elections and on the other hand, he says very clearly that ‘we are going to put aside our weapons for a while and then we are going to get them back and we are going to form a new national army.’

Question: Then, were the political parties that foolish to enter into an accord with the Maoists?

I think the parties entered into the 12-point agreement with good intent. I mean there really is a desire to see whether the Maoists can be brought into the political mainstream. Everybody can praise that. But unfortunately, we have seen since the end of ceasefire that the Maoists have no intention of coming into the political mainstream. You have seen Mr. Prachanda suggest repeatedly that the political parties join the Maoists in an underground parallel government and set up an underground parallel army. He is telling the parties: ‘give up you peaceful ways, join us in violent opposition against the King and the current state.’ They want to draw the political parties to their agenda of violence.

Question: The Maoists may have changed. Having failed over the past ten years, they may have realized that capturing Kathmandu through military means is impossible. Yet, you do not trust them.

If you saw Mr. Prachanda’s interview with the BBC, you saw him repeatedly say that ‘yes, we recognize that we can not win solely by military means’. The interviewer gave him several chances to say that he did not plan to use military means to come to Kathmandu . Mr. Prachanda continued to say, ‘we will use military means also to come to Kathmandu .’ So, I just don’t see why anybody would conclude that the Maoists have decided at this point of time to abandon violence. Baburam Bhattarai gave five interviews where he kept saying there is no way you can separate armed and unarmed struggle.

Question: They may have some compulsions in saying so. Like, they may have to convince the trained armed cadres who had been led to believe all these years that capturing Kathmandu by force was possible.

Ten years ago, the Maoists took up their arms against the struggling democracy. Ten years later, they have made huge strides. The system, I keep on repeating, is very close to a collapse. If the parties and the palace continue to pull apart, the whole thing could just collapse. So, why under those conditions would the Maoists decide that they need to abandon their goals?

Question: You keep on stressing on reconciliation between the King and the parties. How do you achieve this which remains elusive?

The definition is easy. It means, both sides have to compromise.

Question: How can there be a compromise when the King, who has assumed absolute powers, continues to ignore the call for reconciliation? What option is left to the parties under the conditions?

I don’t think, the option left for the parties is to join the Maoists in violence. The parties should push and push and push (the palace). The outside world should push and push and push. The King needs to reconcile. The King needs to reach out.

Question: In a recent interview, the Maoist leader, Prachanda, said that the rebels would have captured Kathmandu long time ago, had the US not backed the King and the army. Any comment?

You probably have to ask Prachanda exactly what he means by that. I will be honest and admit that we have not given as much security assistance in the past as India has. And obviously, we had our lethal security assistance frozen since February 1 last year.

Question: Prachanda also said that the Americans are shedding crocodiles’ tears for democracy in Nepal . Instead, he said that the US pacific commander, Admiral Fallon, during a recent visit to Nepal , advised the King to bolster the ranger battalion.

It is interesting. I did not see Mr. Prachanda in the meeting between the Admiral and the King. I was there and I don’t recall that having been said.

Question: What exactly is the interest of the US in Nepal , then?

The main interest is that we don’t want to see Nepal explode, turning into some sort of a crazy totalitarian state, exporting revolution. That’s it. We want to see a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Nepal . That is what we want. Obviously right now, the main concern is that the state would fail, the Maoists will take over and Nepal would end up destabilizing the entire region. Our interest is to prevent that.

Question: Some including the Maoists suspect that the US’s interest here is to strengthen the hands of the King, take him into confidence and use Nepal as a base to encircle an emerging world power, China, and keep watch on another, India.

Those are ludicrous. They do not deserve serious answers.

Question: Are you aware that you have often been accused of exaggerating the Maoist threat and spreading panic?

People here ignore the miseries in the countryside, because it is an inconvenient fact. Nepal is a mess. Am I the one who is overstating the case or perhaps are there lots of people understating it?

Question: Then what is the solution of the problem? Can you find a solution by excluding the Maoists who have become a major force by now?

Yeah, the Maoists have become a major force and they have to be dealt with, rather than accommodate. What do the Maoists want? They want power. They want to turn Nepal into a totalitarian state. How do you accommodate that? Basically, the only way you accommodate them is by making the Maoists realize that they have no hope of winning. Frankly, they are winning right now. Having a strategic concept, a plan to deal with the Maoists, is to convince them that they are not winning. That, unfortunately, is not easy. There is no sober bullet here. The Maoists are not going to come into the negotiations tomorrow and say ‘we do not want power any more.’ They have to realize that they are losing the countryside. They control almost all countryside now. Why would they give that up for being the fifth or sixth largest party in elections?

Question: How do you make the Maoists give up their weapons?

By convincing them that they are not winning and then negotiations can convince them that they will have to disarm.

Question: The Maoists have already pledged to pursue a peaceful means and multi party competition, under the accord with the parties. Haven’t they?

There is fear in villages. That fear is not going to disappear because the Maoists put their weapons for a week under the control of some unarmed outside observers. That fear will remain there. The Maoists are confident of that. That is why they do not talk about genuinely giving up their weapons. They talk about keeping their weapons, turning them into national weapons. They are forming the core of the national army. That is their plan.

Question: A senior UML leader, Bamdev Gautam, in a recent newspaper article said that the parties would get the Maoists lay down their arms if the US can get the King agree on a constituent assembly.

May be he knows something that I don’t. I am obviously an outsider here, but I do not see a logical connection there: that once there is a constituent assembly, the UML leader can convince the Maoists to give up their arms. The fact is: everyday, Mr. Prachanda is taking the opportunity to tell the world that he is going to keep the weapons. He says, ‘after the constituent assembly, we are going to have our weapons, the RNA is going to be disbanded and we will talk about the future of Nepal .’

Question: India and the European Union appeared to be positive on the Maoist ceasefire and the constituent assembly. You have been isolated on this count.

I do not feel isolated at all. In my conversations with the Indians, the Europeans, they all stress that giving up the weapons has to be the part of the settlement. It is not that you are going to put the arms under the supervision and you are going to grab them back later on which is what Prachanda is saying. The Indians, the Europeans all join me in saying, ‘no, once there is a movement towards constituent assembly, you do not get the weapons back, you don’t get to terrorize the villagers with threats.’

Question: That is exactly what the parties are also saying, that they are trying to persuade the Maoists to give up the arms.

I understand that Nepalese people are desperate for peace. Everybody wants it to be an easy way-out. But the people should look at the insurgency, look at its leadership, what it says and what insurgency does before they come to the conclusion that the Maoists are desperate for peace and can be brought easily into the mainstream. There is no sober bullet, there is no easy way.

Question: You continue on stress on reconciliation between the King and the parties. They were together until the royal takeover. But the Maoists got emboldened instead of being weakened despite the King and the parties being together in the past.

Until 2006, no government – no matter who was composed of what parties or the King – had any coherent policy to address the insurgency. It is not that while we hope for peace talks, they will surrender. Why did not you have peace before 2002? Because Maoists did not want peace. Because they thought they were winning. They were making progress and that they had the hopes of ultimately taking over the country. In 2006, that is still the case.

Question: What is the solution, then?

The big final step is to provide the people in the countryside a feeling of security. The next step is to provide government services to those people. Another step, you have to bring in economic development, social reforms. There is no easy way out.

Question: You said that the Europeans and the Indians are with you on the question of the need for the Maoists to disarm. But Prachanda is on record of having said that the 12-point agreement with the parties had been reached with the knowledge of the Indian authorities. How do you explain it?

You will have to ask the Indian government about the precise explanation, but getting back to what I said earlier, the 12-point agreement, I think, was a good faith effort by the parties to see whether they can bring the Maoists into the mainstream. All I am saying is that, that has not worked.

Question: Is there still any chance of it working? In your recent speech, you also mentioned that the accord had some positive elements.

It will work only if the palace and the parties actually get together. If there is a coherent plan, if the Maoists begin to see their control over the countryside weakening, then only the good parts of the 12-point agreement can work, i.e., the Maoist can be brought into the mainstream.

Question: Are you suggesting that the King and the parties should come together to step up the armed offensive against the rebels?

No, I am not calling for a huge military offensive. What I am calling for is a coherent strategy: make the people in the countryside safer, make them feel like they have a stake in continuing progress.

Question: How do you convince the King?

Everybody - external powers or the Nepalese people - needs to continue to push the palace in the right direction.

Question: Do you think that a coalition government comprising of the seven agitating parties could be a positive step?

Sure, it could be a step forward. I can not give a precise formula here. Ultimately, it is for the people of Nepal , the King and the parties to decide.

Question: I understand that you meet the king from time to time. Did you find him serious about the crisis that Nepal is currently in?

I am probably the only person in this country who is most worried about the way things are, except for the people who feel the horror of insurgency immediately. I am not going to divulge the precise contents of my conversations with the King, but I do think that he is worried about the country and does know that things have to change and that the country is not on the right course.

Question: Did you have the feeling that he has some compulsions — as head of state and the government?

I am not going to comment on that. I am not going to try to look into his mind. That is for him to decide.

Question: The Maoists hate you, the King keeps on ignoring your advice, now even the political parties have started to find fault with you.

I guess, that means I must be doing something right. (Laughs.) [editors note: right, because we all know that if the masses of a country hate you, then that just means that you are doing your duty as a respenative of US imperialism.]