Rosa Lichtenstein
1st March 2006, 12:58
This is from the summary to Essay Four at my site:
"In this Essay I expose the woeful ignorance of FL generally displayed by DM-theorists. Few dialecticians can resist making ill-informed and unsubstantiated criticisms even of AFL, while even fewer appear to know anything of MFL.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic; LOI = Law Of Identity; AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution.]
One particularly egregious aspect of this self-inflicted ignorance is the fact that most DM-theorists seem to think that FL began and ended with Aristotle, despite being told repeatedly that they are wrong. In fact, as any reasonably decent history of logic would have told them (had they bothered to check), 95% of FL is less than 120 years old. Sixty years ago Burnham tried to tell Trotsky that his knowledge was badly out-of-date, but he might as well have been talking to the cat for all the good it did.
So, this is one idea that appears to have escaped the Heraclitean flux.
Even to this day, the 'news' that logic underwent a profound revolution in the late 19th century (easily of the same order that Physics underwent in the 17th century) has yet to penetrate most dialectical skulls. Still, they refuse to be told. In fact, I raised this with John Rees (the author of TAR) in person a few years back, but there is no evidence in TAR that the message got through. Similar attempts posted on Internet discussion boards are an equal waste of time.
Dialecticians, it seems, wear this particular badge of ignorance with pride.
Furthermore, based on what DM-theorists themselves write it is clear that the majority of them have not opened a single logic text ever, especially before they began pontificating on the subject -- at least, not one written since Hegel misnamed his own particular work Logic. And, of the tiny minority who have, few seem to have understood much of what they rapidly skimmed over. The hackneyed definitions that DM-theorists give of the three allegedly fundamental 'laws' of logic are hopelessly confused; their 'research' in this area has clearly been confined to copying these 'non-definitions' off of one another.
The LOI is defined as "A = A", "A is equal to A" -- or even "A is A" (on this see Essay Six at my site) --, which is said to imply that "A cannot be other than A" (which is incorrect). The LOC is similarly characterised as "A cannot at the same time be A and not be A" (or even "A cannot be non-A"), which is said to follow from the LOI (but with no proof that it does), whereas the LEM is depicted rather loosely as "Everything must be A or not A", or even worse, "A does not equal B".
[Detailed support of these allegations can be found here:
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm
in note 23.]
Do dialecticians really think that a philosopher of Aristotle's sophistication actually believed that, say, "Everything is rat or not rat" (sic), or that "rat does not equal cat"?
If they do we might wonder why Marx thought so highly of him.
Of course, anyone familiar with Aristotle's style of writing (or who bothers to check!) will know that he never puts things this way. Indeed, I have been unable to find a sentence remotely like any of these in his work.
And it is quite clear that he does not even so much as [i]mention the LOI. So much for it being a foundational principle of his thought!
Nevertheless, even if the above 'analysis' of the LOC were correct, and it was true that "A is A and at the same time non-A", it would be impossible for DM-theorists to give voice to their criticisms of these alleged AFL-principles. This is because it would be impossible for them to state the following:
B1: "A is A and at the same time non-A".
If it were true that "A" is at the same time "non-A", then sentence B1 would have to be re-written as:
B2: "Non-A is non-A".
Or even worse:
B3: "Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A)".
That is, if each "A" in B1 is replaced with what it is dialectically supposed at the same time to be (i.e., "non-A"). B1 thus dialectically disintegrates into B3.
Now, this fatal result can only be denied by someone who also rejected the DM-inspired version of the LOC, and who thought B1 false.
Even worse still, if every "A" is also "non-A", then these would surely follow from B3:
B4: "Non-(non-A) is non-(non-A) and at the same time non-(non-(non-A))."
B5: "Non-(non-(non-A)) is non-(non-(non-A)) and at the same time non-(non-(non-(non-A)))."
And so on, as each successive "A" in B3 and B4 is replaced by the "non-A" dialecticians insist that they are. Once more, this could only be denied by those who reject standard DM-criticisms of the LOC.
As should now seem apparent, the LOC has an annoying way of striking back in a most un-dialectical way when challenged; it thus becomes impossible to state what it is that DM-'logicians' are trying to tell us. The same problems afflict other DM-inspired criticisms of principles dialecticians claim to have found in textbooks of FL.
Perhaps worse, DM-theorists are invariably unclear what the "A"'s in these alleged FL-laws are supposed to stand for. Based on what they say (the details are given in Essay Four at my site), it is obvious that they regularly confuse these letters with one or more of the following: propositions, judgements, properties, qualities, words, objects, processes, predicates, statements, assertions, type-sentences, token-sentences, concepts, ideas, beliefs, thoughts, phrases, clauses, relations, names and "existences".
The significance of logical disorder of this magnitude lies not so much with the unmitigated confusion it creates, but with the fact that the vast majority of the DL-faithful have not even noticed it!
As will be shown in the aforementioned Essay Four, 2400 years ago (and despite his own confusions in this area) Aristotle was far clearer about such things than the vast majority of DL-fans now appear to be!
And these represent ideas we are told lie right at the very cutting edge of modern science? Yeah, and the Pope is Jewish.
Now, anyone tempted to respond to the above on the lines that it gets the DM-view of contradictions (etc.) wrong, and that dialectical contradictions are really this, or they are in effect that, or they are…whatever, need only reflect on the fact that according to the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC, that criticism itself must be this or that, or whatever, and at the same time not this or that, or whatever -- if we here interpret the "A"'s above as "this or that, or whatever", since, on sound DL-principles, these letters can be interpreted in any which way we fancy.
Thus the radically imprecise nature of the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC (which sees everything as "this or that, or whatever, and not this or that, or whatever" -- where each "this or that, or whatever" remains studiously undefined) must itself be seen as "both a criticism and not a criticism" of the LOC. This is so unless of course criticisms are themselves exempt from their own criticism (and cannot thus ever aspire to become one of these wishy-washy dialectical letter "A"'s).
Alas, this means that DM's own criticism of the LOC must now self-destruct. So, for example, any attempt made by DM-'logicians' to define the LOC must be "a definition and not a definition" -- if their own 'analysis' of the LOC and LOI is itself invoked against any such attempt.
Hence, using "D" to stand for the DM-'definition' of the LOC (whatever that 'definition' is, and whatever it means, if we are ever told), it must be the case that "D is at the same time non-D". Clearly, that would mean that the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC undermines its own definition of it! Or, at least, it does and it doesn't.
It is at this point that even DM-fans might just begin to see how devilish their Diabolical Logic really is.
Now, it could be objected once more that DM-theorists do not object to the use of the LOC, the LOI and the LEM in their proper field of application; where these principles fall short is when they are applied to processes in the world, to change and movement. This hackneyed response is tested to destruction in Essays Five, Six and Eight posted at my site (where consideration is given to Engels's 'analysis' of motion, Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky's attempt to criticise the LOI, and the claim that change is the result of 'internal contradictions', respectively).
In the meantime, it is worth pointing out that these DM-inspired criticisms of FL are themselves phenomenal/material objects (i.e., they have to be written in ink on a page somewhere (etc.), or they have to be propagated in the air as sound waves at some point), and as such they are surely subject to change (if everything is). In that case, they "are never equal to themselves". If this is so, the above DM-inspired criticisms of FL must apply to each material copy of these DM-inspired criticisms of FL.
In that case, no materially-configured DM-criticism of the LOC is equal to itself, and hence each physical example of a DM-criticism is at the same moment both "a criticism and not a criticism".
The rest follows as before.
[The counter-claim that the 'relative' stability of words allows the DM-criticism to stand is examined in more detail in Essays Four and Six. Here is a summary of the argument:
It could be objected that our words do in fact remain relatively stable, so the above comments are entirely misguided. However, if Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky are right, then there would be no way that they (or anyone else) could possibly tell. As should seem obvious, there would be nothing to which they could appeal to ground a single safe thought. Memory would be of no use for if everything is changeable, memory could hardly escape unscathed. Not even Cartesian 'clear and distinct ideas' would be able to anchor a single cognition in solid epistemological bedrock, for the words and concepts used to formulate them could all be non-self-identical from moment to moment, liable to continual change. This must be so if it is at all possible that all things change all the time in the way Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky imagined; and yet it is this doctrine that must be excluded somehow to save the theory that propounded this crazy notion from itself. But, the only viable way to do this involves an invocation of the LOI (interpreted as a grammatical rule, and not as a truth).
Once again, FL would have to be used to rescue DM from itself.]
However, in order to refute the claim that FL cannot account for change (a charge DM-theorists make as often as they fail to substantiate it), I demonstrate how even AFL (never mind modern Tense Logic, for example) can easily cope with change. By way of contrast, I reveal that DL cannot even handle a simple bag of sugar!
Moreover, given that DL is supposed to be applicable to the practical affairs of the material world, the surprising fact is that so far there have been no discernible practical or technological applications of DL. This contrasts unfavourably with the many real applications there already are of MFL, not the least of which are those that have enabled the development of computers. Every standard processor operates with rules drawn from modern-day Propositional Calculus.
Once more, 'dialectics' meets its worst enemy: practicalities. MFL is eminently practical; DL is useless.”
More details at my site:
http://www.anti-dialectics.org
"In this Essay I expose the woeful ignorance of FL generally displayed by DM-theorists. Few dialecticians can resist making ill-informed and unsubstantiated criticisms even of AFL, while even fewer appear to know anything of MFL.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic; LOI = Law Of Identity; AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution.]
One particularly egregious aspect of this self-inflicted ignorance is the fact that most DM-theorists seem to think that FL began and ended with Aristotle, despite being told repeatedly that they are wrong. In fact, as any reasonably decent history of logic would have told them (had they bothered to check), 95% of FL is less than 120 years old. Sixty years ago Burnham tried to tell Trotsky that his knowledge was badly out-of-date, but he might as well have been talking to the cat for all the good it did.
So, this is one idea that appears to have escaped the Heraclitean flux.
Even to this day, the 'news' that logic underwent a profound revolution in the late 19th century (easily of the same order that Physics underwent in the 17th century) has yet to penetrate most dialectical skulls. Still, they refuse to be told. In fact, I raised this with John Rees (the author of TAR) in person a few years back, but there is no evidence in TAR that the message got through. Similar attempts posted on Internet discussion boards are an equal waste of time.
Dialecticians, it seems, wear this particular badge of ignorance with pride.
Furthermore, based on what DM-theorists themselves write it is clear that the majority of them have not opened a single logic text ever, especially before they began pontificating on the subject -- at least, not one written since Hegel misnamed his own particular work Logic. And, of the tiny minority who have, few seem to have understood much of what they rapidly skimmed over. The hackneyed definitions that DM-theorists give of the three allegedly fundamental 'laws' of logic are hopelessly confused; their 'research' in this area has clearly been confined to copying these 'non-definitions' off of one another.
The LOI is defined as "A = A", "A is equal to A" -- or even "A is A" (on this see Essay Six at my site) --, which is said to imply that "A cannot be other than A" (which is incorrect). The LOC is similarly characterised as "A cannot at the same time be A and not be A" (or even "A cannot be non-A"), which is said to follow from the LOI (but with no proof that it does), whereas the LEM is depicted rather loosely as "Everything must be A or not A", or even worse, "A does not equal B".
[Detailed support of these allegations can be found here:
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm
in note 23.]
Do dialecticians really think that a philosopher of Aristotle's sophistication actually believed that, say, "Everything is rat or not rat" (sic), or that "rat does not equal cat"?
If they do we might wonder why Marx thought so highly of him.
Of course, anyone familiar with Aristotle's style of writing (or who bothers to check!) will know that he never puts things this way. Indeed, I have been unable to find a sentence remotely like any of these in his work.
And it is quite clear that he does not even so much as [i]mention the LOI. So much for it being a foundational principle of his thought!
Nevertheless, even if the above 'analysis' of the LOC were correct, and it was true that "A is A and at the same time non-A", it would be impossible for DM-theorists to give voice to their criticisms of these alleged AFL-principles. This is because it would be impossible for them to state the following:
B1: "A is A and at the same time non-A".
If it were true that "A" is at the same time "non-A", then sentence B1 would have to be re-written as:
B2: "Non-A is non-A".
Or even worse:
B3: "Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A)".
That is, if each "A" in B1 is replaced with what it is dialectically supposed at the same time to be (i.e., "non-A"). B1 thus dialectically disintegrates into B3.
Now, this fatal result can only be denied by someone who also rejected the DM-inspired version of the LOC, and who thought B1 false.
Even worse still, if every "A" is also "non-A", then these would surely follow from B3:
B4: "Non-(non-A) is non-(non-A) and at the same time non-(non-(non-A))."
B5: "Non-(non-(non-A)) is non-(non-(non-A)) and at the same time non-(non-(non-(non-A)))."
And so on, as each successive "A" in B3 and B4 is replaced by the "non-A" dialecticians insist that they are. Once more, this could only be denied by those who reject standard DM-criticisms of the LOC.
As should now seem apparent, the LOC has an annoying way of striking back in a most un-dialectical way when challenged; it thus becomes impossible to state what it is that DM-'logicians' are trying to tell us. The same problems afflict other DM-inspired criticisms of principles dialecticians claim to have found in textbooks of FL.
Perhaps worse, DM-theorists are invariably unclear what the "A"'s in these alleged FL-laws are supposed to stand for. Based on what they say (the details are given in Essay Four at my site), it is obvious that they regularly confuse these letters with one or more of the following: propositions, judgements, properties, qualities, words, objects, processes, predicates, statements, assertions, type-sentences, token-sentences, concepts, ideas, beliefs, thoughts, phrases, clauses, relations, names and "existences".
The significance of logical disorder of this magnitude lies not so much with the unmitigated confusion it creates, but with the fact that the vast majority of the DL-faithful have not even noticed it!
As will be shown in the aforementioned Essay Four, 2400 years ago (and despite his own confusions in this area) Aristotle was far clearer about such things than the vast majority of DL-fans now appear to be!
And these represent ideas we are told lie right at the very cutting edge of modern science? Yeah, and the Pope is Jewish.
Now, anyone tempted to respond to the above on the lines that it gets the DM-view of contradictions (etc.) wrong, and that dialectical contradictions are really this, or they are in effect that, or they are…whatever, need only reflect on the fact that according to the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC, that criticism itself must be this or that, or whatever, and at the same time not this or that, or whatever -- if we here interpret the "A"'s above as "this or that, or whatever", since, on sound DL-principles, these letters can be interpreted in any which way we fancy.
Thus the radically imprecise nature of the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC (which sees everything as "this or that, or whatever, and not this or that, or whatever" -- where each "this or that, or whatever" remains studiously undefined) must itself be seen as "both a criticism and not a criticism" of the LOC. This is so unless of course criticisms are themselves exempt from their own criticism (and cannot thus ever aspire to become one of these wishy-washy dialectical letter "A"'s).
Alas, this means that DM's own criticism of the LOC must now self-destruct. So, for example, any attempt made by DM-'logicians' to define the LOC must be "a definition and not a definition" -- if their own 'analysis' of the LOC and LOI is itself invoked against any such attempt.
Hence, using "D" to stand for the DM-'definition' of the LOC (whatever that 'definition' is, and whatever it means, if we are ever told), it must be the case that "D is at the same time non-D". Clearly, that would mean that the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC undermines its own definition of it! Or, at least, it does and it doesn't.
It is at this point that even DM-fans might just begin to see how devilish their Diabolical Logic really is.
Now, it could be objected once more that DM-theorists do not object to the use of the LOC, the LOI and the LEM in their proper field of application; where these principles fall short is when they are applied to processes in the world, to change and movement. This hackneyed response is tested to destruction in Essays Five, Six and Eight posted at my site (where consideration is given to Engels's 'analysis' of motion, Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky's attempt to criticise the LOI, and the claim that change is the result of 'internal contradictions', respectively).
In the meantime, it is worth pointing out that these DM-inspired criticisms of FL are themselves phenomenal/material objects (i.e., they have to be written in ink on a page somewhere (etc.), or they have to be propagated in the air as sound waves at some point), and as such they are surely subject to change (if everything is). In that case, they "are never equal to themselves". If this is so, the above DM-inspired criticisms of FL must apply to each material copy of these DM-inspired criticisms of FL.
In that case, no materially-configured DM-criticism of the LOC is equal to itself, and hence each physical example of a DM-criticism is at the same moment both "a criticism and not a criticism".
The rest follows as before.
[The counter-claim that the 'relative' stability of words allows the DM-criticism to stand is examined in more detail in Essays Four and Six. Here is a summary of the argument:
It could be objected that our words do in fact remain relatively stable, so the above comments are entirely misguided. However, if Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky are right, then there would be no way that they (or anyone else) could possibly tell. As should seem obvious, there would be nothing to which they could appeal to ground a single safe thought. Memory would be of no use for if everything is changeable, memory could hardly escape unscathed. Not even Cartesian 'clear and distinct ideas' would be able to anchor a single cognition in solid epistemological bedrock, for the words and concepts used to formulate them could all be non-self-identical from moment to moment, liable to continual change. This must be so if it is at all possible that all things change all the time in the way Hegel, Lenin and Trotsky imagined; and yet it is this doctrine that must be excluded somehow to save the theory that propounded this crazy notion from itself. But, the only viable way to do this involves an invocation of the LOI (interpreted as a grammatical rule, and not as a truth).
Once again, FL would have to be used to rescue DM from itself.]
However, in order to refute the claim that FL cannot account for change (a charge DM-theorists make as often as they fail to substantiate it), I demonstrate how even AFL (never mind modern Tense Logic, for example) can easily cope with change. By way of contrast, I reveal that DL cannot even handle a simple bag of sugar!
Moreover, given that DL is supposed to be applicable to the practical affairs of the material world, the surprising fact is that so far there have been no discernible practical or technological applications of DL. This contrasts unfavourably with the many real applications there already are of MFL, not the least of which are those that have enabled the development of computers. Every standard processor operates with rules drawn from modern-day Propositional Calculus.
Once more, 'dialectics' meets its worst enemy: practicalities. MFL is eminently practical; DL is useless.”
More details at my site:
http://www.anti-dialectics.org