Conghaileach
16th March 2003, 00:58
Going Public
David Donnelly, Janice Fine, and Ellen S. Miller
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR22.2/donnelly.html
There are only two important things in politics.
The first is money and I can't remember the second.
--Mark Hanna
On November 7, 1995, more than a thousand volunteers in
Maine collected 65,000 signatures to put the Maine Clean
Elections Act on the 1996 ballot. It was the country's
most sweeping campaign finance reform proposal, and
promised to blunt the domination of special interest
money in Maine politics by establishing a system of full
public financing of state elections. One year later, by
a 56-44 margin, Maine voters enacted this fundamental
change. In crisp and decisive terms, they stated that
private money would no longer dominate their political
life.
The situation in other states, however, remains at least
as bad as it was in Maine, and at the federal level
matters are much worse. The American people realize that
money is eating away at the core of our democracy, and
voters seem willing to take decisive action to stop it.
But they need a model for reform. Maine's full public
financing solution, the Clean Money Option, provides
that model--so we will argue. To appreciate the good
sense in the Maine solution, we need first to understand
the problem, and then to appreciate the limits of the
alternative solutions.
The Problem
Americans can no longer pick up a newspaper without
being confronted with the latest campaign finance
excesses--stories about use of the White House and trade
missions for fundraising purposes, or invitations of
special interest lobbyists into legislative drafting
sessions on Capitol Hill, or Republican legislators
vacationing with the largest donors to their Party.
These stories describe a system gone awry, in which
private money is increasingly driving public policy on
an ever-wider array of issues--taxation, environmental
regulation, and health care policy, just to name the
most obvious. And it is all perfectly legal . . . or at
least, as the President says, 90 percent of it is. The
remaining ten percent--contributions to the Democratic
National Committee from well-heeled Asian donors, for
example--may be of questionable legality, and may create
titillating headlines, but it is largely a sideshow (an
ugly, xenophobic sideshow). The real scandal is the
legal stuff.
The precise nature of the scandal was obscured for years
by contributors' ingenuity and reformers' lack of
information. According to the conventional story, reform
efforts in the early 1970s had unwittingly encouraged
the formation of political actions committees (PACs)
that, by coordinating individual contributions,
multiplied their effects and drove up the costs of
campaigning. The big problem was to do something about
the PACs.
Skeptical about this conventional wisdom, the Center for
Responsive Politics pioneered a system for documenting
the thousands of individual contributions to
congressional campaigns. As a result of these efforts,
we now have a far more accurate picture of the flows of
money. The basic elements of this picture are crystal
clear: the total amount of money in the system is
exploding; the vast majority of this money comes from
individuals, not PACs; most of the individual and PAC
contributions come from wealthy special interests with a
direct stake in government decisions; businesses and
corporations are increasingly good at targeting those
contributions at members of committees who deal with
their issues (corporations dealing with health care
issues target their dollars to members of the health
care committees, those dealing with banking issues
target their contributions to members of the banking
committees); and these political investments have
sizable payoffs, in electoral victories and favorable
legislative outcomes.
Consider some basic numbers.
A record $2.2 billion (estimated) was spent in American
politics in 1996. About $742.6 million was spent by
candidates for Congress--not including the money that
parties and other organizations spent on behalf of
candidates. (Common Cause estimates that these
"independent expenditures," and issue advocacy ads,
reached $100 million.) Presidential spending for the
1996 election--including the $177 million spent on the
primaries--reached $1 billion for the first time.
Overall fundraising for the Democratic and Republican
parties through their federal and non-federal accounts
reached $866.1 million through the end of November. The
GOP outspent the Democrats $550 million to $315.9
million. The defensive claims from the Democrats about
their need to keep up with the Joneses seem somewhat
true, but it is hard to feel sorry for the party who
also claims to champion the cause of the working class--
they did keep up with the GOP in "soft money"
contributions ($149.6 million for Republicans and a cool
$117.3 million for the Dems). Soft money refers to the
tens or hundreds of thousand dollar gifts to parties for
so-called party-building activities which invariably
come from corporate interests, not working families.
As to the sources of the money: most political
contributions for federal, state, and local election
campaigns come from a small number of wealthy
individuals and powerful organizations that are subject
to government regulation and taxation or have some other
stake in government policy making. For example in the
1996 election cycle less than one-fourth of 1 percent of
the American people gave contributions of $200 or more
to a federal candidate. Only four percent make any
contribution of any size to any candidate for office--
federal, state, or local. On average, only 20 percent of
the money came from individuals giving contributions
less than $200 per candidate. That means an astonishing
80 percent of political money comes from the tiny group
of donors who give $200 or more. (The residents of one
New York City zip code give more to congressional
candidates than the residents of each of 24 states.)
Funds are intelligently targeted: According to the
Center for Responsive Politics's Cashing In Report, the
timber industry convinced Congress to allow logging of
dead and dying trees on public lands, over the
objections of environmental groups. The 54 Senators who
supported the timber industry received an average of
$20,000; the 42 against the idea received an average of
$2,500. In the House, the 211 members who supported the
industry received $2,500 while the 209 who opposed them
received an average of only $542.
The military industry also wrote big checks and got big
returns. The 213 members of Congress who voted to spend
an additional $493 million on Northrop Grumman's B-2
stealth bombers received an average of $2,100 from the
contractor; the 210 who voted against only got $100 on
average.
With the devolution of important issues to the states,
like the implementation of the new welfare laws, maybe
welfare moms should start a political action committee
or bundle their dwindling benefits checks to the chairs
of the human resource committees in our state capitals.
But how many corporate executives need to choose between
making a political contribution and buying food for
their children?
What does this money buy? The Nation has catalogued the
"return on investment" that corporate America received
in direct corporate welfare from the Commerce
Department. Between 1992 and 1994, AT&T contributed
$90,000 to the Democrats and received $34.2 million in
Commerce Department grants. Boeing gave $127,000 and
received $50.9 million from Commerce. General Electric
gave $153,000 and got $14.8 million; Shell Petroleum
gave $65,000 and got $12 million; and Texaco gave
$22,000 got $8.1 million. Nice work if you can get it.
And the money didn't just determine policy debates; it
decided races. According to the latest data, in 1996
congressional campaigns the biggest spender won House
races 90 percent of the time and Senate races 80% of the
time. The Center for Responsive Politics has also
determined that in both House and Senate races with no
incumbent, candidates who spent the most beat their
opponents by a two-to-one ratio. Races in 1996 were not
financially competitive--in nearly 40 percent of House
races, the winner outspent the loser by a factor of ten-
to-one or more. No candidate who was outspent more than
five-to-one was victorious.
The trends are the same in the states. Maine politics,
for example, has also been dominated by a few wealthy
donors and interest groups. Comparable figures--an
estimated one half of one percent of all voters giving
$50 or more to a state candidate--describe the same
unlevel playing field for citizens in Maine as there is
in Washington. Mainers were persuaded to support reform
by studies showing an explosion in the cost to run for
governor (an increase of 1609 percent over 20 years),
and targeted special-interest giving to influence policy
decisions. When the trucking industry successfully
watered down the "Tired Truckers" bill despite public
opinion squarely behind strict enforcement, they did so
in part with political contributions. When Blue
Cross/Blue Shield sought a change in their tax status
from not-for-profit to for-profit, a move which could
have netted them millions, a study showing their
contributions to the Banking and Insurance Committee
(released at a 'Blues'-sponsored fund raiser for the
committee chair) crystallized public opinion and
editorial opposition to the plan, eventually leading to
its demise. When the timber industry's favorite
incumbent legislator was in trouble in a 1994 re-
election fight, paper companies poured $5,000 into the
campaign for a last-minute radio spot that proved
critical for his six-vote victory. Public outrage about
these events was successfully harnessed for a pro-reform
effort, culminating in an Election Day victory for
reformers.
Solutions?
So we have a problem: simply put, there is too much
private money in our political system. Despite the best
efforts of a few conservative scholars and columnists,
this point is no longer a topic of serious debate. The
large issue is now: What role should private money play,
and how can we correct the current imbalance? The field
is now crowded with competing answers to these
questions. To explain the advantages of the Maine
strategy over the leading alternatives, we will start by
setting out some basic principles that should guide
reform efforts, and then describe the deficiencies of
the alternatives in light of these principles.
Principles
Broad principles should inform the proposals for
campaign finance reform. We suggest five:
Competition: Reform must enhance electoral competition.
It must encourage qualified Americans of diverse
backgrounds and points of view, regardless of their
economic means, to seek public office.
Accountability: Reform must increase government
accountability and restore public confidence in
government. It must eliminate the conflicts of interest
created by privately financing the campaigns of our
public officials.
Fairness: Reform must guarantee fairer and more equal
representation for all citizens. The views of all
Americans must be taken into account in the public
policy making process irrespective of the ability to
make campaign contributions.
Responsibility: Reform must stop the perpetual money
chase. Elected officials should be attending to the
people's business--meeting with constituents, attending
important meetings, researching current policy options--
not lounging with large donors.
Deliberation: Reform must begin the process of
reinvigorating public participation in our democracy. It
must reinstate public elections and legislative debate
as forums for deliberation about how best to address the
most pressing issues of the day.
Alternatives
While it would be impossible to develop an exhaustive
list of proposals to address the money in politics
problem, six models dominate public discussion: lowering
contribution limits; raising the contribution limits and
enhancing disclosure; making lots of modest changes
around the edges (like the McCain-Feingold legislation
in the Senate); instituting partial public financing or
matching funds; challenging the Supreme Court's 1976
Buckley v. Valeo decision, which substantially limited
the measures that government can use to regulate
campaign finance; and full public financing.
Lower contribution limits. A first strategy of reform is
to cut into the flow of money as it passes from
contributors to candidates--to limit the size of the
checks written to candidates for elective office, while
not regulating the overall size of spending. Pursuing
this strategy, voters in several states have passed
proposals to limit contributions to $100 (or some other
level). But these proposals have run into legal trouble.
Although the Supreme Court has permitted limits on
contributions to candidate campaigns--both because such
contributions threaten corruption and because potential
contributors remain free to spend their money to
influence politics without giving it to candidates--the
Court confined its concerns to "large" contributions.
And lower courts have recently struck down $100 limits
in DC, Missouri, and Oregon as too stringent and
therefore incompatible with First Amendment speech
rights.
Because of these legal troubles, we do not have much
experience with more stringent contribution limits.
Still, we can make some informed judgments about their
effectiveness on the basis of evidence gathered in a few
election cycles. Thus, although it appears that the
overall money given to candidates went down, there was a
corresponding increase in money spent outside the system
through independent expenditures. Moreover, these
measures may have the perverse effect of encouraging
candidates to spend even more time courting contributors
because a larger number of contributions are needed to
wage a serious campaign. Furthermore, it is easier for
incumbents to find the numbers of contributors needed to
mount strong campaigns than it is for challengers. If
reduced contribution limits lead to increased
independent expenditures, more candidate time on
fundraising, and a playing field tilted toward
incumbents, then they do not fare well on grounds of
fairness, responsibility, and competitiveness, even if
they help on accountability.
Raising contribution limits/more disclosure. A second
strategy of reform would put increased weight on full
disclosure of support, while raising contribution limits
or eliminating them entirely. Pursuing this strategy
would, we believe, put the financing of our elections
even more securely in the hands of wealthy economic
interests and cause an even more dramatic skewing of
public policy in favor of the big campaign contributors.
Raising the limits would skew the current imbalance in
contributions even more. Business interests already
contribute seven times as much as labor and ten times as
much as ideological groups. For example, in 1996, energy
interests gave $21 million in congressional races,
whereas environmental groups gave just $2 million. As
the principles of accountability, fairness, and
deliberation imply, the issue isn't simply how much
money is being spent and how much time it takes to raise
it, but where it comes from, who provides it and who
doesn't, what obligations and conflicts of interest
result, and how the political debate itself gets skewed.
At the same time, the remedy of full disclosure falls
short. Mere documentation does not correct the problems
just noted. We already know that economic interests
influence, skew, and control the political process. As
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) has commented, "We
are the only human beings in the world who are expected
to take thousands of dollars from perfect strangers on
important matters and not be affected by it." Assuming a
reliable source of information, disclosure may inform
the public of how skewed the process is, but it won't
shield our elected officials, nor will it correct for
the unfair influence that contributors have over the
political process. Citizens are like battered women:
they already know who is hurting them, and how much.
They need a way out, not more information about the
source and extent of the damage.
Modest changes around the edges. A third strategy aims
to control the flow of money--rather than simply
providing greater information about it--but differs from
contribution limits in the target of the controls. The
leading such proposal at the federal level is the
McCain-Feingold bill, which includes voluntary spending
limits for US Senate candidates, a ban on PAC
contributions to federal candidates, and regulations of
"soft money," and would require candidates to rely
substantially on in-state contributions. Candidates who
agree to the spending limits will receive free
television time and reduced postage rates.
Though not without merit, these changes would only bring
slight advantages on the reform principles. The
voluntary spending limits in McCain-Feingold, for
example, are only slightly lower than the current
average. The House companion bill (Shays-Meehan) sets
these voluntary spending limits at higher than the
current average for House candidates. More
fundamentally, though, we would achieve at best limited
gains in fairness and accountability. That's because the
current problems are not principally a result of PACs or
out-of-state state contributions. PACs are now
responsible for only 25 percent of funding for
congressional campaigns. And because PACs are not the
exclusive vehicle for wealthy donors, a PAC ban might
further slant the playing field: it would disarm labor
unions and other interest groups that raise their money
from a large number of small contributions from their
members. Business interests do not now rely on PACs for
their political contributions. If PACs were banned
tomorrow, business would simply channel all, rather than
most, of its money through large individual
contributions. A PAC ban, if constitutional, would take
us back to the days when there were no PACs and most of
the money came from wealthy business executives.
Furthermore, the great majority of funds for these races
already comes from in-state: For Senators, 63 percent of
their funds came from within their home states, and 78
percent of House candidates' funds were raised from
within their home states. Big contributors will continue
to have an insurmountable advantage when it comes to
gaining access and influence with elected officials;
they will just be closer to home.
Partial public financing. The fourth strategy adopts a
different angle on reform: Instead of looking for the
optimal restrictions on private money, it aims to
increase the role of public money as a supplement to
private resources, perhaps by using public funds to
match small contributions. Although the Maine proposal
embraces the principle of public financing, we think
that schemes of partial public financing are worst-of-
both-worlds hybrids: they couple the most troubling
effect of private financing with the most problematic
aspects of public financing.
Consider the best-known case of partial public
financing: the system of financing our presidential
elections. Candidates must first raise lots of special
interest money; after they have become indebted to those
private contributors, the candidates then receive their
public money. So we are asked to pay twice. First,
through public financing, we support presidential
candidates who are already obligated to private economic
interests. Then we finance the tax breaks, subsidies,
and other forms of corporate welfare granted to
corporate sponsors as payback. But even systems of
matching funds that--unlike the presidential scheme--
attempt to amplify small contributions by providing a
high ratio of public money to private money don't change
the fundamental calculus, because they don't outlaw very
large private contributions from wealthy special
interests that, matching funds or no matching funds, are
enormously influential.
Challenging "money equals speech." A fifth line of
approach is less a reform strategy in its own right than
an effort to set the stage for substantial reform by
challenging the Supreme Court's claim that money equals
speech. In its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court determined that political spending was protected
by the First Amendment. Though the Court agreed, as we
indicated earlier, that contribution limits are legal,
it also held that governments cannot impose overall
spending limits on campaigns, or regulate candidates'
spending from their own pockets, or limit independent
expenditures (money spent by a private group or
individual without coordinating with a party or
candidate). Because of Buckley, there can be no
mandatory spending limits, and any system of public
financing must be optional.
Thus some reformers argue that the first order of
business is to challenge Buckley, perhaps through a
constitutional amendment that would restrict First
Amendment protections of campaign spending. But this
cannot be the entire solution to the growing problem of
private money in our political system. Even if we could
limit spending, we would still have not dealt directly
with the corrosive element--the private sources of money
that produce a conflict of interest. Moreover, as
advocates of the Equal Rights Amendment and the Balanced
Budget Amendment would argue, a Constitutional amendment
effort takes years and marshaling the forces to enact it
in two-thirds of the states is daunting.
What role should private money play in our political
system? As our brief sketch of the reform landscape
indicates, an answer to this central question
substantially guides an assessment of different campaign
finance reform proposals. Is contributing money to
campaigns an equally legitimate form of participation
alongside voting and volunteering--even though not every
American has the means to do it and most do not? Are
large contributions just another form of participation
(like going to lots of meetings) or something else
altogether? If not all voters have an equal potential to
make large campaign contributions (and we know they do
not), how can we square the current system with our
egalitarian ideal of "one person, one vote?"
Though Americans accept the legitimacy of the economic
inequality that enables the rich to buy fancier cars and
more homes, they do not generally accept the current
role of private money in our system because they do not
think that the rich are entitled to greater
representation. But the current system establishes
precisely that entitlement: it effectively allocates
political power according to economic status, and treats
participation in the political system just as it treats
participation in the market. That is unfair, and the
large problem with all the reform proposals we have
considered thus far is that they do not do enough to
correct it. To ensure a fair system, in which citizens
have equal opportunities for political influence, we
need to look elsewhere.
Clean Money
Our preferred alternative--what we call the Clean Money
Option--is a system of voluntary full public financing
that cuts the cord of dependency between candidates and
their special interest contributors. While no solution
closes off all channels of influence, the Clean Money
Option blocks the path that creates most trouble for the
reform principles: the donations of large sums of money
by special interests to candidates who, should they win,
may be able to influence policy in areas of interest to
these donors. This is the proposal that Maine voters
enacted and that legislatures and citizens in, for
example, Vermont, Connecticut, North Carolina, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Idaho, Washington, and
Wisconsin, will consider in the coming months and years.
The law that Maine voters passed was based on model
legislation drafted by the Working Group on Electoral
Democracy in the late 1980s for federal elections. The
model legislation called for full public financing of
campaigns for candidates who agree to spending limits,
no private money, and a shorter campaign season. Over
several years, Maine activists rewrote this model to fit
the political reality of running for office in Maine,
and running a state-wide referendum campaign to pass the
legislation.
The Maine Clean Elections Act was drafted to go as far
as possible in the public financing direction while
remaining within the confines of Buckley. The
construction of the Act makes as many changes as
possible on the private side and it creates a public
financing option. The measure sets lower, but not
restrictive, contribution limits for candidates who
continue to exercise their right to privately finance
their campaigns, and, at its center, the Act established
the "Clean Elections Option" to publicly finance
candidates who agree to spending limits and to neither
seek nor spend any private money.
For the first time, office seekers will have the option
of qualifying for and accepting only public money for
their election campaigns. Here is how it works:
Candidates who choose to enter into the Clean Elections
Option must agree to limit spending to the amount
provided in public money and to refuse all private
contributions once the public money comes in. They must
also agree to a shorter campaign season. These
candidates don't get something for nothing. To qualify
for public funds, they must collect a specified number
of $5 qualifying contributions from voters in their
district (or state-wide in the case of governor). A
small amount of private money can be raised as start up
"seed money," but these contributions are limited to
$100 and there is an overall cap. The key difference
from matching funds schemes is that they can neither
raise nor spend any private money once they receive
public money. Moreover, this law covers primaries as
well as general elections. "Clean Election" candidates
would also receive supplementary public funds if they
are outspent by privately-financed opponents, or
independent expenditures, or a combination of the two.
These funds would be capped at twice the original amount
provided to the candidate.
Returning to our five principles, then, what are the
advantages of the Clean Money option? By providing an
alternative to the special interest system for financing
elections, the Clean Money Option will level the playing
field for candidates, thus enhancing electoral
competition. At the same time, public money will lower
the economic barriers now faced by citizens who might
consider running for office and, by reducing the role of
private money, increase the importance of the political
activities available to all citizens. In both ways,
Clean Money should mean a more fair political system,
with greater equality in opportunities for political
influence. Unlike any other proposals, the Clean Money
Option also strengthens accountability by eliminating
political contributions as a way of impacting
legislative deliberation and policy making. In addition,
the Clean Money Option would establish greater
responsibility by freeing our elected officials from the
perpetual money chase, and allowing them to use their
time to engage important issues of the day free of the
undue influence of special interest money. Finally,
while the implications for political deliberation are
uncertain, the same can be said for any of the other
proposals. And there is no reason to think that public
financing will produce even greater distraction from
important public issues than the current system
provides.
Politics
When Maine reformers first raised the possibility of a
public financing system, they were told they were
dreaming--that voters would never go for public
financing. And with politicians like President Clinton
urging that we squeeze politics into bite-sized
morsels--school uniforms as a centerpiece of educational
reform--proposing a total overhaul of the way we pay for
elections seemed quixotic. But Maine voters countered
prevailing wisdom and passed the proposal by a
convincing margin.
Why was this case different? For three reasons.
First, and most straightforwardly, partial measures and
tinkering around the edges are ineffective and the
American public knows it.
Second, people are so disgusted with the problem of
money in politics that they are willing to entertain
fundamental changes in the rules of the game. Polling
results consistently show that campaign finances lie at
the heart of citizen discontent with politics. Americans
believe that Washington's failure to address their
problems is the direct result of politicians accepting
too much campaign money from special interests. They
believe that money forces politicians to bow to the
agendas of those who sign the checks.
Public opinion is way ahead of politicians on the public
financing solution. Polling by the Mellman Group (for
the Center for Responsive Politics) shows that Americans
are more supportive of a public financing solution to
the problems of money and politics than at any time
since Watergate. Gallup polling done before the recent
revelations about campaign finances in Washington
equaled support for public financing in the mid-1970s. A
national poll done for Citizen Action by Stanley
Greenberg showed 61 percent support for "a new law where
the federal government would provide a fixed amount of
money for the campaigns for Congress and all private
contributions would be prohibited."
Other recent studies and public opinion research
corroborates these findings. The League of Women Voters
and the Harwood Group conducted a series of longitudinal
focus groups/discussions with citizens in six cities
across the country. The participants concluded that a
system that provides an option for keeping all special
interest money out and replacing it with public money
was needed as one step in restoring faith in the
democratic process. Bannon Research conducted five
different state-wide polls in 1994 indicating similar
sentiments.
But as political junkies like to say, the only poll that
matters is on Election Day. And--here we come to the
third factor--elections are won by organizations, and
the Maine campaign provides instructive lessons for
other efforts elsewhere.
The campaign waged by Maine Voters for Clean Elections
was a result of years of research, coalition-building,
and grassroots organizing. With ongoing technical
assistance from the Northeast Citizen Action Resource
Center, a regional network of progressive organizations
and elected leaders, the Maine reformers identified the
problem, established a role for their analysis in the
public dialogue, and became the arbiters of what was--
and was not--serious reform. Building a reputation for
fair and non-partisan research, Maine reformers reached
out to all ends of the political spectrum to build the
coalition base necessary to move the issue forward.
Coalition partners--including the state chapters of the
League of Women Voters, American Association of Retired
People, Common Cause, the Maine AFL-CIO, leading
environmental and women's organizations, the Citizen
Action-affiliate, and the Perot-led Reform Party--met
for two and a half years to draft a solution that would
withstand constitutional challenge, effectively address
the problem, and be politically viable. The idea was to
be principled and to win.
When the coalition could not move a principled reform
through the Maine State Legislature--forty reform bills,
some good, most bad, died in the State Legislature over
ten years--the members, under the banner Maine Voters
for Clean Elections, decided to bring the issue to the
voters. With substantial grassroots organizing, the
coalition collected 65,000 signatures in a single day,
and placed a binding referendum question on the 1996
ballot. Demonstrating the breadth of its appeal, the
campaign recruited business leaders and received the
active endorsement of the former director of the state's
Chamber of Commerce and a well-respected former CEO of
Bath Iron Works, the largest private employer in the
state.
An aggressive public education campaign--waged door-to-
door, at forums, in the media, and on the airwaves--
ensued with the aim of persuading Maine voters to adopt,
in the language of the ballot question, "new campaign
laws and give public funding for state candidates who
agree to spending limits." By mid-summer, the campaign
had the support of a plurality of voters, but not a
majority. The large hurdle was the public financing
strategy itself: though a substantial majority supported
the results that public financing would produce--
blunting the influence of special interests and leveling
the playing field--many had trouble believing that the
system could be cleaned up and were especially hesitant
about public financing as a means for advancing those
goals. By stressing that the solution would clean up
politics, the campaign was able to introduce a concept
that historically has been unpopular (public financing)
and couple it with strongly desired results (spending
limits, no private money, shorter campaign, etc.). The
idea was to frame the argument in terms of problems and
goals, not of means: "What will Question 3 do? It will
lower campaign spending by providing a Clean Elections
Option of public money for candidates who agree not to
take any private special interest money." The public
education efforts similarly struck a balance between
problem and proposed solution: for example, in the last
eight weeks of the campaign, 200 people were encouraged
to submit letters to the editor each week, alternating
between discussing the problem and explaining the
solution.
In short, Maine Voters for Clean Elections organized a
broad coalition, well beyond the "usual suspects;" spoke
directly to citizens, in countless forums and meetings;
and kept an emphasis on the goals of reform, not simply
the means. There are no formulas for political success.
But reformers elsewhere might treat these features of
the Maine experience as an instructive benchmark.
Conclusion
Can the Maine proposal be generalized to the federal
level? A Clean Money Option will certainly face rough
sledding in Washington, but so will all other serious
reforms. Moreover, tangible signs suggest that Maine's
success story is not falling on deaf ears. A number of
senators are poised to introduce a Clean Money Option
bill, which would at once signify progress and provide
the opportunity for those of us who care about this
approach to enter the national debate.
But the most dramatic and immediate impact of Maine's
success will be in other states. Nearly a dozen states
have some kind of full public financing under
legislative consideration or headed for the ballot.
Editorial endorsements have come from all over, from
national, regional, and local papers, including USA
Today, the Boston Globe, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Hartford Courant, Rutland Herald (Vermont), and Portland
Press Herald (Maine). The Boston Globe wrote that the
Maine plan ought to be considered a "blueprint" for
national reform.
While the near-term focus for debate on campaign finance
reform will be in Washington, the real debate about the
appropriate role of private money in our public
elections and public policy will take place in the
states. Inside the Beltway, the dominant question is:
What can be won today? We should be asking: What is
worth winning? Keeping that question in focus is the
goal of a new national education effort--spearheaded by
a new national organization, Public Campaign. It is
working to galvanize broad public support behind reforms
that fully address the central and most egregious aspect
of today's campaign finance system--the direct financing
of our public officials by private interests. And, in
due course, the old adage from Downeast may once again
come alive, "As goes Maine, so goes the nation."
David Donnelly, Janice Fine, and Ellen S. Miller
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR22.2/donnelly.html
There are only two important things in politics.
The first is money and I can't remember the second.
--Mark Hanna
On November 7, 1995, more than a thousand volunteers in
Maine collected 65,000 signatures to put the Maine Clean
Elections Act on the 1996 ballot. It was the country's
most sweeping campaign finance reform proposal, and
promised to blunt the domination of special interest
money in Maine politics by establishing a system of full
public financing of state elections. One year later, by
a 56-44 margin, Maine voters enacted this fundamental
change. In crisp and decisive terms, they stated that
private money would no longer dominate their political
life.
The situation in other states, however, remains at least
as bad as it was in Maine, and at the federal level
matters are much worse. The American people realize that
money is eating away at the core of our democracy, and
voters seem willing to take decisive action to stop it.
But they need a model for reform. Maine's full public
financing solution, the Clean Money Option, provides
that model--so we will argue. To appreciate the good
sense in the Maine solution, we need first to understand
the problem, and then to appreciate the limits of the
alternative solutions.
The Problem
Americans can no longer pick up a newspaper without
being confronted with the latest campaign finance
excesses--stories about use of the White House and trade
missions for fundraising purposes, or invitations of
special interest lobbyists into legislative drafting
sessions on Capitol Hill, or Republican legislators
vacationing with the largest donors to their Party.
These stories describe a system gone awry, in which
private money is increasingly driving public policy on
an ever-wider array of issues--taxation, environmental
regulation, and health care policy, just to name the
most obvious. And it is all perfectly legal . . . or at
least, as the President says, 90 percent of it is. The
remaining ten percent--contributions to the Democratic
National Committee from well-heeled Asian donors, for
example--may be of questionable legality, and may create
titillating headlines, but it is largely a sideshow (an
ugly, xenophobic sideshow). The real scandal is the
legal stuff.
The precise nature of the scandal was obscured for years
by contributors' ingenuity and reformers' lack of
information. According to the conventional story, reform
efforts in the early 1970s had unwittingly encouraged
the formation of political actions committees (PACs)
that, by coordinating individual contributions,
multiplied their effects and drove up the costs of
campaigning. The big problem was to do something about
the PACs.
Skeptical about this conventional wisdom, the Center for
Responsive Politics pioneered a system for documenting
the thousands of individual contributions to
congressional campaigns. As a result of these efforts,
we now have a far more accurate picture of the flows of
money. The basic elements of this picture are crystal
clear: the total amount of money in the system is
exploding; the vast majority of this money comes from
individuals, not PACs; most of the individual and PAC
contributions come from wealthy special interests with a
direct stake in government decisions; businesses and
corporations are increasingly good at targeting those
contributions at members of committees who deal with
their issues (corporations dealing with health care
issues target their dollars to members of the health
care committees, those dealing with banking issues
target their contributions to members of the banking
committees); and these political investments have
sizable payoffs, in electoral victories and favorable
legislative outcomes.
Consider some basic numbers.
A record $2.2 billion (estimated) was spent in American
politics in 1996. About $742.6 million was spent by
candidates for Congress--not including the money that
parties and other organizations spent on behalf of
candidates. (Common Cause estimates that these
"independent expenditures," and issue advocacy ads,
reached $100 million.) Presidential spending for the
1996 election--including the $177 million spent on the
primaries--reached $1 billion for the first time.
Overall fundraising for the Democratic and Republican
parties through their federal and non-federal accounts
reached $866.1 million through the end of November. The
GOP outspent the Democrats $550 million to $315.9
million. The defensive claims from the Democrats about
their need to keep up with the Joneses seem somewhat
true, but it is hard to feel sorry for the party who
also claims to champion the cause of the working class--
they did keep up with the GOP in "soft money"
contributions ($149.6 million for Republicans and a cool
$117.3 million for the Dems). Soft money refers to the
tens or hundreds of thousand dollar gifts to parties for
so-called party-building activities which invariably
come from corporate interests, not working families.
As to the sources of the money: most political
contributions for federal, state, and local election
campaigns come from a small number of wealthy
individuals and powerful organizations that are subject
to government regulation and taxation or have some other
stake in government policy making. For example in the
1996 election cycle less than one-fourth of 1 percent of
the American people gave contributions of $200 or more
to a federal candidate. Only four percent make any
contribution of any size to any candidate for office--
federal, state, or local. On average, only 20 percent of
the money came from individuals giving contributions
less than $200 per candidate. That means an astonishing
80 percent of political money comes from the tiny group
of donors who give $200 or more. (The residents of one
New York City zip code give more to congressional
candidates than the residents of each of 24 states.)
Funds are intelligently targeted: According to the
Center for Responsive Politics's Cashing In Report, the
timber industry convinced Congress to allow logging of
dead and dying trees on public lands, over the
objections of environmental groups. The 54 Senators who
supported the timber industry received an average of
$20,000; the 42 against the idea received an average of
$2,500. In the House, the 211 members who supported the
industry received $2,500 while the 209 who opposed them
received an average of only $542.
The military industry also wrote big checks and got big
returns. The 213 members of Congress who voted to spend
an additional $493 million on Northrop Grumman's B-2
stealth bombers received an average of $2,100 from the
contractor; the 210 who voted against only got $100 on
average.
With the devolution of important issues to the states,
like the implementation of the new welfare laws, maybe
welfare moms should start a political action committee
or bundle their dwindling benefits checks to the chairs
of the human resource committees in our state capitals.
But how many corporate executives need to choose between
making a political contribution and buying food for
their children?
What does this money buy? The Nation has catalogued the
"return on investment" that corporate America received
in direct corporate welfare from the Commerce
Department. Between 1992 and 1994, AT&T contributed
$90,000 to the Democrats and received $34.2 million in
Commerce Department grants. Boeing gave $127,000 and
received $50.9 million from Commerce. General Electric
gave $153,000 and got $14.8 million; Shell Petroleum
gave $65,000 and got $12 million; and Texaco gave
$22,000 got $8.1 million. Nice work if you can get it.
And the money didn't just determine policy debates; it
decided races. According to the latest data, in 1996
congressional campaigns the biggest spender won House
races 90 percent of the time and Senate races 80% of the
time. The Center for Responsive Politics has also
determined that in both House and Senate races with no
incumbent, candidates who spent the most beat their
opponents by a two-to-one ratio. Races in 1996 were not
financially competitive--in nearly 40 percent of House
races, the winner outspent the loser by a factor of ten-
to-one or more. No candidate who was outspent more than
five-to-one was victorious.
The trends are the same in the states. Maine politics,
for example, has also been dominated by a few wealthy
donors and interest groups. Comparable figures--an
estimated one half of one percent of all voters giving
$50 or more to a state candidate--describe the same
unlevel playing field for citizens in Maine as there is
in Washington. Mainers were persuaded to support reform
by studies showing an explosion in the cost to run for
governor (an increase of 1609 percent over 20 years),
and targeted special-interest giving to influence policy
decisions. When the trucking industry successfully
watered down the "Tired Truckers" bill despite public
opinion squarely behind strict enforcement, they did so
in part with political contributions. When Blue
Cross/Blue Shield sought a change in their tax status
from not-for-profit to for-profit, a move which could
have netted them millions, a study showing their
contributions to the Banking and Insurance Committee
(released at a 'Blues'-sponsored fund raiser for the
committee chair) crystallized public opinion and
editorial opposition to the plan, eventually leading to
its demise. When the timber industry's favorite
incumbent legislator was in trouble in a 1994 re-
election fight, paper companies poured $5,000 into the
campaign for a last-minute radio spot that proved
critical for his six-vote victory. Public outrage about
these events was successfully harnessed for a pro-reform
effort, culminating in an Election Day victory for
reformers.
Solutions?
So we have a problem: simply put, there is too much
private money in our political system. Despite the best
efforts of a few conservative scholars and columnists,
this point is no longer a topic of serious debate. The
large issue is now: What role should private money play,
and how can we correct the current imbalance? The field
is now crowded with competing answers to these
questions. To explain the advantages of the Maine
strategy over the leading alternatives, we will start by
setting out some basic principles that should guide
reform efforts, and then describe the deficiencies of
the alternatives in light of these principles.
Principles
Broad principles should inform the proposals for
campaign finance reform. We suggest five:
Competition: Reform must enhance electoral competition.
It must encourage qualified Americans of diverse
backgrounds and points of view, regardless of their
economic means, to seek public office.
Accountability: Reform must increase government
accountability and restore public confidence in
government. It must eliminate the conflicts of interest
created by privately financing the campaigns of our
public officials.
Fairness: Reform must guarantee fairer and more equal
representation for all citizens. The views of all
Americans must be taken into account in the public
policy making process irrespective of the ability to
make campaign contributions.
Responsibility: Reform must stop the perpetual money
chase. Elected officials should be attending to the
people's business--meeting with constituents, attending
important meetings, researching current policy options--
not lounging with large donors.
Deliberation: Reform must begin the process of
reinvigorating public participation in our democracy. It
must reinstate public elections and legislative debate
as forums for deliberation about how best to address the
most pressing issues of the day.
Alternatives
While it would be impossible to develop an exhaustive
list of proposals to address the money in politics
problem, six models dominate public discussion: lowering
contribution limits; raising the contribution limits and
enhancing disclosure; making lots of modest changes
around the edges (like the McCain-Feingold legislation
in the Senate); instituting partial public financing or
matching funds; challenging the Supreme Court's 1976
Buckley v. Valeo decision, which substantially limited
the measures that government can use to regulate
campaign finance; and full public financing.
Lower contribution limits. A first strategy of reform is
to cut into the flow of money as it passes from
contributors to candidates--to limit the size of the
checks written to candidates for elective office, while
not regulating the overall size of spending. Pursuing
this strategy, voters in several states have passed
proposals to limit contributions to $100 (or some other
level). But these proposals have run into legal trouble.
Although the Supreme Court has permitted limits on
contributions to candidate campaigns--both because such
contributions threaten corruption and because potential
contributors remain free to spend their money to
influence politics without giving it to candidates--the
Court confined its concerns to "large" contributions.
And lower courts have recently struck down $100 limits
in DC, Missouri, and Oregon as too stringent and
therefore incompatible with First Amendment speech
rights.
Because of these legal troubles, we do not have much
experience with more stringent contribution limits.
Still, we can make some informed judgments about their
effectiveness on the basis of evidence gathered in a few
election cycles. Thus, although it appears that the
overall money given to candidates went down, there was a
corresponding increase in money spent outside the system
through independent expenditures. Moreover, these
measures may have the perverse effect of encouraging
candidates to spend even more time courting contributors
because a larger number of contributions are needed to
wage a serious campaign. Furthermore, it is easier for
incumbents to find the numbers of contributors needed to
mount strong campaigns than it is for challengers. If
reduced contribution limits lead to increased
independent expenditures, more candidate time on
fundraising, and a playing field tilted toward
incumbents, then they do not fare well on grounds of
fairness, responsibility, and competitiveness, even if
they help on accountability.
Raising contribution limits/more disclosure. A second
strategy of reform would put increased weight on full
disclosure of support, while raising contribution limits
or eliminating them entirely. Pursuing this strategy
would, we believe, put the financing of our elections
even more securely in the hands of wealthy economic
interests and cause an even more dramatic skewing of
public policy in favor of the big campaign contributors.
Raising the limits would skew the current imbalance in
contributions even more. Business interests already
contribute seven times as much as labor and ten times as
much as ideological groups. For example, in 1996, energy
interests gave $21 million in congressional races,
whereas environmental groups gave just $2 million. As
the principles of accountability, fairness, and
deliberation imply, the issue isn't simply how much
money is being spent and how much time it takes to raise
it, but where it comes from, who provides it and who
doesn't, what obligations and conflicts of interest
result, and how the political debate itself gets skewed.
At the same time, the remedy of full disclosure falls
short. Mere documentation does not correct the problems
just noted. We already know that economic interests
influence, skew, and control the political process. As
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) has commented, "We
are the only human beings in the world who are expected
to take thousands of dollars from perfect strangers on
important matters and not be affected by it." Assuming a
reliable source of information, disclosure may inform
the public of how skewed the process is, but it won't
shield our elected officials, nor will it correct for
the unfair influence that contributors have over the
political process. Citizens are like battered women:
they already know who is hurting them, and how much.
They need a way out, not more information about the
source and extent of the damage.
Modest changes around the edges. A third strategy aims
to control the flow of money--rather than simply
providing greater information about it--but differs from
contribution limits in the target of the controls. The
leading such proposal at the federal level is the
McCain-Feingold bill, which includes voluntary spending
limits for US Senate candidates, a ban on PAC
contributions to federal candidates, and regulations of
"soft money," and would require candidates to rely
substantially on in-state contributions. Candidates who
agree to the spending limits will receive free
television time and reduced postage rates.
Though not without merit, these changes would only bring
slight advantages on the reform principles. The
voluntary spending limits in McCain-Feingold, for
example, are only slightly lower than the current
average. The House companion bill (Shays-Meehan) sets
these voluntary spending limits at higher than the
current average for House candidates. More
fundamentally, though, we would achieve at best limited
gains in fairness and accountability. That's because the
current problems are not principally a result of PACs or
out-of-state state contributions. PACs are now
responsible for only 25 percent of funding for
congressional campaigns. And because PACs are not the
exclusive vehicle for wealthy donors, a PAC ban might
further slant the playing field: it would disarm labor
unions and other interest groups that raise their money
from a large number of small contributions from their
members. Business interests do not now rely on PACs for
their political contributions. If PACs were banned
tomorrow, business would simply channel all, rather than
most, of its money through large individual
contributions. A PAC ban, if constitutional, would take
us back to the days when there were no PACs and most of
the money came from wealthy business executives.
Furthermore, the great majority of funds for these races
already comes from in-state: For Senators, 63 percent of
their funds came from within their home states, and 78
percent of House candidates' funds were raised from
within their home states. Big contributors will continue
to have an insurmountable advantage when it comes to
gaining access and influence with elected officials;
they will just be closer to home.
Partial public financing. The fourth strategy adopts a
different angle on reform: Instead of looking for the
optimal restrictions on private money, it aims to
increase the role of public money as a supplement to
private resources, perhaps by using public funds to
match small contributions. Although the Maine proposal
embraces the principle of public financing, we think
that schemes of partial public financing are worst-of-
both-worlds hybrids: they couple the most troubling
effect of private financing with the most problematic
aspects of public financing.
Consider the best-known case of partial public
financing: the system of financing our presidential
elections. Candidates must first raise lots of special
interest money; after they have become indebted to those
private contributors, the candidates then receive their
public money. So we are asked to pay twice. First,
through public financing, we support presidential
candidates who are already obligated to private economic
interests. Then we finance the tax breaks, subsidies,
and other forms of corporate welfare granted to
corporate sponsors as payback. But even systems of
matching funds that--unlike the presidential scheme--
attempt to amplify small contributions by providing a
high ratio of public money to private money don't change
the fundamental calculus, because they don't outlaw very
large private contributions from wealthy special
interests that, matching funds or no matching funds, are
enormously influential.
Challenging "money equals speech." A fifth line of
approach is less a reform strategy in its own right than
an effort to set the stage for substantial reform by
challenging the Supreme Court's claim that money equals
speech. In its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court determined that political spending was protected
by the First Amendment. Though the Court agreed, as we
indicated earlier, that contribution limits are legal,
it also held that governments cannot impose overall
spending limits on campaigns, or regulate candidates'
spending from their own pockets, or limit independent
expenditures (money spent by a private group or
individual without coordinating with a party or
candidate). Because of Buckley, there can be no
mandatory spending limits, and any system of public
financing must be optional.
Thus some reformers argue that the first order of
business is to challenge Buckley, perhaps through a
constitutional amendment that would restrict First
Amendment protections of campaign spending. But this
cannot be the entire solution to the growing problem of
private money in our political system. Even if we could
limit spending, we would still have not dealt directly
with the corrosive element--the private sources of money
that produce a conflict of interest. Moreover, as
advocates of the Equal Rights Amendment and the Balanced
Budget Amendment would argue, a Constitutional amendment
effort takes years and marshaling the forces to enact it
in two-thirds of the states is daunting.
What role should private money play in our political
system? As our brief sketch of the reform landscape
indicates, an answer to this central question
substantially guides an assessment of different campaign
finance reform proposals. Is contributing money to
campaigns an equally legitimate form of participation
alongside voting and volunteering--even though not every
American has the means to do it and most do not? Are
large contributions just another form of participation
(like going to lots of meetings) or something else
altogether? If not all voters have an equal potential to
make large campaign contributions (and we know they do
not), how can we square the current system with our
egalitarian ideal of "one person, one vote?"
Though Americans accept the legitimacy of the economic
inequality that enables the rich to buy fancier cars and
more homes, they do not generally accept the current
role of private money in our system because they do not
think that the rich are entitled to greater
representation. But the current system establishes
precisely that entitlement: it effectively allocates
political power according to economic status, and treats
participation in the political system just as it treats
participation in the market. That is unfair, and the
large problem with all the reform proposals we have
considered thus far is that they do not do enough to
correct it. To ensure a fair system, in which citizens
have equal opportunities for political influence, we
need to look elsewhere.
Clean Money
Our preferred alternative--what we call the Clean Money
Option--is a system of voluntary full public financing
that cuts the cord of dependency between candidates and
their special interest contributors. While no solution
closes off all channels of influence, the Clean Money
Option blocks the path that creates most trouble for the
reform principles: the donations of large sums of money
by special interests to candidates who, should they win,
may be able to influence policy in areas of interest to
these donors. This is the proposal that Maine voters
enacted and that legislatures and citizens in, for
example, Vermont, Connecticut, North Carolina, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Idaho, Washington, and
Wisconsin, will consider in the coming months and years.
The law that Maine voters passed was based on model
legislation drafted by the Working Group on Electoral
Democracy in the late 1980s for federal elections. The
model legislation called for full public financing of
campaigns for candidates who agree to spending limits,
no private money, and a shorter campaign season. Over
several years, Maine activists rewrote this model to fit
the political reality of running for office in Maine,
and running a state-wide referendum campaign to pass the
legislation.
The Maine Clean Elections Act was drafted to go as far
as possible in the public financing direction while
remaining within the confines of Buckley. The
construction of the Act makes as many changes as
possible on the private side and it creates a public
financing option. The measure sets lower, but not
restrictive, contribution limits for candidates who
continue to exercise their right to privately finance
their campaigns, and, at its center, the Act established
the "Clean Elections Option" to publicly finance
candidates who agree to spending limits and to neither
seek nor spend any private money.
For the first time, office seekers will have the option
of qualifying for and accepting only public money for
their election campaigns. Here is how it works:
Candidates who choose to enter into the Clean Elections
Option must agree to limit spending to the amount
provided in public money and to refuse all private
contributions once the public money comes in. They must
also agree to a shorter campaign season. These
candidates don't get something for nothing. To qualify
for public funds, they must collect a specified number
of $5 qualifying contributions from voters in their
district (or state-wide in the case of governor). A
small amount of private money can be raised as start up
"seed money," but these contributions are limited to
$100 and there is an overall cap. The key difference
from matching funds schemes is that they can neither
raise nor spend any private money once they receive
public money. Moreover, this law covers primaries as
well as general elections. "Clean Election" candidates
would also receive supplementary public funds if they
are outspent by privately-financed opponents, or
independent expenditures, or a combination of the two.
These funds would be capped at twice the original amount
provided to the candidate.
Returning to our five principles, then, what are the
advantages of the Clean Money option? By providing an
alternative to the special interest system for financing
elections, the Clean Money Option will level the playing
field for candidates, thus enhancing electoral
competition. At the same time, public money will lower
the economic barriers now faced by citizens who might
consider running for office and, by reducing the role of
private money, increase the importance of the political
activities available to all citizens. In both ways,
Clean Money should mean a more fair political system,
with greater equality in opportunities for political
influence. Unlike any other proposals, the Clean Money
Option also strengthens accountability by eliminating
political contributions as a way of impacting
legislative deliberation and policy making. In addition,
the Clean Money Option would establish greater
responsibility by freeing our elected officials from the
perpetual money chase, and allowing them to use their
time to engage important issues of the day free of the
undue influence of special interest money. Finally,
while the implications for political deliberation are
uncertain, the same can be said for any of the other
proposals. And there is no reason to think that public
financing will produce even greater distraction from
important public issues than the current system
provides.
Politics
When Maine reformers first raised the possibility of a
public financing system, they were told they were
dreaming--that voters would never go for public
financing. And with politicians like President Clinton
urging that we squeeze politics into bite-sized
morsels--school uniforms as a centerpiece of educational
reform--proposing a total overhaul of the way we pay for
elections seemed quixotic. But Maine voters countered
prevailing wisdom and passed the proposal by a
convincing margin.
Why was this case different? For three reasons.
First, and most straightforwardly, partial measures and
tinkering around the edges are ineffective and the
American public knows it.
Second, people are so disgusted with the problem of
money in politics that they are willing to entertain
fundamental changes in the rules of the game. Polling
results consistently show that campaign finances lie at
the heart of citizen discontent with politics. Americans
believe that Washington's failure to address their
problems is the direct result of politicians accepting
too much campaign money from special interests. They
believe that money forces politicians to bow to the
agendas of those who sign the checks.
Public opinion is way ahead of politicians on the public
financing solution. Polling by the Mellman Group (for
the Center for Responsive Politics) shows that Americans
are more supportive of a public financing solution to
the problems of money and politics than at any time
since Watergate. Gallup polling done before the recent
revelations about campaign finances in Washington
equaled support for public financing in the mid-1970s. A
national poll done for Citizen Action by Stanley
Greenberg showed 61 percent support for "a new law where
the federal government would provide a fixed amount of
money for the campaigns for Congress and all private
contributions would be prohibited."
Other recent studies and public opinion research
corroborates these findings. The League of Women Voters
and the Harwood Group conducted a series of longitudinal
focus groups/discussions with citizens in six cities
across the country. The participants concluded that a
system that provides an option for keeping all special
interest money out and replacing it with public money
was needed as one step in restoring faith in the
democratic process. Bannon Research conducted five
different state-wide polls in 1994 indicating similar
sentiments.
But as political junkies like to say, the only poll that
matters is on Election Day. And--here we come to the
third factor--elections are won by organizations, and
the Maine campaign provides instructive lessons for
other efforts elsewhere.
The campaign waged by Maine Voters for Clean Elections
was a result of years of research, coalition-building,
and grassroots organizing. With ongoing technical
assistance from the Northeast Citizen Action Resource
Center, a regional network of progressive organizations
and elected leaders, the Maine reformers identified the
problem, established a role for their analysis in the
public dialogue, and became the arbiters of what was--
and was not--serious reform. Building a reputation for
fair and non-partisan research, Maine reformers reached
out to all ends of the political spectrum to build the
coalition base necessary to move the issue forward.
Coalition partners--including the state chapters of the
League of Women Voters, American Association of Retired
People, Common Cause, the Maine AFL-CIO, leading
environmental and women's organizations, the Citizen
Action-affiliate, and the Perot-led Reform Party--met
for two and a half years to draft a solution that would
withstand constitutional challenge, effectively address
the problem, and be politically viable. The idea was to
be principled and to win.
When the coalition could not move a principled reform
through the Maine State Legislature--forty reform bills,
some good, most bad, died in the State Legislature over
ten years--the members, under the banner Maine Voters
for Clean Elections, decided to bring the issue to the
voters. With substantial grassroots organizing, the
coalition collected 65,000 signatures in a single day,
and placed a binding referendum question on the 1996
ballot. Demonstrating the breadth of its appeal, the
campaign recruited business leaders and received the
active endorsement of the former director of the state's
Chamber of Commerce and a well-respected former CEO of
Bath Iron Works, the largest private employer in the
state.
An aggressive public education campaign--waged door-to-
door, at forums, in the media, and on the airwaves--
ensued with the aim of persuading Maine voters to adopt,
in the language of the ballot question, "new campaign
laws and give public funding for state candidates who
agree to spending limits." By mid-summer, the campaign
had the support of a plurality of voters, but not a
majority. The large hurdle was the public financing
strategy itself: though a substantial majority supported
the results that public financing would produce--
blunting the influence of special interests and leveling
the playing field--many had trouble believing that the
system could be cleaned up and were especially hesitant
about public financing as a means for advancing those
goals. By stressing that the solution would clean up
politics, the campaign was able to introduce a concept
that historically has been unpopular (public financing)
and couple it with strongly desired results (spending
limits, no private money, shorter campaign, etc.). The
idea was to frame the argument in terms of problems and
goals, not of means: "What will Question 3 do? It will
lower campaign spending by providing a Clean Elections
Option of public money for candidates who agree not to
take any private special interest money." The public
education efforts similarly struck a balance between
problem and proposed solution: for example, in the last
eight weeks of the campaign, 200 people were encouraged
to submit letters to the editor each week, alternating
between discussing the problem and explaining the
solution.
In short, Maine Voters for Clean Elections organized a
broad coalition, well beyond the "usual suspects;" spoke
directly to citizens, in countless forums and meetings;
and kept an emphasis on the goals of reform, not simply
the means. There are no formulas for political success.
But reformers elsewhere might treat these features of
the Maine experience as an instructive benchmark.
Conclusion
Can the Maine proposal be generalized to the federal
level? A Clean Money Option will certainly face rough
sledding in Washington, but so will all other serious
reforms. Moreover, tangible signs suggest that Maine's
success story is not falling on deaf ears. A number of
senators are poised to introduce a Clean Money Option
bill, which would at once signify progress and provide
the opportunity for those of us who care about this
approach to enter the national debate.
But the most dramatic and immediate impact of Maine's
success will be in other states. Nearly a dozen states
have some kind of full public financing under
legislative consideration or headed for the ballot.
Editorial endorsements have come from all over, from
national, regional, and local papers, including USA
Today, the Boston Globe, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Hartford Courant, Rutland Herald (Vermont), and Portland
Press Herald (Maine). The Boston Globe wrote that the
Maine plan ought to be considered a "blueprint" for
national reform.
While the near-term focus for debate on campaign finance
reform will be in Washington, the real debate about the
appropriate role of private money in our public
elections and public policy will take place in the
states. Inside the Beltway, the dominant question is:
What can be won today? We should be asking: What is
worth winning? Keeping that question in focus is the
goal of a new national education effort--spearheaded by
a new national organization, Public Campaign. It is
working to galvanize broad public support behind reforms
that fully address the central and most egregious aspect
of today's campaign finance system--the direct financing
of our public officials by private interests. And, in
due course, the old adage from Downeast may once again
come alive, "As goes Maine, so goes the nation."