Zeitgeizt
23rd December 2005, 23:38
Approaching Socialism
by Harry Magdoff and Fred Magdoff
This essay covers a variety of subjects, and is not your typical piece..everyone should enjoy. This article can be found at www.monthlyreview.org. I am only going to post the second half of this piece, because most of you already understand the firts half and were probably turned off. There is also a part two, which explains internal problems with Socialism economistically, and politically - China - Russia etc.
This is a great piece comrades..give it a read. I am ommiting sections A - E. And then I will ad Part2. Again if you want to read the whole piece www.monthlyreview.org
F. Capitalism with a Human Face? Reform and Counter-Reform
Reforms can be enacted to soften the social and ecological effects of the raw workings of the capitalist system. Certainly many have occurred, including those that resulted in workers’ gains in the core capitalist countries such as a shorter workday and week, the right to form a union, a government run social security retirement system, higher incomes, and worker safety laws. Concern over the environment has led to laws that have improved the sorry state of air and water quality in most of the advanced capitalist countries. However, as we are now seeing in the countries of the core, it is possible for capital to reverse the gains that were won through hard-fought struggles of the working class. During periods in the ebb and flow of the class struggle when conditions are decidedly in favor of capital, there will be an attempt to reverse the gains and to push towards minimal constraints and maximum flexibility for capital.
At the end of the Second World War, capital, fearing revolution that could destroy the system and needing the cooperation of labor to get the countries back on their feet, promoted a welfare state in much of Europe—paid vacations, better wages, and Germany even placed workers on corporations’ boards of directors. In the United States the welfare state began with Roosevelt’s New Deal and new programs were added through the 1960s.
Following the Second World War as the economies were rapidly rebuilding—spurred on by the stimulus of the automobile and suburbanization with all their ramifications—there was plenty of money to fund welfare programs, provide higher salaries for labor, and still make large profits. When the economy was growing rapidly taxes also increased (without much effort) to fund new programs. The concern for social stability in the 1960s and the desire to have the masses’ support in the Cold War, especially in the United States, are also part of the explanation for increases in social programs. What actually happened also depended on the militancy of unions as well as other forms of class struggle such as the black movement for political and economic rights. But with the growth of larger and larger corporations, competition between countries became more intense and there were no new forces stimulating the economy to grow rapidly, as had occurred from the end of the Second World War through the 1960s.
When economic stagnation developed in the 1970s, capital responded in a number of ways. Investment strategies changed in order to sustain profits—there was a diversion from investment to produce physical commodities toward the service sectors and the speculative world of finance (creating and selling a variety of financial products). With stagnation, capitalist societies, as throughout their history in depressions, also shifted the burdens of stagnation, militarism, and wars to the working people (and the colonial possessions). Beginning in the 1980s those at the top of society have promoted a continuous class war aimed at reducing corporate taxes and taxes on the wealthy. Also starting in the 1980s—and accelerating at this time—the vested interests of capital have unleashed a campaign to dismantle as many worker rights as possible (including those in the reserve army): attacking welfare programs, making it harder to unionize workers and easier to fire them, decreased pension coverage, privatizing basic services (including schools), and attempting to privatize social security. Conservatives in the United States never accepted government social programs and have established the goal of rolling back those initiated during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and the 1960s Great Society era, returning to the situation before the national government had a major role in protecting the rights of workers. There is also a similar drive by capital in Europe to decrease worker protections and rights under the guise that it is necessary to make their industries more competitive in the world market.
The greed, individualism, and competition fostered by capitalism makes it relatively easy to justify elimination of programs that help workers and the poor. Thus, capitalism can have a “human face” for only short periods of time. Reforms that achieve modest gains can never be counted on to achieve a truly humane society. As we now see, counter-reforms will occur as the strength of capital increases relative to that of labor, and class war from above becomes the norm. But more importantly, the evils of inequality, poverty and misery, environmental degradation, using up resources faster than replacements can be found or developed—as well as the imperialist economic, political, and military penetration of the periphery by leading core countries—all flow out of the very nature of the capitalism.
A new society is needed because the evils are part of the DNA of the capitalist system. Moving away from capitalism is not really a choice—the environmental constraints and the growth of immiseration will force a change in the society. The future points to limited possibilities—a turn to fascism (barbarism) or the creation of a collective society that can provide the basic needs for all of humanity.
3. Learning from the Failures of Post-Revolutionary Societies
In view of the extent of misery and the threat of environmental disaster endemic to capitalism, what needs to be done? A simple, direct answer was recently given by Nora Castoneda, founder of a bank for women in Venezuela: “We are creating an economy at the service of human beings instead of human beings at the service of the economy.” This description can stand as the essence of the socialist goal. It may well represent the hopes of billions of people. However, developments of the two great socialist revolutions—in the soviet Union and China—have left many people on the left disheartened and discouraged about the prospects of socialism.
Unfortunately, many of us have a simplified view of history and overlook the contradictions on the road to a new social order. The post-revolutionary societies accomplished a great deal: full employment, mass education, medical service for all the people, industrialization, longer life spans, sharp declines of infant mortality, and much more. They marked advances on the road to socialism. But after a relatively short period they each took detours to social systems that were neither capitalist nor socialist. Eventually, both became firmly established on the road to capitalism. But how did these revolutions become sidetracked, and are there lessons to be learned for new attempts to take the radical road, the socialist road? Hard answers are difficult to come by and we don’t pretend to know all the answers. But we would like to note lines of study and analysis that might help understand the failures.
Most important, in our opinion, is that departures from the socialist road were not inevitable; rather they are outgrowths of specific historical circumstances—and to a large extent the endurance of old social groups and old ways of thinking. Capitalist ideology persisted and served new ruling groups, many of whom, in pursuing their self-interest, played the game of grabbing a higher rung in the hierarchy while holding on to the morality of the old overthrown ruling class. The professed goal of true democracy—people’s intense involvement in determining and participating in setting policy and practice in the new society—was more talk than action.
Perhaps one, if not the leading, lesson of the post-revolutionary societies is the affirmation that socialism cannot arrive overnight—the road to such a major transformation of social structure and people’s consciousness is indeed very long. It is also full of pitfalls. Mao put it simply and clearly:
Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries all teach us that socialist society covers a very, very long historical stage. Throughout this stage, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat goes on and the question of “who will win” between the roads of capitalism and socialism remains, as does the danger of restoration of capitalism. (Mao Zedong, “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” 1964)
The long transition to fully-developed socialism requires a truly new culture imbued with a new ideology. A fundamental reversal of the dominant mentality of capitalist times is crucial for the creation of a new social order. But ideology, values, ethics, and prevailing beliefs in capitalism are strong and cannot evolve overnight to something different. We live in a society that promotes and often requires selfishness, greed, individualism, and a dog-eat-dog competitive spirit. A socialist society, on the other hand, would require and help produce a collective ideology adapted to a totally different social practice—one focused on serving all the people, outlawing hierarchy, overcoming differences in status, and moving toward egalitarianism. Marx posed the difficult question about such changes in philosophical terms:
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. (Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach) [Note that “man” was not the word Marx used. He wrote “Mensch” which in German means “person” and applies equally to men and women.]
The crucial phrase used in the above quotation is “revolutionary practice.” That calls for a high degree of people’s involvement in the revolutionary process of building a new society. And that, at the very least, requires and should encourage the people’s full freedom to criticize leaders and dispute policies.
A. The Experience of the Soviet Union
Many factors underlie the failure to establish a socialist society in the Soviet Union. Despite major improvements in social welfare and an impressive industrialization, a clear road to socialism was never firmly established—certainly not the socialism Marx advocated. While not capitalist, neither was the Soviet Union socialist. We have previously discussed in these pages in some detail our understanding of the economic and social problems that developed in the Soviet Union.6 We will not repeat all of the arguments and discussion, but rather give a brief summary of key issues, occasionally using excerpts from the previously published articles.
While the revolution of 1917 did indeed shake the world, the new post-revolutionary society faced many hazards. Four years of civil war disrupted Soviet society, destroyed a good deal of the infrastructure, and brought much death and destruction. The new revolutionary society also faced the intense desire of the great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, etc.—to crush the Bolshevik Revolution in its cradle. And yet in the face of extreme difficulties, as soon as the Soviet Union could catch its breath, it worked with deliberate speed to provide equal access by the people to housing, education, medical service, and care of the elderly and disabled. Striking, indeed sensational, was the attainment and maintenance of full employment at the same time that the West was mired in the Great Depression; typically in even the richest countries during those years unemployment ranged between 20 to 30 percent of the labor force.
Harry Magdoff made a tour of U.S. machine tool companies in preparation for developing a plan for that industry during the Second World War. Time and again owners reported that their survival in the depths of the Depression was due to the flow of orders from Russia for its five-year plan. Moreover, pulling itself up by its own bootstraps, the Soviet Union transformed a backward, industrially underdeveloped society into an advanced industrial country—one that was able to equip an army and air force that not only stood up to the German invasion during the Second World War but also played a major role in the final defeat of the German army. Still, the ultimate socialist goal was in no small measure diverted at an early date, largely because of the development of a privileged bureaucratic elite and a distorted nationalism.
Bureaucracy and Nationalism
The post-revolutionary society in Russia moved far away from the proclaimed socialist ideal advocated by Marx and Engels. The latter didn’t design blueprints for a new society nor did they predict in detail the trials and tribulations of the struggle for socialism—including the possibility of alternating failure and victory, of battles won and lost, until the transfer of power from the upper to the lower classes was firmly established. But they never faltered in their faith in a final victory, learning from the currents of their time and reaffirming the principles of people’s republics. Thus, the Paris Commune was not only celebrated but also studied, as in Marx’s The Civil War in France. Engels’s introduction to the essay pointed to the distinctly socialist policies of the Commune. Of critical significance, in his opinion, was the Commune’s attempt to safeguard against the development of a leadership that could become new masters:
From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials....
Against [the] transformation of the state and organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society—an inevitable transformation in all previous states—the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place it filled all posts—administrative, judicial, and educational—by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials high or low, were paid the wages received by other workers....In this way an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides.
The Soviet Revolution, in contrast, faced special conditions that led to the growth of a bureaucracy that came to dominate Soviet society. Trotsky’s observation at the close of the Civil War is worth noting: “The demobilization of the Red Army of 5 million played no small role in the formation of the bureaucracy. The victorious commanders assumed leading posts in the local Soviets, in the economy, in education, and they persistently introduced everywhere that regime which had ensured success in the civil war. Thus on all sides the masses were pushed away gradually from active participation in the leadership of the country” (The Revolution Betrayed).
The bureaucracy grew like a cancer during the rough and tough times of recovering from the First World War and the ensuing civil war. Control over the economy and society before long was concentrated in a state ruled by a small minority who had a strong hold on state power. Alongside, an elite sector of the population—party leaders, heads of industry, government officials, military officers, intellectuals, and entertainers—rose to become a privileged stratum. Stratification of the population and hierarchy set in for the duration, influencing the patterns of accumulation and contributing to reproducing the new social formation. Stratification brought benefits to the privileged top: not only in income, but more strikingly in the differences in the quality of medical care, education, living quarters (country homes as well as large urban flats), vacation resorts, hunting lodges, automobiles, and supplies of food not available in markets. Naturally, the more consumption that went to the elite, the less was available for the rest of the population. And the privileges and power of members of the upper strata were replicated in their offspring. However, as distinct from capitalism, there was no inherited ownership of the means of production.
The hierarchical command system ruled with a heavy hand over most aspects of civilian life as well as over the economy as a whole. The outstanding features of its extensive bureaucracy were rigidity and an ever-present sense of insecurity in the privileged sectors—the need to protect one’s own interest and avoid expulsion from one’s privileged position, let alone staying out of jail. As a rule, hierarchy penetrated institutes, industrial enterprises, and industrial syndicates. Thus, the soviet system produced its own contradictions: a bureaucratic structure which operated far removed from the masses and was so rigid and entrenched that it could sabotage economic and political reforms designed to improve the efficiency of production and distribution. In keeping with these developments, wide differences in living conditions among sections of the population, republics, and regions were created. Within each republic, upper and middle social strata diligently strove for higher status and a way of life similar to that of the upper and middle classes of the West.
A second major departure from socialist principles took place on the nationalist question. In the nineteenth century the Tsars had energetically acquired extensive areas, consisting of nations with diverse ethnic populations. The Tsars and nobility had built an empire. Communist Party leaders differed on how to handle this after the Tsar was overthrown. What should be done as socialists? Lenin was firm in his stance: create a federation of states in which each one would have the right to secede. Moreover, the constitution should provide a rotation of presidents of the Soviet Union from one nationality to another. Stalin ridiculed Lenin’s policy suggestions as being romantic. The upshot was a federation in which Russia became the center and Russification the rule.7
The ensuing economic development reflected the dominant status of Russia. It is true that after the revolution, the republics in the Soviet Middle East and Asian republics did advance significantly in a number of respects. For example, the living standards, education, and cultural facilities of the Soviet Middle Eastern republics were far above those of the same ethnic peoples on the other side of the border. Similarly, progress was also spread to Asian Soviet republics. Nevertheless, major differences between the center and periphery remained. An official statistical handbook of the Soviet Union reported in 1987—70 years after the revolution: “for the country as a whole 21 percent of pupils are...in schools without central heating; 30 percent without water piping, and 40 percent lacked sewage” (The USSR in Figures for 1987 [Moscow: Finansy I Statistika, 1988]). These deficiencies, we believe, indicate the scale of priorities adopted by the Russian center. Thus, in Turkestan, for example, more than 60 percent of the maternity hospitals, wards, and children’s hospitals had no running water, and about two-thirds of the hospitals had no indoor plumbing (Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, The Turning Point [Doubleday, 1989]). The revolution brought significant benefits to the former colonial areas, but major differences remained between the core and the periphery. The overall picture is illustrated by the data in the accompanying table comparing the gross product per capita of Russia and several Asian republics after seventy years of Soviet power (table 2).
In addition to differences between Russia and the former Tsarist colonies, major differences also remained in Russia itself—in living standards and quality of life between Moscow and backward regions.
Planning and the Soviet Economy
Most of the problems that led to the crisis in the Soviet Union in the later part of the twentieth century are related to the economy and the way it was organized during the early years of the revolution. It is common to blame the Soviet Union’s difficulties on the use of central planning. There are even those who claim that it is impossible to have a planned economy in a large and complex country, and some offer “market socialism” as an alternative (see below). However, the economic failure was not of planning per se, but rather grew out of the particular characteristics of Soviet planning—a system developed under unique circumstances and which took a very different direction from that imagined by the early revolutionaries. What happened in the Soviet Union was, in essence, planning without a realistic plan. The Soviet Union did not have to embark on an ambitious program of central planning and massive industrialization when it did in the late 1920s. An important part of the leadership, led by Bukharin, advocated a slower and more gradual course. But, once a decision was made, it was inevitable that certain consequences would follow from the initial goal of an incredible rapid acceleration of economic growth under unusually strained conditions: a vast increase in the economic role of the state, extreme concentration of decision making, and harsh regimentation of the people. The first Five Year Plan set the stage for much of what was to happen in the Soviet Union—economically, socially, and politically. The twin goals of rapid industrialization and the build-up of a strong defense capability—both important given the international situation—dominated Soviet thinking beginning with the first plan in 1928. The attempts to implement an overly ambitious plan given the available human and natural resources—and not developed with broad participation of the masses—led to the routine use of threats and coercion.
As long as the economy was able to sustain a rapid growth rate, there was enough maneuvering room to keep the contradictions from reaching the boiling point and exploding. But when the growth rate slowed down an
by Harry Magdoff and Fred Magdoff
This essay covers a variety of subjects, and is not your typical piece..everyone should enjoy. This article can be found at www.monthlyreview.org. I am only going to post the second half of this piece, because most of you already understand the firts half and were probably turned off. There is also a part two, which explains internal problems with Socialism economistically, and politically - China - Russia etc.
This is a great piece comrades..give it a read. I am ommiting sections A - E. And then I will ad Part2. Again if you want to read the whole piece www.monthlyreview.org
F. Capitalism with a Human Face? Reform and Counter-Reform
Reforms can be enacted to soften the social and ecological effects of the raw workings of the capitalist system. Certainly many have occurred, including those that resulted in workers’ gains in the core capitalist countries such as a shorter workday and week, the right to form a union, a government run social security retirement system, higher incomes, and worker safety laws. Concern over the environment has led to laws that have improved the sorry state of air and water quality in most of the advanced capitalist countries. However, as we are now seeing in the countries of the core, it is possible for capital to reverse the gains that were won through hard-fought struggles of the working class. During periods in the ebb and flow of the class struggle when conditions are decidedly in favor of capital, there will be an attempt to reverse the gains and to push towards minimal constraints and maximum flexibility for capital.
At the end of the Second World War, capital, fearing revolution that could destroy the system and needing the cooperation of labor to get the countries back on their feet, promoted a welfare state in much of Europe—paid vacations, better wages, and Germany even placed workers on corporations’ boards of directors. In the United States the welfare state began with Roosevelt’s New Deal and new programs were added through the 1960s.
Following the Second World War as the economies were rapidly rebuilding—spurred on by the stimulus of the automobile and suburbanization with all their ramifications—there was plenty of money to fund welfare programs, provide higher salaries for labor, and still make large profits. When the economy was growing rapidly taxes also increased (without much effort) to fund new programs. The concern for social stability in the 1960s and the desire to have the masses’ support in the Cold War, especially in the United States, are also part of the explanation for increases in social programs. What actually happened also depended on the militancy of unions as well as other forms of class struggle such as the black movement for political and economic rights. But with the growth of larger and larger corporations, competition between countries became more intense and there were no new forces stimulating the economy to grow rapidly, as had occurred from the end of the Second World War through the 1960s.
When economic stagnation developed in the 1970s, capital responded in a number of ways. Investment strategies changed in order to sustain profits—there was a diversion from investment to produce physical commodities toward the service sectors and the speculative world of finance (creating and selling a variety of financial products). With stagnation, capitalist societies, as throughout their history in depressions, also shifted the burdens of stagnation, militarism, and wars to the working people (and the colonial possessions). Beginning in the 1980s those at the top of society have promoted a continuous class war aimed at reducing corporate taxes and taxes on the wealthy. Also starting in the 1980s—and accelerating at this time—the vested interests of capital have unleashed a campaign to dismantle as many worker rights as possible (including those in the reserve army): attacking welfare programs, making it harder to unionize workers and easier to fire them, decreased pension coverage, privatizing basic services (including schools), and attempting to privatize social security. Conservatives in the United States never accepted government social programs and have established the goal of rolling back those initiated during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and the 1960s Great Society era, returning to the situation before the national government had a major role in protecting the rights of workers. There is also a similar drive by capital in Europe to decrease worker protections and rights under the guise that it is necessary to make their industries more competitive in the world market.
The greed, individualism, and competition fostered by capitalism makes it relatively easy to justify elimination of programs that help workers and the poor. Thus, capitalism can have a “human face” for only short periods of time. Reforms that achieve modest gains can never be counted on to achieve a truly humane society. As we now see, counter-reforms will occur as the strength of capital increases relative to that of labor, and class war from above becomes the norm. But more importantly, the evils of inequality, poverty and misery, environmental degradation, using up resources faster than replacements can be found or developed—as well as the imperialist economic, political, and military penetration of the periphery by leading core countries—all flow out of the very nature of the capitalism.
A new society is needed because the evils are part of the DNA of the capitalist system. Moving away from capitalism is not really a choice—the environmental constraints and the growth of immiseration will force a change in the society. The future points to limited possibilities—a turn to fascism (barbarism) or the creation of a collective society that can provide the basic needs for all of humanity.
3. Learning from the Failures of Post-Revolutionary Societies
In view of the extent of misery and the threat of environmental disaster endemic to capitalism, what needs to be done? A simple, direct answer was recently given by Nora Castoneda, founder of a bank for women in Venezuela: “We are creating an economy at the service of human beings instead of human beings at the service of the economy.” This description can stand as the essence of the socialist goal. It may well represent the hopes of billions of people. However, developments of the two great socialist revolutions—in the soviet Union and China—have left many people on the left disheartened and discouraged about the prospects of socialism.
Unfortunately, many of us have a simplified view of history and overlook the contradictions on the road to a new social order. The post-revolutionary societies accomplished a great deal: full employment, mass education, medical service for all the people, industrialization, longer life spans, sharp declines of infant mortality, and much more. They marked advances on the road to socialism. But after a relatively short period they each took detours to social systems that were neither capitalist nor socialist. Eventually, both became firmly established on the road to capitalism. But how did these revolutions become sidetracked, and are there lessons to be learned for new attempts to take the radical road, the socialist road? Hard answers are difficult to come by and we don’t pretend to know all the answers. But we would like to note lines of study and analysis that might help understand the failures.
Most important, in our opinion, is that departures from the socialist road were not inevitable; rather they are outgrowths of specific historical circumstances—and to a large extent the endurance of old social groups and old ways of thinking. Capitalist ideology persisted and served new ruling groups, many of whom, in pursuing their self-interest, played the game of grabbing a higher rung in the hierarchy while holding on to the morality of the old overthrown ruling class. The professed goal of true democracy—people’s intense involvement in determining and participating in setting policy and practice in the new society—was more talk than action.
Perhaps one, if not the leading, lesson of the post-revolutionary societies is the affirmation that socialism cannot arrive overnight—the road to such a major transformation of social structure and people’s consciousness is indeed very long. It is also full of pitfalls. Mao put it simply and clearly:
Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries all teach us that socialist society covers a very, very long historical stage. Throughout this stage, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat goes on and the question of “who will win” between the roads of capitalism and socialism remains, as does the danger of restoration of capitalism. (Mao Zedong, “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” 1964)
The long transition to fully-developed socialism requires a truly new culture imbued with a new ideology. A fundamental reversal of the dominant mentality of capitalist times is crucial for the creation of a new social order. But ideology, values, ethics, and prevailing beliefs in capitalism are strong and cannot evolve overnight to something different. We live in a society that promotes and often requires selfishness, greed, individualism, and a dog-eat-dog competitive spirit. A socialist society, on the other hand, would require and help produce a collective ideology adapted to a totally different social practice—one focused on serving all the people, outlawing hierarchy, overcoming differences in status, and moving toward egalitarianism. Marx posed the difficult question about such changes in philosophical terms:
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. (Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach) [Note that “man” was not the word Marx used. He wrote “Mensch” which in German means “person” and applies equally to men and women.]
The crucial phrase used in the above quotation is “revolutionary practice.” That calls for a high degree of people’s involvement in the revolutionary process of building a new society. And that, at the very least, requires and should encourage the people’s full freedom to criticize leaders and dispute policies.
A. The Experience of the Soviet Union
Many factors underlie the failure to establish a socialist society in the Soviet Union. Despite major improvements in social welfare and an impressive industrialization, a clear road to socialism was never firmly established—certainly not the socialism Marx advocated. While not capitalist, neither was the Soviet Union socialist. We have previously discussed in these pages in some detail our understanding of the economic and social problems that developed in the Soviet Union.6 We will not repeat all of the arguments and discussion, but rather give a brief summary of key issues, occasionally using excerpts from the previously published articles.
While the revolution of 1917 did indeed shake the world, the new post-revolutionary society faced many hazards. Four years of civil war disrupted Soviet society, destroyed a good deal of the infrastructure, and brought much death and destruction. The new revolutionary society also faced the intense desire of the great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, etc.—to crush the Bolshevik Revolution in its cradle. And yet in the face of extreme difficulties, as soon as the Soviet Union could catch its breath, it worked with deliberate speed to provide equal access by the people to housing, education, medical service, and care of the elderly and disabled. Striking, indeed sensational, was the attainment and maintenance of full employment at the same time that the West was mired in the Great Depression; typically in even the richest countries during those years unemployment ranged between 20 to 30 percent of the labor force.
Harry Magdoff made a tour of U.S. machine tool companies in preparation for developing a plan for that industry during the Second World War. Time and again owners reported that their survival in the depths of the Depression was due to the flow of orders from Russia for its five-year plan. Moreover, pulling itself up by its own bootstraps, the Soviet Union transformed a backward, industrially underdeveloped society into an advanced industrial country—one that was able to equip an army and air force that not only stood up to the German invasion during the Second World War but also played a major role in the final defeat of the German army. Still, the ultimate socialist goal was in no small measure diverted at an early date, largely because of the development of a privileged bureaucratic elite and a distorted nationalism.
Bureaucracy and Nationalism
The post-revolutionary society in Russia moved far away from the proclaimed socialist ideal advocated by Marx and Engels. The latter didn’t design blueprints for a new society nor did they predict in detail the trials and tribulations of the struggle for socialism—including the possibility of alternating failure and victory, of battles won and lost, until the transfer of power from the upper to the lower classes was firmly established. But they never faltered in their faith in a final victory, learning from the currents of their time and reaffirming the principles of people’s republics. Thus, the Paris Commune was not only celebrated but also studied, as in Marx’s The Civil War in France. Engels’s introduction to the essay pointed to the distinctly socialist policies of the Commune. Of critical significance, in his opinion, was the Commune’s attempt to safeguard against the development of a leadership that could become new masters:
From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials....
Against [the] transformation of the state and organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society—an inevitable transformation in all previous states—the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place it filled all posts—administrative, judicial, and educational—by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials high or low, were paid the wages received by other workers....In this way an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides.
The Soviet Revolution, in contrast, faced special conditions that led to the growth of a bureaucracy that came to dominate Soviet society. Trotsky’s observation at the close of the Civil War is worth noting: “The demobilization of the Red Army of 5 million played no small role in the formation of the bureaucracy. The victorious commanders assumed leading posts in the local Soviets, in the economy, in education, and they persistently introduced everywhere that regime which had ensured success in the civil war. Thus on all sides the masses were pushed away gradually from active participation in the leadership of the country” (The Revolution Betrayed).
The bureaucracy grew like a cancer during the rough and tough times of recovering from the First World War and the ensuing civil war. Control over the economy and society before long was concentrated in a state ruled by a small minority who had a strong hold on state power. Alongside, an elite sector of the population—party leaders, heads of industry, government officials, military officers, intellectuals, and entertainers—rose to become a privileged stratum. Stratification of the population and hierarchy set in for the duration, influencing the patterns of accumulation and contributing to reproducing the new social formation. Stratification brought benefits to the privileged top: not only in income, but more strikingly in the differences in the quality of medical care, education, living quarters (country homes as well as large urban flats), vacation resorts, hunting lodges, automobiles, and supplies of food not available in markets. Naturally, the more consumption that went to the elite, the less was available for the rest of the population. And the privileges and power of members of the upper strata were replicated in their offspring. However, as distinct from capitalism, there was no inherited ownership of the means of production.
The hierarchical command system ruled with a heavy hand over most aspects of civilian life as well as over the economy as a whole. The outstanding features of its extensive bureaucracy were rigidity and an ever-present sense of insecurity in the privileged sectors—the need to protect one’s own interest and avoid expulsion from one’s privileged position, let alone staying out of jail. As a rule, hierarchy penetrated institutes, industrial enterprises, and industrial syndicates. Thus, the soviet system produced its own contradictions: a bureaucratic structure which operated far removed from the masses and was so rigid and entrenched that it could sabotage economic and political reforms designed to improve the efficiency of production and distribution. In keeping with these developments, wide differences in living conditions among sections of the population, republics, and regions were created. Within each republic, upper and middle social strata diligently strove for higher status and a way of life similar to that of the upper and middle classes of the West.
A second major departure from socialist principles took place on the nationalist question. In the nineteenth century the Tsars had energetically acquired extensive areas, consisting of nations with diverse ethnic populations. The Tsars and nobility had built an empire. Communist Party leaders differed on how to handle this after the Tsar was overthrown. What should be done as socialists? Lenin was firm in his stance: create a federation of states in which each one would have the right to secede. Moreover, the constitution should provide a rotation of presidents of the Soviet Union from one nationality to another. Stalin ridiculed Lenin’s policy suggestions as being romantic. The upshot was a federation in which Russia became the center and Russification the rule.7
The ensuing economic development reflected the dominant status of Russia. It is true that after the revolution, the republics in the Soviet Middle East and Asian republics did advance significantly in a number of respects. For example, the living standards, education, and cultural facilities of the Soviet Middle Eastern republics were far above those of the same ethnic peoples on the other side of the border. Similarly, progress was also spread to Asian Soviet republics. Nevertheless, major differences between the center and periphery remained. An official statistical handbook of the Soviet Union reported in 1987—70 years after the revolution: “for the country as a whole 21 percent of pupils are...in schools without central heating; 30 percent without water piping, and 40 percent lacked sewage” (The USSR in Figures for 1987 [Moscow: Finansy I Statistika, 1988]). These deficiencies, we believe, indicate the scale of priorities adopted by the Russian center. Thus, in Turkestan, for example, more than 60 percent of the maternity hospitals, wards, and children’s hospitals had no running water, and about two-thirds of the hospitals had no indoor plumbing (Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, The Turning Point [Doubleday, 1989]). The revolution brought significant benefits to the former colonial areas, but major differences remained between the core and the periphery. The overall picture is illustrated by the data in the accompanying table comparing the gross product per capita of Russia and several Asian republics after seventy years of Soviet power (table 2).
In addition to differences between Russia and the former Tsarist colonies, major differences also remained in Russia itself—in living standards and quality of life between Moscow and backward regions.
Planning and the Soviet Economy
Most of the problems that led to the crisis in the Soviet Union in the later part of the twentieth century are related to the economy and the way it was organized during the early years of the revolution. It is common to blame the Soviet Union’s difficulties on the use of central planning. There are even those who claim that it is impossible to have a planned economy in a large and complex country, and some offer “market socialism” as an alternative (see below). However, the economic failure was not of planning per se, but rather grew out of the particular characteristics of Soviet planning—a system developed under unique circumstances and which took a very different direction from that imagined by the early revolutionaries. What happened in the Soviet Union was, in essence, planning without a realistic plan. The Soviet Union did not have to embark on an ambitious program of central planning and massive industrialization when it did in the late 1920s. An important part of the leadership, led by Bukharin, advocated a slower and more gradual course. But, once a decision was made, it was inevitable that certain consequences would follow from the initial goal of an incredible rapid acceleration of economic growth under unusually strained conditions: a vast increase in the economic role of the state, extreme concentration of decision making, and harsh regimentation of the people. The first Five Year Plan set the stage for much of what was to happen in the Soviet Union—economically, socially, and politically. The twin goals of rapid industrialization and the build-up of a strong defense capability—both important given the international situation—dominated Soviet thinking beginning with the first plan in 1928. The attempts to implement an overly ambitious plan given the available human and natural resources—and not developed with broad participation of the masses—led to the routine use of threats and coercion.
As long as the economy was able to sustain a rapid growth rate, there was enough maneuvering room to keep the contradictions from reaching the boiling point and exploding. But when the growth rate slowed down an