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View Full Version : ON CONTRADICTION (by Comradae Mao Tse-tung)



John Dory
8th November 2005, 19:19
[This essay on philosophy was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung after his essay "On Practice" and with the same object of overcoming the serious error of dogmatist thinking to be found in the Party at the time. Originally delivered as lectures at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yenan, it was revised by the author on its inclusion in his Selected Works.]



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The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics. Lenin said, "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects." [1] Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics. [2] In studying this law, therefore, we cannot but touch upon a variety of questions, upon a number of philosophical problems. If we can become clear on all these problems, we shall arrive at a fundamental understanding of materialist dialectics. The problems are: the two world outlooks, the universality of contradiction, the particularity of contradiction, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction, the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction, and the place of antagonism in contradiction.

The criticism to which the idealism of the Deborin school has been subjected in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years has aroused great interest among us. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad influence in the Chinese Communist Party, and it cannot be said that the dogmatist thinking in our Party is unrelated to the approach of that school. Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of dogmatist thinking as its main objective.


I. THE TWO WORLD OUTLOOKS
Throughout the history of human knowledge, there have been two conceptions concerning the law of development of the universe, the metaphysical conception and the dialectical conception, which form two opposing world outlooks. Lenin said:

The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation). [3]

Here Lenin was referring to these two different world outlooks.

In China another name for metaphysics is hsuan-hsueh. For a long period in history whether in China or in Europe, this way of thinking, which is part and parcel of the idealist world outlook, occupied a dominant position in human thought. In Europe, the materialism of the bourgeoisie in its early days was also metaphysical. As the social economy of many European countries advanced to the stage of highly developed capitalism, as the forces of production, the class struggle and the sciences developed to a level unprecedented in history, and as the industrial proletariat became the greatest motive force in historical development, there arose the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. Then, in addition to open and barefaced reactionary idealism, vulgar evolutionism emerged among the bourgeoisie to oppose materialist dialectics.

The metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world outlook sees things as isolated, static and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in quantity or a change of place. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or decrease or change of place is not inside things but outside them, that is, the motive force is external. Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion, capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the individualist ideology of capitalist society, and so on, can all be found in ancient slave society, or even in primitive society, and will exist for ever unchanged. They ascribe the causes of social development to factors external to society, such as geography and climate. They search in an over-simplified way outside a thing for the causes of its development, and they deny the theory of materialist dialectics which holds that development arises from the contradictions inside a thing. Consequently they can explain neither the qualitative diversity of things, nor the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. In Europe, this mode of thinking existed as mechanical materialism in the 17th and 18th centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. In China, there was the metaphysical thinking exemplified in the saying "Heaven changeth not, likewise the Tao changeth not", [4] and it was supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes for a long time. Mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism, which were imported from Europe in the last hundred gears, are supported by the bourgeoisie.

As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development. Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are secondary causes. Thus materialist dialectics effectively combats the theory of external causes, or of an external motive force, advanced by metaphysical mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism. It is evident that purely external causes can only give rise to mechanical motion, that is, to changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things differ qualitatively in thousands of ways and why one thing changes into another. As a matter of fact, even mechanical motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of things. Simple growth in plants and animals, their quantitative development, is likewise chiefly the result of their internal contradictions. Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to external but to internal causes. Countries with almost the same geographical and climatic conditions display great diversity and unevenness in their development. Moreover, great social changes may take place in one and the same country although its geography and climate remain unchanged. Imperialist Russia changed into the socialist Soviet Union, and feudal Japan, which had locked its doors against the world, changed into imperialist Japan, although no change occurred in the geography and climate of either country. Long dominated by feudalism, China has undergone great changes in the last hundred years and is now changing in the direction of a new China, liberated and-free, and yet no change has occurred in her geography and climate. Changes do take place in the geography and climate of the earth as a whole and in every part of it, but they are insignificant when compared with changes in society; geographical and climatic changes manifest themselves in terms of tens of thousands of years, while social changes manifest themselves in thousands, hundreds or tens of years, and even in a few years or months in times of revolution. According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new. Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis. There is constant interaction between the peoples of different countries. In the era of capitalism, and especially in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the interaction and mutual impact of different countries in the political, economic and cultural spheres are extremely great. The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history as well as in Russian history. It exerted influence on internal changes in the other countries in the world and, similarly and in a particularly profound way, on internal changes in China. These changes, however, were effected through the inner laws of development of these countries, China included. In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated, both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or because of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes become operative. In China in 1927, the defeat of the proletariat by the big bourgeoisie came about through the opportunism then to be found within the Chinese proletariat itself (inside the Chinese Communist Party). When we liquidated this opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later, the Chinese revolution again suffered severe setbacks at the hands of the enemy, because adventurism had risen within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause advanced once again. Thus it can be seen that to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must depend on the correctness of its own political line and the solidity of its own organization.

The dialectical world outlook emerged in ancient times both in China and in Europe. Ancient dialectics, however, had a somewhat spontaneous and naive character; in the social and historical conditions then prevailing, it was not yet able to form a theoretical system, hence it could not fully explain the world and was supplanted by metaphysics. The famous German philosopher Hegel, who lived in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, made most important contributions to dialectics, but his dialectics was idealist. It was not until Marx and Engels, the great protagonists of the proletarian movement, had synthesized the positive achievements in the history of human knowledge and, in particular, critically absorbed the rational elements of Hegelian dialectics and created the great theory of dialectical and historical materialism that an unprecedented revolution occurred in the history of human knowledge. This theory was further developed by Lenin and Stalin. As soon as it spread to China, it wrought tremendous changes in the world of Chinese thought.

This dialectical world outlook teaches us primarily how to observe and analyse the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions. It is therefore most important for us to understand the law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.

II. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CONTRADICTION
For convenience of exposition, I shall deal first with the universality of contradiction and then proceed to the particularity of contradiction. The reason is that the universality of contradiction can be explained more briefly, for it has been widely recognized ever since the materialist-dialectical world outlook was discovered and materialist dialectics applied with outstanding success to analysing many aspects of human history and natural history and to changing many aspects of society and nature (as in the Soviet Union) by the great creators and continuers of Marxism--Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; whereas the particularity of contradiction is still not dearly understood by many comrades, and especially by the dogmatists. They do not understand that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides. Nor do they understand how important is the study of the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us for guiding the course of revolutionary practice. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the study of the particularity of contradiction and to explain it at adequate length. For this reason, in our analysis of the law of contradiction in things, we shall first analyse the universality of contradiction, then place special stress on analysing the particularity of contradiction, and finally return to the universality of contradiction.

The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.

Engels said, "Motion itself is a contradiction." [5] Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)". [6] Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist.

Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance, mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion.

Engels explained the universality of contradiction as follows:

If simple mechanical change of place contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. ... life consists precisely and primarily in this--that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction between man's inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is--at least practically, for us--an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.

... one of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same....

But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions. [7]


Lenin illustrated the universality of contradiction as follows:

In mathematics: + and--. Differential and integral.

In mechanics: action and reaction.

In physics: positive and negative electricity.

In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.

In social science: the class struggle. [8]

In war, offence and defence, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all mutually contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at once in conflict and in interdependence, and this constitutes the totality of a war, pushes its development forward and solves its problems.

Every difference in men's concepts should be regarded as reflecting an objective contradiction. Objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thinking, and this process constitutes the contradictory movement of concepts, pushes forward the development of thought, and ceaselessly solves problems in man's thinking.

Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end.

Thus it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena. But does contradiction also exist at the initial stage of each process?

Is there a movement of opposites from beginning to end in the process of development of every single thing?

As can be seen from the articles written by Soviet philosophers criticizing it, the Deborin school maintains that contradiction appears not at the inception of a process but only when it has developed to a certain stage. If this were the case, then the cause of the development of the process before that stage would be external and not internal. Deborin thus reverts to the metaphysical theories of external causality and of mechanism. Applying this view in the analysis of concrete problems, the Deborin school sees only differences but not contradictions between the kulaks and the peasants in general under existing conditions in the Soviet Union, thus entirely agreeing with Bukharin. In analysing the French Revolution, it holds that before the Revolution there were likewise only differences but not contradictions within the Third Estate, which was composed of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. These views of the Deborin school are anti-Marxist. This school does not understand that each and every difference already contains contradiction and that difference itself is contradiction. Labour and capital have been in contradiction ever since the two classes came into being, only at first the contradiction had not yet become intense. Even under the social conditions existing in the Soviet Union, there is a difference between workers and peasants and this very difference is a contradiction, although, unlike the contradiction between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle; the workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism. The question is one of different kinds of contradiction, not of the presence or absence of contradiction. Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end.

What is meant by the emergence of a new process? The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites, whereupon a new process emerges to replace the old. The old process ends and the new one begins. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions.

As Lenin pointed out, Marx in his Capital gave a model analysis of this movement of opposites which runs through the process of development of things from beginning to end. This is the method that must be employed in studying the development of all things. Lenin, too, employed this method correctly and adhered to it in all his writings.

In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the [summation] of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Lenin added, "Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general." [9]

Chinese Communists must learn this method; only then will they be able correctly to analyse the history and the present state of the Chinese revolution and infer its future.

III. THE PARTICULARITY OF CONTRADICTION
Contradiction is present in the process of development of all things; it permeates the process of development of each thing from beginning to end. This is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now let us discuss the particularity and relativity of contradiction.

This problem should be studied on several levels.

First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. Man's knowledge of matter is knowledge of its forms of motion, because there is nothing in this world except matter in motion and this motion must assume certain forms. In considering each form of motion of matter, we must observe the points which it has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important and necessary, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world. There are many forms of motion in nature, mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.

The sciences are differentiated precisely on the basis of the particular contradictions inherent in their respective objects of study. Thus the contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a specific branch of science. For example, positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, classes and class struggle, in social science; offence and defence in military science; idealism and materialism, the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in philosophy; and so on--all these are the objects of study of different branches of science precisely because each branch has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Of course, unless we understand the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause or universal basis for the movement or development of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction, we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things, no way of discovering the particular cause or particular basis for the movement or development of a thing, and no way of distinguishing one thing from another or of demarcating the fields of science.

As regards the sequence in the movement of man's knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things.

When man attains the knowledge of this common essence, he uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is he able to supplement, enrich and develop his knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying. These are the two processes of cognition: one, from the particular to the general, and the other, from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. Where our dogmatists err on this question is that, on the one hand, they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things, and that, on the other hand, they do not understand that after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have only just emerged. Our dogmatists are lazy-bones. They refuse to undertake any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as emerging out of the void, they turn them into purely abstract unfathomable formulas, and thereby completely deny and reverse the normal sequence by which man comes to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in cognition-- from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. They understand nothing of the Marxist theory of knowledge.

It is necessary not only to study the particular contradiction and the essence determined thereby of every great system of the forms of motion of matter, but also to study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter. In every form of motion, each process of development which is real (and not imaginary) is qualitatively different. Our study must emphasize and start from this point.

Qualitatively different contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods. For instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by the method of national revolutionary war; the contradiction between the working class and the peasant class in socialist society is resolved by the method of collectivization and mechanization in agriculture; contradiction within the Communist Party is resolved by the method of criticism and self-criticism; the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by the method of developing the productive forces. Processes change, old processes and old contradictions disappear, new processes and new contradictions emerge, and the methods of resolving contradictions differ accordingly. In Russia, there was a fundamental difference between the contradiction resolved by the February Revolution and the contradiction resolved by the October Revolution, as well as between the methods used to resolve them. The principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe. The dogmatists do not observe this principle; they do not understand that conditions differ in different kinds of revolution and so do not understand that different methods should be used to resolve different contradictions; on the contrary, they invariably adopt what they imagine to be an unalterable formula and arbitrarily apply it everywhere, which only causes setbacks to the revolution or makes a sorry mess of what was originally well done.

In order to reveal the particularity of the contradictions in any process in the development of a thing, in their totality or interconnections, that is, in order to reveal the essence of the process, it is necessary to reveal the particularity of the two aspects of each of the contradictions in that process; otherwise it will be impossible to discover the essence of the process. This likewise requires the utmost attention in our study.

There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing. For instance, in the course of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, where the conditions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between all the oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of the people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other, the contradiction between the various reactionary ruling groups, and so on. These contradictions cannot be treated in the same way since each has its own particularity; moreover, the two aspects of each contradiction cannot be treated in the same way since each aspect has its own characteristics. We who are engages in the Chinese revolution should not only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its interdependence and in its contradiction with its opposite, and what concrete methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both interdependent and in contradiction, and also after the interdependence breaks down. It is of great importance to study these problems. Lenin meant just this when he said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. [10] Our dogmatists have violated Lenin's teachings; they never use their brains to analyse anything concretely, and in their writings and speeches they always use stereotypes devoid of content, thereby creating a very bad style of work in our Party.

In studying a problem, we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness and superficiality. To be subjective means not to look at problems objectively, that is, not to use the materialist viewpoint in looking at problems. I have discussed this in my essay "On Practice". To be one-sided means not to look at problems all-sidedly, for example, to understand only China but not Japan, only the Communist Party but not the Kuomintang, only the proletariat but not the bourgeoisie, only the peasants but not the landlords, only the favourable conditions but not the difficult ones, only the past but not the future, only individual parts but not the whole, only the defects but not the achievements, only the plaintiff's case but not the defendant's, only underground revolutionary work but not open revolutionary work, and so on. In a word, it means not to understand the characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. This is what we mean by looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing the part but not the whole, seeing the trees but not the forest. That way it is impossible to kind the method for resolving a contradiction, it is impossible to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out assignments well or to develop inner-Party ideological struggle correctly. When Sun Wu Tzu said in discussing military science, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat", [11] he was referring to the two sides in a battle. Wei Chengi [12] of the Tang Dynasty also understood the error of one- sidedness when he said, "Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened, heed only one side and you will be benighted." But our comrades often look at problems one-sidedly, and so they often run into snags. In the novel Shui Hu Chuan, Sung Chiang thrice attacked Chu Village. [13] Twice he was defeated because he was ignorant of the local conditions and used the wrong method. Later he changed his method; first he investigated the situation, and he familiarized himself with the maze of roads, then he broke up the alliance between the Li, Hu and Chu Villages and sent his men in disguise into the enemy camp to lie in wait, using a stratagem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in the foreign story. And on the third occasion he won. There are many examples of materialist dialectics in Shui Hu Chuan, of which the episode of the three attacks on Chu Village is one of the best. Lenin said:

... in order really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its sides, all connections and "mediations". We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.[14]

We should remember his words. To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects; it means to deny the necessity for probing deeply into a thing and minutely studying the characteristics of its contradiction, but instead merely to look from afar and, after glimpsing the rough outline, immediately to try to resolve the contradiction (to answer a question, settle a dispute, handle work, or direct a military operation). This way of doing things is bound to lead to trouble. The reason the dogmatist and empiricist comrades in China have made mistakes lies precisely in their subjectivist, one-sided and superficial way of looking at things. To be one-sided and superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws, but instead of undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are some people only look at things one-sidedly or superficially and who know neither their interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist.

Not only does the whole process of the movement of opposites in the development of a thing, both in their interconnections and in each of the aspects, have particular features to which we must give attention, but each stage in the process has its particular features to which we must give attention too.

The fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process determined by this fundamental contradiction will not disappear until the process is completed; but in a lengthy process the conditions usually differ at each stage. The reason is that, although the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process remain unchanged, the fundamental contradiction becomes more and more intensified as it passes from one stage to another in the lengthy process. In addition, among the numerous major and minor contradictions which are determined or influenced by the fundamental contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some new ones emerge; hence the process is marked by stages. If people do not pay attention to the stages in the process of development of a thing, they cannot deal with its contradictions properly.

For instance, when the capitalism of the era of free competition developed into imperialism, there was no change in the class nature of the two classes in fundamental contradiction, namely, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or in the capitalist essence of society; however, the contradiction between these two classes became intensified, the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital emerged, the contradiction between the colonial powers and the colonies became intensified, the contradiction among the capitalist countries resulting from their uneven development manifested itself with particular sharpness, and thus there arose the special stage of capitalism, the stage of imperialism. Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution.

Take the process of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, which began with the Revolution of 1911; it, too, has several distinct stages. In particular, the revolution in its period of bourgeois leadership and the revolution in its period of proletarian leadership represent two vastly different historical stages. In other words, proletarian leadership has fundamentally changed the whole face of the revolution, has brought about a new alignment of classes, given rise to a tremendous upsurge in the peasant revolution, imparted thoroughness to the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, created the possibility of the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and so on. None of these was possible in the period when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership. Although no change has taken place in the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process as a whole, i.e., in the anti-imperialist, anti- feudal, democratic-revolutionary nature of the process (the opposite of which is its semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature), nonetheless this process has passed through several stages of development in the course of more than twenty years; during this time many great events have taken place-- the failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the regime of the Northern warlords, the formation of the first national united front and the revolution of 1924-27, the break-up of the united front and the desertion of the bourgeoisie to the side of the counterrevolution, the wars among the new warlords, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the establishment of the second national united front and the War of Resistance Against Japan. These stages are marked by particular features such as the intensification of certain contradictions (e.g., the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Japanese invasion of the four northeastern provinces), the partial or temporary resolution of other contradictions (e.g., the destruction of the Northern warlords and our confiscation of the land of the landlords), and the emergence of yet other contradictions (e.g., the conflicts among the new warlords, and the landlords' recapture of the land after the loss of our revolutionary base areas in the south).

In studying the particularities of the contradictions at each stage in the process of development of a thing, we must not only observe them in their interconnections or their totality, we must also examine the two aspects of each contradiction.

For instance, consider the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Take one aspect, the Kuomintang. In the period of the first united front, the Kuomintang carried out Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; hence it was revolutionary and vigorous, it was an alliance of various classes for the democratic revolution. After 1927, however, the Kuomintang changed into its opposite and became a reactionary bloc of the landlords and big bourgeoisie. After the Sian Incident in December 1936, it began another change in the direction of ending the civil war and co-operating with the Communist Party for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism. Such have been the particular features of the Kuomintang in the three stages. Of course, these features have arisen from a variety of causes. Now take the other aspect, the Chinese Communist Party. In the period of the first united front, the Chinese Communist Party was in its infancy; it courageously led the revolution of 1924-27 but revealed its immaturity in its understanding of the character, the tasks and the methods of the revolution, and consequently it became possible for Chen Tu-hsiuism, which appeared during the latter part of this revolution, to assert itself and bring about the defeat of the revolution. After 1927, the Communist Party courageously led the Agrarian Revolutionary War and created the revolutionary army and revolutionary base areas; however, it committed adventurist errors which brought about very great losses both to the army and to the base areas. Since 1935 the Party has corrected these errors and has been leading the new united front for resistance to Japan; this great struggle is now developing. At the present stage, the Communist Party is a Party that has gone through the test of two revolutions and acquired a wealth of experience. Such have been the particular features of the Chinese Communist Party in the three stages. These features, too, have arisen from a variety of causes. Without studying both these sets of features we cannot understand the particular relations between the two parties during the various stages of their development, namely, the establishment of a united front, the break-up of the united front, and the establishment of another united front. What is even more fundamental for the study of the particular features of the two parties is the examination of the class basis of the two parties and the resultant contradictions which have arisen between each party and other forces at different periods. For instance, in the period of its first cooperation with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore anti-imperialist; on the other hand, it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country--although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing. In the period when it carried on the anti-Communist war, the Kuomintang collaborated with imperialism and feudalism against the great masses of the people and wiped out all the gains they had won in the revolution, and thereby intensified its contradictions with them. In the present period of the anti-Japanese war, the Kuomintang stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants co-operation with the Communist Party, without however relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people or its oppression of them. As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism, but in the present period of the anti-Japanese war, it has adopted a moderate policy towards the Kuomintang and the domestic feudal forces because the Kuomintang has pressed itself in favour of resisting Japan. The above circumstances have resulted now in alliance between the two parties and now in struggle between them, and even during the periods of alliance there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle. If we do not study the particular features of both aspects of the contradiction, we shall fail to understand not only the relations of each party with the other forces, but also the relations between the two parties.

It can thus be seen that in studying the particularity of any kind of contradiction--the contradiction in each form of motion of matter, the contradiction in each of its processes of development, the two aspects of the contradiction in each process, the contradiction at each stage of a process, and the two aspects of the contradiction at each stage--in studying the particularity of all these contradictions, we must not be subjective and arbitrary but must analyse it concretely. Without concrete analysis there can be no knowledge of the particularity of any contradiction. We must always remember Lenin's words, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.

Marx and Engels were the first to provide us with excellent models of such concrete analysis.

When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the socio-historical process, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, they discovered the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology, etc.), and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society.

When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Because the range of things is vast and there is no limit to their development, what is universal in one context becomes particular in another. Conversely, what is particular in one context becomes universal in another. The contradiction in the capitalist system between the social character of production and the private ownership of the means of production is common to all countries where capitalism exists and develops; as far as capitalism is concerned, this constitutes the universality of contradiction. But this contradiction of capitalism belongs only to a certain historical stage in the general development of class society; as far as the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society as a whole is concerned, it constitutes the particularity of contradiction. However, in the course of dissecting the particularity of all these contradictions in capitalist society, Marx gave a still more profound, more adequate and more complete elucidation of the universality of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general.

Since the particular is united with the universal and since the universality as well as the particularity of contradiction is inherent in everything, universality residing in particularity, we should, when studying an object, try to discover both the particular and the universal and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnection within the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it. When Stalin explained the historical roots of Leninism in his famous work, The Foundations of Leninism, he analysed the international situation in which Leninism arose, analysed those contradictions of capitalism which reached their culmination under imperialism, and showed how these contradictions made proletarian revolution a matter for immediate action and created favourable conditions for a direct onslaught on capitalism. What is more, he analysed the reasons why Russia became the cradle of Leninism, why tsarist Russia became the focus of all the contradictions of imperialism, and why it was possible for the Russian proletariat to become the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. Thus, Stalin analysed the universality of contradiction in imperialism, showing why Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, and at the same time analysed the particularity of tsarist Russian imperialism within this general contradiction, showing why Russia became the birthplace of the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution and how the universality of contradiction is contained in this particularity. Stalin's analysis provides us with a model for understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their interconnection.

On the question of using dialectics in the study of objective phenomena, Marx and Engels, and likewise Lenin and Stalin, always enjoin people not to be in any way subjective and arbitrary but, from the concrete conditions in the actual objective movement of these phenomena, to discover their concrete contradictions, the concrete position of each aspect of every contradiction and the concrete interrelations of the contradictions. Our dogmatists do not have this attitude in study and therefore can never get anything right. We must take warning from their failure and learn to acquire this attitude, which is the only correct one in study.

The relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction is the relationship between the general character and` the individual character of contradiction. By the former we mean that contradiction exists in and runs through all processes from beginning to end; motion, things, processes, thinking--all are contradictions. To deny contradiction is to deny everything. This is a universal truth for all times and all countries, which admits of no exception. Hence the general character, the absoluteness of contradiction. But this general character is contained in every individual character; without individual character there can be no general character. If all individual character were removed, what general character would remain? It is because each contradiction is particular that individual character arises. All individual character exists conditionally and temporarily, and hence is relative.

This truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION AND THE PRINCIPAL ASPECT OF A CONTRADICTION
There are still two points in the problem of the particularity of contradiction which must be singled out for analysis, namely, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction.

There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.

For instance, in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie ant the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction.

In a semi-colonial country such as China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions presents a complicated picture.

When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within the country (including what was the principal contradiction, between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to a secondary and subordinate position. So it was in China in the Opium War of 1840, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Yi Ho Tuan War of 1900, and so it is now in the present Sino-Japanese War.

But in another situation, the contradictions change position. When imperialism carries on its oppression not by war, but by milder means--political, economic and cultural--the ruling classes in semi-colonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and the two form an alliance for the joint oppression of the masses of the people. At such a time, the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of imperialism and the feudal classes, while imperialism often employs indirect methods rather than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to oppress the people, and thus the internal contradictions become particularly sharp. This is what happened in China in the Revolutionary War of 1911, the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, and the ten years of Agrarian Revolutionary War after 1997. Wars among the various reactionary ruling groups in the semi-colonial countries, e.g., the wars among the warlords in China, fall into the same category.

When a revolutionary civil war develops to the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, the domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within or sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a time, foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole while the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of the other contradictions. The assistance given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the October Revolution is an example of armed intervention. Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal in 1927 is an example of splitting the revolutionary front.

But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.

Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to funding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved. This is the method Marx taught us in his study of capitalist society. Likewise Lenin and Stalin taught us this method when they studied imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism and when they studied the Soviet economy. There are thousands of scholars and men of action who do not understand it, and the result is that, lost in a fog, they are unable to get to the heart of a problem and naturally cannot find a way to resolve its contradictions.

As we have said, one must not treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal but must distinguish between the principal and the secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the principal one. But, in any given contradiction, whether principal or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.

But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed--a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing.

We often speak of "the new superseding the old". The supersession of the old by the new is a general, eternal and inviolable law of the universe. The transformation of one thing into another, through leaps of different forms in accordance with its essence and external conditions--this is the process of the new superseding the old. In each thing there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from being minor to being major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from being major to being minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing. It can thus be seen that the nature of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction, the aspect which has gained predominance. When the principal aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly.

In capitalist society, capitalism has changed its position from being a subordinate force in the old feudal era to being the dominant force, and the nature of society has accordingly changed from feudal to capitalist. In the new, capitalist era, the feudal forces changed from their former dominant position to a subordinate one, gradually dying out. Such was the case, for example, in Britain and France. With the development of the productive forces, the bourgeoisie changes from being a new class playing a progressive role to being an old class playing a reactionary role, until it is finally overthrown by the proletariat and becomes a class deprived of privately owned means of production and stripped of power, when it, too, gradually dies out. The proletariat, which is much more numerous than the bourgeoisie and grows simultaneously with it but under its rule, is a new force which, initially subordinate to the bourgeoisie, gradually gains strength, becomes an independent class playing the leading role in history, and finally seizes political power and becomes the ruling class. Thereupon the nature of society changes and the old capitalist society becomes the new socialist society. This is the path already taken by the Soviet Union, a path that all other countries will inevitably take.

Look at China, for instance. Imperialism occupies the principal position in the contradiction in which China has been reduced to a semi-colony, it oppresses the Chinese people, and China has been changed from an independent country into a semi-colonial one. But this state of affairs will inevitably change; in the struggle between the two sides, the power of the Chinese people which is growing under the leadership of the proletariat will inevitably change China from a semi-colony into an independent country, whereas imperialism will be overthrown and old China will inevitably change into New China.

The change of old China into New China also involves a change in the relation between the old feudal forces and the new popular forces within the country. The old feudal landlord class will be overthrown, and from being the ruler it will change into being the ruled; and this class, too, will gradually die out. From being the ruled the people, led by the proletariat, will become the rulers. Thereupon, the nature of Chinese society will change and the old, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society will change into a new democratic society.

Instances of such reciprocal transformation are found in our past experience. The Ching Dynasty which ruled China for nearly three hundred years was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911, and the revolutionary Tung Meng Hui under Sun Yat-sen's leadership was victorious for a time. In the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, the revolutionary forces of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance in the south changed from being weak to being strong and won victory in the Northern Expedition, while the Northern warlords who once ruled the roost were overthrown. In 1927, the people's forces led by the Communist Party were greatly reduced numerically under the attacks of Kuomintang reaction, but with the elimination of opportunism within their ranks they gradually grew again. In the revolutionary base areas under Communist leadership, the peasants have been transformed from being the ruled to being the rulers, while the landlords have undergone a reverse transformation. It is always so in the world, the new displacing the old, the old being superseded by the new, the old being eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.

At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, the difficulties outweigh the favourable conditions and so constitute the principal aspect of the contradiction and the favourable conditions constitute the secondary aspect. But through their efforts the revolutionaries can overcome the difficulties step by step and open up a favourable new situation; thus a difficult situation yields place to a favourable one. This- is what happened after the failure of the revolution in China in 1927 and during the Long March of the Chinese Red Army. In the present Sino-Japanese War, China is again in a difficult position, but we can change this and fundamentally transform the situation as between China and Japan. Conversely, favourable conditions can be transformed into difficulty if the revolutionaries make mistakes. Thus the victory of the revolution of 1924-27 turned into defeat. The revolutionary base areas which grew up in the southern provinces after 1927 had all suffered defeat by 1934.

When we engage in study, the same holds good for the contradiction in the passage from ignorance to knowledge. At the very beginning of our study of Marxism, our ignorance of or scanty acquaintance with Marxism stands in contradiction to knowledge of Marxism. But by assiduous study, ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, scanty knowledge into substantial knowledge, and blindness in the application of Marxism into mastery of its application.

Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." [15] When a task, no maker which, has to be performed, but there is as yet no guiding line, method, plan or policy, the principal and decisive thing is to decide on a guiding line, method, plan or policy. When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recog

John Dory
8th November 2005, 19:25
The rest of this article can be found at this link (http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm).

red_che
9th November 2005, 03:48
This is one major contribution of Comrade Mao Tse Tung to Marxism-Leninism.

redstar2000
9th November 2005, 16:19
Originally posted by Mao+--> (Mao)The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).[/b]

Well, one should remember that Mao was a "middle peasant" with scant knowledge of the complexities of the history of philosophy.

One can broadly distinguish between materialist and idealist "philosophical explanations" of reality...but it doesn't seem as if Mao was even aware that "dialectics" is idealist.

To reduce any material phenomenon to "a struggle between two opposites" is not only a drastic oversimplification but, even worse, simply imposes a philosophic construct (or idea) on reality without any empirical justification whatsoever.

That's not materialism!

It's idealism!

It's long been a philosophic conceit that the task of philosophy was to "discover" the "underlying reality" of observable phenomena. "Dialectics" was, in the past, one of the approaches to that task.

Now we have real science -- something which Mao had only the haziest notion of.

Especially in 1937!


Mao
The dialectical world outlook emerged in ancient times both in China and in Europe.

Indeed it did...and it worked no better then than it does now.

Because it is inherently idealist...despite even Marx's efforts to "modernize it" by incorporating materialist data.

Marx's real contribution was his rigorous historical materialism. He really understood the material roots of all philosophical "explanations" of social phenomena.

He didn't need "dialectics" -- he simply incorporated "dialectical" terminology because that's how he was educated!

In his youth, to "be revolutionary" was to be "a left Hegelian"...and he never escaped that youthful enthusiasm for "dialectics".

It is indeed an unfortunate "accident of history" that the dead hand of Hegel oppressed living revolutionaries throughout the last century.

And even more so that some sincere revolutionaries still waste their time and energy on this romanticist superstition.

This thread is accordingly moved to the Philosophy forum...and unless there is strenuous objection, that's going to be the fate of all threads about "dialectics" from now on.

In fact, I hope that within a few years, it will be possible to move "dialectics" threads to the Religion subforum.

It's where they really belong!

http://www.websmileys.com/sm/cool/123.gif

KC
9th November 2005, 16:47
To reduce any material phenomenon to "a struggle between two opposites" is not only a drastic oversimplification but, even worse, simply imposes a philosophic construct (or idea) on reality without any empirical justification whatsoever.

Explain this better. Maybe a few examples would help?



Now we have real science

The philosophy of science is dialectical.

It seems to me that you are in opposition to dialectics because it is often used as a way to "predict the future." This I am also in disagreement with. The fact remains, however, that dialectics are still useful in understanding many, many things. The problem is that the dialectical method is used so commonly that it often isn't even recognized.

SonofRage
9th November 2005, 17:35
Originally posted by [email protected] 9 2005, 12:47 PM



The philosophy of science is dialectical.



What does that even mean?

I've found dialectics useful as a philosophy...the break down complex things into parts that are more easily understood...but trying to make a science out of it or use it to prove something is a joke.

KC
9th November 2005, 20:24
What does that even mean?

I've found dialectics useful as a philosophy...the break down complex things into parts that are more easily understood...but trying to make a science out of it or use it to prove something is a joke.


You are not turning dialectical materialism into science. I believe CyM described it best in the Dialectical Materialism thread:


Originally posted by CyM

Philosophical empiricism and formal logic have their roles, but often cannot be relied upon when we venture beyond the abstract perfect models. Reality is contradictory by nature, and this contradiction is an essential feature of change, rather than an exception to the perfect models many think describe reality.


Dialectical Materialism. (http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/index.php?showtopic=42399)

red_che
10th November 2005, 08:26
Well, one should remember that Mao was a "middle peasant" with scant knowledge of the complexities of the history of philosophy.


Well, we have here again this intellectual arrogant who postures to be "the person who knows all things" and thinks as if he's smarter than Marx himself.



One can broadly distinguish between materialist and idealist "philosophical explanations" of reality...but it doesn't seem as if Mao was even aware that "dialectics" is idealist.

Here, it should be noted that dialectics is just one aspect of dialectical materialism, such as materialism is its another aspect. Don't obscure these two things. That's why Marx criticized Hegel's dialectics as idealist because Hegel did not incorporate materialism in his teachings. Marx combined dialectics and materialism (that henceforth became to be known as dialectical materialism) as his tool for anylizing things.



To reduce any material phenomenon to "a struggle between two opposites" is not only a drastic oversimplification but, even worse, simply imposes a philosophic construct (or idea) on reality without any empirical justification whatsoever.


It is not "reducing any material phenomenon" but, rather, the essence of things or such material conditions. Here, Mao explained that in every thing (matter) there lies within it the contradiction of two things, and such contradiction make up its very essence. As such, these two forces contradicting within make up the condition for this thing to advance to a higher stage of existence until its eventual decay. Without this contradiction, a thing cannot progress.

Applied to social conditions, there lies within the society contradicting forces (the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, the contradiction between the old society and the new emerging society, and the class contradictions.) Such contradictions make the up the material condition for the society's development and decay. There is nothing unMarxist in this mentioned teaching of Mao.



That's not materialism!

It's idealism!


In your own mindset.



It's long been a philosophic conceit that the task of philosophy was to "discover" the "underlying reality" of observable phenomena. "Dialectics" was, in the past, one of the approaches to that task.

Now we have real science -- something which Mao had only the haziest notion of.


Well, Marx said that our task now is not only to discover the reality of things, but to change things with a better one.

Faceless
10th November 2005, 12:19
The debate following on from this has been unfortunately poor and has missed the "principal" weakness of Mao's "theoretical insights".

Should I really dignify the suggestion that "dialectics is idealist"?

RedStar, you make one claim after the other about dialectics, firstly that it is meaningless and really just used to justify tyranny, secondly that if it is common sense, then why the need to formulate it? and now even that it is idealist, which I will now ask you to substansiate.


There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.

For instance, in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie ant the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction.

This is, broadly speaking, the only point at which Mao tries to actually add something to dialectics. The rest of it is more or less a re-hash of the well known philosophy of dialectics and nothing new.

The problem with this idea, "the principal contradiction" is that it is not necessarily always a true aspect of related dialectical processes. Certainly his example too is a poor one. Firstly I would like to illustrate with an example I have heard before, that there is not always a "principal contradiction" or rather one which seems of higher urgency. Suppose you are getting dressed in the morning. You are un-clothed, you havent cleaned your teeth, you havent yet had a wash. You are going to have to do all of these things, but generally speaking it is irrelevant which you do first. There is no principal contradiction here. There is a case for saying that the motor force in bourgeois society is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; a principal contradiction maybe? Certainly with only a few examples it is clear to see that it is not a necessary feature of interrelated problems.

I would now like to bring in to question what it even means when a principal contradiction is supposeduly manifest, such as the example quoted by Mao. It seems that all of these non-principal contradictions are influenced by the principal contradiction; obviously this is true. But so too is the principal contradiction profoundly influenced by its interactions with the other contradictions. Indeed, they can be said even to complement it. Take the struggle between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. If Rosa Luxemburg is to be believed, the bourgeoisie undergo a war of annihilation with this class, only to remove from themselves their most obvious source of accumulation of capital by destroying what is left of pre-capitalist forms of production. This, and the declining rate of profit (the contradiction existing between bourgeois) will lead ultimately to the demise of capitalism, but not through a simple transition without contradiction itself. First a new contradiction within the capitalist class will emerge between "democratic capitalists" and "fascist capitalists" as Mao terms them. Secondly the class war will intensify as the capitalist class attacks the one remaining potential source of profit; wages and thus the proletariat. Thus this final contradiction will result in the transformation of society, with socialism or barbarism being the only two alternatives. But which contradiction was affecting the other? The major class conflict between bourgeois and proletarians could be said to be decisively affected by other contradictions. But the other class contradictions are themselves far from immune from the activity of this "principal contradiction".

Mao was not a philosopher of any great importance, though I guess he fancied himself as one.

redstar2000
10th November 2005, 15:12
Originally posted by Lazar+--> (Lazar)
Originally posted by redstar2000+--> (redstar2000)To reduce any material phenomenon to "a struggle between two opposites" is not only a drastic oversimplification but, even worse, simply imposes a philosophic construct (or idea) on reality without any empirical justification whatsoever.[/b]

Explain this better. Maybe a few examples would help?[/b]

Surely a bit of reflection on any real world phenomenon suggests at once a variety of causes, influences, factors, etc.

Consider a problem of pressing interest to all those who desire the overthrow of capitalism.

What are the required conditions of massive revolutionary proletarian insurgency?

Or, why do uprisings take place here and not there and why at this time and not some other time?

This is a problem that is so complicated that we do not have, at this point, more than a few scraps of a "theory". We look at past insurrections empirically and try to formulate some "explanations" that make at least minimal sense.

But, realistically speaking, we are in the same position as some 18th century scientist trying to "explain" hurricanes.

Of course, all the self-anointed "masters of the dialectic" claim that they "know the truth" of these matters and can not only successfully "predict" revolutions but even "lead" and "guide" them.

Sensible people scornfully dismiss such conceits...but it cannot be denied that there are still a few people that accept such claims in plain denial of the massive evidence against them.


The philosophy of science is dialectical.

:lol:


The problem is that the dialectical method is used so commonly that it often isn't even recognized.

I'm afraid this is a typically shabby verbal maneuver occasionally offered by the "dialecticians".

Faced with the indisputable fact that the overwhelming majority of working scientists have never heard of "dialectics", they claim that whenever a scientist reaches a correct conclusion from his/her research, they were being "unconsciously dialectical" in their thinking.

Scientific errors, on the other hand, are universally attributed to "bourgeois empiricism" or "static, linear, logic" or some such "inferior mode of thinking".

This obviously self-serving crap should remind us of what the Christians say when reproached for their atrocities..."Oh, those bad people weren't real Christians." And should an avowed and public atheist do something they admire, they'll say "Oh, God must have moved his heart to do the Christian thing."

Perhaps the appeal of "dialectics" becomes clearer by these examples: you can use "dialectics" to say anything you like as if it were really true.

That's idealism!


Originally posted by red_che
Well, we have here again this intellectual arrogant who postures to be "the person who knows all things" and thinks as if he's smarter than Marx himself.

:lol:


introduction to the [email protected]
I am obviously not "Marx" or even "Engels" -- but I try, to the best of my limited abilities, to look at social reality in the same critical sense that they did.

You have a problem with that? :lol:


Marx combined dialectics and materialism (that henceforth became to be known as dialectical materialism) as his tool for analyzing things.

I am well aware that Marx thought he was "standing Hegel on his head" by grounding "dialectics" in material reality.

But I don't think the oxymoronic term "dialectical materialism" was ever used by Marx himself. I've seen sources that suggested it was first used by either Engels or by an anonymous early member of the German social democratic party...in either case, after Marx's death.

The substance of the question remains: did Marx need "dialectics" to make his materialist analysis "work"?

The answer, in my view, is obviously negative.

If he didn't really need it, then why do we?


It is not "reducing any material phenomenon" but, rather, the essence of things or such material conditions. Here, Mao explained that in every thing (matter) there lies within it the contradiction of two things, and such contradiction make up its very essence. As such, these two forces contradicting within make up the condition for this thing to advance to a higher stage of existence until its eventual decay. Without this contradiction, a thing cannot progress.

Theology!


Faceless
RedStar, you make one claim after the other about dialectics, firstly that it is meaningless and really just used to justify tyranny, secondly that if it is common sense, then why the need to formulate it? and now even that it is idealist, which I will now ask you to substantiate.

It is idealist because it has no real world significance.

In all but the very simplest phenomena, there are "more than two" causes in operation...some which "oppose" each other and some which "reinforce" each other.

Figuring out the real causes of "what this is" or "why this happens" generally involves enormous and laborious research into reality and uncovers a multitude of factors that interact with each other in very complex ways.

"Dialectical" word-spinning is just a way to avoid confronting real world complexities.

It's also really useful to those who wish to disguise their own real world ignorance while projecting an image of erudition...following in Hegel's own footsteps, so to speak.

http://www.websmileys.com/sm/cool/123.gif

Faceless
10th November 2005, 22:59
It is idealist because it has no real world significance.
OK, firstly this is not what is meant by "idealism", hence my confusion when you decided to throw this word into the mix. Idealism is the philosophy of the primacy of the mind over matter, to reduce it to its simplest terms. Idealism is not just the word we use for irrelevant things, but for anything emanating from the idea that the mind comes first. There is no reason to suspect this of dialectics.


Perhaps the appeal of "dialectics" becomes clearer by these examples: you can use "dialectics" to say anything you like as if it were really true.

That's idealism!
Conjecture based upon nothing. So called marxists have said a lot in the name of dialectics so you extend the problem to dialectics itself without really considering the matter at hand. The same can be said for real science too. Regardless of the integrity of the scientist, once can distort, or infact say anything you bloody well like in the name of science as if it were really true. So science too, I presume, is idealism.


In all but the very simplest phenomena, there are "more than two" causes in operation...some which "oppose" each other and some which "reinforce" each other.

Figuring out the real causes of "what this is" or "why this happens" generally involves enormous and laborious research into reality and uncovers a multitude of factors that interact with each other in very complex ways.
You might not realise the irony of what you just said. Basically there are numerous acting elements in a system (a multitude?) acting in basically only two directions, one that opposes and one that reinforces. Consider a box full of gas, with an internal energy. The gas is exerting an outward pressure, and if allowed to expand will do work, antagonistically there is only one other direction in which work can affect the system, and that is if it is negative, and the gas is compressed. For all the different apparent motions of the particles, the motion affecting the internal energy of the gas can only be expressed in one of two ways, negative or positive; work on or work by. This is the essential feature of dialectics. That only expresses one of the three essential features of dialectics. Do enough work in compressing the gas and it will condense into a liquid, has quantity changed into quality? On the level of the individual molecules, no sensible dialectician would suggest that this can be observed to happen, there are always molecules attracting eachother with intermolecular forces and then breaking away, from this perspective the greater change can not be observed. To look at these random intermolecular bonds and then say that they follow immutable laws is nonsense and fails to recognise the dialectical processes which take place from the perspective of the totality. Because suddenly you are a crystal, and your science is broken. In the language of chaos theory, the gas has "emergent" qualities when one has millions of molecules and not just the two attracting or repelling eachother. Bourgeois science is much like the latter way of looking at the world, it can not perceive the dialectical process because of its formalism originating in the fact that it views the world as individual gas molecules; individual bourgeois interacting without forming a class and with no "emergeny" qualities.

The bourgeoisie do not have the disadvantage in world-view that they consider everything in terms of idealism. They have had many great materialists working for their cause. And yet they fail to see what we see from a proletarian stand-point.

You see science does have its words which essentially express the dialectical world-view. Chaos theory in modern times represents something of a rebirth for dialectics in the science. Just because they dont use the same words that marxists use, doesnt make them undialectical.

I for one will not be dishonest in my exposition of a dialectical concept and will use words to describe these processes which are not necessarily marxian in origin. Consider the different aspects of a gas I just described. Sure enough, I didnt need "dialectics" as a terminology to express them. However, the certain stages in the gases development CAN be expressed in terms of quality/quantity or totalities or contradiction.

redstar2000
11th November 2005, 00:55
Originally posted by Faceless
Consider the different aspects of a gas I just described. Sure enough, I didn't need "dialectics" as a terminology to express them. However, the certain stages in the gases development CAN be expressed in terms of quality/quantity or totalities or contradiction.

Very revealing!

"Dialectical terminology" is infinitely flexible...one can, if one wishes, express anything "dialectically" without regard to its truth or falsity.

But "dialectics" does not "explain" why certain molecules behave a particular way under specific conditions.

You have to really know something about physics and chemistry to describe what really happens and why...including a good deal of mathematics.

Just waving the "magic wand" of "dialectics" doesn't really explain anything. One could, with the same level of justification, "explain anything" as "the Will of God".

I assert once again: "dialectics" is idealism!

http://www.websmileys.com/sm/cool/123.gif

red_che
11th November 2005, 03:50
The problem with this idea, "the principal contradiction" is that it is not necessarily always a true aspect of related dialectical processes. Certainly his example too is a poor one. Firstly I would like to illustrate with an example I have heard before, that there is not always a "principal contradiction" or rather one which seems of higher urgency. Suppose you are getting dressed in the morning. You are un-clothed, you havent cleaned your teeth, you havent yet had a wash. You are going to have to do all of these things, but generally speaking it is irrelevant which you do first. There is no principal contradiction here. There is a case for saying that the motor force in bourgeois society is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; a principal contradiction maybe? Certainly with only a few examples it is clear to see that it is not a necessary feature of interrelated problems.


Like your example, one cannot do many things at the same time, that's why Mao here explained that the contradictions existing in the society are many and such, they should be dealt with one-by-one according to the urgency of it, or which should be dealt with first in order to make the other contradictions easier to deal with (or something along that line). The same way that these contradictions existed, they did not came at once, they undertook some process before all these contradictions emerged and affect each other.

What Mao is trying to imply is that in every society, there are lots of contradictions existing. In capitalism, the contradictions that are existing within are those already enumerated in this thread. And in these contradictions, it is very important to look at what is the primary contradiction at a given time in order to understand it (the social system) more. And that contradiction must be dealt with at that time with primary importance, while dealing with the other contradictions, secondarily.

Precisely, Mao's presentation of the "principal contradiction" is his major theoretical contribution to Marxism. This Thought explains every Marxist how to deal with contradictions.

Faceless
11th November 2005, 12:32
Like your example, one cannot do many things at the same time, that's why Mao here explained that the contradictions existing in the society are many and such, they should be dealt with one-by-one according to the urgency of it

However, my example of a person getting dressed shows that there is not necessarily a competition in urgency for various contradictions. One could just as easily address the fact that you are unwashed before cleaning your teeth as you could the opposite. My objection is that whilst it may be true that there are problems in society which should be addressed in order of priority by the individual, what that order is is sometimes unclear, indeed, certain contradictions can be addressed simultaneously and the order of others is irrelevant.


Very revealing!

"Dialectical terminology" is infinitely flexible...one can, if one wishes, express anything "dialectically" without regard to its truth or falsity.

But "dialectics" does not "explain" why certain molecules behave a particular way under specific conditions.

Dialectics is not the explanation of everything, from which a complete system of existence can be derived, but is rather a law of development derived in much the same way as newton's laws, from experiencing them in every day life. I can not hope to schematise the entire world from the equation F = ma any more than from dialectics, I would have to really know something about physics and chemistry to describe what really happens. However, this does not detract from them element of truth in Newton's mechanics. In the same way, the fact that I have to know something about the nature of the forces involved in a system's evolution does not make dialectics any less relevant.

You have twisted what I said to suit you. I could use the terminology of chaos theory also to suit my need. I could say that because the world is a chaotic system, there is a god. That was somewhat random, I plucked it out of nowhere; it is nonsense. And yet, why dismiss chaos theory because I can express anything I want using words. Chaos theory, without reference to the REAL WORLD tells us nothing. The same is true for dialectics. Which is why it is inseperable from actual observation and activity.

Your arguement reduces itself to the fact that words are so terrible as to ba able to express anything! Imagine it, if I use words I could say what I like without a shred of evidence!!

Inspite of my effort in which I described processes which conform to what is meant by dialectics in nature, and the apparent dominance of these ideas, you attack me because they are, "just words". Idealist indeed.


But "dialectics" does not "explain" why certain molecules behave a particular way under specific conditions.
OK, I used the logic of dialectics to show how a gas behaves and refuted your arguement that complexity in a system rules out the possibility of resolving forces into two contradictory actions. What are you asking of me now? To explain the structure of the molecule itself in terms of dialectics? You, if you know anything about dialectics, will know that on such a small scale, the amount we know about these systems becomes less and less. It would be a subterfuge of sorts to say that quantum physics and black holes are beyond dialectics when they are beyond the scope of human observation itself. Or are you asking why dialectics cant be used to derive the gravitational constant. In fact, no scientific method can derive nature's fundamental laws. Not even aristotlean logic can tell me the magnitude of G! Perhaps you would alledge they are god ordained?

There are instances though where departure from dialectics leads to catastrophic mistakes. To observe from the perspective of the individual instead of the totality is the reason bourgeois economics became unstuck, to be unable to see that quantity transforms into quality and to instead to believe its opposite, that quantity can develop at a steady pace without there ever being a qualitative turning point is called "evolutionary socialism" in the field of socialist politics and was the speciality of Bernstein. I have just described, in precise terms, what departures from dialectics leads to. I have not denied the value of empirical evidence. But I am staiting that empirical evidence is insufficient. Bernstein or Adam Smith had a wealth of empirical evidence at their disposal. Certainly this was not Marx's advantage over them. That they did not understand the world entirely is proof enough that mere observation does not fully explain how things are interconnected.

red_che
12th November 2005, 04:34
I am well aware that Marx thought he was "standing Hegel on his head" by grounding "dialectics" in material reality.

But I don't think the oxymoronic term "dialectical materialism" was ever used by Marx himself. I've seen sources that suggested it was first used by either Engels or by an anonymous early member of the German social democratic party...in either case, after Marx's death.


"My dialectic method," wrote Marx, "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite."


QUOTE (introduction to the redstar2000papers)
I am obviously not "Marx" or even "Engels" -- but I try, to the best of my limited abilities, to look at social reality in the same critical sense that they did.



You have a problem with that?


Yeah, you are far behind what you think you are.


"Dialectical terminology" is infinitely flexible...one can, if one wishes, express anything "dialectically" without regard to its truth or falsity.

But "dialectics" does not "explain" why certain molecules behave a particular way under specific conditions.

You have to really know something about physics and chemistry to describe what really happens and why...including a good deal of mathematics.

Just waving the "magic wand" of "dialectics" doesn't really explain anything. One could, with the same level of justification, "explain anything" as "the Will of God".


Here, Engels said something:

"II. Dialectics
(The general nature of dialectics to be developed as the science of interconnections, in contrast to metaphysics.)
It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three:

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa;
The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
The law of the negation of the negation.

All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought. If we turn the thing round, then everything becomes simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday.

Moreover, anyone who is even only slightly acquainted with his Hegel will be aware that in hundreds of passages Hegel is capable of giving the most striking individual illustrations from nature and history of the dialectical laws.

We are not concerned here with writing a handbook of dialectics, but only with showing that the dialectical laws are really laws of development of nature, and therefore are valid also for theoretical natural science. Hence we cannot go into the inner interconnection of these laws with one another.

1. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious.

It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.

But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with Heine's vices; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body.

We are concerned here in the first place with nonliving bodies; the same law holds for living bodies, but it operates under very complex conditions and at present quantitative measurement is still often impossible for us.

If we imagine any non-living body cut up into smaller and smaller portions, at first no qualitative change occurs. But this has a limit: if we succeed, as by evaporation, in obtaining the separate molecules in the free state, then it is true that we can usually divide these still further, yet only with a complete change of quality. The molecule is decomposed into its separate atoms, which have quite different properties from those of the molecule. In the case of molecules composed of various chemical elements, atoms or molecules of these elements themselves make their appearance in the place of the compound molecule; in the case of molecules of elements, the free atoms appear, which exert quite distinct qualitative effects: the free atoms of nascent oxygen are easily able to effect what the atoms of atmospheric oxygen, bound together in the molecule, can never achieve.

But the molecule is also qualitatively different from the mass of the body to which it belongs. It can carry out movements independently of this mass and while the latter remains apparently at rest, e.g. heat oscillations; by means of a change of position and of connection with neighbouring molecules it can change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation.

Thus we see that the purely quantitative operation of division has a limit at which it becomes transformed into a qualitative difference: the mass consists solely of molecules, but it is something essentially different from the molecule, just as the latter is different from the atom. It is this difference that is the basis for the separation of mechanics, as the science of heavenly and terrestrial masses, from physics, as the mechanics of the molecule, and from chemistry, as the physics of the atom.

In mechanics, no qualities occur; at most, states such as equilibrium, motion, potential energy, which all depend on measurable transference of motion and are themselves capable of quantitative expression. Hence, in so far as qualitative change takes place here, it is determined by a corresponding quantitative change.

In physics, bodies are treated as chemically unalterable or indifferent; we have to do with changes of their molecular states and with the change of form of the motion which in all cases, at least on one of the two sides, brings the molecule into play. Here every change is a transformation of quantity into quality, a consequence of the quantitative change of the quantity of motion of one form or another that is inherent in the body or communicated to it. "Thus, for instance, the temperature of water is first of all indifferent in relation to its state as a liquid; but by increasing or decreasing the temperature of liquid water a point is reached at which this state of cohesion alters and the water becomes transformed on the one side into steam and on the other into ice." (Hegel, Encyclopedia, Collected Works, VI, p. 217.) Similarly, a definite minimum current strength is required to cause the platinum wire of an electric incandescent lamp to glow; and every metal has its temperature of incandescence and fusion, every liquid its definite freezing and boiling point at a given pressure - in so far as our means allow us to produce the temperature required; finally also every gas has its critical point at which it can be liquefied by pressure and cooling. In short, the so-called physical constants are for the most part nothing but designations of the nodal points at which quantitative addition or subtraction of motion produces qualitative alteration in the state of the body concerned, at which, therefore, quantity is transformed into quality.

The sphere, however, in which the law of nature discovered by Hegel celebrates its most important triumphs is that of chemistry. Chemistry can be termed the science of the qualitative changes of bodies as a result of changed quantitative composition. That was already known to Hegel himself (Logic, Collected Works, III, p. 488). As in the case of oxygen: if three atoms unite into a molecule, instead of the usual two, we get ozone, a body which is very considerably different from ordinary oxygen in its odour and reactions. Again, one can take the various proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur, each of which produces a substance qualitatively different from any of the others! How different laughing gas (nitrogen monoxide N2O) is from nitric anhydride (nitrogen pentoxide, N2O5) ! The first is a gas, the second at ordinary temperatures a solid crystalline substance. And yet the whole difference in composition is that the second contains five times as much oxygen as the first, and between the two of them are three more oxides of nitrogen (N0, N2O3, NO2), each of which is qualitatively different from the first two and from each other.

This is seen still more strikingly in the homologous series of carbon compounds, especially in the simpler hydrocarbons. Of the normal paraffins, the lowest is methane, CH4; here the four linkages of the carbon atom are saturated by four atoms of hydrogen. The second, ethane, C2H6, has two atoms of carbon joined together and the six free linkages are saturated by six atoms of hydrogen. And so it goes on, with C3H8, C4H10, etc., according t,o the algebraic formula CnH2n+2, so that by each addition of CH2 a body is formed that is qualitatively distinct from the preceding one. The three lowest members of the series are gases, the highest known, hexadecane, C16H34, is a solid body with a boiling point of 270º C. Exactly the same holds good for the series of primary alcohols with formula CnH2n+20, derived (theoretically) from the paraffins, and the series of monobasic fatty acids (formula CnH2nO2). What qualitative difference can be caused by the quantitative addition of C3H6 is taught by experience if we consume ethyl alcohol, C2H12O, in any drinkable form without addition of other alcohols, and on another occasion take the same ethyl alcohol but with a slight addition of amyl alcohol, C5H12O, which forms the main constituent of the notorious fusel oil. One's head will certainly be aware of it the next morning, much to its detriment; so that one could even say that the intoxication, and subsequent "morning after" feeling, is also quantity transformed into quality, on the one hand of ethyl alcohol and on the other hand of this added C3H6.

In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series. Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10 there are two, for C6H12 there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers.

Still more. From the analogy of the substances with which we are acquainted in each of these series, we can draw conclusions as to the physical properties of the still unknown members of the series and, at least for the members immediately following the known ones, predict their properties, boiling point, etc., with fair certainty.

Finally, the Hegelian law is valid not only for compound substances but also for the chemical elements themselves. We now know that "the chemical properties of the elements are a periodic function of their atomic weights" (Roscoe-Schorlemmer, Complete Text-Book of Chemistry, II, p. 823), and that, therefore, their quality is determined by the quantity of their atomic weight. And the test of this has been brilliantly carried out. Mendeleyev proved that various gaps occur in the series of related elements arranged according to atomic weights indicating that here new elements remain to be discovered. He described in advance the general chemical properties of one of these unknown elements, which he termed eka-aluminium, because it follows after aluminium in the series beginning with the latter, and he predicted its approximate specific and atomic weight as well as its atomic volume. A few years later, Lecoq de Boisbaudran actually discovered this element, and Mendeleyev's predictions fitted with only very slight discrepancies. Eka-aluminium was realised in gallium (ibid., p. 828). By means of the - unconscious - application of Hegel's law of the transformation of quantity into quality, Mendeleyev achieved a scientific feat which it is not too bold to put on a par with that of Leverrier in calculating the orbit of the still unknown planet Neptune.

In biology, as in the history of human society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately measurable and traceable.

Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism will now declare that it is indeed something quite self-evident, trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and so they have been taught nothing new.

But to have formulated for the first time in its universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance. And if these gentlemen have for years caused quantity and quality to be transformed into one another, without knowing what they did, then they will have to console themselves with Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who had spoken prose all his life without having the slightest inkling of it."


Here's another, his introduction to the same book, Dialectics of Nature:

"1. INTRODUCTION
MODERN natural science, which alone has achieved an all-round systematic and scientific development, as contrasted with the brilliant natural-philosophical intuitions of antiquity and the extremely important but sporadic discoveries of the Arabs, which for the most part vanished without results - this modern natural science dates, like all more recent history, from that mighty epoch which we Germans term the Reformation, from the national misfortune that overtook us at that time, and which the French term the Renaissance and the Italians the Cinquecento, although it is not fully expressed by any of these names. It is the epoch which had its rise in the last half of the fifteenth century. Royalty, with the support of the burghers of the towns, broke the power of the feudal nobility and established the great monarchies, based essentially on nationality, within which the modern European nations and modern bourgeois society came to development. And while the burghers and nobles were still fighting one another, the peasant war in Germany pointed prophetically to future class struggles, not only by bringing on to the stage the peasants in revolt - that was no longer anything new - but behind them the beginnings of the modern proletariat, with the red flag in their hands and the demand for common ownership of goods on their lips. In the manuscripts saved from the fall of Byzantium, in the antique statues dug out of the ruins of Rome, a new world was revealed to the astonished West, that of ancient Greece: the ghosts of the Middle Ages vanished before its shining forms; Italy rose to an undreamt-of flowering of art, which seemed like a reflection of classical antiquity and was never attained again. In Italy, France, and Germany a new literature arose, the first, modern literature; shortly afterwards came the classical epochs of English and Spanish literature. The bounds of the old orbis terrarum were pierced. Only now for the first time was the world really discovered and the basis laid for subsequent world trade and the transition from handicraft to manufacture, which in its turn formed the starting-point for modern large scale industry. The dictatorship of the Church over men's minds was shattered; it was directly cast off by the majority of the Germanic peoples, who adopted Protestantism, while among the Latins a cheerful spirit of free thought, taken over from the Arabs and nourished by the newly-discovered Greek philosophy, took root more and more and prepared the way for the materialism of the eighteenth century.

It was the greatest progressive revolution that mankind has so far experienced, a time which called for giants and produced giants - giants in power of thought, passion, and character, in universality and learning. The men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations. On the contrary, the adventurous character of the time inspired them to a greater or less degree. There was hardly any man of importance then living who had not travelled extensively, who did not command four or five languages, who did not shine in a number of fields. Leonardo da Vinci was not only a great painter but also a great mathematician, mechanician, and engineer, to whom the most diverse branches of physics are indebted for important discoveries. Albrecht Durer was painter, engraver, sculptor, and architect, and in addition invented a system of fortification embodying many of the ideas that much later were again taken up by Montalembert and the modern German science of fortification. Machiavelli was statesman, historian, poet, and at the same time the first notable military author of modern times. Luther not only cleaned the Augean stable of the Church but also that of the German language; he created modern German prose and composed the text and melody of that triumphal hymn which became the Marseillaise of the sixteenth century. The heroes of that time had not yet come under the servitude of the division of labour, the restricting effects of which, with its production of onesidedness, we so often notice in their successors. But what is especially characteristic of them is that they almost all pursue their lives and activities in the midst of the contemporary movements, in the practical struggle; they take sides and join in the fight, one by speaking and writing, another with the sword, many with both. Hence the fullness and force of character that makes them r.omplete men. Men of the study are the exception - either persons of second or third rank or cautious philistines who do not want to burn their fingers.

At that time natural science also developed in the midst of the general revolution and was itself thoroughly revolutionary; it had to win in struggle its right of existence. Side by side with the great Italians from whom modern philosophy dates, it provided its martyrs for the stake and the prisons of the Inquisition. And it is characteristic that Protestants outdid Catholics in persecuting the free investigation of nature. Calvin had Servetus burnt at the stake when the latter was on the point of discovering the circulation of the blood, and indeed he kept him roasting alive during two hours; for the Inquisition at least it sufficed to have Giordano Bruno simply burnt alive.

The revolutionary act by which natural science declared its independence and, as it were, repeated Luther's burning of the Papal Bull was the publication of the immortal work by which Copernicus, though timidly and, so to speak, only from his deathbed, threw down the gauntlet to ecclesiastical authority in the affairs of nature. The emancipation of natural science from theology dates from this act, although the fighting out of the particular antagonistic claims has dragged out up to our day and in many minds is still far from completion. Thenceforward, however, the development of the sciences proceeded with giant strides, and, it might be said, gained in force in proportion to the square of the distance (in time) from its point of departure. It was as if the world were to be shown that henceforth the reciprocal law of motion would be as valid for the highest product of organic matter, the human mind, as for inorganic substance.

The main work in the first period of natural science that now opened lay in mastering the material immediately at hand. In most fields a start had to be made from the very beginning. Antiquity had bequeathed Euclid and the Ptolemaic solar system; the Arabs had left behind the decimal notation, the beginnings of algebra, the modern numerals, and alchemy; the Christian Middle Ages nothing at all. Of necessity, in this situation the most fundamental natural science, the mechanics of terrestrial and heavenly bodies, occupied first place, and alongside of it, as handmaiden to it, the discovery and perfecting of mathematical methods. Great work was achieved here. At the end of the period characterised by Newton and Linnaus we find these branches of science brought to a certain perfection. The basic features of the most essential mathematical methods were established; analytical geometry by Descartes especially, logarithms by Napier, and the differential and integral calculus by Leibniz and perhaps Newton. The same holds good of the mechanics of rigid bodies, the main laws of which were made clear once for all. Finally in the astronomy of the solar system Kepler discovered the laws of planetary movement and Newton formulated them from the point of view of the general laws of motion of matter. The other branches of natural science were far removed even from this preliminary perfection. Only towards the end of the period did the mechanics of fluid and gaseous bodies receive further treatment. Physics proper had still not gone beyond its first beginnings, with the exception of optics, the exceptional progress of which was due to the practical needs of astronomy. By the phlogistic theory, chemistry for the first time emancipated itself from alchemy. Geology had not yet gone beyond the embryonic stage of mineralogy; hence paleontology could not yet exist at all. Finally, in the field of biology the essential preoccupation was still with the collection and first sifting of the immense material, not only botanical and zoological but also anatomical and even physiological. There could as yet be hardly any talk of the comparison of the various forms of life, of the investigation of their geographical distribution and their climatic, etc., living conditions. Here only botany and zoology arrived at an approximate completion owing to Linnæus.

But what especially characterises this period is the elaboration of a peculiar general outlook, in which the central point is the view of the absolute immutability of nature. In whatever way nature itself might have come into being, once present it remained as it was as long as it continued to exist. The planets and their satellites, once set in motion by the mysterious "first impulse", circled on and on in their predestined ellipses for all eternity, or at any rate until the end of all things. The stars remained for ever fixed and immovable in their places, keeping one another therein by "universal gravitation". The earth had persisted without alteration from all eternity, or, alternatively, from the first day of its creation. The "five continents" of the present day had always existed, and they had always had the same mountains, valleys, and rivers, the same climate, and the same flora and fauna, except in so far as change or cultivation had taken place at the hand of man. The species of plants and animals had been established once for all when they came into existence; like continually produced like, and it was already a good deal for Linnaus to have conceded that possibly here and there new species could have arisen by crossing. In contrast to the history of mankind, which develops in time, there was ascribed to the history of nature only an unfolding in space. All change, all development in nature, was denied. Natural science, so revolutionary at the outset, suddenly found itself confronted by an out-and-out conservative nature in which even to-day everything was as it had been at the beginning and in which - to the end of the world or for all eternity - everything would remain as it had been since the beginning.

High as the natural science of the first half of the eighteenth century stood above Greek antiquity in knowledge and even in the sifting of its material, it stood just as deeply below Greek antiquity in the theoretical mastery of this material, in the general outlook on nature. For the Greek philosophers the world was essentially something that had emerged from chaos, something that had developed, that had come into being. For the natural scientists of the period that we are dealing with it was something ossified, something immutable, and for most of them something that had been created at one stroke. Science was still deeply enmeshed in theology. Everywhere it sought and found its ultimate resort in an impulse from outside that was not to be explained from nature itself. Even if attraction, by Newton pompously baptised as "universal gravitation", was conceived as an essential property of matter, whence comes the unexplained tangential force which first gives rise to the orbits of the planets? How did the innumerable varieties of animals and plants arise? And how, above all, did man arise, since after all it was certain that he was not present from all eternity? To such questions natural science only too frequently answered by making the creator of all things responsible. Copernicus, at the beginning of the period, writes a letter renouncing theology; Newton closes the period with the postulate of a divine first impulse. The highest general idea to which this natural science attained was that of the purposiveness of the arrangements of nature, the shallow teleology of Wolff, according to which cats were created to eat mice, mice to he eaten by cats, and the whole of nature to testify to the wisdom of the creator. It is to the highest credit of the philosophy of the time that it did not let itself be led astray by the restricted state of contemporary natural knowledge, and that - from Spinoza right to the great French materialists - it insisted on explaining the world from the world itself and left the justification in detail to the natural science of the future.

I include the materialists of the eighteenth century in this period because no natural scientific material was available to them other than that above described. Kant's epoch- making work remained a secret to them, and Laplace came long after them. We should not forget that this obsolete outlook on nature, although riddled through and through by the progress of science, dominated the entire first half of the nineteenth century, and in substance is even now still taught in all schools. 1

The first breach in this petrified outlook on nature was made not by a natural scientist but by a philosopher. In 1755 appeared Kant's Allgemeine Naturgesehichte und Theorie des Himmels [General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens]. The question of the first impulse was abolished; the earth and the whole solar system appeared as something that had come into being in the course of time. If the great majority of the natural scientists had had a little less of the repugnance to thinking that Newton expressed in the warning: "Physics, beware of metaphysics!", they would have been compelled from this single brilliant discovery of Kant's to draw conclusions that would have spared them endless deviations and immeasurable amounts of time and labour wasted in false directions. For Kant's discovery contained the point of departure for all further progress. If the earth were something that had come into being, then its present geological, geographical, and climatic state, and its plants and animals likewise, must be something that had come into being; it must have had a history not only of co-existence in space but also of succession in time. If st once further investigations had been resolutely pursued in this direction, natural science would now be considerably further advanced than it is. Rut what good could come of philosophy? Kant's work remained without immediate results, until many years later Laplace and Herschel expounded its contents and gave them a deeper foundation, thereby gradually bringing the "nebular hypothesis" into favour. Further discoveries finally brought it victory; the most important of these were: the proper motion of the fixed stars, the demonstration of a resistant medium in universal space, the proof furnished by spectral analysis of the chemical identity of the matter of the universe and the existence of such glowing nebular masses as Kant had postulated.

It is, however, permissible to doubt whether the majority of natural scientists would so soon have become conscious of the contradiction of a changing earth that bore immutable organisms, had not the dawning conception that nature does not just exist, but comes into being and passes away, derived support from another quarter. Geology arose and pointed out, not only the terrestrial strata formed one after another and deposited one upon another, but also the shells and skeletons of extinct animals and the trunks, leaves, and fruits of no longer existing plants contained in these strata. It had finally to be acknowledged that not only the earth as a whole but also its present surface and the plants and animals living on it possessed a history in time. At first the acknowledgement occurred reluctantly enough. Cuvier's theory of the revolutions of the earth was revolutionary in phrase and reactionary in substance. In place of a single divine creation, he put a whole series of repeated acts of creation, making the miracle an essential natural agent. Lyell first brought sense into geology by substituting for the sudden revolutions due to the moods of the creator the gradual effects of a slow transformation of the earth. 2

Lyell's theory was even more incompatible than any of its predecessors with the assumption of constant organic species. Gradual transformation of the earth's surface and of all conditions of life led directly to gradual transformation of the organisms and their adaptation to the changing environment, to the mutability of species. But tradition is a power not only in the Catholic Church but also in natural science. For years, Lyell himself did not see the contradiction, and his pupils still less. This is only to be explained by the division of labour that had meanwhile become dominant in natural science, which more or less restricted each person to his special sphere, there being only a few whom it did not rob of a comprehensive view. Meanwhile physics had made mighty advances, the results of which were summed up almost simultaneously by three different persons in the year 1842, an epoch-making year for this branch of natural investigation. Mayer in Heilbronn and Joule in Manchester demonstrated the transformation of heat into mechanical energy and of mechanical energy into heat. The determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat put this result beyond question. Simultaneously, by simply working up the separate physical results already arrived at, Grove - not a natural scientist by profession, but an English lawyer - proved that all so-called physical energy, mechanical energy, heat, light, electricity magnetism, indeed even so-called chemical energy, become transformed into one another under definite conditions without any loss of energy occurring, and so proved post factum along physical lines Descartes' principle that the quantity of motion present in the world is constant. With that the special physical energies, the as it were immutable "species" of physics, were resolved into variously differentiated forms of the motion of matter, convertible into one another according to definite laws. The fortuitousness of the existence of a number of physical energies was abolished from science by the proof of their interconnections and transitions. Physics, like astronomy before it, had arrived at a result that necessarily pointed to the eternal cycle of matter in motion as the ultimate reality.

The wonderfully rapid development of chemistry, since Lavoisier, and especially since Dalton, attacked the old ideas of nature from another aspect. The preparation by inorganic means of compounds that hitherto had been produced only in the living organism proved that the laws of chemistry have the same validity for organic as for inorganic bodies, and to a large extent bridged the gulf between inorganic and organic nature, a gulf that even Kant regarded as for ever impassable.

Finally, in the sphere of biological research also the scientific journeys and expeditions that had been systematically organised since the middle of the previous century, the more thorough exploration of the European colonies in all parts of the world by specialists living there, and further the progress of paleontology, anatomy, and physiology in general, particularly since the systematic use of the microscope and the discovery of the cell, had ar.cumulated so much material that the application of the comparative method became possible and at the same time indispensable. On the one hand the conditions of life of the various floras and faunas were determined by means of comparative physical geography; on the other hand the various organisms were compared with one another according to their homologous organs, and this not only in the adult condition but at all stages of development. The more deeply and exactly this research was carried on, the more did the rigid system of an immutable, fixed organic nature crumble away at its touch. Not only did the separate species of plants and animals become more and more inextricably intermingled, but animals turned up, such as Amphioxus and Lepidosiren, that made a mockery of all previous classification, and finally organisms were encountered of which it was not possible to say whether they belonged to the plant or animal kingdom. More and more the gaps in the paleontological record were filled up, compelling even the most reluctant to acknowledge the striking parallelism between the evolutionary history of the organic world as a whole and that of the individual organism, the Ariadne's thread that was to lead the way out of the labyrinth in which botany and zoology appeared to have become more and more deeply lost. It was characteristic that, almost simultaneously with Kant's attack on the eternity of the solar system, C. F. Wolff in 1759 launched the first attack on the fixity of species and proclaimed the theory of descent. But what in his case was still only a brilliant anticipation took firm shape in the hands of Oken, Lamarck, Baer, and was victoriously carried through by Darwin in 1859, exactly a hundred years later. Almost simultaneously it was established that protoplasm and the cell, which had already been shown to be the ultimate morphological constituents of all organisms, occurred independently as the lowest forms of organic life. This not only reduced the gulf between inorganic and organic nature to a minimum but removed one of the most essential difficulties that had previously stood in the way of the theory of descent of organisms. The new conception of nature was complete in its main features; all rigidity was dissolved, all fixity dissipated, all particularity that had been regarded as eternal became transient, the whole of nature shown as moving in eternal flux and cyclical course.

Thus we have once again returned to the point of view of the great founders of Greek philosophy, the view that the whole of nature, from the smallest element to the greatest, from grains of sand to suns, from protista to men, has its existence in eternal coming into being and passing away, in ceaseless flux, in un-resting motion and change, only with the essential difference that what for the Greeks was a brilliant intuition, is in our case the result of strictly scientific research in accordance with experience, and hence also it emerges in a much more definite and clear form. It is true that the empirical proof of this motion is not wholly free from gaps, but these are insignificant in comparison with what has already been firmly established, and with each year they become more and more filled up. And how could the proof in detail be otherwise than defective when one bears in mind that the most essential branches of science —trans-planetary astronomy, chemistry, geology— have a scientific existence of barely a hundred years, and the comparative method in physiology one of barely fifty years, and that the basic form of almost all organic development, the cell, is a discovery not yet forty years old?

The innumerable suns and solar systems of our island universe, bounded by the outermost stellar rings of the Milky Way, developed from swirling, glowing masses of vapour, the laws of motion of which will perhaps be disclosed after the observations of some centuries have given us an insight into the proper motion of the stars. Obviously, this development did not proceed everywhere at the same rate. Recognition of. the existence of dark bodies, not merely planetary in nature, hence extinct suns in our stellar system, more and more forces itself on astronomy (Mädler); on the other hand (according to Secchi) a part of the vaporous nebular patches belong to our stellar system as suns not yet fully formed, whereby it is not excluded that other nebulae, as Mädler maintains, are distant independent island universes, the relative stage of development of which must be determined by the spectroscope.

How a solar system develops from an individual nebular mass has been shown in detail by Laplace in a manner still unsurpassed; subsequent science has more and more confirmed him.

On the separate bodies so formed - suns as well as planets and satellites - the form of motion of matter at first prevailing is that which we call heat. There can be no question of chemical compounds of the elements even at a temperature like that still possessed by the sun; the extent to which heat is transformed into electricity or magnetism under such conditions, continued solar observations will show; it is already as good as proved that the mechanical motion taking place in the sun arises solely from the conflict of heat with gravity.

The smaller the individual bodies, the quicker they cool down, the satellites, asteroids, and meteors first of all, just as our moon has long been extinct. The planets cool more slowly, the central body slowest of all.

With progressive cooling the interplay of the physical forms of motion which become transformed into one another comes more and more to the forefront until finally a point is reached from when on chemical affinity begins to make itself felt, the previously chemically indifferent elements become differentiated chemically one after another, obtain chemical properties, and enter into combination with one another. These compounds change continually with the decreasing temperature, which affects differently not only each element but also each separate compound of the elements, changing also with the consequent passage of part of the gaseous matter first to the liquid and then the solid state, and with the new conditions thus created.

The period when the planet has a firm shell and accumulations of water on its surface coincides with that when its intrinsic heat diminishes more and more in comparison to the heat emitted to it from the central body. Its atmosphere becomes the arena of meteorological phenomena in the sense in which we now understand the word; its surface becomes the arena of geological changes in which the deposits resulting from atmospheric precipitation become of ever greater importance in comparison to the slowly decreasing external effects of the hot fluid interior.

If, finally, the temperature becomes so far equalised that over a considerable portion of the surface at least it does not exceed the limits within which protein is capable of life, then, if other chemical conditions are favourable, living protoplasm is formed. What these conditions are, we do not yet know, which is not to be wondered at since so far not even the chemical formula of protein has been established - we do not even know how many chemically different protein bodies there are - and since it is only about ten years ago that the fact became known that completely structureless protein exercises all the essential functions of life, digestion, excretion, movement, contraction, reaction to stimuli, and reproduction.

Thousands of years may have passed before the conditions arose in which the next advance could take place and this formless protein produce the first cell by formation of nucleus and cell membrane. Rut this first cell also provided the foundation for the morphological development of the whole organic world; the first to develop, as it is permissible to assume from the whole analogy of the palæontological record, were innumerable species of non-cellular and cellular protista, of which Eozoon canadense alone has come down to us, and of which some were gradually differentiated into the first plants and others into the first animals. And from the first animals were developed, essentially by further differentiation, the numerous classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals; and finally mammals, the form in which the nervous system attains its fullest development; and among these again finally that mammal in which nature attains consciousness of itself - man.

Man too arises by differentiation. Not only individually, by differentiation from a single egg cell to the most complicated organism that nature produces - no, also historically. When after thousands of years of struggle the differentiation of hand from foot, and erect gait, were finally established, man became distinct from the monkey and the basis was laid for the development of articulate speech and the mighty development of the brain that has since made the gulf between man and monkey an unbridgeable one. The specialisation of the hand - this implies the tool, and the tool implies specific human activity, the transforming reaction of man on nature, production. Animals in the narrower sense also have tools, but only as limbs of their bodies: the ant, the bee, the beaver; animals also produce, but their productive effect on surrounding nature in relation to the latter amounts to nothing at all. Man alone has succeeded in impressing his stamp on nature, not only by shifting the plant and animal world from one place to another, but also by so altering the aspect and climate of his dwelling place, and even the plants and animals themselves, that the consequences of his activity can disappear only with the general extinction of the terrestrial globe. And he has accomplished this primarily and essentially by means of the hand. Even the steam engine, so far his most powerful tool for the transformation of nature, depends, because it is a tool, in the last resort on the hand. But step by step with the development of the hand went that of the brain; first of all consciousness of the conditions for separate practically useful actions, and later, among the more favoured peoples and arising from the preceding, insight into the natural laws governing them. And with the rapidly growing knowledge of the laws of nature the means for reacting on nature also grew; the hand alone would never have achieved the steam engine if the brain of man had not attained a correlative development with it, and parallel to it, and partly owing to it.

With men we enter history. Animals also have a history, that of their derivation and gradual evolution to their present position. This history, however, is made for them, and in so far as they themselves take part in it, this occurs without their knowledge or desire. On the other hand, the more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense of the word, the more they make their own history consciously, the less becomes the influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history, and the more accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid down in advance. If, however, we apply this measure to human history, to that of even the most developed peoples of the present day, we find that there still exists here a colossal disproportion between the proposed aims and the results arrived at, that unforeseen effects predominate, and that the uncontrolled forces are far more powerful than those set into motion according to plan. And this cannot be otherwise as long as the most essential historical activity of men, the one which has raised them from bestiality to humanity and which forms the material foundation of all their other activities, namely the production of their requirements of life, that is to-day social production, is above all subject to the interplay of unintended effects from uncontrolled forces and achieves its desired end only by way of exception and, much more frequently, the exact opposite. In the most advanced industrial countries we have subdued the forces of nature and pressed them into the service of mankind; we have thereby infinitely multiplied production, so that a child now produces more than a hundred adults previously did. And what is the result? Increasing overwork and increasing misery of the masses, and every ten years a great collapse. Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind, and especially on his countrymen, when he showed that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the highest historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal kingdom. Only conscious organisation of social production, in which production and distribution are carried on in a planned way, can lift mankind above the rest of the animal world as regards the social aspect, in the same way that production in general has done this for men in their aspect as species. Historical evolution makes such an organisation daily more indispensable, but also with every day more possible. From it will date a new epoch of history, in which mankind itself, and with mankind all branches of its activity, and especially natural science, will experience an advance that will put everything preceding it in the deepest shade.

Nevertheless, "all that comes into being deserves to perish". Millions of years may elapse, hundreds of thousands of generations be born and die, but inexorably the time will come when the declining warmth of the sun will no longer suffice to melt the ice thrusting itself forward from the poles; when the human race, crowding more and more about the equator, will finally no longer find even there enough heat for life; when gradually even the last trace of organic life will vanish; and the earth, an extinct frozen globe like the moon, will circle in deepest darkness and in an ever narrower orbit about the equally extinct sun, and at last fall into it. Other planets will have preceded it, others will follow it; instead of the bright, warm solar system with its harmonious arrangement of members, only a cold, dead sphere will still pursue its lonely path through universal space. And what will happen to our solar system will happen sooner or later to all the other systems of our island universe; it will happen to all the other innumerable island universes, even to those the light of which will never reach the earth while there is a living human eye to receive it.

And when such a solar system has completed its life history and succumbs to the fate of all that is finite, death, what then? Will the sun's corpse roll on for all eternity through infinite space, and all the once infinitely diverse, differentiated natural forces pass for ever into one single form of motion, attraction ? "Or" - as Secchi asks - "do forces exist in nature which can re-convert the dead system into its original state of an incandescent nebula and re-awake it to new life? We do not know".

At all events we do not know in the sense that we know that 2 × 2 = 4, or that the attraction of matter increases and decreases according to the square of the distance. In theoretical natural science, however, which as far as possible builds up its view of nature into a harmonious whole, and without which nowadays even the most thoughtless empiricist cannot get anywhere, we have very often to reckon with incompletely known magnitudes; and logical consistency of thought must at all times help to get over defective knowledge. Modern natural science has had to take over from philosophy the principle of the indestructibility of motion; it cannot any longer exist without this principle. But the motion of matter is not merely crude mechanical motion, mere change of place, it is heat and light, electric and magnetic stress, chemical combination and dissociation, life and, finally, consciousness. To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and a.fter this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place - this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.

This much is certain: there was a time when the matter of our island universe had transformed a quantity of motion - of what kind we do not yet know - into heat, such that there could be developed from it the solar systems appertaining to (according to Mädler) at least twenty million stars, the gradual extinction of which is likewise certain. How did this transformation take place? We know just as little as Father Secchi knows whether the future caput mortuum of our solar system will once again be converted into the raw material of a new solar system. But here either we must have recourse to a creator, or we are forced to the conclusion that the incandescent raw material for the solar system of our universe was produced in a natural way by transformations of motion which are by nature inherent in moving matter, and the conditions of which therefore also must be reproduced by matter, even if only after millions and millions of years and more or less by chance but with the necessity that is also inherent in chance.

The possibility of such a transformation is more and more being conceded. The view is being arrived at that the heavenly bodies are ultimately destined to fall into one another, and one even calculates the amount of heat which must be developed on such collisions. The sudden flaring up of new stars, and the equally sudden increase in brightness of familiar ones, of which we are informed by astronomy, is most easily explained by such collisions. Not only does our group of planets move about the sun, and our sun within our island universe, but our whole island universe also moves in space in temporary, relative equilibrium with the other island universes, for even the relative equilibrium of freely moving bodies can only exist where the motion is reciprocally determined; and it is assumed by many that the temperature in space is not everywhere the same. Finally, we know that, with the exception of an infinitesimal portion, the heat of the innumerable suns of our island universe vanishes into space and fails to raise the temperature of space even by a millionth of a degree centigrade. What becomes of all this enormous quantity of heat? Is it for ever dissipated in the attempt to heat universal space, has it ceased to exist practically, and does it only continue to exist theoretically, in the fact that universal space has become warmer by a decimal fraction of a degree beginning with ten or more noughts? The indestructibility of motion forbids such an assumption, but it allows the possibility that by the successive falling into one another of the bodies of the universe all existing mechanical motion will be converted into heat and the latter radiated into space, so that in spite of all "indestructibility of force" all motion in general would have ceased. (Incidentally it is seen here how inaccurate is the term "indestructibility of force" instead of "indestructibility of motion".) Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in some way, which it will later be the task of scientific research to demonstrate, the heat radiated into space must be able to become transformed into another form of motion, in which it can once more be stored up and rendered active. Thereby the chief difficulty in the way of the reconversion of extinct suns into incandescent vapour disappears.

For the rest, the eternally repeated succession of worlds in infinite time is only the logical complement to the co-existence of innumerable worlds in infinite space - a principle the necessity of which has forced itself even on the anti-theoretical Yankee brain of Draper. 3

It is an eternal cycle in which matter moves, a cycle that certainly only completes its orbit in periods of time for which our terrestrial year is no adequate measure, a cycle in which the time of highest development, the time of organic life and still more that of the life of beings conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and self-consciousness come into operation; a cycle in which every finite mode of existence of matter, whether it be sun or nebular vapour, single animal or genus of animals, chemical combination or dissociation, is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes. But however often, and however relentlessly, this cycle is completed in time and space, however many millions of suns and earths may arise and pass away, however long it may last before the conditions for organic life develop, however innumerable the organic beings that have to arise and to pass away before animals with a brain capable of thought are developed from their midst, and for a short span of time find conditions suitable for life, only to be exterminated later without mercy, we have the certainty that matter remains eternally the same in all its transformations, that none of its attributes can ever be lost, and therefore, also, that with the same iron necessity that it will exterminate on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it must somewhere else and at another time again produce it."


I've copied and posted it all so you can be able to read it entirely.

redstar2000
12th November 2005, 06:14
Originally posted by red_che+--> (red_che)I've copied and posted it all so you can be able to read it entirely.[/b]

You needn't have bothered.

Neither I nor, in all likelihood, anyone else will plow through Engels' obsolete account of late 19th century science.

In fact, Dialectics of Nature is not really "a book by Engels" at all.

Engels wanted to write such a book but did not complete it in his lifetime. It was "put together" by scholars in the USSR (if I'm not mistaken) from the notes that Engels had written in preparation for such a book.

Of course Engels was -- along with Marx himself -- an enthusiastic defender of "dialectics".

That doesn't mean that "dialectics" is true.

Marx and Engels were just plain wrong about "dialectics". :o

Even "really smart people" who were "right about a whole bunch of things" can still be wrong about some things.


Faceless
In the same way, the fact that I have to know something about the nature of the forces involved in a system's evolution does not make dialectics any less relevant.

Sure it does. If you understand what is really taking place, then you don't need "dialectics" at all.

And if you don't understand what is really taking place, then even an infinite amount of "dialectical" babble will not advance your understanding of what is really taking place a single nanometer.


You have twisted what I said to suit you.

Something of which I have been accused of on many occasions.

But I cannot "twist" what has not already been said.

What you do is exactly what "dialecticians" always do -- attempt to re-phrase ordinary knowledge discovered through perfectly ordinary investigation, logical reasoning, etc., in "dialectical" language...as if that "proves" that reality "is dialectical" or even that "dialectics works".

And as I pointed out, any theologian could and often does exactly the same thing...only they openly use the language of superstition.


OK, I used the logic of dialectics to show how a gas behaves and refuted your argument that complexity in a system rules out the possibility of resolving forces into two contradictory actions.

I have no doubt that you imagine that you've "refuted me"...but it would be more reasonable to leave that judgment to the reader, would it not?

Of course, modesty is not a characteristic of "dialecticians", is it?


There are instances though where departure from dialectics leads to catastrophic mistakes.

:lol:


To observe from the perspective of the individual instead of the totality is the reason bourgeois economics became unstuck; to be unable to see that quantity transforms into quality and to instead to believe its opposite, that quantity can develop at a steady pace without there ever being a qualitative turning point is called "evolutionary socialism" in the field of socialist politics and was the specialty of Bernstein.

Bourgeois economics has not really been a science in a reasonable sense of that word for a very long time.

It borrows some of the mathematical tools of science and sometimes actually researches empirical reality.

But, above all, it has been an ideological tool to "justify" capitalism itself.

"Honest" bourgeois economists frankly admit that what they do has no relationship to the real world.

What makes bourgeois economics so unreliable is not its failure to incorporate "dialectics"...it's the fact that "an accurate understanding of the real world" is not its purpose.

I think this was suspected even during Marx's own lifetime.

Moreover, Bernstein's theory of "evolutionary socialism" did not stem from "a failure to grasp the dialectic".

Bernstein empirically observed as far back as 1900 or so that the general political character of German social democracy was evolutionary in orientation -- inspite of the "official Marxist rhetoric".

He "got in trouble" for the "crime" of suggesting that the rhetoric of German social democracy should be changed to conform to its actual practice.

Bernstein's understanding of Marxist methodology was, in reality, superior to that of his "orthodox" critics.

Of course, Bernstein has been demonstrated to be entirely wrong about the possibilities of capitalism "evolving" into socialism or communism.

But in his own era, Bernstein's theory was not only a plausible hypothesis but one that was widely accepted throughout the 2nd International by the same people who denounced him for saying what nearly everyone was doing!

What was, after all, the 2nd International's infatuation with bourgeois electoral politics if not "evolutionary socialism" in practice?

Bernstein's critics -- including all the famous "masters of the dialectic" -- somehow managed to overlook the real political nature of the 2nd International until after 1914.

Curious, is it not?


I have not denied the value of empirical evidence. But I am stating that empirical evidence is insufficient. Bernstein or Adam Smith had a wealth of empirical evidence at their disposal. Certainly this was not Marx's advantage over them. That they did not understand the world entirely is proof enough that mere observation does not fully explain how things are interconnected.

Understanding the world "entirely" is a metaphysical goal. In fact, it illustrates -- yet again! -- what is wrong with "dialectics".

We understand (or fail to understand) historically specific aspects of the real world.

"Dialectics", like all superstitions, is "a theory of everything".

It may be possible that we are not far from a real "theory of everything"...at least some modern physicists are pursuing that goal.

But if one is discovered and "really works", I'll happily wager the rent money that "dialectics" will have no role in it at all.

In fact, what will happen is that "dialecticians" will try to "summarize" it in "dialectical" words. :lol:

And their efforts will be even less successful than Engels' efforts.

No one cares about 19th century romanticist superstitions any more.

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Faceless
12th November 2005, 14:14
In the same way, the fact that I have to know something about the nature of the forces involved in a system's evolution does not make dialectics any less relevant.

Sure it does. If you understand what is really taking place, then you don't need "dialectics" at all.

I did not say that we need to understand what is taking place to use dialectics, that would be pure nonsense. What I did say, and if you would not put your words in favour of mine, was that we need to know something of observational data.

Let us go back to what I actually said:

Dialectics is not the explanation of everything, from which a complete system of existence can be derived, but is rather a law of development derived in much the same way as newton's laws, from experiencing them in every day life. I can not hope to schematise the entire world from the equation F = ma any more than from dialectics, I would have to really know something about physics and chemistry to describe what really happens. However, this does not detract from them element of truth in Newton's mechanics. In the same way, the fact that I have to know something about the nature of the forces involved in a system's evolution does not make dialectics any less relevant.

Newton had to know something about the manner in which bodies attract eachother and had to have some intuition about inertia. But to simply tabulate the masses and velocities of various interacting bodies would not have been of independent use to anyone.

You take dialectics to be one of two extremes, both of which are contradictory. In the first instance, and this is what I was addressing, you said it was a terminology used to justify anything and to work out the way in which the world worked without reference to the world itself; you accused it of idealism. I then pointed out that any mathematical language, in this example newtonian mechanics, could be considered "idealist" because it seems, when you observe it without taking it seriously and seeing if indeed it does fit in with the world, as if it is attempting to make some pure determination of the manner in which the world works. As if the formula is superior to the external world. This appears to be nonsense, and it is because it is based on a false assumption, that it was derived entirely theoretically.

I then replied that in fact dialectics does use empirical data to draw a conclusion and to perhaps extrapolate events. You said that in fact when we have empirical data we already know something about the world and that there is therefore no use for dialectics. Presumably then to record the velocities and masses of bodies is enough and we dont need to turn it into an abstract formula such as Newton did.

Your analysis of Bernstein on the other hand is truly remarkable and appears to me to be a justification for revisionism, which almost drove Luxemburg to suicide, on the basis that it seemed ok at the time. Don't ask me why im starting to embolden my words, I think im picking up the nack for patronising people.


Bernstein empirically observed as far back as 1900 or so that the general political character of German social democracy was evolutionary in orientation -- inspite of the "official Marxist rhetoric".

He "got in trouble" for the "crime" of suggesting that the rhetoric of German social democracy should be changed to conform to its actual practice.

Bernstein's understanding of Marxist methodology was, in reality, superior to that of his "orthodox" critics.

HAHA! You tell me that empirical observation, of a discrete moment in time, was a methodologically correct thing to do and that he was theoretically above Luxemburg. This then proved disasterously incorrect and Luxemburg was vindicated. Presumably by chance? Obviously it was not dialectics which gave her an edge. That a steady period of evolution, or should we say, bureaucratisation in German social democracy, could never be puncuated by a period of upheaval within global capitalism because of what he empiracally observed to be true at a specific point in time. He proved to be tragically incorrect, and yet you tell me that his was good Marxist practice; better even than Luxemburg's?


Understanding the world "entirely" is a metaphysical goal. In fact, it illustrates -- yet again! -- what is wrong with "dialectics".
Presumably they understood it sufficiently. The regression in socialist ideas egged on by Bernstein was sufficiently good because to seak the entire truth is hopeless. We will never know the "Ding an Sich" will we redstar. In fact what I was referring to I expressed badly although it should have been obvious. All you are good at is playing word games. You have not for one moment even looked at dialectics. You have not referred to a single methodological flaw that could not be applied to the entire world of ideas itself. If we had replaced dialectics for the word "formal logic", you could have still wheeled out the same crap in justification for little more than not analyising dialectics.

redstar2000
13th November 2005, 01:14
Originally posted by Faceless
Your analysis of Bernstein on the other hand is truly remarkable and appears to me to be a justification for revisionism, which almost drove Luxemburg to suicide, on the basis that it seemed ok at the time.

Do you think then that Bernstein's revisionism was "unjustified"? That perhaps it stemmed from Bernstein's "personal villainy" or some such thing?? That Bernstein "wanted Luxemburg dead" and "that's why" he wrote his books???

:lol:

Bernstein said in plain words what everyone else was doing while the leadership of the 2nd International was still using Marxist "revolutionary rhetoric".

Why do you ascribe such "evil motives" to the guy who said it while being so discreetly silent about the common practice of the 2nd International?

Do you imagine that the European proletariat became "social patriots" as a consequence of some "dialectical miracle" of "transfiguration" in August 1914?

Look rather to what the leadership of the 2nd International had been telling the proletariat through its practice from the very beginning.

The social democrats in every European country behaved like revisionists. To the extent that their practice "molded" the consciousness of the European proletariat, social patriotism was the logical and expected consequence.


HAHA! You tell me that empirical observation, of a discrete moment in time, was a methodologically correct thing to do and that he was theoretically above Luxemburg.

Well, who figured out what was really happening first? Who took the trouble to actually look and see what was happening?

Laugh all you wish...that does not change history.


The regression in socialist ideas egged on by Bernstein was sufficiently good because to seek the entire truth is hopeless. We will never know the "Ding an Sich", will we, redstar?

The "thing in itself"? Probably not...at least in any sense that a German philosopher would recognize as "knowing".

What we do seem to able to learn is how a "thing" behaves under specific conditions. No doubt philosophers find such "knowledge" to be "unsatisfying".

But it's fine with me. I'll happily leave to others the search for "Absolute Truth"...especially since those interested in that search seem to be almost always theologians.


All you are good at is playing word games.

I regret that the force of my rational arguments against "dialectics" has proven so inadequate in your eyes.

But I am not "playing games" here...when I assert that "dialectics" is nothing but superstitious crap, I mean it!


You have not referred to a single methodological flaw that could not be applied to the entire world of ideas itself.

The "world of ideas" in isolation from objective reality IS HOPELESSLY "FLAWED".

It is only when ideas are tested against the real world that they may become interesting...and even accurate.

Otherwise, what's the point?

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Faceless
13th November 2005, 22:26
Do you think then that Bernstein's revisionism was "unjustified"? That perhaps it stemmed from Bernstein's "personal villainy" or some such thing?? That Bernstein "wanted Luxemburg dead" and "that's why" he wrote his books???

Did I say that Bernstein wanted Luxemburg dead? NO!
I stated that revisionism sweeping through social democracy drove her to despair.

Did I accuse Bernstein of personal villainy? NO!
His revisionism was scientifically unjustified, after all, it is the method of scientific analysis we are looking at here

Indeed, I would not even accuse Bush or Blair of "personal villany". After all, it was you who reduced my arguement against bourgeois economics to:


But, above all, it has been an ideological tool to "justify" capitalism itself.
Reducing Smith and Ricardo much more swiftly to the position of "personal villainy". Sure enough, their ideas did become such in the hands of their vulgarisers but it was YOU who reduced them so cynically to manufacturers of tools of justification; to avoid facing my dialectical arguement that they did not achieve a position of clarity because they could not view society from the perspective of a totality, which is only fundamentally possible for the proletariat.

Your arguement continues blah blah blah with a final admission that an evolutionary model of socialism may well be false but it was merely the expression of objective factors at the time. Something I wouldnt disagree with.


The social democrats in every European country behaved like revisionists. To the extent that their practice "molded" the consciousness of the European proletariat, social patriotism was the logical and expected consequence.

But this is not the matter in question. Bernstein also systemised his ideas to fit in with this particular situation which had arisen, without any care for the fact that capitalism, and less than that, social democracy itself is in flux. How can you come to this conclusion then? It is the way in which you look at the world. If you see an accumulation of small quantitative reforms, and fail to analyse the world dialectically, then you may well conclude that it will continue on this progress in a steady manner. But when you understand that a numbers of steady quantitative steps transform at some point into a qualitative leap, you will see that Bernstein's assumption is not necessarily true and that, inspite of social democracy and its practice, Luxemburg's analysis was infact the correct one. This is not to deny that the practice of social democracy won't influence people, it can and will do so. But a position which posits its momentary truth as an eternal truth, as Bernstein did with evolutionary socialism, has an element of falseness in it and will come to expire.


Well, who figured out what was really happening first? Who took the trouble to actually look and see what was happening?

Laugh all you wish...that does not change history.
And in the broad view, Luxemburg has been proven correct. Almost a hundred years later and capitalism has not steadily evolved via reforms towards socialism, where it can it rolls back the gains of the working class, and continuoslly the proletariat are forced to put forward a revolutionary programme as the only capable one. Bernstein did not predict the emergence of social democracy, he predicted that it could reform capitalism towards socialism; he was wrong. I don't need to change history to prove that, history is a catalouge dedicated to proving that.


The "world of ideas" in isolation from objective reality IS HOPELESSLY "FLAWED".

It is only when ideas are tested against the real world that they may become interesting...and even accurate.

Otherwise, what's the point?
I couldnt agree more, so why do you insist on telling me NOT to test dialectics on real world situations? It is you who is driving the wedge between them.
Formal logic is useless when detatched from the real world. So are newtons laws. So is dialectics. So what's your point, since I could show you a million examples of dialectical movements in nature, from chaos theory to behaviour of gases, to the theory of evolution?

red_che
14th November 2005, 03:24
You needn't have bothered.

Neither I nor, in all likelihood, anyone else will plow through Engels' obsolete account of late 19th century science.


It's obvious that either you didn't understand Engels or you wouldn't want to accept his thoughts because you are obsessed with your own brand of "materialism" which is entirely mechanical and close to being idealist. You can't simply understand, or refused to understand, the dialectical relations of things (most especially the contradictions that causes the development of matters) as correctly presented by Marx and Engels.

Your ideas were basically immaterial and irrelevant to the current proletarian struggle. You have contributed nothing to advance the world proletarian struggle. In fact, you were obscuring things to divert the mass struggle of the working class into something else other than the victory of socialism. Yours is bourgeois liberalism masquerading as materialism.



Engels wanted to write such a book but did not complete it in his lifetime. It was "put together" by scholars in the USSR (if I'm not mistaken) from the notes that Engels had written in preparation for such a book.

Of course Engels was -- along with Marx himself -- an enthusiastic defender of "dialectics".

That doesn't mean that "dialectics" is true.

Marx and Engels were just plain wrong about "dialectics".


Marx and Engels tried to interpret things in a dialectical materialist way. Not only to interpret but to effect changes. That is dialectics, that is dialectical materialism. To mainly interpret things, that is idealism, that is Hegel's dialectics. But for Marx and Engels, they interpreted things, applied to social conditions and try to effect changes as they are going to be, that is dialectical and historical materialism.

redstar2000
14th November 2005, 14:48
I wrote this...


Originally posted by redstar2000+--> (redstar2000)Bourgeois economics has not really been a science in a reasonable sense of that word for a very long time.[/b]

The "dialectician" transforms my statement into this...


Faceless
Reducing Smith and Ricardo much more swiftly to the position of "personal villainy".

Did I actually suggest that Smith and Ricardo were "not scientists"?

Of course not...but "dialecticians" are never inhibited by so vulgar an obstacle as reality.

It's "not my field", but my impression is that bourgeois economics became an ideological construct and left science behind with the emergence of the "Austrian school".


His revisionism was [b]scientifically unjustified, after all, it is the method of scientific analysis we are looking at here.

Well, that is now known and agreed upon. The point that I was making is that he made a valid empirical observation...something that all of the "masters of the dialectic" of his time somehow "overlooked".

He "saw through" the rhetoric of the 2nd International and correctly perceived its social reality...something that "dialecticians" have a real problem with.

Probably because to them, rhetoric is reality. Indeed, a really literal interpretation of contemporary western Maoism illustrates this: to them, "a correct line at the top" is far more important than any objective material conditions.

Idealists value ideas "above all things".


Bernstein also systemised his ideas to fit in with this particular situation which had arisen, without any care for the fact that capitalism, and less than that, social democracy itself is in flux.

Bernstein spotted the trend and, no doubt, wished to become one of its "leaders".

You or I may deplore such "vulgar careerism"...but "things were different" in those days. It was quite possible to make a pretty decent living in the 2nd International...not "luxury" but reasonably comfortable -- especially if you could get a seat in a bourgeois parliament.

Beyond this, it seems to me that Bernstein took the position that he did because he thought Marx "was wrong" about proletarian revolution...and indeed about the whole way that capitalism would "evolve" and "develop".

You imagine that if Bernstein "had grasped the dialectic" then he wouldn't have "made the mistakes he did".

But how then can you explain all of the gross blunders of those who claimed to be "masters of the dialectic" then and now?

Has no one ever "properly grasped the dialectic"? Is it "beyond human understanding"?

Like the "Mind of God"?

Then why are we bothering to discuss this useless crap?

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