Conghaileach
8th December 2002, 14:45
IN THE UNITED STATES
Otto Reich and the
Cuban-American Conservative Lobby
By Jesús Arboleya
The news of Otto Reich's departure as Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin America came on November 23. If we believe
everything we read and hear, this was a necessary step
mandated by law. His appointment - never ratified by the
Senate - had been maneuvered by President George W. Bush,
who took advantage of executive privilege to make an
emergency, temporary appointment during a Congressional
recess. However, it seems more likely that it was the
perfect moment to elegantly rid the administration of the
troublesome diplomat, thus avoiding as much conflict as
possible with his backers in the far right Cuban-American
community. Although Reich's name could still technically be
submitted to the Senate in January, most specialists find
this improbable, particularly because of the Eugene Scalia
case, who faced a similar situation. The administration's
position then was different: it ratified Scalia temporarily
in his post. Reich's consolation prize is his designation as
roaming ambassador to Latin America, a post whose functions
nobody knows. Otto Reich's nomination for the post had
created strong opposition in Congress and other sectors of
U.S. public opinion. The reason is his alignment with an
extremely intransigent ideological line, as well as
accusations regarding his lack of tact and ethics in the
application of that line. Nevertheless, the administration
insisted in nominating him, so it now becomes evident that
to ratify or substitute him, at this time, is an important
signal of the administration's future policy for the region.
Also noteworthy is the sway the Cuban-American conservative
lobby will have in its implementation.
This strange man, born in Cuba with Germanic name and
appearance, was an unknown when he was appointed by Ronald
Reagan to head the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin
America and the Caribbean, a post that was then also a
mystery. He came from Georgetown University, a gathering
place for some of the most important ideologues in the
Cuban-American far right, who were at the time a small group
without a solid base in the Cuban community, but active in
national politics. The group conveyed to the then 'pioneer'
Miami politicians - still focusing on electing local
politicians - the experience garnered while lobbying in
Washington, and the contacts with the Republican
conservative sector that came to power in 1980.
The group's existence might not have had major repercussions
had it not coincided with a historical moment, ideal to this
collection of individuals. The emergence of this class of
Cuban-American politicos paralleled an offensive by
conservative Republicans attempting to consolidate
nationally by extending their influence on U.S. foreign
policy. The Cuban-American right contributed to the trend by
its initial attempts of controlling the Miami enclave. Add
the group's counter-revolutionary attitude toward Latin
America which was ideal to its ideological origins and
inclinations, resulting in new rewards due in large part to
the unrestricted support it got from the Ronald Reagan
administration.
In this manner, the Cuban right became part of the
conservative ideological crusade, contributing human
resources and apparent legitimacy to the Republican
positions concerning policy toward Cuba and Central America,
and the Hispanic-American movement. In exchange for their
contribution, the Cuban rightists would receive financing,
tax breaks to develop businesses, propaganda space, and a
national and international presence, which in the long run
disproportionately influenced U.S. foreign policy and even
some domestic policy aspects.
Cubans then made their debut in the Reagan operation. The
Cuban-American National Foundation was created to
consolidate control over the Cuban-origin community and win
it for the Republican cause in the state of Florida and the
Hispanic movement in the United States. Another objective
was to make sure that the Cuban-American right would have a
predominant role in the debate over Cuba, as well as
articulate new international campaigns and revitalize the
domestic subversive movement. Men of Cuban origin trained
the Nicaraguan contras, organized the illegal delivery of
weapons to them and participated in the training of
counterinsurgent forces in El Salvador and other places.
Personalities like Otto Reich became well known for
designing and implementing propaganda and disinformation
campaigns whose principal target was U.S. public opinion.
In November 1987, a joint Congressional report on the
Iran-Contra Operation said, when referring to the activities
of the Office for Public Diplomacy: "'Public diplomacy'
turned out to be a combination of public relations and
lobbying, all of it at taxpayers' expense." A few months
later, on Sept. 7, 1988, a report of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs amplified details when it indicated that
"high-ranking functionaries in the CIA, with background in
covert operations, as well as specialists in military
intelligence and psychological operations of the Department
of Defense, were closely involved in the creation of, and
participation in a political and propaganda operation on
national soil and carried out by an obscure bureau of the
Department of State that reported directly to the National
Security Council, instead of reporting through normal
channels of the State Department.
"By means of contracts without bids and using a single,
irregular supplier, S/LPD, established and maintained a
private network of individuals and organizations whose
activities were coordinated by Col. Oliver North -- and
sometimes directed by him -- and officials of the NSC and
the S/LPD. These private individuals and organizations
collected and spent funds for the purpose of influencing the
votes in Congress and the U.S. news media."
Although Otto Reich was called to testify before Congress,
and his name was amply linked to the Iran-Contra Operation,
Republican pressures kept the operations of Reich's office
from being included in detail in the Congressional report,
and kept Reich from being taken to court for his actions. On
the contrary, he was named U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela,
where he remained until 1989. While there, a rumor
circulated that Reich played an important role in the
reopening of the case of Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch and
his eventual release from prison. Bosch had been tried for
blowing up a Cubana de Aviación airliner in flight, killing
73 civilians.
Bosch returned illegally to the United States, where he was
sought for violating his parole - he had been convicted of
terrorism on U.S. territory - but the Cuban-American
conservative lobby managed to have then-President George H.
Bush grant Bosch a presidential pardon against the advice of
the Immigration Service. Two years later, Bosch obtained
permanent residence in the U.S.
Returning from Venezuela, Reich devoted himself to lobbying
in Washington. Among his clients was the Bacardí Company,
involved in financing counter-revolutionary activities
against Cuba since the 1960s. It is believed that while
serving those interests, Reich participated in the drafting
and promotion of the Helms-Burton Act. This measure
converted into law all previous administrative measures
taken in connection with the embargo against Cuba. It also
established extraterritorial prohibitions on trade and
investment - actions repudiated by the whole world -
particularly by many European nations.
Reich also helped Bacardí - which is not an American
company - to promote an amendment allowing it to win a
lawsuit over the use of the Havana Club trademark (property
of the Cuban state) in association with the French firm
Pernod-Ricard. This provoked a lawsuit filed by the European
Union with the World Trade Organization.
Reich's work as Assistant to the Secretary of State has been
much criticized. It is evident that he rushed to publicly
approve the attempted coup d'état in Venezuela, and although
there's no proof of his participation in the conspiracy,
he's reported to have met with some the people involved. His
pronouncement that Gov. Jesse Ventura should abstain from
engaging in sexual tourism while in Cuba was so tasteless,
that it reportedly shocked Colin Powell. And his charges
that Cuban biotechnology companies produce, or are planning
to produce, weapons of mass destruction were reminiscent of
his worst campaigns at the head of the Office for Public
Diplomacy. In numerous ways, Otto Reich became a problem
for the administration. It is evident that he was thrust
upon Colin Powell by the conservative right wing sector, and
that the relationship was neither smooth nor pleasant. As to
resubmitting his nomination to Congress, his appointment
would continue to be strongly rejected by Democrats, and
opposed by the Republican Congressmen who advocate
establishing trade with Cuba. Finally, he would not be the
right person to deal with Latin America at a time of
tremendous changes and pressures, especially from the left
and progressive sectors. Otto Reich's replacement does not
necessarily imply a change of policy toward Cuba, but any
initiative that tends to relax the existing policy would be
impossible, with him in charge of its implementation. Otto
Reich is not just a politician who is more or less erratic
and intransigent. He represents a philosophy, and economic
and political interests, that oblige him to act in a
predetermined manner. Therein lies the importance of his
replacement, more than in his personal characteristics.
Historically, the Cuban right has relied on U.S.
intervention for their re-installment in power in Cuba: a
recurring theme in counter-revolutionary plans, from the Bay
of Pigs to the Helms-Burton Act. One must remember that it
was Kennedy's refusal to intervene directly that attracted
the hatred of Cuban counter-revolutionaries despite the fact
that no other American president has supported them in more
concrete, and broader, terms. At present - facing a growing
and all-encompassing call for a policy change that would
favor trade and travel to Cuba - the option of the
Cuban-American far right is to create conflict between the
two countries, inducing a hardening of public opinion,
thereby pressuring punitive actions by the U.S. government.
For this strategy's execution, Otto Reich's State Department
position was extremely convenient.
The consolidation of the Cuban-American lobby has
materialized to the point that its influence has reached
executive positions in various administrations. First we had
OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), a Treasury
Department agency that controls the legal application of the
embargo. That was followed by the Cuba Office of the State
Department (COSD). In the first example, the tenure of its
main officials has lasted dozens of years, and its
relationship with the Cuban-origin right-wing reached such
proportions that it opened an office in Miami. In the second
instance, the link is so obvious that on two occasions the
Cuban American National Foundation leader in Washington had
previously worked for the COSD.
Later on, in these ongoing relationships, we've had
conservative Cubans in the National Security Council - at
present, Col. Emilio González - and particularly in key
posts for application of policy toward Cuba such as AID
(Agency for International Development), which provides funds
for the counter-revolutionary groups inside and outside
Cuba. It is currently directed by Adolfo Franco, former
personnel chief for Congresswoman Ileana Ros. There's also
the Federal Claims Commission, which would approve the
claims of Cuban-Americans who would benefit from a chapter
of the Helms-Burton Act (if it's ever enforced), and headed
by another former Ileana Ros aide, Mauricio Tamargo.
The appointment of Otto Reich was a relevant step in this
process. For all practical purposes, he placed himself in
the center of policy implementation toward Cuba, and had
considerable capacity for pressuring Latin American
governments to act in accordance with the policy's interest.
His demotion therefore implies an inevitable step backward
for the conservative Cuban-American lobby, no matter how
much influence they exercise over other government
functionaries. And despite the Germanic name and face, Reich
is one of theirs.
Jesús Arboleya has a doctorate in Historical Sciences and
is an assistant professor at the University of Havana. He
has written several books on Cuban emigration and the
counter-revolution.
Otto Reich and the
Cuban-American Conservative Lobby
By Jesús Arboleya
The news of Otto Reich's departure as Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin America came on November 23. If we believe
everything we read and hear, this was a necessary step
mandated by law. His appointment - never ratified by the
Senate - had been maneuvered by President George W. Bush,
who took advantage of executive privilege to make an
emergency, temporary appointment during a Congressional
recess. However, it seems more likely that it was the
perfect moment to elegantly rid the administration of the
troublesome diplomat, thus avoiding as much conflict as
possible with his backers in the far right Cuban-American
community. Although Reich's name could still technically be
submitted to the Senate in January, most specialists find
this improbable, particularly because of the Eugene Scalia
case, who faced a similar situation. The administration's
position then was different: it ratified Scalia temporarily
in his post. Reich's consolation prize is his designation as
roaming ambassador to Latin America, a post whose functions
nobody knows. Otto Reich's nomination for the post had
created strong opposition in Congress and other sectors of
U.S. public opinion. The reason is his alignment with an
extremely intransigent ideological line, as well as
accusations regarding his lack of tact and ethics in the
application of that line. Nevertheless, the administration
insisted in nominating him, so it now becomes evident that
to ratify or substitute him, at this time, is an important
signal of the administration's future policy for the region.
Also noteworthy is the sway the Cuban-American conservative
lobby will have in its implementation.
This strange man, born in Cuba with Germanic name and
appearance, was an unknown when he was appointed by Ronald
Reagan to head the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin
America and the Caribbean, a post that was then also a
mystery. He came from Georgetown University, a gathering
place for some of the most important ideologues in the
Cuban-American far right, who were at the time a small group
without a solid base in the Cuban community, but active in
national politics. The group conveyed to the then 'pioneer'
Miami politicians - still focusing on electing local
politicians - the experience garnered while lobbying in
Washington, and the contacts with the Republican
conservative sector that came to power in 1980.
The group's existence might not have had major repercussions
had it not coincided with a historical moment, ideal to this
collection of individuals. The emergence of this class of
Cuban-American politicos paralleled an offensive by
conservative Republicans attempting to consolidate
nationally by extending their influence on U.S. foreign
policy. The Cuban-American right contributed to the trend by
its initial attempts of controlling the Miami enclave. Add
the group's counter-revolutionary attitude toward Latin
America which was ideal to its ideological origins and
inclinations, resulting in new rewards due in large part to
the unrestricted support it got from the Ronald Reagan
administration.
In this manner, the Cuban right became part of the
conservative ideological crusade, contributing human
resources and apparent legitimacy to the Republican
positions concerning policy toward Cuba and Central America,
and the Hispanic-American movement. In exchange for their
contribution, the Cuban rightists would receive financing,
tax breaks to develop businesses, propaganda space, and a
national and international presence, which in the long run
disproportionately influenced U.S. foreign policy and even
some domestic policy aspects.
Cubans then made their debut in the Reagan operation. The
Cuban-American National Foundation was created to
consolidate control over the Cuban-origin community and win
it for the Republican cause in the state of Florida and the
Hispanic movement in the United States. Another objective
was to make sure that the Cuban-American right would have a
predominant role in the debate over Cuba, as well as
articulate new international campaigns and revitalize the
domestic subversive movement. Men of Cuban origin trained
the Nicaraguan contras, organized the illegal delivery of
weapons to them and participated in the training of
counterinsurgent forces in El Salvador and other places.
Personalities like Otto Reich became well known for
designing and implementing propaganda and disinformation
campaigns whose principal target was U.S. public opinion.
In November 1987, a joint Congressional report on the
Iran-Contra Operation said, when referring to the activities
of the Office for Public Diplomacy: "'Public diplomacy'
turned out to be a combination of public relations and
lobbying, all of it at taxpayers' expense." A few months
later, on Sept. 7, 1988, a report of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs amplified details when it indicated that
"high-ranking functionaries in the CIA, with background in
covert operations, as well as specialists in military
intelligence and psychological operations of the Department
of Defense, were closely involved in the creation of, and
participation in a political and propaganda operation on
national soil and carried out by an obscure bureau of the
Department of State that reported directly to the National
Security Council, instead of reporting through normal
channels of the State Department.
"By means of contracts without bids and using a single,
irregular supplier, S/LPD, established and maintained a
private network of individuals and organizations whose
activities were coordinated by Col. Oliver North -- and
sometimes directed by him -- and officials of the NSC and
the S/LPD. These private individuals and organizations
collected and spent funds for the purpose of influencing the
votes in Congress and the U.S. news media."
Although Otto Reich was called to testify before Congress,
and his name was amply linked to the Iran-Contra Operation,
Republican pressures kept the operations of Reich's office
from being included in detail in the Congressional report,
and kept Reich from being taken to court for his actions. On
the contrary, he was named U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela,
where he remained until 1989. While there, a rumor
circulated that Reich played an important role in the
reopening of the case of Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch and
his eventual release from prison. Bosch had been tried for
blowing up a Cubana de Aviación airliner in flight, killing
73 civilians.
Bosch returned illegally to the United States, where he was
sought for violating his parole - he had been convicted of
terrorism on U.S. territory - but the Cuban-American
conservative lobby managed to have then-President George H.
Bush grant Bosch a presidential pardon against the advice of
the Immigration Service. Two years later, Bosch obtained
permanent residence in the U.S.
Returning from Venezuela, Reich devoted himself to lobbying
in Washington. Among his clients was the Bacardí Company,
involved in financing counter-revolutionary activities
against Cuba since the 1960s. It is believed that while
serving those interests, Reich participated in the drafting
and promotion of the Helms-Burton Act. This measure
converted into law all previous administrative measures
taken in connection with the embargo against Cuba. It also
established extraterritorial prohibitions on trade and
investment - actions repudiated by the whole world -
particularly by many European nations.
Reich also helped Bacardí - which is not an American
company - to promote an amendment allowing it to win a
lawsuit over the use of the Havana Club trademark (property
of the Cuban state) in association with the French firm
Pernod-Ricard. This provoked a lawsuit filed by the European
Union with the World Trade Organization.
Reich's work as Assistant to the Secretary of State has been
much criticized. It is evident that he rushed to publicly
approve the attempted coup d'état in Venezuela, and although
there's no proof of his participation in the conspiracy,
he's reported to have met with some the people involved. His
pronouncement that Gov. Jesse Ventura should abstain from
engaging in sexual tourism while in Cuba was so tasteless,
that it reportedly shocked Colin Powell. And his charges
that Cuban biotechnology companies produce, or are planning
to produce, weapons of mass destruction were reminiscent of
his worst campaigns at the head of the Office for Public
Diplomacy. In numerous ways, Otto Reich became a problem
for the administration. It is evident that he was thrust
upon Colin Powell by the conservative right wing sector, and
that the relationship was neither smooth nor pleasant. As to
resubmitting his nomination to Congress, his appointment
would continue to be strongly rejected by Democrats, and
opposed by the Republican Congressmen who advocate
establishing trade with Cuba. Finally, he would not be the
right person to deal with Latin America at a time of
tremendous changes and pressures, especially from the left
and progressive sectors. Otto Reich's replacement does not
necessarily imply a change of policy toward Cuba, but any
initiative that tends to relax the existing policy would be
impossible, with him in charge of its implementation. Otto
Reich is not just a politician who is more or less erratic
and intransigent. He represents a philosophy, and economic
and political interests, that oblige him to act in a
predetermined manner. Therein lies the importance of his
replacement, more than in his personal characteristics.
Historically, the Cuban right has relied on U.S.
intervention for their re-installment in power in Cuba: a
recurring theme in counter-revolutionary plans, from the Bay
of Pigs to the Helms-Burton Act. One must remember that it
was Kennedy's refusal to intervene directly that attracted
the hatred of Cuban counter-revolutionaries despite the fact
that no other American president has supported them in more
concrete, and broader, terms. At present - facing a growing
and all-encompassing call for a policy change that would
favor trade and travel to Cuba - the option of the
Cuban-American far right is to create conflict between the
two countries, inducing a hardening of public opinion,
thereby pressuring punitive actions by the U.S. government.
For this strategy's execution, Otto Reich's State Department
position was extremely convenient.
The consolidation of the Cuban-American lobby has
materialized to the point that its influence has reached
executive positions in various administrations. First we had
OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), a Treasury
Department agency that controls the legal application of the
embargo. That was followed by the Cuba Office of the State
Department (COSD). In the first example, the tenure of its
main officials has lasted dozens of years, and its
relationship with the Cuban-origin right-wing reached such
proportions that it opened an office in Miami. In the second
instance, the link is so obvious that on two occasions the
Cuban American National Foundation leader in Washington had
previously worked for the COSD.
Later on, in these ongoing relationships, we've had
conservative Cubans in the National Security Council - at
present, Col. Emilio González - and particularly in key
posts for application of policy toward Cuba such as AID
(Agency for International Development), which provides funds
for the counter-revolutionary groups inside and outside
Cuba. It is currently directed by Adolfo Franco, former
personnel chief for Congresswoman Ileana Ros. There's also
the Federal Claims Commission, which would approve the
claims of Cuban-Americans who would benefit from a chapter
of the Helms-Burton Act (if it's ever enforced), and headed
by another former Ileana Ros aide, Mauricio Tamargo.
The appointment of Otto Reich was a relevant step in this
process. For all practical purposes, he placed himself in
the center of policy implementation toward Cuba, and had
considerable capacity for pressuring Latin American
governments to act in accordance with the policy's interest.
His demotion therefore implies an inevitable step backward
for the conservative Cuban-American lobby, no matter how
much influence they exercise over other government
functionaries. And despite the Germanic name and face, Reich
is one of theirs.
Jesús Arboleya has a doctorate in Historical Sciences and
is an assistant professor at the University of Havana. He
has written several books on Cuban emigration and the
counter-revolution.