Severian
25th June 2005, 08:50
According to a leaked pre-war document, the British government wanted either a "Sunni strongman" or a "Sunni-led" "representative broadly democratic government."
In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* a Sunni military strongman. We would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni dictator emerged who protected Sunni interest. With time he could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but, within a federal structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This would entail a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction.
full text of document (http://memoryhole.freedomunderground.org/downing/ods020308.html)
Newspaper article about document (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002345146_brits23.html)
This is quite traditional; back in the 1920s, the British Empire was the architect of Sunni supremacy in Iraq, partly to punish Shi'a for being the backbone of a pro-independence revolt. And the U.S. as well has usually favored keeping the overdog on top, in the name of "stability". As shown by it's attitude toward the '91 revolt by the Shi'a and Kurdish populations of Iraq.
But this time Washington chose something different. Affecting decisions like de-Baathification, disbanding of the old Iraqi army, and how and when elections were held.
(In Afghanistan as well, after some initial hesitation, Washington backed the Northern Alliance of traditionally disenfranchised nationalities, knowing this would shake traditional Pashtun dominance, and hurt its Pakistani client regime.)
The interesting question is, why?
In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* a Sunni military strongman. We would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni dictator emerged who protected Sunni interest. With time he could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but, within a federal structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This would entail a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction.
full text of document (http://memoryhole.freedomunderground.org/downing/ods020308.html)
Newspaper article about document (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002345146_brits23.html)
This is quite traditional; back in the 1920s, the British Empire was the architect of Sunni supremacy in Iraq, partly to punish Shi'a for being the backbone of a pro-independence revolt. And the U.S. as well has usually favored keeping the overdog on top, in the name of "stability". As shown by it's attitude toward the '91 revolt by the Shi'a and Kurdish populations of Iraq.
But this time Washington chose something different. Affecting decisions like de-Baathification, disbanding of the old Iraqi army, and how and when elections were held.
(In Afghanistan as well, after some initial hesitation, Washington backed the Northern Alliance of traditionally disenfranchised nationalities, knowing this would shake traditional Pashtun dominance, and hurt its Pakistani client regime.)
The interesting question is, why?