Conghaileach
27th August 2002, 18:42
If we fight, it must be in a way to legitimize global U.S. role
Opinion
Zbigniew Brzezinski
There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously,
if it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same
is true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more
complex if a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must
consider carefully the consequences of its actions, for itself as the
world's preeminent power and for the long-term evolution of the
international system as a whole.
The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial
terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction Hussein is said to be
producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a
business and too unpredictable in its results to be undertaken because
of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual
assertions.
If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that
legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to
a more responsible system of international security. Accordingly,
several essential steps should be followed:
(1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to
the nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the
specifics of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that
the threat is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed
as to why one member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing
than others. The president's case should serve as the basis for
serious and searching consultations with Congress and key allies as
well as other interested states.
(2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central
issue that should concern the world. Hence the focus of the U.S.
concern must be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be
surreptitiously seeking to produce in contravention of U.N.
resolutions, and not on Saddam Hussein personally. Insofar as Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive case needs to
be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer suffices.
The often cited formula that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction
(specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact that he did
not use such weapons in 1991 against U.S. troops or Israel, both of
which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter
(3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating
detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection
regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's
compliance with the will of the international community. America's
European allies would find it difficult not to go along with this,
while Iraq's recalcitrance - either by outright refusal or efforts to
sabotage the inspection process - would then provide a highly
legitimate casus belli for military action.
(4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become
more active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by
pressuring both sides. The standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser
Arafat has undone much of the progress achieved after Oslo, while
inflicting massive suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.
In the absence of any serious effort by the Bush administration to
push the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk
that a U.S. assault on Iraq will be perceived as part of an American-
Israeli effort to impose a new order on the Middle East without regard
for either Iraqi or Palestinian civilian casualties.
(5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies
as well as other concerned powers, including Arab friends, regarding
possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged
collective security presence and plans for international financing of
the social rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would reinforce the
credibility of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a
nonviolent resolution of the issue proves to be impossible.
It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America
to initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly:
(1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by
the president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without
regard for either American or global public opinion.
(2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or
demagogy, with some of it encouraged by parties with a strategic
interest in fostering American-Arab hostility. Particularly disturbing
has been the news report that some members of the Pentagon's Defense
Policy Board have been pushing, in addition to war with Iraq, a
confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations.
(3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the
consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept
international rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many to
justify any subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel,
even with a weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous
example of an essentially Darwinian international system characterized
by sudden, preemptive attacks. War should be waged with meticulous
attention to minimizing civilian casualties, given the widespread view
abroad that U.S.-sponsored sanctions have already badly and unfairly
hurt the Iraqi population.
Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is
the character of the international system and the role in it of the
most powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people
should ignore the fact that America's enemies will do everything
possible to present the United States as a global gangster. Yet
without a respected and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could
be in serious jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in
determining when, in what circumstances and how it acts as such in
initiating the use of force. Zbigniew Brzezinski was national
security adviser to President Carter
The Guardian Weekly 22-8-2002, page 26
Opinion
Zbigniew Brzezinski
There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously,
if it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same
is true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more
complex if a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must
consider carefully the consequences of its actions, for itself as the
world's preeminent power and for the long-term evolution of the
international system as a whole.
The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial
terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction Hussein is said to be
producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a
business and too unpredictable in its results to be undertaken because
of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual
assertions.
If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that
legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to
a more responsible system of international security. Accordingly,
several essential steps should be followed:
(1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to
the nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the
specifics of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that
the threat is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed
as to why one member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing
than others. The president's case should serve as the basis for
serious and searching consultations with Congress and key allies as
well as other interested states.
(2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central
issue that should concern the world. Hence the focus of the U.S.
concern must be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be
surreptitiously seeking to produce in contravention of U.N.
resolutions, and not on Saddam Hussein personally. Insofar as Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive case needs to
be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer suffices.
The often cited formula that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction
(specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact that he did
not use such weapons in 1991 against U.S. troops or Israel, both of
which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter
(3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating
detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection
regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's
compliance with the will of the international community. America's
European allies would find it difficult not to go along with this,
while Iraq's recalcitrance - either by outright refusal or efforts to
sabotage the inspection process - would then provide a highly
legitimate casus belli for military action.
(4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become
more active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by
pressuring both sides. The standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser
Arafat has undone much of the progress achieved after Oslo, while
inflicting massive suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.
In the absence of any serious effort by the Bush administration to
push the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk
that a U.S. assault on Iraq will be perceived as part of an American-
Israeli effort to impose a new order on the Middle East without regard
for either Iraqi or Palestinian civilian casualties.
(5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies
as well as other concerned powers, including Arab friends, regarding
possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged
collective security presence and plans for international financing of
the social rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would reinforce the
credibility of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a
nonviolent resolution of the issue proves to be impossible.
It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America
to initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly:
(1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by
the president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without
regard for either American or global public opinion.
(2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or
demagogy, with some of it encouraged by parties with a strategic
interest in fostering American-Arab hostility. Particularly disturbing
has been the news report that some members of the Pentagon's Defense
Policy Board have been pushing, in addition to war with Iraq, a
confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations.
(3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the
consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept
international rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many to
justify any subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel,
even with a weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous
example of an essentially Darwinian international system characterized
by sudden, preemptive attacks. War should be waged with meticulous
attention to minimizing civilian casualties, given the widespread view
abroad that U.S.-sponsored sanctions have already badly and unfairly
hurt the Iraqi population.
Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is
the character of the international system and the role in it of the
most powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people
should ignore the fact that America's enemies will do everything
possible to present the United States as a global gangster. Yet
without a respected and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could
be in serious jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in
determining when, in what circumstances and how it acts as such in
initiating the use of force. Zbigniew Brzezinski was national
security adviser to President Carter
The Guardian Weekly 22-8-2002, page 26