View Full Version : Reasonableness, Authority & Anarchism
CommieBastard
2nd January 2005, 00:55
What is it to act Reasonably?
My current definition of it goes a bit like this.
We act reasonably when we:
1. attempt to give reasons, when asked, for why we are acting in a certain way(Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
2. where we see a conflict between how we wish to act, and how someone else is telling us we should act, we ask that they give reasons (Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
3. resist the attempts of others to make us act without reasons, whether they are using force of physical strength, social position or resources (or any other of the means that they might use)
This is, in effect, a total rejection of the idea of authority.
Authority being where a person can tell us what to do on either the basis of their greater expertise, knowledge or social position.
In the situation of greater expertise, just because someone tells me they know better, does not mean that I know that they know better.
If they truly know better, and I should be acting in a certain way, it will not take them much effort to relate to me the relevant information.
As for social position, i see no reason to believe that just because someone has a certain job or responsibility that this means that they should direct my actions. If they can justify it to me in actual communicated terms, then all well and good, but i am not going to just do it on the assumption that they have a justification.
Now, I do not demand that people be reasonable on these terms.
However, considering that I am acting on these terms, if they truly wish to affect my behaviour or beliefs, then the only way that they can functionally do this is to act themselves on these terms towards me.
Any society which does this, and does not rely on the indoctrination of people into certain beliefs through force, will be a succesfully anarchist one. However, I do not care whether such a society (where this means a large number of people in a geographical area) comes into existence. I can only prove the 'existence' of those people I have come into contact with and during the time i am in contact with them, these are the society i interact with. It is for this reason that i do my best to convey to such people the criteria that they need in order to interact with me. I do not demand they interact with me, but if that is what they desire, then this is what they must do, at least towards me.
I am changing society every day of my life. I am changing that part of it which i come into contact with. If they do not change, then they stop coming into contact with me. Or at least, where they attempt to make contact, i will take their words as being meaningless (as they have been given no justification) and so will not return the favour of contact.
If you, too, wish to live in a society with no authority, then i suggest that you too live by these principles.
On another matter, that I have often heard churned out. The situation of an emergency.
In an emergency situation we have good reasons (and therefore it is reasonable) to take account of the time limit involved. Thus, when we are in a burning building, if a fireperson tells us to take a certain exit route, it is reasonable to accept his 'authority'. We have to, at least temporarily, accept that he cannot give his reasons. If we are ignorant in the relevant matters, then we have to take what information we have.
After the event, we might ask the fireperson why it was that they told us to take that route. They can then tell us the reasons, and we can in future act on them, after all, there might not always be a fireperson there to save us.
It is, however, for our benefit that we should not have to rely on this kind of 'authority', and so where it is possible and does not consume too much time, we should familiarise ourselves with how to deal with emergency situations. The 'authority' on the subjects relevant will not always be there to help, and it should be odious to any free thinking person to have to rely on it in any circumstances.
Another point that was raised is that if everyone did this, then it would slow down society. In my experience, it has not slowed down my actions or interactions. If we do not find proper justifications, then we are likely to end up in a cycle of arguing the same points over and over, never reaching any form of resolution. If, however, we reach a resolution, no matter how temporary, then this means that we will not end up in pointless arguments, and will be able to act on this knowledge quickly in future. Furthermore, if we manage to establish the correct thing to do (on the basis of the current knowledge) then we will have less hesitance, less doubt and less confusion.
Furthermore, another point raised was that people acting in this way are 'Commander Datas'. Slaves to their logic. This i perceive as a misconception. our ability to reason and our feelings are not mutually exclusive, in fact i believe them to be dependant on one another. Our feelings provide our motivation to act, and our reasoning provides a means by which to achieve the feelings we most enjoy and avoid those we dislike. Without feelings, we would have no motivation to act (except for, in the case of commander data, and some people, the programs we have been given). Without reasoning, we will not achieve the fulfilment of our desires, or our achievement of this will be chaotic, and not very succesful at all. We would be lower than animals, as even they have some level of reasoning that they use to achieve their ends.
Ofcourse, I do not mean to suggest that we can ALWAYS act in this manner. Sometimes our passions override our abilities to act reasonably. However, the point is to strive to act reasonably as much as is possible. If people around us are aware of this 'reasonableness', then when we act unreasonably, all they need do is point it out, and we can again take control. It is only ever forgetfullness that leads to me acting unreasonably, and if someone is going to act reasonably towards me, by for example pointing out my unreasonableness, then i am more than willing to begin acting reasonably.
I would love to hear some points raised against this, as it would allow me to come to a better explanation of my position.
redstar2000
2nd January 2005, 14:20
The ability to articulate "reasons" for an opinion or an action is not the same as speaking or acting reasonably.
The "reasons" might be very bad ones...even totally irrational/clinically insane.
"God told me to kill her for her sins."
In such circumstances, it is sometimes (often?) necessary to "by-pass" a reasoned argument and take direct action to stop the prospective opinion/action.
Most people in the world today are not very reasonable about many things...although, reason is "gaining" in influence.
But progress is "slow" and learning to counter and frustrate the unreasonable behavior of others is still necessary.
:redstar2000:
The Redstar2000 Papers (http://www.redstar2000papers.fightcapitalism.net)
A site about communist ideas
Saint-Just
2nd January 2005, 16:46
Authority being where a person can tell us what to do on either the basis of their greater expertise, knowledge or social position.
In the situation of greater expertise, just because someone tells me they know better, does not mean that I know that they know better.
If they truly know better, and I should be acting in a certain way, it will not take them much effort to relate to me the relevant information.
This is not true. You may be thinking 'unreasonably' yourself. And, therefore even though they tell you why they know better you will not necessarily 'listen'.
Even if you are thinking reasonably you may still argue with the authority. The argument may be ideological in certain instances. They can tell you why they know better but until you have experienced what they have experienced first-hand you may well simply not believe them. At times you may be right, that is why it is necessary to question authority in certain instances.
Any society which does this, and does not rely on the indoctrination of people into certain beliefs through force, will be a succesfully anarchist one.
What is your opinion on indoctrination without force? Is that acceptable. Indoctrination can only occur where you teach people things without teaching them to question anything.
If you, too, wish to live in a society with no authority, then i suggest that you too live by these principles.
It takes time for people to come to terms with these principles, especially those used to authority. But trust me, it happens eventually.
I do not wish to live in a society without any authority. Also, I do not trust you to live apart from any authority. I think you may act in moral wrongdoing and therefore I see it necessary that a degree of authority be wielded over you to prevent any wrongdoing by your hand.
I agree with you that people must be taught to act with reason and that people should learn reasons as to why they are told to do certain things.
CommieBastard
6th January 2005, 14:44
The ability to articulate "reasons" for an opinion or an action is not the same as speaking or acting reasonably.
The "reasons" might be very bad ones...even totally irrational/clinically insane.
"God told me to kill her for her sins."
In such circumstances, it is sometimes (often?) necessary to "by-pass" a reasoned argument and take direct action to stop the prospective opinion/action.
Most people in the world today are not very reasonable about many things...although, reason is "gaining" in influence.
But progress is "slow" and learning to counter and frustrate the unreasonable behavior of others is still necessary.
I was using the word reasonably in a special sense that i gave.
The argument is unto the self, as we can only speak in terms (when it comes to minds) of the self.
The reasons we might see might be totally irrational or clinically insane, but we cannot know that if it is a reason that appears to us, without making the assumption that we are totally irrational or clinically insane.
When talking with another person we can usually come up with a reason for why something totally irrational or clinically insane is wrong. if the person putting forward such irrational/insane arguments can tell us why our analysis of what they are saying is itself incorrect then we will have to think more deeply as to whether our stamping of them as being irrational/insane is accurate. If they cannot, and say something completely irrelevant, or reiterate what they originally said with no elaboration or rebuttal, then we can safely ignore them.
They might eventually make recourse to some perceptual object which they observe but we do not. For example, they might see 1+1 making 3, but unless they can actually show us personally a circumstance when that occurs then we have no reason to believe them. The burden of proof is on them.
If a person acts in a directly injurious way towards our welfare then we must, ofcourse, act to prevent that. We have no other recourse. As a society that is composed of individuals, it's greatest concern must be the welfare of each individual. So even if this person acts murderously towards other people, we must deal with them in the best way possible. This means housing them in a comfortable environment, and attempting as best we can to find a 'cure' for their position. Whether it be medical, due to some neurological problem, or whether it be reasoning, because they have some problem of reasoning which has lead them to their incorrect actions.
After all, if they actually have a perception of a God talking to them, then they have good reason to believe in this God and maybe might even think they have good reasons to obey this God. We cannot help that, and have to act accordingly.
If a person professes to believe in a God without any good reason to do so, however, then we have a duty to give them the reasons why believing in this God is incorrect, but not a duty to anything more than this. If we are detaining them and they come to see that they have been believing in things with no justification, then there is no reason to detan them any longer, as they will no longer be a threat to our welfare.
Discarded Wobbly Pop
7th January 2005, 21:32
Originally posted by Chairman
[email protected] 2 2005, 04:46 PM
This is not true. You may be thinking 'unreasonably' yourself. And, therefore even though they tell you why they know better you will not necessarily 'listen'.
Maybe reason in just not the correct wording. How about rationality.
If I wan't to have sex with someone without any emotional attatchment. You may have a "reason" in saying that this is immoral, however it would be irrational for you to act authortatively upon that dissagreement. Agreed?
DEPAVER
9th January 2005, 23:38
What is "reasonable" and what is not "reasonable" are culturally defined and societies and cultures have different ways of dealing with people that act "unreasonably."
Provided all members of a society have an opportunity to provide input as to what is reasonable behavior and what is not, I believe authority is, in that case, legitimate. In a democractic society, authority rests with the people, all of the people, just not a select few.
redstar2000
11th January 2005, 01:31
Originally posted by CommieBastard
When talking with another person we can usually come up with a reason for why something totally irrational or clinically insane is wrong.
Of course we can...but they might stubbornly resist our "appeal to reason" (assuming we have time and opportunity to make one).
God spoke to me, not you!
The burden of proof is on them.
To be sure...if they are trying to convince you to help them in some fashion.
But if they are content to proceed to action by themselves and do not require your assistance, then the "burden of proof" is weightless.
They already "know."
:redstar2000:
The Redstar2000 Papers (http://www.redstar2000papers.fightcapitalism.net)
A site about communist ideas
ComradeRed
11th January 2005, 02:02
I think Occam's razor has a factor which CommieBastard is forgetting ;)
CommieBastard
20th January 2005, 17:22
This is not true. You may be thinking 'unreasonably' yourself. And, therefore even though they tell you why they know better you will not necessarily 'listen'.
In which case I am failing at acting reasonably and it doesn't matter. It would be my loss.
Even if you are thinking reasonably you may still argue with the authority. The argument may be ideological in certain instances. They can tell you why they know better but until you have experienced what they have experienced first-hand you may well simply not believe them. At times you may be right, that is why it is necessary to question authority in certain instances.
I didn't say that thinking reasonably necessitated ignoring people who attempt to act with authority. What i said is that if you are to act reasonably you will not be convinced by the authority until it too is acting reasonably (and therefore not as an authority).
What is your opinion on indoctrination without force? Is that acceptable. Indoctrination can only occur where you teach people things without teaching them to question anything.[QUOTE]
I do not consider indoctrination as practically possible without force of some kind. However, where it to happen, it would be just as distasteful. Indoctrination is the greatest injury that can be done, as it prevents the mind from growing.
[QUOTE]I do not wish to live in a society without any authority. Also, I do not trust you to live apart from any authority. I think you may act in moral wrongdoing and therefore I see it necessary that a degree of authority be wielded over you to prevent any wrongdoing by your hand.
What, exactly, is moral wrongdoing, how do you define it and how do you identify it?
CommieBastard
20th January 2005, 17:23
It cannot rest with all of the people if it rests on the decisions of a majority of the people.
It can only rest with all of the people when it rests with everyone individually.
CommieBastard
20th January 2005, 17:25
Originally posted by CommieBastard
When talking with another person we can usually come up with a reason for why something totally irrational or clinically insane is wrong.
Of course we can...but they might stubbornly resist our "appeal to reason" (assuming we have time and opportunity to make one).
God spoke to me, not you!
The burden of proof is on them.
To be sure...if they are trying to convince you to help them in some fashion.
But if they are content to proceed to action by themselves and do not require your assistance, then the "burden of proof" is weightless.
They already "know."
Good, fine by me. Show me anywhere where i said it required every dolt on this planet to agree with it to make it true.
CommieBastard
20th January 2005, 17:26
I think Occam's razor has a factor which CommieBastard is forgetting ;)
please elaborate
redstar2000
20th January 2005, 23:10
Originally posted by CommieBastard
Show me anywhere where I said it required every dolt on this planet to agree with it to make it true.
I don't think you said that and certainly I didn't.
The problem is when a "dolt" is about to act unreasonably and is, in fact, "immune" to reasonable appeals.
Someone who is convinced that they are "carrying out God's Will" is "unreachable" by reason...no matter how well articulated or constructed and no matter how many people disagree with him.
Can you imagine what it "would be like" to have a "reasonable argument" with a Nazi? Or, just look at what gets posted in the Opposing Ideology forum on this board.
It's not just that our cappies are ignorant (some of them know some things)...it's the apparent inability to develop and present a reasoned argument or comprehend such an argument from anyone who disagrees with them.
This is not a "cappie thing" I hasten to add -- some lefties here suffer a similar disability, sad to say. I could see a "reasonable exchange" with an editor of The Economist, for example.
But when you get down to the level of the "hard-core" reactionaries, I think reason is powerless.
The only form of "reason" that they respect is violence or the threat of violence. They are the "barbarians in our midst"...and if we "appeal to reason", they will simply kill us!
Unless we kill them first.
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ComradeRed
20th January 2005, 23:31
Originally posted by
[email protected] 20 2005, 09:26 AM
I think Occam's razor has a factor which CommieBastard is forgetting ;)
please elaborate
By this I mean that the simplest reasonable answer is best and ussually correct. Take Redstar2000's example: I killed her because of her sins. It is clearly an unreasonable answer which is, however, simple. This, however, contradicts the premises that
We act reasonably when we:
1. attempt to give reasons, when asked, for why we are acting in a certain way(Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
2. where we see a conflict between how we wish to act, and how someone else is telling us we should act, we ask that they give reasons (Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
3. resist the attempts of others to make us act without reasons, whether they are using force of physical strength, social position or resources (or any other of the means that they might use)
We must reject the premises which we began with as incorrect.
CommieBastard
21st January 2005, 01:11
Originally posted by redstar2000+Jan 20 2005, 11:10 PM--> (redstar2000 @ Jan 20 2005, 11:10 PM)
CommieBastard
Show me anywhere where I said it required every dolt on this planet to agree with it to make it true.
I don't think you said that and certainly I didn't.
The problem is when a "dolt" is about to act unreasonably and is, in fact, "immune" to reasonable appeals.
Someone who is convinced that they are "carrying out God's Will" is "unreachable" by reason...no matter how well articulated or constructed and no matter how many people disagree with him.
Can you imagine what it "would be like" to have a "reasonable argument" with a Nazi? Or, just look at what gets posted in the Opposing Ideology forum on this board.
It's not just that our cappies are ignorant (some of them know some things)...it's the apparent inability to develop and present a reasoned argument or comprehend such an argument from anyone who disagrees with them.
This is not a "cappie thing" I hasten to add -- some lefties here suffer a similar disability, sad to say. I could see a "reasonable exchange" with an editor of The Economist, for example.
But when you get down to the level of the "hard-core" reactionaries, I think reason is powerless.
The only form of "reason" that they respect is violence or the threat of violence. They are the "barbarians in our midst"...and if we "appeal to reason", they will simply kill us!
Unless we kill them first.[/b]
None of this contradicts what I'm saying. My argument is that to have valid thoughts you have to do certain things. All you are doing is saying that there are some people who are incapable of doing those certain things. I haven't denied this possibility.
What I am talking about is how to go about forming a world view, based on reasonable grounds. Obviously if the Nazi can't contribute further to the debate than a certain point, then that is the point at which they stop informing reasonable debate, and a reasonable world view.
The only point on which i think we really disagree is that you want to carry out a pre-emptive strike on such people. Whereas I think that it is best to first exhaust all channels through which reasoning might be carried out.
CommieBastard
21st January 2005, 01:12
Originally posted by ComradeRed+Jan 20 2005, 11:31 PM--> (ComradeRed @ Jan 20 2005, 11:31 PM)
[email protected] 20 2005, 09:26 AM
I think Occam's razor has a factor which CommieBastard is forgetting ;)
please elaborate
By this I mean that the simplest reasonable answer is best and ussually correct. Take Redstar2000's example: I killed her because of her sins. It is clearly an unreasonable answer which is, however, simple. This, however, contradicts the premises that
We act reasonably when we:
1. attempt to give reasons, when asked, for why we are acting in a certain way(Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
2. where we see a conflict between how we wish to act, and how someone else is telling us we should act, we ask that they give reasons (Where actions can include voicing opinions or even holding beliefs).
3. resist the attempts of others to make us act without reasons, whether they are using force of physical strength, social position or resources (or any other of the means that they might use)
We must reject the premises which we began with as incorrect. [/b]
That does not imply we have to reject the premises. It just means we have to reject the idea that the person was acting reasonably.
redstar2000
21st January 2005, 03:01
Originally posted by CommieBastard
The only point on which i think we really disagree is that you want to carry out a pre-emptive strike on such people. Whereas I think that it is best to first exhaust all channels through which reasoning might be carried out.
This does seem to be a central "bone of contention".
On what basis do we decide that the "channels of reason" have become "exhausted"?
Must each of us, for example, engage in an exhaustive (and exhausting) discussion with an articulate Nazi (if we can find one that's unarmed) before concluding that reason is useless with such vermin?
Isn't the Nazi experience prima facie evidence that reason is useless in this context?
In other words, there are real world situations where it's entirely reasonable to be "completely unreasonable".
Do you recall the infamous quip from Joseph Goebbels? "When I hear the word culture, I reach for my revolver."
Unless you have reached for your revolver first, guess who's going to "win the argument"?
As civilized humans, we would naturally prefer to arrive at meaningful truths in a reasoned way...that's our "first choice" whenever possible.
On occasion, it's not possible...and we'd better be prepared for that.
After January 30, 1933, it was "too late to reason".
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CommieBastard
21st January 2005, 12:43
i don't think its a central bone of contention for anyone other than you, i frankly don't care about methodology, nor do i particularly care whether many people within this world become reasonable or not.
However, I would say that it is probably impossible to exhaust the channels of reason, as there is always the possibility of a method as yet unrealised.
Either way, I still advocate the defence of one's own welfare in the face of unreasonable people acting violently, and i see nothing wrong with being prepared for this.
The contention I have with your idea that we should strike them first is that: 1. You have not even begun to find out whether they might be reasoned with which leads to 2. You do not even know if they are the ones being more reasonable, since you have not explored their reasons for taking the stance they do 3. There are violent ways by which a person can be made reasonable, and there is no need to extinguish or overtly harm life.
I think though, that you may have succumbed to the paranoid lies of the western media. You seem to think that every street corner you turn you will be faced by hordes of bnp thugs, nazis and jabbering maniacs. Now admittedly there are plenty of the jabbering maniacs, but i havent had a single experience of them being the violent ones.
redstar2000
21st January 2005, 13:40
Originally posted by CommieBastard
I don't think it's a central bone of contention for anyone other than you, I frankly don't care about methodology, nor do I particularly care whether many people within this world become reasonable or not.
Putting aside your first two assertions, the third one sounds completely unreasonable.
You've started a bunch of threads about reason and written a large number of words on the subject...and "you don't care" whether or not reason "wins out" over unreason???
Well, as you wish; I "care" a great deal!
However, I would say that it is probably impossible to exhaust the channels of reason, as there is always the possibility of a method as yet unrealised.
A truism...but too abstract to be very useful. If implemented in a literal sense, debate would be infinite.
The contention I have with your idea that we should strike them first is that: 1. You have not even begun to find out whether they might be reasoned with which leads to 2. You do not even know if they are the ones being more reasonable, since you have not explored their reasons for taking the stance they do 3. There are violent ways by which a person can be made reasonable, and there is no need to extinguish or overtly harm life.
1. As I noted in my last post, historical experience in many cases has demonstrated their lack of reason (and corresponding willingness to settle disagreements by violence).
2. Not so...I'm probably one of the few people alive today who has actually plowed through the 600+ pages of Mein Kampf. True, it was a very long time ago...but it's the sort of book that "stays with you" (like an ideological tapeworm).
3. Yes, there are violent ways that one can force someone to temporarily "see reason" which do no permanent harm...unfortunately, their "conversion to reason" lasts only as long as your methods are employed.
I think though, that you may have succumbed to the paranoid lies of the western media. You seem to think that every street corner you turn, you will be faced by hordes of BNP thugs, Nazis and jabbering maniacs.
The jabbering maniacs are usually harmless...I don't worry about them. The BNP, the Nazis, and their ilk are quite another matter altogether.
I hope you won't have occasion to discover that personally.
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CommieBastard
21st January 2005, 15:29
Putting aside your first two assertions, the third one sounds completely unreasonable.
You've started a bunch of threads about reason and written a large number of words on the subject...and "you don't care" whether or not reason "wins out" over unreason???
Well, as you wish; I "care" a great deal!
Oh I care very much whether reason 'wins out'. But it doesnt win out by being the most popular concept, it wins out by being the most correct.
As I have said, reason has allready won.
However, I would say that it is probably impossible to exhaust the channels of reason, as there is always the possibility of a method as yet unrealised.
A truism...but too abstract to be very useful. If implemented in a literal sense, debate would be infinite.
And what exactly would be wrong with debate being infinite? So long as sentient thinking creatures exist, debate will go on! It is better that this debate churn out information which is functionally useful, rather than a load of drivel, however.
1. As I noted in my last post, historical experience in many cases has demonstrated their lack of reason (and corresponding willingness to settle disagreements by violence).
2. Not so...I'm probably one of the few people alive today who has actually plowed through the 600+ pages of Mein Kampf. True, it was a very long time ago...but it's the sort of book that "stays with you" (like an ideological tapeworm).
3. Yes, there are violent ways that one can force someone to temporarily "see reason" which do no permanent harm...unfortunately, their "conversion to reason" lasts only as long as your methods are employed.
1. Historical experience? Are you here saying that because fascists 60 years ago did x and not y, this implies that fascists now will do x and not y? Or are you referring to the specific individuals? in which case i cant imagine you have historical experience of a lot of them.
2. Plowing through Mein Kampf may give you good reason to believe it's author is incorrect and cannot contribute to the debate, this does not mean that you can rule out all of the people who are pigeon-holed into the same 'ideology'. Every person has their own take on any givem belief they have, you cannot expect all fascists to agree with or even care about Mein Kampf.
3. What are you referring to and what do you mean? Furthermore, do you mean to imply that the temporary nature of such a 'conversion' makes it such that it is functionally worse than exterminating the person in question?
The jabbering maniacs are usually harmless...I don't worry about them. The BNP, the Nazis, and their ilk are quite another matter altogether.
I hope you won't have occasion to discover that personally.
luckily I won't ever have to, the BNP and Nazis are a joke and present no danger to anyone, except maybe those who deliberately throw themselves into danger's path.
redstar2000
22nd January 2005, 00:37
Originally posted by CommieBastard
Oh I care very much whether reason 'wins out'. But it doesn't win out by being the most popular concept, it wins out by being the most correct.
As I have said, reason has already won.
I don't understand the empirical basis for either of these assertions.
And what exactly would be wrong with debate being infinite?
Because if reasonable conclusions are "never reached", then there's no foundation on which to proceed to further and more advanced debate.
Historical experience? Are you here saying that because fascists 60 years ago did x and not y, this implies that fascists now will do x and not y?
Yes...if they think they can get away with it.
Just as I think those "nice, progressive Christians" that people are always bringing up in the Religion subforum would burn a witch if they thought they could get away with it.
An inherently unreasonable "world outlook" will always (sooner or later) generate unreasonable behavior...usually of a rather nasty sort.
Every person has their own take on any given belief they have, you cannot expect all fascists to agree with or even care about Mein Kampf.
True, there are the "hard core" and the "soft periphery". What seems to be the case, however, is that the followers generally do what their hard-core tells them to do.
There are certainly occasional exceptions...but I think they are trivial in number and impact.
Furthermore, do you mean to imply that the temporary nature of such a 'conversion' makes it such that it is functionally worse than exterminating the person in question?
Well, consider that fellow who killed a woman "for her sins".
What we do now is put him someplace where (hopefully) he can't ever do it again. We impose a reasonable behavior on him by depriving him of the opportunity to act unreasonably.
However...this takes resources.
In particular, it takes human resources...people who have to spend an important part of their lives doing nothing more interesting than watching this guy so he doesn't get the opportunity to act unreasonably.
I suggest that requiring some (otherwise reasonable) people to do that is unreasonable...it is, at best, a waste of the watchers' lives and, at worst, can negatively affect the reasonableness of the watchers' behavior...they may, for example, become attracted to the "pleasures" of sadism -- an obviously unreasonable form of human behavior.
Therefore, when one is so unreasonable as to engage in unreasonable violence against another, execution (or exile if that is practical) seems to me to be the reasonable response.
The violently unreasonable must be removed from the community of the reasonable.
Luckily I won't ever have to, the BNP and Nazis are a joke and present no danger to anyone, except maybe those who deliberately throw themselves into danger's path.
You know the one about the fellow who jumped from the top of a very high building, right? Passing the 50th floor, he was heard to yell, "So far, so good." :)
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ComradeRed
22nd January 2005, 00:58
That does not imply we have to reject the premises. It just means we have to reject the idea that the person was acting reasonably. But from the premises, it is excusable for this person to kill "the sinner"; afterall, s/he had a reason. Yet it is unreasonable to kill because your invisible best friend tells you to do so, but s/he "acted reasonably" when s/he "attempts to give reasons, when asked, for why we are acting in a certain way(like killing someone).
Is it the idea that the person was acting reasonable or the premises which suggested s/he did so which is incorrect?
redstar2000
22nd January 2005, 12:45
CORRECTION
I wrote this...
Originally posted by redstar2000
Do you recall the infamous quip from Joseph Goebbels? "When I hear the word culture, I reach for my revolver."
Unfortunately, he never said it...however much it sounds like something he would have said.
The line was actually "When I hear culture, I release the safety catch of my Browning."
It comes from an ultra-nationalist play called Schlageter which premiered in Berlin on April 20, 1933 (Hitler's birthday). Hitler and his inner circle attended the play and it was widely applauded in the Nazi press.
Many people (correctly) took this line for the general attitude of the new Nazi regime towards culture and it was subsequently attributed to a number of leading Nazis and recast in the punchier wording.
See The Coming of the Third Reich by Richard J. Evans, pp. 417-8.
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CommieBastard
23rd January 2005, 13:43
Originally posted by CommieBastard
Oh I care very much whether reason 'wins out'. But it doesn't win out by being the most popular concept, it wins out by being the most correct.
As I have said, reason has already won.
I don't understand the empirical basis for either of these assertions.
I don't understand the basis for an empirical assertion.
But seriously, it is actually very empirical.
Something is empirical when it is an observation that is capable of being verified or disproved. Therefore, there is nothing about the extent to which something is believed that makes something empirically true. It is the amount to which when experiments are done based on it the same data is returned. So, for example, the assertion that something wins out by being correct should be empirically true, insofar as something is considered to be indubitable when it is correct. The fact that a mind which has not considered a concept does not accept that concept does not make it any less empirically valid a concept.
Because if reasonable conclusions are "never reached", then there's no foundation on which to proceed to further and more advanced debate.
i said the debate would be infinite, i didn't say reasonable conclusions couldn't be reached. As i have already said, there are some things which i consider to be indubitable truths, and i think there are more things which can be inferred from them which i havent gone into yet.
But what's more, for those things which require debating by reason to reach a conclusion, whatever is supported by the reasons at any given point is what is the conclusion. There are 6 billion humans on this planet, I think there is the capability to come up with all the relevant factors in any given debate.
Historical experience? Are you here saying that because fascists 60 years ago did x and not y, this implies that fascists now will do x and not y?
Yes...if they think they can get away with it.
Just as I think those "nice, progressive Christians" that people are always bringing up in the Religion subforum would burn a witch if they thought they could get away with it.
An inherently unreasonable "world outlook" will always (sooner or later) generate unreasonable behavior...usually of a rather nasty sort.
I would argue that the vast majority of humankind has an 'unreasonable world outlook', and it does generate a hell of a lot of unreasonable behaviour, some of it simply a hindrance to the unreasonable person, some of it which harms the welfares of others. I don't see why you should single out particular types of unreasonableness
Every person has their own take on any given belief they have, you cannot expect all fascists to agree with or even care about Mein Kampf.
True, there are the "hard core" and the "soft periphery". What seems to be the case, however, is that the followers generally do what their hard-core tells them to do.
There are certainly occasional exceptions...but I think they are trivial in number and impact.
Just because they don't use the same reasoning as Mein Kampf doesn't stop them being a 'hard core' fascist.
Furthermore, do you mean to imply that the temporary nature of such a 'conversion' makes it such that it is functionally worse than exterminating the person in question?
Well, consider that fellow who killed a woman "for her sins".
What we do now is put him someplace where (hopefully) he can't ever do it again. We impose a reasonable behavior on him by depriving him of the opportunity to act unreasonably.
However...this takes resources.
In particular, it takes human resources...people who have to spend an important part of their lives doing nothing more interesting than watching this guy so he doesn't get the opportunity to act unreasonably.
I suggest that requiring some (otherwise reasonable) people to do that is unreasonable...it is, at best, a waste of the watchers' lives and, at worst, can negatively affect the reasonableness of the watchers' behavior...they may, for example, become attracted to the "pleasures" of sadism -- an obviously unreasonable form of human behavior.
Therefore, when one is so unreasonable as to engage in unreasonable violence against another, execution (or exile if that is practical) seems to me to be the reasonable response.
The violently unreasonable must be removed from the community of the reasonable.
I agree with placing a person where they cannot harm others if they act in some particularly injurous manner towards someone, so long as that place has all the comforts that any other person could expect.
It takes resources to provide for such a person, but there is no reason why they cannot provide for the rest of the community in some manner.
As for the guard watching him, there would be many jobs that society requires to be done to keep it running and in order. I would expect that there would be some system for people to do these jobs voluntarily (after all, no one wants the garbage to build up or anything else of that ilk). It would just be another one of those jobs to care for killers.
However, i think that one of the primary aims of such an incarceration should be rehabilitation.
Luckily I won't ever have to, the BNP and Nazis are a joke and present no danger to anyone, except maybe those who deliberately throw themselves into danger's path.
You know the one about the fellow who jumped from the top of a very high building, right? Passing the 50th floor, he was heard to yell, "So far, so good." :)
Well, I'm either that person jumping off the building, or you're wrong and i'm not. Only time will tell.
However, I generally find it more practical to not act on the supposition that paranoid delusions are correct, as it is time consuming to prepare for every eventuality. It is best, I think, to only prepare for those problems which one has reason to expect.
CommieBastard
23rd January 2005, 14:00
Originally posted by
[email protected] 22 2005, 12:58 AM
That does not imply we have to reject the premises. It just means we have to reject the idea that the person was acting reasonably. But from the premises, it is excusable for this person to kill "the sinner"; afterall, s/he had a reason. Yet it is unreasonable to kill because your invisible best friend tells you to do so, but s/he "acted reasonably" when s/he "attempts to give reasons, when asked, for why we are acting in a certain way(like killing someone).
Is it the idea that the person was acting reasonable or the premises which suggested s/he did so which is incorrect?
The premises say nothing about whether a person's actions are excusable. It is my opinion that all actions are ultimately excusable, as we act in the way that causality determines.
As for this person who killed someone becasue God told them to do it for the person's sins, If they actually did perceive an object, God, who communicated to them GOOD REASONS to kill the person, then they might be said to be acting reasonably.
If, however, they killed the person just on the basis of God's authority, then they would not have been acting reasonably.
If when the killer is asked, before the act, why they are about to kill the person, and they express their reasons, and then the other person expresses their reasons why they think what they've said is invalid, then they would be acting unreasonably if they did not first counter with reasons why they think the rebuttal is invalid. That IS, assuming that the entity 'God' did actually express reasons to the person for why they should kill the person.
What is more, the basis for the reasonableness I am expressing here precludes a certain kind of world-belief, which I do not think that anyone who speaks to God is likely to have.
redstar2000
23rd January 2005, 15:25
Originally posted by CommieBastard
But seriously, it is actually very empirical.
Something is empirical when it is an observation that is capable of being verified or disproved.
Indeed...and I don't see any empirical demonstration of your statement that reason "wins out because it is correct".
I will grant a measure of probability in that direction and one which is increasing in magnitude...slowly.
In science, reason does (usually) "win out" over unreason...because it is correct.
But in most (all?) other human spheres, reason "wins out" because it has put a stop to unreason by violence -- an "unreasonable" measure.
Nazi unreason was not overcome by reason...but by soldiers.
Or, as Marx quipped, by "passing from the arms of criticism to the criticism of arms."
Likewise, I see no empirical verification for your contention that "reason has already won"...unless, of course, you're speaking personally.
Indeed, you go on to admit as much...
I would argue that the vast majority of humankind has an 'unreasonable world outlook', and it does generate a hell of a lot of unreasonable behaviour, some of it simply a hindrance to the unreasonable person, some of it which harms the welfare of others. I don't see why you should single out particular types of unreasonableness.
Because they are the most harmful to the welfare of others, of course. Unreasonable behavior that is "trivial" in its effects can safely be ignored. Drinking to excess is unreasonable...but rarely harms others.
The behavior of capitalists, fascists, religious fundamentalists, etc. -- though subjectively "reasonable" in their own eyes -- is directly harmful to most of the world's population.
So, I attack it as best I can.
I agree with placing a person where they cannot harm others if they act in some particularly injurious manner towards someone, so long as that place has all the comforts that any other person could expect...However, I think that one of the primary aims of such an incarceration should be rehabilitation.
But what of the "unreasonable" human desire for justice?
Yes, it would be humane (ethically desirable) to impose no penalty on the violently unreasonable save that of confinement -- to prevent them from acting unreasonably violent again.
But, if you or someone you cared about happened to be the victim of unreasonably violent behavior, would you be "happy" with such an outcome?
Perhaps you would...and that would be a demonstration of your commitment to reason above all other considerations.
I, frankly, would not "be happy". And I think my reaction would be a near-universal one.
There's also an empirical question here: how do we determine when someone has been "rehabilitated"? A mistake here has serious consequences -- it means that we have unknowingly condemned some innocent person to injury or death through the failure of our methodology.
I'm not "comfortable" with that outcome...it seems unreasonable to me.
As for the guard watching him, there would be many jobs that society requires to be done to keep it running and in order. I would expect that there would be some system for people to do these jobs voluntarily (after all, no one wants the garbage to build up or anything else of that ilk). It would just be another one of those jobs to care for killers.
Yes, there are "unpleasant" jobs that must be shared out in some fashion. But this would not be, I don't think, "just another one of those jobs".
Some years ago, a psychology professor tried an experiment with his students. He divided his class into "half prisoners, half guards"...just to see what would happen.
After three days, he had to terminate the experiment, as the threat of violence loomed. The "guards" engaged in verbal sadism and humiliation towards the "prisoners" and the "prisoners" responded with sullen servility and smoldering anger.
Caging people as if they were "wild animals" seems to have the effect of turning the jailers into particularly nasty animals themselves.
That's why I think it's an unreasonable response to the problem.
However, I generally find it more practical to not act on the supposition that paranoid delusions are correct, as it is time consuming to prepare for every eventuality. It is best, I think, to only prepare for those problems which one has reason to expect.
To be sure...but what if the "delusions" are not delusional after all? Were the people who started leaving Germany in 1930-32 "paranoid"...or perceptive?
A draft-age male (18-26) living in the United States, if he's sensible, would permanently depart for some European country now.
That's not "paranoia" in my opinion; it's a reasonable response to an imminent danger.
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CommieBastard
24th January 2005, 16:54
Originally posted by CommieBastard
But seriously, it is actually very empirical.
Something is empirical when it is an observation that is capable of being verified or disproved.
Indeed...and I don't see any empirical demonstration of your statement that reason "wins out because it is correct".
I will grant a measure of probability in that direction and one which is increasing in magnitude...slowly.
In science, reason does (usually) "win out" over unreason...because it is correct.
But in most (all?) other human spheres, reason "wins out" because it has put a stop to unreason by violence -- an "unreasonable" measure.
Nazi unreason was not overcome by reason...but by soldiers.
Or, as Marx quipped, by "passing from the arms of criticism to the criticism of arms."
Likewise, I see no empirical verification for your contention that "reason has already won"...unless, of course, you're speaking personally.
Something is empirical when it is capable of being verified or disproved. Not when it HAS been verified or disproved. Furthermore, whether something has actually been verified or disproved is not dependant on the number of people who consider it to be so, but rather on the basis of certain definable criteria.
What i meant by reason wins out 'by being correct', is that that is the very criteria by which it wins, not the means. Say you have 20 computers, and 19 of them have been programmed badly, so that when they try and do the sum 1+1, they get 3. The 20th computer which gets the correct answer is not wrong, and has not failed, just because it is returning a different or rare answer.
Obviously you haven't bothered to acquiant yourself with my argument for reason, as within it i very specifically say that i am speaking 'personally', for the very reason that this is the only way in which we can validly speak.
I would argue that the vast majority of humankind has an 'unreasonable world outlook', and it does generate a hell of a lot of unreasonable behaviour, some of it simply a hindrance to the unreasonable person, some of it which harms the welfare of others. I don't see why you should single out particular types of unreasonableness.
Because they are the most harmful to the welfare of others, of course. Unreasonable behavior that is "trivial" in its effects can safely be ignored. Drinking to excess is unreasonable...but rarely harms others.
The behavior of capitalists, fascists, religious fundamentalists, etc. -- though subjectively "reasonable" in their own eyes -- is directly harmful to most of the world's population.
So, I attack it as best I can.
It is hard to measure the extent of the effects of someone's behaviour, for a multitude of reasons.
You work from the two suppositions that drinking to 'excess' is unreasonable (a tautology unless what you mean by excess is what society standardly considers excess) and that it rarely harms others.
I doubt you have good reasons for these beliefs.
What is more, you also work on the supposition that a person's professed beliefs represent the actions they are likely to take. While this is true (to the extent that if someone says "i am going to hit you", this makes it likely that they will hit you), it is not true in the case of if someone professes to be in a pigeon-hole of beliefs that you can extrapolate their likely actions.
Within capitalism, fascism and religious fundamentalism there is a whole plethora of beliefs, and a whole plethora of different actions that is derived from these particular beliefs.
If the means by which you are identifying unreason is whether a person advocates one or another of a set of broad philosophies, then you cannot even confirm the belief that they are 'the most harmful to the welfare of others'. Though it might well be the case that they are, it is not valid to believe that they are with no good cause.
It is better to identify unreason as a whole, and to meet it irregardless of what particular pigeon-hole belief the person professing the unreason fits into. If there are particular practices of unreason that you think more damaging than others, then again i think it is best to pay attention to the practices themselves, irregardless of who is carrying them out.
I agree with placing a person where they cannot harm others if they act in some particularly injurious manner towards someone, so long as that place has all the comforts that any other person could expect...However, I think that one of the primary aims of such an incarceration should be rehabilitation.
But what of the "unreasonable" human desire for justice?
Yes, it would be humane (ethically desirable) to impose no penalty on the violently unreasonable save that of confinement -- to prevent them from acting unreasonably violent again.
But, if you or someone you cared about happened to be the victim of unreasonably violent behavior, would you be "happy" with such an outcome?
Perhaps you would...and that would be a demonstration of your commitment to reason above all other considerations.
I, frankly, would not "be happy". And I think my reaction would be a near-universal one.
There's also an empirical question here: how do we determine when someone has been "rehabilitated"? A mistake here has serious consequences -- it means that we have unknowingly condemned some innocent person to injury or death through the failure of our methodology.
I'm not "comfortable" with that outcome...it seems unreasonable to me.
What of the "unreasonable human desire for justice"?
It is an error to call it 'human' here i feel. There is nothing distinctly human about any particular abstract concept.
Of the unreasonable desire for justice, you've summed up my argument against it pretty nicely. It is unreasonable.
It is one of the results of a confusion which society creates within us. The idea that the state of mind of another person can in any way directly impact upon our own state of mind is, i think, quite obviously incoherent. There is no means by which we can feel directly tied to the state's of mind of other people. The only means is indirect. Quite succesfully our society has created a concept within our mind by which we can indirectly feel tied to the welfare of other's. The concept of justice. It is smoke and mirrors, any examination of the concept shows it to have little behind it.
I suppose I could conceed that it can be called human, as the tendency to get drawn into confused and nonsensical conceptual thinking does seem to be very human...
As for the guard watching him, there would be many jobs that society requires to be done to keep it running and in order. I would expect that there would be some system for people to do these jobs voluntarily (after all, no one wants the garbage to build up or anything else of that ilk). It would just be another one of those jobs to care for killers.
Yes, there are "unpleasant" jobs that must be shared out in some fashion. But this would not be, I don't think, "just another one of those jobs".
Some years ago, a psychology professor tried an experiment with his students. He divided his class into "half prisoners, half guards"...just to see what would happen.
After three days, he had to terminate the experiment, as the threat of violence loomed. The "guards" engaged in verbal sadism and humiliation towards the "prisoners" and the "prisoners" responded with sullen servility and smoldering anger.
Caging people as if they were "wild animals" seems to have the effect of turning the jailers into particularly nasty animals themselves.
That's why I think it's an unreasonable response to the problem.
Funny, I don't remember advocating caging people like they were wild animals...
However, I generally find it more practical to not act on the supposition that paranoid delusions are correct, as it is time consuming to prepare for every eventuality. It is best, I think, to only prepare for those problems which one has reason to expect.
To be sure...but what if the "delusions" are not delusional after all? Were the people who started leaving Germany in 1930-32 "paranoid"...or perceptive?
A draft-age male (18-26) living in the United States, if he's sensible, would permanently depart for some European country now.
That's not "paranoia" in my opinion; it's a reasonable response to an imminent danger.
two points for this
1. Because something proves, in the end, to have been right, does not mean that it has proven to be right to have held the belief at the time.
Take this story. There is an omnipotent being, the Great Plum Pudding Tree in the Sky. The Tree is bored, so it decides to create something. It makes from one of it's plum puddings a planet, and from some of the plums two people. These people are Fred and George. The Tree decides to make Fred devoutly faithful to it, and to make George an enquirer who at the beggining will hold no beliefs to be true. The Great Plum Pudding Tree does not reveal itself to either Fred and George, and they live out their days arguing over what they should believe about the world.
In the end George comes to a reasoned argument that he thinks proves the Great Plum Pudding Tree in the Sky exists. Despite all the time he has spent telling Fred that he is foolish to believe in the Great Plum Pudding Tree in the Sky.
Was Fred right all along?
No. There is more to being right than happening to draw the correct conlusions. You also have to know WHY you have drawn those conclusions, what makes them valid, and what makes other conclusions invalid. Without knowing these things all you have is conjecture, which at the point of belief (not of confirmation) is as likely to be correct as any other conjecture you could care to name. Whether it be that the world was created by a great plum pudding tree, or that it was created by the Christian God, or that it was created by a computer programmer.
2. You are correct, that is a reasonable response to an imminent danger. It really isn't paranoia. That's how little the scenario you have given has in common with the scenario of me, now, and whether i should be fearing BNP or Nazi reprisals.
redstar2000
25th January 2005, 04:14
Originally posted by CommieBastard
What is more, you also work on the supposition that a person's professed beliefs represent the actions they are likely to take. While this is true (to the extent that if someone says "I am going to hit you", this makes it likely that they will hit you), it is not true in the case of if someone professes to be in a pigeon-hole of beliefs that you can extrapolate their likely actions.
Why is that not true?
1. We've observed in the past that devout Christians have a marked propensity for torturing and murdering heretics, people of non-Christian religions, and unbelievers (atheists).
2. Mr. Jones has revealed himself to be, in his own words, a devout Christian.
3. Why should we not then conclude that Mr. Jones will, if given the opportunity, torture and murder a heretic, a non-Christian believer, or an unbeliever?
Is it reasonable to wait until he actually does it or attempts to do it?
To be sure, a "marked propensity" is not the same as a "lead pipe cinch". Mr. Jones may have a personal distaste for torture and murder -- he doesn't reject the idea in principle, but he does not wish to personally participate or even observe. Or he may wish he could do those things but favorable circumstances never, as it turns out, appear. Finally, he may (falsely) believe that devout Christians "don't do those things"...and therefore refrain from them even if opportunity presents itself.
We can't predict the future in useful detail...we simply don't know what Mr. Jones will do. But we can make a perfectly valid generic prediction -- if some version of Christianity has the opportunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!
One can argue the details, of course...some would say that my estimate of the probability of that outcome is "too high" and others might even say it's "too low".
But given any unreasonable paradigm, I can't see how anyone could argue that the probability of the emergence of unreasonable behavior is zero.
If the means by which you are identifying unreason is whether a person advocates one or another of a set of broad philosophies, then you cannot even confirm the belief that they are 'the most harmful to the welfare of others'. Though it might well be the case that they are, it is not valid to believe that they are with no good cause.
I quite agree that "good cause" is a necessary requirement...that's the role of historical interpretation.
The Greater Brighton Gardening Club may be possessed of the unreasonable conviction that royal palm trees will flourish in that mildest example of British climate -- but there's no historical evidence that gardening clubs do any harm to people in general...in fact, most would probably agree that their efforts have a positive effect on human welfare.
Other kinds of social groupings have a different history.
It is better to identify unreason as a whole, and to meet it irregardless of what particular pigeon-hole belief the person professing the unreason fits into. If there are particular practices of unreason that you think more damaging than others, then again I think it is best to pay attention to the practices themselves, irregardless of who is carrying them out.
But that would be a-historical. The people who are in the BNP and those who support them in Brighton are (potentially) far more dangerous than the misguided folks in the garden club (who will plant palm trees that will die)...even though they are equally unreasonable in their views.
The BNP has a history...as does fascism itself.
The idea that the state of mind of another person can in any way directly impact upon our own state of mind is, I think, quite obviously incoherent. There is no means by which we can feel directly tied to the states of mind of other people. The only means is indirect.
If by "directly impact" you mean a formal mechanism...well, that's obviously true.
But it seems to me that the "indirect impacts" are often strong enough to usefully substitute for "direct impacts" in actual experience.
If we engage in play with a friend's child and note his pleasure while playing, are we not pleased as well? When we see unjustifiable pain and suffering, do we not also suffer even if we can't feel the pain "directly"?
I think there are many such examples of "indirect impacts" that have the force -- or nearly the force -- of hypothetical "direct impacts".
Funny, I don't remember advocating caging people like they were wild animals...
And indeed you did not. I am guilty of badly summarizing both your view and mine.
I should have said this:
The practice of caging people, even in the most humane of circumstances, is unreasonable on its face...because a caged human becomes less than human (more unreasonable) and so do the cage-keepers.
My apologies.
Because something proves, in the end, to have been right, does not mean that it has [been] proven to be right to have held the belief at the time.
If I grasp your point correctly, you are saying that a reasonable conclusion based on the available evidence at that time could later turn out to be unreasonable; while an unreasonable conclusion at the same time could later on turn out to be reasonable.
Well...sure. Such things have happened in science.
Kant had no real evidence on which to base his "nebular hypothesis" (the origin of the solar system in a cloud of cold gas and dust)...it was "a lucky guess" and completely unreasonable in the light of the evidence available at the beginning of the 19th century.
The reasonable position then was "we have no fucking idea of how the earth or the solar system began."
Still, something had to have started the processes that ended up with a solar system -- divine creation was starting to look kind of shaky even then.
And Kant's hypothesis didn't call upon any outright impossibilities...an important consideration.
Perhaps we should allow for people to occasionally make "quasi-reasonable" propositions -- ideas that are not absurd on their face -- and then see how they work out.
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CommieBastard
25th January 2005, 15:59
Originally posted by CommieBastard
What is more, you also work on the supposition that a person's professed beliefs represent the actions they are likely to take. While this is true (to the extent that if someone says "I am going to hit you", this makes it likely that they will hit you), it is not true in the case of if someone professes to be in a pigeon-hole of beliefs that you can extrapolate their likely actions.
Why is that not true?
1. We've observed in the past that devout Christians have a marked propensity for torturing and murdering heretics, people of non-Christian religions, and unbelievers (atheists).
2. Mr. Jones has revealed himself to be, in his own words, a devout Christian.
3. Why should we not then conclude that Mr. Jones will, if given the opportunity, torture and murder a heretic, a non-Christian believer, or an unbeliever?
Is it reasonable to wait until he actually does it or attempts to do it?
To be sure, a "marked propensity" is not the same as a "lead pipe cinch". Mr. Jones may have a personal distaste for torture and murder -- he doesn't reject the idea in principle, but he does not wish to personally participate or even observe. Or he may wish he could do those things but favorable circumstances never, as it turns out, appear. Finally, he may (falsely) believe that devout Christians "don't do those things"...and therefore refrain from them even if opportunity presents itself.
We can't predict the future in useful detail...we simply don't know what Mr. Jones will do. But we can make a perfectly valid generic prediction -- if some version of Christianity has the opportunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!
One can argue the details, of course...some would say that my estimate of the probability of that outcome is "too high" and others might even say it's "too low".
But given any unreasonable paradigm, I can't see how anyone could argue that the probability of the emergence of unreasonable behavior is zero.
For one, the label 'Christian' has been used to describe such a diverse number of different sets of beliefs that it is impossible to use 'Christian' to identify any specific beliefs. There are a couple that might identify all Christians, belief in a God etc.
If Mr.Jones says he is a Christian without any further elaboration it says very little about his belief system. Yes, it establishes that he has unreasonable beliefs, and yes it establishes that he will therefore have unreasonable actions. The nature of these unreasonable actions are, however, indeterminate. Mr.Jones is more likely to want to be a member of the Greater Brighton Gardening Club so he can grow his dahlias, than he is to want to go around burning heretics.
Yes, you can say that "if some version of Christianity has the opportunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!"
but thats akin to saying that we should get rid of all humans because "Some version of humanity has the oppurtunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!"
The emergence of unreasonable behaviour is not zero, my point is that it is simply inconsequential in a world of almost infinite unreasonable behaviour. What is much more consequential is the amount of reasonableness.
If the means by which you are identifying unreason is whether a person advocates one or another of a set of broad philosophies, then you cannot even confirm the belief that they are 'the most harmful to the welfare of others'. Though it might well be the case that they are, it is not valid to believe that they are with no good cause.
I quite agree that "good cause" is a necessary requirement...that's the role of historical interpretation.
The Greater Brighton Gardening Club may be possessed of the unreasonable conviction that royal palm trees will flourish in that mildest example of British climate -- but there's no historical evidence that gardening clubs do any harm to people in general...in fact, most would probably agree that their efforts have a positive effect on human welfare.
Other kinds of social groupings have a different history.
Where their history is as large and diverse as that of Christianity, there is nothing you can say about the behaviour of individuals.
Even with small organisations like the GBGC, all you can say of the unreasonable behaviour likely is that which is directly linked to that which unifies all of it's members.
For all you know the members of the GBGC, though they are unreasonable because they try and grow palm trees, also happens to be a group of fundamentalist horticulturists who want to wipe out all but a small selection of flora and fauna, and therefore directly harm the environs within which other people live.
Hell, thats what 'gardening' (in Britain at least) is, and has probably done a lot more to damage the world I live in than any crowbar-wielding BNP thug.
In fact, much more dangerous than any fundamentalist is the mainstream administrator. How much better could this World be were it not for the fools who came up with the current system. What makes them especially dangerous is how little attention they receive.
It is better to identify unreason as a whole, and to meet it irregardless of what particular pigeon-hole belief the person professing the unreason fits into. If there are particular practices of unreason that you think more damaging than others, then again I think it is best to pay attention to the practices themselves, irregardless of who is carrying them out.
But that would be a-historical. The people who are in the BNP and those who support them in Brighton are (potentially) far more dangerous than the misguided folks in the garden club (who will plant palm trees that will die)...even though they are equally unreasonable in their views.
The BNP has a history...as does fascism itself.
If someone is a member of the BNP then they are a member of an organisation. Organisations generally have clear goals which they usually have written somewhere. If someone reads these goals, and then joins the organisation, they are as good as professing those goals as their own.
To predict what a member of the BNP is going to do is much easier than predicting what a fascist is going to do, as fascist is a catch-all term for a lot of different views and types of view.
In fact, when i say much easier, its infinitely more easy. As without knowing more about the person's particular beliefs than that they fit into the 'fascist' pigeon-hole you cannot even know what their beliefs are, whether they are reasonable or not, or what actions are likely to come from them.
The idea that the state of mind of another person can in any way directly impact upon our own state of mind is, I think, quite obviously incoherent. There is no means by which we can feel directly tied to the states of mind of other people. The only means is indirect.
If by "directly impact" you mean a formal mechanism...well, that's obviously true.
But it seems to me that the "indirect impacts" are often strong enough to usefully substitute for "direct impacts" in actual experience.
If we engage in play with a friend's child and note his pleasure while playing, are we not pleased as well? When we see unjustifiable pain and suffering, do we not also suffer even if we can't feel the pain "directly"?
I think there are many such examples of "indirect impacts" that have the force -- or nearly the force -- of hypothetical "direct impacts".
Such 'indirect impacts' are in fact the direct impacts of another thing. When we look at a person suffering, we might suffer ourselves. Not because of THEIR suffering, however. We have no way of even knowing if they are suffering, and it is perfectly possible for us to suffer in 'empathy' with a person who is in no pain at all.
It is, in fact, the direct impact of a particular imperative within our own mind. One of the states which people often find unpleasant is the observance of another person being in an unpleasant state. It has nothing to do with that person being in the state, we simply find the image unpleasant (possibly for evolutionary reasons). We want to avoid other people being in suffering for the selfish reason that we do not find viewing other people suffering pleasant.
However, it is also possible that such 'empathy' is just an error brought about by confusion with the concepts (and parts thereof) of 'self', 'body' and 'reality'.
Funny, I don't remember advocating caging people like they were wild animals...
And indeed you did not. I am guilty of badly summarizing both your view and mine.
I should have said this:
The practice of caging people, even in the most humane of circumstances, is unreasonable on its face...because a caged human becomes less than human (more unreasonable) and so do the cage-keepers.
My apologies.
We are all caged.
Do you claim to be able to travel limitlessly?
Do you claim that for the limits of your travel you are less human?
As for the cage-keepers, thats a pretty brave hypothesis considering the lack of evidence. Has there yet been a penal system that employed people who began as reasonable? Has there been a penal system based on reasonable beliefs? Has there yet been a penal system that provides sufficiently for all of it's prisoners needs? has there yet been a penal system?
Because something proves, in the end, to have been right, does not mean that it has [been] proven to be right to have held the belief at the time.
If I grasp your point correctly, you are saying that a reasonable conclusion based on the available evidence at that time could later turn out to be unreasonable; while an unreasonable conclusion at the same time could later on turn out to be reasonable.
Not exactly.
It is not that it 'turns out to be unreasonable'
It was always reasonable, and later on it was still (in the past) reasonable to hold the belief. It does not 'turn out' to be unreasonable. A new reason is presented, and so it is no longer reasonable to hold the belief. It was still reasonable at the time.
The unreasonable conclusion does NOT by ANY means 'turn out to be reasonable'.
The conclusion had no basis in the first place, and even if evidence later appears to show that the conclusion was correct, it was NOT correct to hold the conclusion before that evidence appeared. It does not turn out to be reasonable later, by virtue of a reasonable person coming to that conclusion. If the unreasonable person still holds their beliefs for unreasonable reasons, then no matter how correct the conclusion turns out to be, that particular person has no reasonable or rational basis for their belief.
Well...sure. Such things have happened in science.
Kant had no real evidence on which to base his "nebular hypothesis" (the origin of the solar system in a cloud of cold gas and dust)...it was "a lucky guess" and completely unreasonable in the light of the evidence available at the beginning of the 19th century.
The reasonable position then was "we have no fucking idea of how the earth or the solar system began."
Still, something had to have started the processes that ended up with a solar system -- divine creation was starting to look kind of shaky even then.
And Kant's hypothesis didn't call upon any outright impossibilities...an important consideration.
Perhaps we should allow for people to occasionally make "quasi-reasonable" propositions -- ideas that are not absurd on their face -- and then see how they work out.
There is another thread I'm going to start soon called 'From Conjecture to Truth', about whether we can talk in truthful terms about our conjectures, in sufficient of a way to act upon them.
For some, there is. Take causality. It is the only conceivable explanation for the continuing series of events. Failing to even have one other conjecture means that we simply have to act on the basis of causality, irregardless of whether it is actually true.
You are right to say that the reasonable position at the time would have been "we have no fucking idea of how the earth or the solar system began." However, this can be expanded upon. We can say of some things that they are the only conceivable conjecture, and therefore the only one which can be acted on. For other things, such as the start of the earth or solar system we can truthfully speak of those conjectures which there have been. We might have said truthfully "That it is a possibility that Kant's model is the case". Given only a limited number of models, this would allow us to select out a limited number of reactions to these different hypotheses.
Though I deny entirely the basis for modern science, I do not deny modern science it's role.
I see in my philosophy a new and better basis for modern science.
Someone once said that scientists need philosophers of science as much as a bird needs an ornithologist. This person was a pompous and ignorant ingrate.
What they failed to recognise is that a belief needs a basis if it so be correct.
The philosophy of science is essential in keeping science headed in the right direction, as it is the thing which defines what that direction is.
It is the reduction in the importance of the various philosophies of science in relatively recent years which has seen the flood-gates thrown even wider open. We have a science which is confused, self-contradictory, and more often than not that supports its benefactors and the profit-motive, not the truth.
CommieBastard
25th January 2005, 17:40
Another point about 'BNP thugs'.
Because a person acts unreasonably towards us in a way that harms our welfare, does not mean to say that we should attack the person (in their entirety).
Like any thing, a person has many features.
If a chair has a wobbly leg, we don't fight with all our might against the chair. We fight against that one feature of it which we dislike, namely the wobbly leg.
Equally, it is perfectly possible that a BNP thug who does something within your perceptual experience that you find unpleasant, has an overall effect on your perceptual experience which is beneficial to you. They might volunteer for a charity that provides for someone you care about. They might have a job as a fireman, and one day save you from a burning building.
A person's ideas are not (provably) inherent, just like the chair is not inherently wobbly, it is just one feature of it that makes it so.
You would do better to fight those particular features of the BNP thug which you find unfavourable, while leaving open the possibility that they can carry on doing those things which you do find favourable.
Kill the BNP thug when he's at a rally, but you might well end up burning to death when he would have been valiantly leaping through a burning building to save you.
I think you have either failed to make an important distinction between an object and it's properties, or have come upon the unfounded belief that people have inherent ideas.
redstar2000
25th January 2005, 18:15
Originally posted by CommieBastard
Yes, you can say that "if some version of Christianity has the opportunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!" but that's akin to saying that we should get rid of all humans because "Some version of humanity has the opportunity to torture and murder heretics, etc., some among them will do it!"
Yes, that's also a perfectly reasonable generic prediction...but too vague to be useful. There's nothing there to act on until one or more of those humans actually does torture and murder.
And that's too late!
By carefully noting what kinds of paradigms generate an unusually high probability of torture and murder and acting to confront and destroy them, we reduce the overall probability of torture and murder.
That seems to be to be the reasonable thing to do...based on our present knowledge of course.
Where their history is as large and diverse as that of Christianity, there is nothing you can say about the behaviour of individuals.
I must disagree...my reading of their history and their present actions in the U.S., Latin America, etc. is much grimmer than yours.
In the U.K. (and western Europe generally), I realize that things are different. Outside of Islam, unreasonable superstitions appear to be "withering away".
You're fortunate.
But beware of complacency!
In fact, much more dangerous than any fundamentalist is the mainstream administrator. How much better could this World be were it not for the fools who came up with the current system. What makes them especially dangerous is how little attention they receive.
I would hardly be likely to challenge your contention that the prevailing social order and those who run it are unreasonable.
And they do get quite a lot of negative attention...though not nearly enough, to be sure.
But capitalism was not the product of "unreasonable fools" -- quite the contrary, it was the reasonable choice over feudalism.
To predict what a member of the BNP is going to do is much easier than predicting what a fascist is going to do, as fascist is a catch-all term for a lot of different views and types of view.
Certainly it has been used irresponsibly as an "all purpose" political term of abuse. That doesn't negate the common characteristics that all fascist states and parties have historically demonstrated.
We are all caged.
Do you claim to be able to travel limitlessly?
Do you claim that for the limits of your travel you are less human?
Yes, we all suffer under the constraints of nature itself in many, many ways. And yes, it does make us "less human" than we might be if some or many of those constraints could be overcome.
Humans have had some limited success in overcoming some of those constraints...and few would wish to return to a time when we were still utterly helpless in the face of nature's unreason.
When we impose "man-made" constraints, however, we enter very dangerous territory...dangerous to ourselves.
Some of those constraints may be reasonable and hence desirable, but our suspicions should be aroused.
For example, it's pretty well-known that prison guards exhibit a fascist mentality in both their words and their behavior.
Is that because "fascist types" are attracted to that line of "work" in the first place...or is it because the experience of being a prison guard generates a fascist-like consciousness?
The same questions might be asked of many of the existing society's institutions -- military schools, law enforcement, military career paths, etc.
As for the cage-keepers, thats a pretty brave hypothesis considering the lack of evidence.
Well, I mentioned the psychology experiment. There is a plethora of anecdotal evidence regarding how prisons actually work...even including accounts by ex-prison guards who couldn't handle the experience.
To be sure, that's very far from conclusive -- the plural of anecdote is not data.
But it strikes me as "quasi-reasonable" and involves no known impossibilities.
We have a science which is confused, self-contradictory, and more often than not that supports its benefactors and the profit-motive, not the truth.
Well, scientists have to eat. Of course that will distort their findings in some situations...particularly with regard to human behavior and medicine.
What I find most encouragingly reasonable in science is that, sooner or later, the truth comes out. No matter how much a given scientific explanation appears to be "set in stone"...there always seems to be a young scientist who starts to wonder if that's really true -- and sets to work with hammer and chisel. Usually, to be sure, without success -- but sometimes...
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