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KrazyRabidSheep
19th December 2004, 04:38
wasn't there a sticky? oh, well, here's some news stories

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4108169.stm

Nepal rebels attack police post

Maoist rebels in Nepal have attacked a police station near the capital for the first time, killing four officers - one of them an inspector.

Several dozen Maoists launched the surprise assault just 15km (10 miles) from the centre of Kathmandu.

In previous attacks in the area, rebels targeted security personnel and government officials individually.

Over 10,000 people have died in the Maoist insurgency which aims to replace the monarchy with a communist republic.

Previous attacks in the Kathmandu area have involved bombs being thrown at buildings.

The BBC's Charles Haviland in Kathmandu says the attack on a police station was far more audacious than previous incidents, and the first of its kind against an office of a security agency inside the Kathmandu valley.

At least 60 Maoists stormed the post in the village of Sankhu, east of the city, and an exchange of fire caused fatalities and several injuries.

Reports quoting police at the scene suggest the rebels arrived in pick-up trucks and that the police were caught off guard during a change of shift.

The attack comes a day after 10 extra police were sent to the post after it had been declared vulnerable.

The attack comes at the end of a week of bloodshed which saw a total of 60 police, soldiers and rebels die in a number of clashes in the west of the country in the space of just two days.
__________________________________________________ ________________

Also see this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3573402.stm

Who are Nepal's Maoist rebels?

Just when it seems that revolutionary communism has all but disappeared in the world, Nepal's Maoist rebels seem to grow stronger and stronger.

It is estimated that they now have between 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, and are active across the country, with many parts completely under their control.

So how did the rebels transform themselves from a small group of shotgun-wielding insurgents in 1996 to the formidable fighting force they are today?

The disillusionment of the Maoists with the Nepalese political system began after democracy was re-introduced in 1990.

Shining Path

Many who are key figures in the rebel movement today played a role alongside mainstream political parties in over-throwing Nepal's absolute monarchy.

Although they participated in the country's first parliamentary elections, their disenchantment with ceaseless political squabbling - and their anger at the plight of the rural poor - prompted them to take up arms.

In doing so, there is little doubt that the two key rebel leaders, Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, derived their inspiration from Peru's Shining Path rebels.

Both men wanted to emulate the Shining Path's stated objective of destroying government institutions and replacing them with a revolutionary peasant regime.

As with the Shining Path, Nepal's Maoists deal with dissent ruthlessly. Human rights groups say that like the security forces, they are guilty of numerous summary executions and cases of torture.

The Nepalese Maoists have also made some "homegrown" modifications to Maoist ideology.

Caste resentment

They argue that what makes them different from other communist parties in the country is that they want a complete revamp of the multiparty democratic system as part of a programme aimed at turning the country into a Marxist republic.

But on this issue there is some ambiguity, because in the past Maoist negotiators have hinted that they will abandon this demand so that the peace process can be kick-started.

In fact the only area where they have stayed consistent is in their demand for an end to Nepal's constitutional monarchy.

Another key grievance of the rebels was the resentment felt by lower caste people against the authority wielded by the higher castes.

The Maoists say that the reason they have so much support is because most of their supporters have traditionally been treated as second-class citizens or worse.

Many analysts that this is the real explanation as to why such a seemingly anachronistic movement has made such dramatic headway.

Unquestionably there is a substantial number of people in Nepal who see the Maoists as the only genuine alternative to the old, repressive social order.

The first Maoist attack is believed to have taken place in 1996, when six government and police outposts were attacked simultaneously in mid-western Nepal. Similar attacks took place on a regular basis in the same area over the next few years.

Initially the rebels were not taken seriously at all by the government, diplomats, journalists or the all-pervasive aid agencies that dominate Nepal's economy. They were lightly armed and not considered a genuine military threat.

Rebel abductions

But since then they have become one of South Asia's most potent rebel groups, rivalling the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.

Today the Maoists are well organised, and the firepower at their disposal greater than ever.

Rifles and explosives have been stolen from captured police outposts and it is believed that the country's open border with India has made it easier to smuggle arms and money.

So powerful have the Maoists become that few dare defy them when they call a general strike in Kathmandu. The rebels' threat to cut off the city from the rest of the country can no longer be considered an idle threat.

Only a few weeks ago, the rebels abducted hundreds of school children for a week long "re-education" course on Maoist ideology right under the noses of the security forces on the outskirts of Kathmandu.

The Maoists may not yet have the strength to win their "People's War" but they are too strong to lose it.

As one analyst put it, the government appears to be caught in a classic catch-22 situation.

Until there is substantial social and economic development in the areas of the countryside where the Maoists hold sway, the insurgency will continue.

But development cannot happen until the government gains even limited access to these areas, and access can only be achieved by using highly unpopular and potentially counterproductive military means against a well-organised guerrilla army.

KrazyRabidSheep
19th December 2004, 04:40
i just saw another one

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4100457.stm

Bloodshed rises in western Nepal

Nepalese security forces have killed 23 Maoist rebels in two clashes in the west of the country, the military says.

Six security personnel were injured in one of the incidents.

On Wednesday, 20 police and soldiers died in a rebel ambush, the biggest loss by the security forces in months. Six rebels also died, the army said.

Extra forces have gone to Arghakhanchi in western Nepal following the ambush. Bloodshed has risen since peace talks collapsed last year.

Wednesday's fighting came as a European Union delegation urged the Maoists to enter peace talks and abandon violence.

Arms seized

In the latest clashes, military authorities say that 17 rebels were killed in Dailekh district in the west of Nepal.

They say a large number of arms and ammunition were also seized. No further details are available.

In a separate incident, the security forces say they killed six rebels while foiling an overnight attack on a telephone exchange in another western district, Lamjung. Six security personnel were injured.

The government says that dozens of rebels may have died in the different outbreaks of fighting, but the rebels deny the claim.

Correspondents say details are difficult to verify since the fighting was in a remote area.

Security officials say ground and aerial support have been sent out to remote Arghakhanchi district to search for any rebels who may have survived Wednesday's clashes.

The army said it recovered the bodies of six rebels.

About 10,000 people have died in the conflict in Nepal since the Maoists began their fight to replace the monarchy with a communist republic in 1995.

dso79
19th December 2004, 13:24
Don't the Maoists have any websites of their own? Most of the news and the casualty figures seem to come from government/military sources, which are often unreliable.

h&s
20th December 2004, 14:12
http://www.cpnm.org/english_index.htm

Saint-Just
20th December 2004, 14:47
http://nepalnews.com/

This is an okay site for the news from Nepal.

The Maoists have been very successful in Nepal. But the government is getting a lot of help from the Indian army, the Americans and others. Even the Chinese I believe. This is why the Maoists are finding it very difficult to take Kathmandu. However, when one refers to the Maoists and the political opposition in the country one refers to many different groups. The opposition needs a strong party to take control so that they may seek more than just a compromise with the government.

dso79
20th December 2004, 16:53
Thanks for the links.

I was surprised to learn that the Maoists have become so strong; most of the news from Nepal that I read in recent months was about large numbers of rebels being killed by the army.

bolshevik butcher
21st December 2004, 10:14
Nice 2 hear some news on our side for a change.

RedAnarchist
21st December 2004, 12:22
do we all suddenly like Maoists now that there is a chance that they could overthrow a corrupt monarchy?

h&s
21st December 2004, 15:09
Hasn't the monarchy been overthrown in all but name? I thought the rebels held the vast majority of the country?
Personally I don't like the Maoists, but I will support anyone who improves the quality of life of the people to a certain extent. When the rebels take over the cities, we will see their true nature, and whether or not they will be good for the country.

Saint-Just
21st December 2004, 16:10
Originally posted by h&[email protected] 21 2004, 03:09 PM
Hasn't the monarchy been overthrown in all but name? I thought the rebels held the vast majority of the country?
Personally I don't like the Maoists, but I will support anyone who improves the quality of life of the people to a certain extent. When the rebels take over the cities, we will see their true nature, and whether or not they will be good for the country.
Rebels do hold the vast majority of the country. However, as I mentioned in my above post they are finding it increasingly difficult as the government gains help from abroad. In addition there are a number of other groups who oppose the monarchy and they may be successful before the Maoists are. If the rebels to gain control of Nepal I don't think we will hear much good news, thats always the case and always has been.

Rasta Sapian
23rd December 2004, 19:24
The Chinease Maoist Rebels are definately fighting for communism, they control and have controlled Tibet for decades now, securing the northern passes to the himilayan mountians.

Tibet borders the China to the south, and has been recently targeted by the maoist rebeles. Katmandu is an ancient city with alot of temples and poverty to boot; however it is a popular destination for international trekkers and mountaineers who bring big $$ to the local napali economy. China would like a peice of the action, India, is down there to but it is not on the other side of everest is it?

Lacrimi de Chiciură
23rd December 2004, 19:38
The CPC is anti-Maoist in Nepal? They are true sell-outs.

sin miedo
24th December 2004, 19:05
While the Nepalese Monarchy deserves everything the guerillas have done to it, the guerillas themselves are bad-times. Forcing kids to fight is never right and should be condemned by all. Nepalese villagers are scared of both the government forces and the Maoist forces. We are seeing another repeat of the Sendero Luminoso which, I believe at least, is not good.

Wurkwurk
25th December 2004, 23:47
Two years ago, I myself was in Nepal (Kathmandu only). Back then, the Maoist rebellion wasn't nearly as large (about 60 percent of Nepal), but I can tell you now that taking Kathmandu will definetley not be easy.
It has open airlanes that passenger and military planes can easily fly in and out of, and is huge, sprawling, and dense. As well, since all the international embassies are based in Kathmandu, any major assault by Maoists will almost certainly face an international relief force.
And come on, can 15,000 guerrillas take a city of a million, with an international army to boot?

Not saying I don't support the rebellion of course; when I was in Kathmandu, poverty was rife and the people dejected. Most people I met where in the high echelon who had nothing but disgust for Maoists, but I've leared to keep an open mind of the whole matter.

EMS
14th January 2005, 01:06
http://www.rwor.org/a/1248/nepal_peoples_w...ents_kidnap.htm (http://www.rwor.org/a/1248/nepal_peoples_war_students_kidnap.htm)

I think the kidnapping thing is overexaggerated, but seriously they have some civil rights violations(that seems to be the problem with all except the EZLN)

Skeptic
14th January 2005, 02:03
China does not support the People's War in Nepal because China is not a Socialist country and hasn't been since the death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976. Like was mentioned earlier, it's exciting and inspiring to hear some news on what our forces are doing for a change.

Excerpt from New Book: Dispatches from the People’s War in Nepal

Strategic Considerations in Nepal
by Li Onesto

Revolutionary Worker #1262, December 19, 2004, posted at rwor.org

The following excerpt is from the Afterword in Dispatches from the People’s War in Nepal by Li Onesto

POST-SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE GEOPOLITICAL STAKES
Colin Powell’s visit to Kathmandu came four months after September 11 and two months after King Gyanendra declared a State of Emergency. This was the first high-level diplomatic trip by a US official to Nepal in 30 years and signaled mounting concern, necessity, and willingness by the US to provide not only political but also military support to crush the People’s War.

The US doesn’t have lots of investments or sweatshops in Nepal and there aren’t any significant oilfields in this small Himalayan country. So what’s behind this high-level concern? Why is the US providing the Nepalese army with millions of dollars, thousands of weapons, and military advisers and trainers? Why has the US, as a July 1, 2003 article in the Kathmandu Post revealed, been "quietly securing close military and political ties with Nepal"?

Since September 11, the US "war against terrorism" and the aims and ambitions of the US crusade to attain unrivaled world hegemony have been setting the terms for much of international relations, including how the US (and other powers) look at their necessity and freedom to intervene in Nepal.

As part of the US quest for world domination, the "war on terrorism" serves as an all-purpose umbrella under which numerous interventions are being justified. The political and ideological program of the Maoists in Nepal clearly has nothing in common with the reactionary politics and religious fundamentalism of groups like al-Qaeda. But this hasn’t stopped the US from using the pretext of "combating terror" to justify military action against any and all insurgencies which threaten U.S. interests—including genuine revolutions aimed at overthrowing oppressive governments.

The US, Britain, and other imperialist powers have provided the Nepalese regime with political and military support exactly because they know that a Maoist victory would reverberate throughout the Indian subcontinent and the world. This is a region of extreme instability where a Maoist "regime change" in Nepal could interact in unpredictable ways with the hostility between Pakistan and India, the conflict in Kashmir, relations between India and China, and other guerrilla insurgencies in the region, especially those in India.

The often antagonistic relationship between India and China is certainly a factor in this developing scenario. Nepal is strategically situated between the Tibetan region of China and the northern border of India. Because of this, both of these major powers view Nepal as a kind of "buffer," over which each has jockeyed for influence and power as a way of challenging and defending against the other.

India would be seriously threatened by a government in Kathmandu run by Maoists (who have already stated that one of the key goals of their revolution is to end Indian domination). And the New Delhi government worries that China would try to take advantage of any kind of upheaval in Nepal to strengthen its hand against India and in the whole region.

The Maoists in Nepal denounce the current Chinese regime for overthrowing and dismantling socialism after Mao’s death. The Chinese government has made clear that it supports the efforts to crush the insurgency, but China would be extremely concerned if India invaded Nepal to prevent the Maoists from seizing power. This would upset the long-standing and fragile balance of power on the China/India border, where serious warfare has broken out before and possibly provoke renewed hostility between these two major powers.

In terms of the US and its geostrategic stakes in Nepal, the question is: Can the US in its quest to achieve unprecedented global hegemony allow a successful Maoist guerrilla war in Nepal?

In a radio interview at the end of 2003, Michael Malinowski, the US ambassador to Nepal, revealed something about how the US views this question.16 He said:

"It’s a troubled country. It’s very disturbing. We’re concerned about it. One may ask why does the United States care, it’s 8,000 miles away? I would say there’s a number of reasons. One on the ideological plane we want democracy to succeed. We don’t want to see democracy fail. We don’t want to see democracy fail by a group, a small group that is unwilling to contest its ideas in the electoral process or the parliamentary process. But instead have decided to go the way of the gun, use terrorism, terrorist acts to get their will... There’s real reasons why people have picked up the gun here. They’re impoverished. There’s a lack of access to higher levers of education. There’s corruption. There’s mismanagement. There’s bad government. All of that. But again I would argue that Maoism is not the way to solve that."

Later Malinowski spoke to the international dimension of the US concerns, saying that he sees the need for "A clear message from every outside nation or people who care about Nepal—a clear message to the Maoists that the world will not put up with this type of behavior and indiscriminate use of terror."

Malinowski’s statements deliver both a message and threat: this Maoist revolution is "not the solution’ and ’will not be tolerated."

While Malinowski tars the Maoists with the "terrorist" brush, he can’t offer any real evidence to justify the charge. In fact, he is forced to admit that the Maoists have real support because of the oppressive conditions in Nepal—and that this is the basis for the military and political strength of the Maoists.

On one level, it seems almost counterintuitive that an operative of the Bush administration would be conceding that Maoist guerrillas have a base among the people and that poverty, deep inequalities, and a corrupt and bad government are fueling the revolution. While Malinowski calls the Maoists "terrorists" he cannot simply write them off as "terrorists" and has to acknowledge that they are actually seen by millions of people as a real alternative to the current order. Malinowski’s arguments tell you something about the nature of this insurgency—that this is not an uprising of isolated rebels, but a revolution with mass, popular support that propounds a viable program for how to run Nepal and is contending for power.

The US fears that a Maoist victory in Nepal would, to use a phrase from Mao, "ignite a prairie fire." Intelligence reports assessing the impact of the insurgency in Nepal point to growing Maoist guerrilla warfare in India.17 And the Naxalbari area, where Maoist armed struggle began in India in the 1960s, is located right across Nepal’s eastern border.

In June 2002, at the request of nine Indian states where Maoists are waging armed struggle—Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal - India created a special police force to crack down on Maoist guerrillas.18 Official Indian sources have said that any negotiated deal in Nepal that produces a government with "unreformed" revolutionary Maoists sharing power would have serious security consequences for India and its war against Indian Maoists.19

CAN THE REVOLUTION WIN?
The political and geographic connections and interrelationships between the situation in Nepal and India (and the whole region) also have huge implications for and present real challenges to the Maoists if they do seize power in Nepal.

Militarily, a new revolutionary government would immediately face the problem of being surrounded by unfriendly governments and the possibility of military invasion—by India, UN "peacekeeping troops" or even the United States.

Economically, as an underdeveloped country with a long history of dependency on India and other foreign countries, and an almost complete lack of industry, the new Nepal would immediately face enormous challenges in meeting people’s basic needs and developing an economy that does not create relations of foreign dependency and exploitation.

Politically, the Maoists would be attempting to build a new socialist society surrounded by hostile states, in a world where "communism has been declared dead," and in which there are tremendous prejudices against socialist states led by communist parties. During the Chinese revolution Mao had to deal with what he called "bourgeois democrats becoming capitalist roaders"— that is, those within the Communist Party itself who united with the anti-feudal, democratic aims of the revolution but then became proponents of building a capitalist, not socialist, society. This would certainly be a phenomenon in Nepal, the outlines of which can already been seen in the outlook of various political parties that are proponents of bourgeois democracy, not socialism, but who could unite with the Maoists to oppose the monarchy.

Bob Avakian sheds valuable light on this complex relationship between seizing power in one country and promoting the advance of revolutions elsewhere. He says:

"Socialist countries have so far emerged and for a certain historical period are very likely to emerge one or a few at a time. So, in grand strategic terms socialist countries and, more broadly, the international proletariat and the international communist movement will be faced with a situation where it is necessary to change the world alignment of forces or face the prospect of socialist countries going under after a certain point. This doesn’t mean there is some sort of mechanical mathematical or arithmetic equation where if you don’t get more and more of the world in a given period of time, then the socialist country, or countries, that exist at the time (if there are any socialist counties right then) will inevitably go under. But there is a contradiction when a socialist country is in a situation of being encircled; and that also interacts with the internal contradictions within the socialist society. And, at a certain point, if further advances aren’t made in the proletarian revolution worldwide, these things will turn to their opposites and the conditions will become more favorable for capitalist restoration within the socialist country. This doesn’t mean capitalist restoration automatically kicks in after a certain point, or that it will automatically occur at all. But it means that things will begin to turn into their opposites and the conditions for capitalist restoration will become more favorable. So, in that dialectical materialist sense, it’s one way or the other: make further advances and breakthroughs in the world revolution or be thrown back, temporarily."20

Recognizing the greater regional and world significance of the People’s War in Nepal also informs the overall strategy of the CPN (Maoist)—in how it sees the path to seizing power and in how it sees consolidating state power. The Party leaders very consciously look at their revolution as "part of the world revolution" and they look at the success of a revolution in Nepal as providing both an example and a "base area" for further Maoist revolutions.21 This has huge implications for the armed struggles being waged by Maoists in India and in turn reacts back on the struggle in Nepal. When I interviewed Prachanda he emphasized the importance of the struggle in India to the success or failure of the Nepalese revolution—pointing to the positive factor of a reinforcing synergy between Nepalese Maoists living in India, the political forces in India that would oppose intervention in Nepal, and the overall progress of Maoist revolution in India.22

The CPN (Maoist) emphasizes its "proletarian internationalism" and has given this organizational expression through its participation in the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), whose participants include Maoist parties and organizations from around the world. The CPN (Maoist) also makes no secret of the fact that it has fraternal relations with Maoist organizations throughout the Indian subcontinent. For example, in June 2001, the CPN (Maoist) helped form CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia), which is made up of ten parties, including ones from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. CCOMPOSA’s stated purpose is to "unify and coordinate the activities of the Maoist parties and organizations in South Asia to spread protracted people’s war in the region." Maoist parties in India have clearly been encouraged and emboldened by the success of the Maoists in Nepal. A press statement announcing the formation of CCOMPOSA emphasized how the struggle in Nepal is "changing the political geography and revolutionary dynamics of South Asia."23

All this underscores the strategic significance and political importance of the Nepalese revolution—and the fact that the US and other imperialist powers cannot (and will not) ignore the real threat of a Maoist victory in Nepal. This also poses critical questions if the revolution does come to power in Nepal—what this could spark in neighboring countries, how the US, UK, India, and other countries would respond, and what kind of support would have to be built in the world for a new Maoist government in Nepal to survive the pressures and attacks of surrounding states and America’s new imperial order. This would be a real challenge, not just for the revolutionaries in Nepal but for all who stand against injustice and oppression.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOOTNOTES

16Worldview, Chicago Public Radio, WBEZ, Jerome McDonnell interview with Michael Malinowski, November 28, 2003, Chicago.

17 See, for example, "Prairie Fire from Nepal" by B. Raman, former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications, 23 July 2001 and "Maoist Incursions across Open Borders" by P.G. Rajamohan in South Asia Intelligence Review , Volume 2, No. 22, December 15, 2003, and "MCC and Maoists: Expanding Naxal Violence in Bihar" by Sanjay K. Jha and other articles on the Institute for Conflict Management website.

18Kathmandu Post, June 12, 2002.

19 Rita Manchanda, "’War for Peace’ Approach Promises More Bloodshed" (InterPress Service, December 26, 2002).

20 Bob Avakian, "Two Humps in the World Revolution: Putting the Enemy on the Run," Revolutionary Worker, January 18, 1998.

21 See "International Communist Movement and Its Historical Lessons," Document of the Second National Conference of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), reprinted in A World to Win #27, 2001 and Himalayan Thunder , the quarterly bulletin of the CPN (Maoist), May 2001. This document from the CPN (Maoist) states: "Due to the uniqueness of the economic, political, cultural and geographical conditions and the unchallenged hold of Indian monopoly capitalism, it will be very difficult for any single country of this region to successfully complete the new national-democratic revolution and; even if it succeeds following the distinct contradictions, it will be almost impossible for it to survive. The revolutionaries need to seriously concentrate on the fact that a particular country, or a particular territory of a country, shall be liberated through the force of the common and joint struggle of the people of this region following the unequal stage of development, and that it can play only a particular role of base area for the revolution in the whole region."

22 Li Onesto, "Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World" (interview with Comrade Prachanda), Revolutionary Worker , February 20, 2000.

23 Press statement of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), 1 July 2001, published in People’s March (Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2001). Available on the web at www.peoplesmarch.com


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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bolshevik butcher
14th January 2005, 13:51
Originally posted by [email protected] 14 2005, 02:03 AM
China does not support the People's War in Nepal because China is not a Socialist country and hasn't been since the death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976. Like was mentioned earlier, it's exciting and inspiring to hear some news on what our forces are doing for a change.

Excerpt from New Book: Dispatches from the People’s War in Nepal

Strategic Considerations in Nepal
by Li Onesto

Revolutionary Worker #1262, December 19, 2004, posted at rwor.org

The following excerpt is from the Afterword in Dispatches from the People’s War in Nepal by Li Onesto

POST-SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE GEOPOLITICAL STAKES
Colin Powell’s visit to Kathmandu came four months after September 11 and two months after King Gyanendra declared a State of Emergency. This was the first high-level diplomatic trip by a US official to Nepal in 30 years and signaled mounting concern, necessity, and willingness by the US to provide not only political but also military support to crush the People’s War.

The US doesn’t have lots of investments or sweatshops in Nepal and there aren’t any significant oilfields in this small Himalayan country. So what’s behind this high-level concern? Why is the US providing the Nepalese army with millions of dollars, thousands of weapons, and military advisers and trainers? Why has the US, as a July 1, 2003 article in the Kathmandu Post revealed, been "quietly securing close military and political ties with Nepal"?

Since September 11, the US "war against terrorism" and the aims and ambitions of the US crusade to attain unrivaled world hegemony have been setting the terms for much of international relations, including how the US (and other powers) look at their necessity and freedom to intervene in Nepal.

As part of the US quest for world domination, the "war on terrorism" serves as an all-purpose umbrella under which numerous interventions are being justified. The political and ideological program of the Maoists in Nepal clearly has nothing in common with the reactionary politics and religious fundamentalism of groups like al-Qaeda. But this hasn’t stopped the US from using the pretext of "combating terror" to justify military action against any and all insurgencies which threaten U.S. interests—including genuine revolutions aimed at overthrowing oppressive governments.

The US, Britain, and other imperialist powers have provided the Nepalese regime with political and military support exactly because they know that a Maoist victory would reverberate throughout the Indian subcontinent and the world. This is a region of extreme instability where a Maoist "regime change" in Nepal could interact in unpredictable ways with the hostility between Pakistan and India, the conflict in Kashmir, relations between India and China, and other guerrilla insurgencies in the region, especially those in India.

The often antagonistic relationship between India and China is certainly a factor in this developing scenario. Nepal is strategically situated between the Tibetan region of China and the northern border of India. Because of this, both of these major powers view Nepal as a kind of "buffer," over which each has jockeyed for influence and power as a way of challenging and defending against the other.

India would be seriously threatened by a government in Kathmandu run by Maoists (who have already stated that one of the key goals of their revolution is to end Indian domination). And the New Delhi government worries that China would try to take advantage of any kind of upheaval in Nepal to strengthen its hand against India and in the whole region.

The Maoists in Nepal denounce the current Chinese regime for overthrowing and dismantling socialism after Mao’s death. The Chinese government has made clear that it supports the efforts to crush the insurgency, but China would be extremely concerned if India invaded Nepal to prevent the Maoists from seizing power. This would upset the long-standing and fragile balance of power on the China/India border, where serious warfare has broken out before and possibly provoke renewed hostility between these two major powers.

In terms of the US and its geostrategic stakes in Nepal, the question is: Can the US in its quest to achieve unprecedented global hegemony allow a successful Maoist guerrilla war in Nepal?

In a radio interview at the end of 2003, Michael Malinowski, the US ambassador to Nepal, revealed something about how the US views this question.16 He said:

"It’s a troubled country. It’s very disturbing. We’re concerned about it. One may ask why does the United States care, it’s 8,000 miles away? I would say there’s a number of reasons. One on the ideological plane we want democracy to succeed. We don’t want to see democracy fail. We don’t want to see democracy fail by a group, a small group that is unwilling to contest its ideas in the electoral process or the parliamentary process. But instead have decided to go the way of the gun, use terrorism, terrorist acts to get their will... There’s real reasons why people have picked up the gun here. They’re impoverished. There’s a lack of access to higher levers of education. There’s corruption. There’s mismanagement. There’s bad government. All of that. But again I would argue that Maoism is not the way to solve that."

Later Malinowski spoke to the international dimension of the US concerns, saying that he sees the need for "A clear message from every outside nation or people who care about Nepal—a clear message to the Maoists that the world will not put up with this type of behavior and indiscriminate use of terror."

Malinowski’s statements deliver both a message and threat: this Maoist revolution is "not the solution’ and ’will not be tolerated."

While Malinowski tars the Maoists with the "terrorist" brush, he can’t offer any real evidence to justify the charge. In fact, he is forced to admit that the Maoists have real support because of the oppressive conditions in Nepal—and that this is the basis for the military and political strength of the Maoists.

On one level, it seems almost counterintuitive that an operative of the Bush administration would be conceding that Maoist guerrillas have a base among the people and that poverty, deep inequalities, and a corrupt and bad government are fueling the revolution. While Malinowski calls the Maoists "terrorists" he cannot simply write them off as "terrorists" and has to acknowledge that they are actually seen by millions of people as a real alternative to the current order. Malinowski’s arguments tell you something about the nature of this insurgency—that this is not an uprising of isolated rebels, but a revolution with mass, popular support that propounds a viable program for how to run Nepal and is contending for power.

The US fears that a Maoist victory in Nepal would, to use a phrase from Mao, "ignite a prairie fire." Intelligence reports assessing the impact of the insurgency in Nepal point to growing Maoist guerrilla warfare in India.17 And the Naxalbari area, where Maoist armed struggle began in India in the 1960s, is located right across Nepal’s eastern border.

In June 2002, at the request of nine Indian states where Maoists are waging armed struggle—Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal - India created a special police force to crack down on Maoist guerrillas.18 Official Indian sources have said that any negotiated deal in Nepal that produces a government with "unreformed" revolutionary Maoists sharing power would have serious security consequences for India and its war against Indian Maoists.19

CAN THE REVOLUTION WIN?
The political and geographic connections and interrelationships between the situation in Nepal and India (and the whole region) also have huge implications for and present real challenges to the Maoists if they do seize power in Nepal.

Militarily, a new revolutionary government would immediately face the problem of being surrounded by unfriendly governments and the possibility of military invasion—by India, UN "peacekeeping troops" or even the United States.

Economically, as an underdeveloped country with a long history of dependency on India and other foreign countries, and an almost complete lack of industry, the new Nepal would immediately face enormous challenges in meeting people’s basic needs and developing an economy that does not create relations of foreign dependency and exploitation.

Politically, the Maoists would be attempting to build a new socialist society surrounded by hostile states, in a world where "communism has been declared dead," and in which there are tremendous prejudices against socialist states led by communist parties. During the Chinese revolution Mao had to deal with what he called "bourgeois democrats becoming capitalist roaders"— that is, those within the Communist Party itself who united with the anti-feudal, democratic aims of the revolution but then became proponents of building a capitalist, not socialist, society. This would certainly be a phenomenon in Nepal, the outlines of which can already been seen in the outlook of various political parties that are proponents of bourgeois democracy, not socialism, but who could unite with the Maoists to oppose the monarchy.

Bob Avakian sheds valuable light on this complex relationship between seizing power in one country and promoting the advance of revolutions elsewhere. He says:

"Socialist countries have so far emerged and for a certain historical period are very likely to emerge one or a few at a time. So, in grand strategic terms socialist countries and, more broadly, the international proletariat and the international communist movement will be faced with a situation where it is necessary to change the world alignment of forces or face the prospect of socialist countries going under after a certain point. This doesn’t mean there is some sort of mechanical mathematical or arithmetic equation where if you don’t get more and more of the world in a given period of time, then the socialist country, or countries, that exist at the time (if there are any socialist counties right then) will inevitably go under. But there is a contradiction when a socialist country is in a situation of being encircled; and that also interacts with the internal contradictions within the socialist society. And, at a certain point, if further advances aren’t made in the proletarian revolution worldwide, these things will turn to their opposites and the conditions will become more favorable for capitalist restoration within the socialist country. This doesn’t mean capitalist restoration automatically kicks in after a certain point, or that it will automatically occur at all. But it means that things will begin to turn into their opposites and the conditions for capitalist restoration will become more favorable. So, in that dialectical materialist sense, it’s one way or the other: make further advances and breakthroughs in the world revolution or be thrown back, temporarily."20

Recognizing the greater regional and world significance of the People’s War in Nepal also informs the overall strategy of the CPN (Maoist)—in how it sees the path to seizing power and in how it sees consolidating state power. The Party leaders very consciously look at their revolution as "part of the world revolution" and they look at the success of a revolution in Nepal as providing both an example and a "base area" for further Maoist revolutions.21 This has huge implications for the armed struggles being waged by Maoists in India and in turn reacts back on the struggle in Nepal. When I interviewed Prachanda he emphasized the importance of the struggle in India to the success or failure of the Nepalese revolution—pointing to the positive factor of a reinforcing synergy between Nepalese Maoists living in India, the political forces in India that would oppose intervention in Nepal, and the overall progress of Maoist revolution in India.22

The CPN (Maoist) emphasizes its "proletarian internationalism" and has given this organizational expression through its participation in the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), whose participants include Maoist parties and organizations from around the world. The CPN (Maoist) also makes no secret of the fact that it has fraternal relations with Maoist organizations throughout the Indian subcontinent. For example, in June 2001, the CPN (Maoist) helped form CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia), which is made up of ten parties, including ones from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. CCOMPOSA’s stated purpose is to "unify and coordinate the activities of the Maoist parties and organizations in South Asia to spread protracted people’s war in the region." Maoist parties in India have clearly been encouraged and emboldened by the success of the Maoists in Nepal. A press statement announcing the formation of CCOMPOSA emphasized how the struggle in Nepal is "changing the political geography and revolutionary dynamics of South Asia."23

All this underscores the strategic significance and political importance of the Nepalese revolution—and the fact that the US and other imperialist powers cannot (and will not) ignore the real threat of a Maoist victory in Nepal. This also poses critical questions if the revolution does come to power in Nepal—what this could spark in neighboring countries, how the US, UK, India, and other countries would respond, and what kind of support would have to be built in the world for a new Maoist government in Nepal to survive the pressures and attacks of surrounding states and America’s new imperial order. This would be a real challenge, not just for the revolutionaries in Nepal but for all who stand against injustice and oppression.


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FOOTNOTES

16Worldview, Chicago Public Radio, WBEZ, Jerome McDonnell interview with Michael Malinowski, November 28, 2003, Chicago.

17 See, for example, "Prairie Fire from Nepal" by B. Raman, former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications, 23 July 2001 and "Maoist Incursions across Open Borders" by P.G. Rajamohan in South Asia Intelligence Review , Volume 2, No. 22, December 15, 2003, and "MCC and Maoists: Expanding Naxal Violence in Bihar" by Sanjay K. Jha and other articles on the Institute for Conflict Management website.

18Kathmandu Post, June 12, 2002.

19 Rita Manchanda, "’War for Peace’ Approach Promises More Bloodshed" (InterPress Service, December 26, 2002).

20 Bob Avakian, "Two Humps in the World Revolution: Putting the Enemy on the Run," Revolutionary Worker, January 18, 1998.

21 See "International Communist Movement and Its Historical Lessons," Document of the Second National Conference of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), reprinted in A World to Win #27, 2001 and Himalayan Thunder , the quarterly bulletin of the CPN (Maoist), May 2001. This document from the CPN (Maoist) states: "Due to the uniqueness of the economic, political, cultural and geographical conditions and the unchallenged hold of Indian monopoly capitalism, it will be very difficult for any single country of this region to successfully complete the new national-democratic revolution and; even if it succeeds following the distinct contradictions, it will be almost impossible for it to survive. The revolutionaries need to seriously concentrate on the fact that a particular country, or a particular territory of a country, shall be liberated through the force of the common and joint struggle of the people of this region following the unequal stage of development, and that it can play only a particular role of base area for the revolution in the whole region."

22 Li Onesto, "Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World" (interview with Comrade Prachanda), Revolutionary Worker , February 20, 2000.

23 Press statement of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), 1 July 2001, published in People’s March (Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2001). Available on the web at www.peoplesmarch.com


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I would question if China was ever Socialist. It certainly isn't know anyway,it's only insterested in attracting more western buissness.