The Garbage Disposal Unit
2nd December 2004, 14:29
Finished. For all intents and purposes.
While ethical egoism offers useful critiques of universal and “divinely-inspired” ethics, the conclusions of ethical and psychological egoists regarding selfishness are ultimately flawed. Where then, is the disconnect and where do the ideas of egoism go awry? In order to answer this, it is necessary to first critically view ethical and psychological egoism, and the bases within which they rest.
Egoism breaks from other philosophies of ethics in that it holds the individual to be the ultimate judge of right and wrong. It holds that experientially unique individuals, operating within a specific set of circumstances are most fit to decide what actions are or are not ethical. Authority from outside the individual is attacked as illegitimate, and “Even if you chose to believe there’s higher authority, you are the authority who chooses what it is and what it is telling you to do.”1 In other words, the universe is inherently immoral, and authority ultimately rests on the consent of those who recognize it, rather than any characteristic of the authority itself. Ultimately, even God is looked at as an illegitimate source of external ethical authority - he/she/it might have the power to exert some coercive force against the individual, but it is the free and conscious individual who must reach decisions and act for themselves presented with that force. For example, Browne, a libertarian, holds that, “No matter how you approach the matter, you are the sovereign authority who makes the final decisions. The more you recognize that, the more your decisions will fit realistically with your own life . . .”2
The problem then arises when egoists refuse to allow individuals real freedom of choice, and maintain that all ethical actions within the framework of a radical individualism must reflect a selfishness and loyalty only to one’s own self-interest. Defense of this position tends to rely on psychological egoism - the postulate that humans are, naturally, selfish in all their actions. Amusingly, this immediately conflicts with the notion of unique individuals, not tied to any grand and uniting ethic. More importantly, however, it’s simply ridiculous.
Psychological egoists defend their philosophy by defining the terms in such a bizarre way as to make their argument, ultimately, unfalsifiable. If selfishness simply means doing that which one is inclined to do, for whatever reason, than naturally, every action is selfish (and in this, we’re dragged inevitably back toward Blatchford’s determinism). If, instead, we consider actions and results, rather than untestable reasons, we reach a very different conclusion: people act unselfishly on a daily basis (a dreadful bellum omnium contra omnes would likely prevail if this were not the case!). James Rachels offers a simple explanation:
. . . If we have a positive attitude toward the attainment of some goal, then we may derive satisfaction from attaining that goal. But the object of our attitude is the attainment of that goal; and we must want to attain the goal before we can find any satisfaction in it.3
In other words, there may be some degree of gratification in achieving our goals, but this does not necessarily make them selfish - indeed, it is the results and methods themselves that ought to be subject to our judgement - the real world implications, and not the untestable assertion that all of one’s motivations are “concerned excessively or exclusively with oneself : seeking or concentrating on one's own advantage, pleasure, or well-being without regard for others.”4
Returning to the problem of ethical egoism and selfishness, recognizing that not all human action is inherently selfish, how might this impact our response to the ethic of selfishness? Indeed, this must remain our focus, as the earlier rebuttals to absolute morality, etc. stand. Some maintain that selfishness is universally (the irony!) desirable. Browne attacks “unselfishness” saying, if unselfishness is truly desirable, then “. . . there must be something unworthy in seeking to live your life as you want to live.” However, as being unselfish, and living life as one wants, as demonstrated above, are not mutually exclusive. This gross oversimplification can be illustrated with the metaphor of a big red ball, representing the ability to be happy. In Browne’s (terrifying) world, an unselfish act implies tossing the ball to somebody else, and thus depriving one’s self of the ability to be happy. However, in reality, pleasure isn’t a question of all-or-nothing in which one individual cedes to another in a given situation. Just as in real life, only the most neurotic individuals would enjoy clinging to the big red ball, and take pleasure in solely possessing it, a game of catch is most likely to make people happy. Happiness is not limited like a certain number of balls which must be shared among a number of individuals, but is an individual response to circumstances, such as a game of catch, from which every participant can take joy. It is here that the real potential of an individualism lies: Because human happiness, fulfilment, and the like are not subject to physical limitations (beyond perhaps the brain’s ability to produce dopamine, endorphins, etc.), there is no reason that any number of individual approaches - selfish or selfless - might not be explored. This seems as though it would be the natural conclusion at which a philosophy supposedly rejecting “universal” and “absolute” morality would arrive. However, from Harry Browne through Ayn Rand, exponents of this twisted form of ethical egoism tend to have an ulterior motive - defense of certain ideology. If everybody is selfish, it only makes sense to pursue one’s own gains, even at the expense of others, and rather than a “live and let live” philosophy that should spring from ultimate respect for individual autonomy, or even “live and let die,” the ethical egoist espouses “live and kill.” This translates to a rule by the strongest - a sort of social Darwinism - that ultimately, comes in the conflict with their opposition to Universal Morality, as the most powerful forces in society gain the ability to force their moral understandings on others.
The practical implications of this can be seen in today’s world. The ideology advocated by so-called ethical egoists, and flowing naturally from the ethos of selfishness, capitalism, can be seen in its harsh realities in an increasingly moralistic United States. The domination of power structures by a well-heeled elite has allowed them to, in pursuing their own selfish interests, rise to a position where their own moral and ethical understandings may be imposed universally. In practice, ethical egoism becomes anything but egoistic. As the biggest stick rises to prominence the individual is forced to participate in the dominant institutions, lest they face the wrath of the stick, and are made to obey, “. . . a code of conduct that is presumed to bring happiness to anyone who uses it.”5 This code may be the supposedly “personal morality” of the egoists, but, in reality, it represents the corrupt, imposed, and exterior morality they claim to oppose.
Therefore, where the philosophy fundamentally fails is under the pressure of its own critiques. The grand moral narrative of “individualism” reveals itself, in its theory and application to be subject to the same criticisms as any other grand, and overarching ethical philosophy. In order to meet its their own criticisms, ethical egoists must abandon their philosophy of selfishness, and instead, insist on the formulation of unique, situational and personal ethical philosophies that reflect specific needs and desires, rather than essentialist notions of human nature.
1 p.418, Ed. Hollinger, Klemke, Kline. Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues Forth Edition Bedford/St. Martins / Boston/New York; United States Of America 1994
2 p.419, ibid.
3 p.427, ibid.
4 Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.m-w.com, 2004
5 p. 417, Ed. Hollinger, Klemke, Kline. Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues Forth Edition Bedford/St. Martins / Boston/New York; United States Of America 1994
While ethical egoism offers useful critiques of universal and “divinely-inspired” ethics, the conclusions of ethical and psychological egoists regarding selfishness are ultimately flawed. Where then, is the disconnect and where do the ideas of egoism go awry? In order to answer this, it is necessary to first critically view ethical and psychological egoism, and the bases within which they rest.
Egoism breaks from other philosophies of ethics in that it holds the individual to be the ultimate judge of right and wrong. It holds that experientially unique individuals, operating within a specific set of circumstances are most fit to decide what actions are or are not ethical. Authority from outside the individual is attacked as illegitimate, and “Even if you chose to believe there’s higher authority, you are the authority who chooses what it is and what it is telling you to do.”1 In other words, the universe is inherently immoral, and authority ultimately rests on the consent of those who recognize it, rather than any characteristic of the authority itself. Ultimately, even God is looked at as an illegitimate source of external ethical authority - he/she/it might have the power to exert some coercive force against the individual, but it is the free and conscious individual who must reach decisions and act for themselves presented with that force. For example, Browne, a libertarian, holds that, “No matter how you approach the matter, you are the sovereign authority who makes the final decisions. The more you recognize that, the more your decisions will fit realistically with your own life . . .”2
The problem then arises when egoists refuse to allow individuals real freedom of choice, and maintain that all ethical actions within the framework of a radical individualism must reflect a selfishness and loyalty only to one’s own self-interest. Defense of this position tends to rely on psychological egoism - the postulate that humans are, naturally, selfish in all their actions. Amusingly, this immediately conflicts with the notion of unique individuals, not tied to any grand and uniting ethic. More importantly, however, it’s simply ridiculous.
Psychological egoists defend their philosophy by defining the terms in such a bizarre way as to make their argument, ultimately, unfalsifiable. If selfishness simply means doing that which one is inclined to do, for whatever reason, than naturally, every action is selfish (and in this, we’re dragged inevitably back toward Blatchford’s determinism). If, instead, we consider actions and results, rather than untestable reasons, we reach a very different conclusion: people act unselfishly on a daily basis (a dreadful bellum omnium contra omnes would likely prevail if this were not the case!). James Rachels offers a simple explanation:
. . . If we have a positive attitude toward the attainment of some goal, then we may derive satisfaction from attaining that goal. But the object of our attitude is the attainment of that goal; and we must want to attain the goal before we can find any satisfaction in it.3
In other words, there may be some degree of gratification in achieving our goals, but this does not necessarily make them selfish - indeed, it is the results and methods themselves that ought to be subject to our judgement - the real world implications, and not the untestable assertion that all of one’s motivations are “concerned excessively or exclusively with oneself : seeking or concentrating on one's own advantage, pleasure, or well-being without regard for others.”4
Returning to the problem of ethical egoism and selfishness, recognizing that not all human action is inherently selfish, how might this impact our response to the ethic of selfishness? Indeed, this must remain our focus, as the earlier rebuttals to absolute morality, etc. stand. Some maintain that selfishness is universally (the irony!) desirable. Browne attacks “unselfishness” saying, if unselfishness is truly desirable, then “. . . there must be something unworthy in seeking to live your life as you want to live.” However, as being unselfish, and living life as one wants, as demonstrated above, are not mutually exclusive. This gross oversimplification can be illustrated with the metaphor of a big red ball, representing the ability to be happy. In Browne’s (terrifying) world, an unselfish act implies tossing the ball to somebody else, and thus depriving one’s self of the ability to be happy. However, in reality, pleasure isn’t a question of all-or-nothing in which one individual cedes to another in a given situation. Just as in real life, only the most neurotic individuals would enjoy clinging to the big red ball, and take pleasure in solely possessing it, a game of catch is most likely to make people happy. Happiness is not limited like a certain number of balls which must be shared among a number of individuals, but is an individual response to circumstances, such as a game of catch, from which every participant can take joy. It is here that the real potential of an individualism lies: Because human happiness, fulfilment, and the like are not subject to physical limitations (beyond perhaps the brain’s ability to produce dopamine, endorphins, etc.), there is no reason that any number of individual approaches - selfish or selfless - might not be explored. This seems as though it would be the natural conclusion at which a philosophy supposedly rejecting “universal” and “absolute” morality would arrive. However, from Harry Browne through Ayn Rand, exponents of this twisted form of ethical egoism tend to have an ulterior motive - defense of certain ideology. If everybody is selfish, it only makes sense to pursue one’s own gains, even at the expense of others, and rather than a “live and let live” philosophy that should spring from ultimate respect for individual autonomy, or even “live and let die,” the ethical egoist espouses “live and kill.” This translates to a rule by the strongest - a sort of social Darwinism - that ultimately, comes in the conflict with their opposition to Universal Morality, as the most powerful forces in society gain the ability to force their moral understandings on others.
The practical implications of this can be seen in today’s world. The ideology advocated by so-called ethical egoists, and flowing naturally from the ethos of selfishness, capitalism, can be seen in its harsh realities in an increasingly moralistic United States. The domination of power structures by a well-heeled elite has allowed them to, in pursuing their own selfish interests, rise to a position where their own moral and ethical understandings may be imposed universally. In practice, ethical egoism becomes anything but egoistic. As the biggest stick rises to prominence the individual is forced to participate in the dominant institutions, lest they face the wrath of the stick, and are made to obey, “. . . a code of conduct that is presumed to bring happiness to anyone who uses it.”5 This code may be the supposedly “personal morality” of the egoists, but, in reality, it represents the corrupt, imposed, and exterior morality they claim to oppose.
Therefore, where the philosophy fundamentally fails is under the pressure of its own critiques. The grand moral narrative of “individualism” reveals itself, in its theory and application to be subject to the same criticisms as any other grand, and overarching ethical philosophy. In order to meet its their own criticisms, ethical egoists must abandon their philosophy of selfishness, and instead, insist on the formulation of unique, situational and personal ethical philosophies that reflect specific needs and desires, rather than essentialist notions of human nature.
1 p.418, Ed. Hollinger, Klemke, Kline. Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues Forth Edition Bedford/St. Martins / Boston/New York; United States Of America 1994
2 p.419, ibid.
3 p.427, ibid.
4 Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.m-w.com, 2004
5 p. 417, Ed. Hollinger, Klemke, Kline. Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues Forth Edition Bedford/St. Martins / Boston/New York; United States Of America 1994