Two questions

[Subversive Pessimist]

In what way is historical materialism and dialectial materialism connected to our movement? How is those theories going to help us achieving socialism and communism?

[The Immortal Goon]

The dielectic is the very crux of the movement, materialism being a crux as well.

Materialism, simply stated, is the fact that material conditions create our reality. For instance, when I was traveling in Paris I came accross an Arabic ghetto. Because the material conditions are very close in France and the US; and because of this the material conditons of the ghettos in France and the US are the same; the culture and 'feel' of the ghettos - both inhabited by totally different minority groups, with totally different cultures, populated at totally different times - were nearly identical.

One could draw on this and see how material conditions create the reality that would be needed to see Marxism in a correct light.

-------

The dialectic, simply stated, is the fact that everything creates an opposite; both the thing and the opposite must create a synthesis, and the synthesis will create an opposite - the same process occurs.

An example: Feudalism replaced the slave labor ecnomies. In Feudalism, the aristocracy (kings and nobles) ruled. However, in order to get their goods, they were dependent upon merchants and traders who would move these things along )these merchants and traders were called bourgouis). The merchants were created by the nobles - but as a class, they came in to a conflict. A synthesis occurred (In the historical case this was Revolution; the Jacobites in France are the best example of this). When the dust cleared, the bourgouis were in charge and created a new class to oppose them - the proletariat.

----

When Dialectic and Materialism is put together, we have a good way to look at the world. Using the example above (Feudalism creating capitalism) we can study the American Civil War in detail previously impossible (we see that slavery led to Feudalism - share cropping - ; Feudalism led to capitalism - the South is the most loyally capitalistic region of the US today).

We can also use this technique, not just to study the past, but to study the future. With dielectic materialism, we can recognize two opposing forces in each thing and come to an understanding of how it will come to realization. This is how the Marxist writer will often come to have an uncanny apt prediction of the future. Alexandra Kollontai, for instance, writes in the 1920s about modern family structures in developed western nations with an eerie acuracy. Furthermore, Trotsky - with no military experience at all - was able to lead the Reds to victory in a civil war while the opposition was enhanced by treatments from the Japanese, Germany, France, England, and the US. He accomplished this unheard of feat through a study of dialectic materialism while looking over plans.

----

I realize I may not to a great job explaining it, but it is rather difficult to explain. Below are two sources I think do it quite well.

Trotsky's awesome. 'Nuff said.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/wo...39/1939-abc.htm (http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1939/1939-abc.htm)

I'm not really a Maoist, but he does do a good job of boiling things down to the basics here.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/...rks/1937/08.htm (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/08.htm)

I hope I explained this to some satisfaction, at least.

-TIG :ph34r:

[Hiero]

Engels and Marx extended the materailist philosophy of Feurbach and Hegel and others. The philosophy is the believe that things exist outside of us independent of us. Materialism is that our sensations are the objective truth of the world.

Marx and Engels extended the philosophy to History, therefore it is called historical materialism. That is the progress of human society. From hunter gather to feudalism to capitalism to socialism. It denies any spirtual force effected this. Class conflict, explained and proved by use of sciences.

This is really basic but i belive that The Immortal Goon left out some factors of Materialism and jump past the question.

[Palmares]

Originally posted by ComradeStrawberry+--> (ComradeStrawberry)In what way is historical materialism and dialectial materialism connected to our movement?[/b]

Dialectical materialism:

Thesis: Capitalism
Antithesis: Socialism
Synthesis: Communism

Historical materialism:

Dialectical materialism applied to history.

Given that, both these concepts simply put are some of the foundations of Marxist-type thought, it is our very interpretations. It is connected to our movement because it is the way we understand the world.


ComradeStrawberry
How is those theories going to help us achieving socialism and communism?

It tells how how to get there. Not quite in 'step by step' form, but it lays down the foundation.

[Essential Insignificance]

Dialectical materialism:

Thesis: Capitalism
Antithesis: Socialism
Synthesis: Communism

The above -- "gobbledygook" -- interpretation of the dialect has "somehow", in the process of history -- like a lot of Marx's ideas -- being wrongly construed and erroneously applied to explain Marxian dialectics by both philosophers and more importantly, "so called" Marxists.

I must, however confess, I too, was once under the impression of the dialect has the above process, the -- "thesis, antithesis and synthesis".

The above "jargon" is not, in any regards "characteristic" of dialectical materialism.

To my knowledge, it was never used by Hegel, the "founding father of the (idealist) modern dialect" ...and Marx only used the above exposition once; and only with the intention of mockery.

[Djehuti]

Nay, I would rather say:

Thesis: Capitalism
Antithesis: Communism - As the negation, the material proletarian movement.
Synthesis: Communism - Coincidentia opposotorium


But dialectics is really FAR more then the simplified "thesis - antithesis - synthesis" stuff. So I really agree with Essential Insignificance on this.

[Hiero]

Materialism in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In both cases consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it. - Lenin 6.2 Materialism and Empirio criticism.

[Palmares]

Marx did use that system of dialectics from my knowledge, but not as blandly as I put it. Dialectical materialism is not as simple as I noted, but that is the fundamentals from my knowledge. Please note, I don't even believe in it, as it is based on materialism, and from there it concludes that the outcome(s) are inevitable. I prefer to say, they are a better system.

Essential Insignificance, could you elaborate more about dialectical materialism being different to my interpretation? :unsure:

[Essential Insignificance]

Materialism in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity.

That's right, but Marx never to my knowledge, contributed originally to the materialist philosophical doctrine developed by modern materialist, such as Bacon, Hobbes, etc. Although Marx’s doctoral thesis was based on the distinction between two materialist philosophies: The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of nature.

For Marx, philosophical materialism was just "obvious".


Please note, I don't even believe in it, as it is based on materialism, and from there it concludes that the outcome(s) are inevitable. I prefer to say, they are a better system.

Good to hear!

Philosophically, materialism is unsubstantiated.


Essential Insignificance, could you elaborate more about dialectical materialism being different to my interpretation?

Sure.

Let's keep in mind, that never did Marx or Engel's use the term "dialectical materialism" themselves, although the latter did constructively -- disparity -- both "materialist dialectics" and "idealist dialectics" of Hegel and other conventional metaphysical standpoints of "supplementary" nineteenth-century materialist. And also that the central foundations of dialectical materialism was the work of Engel's not Marx.

To summarize.

The unity of opposites.
The nature of everything engross internal opposition of contradiction.

Quantity and Qualitative.
Quantitative change always ultimately leads to qualitative change of development.

Negation of the negation.
Change negates what is changed, and as a result it is in turn negated, but this second negation leads to further development and not a return to that with which we begun with.

Engel's "dialectical materialism" upholds a critique of early modern science presented by German idealism and it's "philosophy of nature" -- which opposed "formalism" and "reductionism" and accentuates the "phenomena of organic interconnection" and qualitative emergence.

Thus the commonest changes against metaphysical materialism are that it disregards the fundamentally development nature of matter, that it tries to reduce all change to quantitative change, and it fail to recognize internal contradictions in the nature of material things as the fundamental source of change.

Engel's, had therefore recognized the "dialectical laws".

[Hiero]

Philosophically, materialism is unsubstantiated.

How so, could you explain.

[Essential Insignificance]

How so, could you explain.

Sure, and with great contentment. :D

I'm talking about metaphysical and epistemological areas of philosophy here.

According to metaphysical materialism the only "real world" is the material world, and thus, the mind, is therefore a product of a material organ -- informally, the brain.

There has been in recent time's argument and contrast highlighted between dialectal materialist and the older materialist outlook, but, the disparagement is not, of course adjacent to materialism itself, rather, the lack of the newly fashioned dialectical element -- "dialectical materialism"

Dialectical materialism has been, of course, expounded and developed by Marx, Engel's, Plekhanov and your most familiar (I believe) Lenin.

Materialist's hold that matter "determines" consciousness, thus sensory knowledge, is and must be conceivable in a realistic manner -- a theory of perception that holds the ordinary perception of physical objects is entirely direct, unconditioned by subjective entities, and that, in normal perceptual conditions, these object have the properties they appear to have.

Thus if a apple perceptually appears to be red, or snow white; then the apple is red and the snow white -- providing that the objects are themselves conditional to there usual appearance.

Now there, kind of "reasoning" relies on vague terms; by that I mean -- sensible objects are subject to differing shades and degrees of meaning, according to subjective, individual persons. When is a man bald?

Now, materialist's argue that:

1. Physical matter grounds our perceptions (color, height, firmness...)
2. Our perceptions (firmness, height, color...) are caused by physical matter.

According to idealist the materialist can articulate no more than this, for we have no other way to speak about physical matter, without referring to our subjective perceptions. Of which, it must, now seem, that materialism is a very circular project.

Idealist's argue that if the physical matter exists autonomously of our perceptions (as materialists believe) then there should be a way to illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions. In other words we should, if the theory of a material (external) world has any "validity", be able explain physical matter independently of our perceptions -- or of perceptions in general -- since it is believed by materialist's to be independent of our perceptions.

However, the mind can be defined independently of the way we describe our perceptions.

[Essential Insignificance]

How so, could you explain.

Sure, and with great contentment. :D

I'm talking about metaphysical and epistemological areas of philosophy here.

According to metaphysical materialism the only "real world" is the material world, and thus, the mind, is therefore a product of a material organ -- informally, the brain.

There has been in recent time's argument and contrast highlighted between dialectal materialist and the older materialist outlook, but, the disparagement is not, of course adjacent to materialism itself, rather, the lack of the newly fashioned dialectical element -- "dialectical materialism"

Dialectical materialism has been, of course, expounded and developed by Marx, Engel's, Plekhanov and your most familiar (I believe) Lenin.

Materialist's hold that matter "determines" consciousness, thus sensory knowledge, is and must be conceivable in a realistic manner -- a theory of perception that holds the ordinary perception of physical objects is entirely direct, unconditioned by subjective entities, and that, in normal perceptual conditions, these object have the properties they appear to have.

Thus if a apple perceptually appears to be red, or snow white; then the apple is red and the snow white -- providing that the objects are themselves conditional to there usual appearance.

Now there, kind of "reasoning" relies on vague terms; by that I mean -- sensible objects are subject to differing shades and degrees of meaning, according to subjective, individual persons. When is a man bald?

Now, materialist's argue that:

1. Physical matter grounds our perceptions (color, height, firmness...)
2. Our perceptions (firmness, height, color...) are caused by physical matter.

According to idealist the materialist can articulate no more than this, for we have no other way to speak about physical matter, without referring to our subjective perceptions. Of which, it must, now seem, that materialism is a very circular project.

Idealist's argue that if the physical matter exists autonomously of our perceptions (as materialists believe) then there should be a way to illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions. In other words we should, if the theory of a material (external) world has any "validity", be able explain physical matter independently of our perceptions -- or of perceptions in general -- since it is believed by materialist's to be independent of our perceptions.

However, the mind can be defined independently of the way we describe our perceptions.

[Essential Insignificance]

How so, could you explain.

Sure, and with great contentment. :D

I'm talking about metaphysical and epistemological areas of philosophy here.

According to metaphysical materialism the only "real world" is the material world, and thus, the mind, is therefore a product of a material organ -- informally, the brain.

There has been in recent time's argument and contrast highlighted between dialectal materialist and the older materialist outlook, but, the disparagement is not, of course adjacent to materialism itself, rather, the lack of the newly fashioned dialectical element -- "dialectical materialism"

Dialectical materialism has been, of course, expounded and developed by Marx, Engel's, Plekhanov and your most familiar (I believe) Lenin.

Materialist's hold that matter "determines" consciousness, thus sensory knowledge, is and must be conceivable in a realistic manner -- a theory of perception that holds the ordinary perception of physical objects is entirely direct, unconditioned by subjective entities, and that, in normal perceptual conditions, these object have the properties they appear to have.

Thus if a apple perceptually appears to be red, or snow white; then the apple is red and the snow white -- providing that the objects are themselves conditional to there usual appearance.

Now there, kind of "reasoning" relies on vague terms; by that I mean -- sensible objects are subject to differing shades and degrees of meaning, according to subjective, individual persons. When is a man bald?

Now, materialist's argue that:

1. Physical matter grounds our perceptions (color, height, firmness...)
2. Our perceptions (firmness, height, color...) are caused by physical matter.

According to idealist the materialist can articulate no more than this, for we have no other way to speak about physical matter, without referring to our subjective perceptions. Of which, it must, now seem, that materialism is a very circular project.

Idealist's argue that if the physical matter exists autonomously of our perceptions (as materialists believe) then there should be a way to illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions. In other words we should, if the theory of a material (external) world has any "validity", be able explain physical matter independently of our perceptions -- or of perceptions in general -- since it is believed by materialist's to be independent of our perceptions.

However, the mind can be defined independently of the way we describe our perceptions.

[Hiero]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is. If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I have read back over your post after i wrote that paragraph but i will post it anyway. I think i may have mistaken what you meant by [QUOTE]illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions[CODE] I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

[Hiero]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is. If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I have read back over your post after i wrote that paragraph but i will post it anyway. I think i may have mistaken what you meant by [QUOTE]illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions[CODE] I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

[Hiero]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is. If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I have read back over your post after i wrote that paragraph but i will post it anyway. I think i may have mistaken what you meant by [QUOTE]illustrate it without orientation to our perceptions[CODE] I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

[Essential Insignificance]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is.

Sure.

Yet we have no real conception of the form and manner of our perceptions; all we have are sensory ideas. Materialist hold that there are qualities inhering in matter of which cause ideas in us which represent or even (but how could we know?) resemble those "objective" qualities.

The "quandary" is that we are able to obtain our own perceptions, and by no means the things which are supposed to lie inaccessibly beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of them, or even be justified in asserting their existence?

How can we endure the notion of something which by definition is empirically imperceptible, lying hidden behind perceptible qualities of things, as their supposed basis or support? If the concept of matter cannot be fortified, surely we must understand experience and knowledge in other terms.

I hereby refute the existence of matter, but, of course, not the external world and physical objects it contains, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.


If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I would never, like I have already stated deny the existence of objects, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.

It's just that the materialist line of reasoning is totally circular.


I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

Quite likely.

Let me assure you, that your not the first and you most certainly won't be the last. :D

[Essential Insignificance]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is.

Sure.

Yet we have no real conception of the form and manner of our perceptions; all we have are sensory ideas. Materialist hold that there are qualities inhering in matter of which cause ideas in us which represent or even (but how could we know?) resemble those "objective" qualities.

The "quandary" is that we are able to obtain our own perceptions, and by no means the things which are supposed to lie inaccessibly beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of them, or even be justified in asserting their existence?

How can we endure the notion of something which by definition is empirically imperceptible, lying hidden behind perceptible qualities of things, as their supposed basis or support? If the concept of matter cannot be fortified, surely we must understand experience and knowledge in other terms.

I hereby refute the existence of matter, but, of course, not the external world and physical objects it contains, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.


If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I would never, like I have already stated deny the existence of objects, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.

It's just that the materialist line of reasoning is totally circular.


I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

Quite likely.

Let me assure you, that your not the first and you most certainly won't be the last. :D

[Essential Insignificance]

If we cant explain physical matter that does not mean our sensation are not a reflection of the outer world as it is.

Sure.

Yet we have no real conception of the form and manner of our perceptions; all we have are sensory ideas. Materialist hold that there are qualities inhering in matter of which cause ideas in us which represent or even (but how could we know?) resemble those "objective" qualities.

The "quandary" is that we are able to obtain our own perceptions, and by no means the things which are supposed to lie inaccessibly beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of them, or even be justified in asserting their existence?

How can we endure the notion of something which by definition is empirically imperceptible, lying hidden behind perceptible qualities of things, as their supposed basis or support? If the concept of matter cannot be fortified, surely we must understand experience and knowledge in other terms.

I hereby refute the existence of matter, but, of course, not the external world and physical objects it contains, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.


If we were to sense something never before described and we cannot explain the physical matter then that does not mean that our sensation is false and the object is not reall.

I would never, like I have already stated deny the existence of objects, such as tables, chairs, mountains and trees.

It's just that the materialist line of reasoning is totally circular.


I have read only little bits of philosophy and the termonology may be screwing me up.

Quite likely.

Let me assure you, that your not the first and you most certainly won't be the last. :D