Invader Zim
18th April 2004, 23:00
To What Extent Can The Generalship Of Wellington Be Considered To Be The Decisive Factor In The Defeat Of Napoleon Bonaparte At Waterloo?
The established view among many British historians is that Wellingtons battle was flawless, and was largely responsible for the victory of the allied army, at the Battle of waterloo and final defeat of napoleon Bonaparte. He became a national hero, and was later to become prime minister of Britain. When he died, thousands were to attend his funeral. However other historians have argued against this view, suggesting that other factors were ultimately responsible for the victory at Waterloo.
The main argument which supports the view that Wellingtons generalship is that he made good decisions both during and before the battle had commenced. His choice of position was a decisive factor both for its defensive and strategic value. The defensive value was that the location was two ridges facing each other, at the foot of Wellingtons ridge three buildings existed. On Wellingtons right was the Chateau of Goumont (Hougoumont), in the centre of his position La Haye Sainte, and on his left the cluster of buildings, Papelotte, La Haye and Smohain. In order to attack Wellingtons main line French troops would have to take these key positions from the Allied army. The use of a ridge was a common feature among many of Wellingtons battles. At Waterloo he used the Ridge to shelter his men from the French artillery, by having them lie down just behind the top of the ridge. This meant that they were out of site of the gunners, and reduced the casualties. It also was a method to hide his true numbers. When a French infantry attack came the men would be ordered to stand, and start firing at the French. However the position has been criticised by a number of people, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte who claimed that should Wellington have been defeated then the army would have been trapped and unable to retreat. However Jomini, usually pro-Napoleon criticised Napoleons view,
“Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the centre and each wing have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that such a position would be more favourable than an entirely open field. A beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger.”
Jomini is suggesting that Napoleon is incorrect in suggesting that the forest of Bois De Soignies would make retreat for a defeated army difficult. In fact he is suggesting that it would make it easier to retreat even than an open field. Another criticism came from Picton, who also believed that the position was unsuitable. Picton was a division commander in Wellingtons army and was highly experienced, and had fought in the Peninsula war. Jac Weller however wrote about Pictons view on the Waterloo position, Wellers book was first published in 1967,
“After years in the peninsula , he expected bold, bare slopes; he did not realise that similar tactical advantages could be obtained from the less rugged, rounded ridges at Waterloo. Wellingtons army was almost as well protected by these over most of the front as behind the crest of the Busaco mountains. Lateral communications were secure and shielded from enemy observation. The farm enclosures of Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and Papelotte-La Haye added elements of strength.”
Weller is suggesting that Pictons familiarity with the Harsh terrains of the Spanish and Portuguese peninsula had given him the impression that the Waterloo position was unsuitable for a defensive battle. This agrees with Napoleons view that the location was unsuitable, however for very different reasons. Napoleon was criticising Wellington having the Forest at his back, where as Picton was criticising the terrain in general. Weller however has Attacked Pictons view and listed the positions advantages. Weller having written the book in the late 1960’s has the benefit of hindsight which Picton did not, and also access to the views of both contemporaries and historians, Picton was limited in this. Napoleons attacks on Wellingtons position have been criticised even by those who usually support his views, such as Jomini. However the strength of the position is also shown by the actual difficulty that the French had removing Wellingtons troops from the Key positions. Hougoumont was the first place that Napoleon attacked, and from then on was attacked all day. It had been well prepared with loopholes added, and was well supplied, Wellington used about 3,500 men to defend Hougoumont.
“They kept about 14,000 veteran French infantry busy throughout the day and finally defeated them.
As many as 10,000 men from both armies are said to have fallen in and around Hougoumont.”
This quote from Weller outlines the strength of Hougoumont position. Especially when you consider that Napoleons entire force numbered approximately 73,000 men. The strength of the position can also be judged by French successes in taking it. The only major point taken against Wellington was La Haye Sainte, and the French were unable to capitalise on that gained advantage by the arrival of the Prussians.
The view that Wellington fought a flawless battle has also come under attack, from historians and contemporaries. A serious charge is that Wellington left 17,000 men at Hal, located to the west of the Battlefield. These troops would have been of great benefit to Wellingtons army. Wellingtons explanation for these troops, written in a letter to the Duc de Berri was,
“It is possible that the enemy will turn us at Hal, even though the weather is terrible and the roads detestable. Despite that, I have positioned Prince Frederick’s corps between Hal and Enghien. If the Former [the French] arrive, then I beg your highness to march to Antwerp…”
This source from Wellington himself suggests that he was worried about his right Flank. That is consistent with Wellingtons over all layout, it is also a view which is supported by Weller. Who points out that Wellington did not underrate Napoleon and was aware that the Emperor had often won by doing the unexpected, he writes specifically about the troops at Hal, saying,
“On the Morning of the 18th Wellington did not know the exact position of all French forces. He could see by personal observation that Napoleon had detached a considerable portion of his entire army. There were about 38,000 Frenchmen unaccounted for; he knew all of Grouchy’s movements in General but not his strength. If Grouchy had only half his force, the other half could have been moving to turn the Dukes right flank.”
This view is supported by Wellingtons general fear of being turned on the right flank as shown in Wellingtons letter to the Duc de Berri. However the German historian Peter Hofschroer has a different view as to why these troops were located at Hal rather than on the battle field,
“Wellington’s decision to deploy such a strong force at Hal is worthy of comment. Clearly, he feared his right Flank being Turned, and Louis’ court, of which the Duke was the protector, being surprised by a rapid French movement There were also other considerations. His Use of the remaining substantial force of Netherlands for this mission was an interesting choice. With the Prince of Orange present and about to fight at Waterloo, the Rulers of the new Netherlands Kingdom could claim a role in the victory, should one eventuate. In the Event of a defeat and the subsequent destruction of the Princes corps at Waterloo, then the continued existence of Part of the Netherlands Army might ensure that the Kingdom might not fall apart so easily. The deployment of such a substantial force at Hal would thus seem in part to have been a political decision…”
Hofschroer in this source is stating that the Duke clearly had fears about his right Flank, but the use of forces from the Netherlands for this task also made it a move of political importance. If Wellington was defeated then a significant force of Netherlands troops would survive battle and be able to stop the Netherlands from collapsing. All three of the sources used, support the fact that Wellington was fearful of his right flank. However Hofschroer points out a possible political reason for this deployment as well. A combination of these factors seems to be the most likely reason for keeping these troops at Hal. Another possible reason is the Netherlands had recently been under French rule, and its Army actually fought for the French, then there was a higher probability that these troops may also run, as they were unwilling to fight against their former comrades. This may also have been a factor the Duke considered when keeping these troops from the Netherlands out of the Battle, as if they had run then they would have caused damage to the Moral of the rest of Wellingtons army. However as Napoleon did not threaten Wellingtons Flank at Hal, as Wellington feared, these troops were wasted, and it is undeniably a waste of important resources to Wellington. Had they been at the battle these troops may have made a very positive impact to Wellingtons Army. So Wellingtons decision to place troops at Hal, was an error of judgment, though it was a logical move.
If Wellingtons generalship was not the factor responsible for, the victory at Waterloo, then other factors must have played an important role. Some of these factors were mere chance, while others mistakes on the part of the French and actions from the Prussians. The Prussian involvement is a very important factor, as Blücher arrived in time to threaten Napoleons right flank, and divert troops away from Napoleons attack on the British line following the fall of La Haye Sainte. The Prussians attacked the French at Plancenoit, a position on Napoleons right Flank, as well as reinforcing Wellingtons weaker left flank. The view that it was the Prussians saved Wellington from defeat is supported by the German Historian Peter Hofschroer, who has written,
History, particularly that written in the English language, regards the Duke of Wellington as the victor of Waterloo. However, if that victory is to be attributed to any one man, then surely it has to be field marshal Blücher. His army was the first to engage the French, suffered a significant defeat, then held its self together in the difficult circumstances of a retreat before arriving to tip the balance on the fateful field of Waterloo.
It is true that the Prussians did tip the Balance at Waterloo, and save Wellington from possible defeat, however they were late getting to the Battle field. Wellington had only ever agreed to make a stand at Waterloo because he had been promised by Blücher, that the Prussian army would come to his aid, and march to the Field at first light. Hofschroer states that Wellington expected the Prussians to arrive around 11am, however Wellington himself stated that “The roads are heavy. They can not be here before two or three o’clock.” However the Prussians still did not arrive until 4:30 PM, and did not arrive in force until 7:00 PM. Hofschroer says that the delays were caused by a fire in Wavre, and the poor weather, and hilly terrain, which would slow artillery movements down. This certainly accounts for some of the delays which the Prussian army faced, however, another theory for this delay also exists,
“The Prussians were late, very late, partly because of muddy roads and a fire in Wavre, but chiefly because Gneisenau intentionally delayed the troops, owing to his mistrust of Wellington”
This source states that Gneisenau, the Prussian chief of staff, deliberately delayed the Prussian advance to Waterloo, because of personal distrust of Wellington. The source does support the view that the poor condition of the roads and the fire in Wavre delayed the Prussians, like Hofschroer states, however, Hofschroer makes no mention of these allegations against Gneisenau, yet Gneisenau is one of the major sources to his book “Waterloo a German Victory”. Hofschroer’s book is largely an attack on Wellington, in favour of showing the German involvement in Waterloo as the major factor in the Allied victory. He uses an introductory quotation at the beginning of his book rather than a dedication, from Gneisenau, which attacks Wellington, which displays Gneisenau’s personal dislike for Wellington,
“The worst behaviour comes from Welligton, who without us would have been smashed to pieces. He did not keep his promises to be prepared to come to our assistance on the 16th, but, not considering the defeats he caused, we chivalrously came to his assistance on the 18th. We cleared his way to Paris, for without us, he would not have got there so quickly. We saved him from a second battle thanks to our rapid pursuit, for it was we who scattered the enemy, so no Britons needed to fight a battle after the 18th. The man has rewarded our many services with the most contemptuous ingratitude.”
Gneisenau believed that Wellington would abandon the Prussians to the French and retreat, and so attempted to stop a Prussian advance to the Waterloo position, so that the Prussians did not have to fight the French alone for a second time. The view that, if the Prussians had arrived when they were supposed to, between 11am and 3pm, then the Battle would not have needed saving, and the Prussians would not have turned up just in time to “tip the balance”, appears to be correct. Wellington only ever agreed to fight at the Waterloo position because Blücher, promised to come to his assistance prior to the battle.
The same poor weather which partly delayed the Prussian arrival also delayed the French attack on Wellingtons position. The poor weather would have made the march to the Waterloo position far more difficult that under normal circumstances, it would also have not helped the condition of the troops, whom would have been wet cold and in need of rest, some troops still had not arrived from Rossome. As the French were reliant on defeating the British before the Prussians arrived on the field, every hour counted.
One of the factors which lead to the defeat of napoleons army, was the tactic used by the French. The infantry would form into vast columns of men, and then march up to the enemy and charging them with bayonets. However it usually never went that far, the psychological effect of the column was so great that enemies usually ran at the site of them. Napoleon had used this tactic to defeat Europe’s armies. This tactic however did not work on the British forces. This was because the British forces were more proficient at firing muskets than any other power at the time. This was because the troops trained with live ammunition, unlike other countries armed forces. The nature of the column was that only the front ranks could fire, those behind the front ranks could not, without hitting there comrades. In line however every musket could fire, with the efficiency of Wellingtons armies musketry the French columns were always beaten back. Even the infamous imperial guard, when faced with Wellingtons line was defeated,
“When the last attacking column made its appearance through the fog and smoke, which through out the day lay thick on the ground. Their advance was as usual with the French, very noisy and evidently reluctant, the officers being in advance some yards cheering their men on. They however kept up a confused and running fire, which we did not reply to until they reached nearly on a level with us, when a well directed volley put them into confusion which they did not appear to recover, but after a short interval of musketry on both sides, they turned about to a man and fled.”
The letter describes the defeat of a French column, which was already disheartened by the defeat of several other columns The source is a letter written by from Lieut-Colonel Dawson Kelly, some time after the event in 1834. This tactic used by the French was clearly ineffective against Wellingtons army, and in Waterloo a poor tactic, especially as it had been defeated throughout the Peninsula. If the French had adapted their tactics to face Wellingtons army, then the battle may have had a different outcome.
The view that Wellington’s generalship was the decisive factor in the battle of Waterloo, can sustained to an extent, as Wellingtons almost flawless command of the battle, and skill in positioning his army, put great pressure on Bonaparte’s army. However other factors such as the flawed French battle tactics also played a part in the ultimate defeat of the French forces. The actions of Blucher and the Prussian arrival, though agreed by Wellington and Blucher prior to the battle, certainly was the factor which tipped the balance from being in favour of the French after the capture of La Haye Sainte, to an Allied victory. The poor weather which partly delayed the French attack on Wellington, also gave the Prussians more time to reach the battlefield, without this delay the Prussians would not have reached the field in time, and the battle would likely have been lost. These factors are all very important in defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. So the view that all factors such as French errors, Prussian timing, weather in Wellingtons favour and Wellingtons own Generalship, are all equally important to the allied victory at Waterloo. No one factor being anymore decisive than another, because without all the events being as they were the outcome could have been much different.
Sources
“The Waterloo Letters” Edited by H.T. Siborne.
“Wellington at Waterloo” by Jac Weller
“Wellington The Iron Duke” by Richard Holmes
“Waterloo a German Victory” by Peter Hofschroer
The established view among many British historians is that Wellingtons battle was flawless, and was largely responsible for the victory of the allied army, at the Battle of waterloo and final defeat of napoleon Bonaparte. He became a national hero, and was later to become prime minister of Britain. When he died, thousands were to attend his funeral. However other historians have argued against this view, suggesting that other factors were ultimately responsible for the victory at Waterloo.
The main argument which supports the view that Wellingtons generalship is that he made good decisions both during and before the battle had commenced. His choice of position was a decisive factor both for its defensive and strategic value. The defensive value was that the location was two ridges facing each other, at the foot of Wellingtons ridge three buildings existed. On Wellingtons right was the Chateau of Goumont (Hougoumont), in the centre of his position La Haye Sainte, and on his left the cluster of buildings, Papelotte, La Haye and Smohain. In order to attack Wellingtons main line French troops would have to take these key positions from the Allied army. The use of a ridge was a common feature among many of Wellingtons battles. At Waterloo he used the Ridge to shelter his men from the French artillery, by having them lie down just behind the top of the ridge. This meant that they were out of site of the gunners, and reduced the casualties. It also was a method to hide his true numbers. When a French infantry attack came the men would be ordered to stand, and start firing at the French. However the position has been criticised by a number of people, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte who claimed that should Wellington have been defeated then the army would have been trapped and unable to retreat. However Jomini, usually pro-Napoleon criticised Napoleons view,
“Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the centre and each wing have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that such a position would be more favourable than an entirely open field. A beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger.”
Jomini is suggesting that Napoleon is incorrect in suggesting that the forest of Bois De Soignies would make retreat for a defeated army difficult. In fact he is suggesting that it would make it easier to retreat even than an open field. Another criticism came from Picton, who also believed that the position was unsuitable. Picton was a division commander in Wellingtons army and was highly experienced, and had fought in the Peninsula war. Jac Weller however wrote about Pictons view on the Waterloo position, Wellers book was first published in 1967,
“After years in the peninsula , he expected bold, bare slopes; he did not realise that similar tactical advantages could be obtained from the less rugged, rounded ridges at Waterloo. Wellingtons army was almost as well protected by these over most of the front as behind the crest of the Busaco mountains. Lateral communications were secure and shielded from enemy observation. The farm enclosures of Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and Papelotte-La Haye added elements of strength.”
Weller is suggesting that Pictons familiarity with the Harsh terrains of the Spanish and Portuguese peninsula had given him the impression that the Waterloo position was unsuitable for a defensive battle. This agrees with Napoleons view that the location was unsuitable, however for very different reasons. Napoleon was criticising Wellington having the Forest at his back, where as Picton was criticising the terrain in general. Weller however has Attacked Pictons view and listed the positions advantages. Weller having written the book in the late 1960’s has the benefit of hindsight which Picton did not, and also access to the views of both contemporaries and historians, Picton was limited in this. Napoleons attacks on Wellingtons position have been criticised even by those who usually support his views, such as Jomini. However the strength of the position is also shown by the actual difficulty that the French had removing Wellingtons troops from the Key positions. Hougoumont was the first place that Napoleon attacked, and from then on was attacked all day. It had been well prepared with loopholes added, and was well supplied, Wellington used about 3,500 men to defend Hougoumont.
“They kept about 14,000 veteran French infantry busy throughout the day and finally defeated them.
As many as 10,000 men from both armies are said to have fallen in and around Hougoumont.”
This quote from Weller outlines the strength of Hougoumont position. Especially when you consider that Napoleons entire force numbered approximately 73,000 men. The strength of the position can also be judged by French successes in taking it. The only major point taken against Wellington was La Haye Sainte, and the French were unable to capitalise on that gained advantage by the arrival of the Prussians.
The view that Wellington fought a flawless battle has also come under attack, from historians and contemporaries. A serious charge is that Wellington left 17,000 men at Hal, located to the west of the Battlefield. These troops would have been of great benefit to Wellingtons army. Wellingtons explanation for these troops, written in a letter to the Duc de Berri was,
“It is possible that the enemy will turn us at Hal, even though the weather is terrible and the roads detestable. Despite that, I have positioned Prince Frederick’s corps between Hal and Enghien. If the Former [the French] arrive, then I beg your highness to march to Antwerp…”
This source from Wellington himself suggests that he was worried about his right Flank. That is consistent with Wellingtons over all layout, it is also a view which is supported by Weller. Who points out that Wellington did not underrate Napoleon and was aware that the Emperor had often won by doing the unexpected, he writes specifically about the troops at Hal, saying,
“On the Morning of the 18th Wellington did not know the exact position of all French forces. He could see by personal observation that Napoleon had detached a considerable portion of his entire army. There were about 38,000 Frenchmen unaccounted for; he knew all of Grouchy’s movements in General but not his strength. If Grouchy had only half his force, the other half could have been moving to turn the Dukes right flank.”
This view is supported by Wellingtons general fear of being turned on the right flank as shown in Wellingtons letter to the Duc de Berri. However the German historian Peter Hofschroer has a different view as to why these troops were located at Hal rather than on the battle field,
“Wellington’s decision to deploy such a strong force at Hal is worthy of comment. Clearly, he feared his right Flank being Turned, and Louis’ court, of which the Duke was the protector, being surprised by a rapid French movement There were also other considerations. His Use of the remaining substantial force of Netherlands for this mission was an interesting choice. With the Prince of Orange present and about to fight at Waterloo, the Rulers of the new Netherlands Kingdom could claim a role in the victory, should one eventuate. In the Event of a defeat and the subsequent destruction of the Princes corps at Waterloo, then the continued existence of Part of the Netherlands Army might ensure that the Kingdom might not fall apart so easily. The deployment of such a substantial force at Hal would thus seem in part to have been a political decision…”
Hofschroer in this source is stating that the Duke clearly had fears about his right Flank, but the use of forces from the Netherlands for this task also made it a move of political importance. If Wellington was defeated then a significant force of Netherlands troops would survive battle and be able to stop the Netherlands from collapsing. All three of the sources used, support the fact that Wellington was fearful of his right flank. However Hofschroer points out a possible political reason for this deployment as well. A combination of these factors seems to be the most likely reason for keeping these troops at Hal. Another possible reason is the Netherlands had recently been under French rule, and its Army actually fought for the French, then there was a higher probability that these troops may also run, as they were unwilling to fight against their former comrades. This may also have been a factor the Duke considered when keeping these troops from the Netherlands out of the Battle, as if they had run then they would have caused damage to the Moral of the rest of Wellingtons army. However as Napoleon did not threaten Wellingtons Flank at Hal, as Wellington feared, these troops were wasted, and it is undeniably a waste of important resources to Wellington. Had they been at the battle these troops may have made a very positive impact to Wellingtons Army. So Wellingtons decision to place troops at Hal, was an error of judgment, though it was a logical move.
If Wellingtons generalship was not the factor responsible for, the victory at Waterloo, then other factors must have played an important role. Some of these factors were mere chance, while others mistakes on the part of the French and actions from the Prussians. The Prussian involvement is a very important factor, as Blücher arrived in time to threaten Napoleons right flank, and divert troops away from Napoleons attack on the British line following the fall of La Haye Sainte. The Prussians attacked the French at Plancenoit, a position on Napoleons right Flank, as well as reinforcing Wellingtons weaker left flank. The view that it was the Prussians saved Wellington from defeat is supported by the German Historian Peter Hofschroer, who has written,
History, particularly that written in the English language, regards the Duke of Wellington as the victor of Waterloo. However, if that victory is to be attributed to any one man, then surely it has to be field marshal Blücher. His army was the first to engage the French, suffered a significant defeat, then held its self together in the difficult circumstances of a retreat before arriving to tip the balance on the fateful field of Waterloo.
It is true that the Prussians did tip the Balance at Waterloo, and save Wellington from possible defeat, however they were late getting to the Battle field. Wellington had only ever agreed to make a stand at Waterloo because he had been promised by Blücher, that the Prussian army would come to his aid, and march to the Field at first light. Hofschroer states that Wellington expected the Prussians to arrive around 11am, however Wellington himself stated that “The roads are heavy. They can not be here before two or three o’clock.” However the Prussians still did not arrive until 4:30 PM, and did not arrive in force until 7:00 PM. Hofschroer says that the delays were caused by a fire in Wavre, and the poor weather, and hilly terrain, which would slow artillery movements down. This certainly accounts for some of the delays which the Prussian army faced, however, another theory for this delay also exists,
“The Prussians were late, very late, partly because of muddy roads and a fire in Wavre, but chiefly because Gneisenau intentionally delayed the troops, owing to his mistrust of Wellington”
This source states that Gneisenau, the Prussian chief of staff, deliberately delayed the Prussian advance to Waterloo, because of personal distrust of Wellington. The source does support the view that the poor condition of the roads and the fire in Wavre delayed the Prussians, like Hofschroer states, however, Hofschroer makes no mention of these allegations against Gneisenau, yet Gneisenau is one of the major sources to his book “Waterloo a German Victory”. Hofschroer’s book is largely an attack on Wellington, in favour of showing the German involvement in Waterloo as the major factor in the Allied victory. He uses an introductory quotation at the beginning of his book rather than a dedication, from Gneisenau, which attacks Wellington, which displays Gneisenau’s personal dislike for Wellington,
“The worst behaviour comes from Welligton, who without us would have been smashed to pieces. He did not keep his promises to be prepared to come to our assistance on the 16th, but, not considering the defeats he caused, we chivalrously came to his assistance on the 18th. We cleared his way to Paris, for without us, he would not have got there so quickly. We saved him from a second battle thanks to our rapid pursuit, for it was we who scattered the enemy, so no Britons needed to fight a battle after the 18th. The man has rewarded our many services with the most contemptuous ingratitude.”
Gneisenau believed that Wellington would abandon the Prussians to the French and retreat, and so attempted to stop a Prussian advance to the Waterloo position, so that the Prussians did not have to fight the French alone for a second time. The view that, if the Prussians had arrived when they were supposed to, between 11am and 3pm, then the Battle would not have needed saving, and the Prussians would not have turned up just in time to “tip the balance”, appears to be correct. Wellington only ever agreed to fight at the Waterloo position because Blücher, promised to come to his assistance prior to the battle.
The same poor weather which partly delayed the Prussian arrival also delayed the French attack on Wellingtons position. The poor weather would have made the march to the Waterloo position far more difficult that under normal circumstances, it would also have not helped the condition of the troops, whom would have been wet cold and in need of rest, some troops still had not arrived from Rossome. As the French were reliant on defeating the British before the Prussians arrived on the field, every hour counted.
One of the factors which lead to the defeat of napoleons army, was the tactic used by the French. The infantry would form into vast columns of men, and then march up to the enemy and charging them with bayonets. However it usually never went that far, the psychological effect of the column was so great that enemies usually ran at the site of them. Napoleon had used this tactic to defeat Europe’s armies. This tactic however did not work on the British forces. This was because the British forces were more proficient at firing muskets than any other power at the time. This was because the troops trained with live ammunition, unlike other countries armed forces. The nature of the column was that only the front ranks could fire, those behind the front ranks could not, without hitting there comrades. In line however every musket could fire, with the efficiency of Wellingtons armies musketry the French columns were always beaten back. Even the infamous imperial guard, when faced with Wellingtons line was defeated,
“When the last attacking column made its appearance through the fog and smoke, which through out the day lay thick on the ground. Their advance was as usual with the French, very noisy and evidently reluctant, the officers being in advance some yards cheering their men on. They however kept up a confused and running fire, which we did not reply to until they reached nearly on a level with us, when a well directed volley put them into confusion which they did not appear to recover, but after a short interval of musketry on both sides, they turned about to a man and fled.”
The letter describes the defeat of a French column, which was already disheartened by the defeat of several other columns The source is a letter written by from Lieut-Colonel Dawson Kelly, some time after the event in 1834. This tactic used by the French was clearly ineffective against Wellingtons army, and in Waterloo a poor tactic, especially as it had been defeated throughout the Peninsula. If the French had adapted their tactics to face Wellingtons army, then the battle may have had a different outcome.
The view that Wellington’s generalship was the decisive factor in the battle of Waterloo, can sustained to an extent, as Wellingtons almost flawless command of the battle, and skill in positioning his army, put great pressure on Bonaparte’s army. However other factors such as the flawed French battle tactics also played a part in the ultimate defeat of the French forces. The actions of Blucher and the Prussian arrival, though agreed by Wellington and Blucher prior to the battle, certainly was the factor which tipped the balance from being in favour of the French after the capture of La Haye Sainte, to an Allied victory. The poor weather which partly delayed the French attack on Wellington, also gave the Prussians more time to reach the battlefield, without this delay the Prussians would not have reached the field in time, and the battle would likely have been lost. These factors are all very important in defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. So the view that all factors such as French errors, Prussian timing, weather in Wellingtons favour and Wellingtons own Generalship, are all equally important to the allied victory at Waterloo. No one factor being anymore decisive than another, because without all the events being as they were the outcome could have been much different.
Sources
“The Waterloo Letters” Edited by H.T. Siborne.
“Wellington at Waterloo” by Jac Weller
“Wellington The Iron Duke” by Richard Holmes
“Waterloo a German Victory” by Peter Hofschroer