Spinoza

[Pedro Alonso Lopez]

According to Spinoza, a substance is that which is 'in itself and concieved through itself', an attribute is that which ' the intellect percieves as a substance, as constituting its essence', and modes are 'the affections of substance, or that which is in another through which also it is concieved'.

Spinoza in his ethics deduced a strict substantial monism, according to which God is the only substance. Spinoza's God is the only substance. Spinoza's God is a self caused substance of infinate attributes, including both extension and though, from whose nautre everything possible neccessarily flows. It follows that individual things, such as human beings, can only be modes of this one substance- which Spinoza calls God or nature.

What are your views on Spinoza especially in relationt to substance, I have put a little bit of an explanation above for those who arent acquainted with his philosophy.

[Wenty]

I've only read a bit on spinoza but it seems logical to reject the cartesian conception of there being three substances, god, soul and matter is it?

If you are to believe in God (or be a pantheist as spinoza was) as the only substance it follows that everything must come from this source or everything. Of course there are variations on this, i.e. berkely's idea of mind dependence reality has God as an imp. role in keeping things in order.

The definition of a substance as 'in itself and conceived through itself' seems confusing.

[Pedro Alonso Lopez]

Well I would say it is logical to rejest the Cartesian conception of three substances, I am at the moment quite interested in Spinoza's strict substanial monism.



The definition of a substance as 'in itself and conceived through itself' seems confusing.

With Spinoza you just need to keep at it, quite confusing but it comes together the more you get into it.


On the whole God issue, I was thinking about Spinoza's argument from a logical point of view:

(a) There is a substance that has every attribute.
(b) There cannot be two substances that have an attribute in common
© There cannot be a substance that has no attributes

Therefore

(d) There cannot be two substances. Cc64

From a logical point of view the argument follows and is valid but premise (a) depends on an ontological argument for Gods existence. Much like the argument put forth by Descartes and the subsequent problems it lead to we must in order to follow Spinoza’s logic agree beforehand on an ontological argument for God’s existence.

[Pedro Alonso Lopez]

Anybody else any ideas?

[Trissy]

But if it is all based upon the ontological argument then doesn't his whole system fall flat? If we consider Anselm's two versions of the ontological argument then don't the problems hinder Spinoza's system?

The first version Anselms puts forward goes roughly like this

1. God is ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’
2. A being that exists in reality and in the mind is greater then one that exists just in the mind.
hence
3.God exists in both reality and the mind

But as Kant points out Anselm is treating existence as a first order predicate (ie a quality that applies to objects) when it is in fact a second order predicate (ie a quality that applies to ideas).

I suppose we could take Anselm's second version of the ontological argument which is based on necessary existence but even that is flawed. If we take his version to be summed up in the following syllogism...

1.God is ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’
2.A being that exists necessarily in both reality and the mind is greater then a being that exists contingently in both the reality and the mind.
hence
3. God exists necessarily in both reality and the mind.

But then we are faced with Hume's argument against necessary existence (namely that necessity implies that I cannot imagine that something is not the case [e.g. 2+2=4], and since I can imgine God not existing then his existence cannot be necessary). Does Spinoza make any attempt to solve these problems in the ontological argument?

[Pedro Alonso Lopez]

Spinoza has a special version of the ontological argument. I'll have a look at it now and post his version.