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Die Neue Zeit
29th October 2016, 04:40
The roots of 1917: Kautsky, the state, and revolution in Imperial Russia (https://johnriddell.wordpress.com/2016/10/13/the-roots-of-1917-kautsky-the-state-and-revolution-in-imperial-russia/)

(Excerpts from article by Eric Blanc)

As the Kari expulsion illustrates, the Finnish Social Democratic Party, unlike the German SPD, did not slowly evolve in an integrationist, class-collaborationist direction. Finlands Social Democracy was unique among Europes mass socialist parties operating in contexts of political freedom in that it became more committed to revolutionary social democracy after 1905.

Had Finland not been part of the Tsarist Empire, it is likely that the Finnish Social Democracy would have evolved down an accomodationist path similar to that of so many Western socialist currents, in which increasing bureaucratization and parliamentary integration relegated radical leaders to an internal minority by the eve of World War One. Yet, unlike every other legal socialist party in Europe, the Finnish social democracy directly took part in the 1905 revolution. The general strike in the fall radicalized urban and rural proletarians in Finland, sparking an explosive mass upheaval that swept out much of the partys old guard leadership and brought in a new group of dedicated Marxists, committed to implementing a strict independent class perspective.

So while the spread of revolutionary social democracy came relatively late to Finland, it played a pivotal role in breaking the workers movement from a longstanding tradition of alliances with the upper class. From 1905 onwards, the experience of Finnish socialism constitutes a particularly revealing test case for analyzing the political dynamics and possibilities of patient orthodox social democracy in a context of political freedom and parliamentary democracy.

[...]

As an extended discussion of the role of soviets during and after 1917 is beyond the scope of this paper, I will limit myself to a few comments. First, while the soviets represented a more direct form of democracy than envisioned even by the early Kautsky, the extent of the divergences should not be overstated. As we saw earlier, Kautsky similarly rejected bourgeois parliamentarism as a sham and called for a republic in which the separation between working people and the state would be broken down through the election of all state officials, the arming of the people, the extension of local self-government, and merging of executive and legislative powers. Such a proletarian parliamentary republic resembled the soviet model far more than any existing capitalist democracy.

[...]

A strong Finnish parliament and parliamentary tradition posed obstacles and opportunities that socialists did not face in the rest of the empire. Unlike in the other regions of imperial Russia, there was a long tradition of political freedom and a parliament in Finland; as advocated by orthodox doctrine for such conditions, the Finnish Social Democracy had a strong focus on parliamentary activity. In fact, the party won an absolute majority in the Finnish parliament in 1916 and sought (ultimately without success) for much of 1917 to use this institution to meet the basic demands of the working class. In such a context, it is not surprising that among neither the Finnish socialists nor the working class did there emerge a push to build workers councils in 1917.

Late in the summer of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government in alliance with Finnish conservatives illegally dissolved Finlands socialist-led parliament and called for new elections.

[...]

Finland in many ways confirms the traditional view of revolution espoused by Kautsky: Through patient class-conscious organization and education, socialists won a majority in parliament, leading the right wing to dissolve the institution, which in turn sparked a socialist-led revolution. The Finnish partys orthodox preference for a peaceful, defensive, and parliamentary strategy did not ultimately prevent it from violently overthrowing the existing capitalist state and taking steps towards socialism. In contrast, the bureaucratized German Social Democracy actively upheld capitalist rule in 191819 and violently smashed efforts by revolutionary workers and socialists to overturn it.

My argument is not that the Finnish experience shows the path that all workers revolutions will take in conditions of bourgeois democracy. Nor does it follow that Marxists must always seek to win a parliamentary majority before attempting to overthrow a bourgeois-democratic state or that soviet-like bodies cannot arise in parliamentary polities. The lessons of the 1918-23 German Revolution and other subsequent working-class upheavals undercut any simplistic schemas along those lines. Moreover, Finland showed not only the strengths but also the potential limitations of social democratic orthodoxy: a hesitancy to abandon the parliamentary arena; a tendency to be overly-defensive; an overemphasis on peaceful tactics; and an underestimation of mass action.

Noa Rodman
29th October 2016, 15:50
As we saw earlier, Kautsky similarly rejected bourgeois parliamentarism as a sham and called for a republic in which the separation between working people and the state would be broken down through the election of all state officials, .... and the merging of executive and legislative powers.

There is no clear evidence that the orthodox Kautsky ever argued for the merging of executive and legislative powers of the state (as opposed to the commune).


In place of the State, Marx foresaw “a national delegation in Paris,” confronting “a central government with few but very important functions.” This, however, implied the same separation of legislative and executive powers which Marx desired to see abolished so far as the Commune was concerned.

Consequently, it may well be doubted whether Marx desired the same institution for the State as for the Commune. But even if Marx wished to see all the powers of the State combined in a single body, this would signify nothing more than the persistence of memories of the great bourgeois revolution, whose forms it was the custom to regard as those of revolutions in general, inasmuch as the peculiar conditions for the proletarian revolution had not yet developed with sufficient clearness. This did not take place until the last generation.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1924/labour/ch02_c.htm#se

The combination of powers in Sovnarkom was simply a tradition taken over already from the Provisional Government (which had no parliament).

I would even suggest, that the merger of powers is something found even under ordinary political system still today; ie, most of the passed laws are submitted and written by the government. Actually the legislative power is subordinated to the executive.

Thus Kautsky's demand of the separation of powers can be seen as a step toward democratization. Whereas the supposed orthodox revolutionary position merely continues the executive prerogative (Locke).

John Nada
30th October 2016, 04:33
Late in the summer of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government in alliance with Finnish conservatives illegally dissolved Finlands socialist-led parliament and called for new elections. In response to this anti-democratic bourgeois coup, the Finnish socialist leadership protested sharply and then prevaricated for months. Though conditions of crisis and counter-revolution now put insurrection firmly on the agenda, it remained very hesitant to break from the parliamentary arena. At the same time, however, it fought hard against any attempts by the Finnish bourgeoisie to establish a police force and army to prop up its rule (the old repressive apparatus in Finland had also been destroyed in February 1917).
Finland in many ways confirms the traditional view of revolution espoused by Kautsky: Through patient class-conscious organization and education, socialists won a majority in parliament, leading the right wing to dissolve the institution, which in turn sparked a socialist-led revolution. The Finnish partys orthodox preference for a peaceful, defensive, and parliamentary strategy did not ultimately prevent it from violently overthrowing the existing capitalist state and taking steps towards socialism. In contrast, the bureaucratized German Social Democracy actively upheld capitalist rule in 191819 and violently smashed efforts by revolutionary workers and socialists to overturn it.This sounds similar to the armed electoralism strategy, a variant of insurrection, with elements of the Leninist insurrectionary strategy. From Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy
7. The Strategy of Armed Electoralism

Based on the theory that a partial seizure of power is possible by legal means (the condition being that a large mass struggle exists to guarantee democratic rights) and that this partial seizure of power will provide the revolutionary movement with the tools that, in conjunction with the resources of the revolutionary forces themselves, will be enough to ensure the advance of the revolutionary process and to hold in check the reactionary counter-offensive (military coup or foreign intervention). Organizations that adopt this strategy outfit themselves with a military potential to ensure a seizure of power which is actually based on legal methods. General Pinochet did a lot to discredit this strategic hypothesis, which had already experienced a bloody failure with the decimation of the Austrian Schutzbund in 1934.Interestingly, it seems the Austrian Social Democrats tried to pursue a similar strategy.
My argument is not that the Finnish experience shows the path that all workers revolutions will take in conditions of bourgeois democracy. Nor does it follow that Marxists must always seek to win a parliamentary majority before attempting to overthrow a bourgeois-democratic state or that soviet-like bodies cannot arise in parliamentary polities. The lessons of the 1918-23 German Revolution and other subsequent working-class upheavals undercut any simplistic schemas along those lines. Moreover, Finland showed not only the strengths but also the potential limitations of social democratic orthodoxy: a hesitancy to abandon the parliamentary arena; a tendency to be overly-defensive; an overemphasis on peaceful tactics; and an underestimation of mass action.This is a common form of opportunism among dogmatic adherents to insurrectionary strategies:
Amongst adherents of insurrection theology, their goal appears somewhat like the horizon: the more they move towards it, the further it moves away. By separating the medium-term objectives from the (supposed) long-term objective armed insurrection they are developing a line that might strengthen the Party and its influence in the medium term as regards Party-oriented work, the organization of advanced workers, tactics in mass struggles, etc. but which objectively hinders the emergence of those objective and subjective conditions necessary for the revolutionary crisis that will set off the insurrection.

Die Neue Zeit
30th October 2016, 18:22
There is no clear evidence that the orthodox Kautsky ever argued for the merging of executive and legislative powers of the state (as opposed to the commune).

Perhaps, comrade, but his commentary was way before the time of rule by cabinet decree, war cabinets, etc. Sovnarkom, State Committee of Defense (GKO), China's Central People's Government, Cuba's 1959-1976 Council of Ministers (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_parliamentary_election,_1976), and even Churchill's war cabinet came later.

Even the post-orthodox Kautsky didn't criticize the powers of Sovnarkom, per se.

Since you deftly turned to present affairs (if you hadn't, I would have, anyway), I'll have to create a separate discussion in Theory.

ShraddhaKapoor
9th December 2016, 07:16
hii