To what extent did Stalin's purges hurt the party?

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Stalin's purges occurred at a time when the USSR was desperately industrializing and was preparing for what would become the largest military conflict in human history. I've seen it argued that the hierarchical authoritarianism of the USSR during the 30s was a form of ruthless pragmatism designed to prepare the nation for defense against foreign imperialism. Had they not gone through this period, the argument goes, the USSR would have been left vulnerable to economic disaster at home and foreign intervention from abroad (and we all know that such foreign intervention did come in the form of German Tiger tanks). The USSR did see unprecedented growth in industry and defense capabilities during this time period, at least by the standards of Russian history. However, if you're cutting some huge swath through the party and defense establishment and torturing otherwise competent people into what may well be a false confession (before executing them based on said confession), you're presumably going to kill off some of the people best suited to either (a) organize a defense of the nation or (b) organize the industrialization and economic growth of the nation.

To what extent did Stalin's purges actually hinder the capacity of the USSR to respond to the challenges of the 30s and the 40s? Insofar as they did hinder this, does it undermine the pragmatist defense of Stalin's authoritarianism?

[Antiochus]

Well, just to show 'to what extent', the tactics we associate with "Blitzkrieg" (i.e massed independent tank formations closely supported by aircraft) were invented in the USSR for the Red Army. But largely due to the purges and the 'chance' that many of the surviving officers were conservative (in terms of military stratagem), the Soviet Army failed to really modernize anywhere near the level that it could have.

This also went into various defense technologies whose developers were savagely purged, putting them in the back-burner or not really developing them very much before the start of the war. Some of these technologies included things like RADAR, which if fully developed and well integrated could have, even if the USSR were caught by surprise, saved the Red Air force from the absolutely disastrous first weeks of the war; where it was losing aircraft at a rate of over 20:1.

The Soviet High command was gutted. This was particularly evident in the higher ranks of the Soviet military. It isn't any coincidence that Zhukov (one of the few 'saved') would have such a prominent role later on. Many of the Soviet generals when the war began had little actual experience, many of them were just yes-men. This is further illustrated by the terrible performance (despite being well armed) of the Red Army in the Winter War; against Finns armed with WW1 rifles and no anti-tank equipment.

So yeah, I suppose you could argue that it "solidified" the political/military union into one, but was it worth it? All the evidence shows the contrary.

[Guardia Rossa]

Well, just to show 'to what extent', the tactics we associate with "Blitzkrieg" (i.e massed independent tank formations closely supported by aircraft) were invented in the USSR for the Red Army.

Just to make it clear, Blitzkrieg is not simply quick combined arms, Blitzkrieg is the quick advance of combined arms operations into the heartlands of the enemy before he can react, destroying his defensive capability directly. USSR developed "Deep Operation" which is combined arms in large scale, using to full advantage the huge manpower of USSR and focusing more on weakening and strangling and the enemy army by flowing into the front and encircling the enemy. The reason of this difference is obvious, if the enemy of Germany managed to react and establish an attrition war, the low german manpower would be their defeat, so they had to quickly destroy the enemy. But in the Soviet case it was the contrary, they had huge manpower and could capitalize this to achieve greater success.

[Invader Zim]

Actually, the principles of Blitzkrieg were developed in the First World War and expanded upon during the 1920s, read Fuller's 1919 plan and Basil Liddell-Hart.

[Aslan]

Blitzkrieg was a German military term for ''lightning war'', which was developed during WWI. Using effectively equipped soldiers and extremely quick strategic maneuvering to overwhelm opponents. The Russians used no such thing, instead relying on sheer numbers to hammer their enemies to dust.

The Russians were always less advanced than their opponents. But they used numbers to win. Similar to the Chinese strategy used to this day.

[Blake's Baby]

The rather esoteric question of the Blitzkrieg aside, the main point is 'did the purges hurt the party, and does this negate a pragmatic defence?'

Of course they hurt the party, they pretty much destroyed it; but they made Stalin more secure, and that surely was the point. As for 'pragmatism', when Stalin gets to set policy, then what is good for Stalin is good for the Party, Russia and the working class. So destroying the 'Old Bolsheviks' and anyone else that could conceivably be a threat is obviously a good thing. For Stalin.l

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

You guys are reflecting what I already thought. The motivation for the thread though in specific was an argument Rafiq made in another thread where he said that the forced grain requisition which lead to mass famine was necessary for the USSR to modernize and industrialize. My thought is, that would have been unnecessary had Stalin not utterly gutted his bureaucracy and military high command afterwards, but I wasn't sure if that was just "bourgeois propaganda" or whatever phrase Stalinoids utilize. As such, it was also motivated by the fact that Stalinists seem to overlook or minimize the significance of this period, when it seems obvious to me that if you torture bureaucrats into confessing, aside from the fact that they will make false confessions you will end up actually killing a lot of good talent, too.

[Rafiq]

It is not a matter of efficiency or how better some specialists were compared to others. If we are speaking in terms of what was necessary for the Soviet Union's survival, then political unification had to triumph over all considerations.

The bureaucracy had to be purged, as well as the military, not because they were 'incompetent' in what they did, but because they were not politically homogeneous enough. If we speak about 'competency' and 'efficiency', what are we talking about here? With what reference point? What would the military specialists be competent in doing, exactly, if they are not politically unified? A hammer is important, true. What is of foremost importance is that the wielder of that hammer has something he can do with the hammer that is in his interests. The Soviet Union's existence was not a given. It was a political entity. Without guaranteeing homogenization of the military and total political centralization, its existence is jeopardized, and you can very well throw away any talk of military prowess if this military doesn't have a definite political master, a will that it can enforce.

The 30's were still an ambiguous time, and it is certainly true that the fate of the Soviet Union here was rather undecided. What the purges did was ensure loyalty to the Soviet state, and command over them in a centralized manner (i.e. as opposed to various rivaling factions with disproportionate influence in this or that sector of the state with no consideration for holistic needs in place).

Of course, explaining why something happened is always going to be conflated with crude determinism. The stupidity of this notion is the assumption that the Soviet state was at the level of will, following our political, ideological rationality. The reality is that an entirely different rationality was in place - assuming that the purges happened out of 'irrationality' and 'stupidity' is to presuppose that the culprits share our standards of reason, but they didn't. The Soviet Union by this time had its own entirely different inner-logic - one that did not include the protection of a proletarian dictatorship, etc. (likewise, the protection of the proletarian dictatorship and the soviet union's survival were inversely proportional). Trotskyists understood this, and it is a huge conundrum they face to this day. Go on and ask any (typical, that is, I understand there are more 'creative' types) Trotskyist of it. You won't get a satisfactory answer.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Torturing someone (or, alternatively, hundreds of thousands of people) into falsely confessing to divisive acts and executing them does not really mean one has actually unified the party.


With what reference point? What would the military specialists be competent in doing, exactly, if they are not politically unifiedPlanning effective military strategies? Total political unity is not necessary for military planning. On the contrary, it can hinder it. Fear of superiors is widely cited as one reason among many (but a particularly important one) for the disastrous inability of the Soviets to defend against Nazi Germany for some time. As long as a single strategic vision can be built out of the seeming disunity of various voices, then you can obtain the singular will necessary to win a war but without literally killing off one's own competent officers.


The 30's were still an ambiguous time, and it is certainly true that the fate of the Soviet Union here was rather undecided. What the purges did was ensure loyalty to the Soviet state, and command over them in a centralized manner (i.e. as opposed to various rivaling factions with disproportionate influence in this or that sector of the state with no consideration for holistic needs in place).I think it is a mistake to assume that any disunity anywhere in the state is a fundamental threat to a regime. It might be a threat to other political factions in the regime, but not the whole regime itself. Yes, there needs to be some political cohesiveness, but if you end up liquidating most of your most competent people, especially if they are liquidated on questionable charges, you are throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Other regimes have obtained a level of unity without such extreme measures. There may be purges, but not of the vast majority of the ruling party. Moreover, it may only create a false sense of unity - thus, once Stalin had died, the party turned on itself and Stalin. While he was alive, the penchant for dishonesty hindered economic and military planning. The Soviets were just lucky Zhukov had the will and foresight to tell Stalin he was wrong. The only logical way to respond to a regime which terrorizes itself is for those working in the regime to become duplicitous.


Of course, explaining why something happened is always going to be conflated with crude determinism. The stupidity of this notion is the assumption that the Soviet state was at the level of will, following our political, ideological rationality. The reality is that an entirely different rationality was in place - assuming that the purges happened out of 'irrationality' and 'stupidity' is to presuppose that the culprits share our standards of reason, but they didn't. The Soviet Union by this time had its own entirely different inner-logic - one that did not include the protection of a proletarian dictatorship, etc. (likewise, the protection of the proletarian dictatorship and the soviet union's survival were inversely proportional). Trotskyists understood this, and it is a huge conundrum they face to this day. Go on and ask any (typical, that is, I understand there are more 'creative' types) Trotskyist of it. You won't get a satisfactory answer. Well, this isn't a debate over determinism, nor am I saying the Soviet state was irrational. What I am saying is that the policy had practical consequences that outweighed the benefits and that these practical consequences should have been self-evident. I agree that the Soviet regime followed a "logic of its own", but then this begs the question, what internal logic did it follow? Were the purges just a symptom of the move away from the logic of creating of a proletarian dictatorship, or did they contribute to this process, or both?

[Rafiq]

Torturing someone (or, alternatively, hundreds of thousands of people) into falsely confessing to divisive acts and executing them does not really mean one has actually unified the party.

In the context that this is relevant, yes it actually did. Many were forced to make false confessions - but what was certain is that almost all prominent targets of the purges were aligned into different factions of the bureaucracy and were not politically unified. Whether they actually were engaging in plots and 'illegal' activities is irrelevant to this end. The purges put an end to different POLITICAL factions within the bureaucracy. Case closed, end of story. We can talk about how the means that which this was conducted in its entirety was necessary or not - that's pointless.

I mean, you overly emphasize your own moral sensitivities as a means to draw conclusions about the Soviet Union's basis of survival. We get it, you are outraged by torture. What do you expect? The Soviet state into the late 30's was built on violent coercion, like any other state - this one, unlike the United Kingdom, however, had a precarious basis of existence - so the brutality is all the more raw and unrestrained. Every idiot who understands the Soviet Union knows that acts of brutality and violence were wrought from total chaos and weakness.


Planning effective military strategies? Total political unity is not necessary for military planning. [...]As long as a single strategic vision can be built out of the seeming disunity of various voices, then you can obtain the singular will necessary to win a war but without literally killing off one's own competent officers.

What you say is so ridiculous it's actually painful. You do realize that the absence of the same kind of political unity in Germany was a significant factor in Germany's defeat to the Soviet Union, right? But let's put that aside.

Total political unity is necessary for military planning, because military planning must necessarily be conducted in a politically centralized manner. A "single strategic vision" simply COULDN'T be built out of seeming disunity. I mean, why do I even need to say this? if the Soviet Union wasn't unified during the course of the war, do you realize how great the probability that a total collapse of the state, emergency-measure overthrow, and so on would have been possible? It is silly enough that you claim this is unnecessary. But now it can be a HINDRANCE? And what does fear of superiors have to do with it, mind you? Are you claiming that, somehow, military hierarchy wouldn't have existed with POLITICAL disunity? But nevermind that. WHY were they fearful of superiors, to what ends? Because some times the particular prerogatives of this or that general conflicts with the holistic ones. And it is, for the Soviet state, a damned blessing that those particular interests are invested with fear that they disobey high command - because the holistic strategic interests were always necessary to take precedence. I mean you really underestimate how important political unity is in this context.


I think it is a mistake to assume that any disunity anywhere in the state is a fundamental threat to a regime. It might be a threat to other political factions in the regime, but not the whole regime itself. Yes, there needs to be some political cohesiveness, but if you end up liquidating most of your most competent people, especially if they are liquidated on questionable charges, you are throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

What are you even talking about? Political disunity is not some marginal problem that can be tolerated. You don't get it. If a regime is divided into pieces, then that regime is a provisionality, it will either fall apart, or be usurped by one of the faction. The Soviet regime WAS NOT A GIVEN. The BASIS of its existence was PRECARIOUS, it was not some autonomous thing that would go on despite any internal strife. The CHARACTER and FATE of the Soviet regime was dependent on which political faction would triumph. This is what you abjectly fail to understand. This is not about disunity as some marginal issue. it is about how this was a determining force insofar as the fate of the Soviet Union itself was concerned. It's not like this political entity is just 'there'. So what "regime" are you talking about, honestly? Are regimes not political entities?

Political cohesiveness has no spectrum. Something is either politically cohesive, or it is not. You can't just play this game of 'balancing' here. It's obscene. And okay, you talk about competent people. VIS A VIS WHAT? Competence TO WHAT ENDS? IN DOING WHAT? What militaries are USED FOR is NOT a given. So you can have all the competent generals you want. If they are politically disloyal, then guess what? It doesn't mean shit that they are competent! You can have a rifle that is competent at firing bullets, but that doesn't mean shit if you can't control it. Any moron would rather have a shitty rifle they can control, then a competent one that is outside their control. Does this not make sense to you?

You seem to mistaken the fact that many were falsely accused with the illusion that they were killed for a totally irrational reason, for no reason at all. Even bourgeois historians know that's bullshit. They were killed because they were a threat to the unity of the state. "Being a threat to the unity of the state" alone is not in any Soviet legal code. So of course they were killed on bullshit charges. Bourgeois historians interpret this in terms of Stalin solidifying his own powerz. But no matter how you interpret it, the common fact is there: They were a threat to the political homogeneity of the state.


Other regimes have obtained a level of unity without such extreme measures. There may be purges, but not of the vast majority of the ruling party.

What regimes? What regimes had the EXACT SAME, or even SIMILAR character as that of the Soviet Union before the great purges that were able to overcome it without "extreme measures"? Even the Stalinist state would recognize Yezhov's excesses, for one, but this amounted to nothing more than covering it's own tracks and what was the inevitable result of a very disorganized, and chaotic outburst of violence on its part. A circus is what the great purges were, under the backdrop of a very precarious state, who, out of this weakness and disunity, demanded blood. Again, such silly and opportunist abstractions are meaningless.

Different regimes had different courses of action as a result of entirely different and incomparable conditions. Few states had ever undergone what the Soviet Union did - where a mere thread separated it from total collapse, where it's very fate was very politically ambiguous and undetermined, I can't even think of a single state that follows this course. And even if there is a similar circumstance in this regard (there isn't) I can most certainly bet that the sheer LEVEL of political disunity and chaos was nowhere near that of the Soviet state before the great purges. I bet my two balls on it, guaranteed. In addition, what revisionist historians point out - what you fail to even acknowledge - is the role of ordinary people in these purges. NOt only were the overwhelming majority of victims NOT ordinary people, ordinary people to some degree greatly supported the purges, as it opened up new avenues of climbing the bureaucratic ladder, and so on.

"Totalitarian" mythology obfuscates this fact. The soviet state was not in complete, total, 100% control. Evaluate the context, there is no 'irrationality' to it.


Moreover, it may only create a false sense of unity - thus, once Stalin had died, the party turned on itself and Stalin. While he was alive, the penchant for dishonesty hindered economic and military planning. The Soviets were just lucky Zhukov had the will and foresight to tell Stalin he was wrong. The only logical way to respond to a regime which terrorizes itself is for those working in the regime to become duplicitous.

A bunch of nonsense. Why? Because De-Stalinization was ABSOLUTELY the logical result of the Stalinist unification in the late 30's in its context. Stalin could not oversee it, but what you don't understand is that by the time of de-Stalinization, the CHARACTER of the Soviet state was already ensured. You don't understand that so many different outcomes were possible before this context that would have drastically changed the nature of the Soviet state. A military coup could have ensured a military dictatorship led by a figure like Tukhachevsky, aligned with Germany with Bukharinite economic policies which wouldn't be able to withstand a war, and the list goes on. You don't understand that de-Stalinization did not make the regime any less Stalinist. It merely became stable enough to the point where the violent coercion that was marked by Stalin's rule was no longer necessary.

But make no mistake, as far as the necessary common political objectives existed to win the war, there WAS political unity in the absolute sense. In fact, it is stupid to think that this political disunity existed under Stalin. It was only after Stalin's death that the bureaucracy was again faced with a kind of crisis. But this was not a crisis of the character of the regime, but specific policies that same regime would roll back, sustain, and so on.

And say what you will of 'dishonesty', it's a worthless point. It has nothing to do with the fact that the political unity, no matter what 'dishonesty' that entails (an irrelevant point, actually - so there is dishonesty, at least there is a standard in place that would expect honesty: And don't make me laugh thinking that political disunity would have solved this problem in a way that would allow for the Soviet Union's survival.


Were the purges just a symptom of the move away from the logic of creating of a proletarian dictatorship, or did they contribute to this process, or both?

It was absolutely a symptom of this general moving away from the proletarian dictatorship. That is another discussion all together, one I have thoroughly invested too much in repeating myself in. The point is that the institutions of the proletarian dictatorship were incompatible with the survival of the Soviet state, as a result of collectivization which drastically transformed its character (into a radical-bourgeois, "Jacobin" one). I explore this very deeply elsewhere. The soviet state had no affirmative qualities, it was purely a political entity, a prolonged Jacobin phrase whose achievements were in its negation of old traditional bonds. To this end, quite unfortunately - it is true that the modern Russian state IS kind of a successor to the old Soviet Union (of course, we can debate about how a 'social-democratic', China-esque soviet state under gorbachev could have endured in its place, but that's another discussion). The re-introduction of market relations were inevitable. But not before old traditional bonds could be overcome.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Total political unity is necessary for military planning, because military planning must necessarily be conducted in a politically centralized manner.Well what do we mean by "political unity" here then? You can have different factions existing within a centralized system, so long as the ultimate decisions are made by a central authority. Factions don't preclude hierarchy. The Bolshevik party after all had a history of factionalism, yet had to that point stayed relatively in tact.


I mean you really underestimate how important political unity is in this context.
I've seen no real evidence that the existence of Trotskyists, the Right faction, the Left faction, and so on actually endangered the very existence of the party. On the contrary, they all believed in the primacy of the Bolshevik party, they just disagreed on what policies it should implement. They disagreed on the course it should take. Of course, those who stayed alive and in power argued that the elimination of these factions were necessary to preserve the state. It doesn't mean it actually was.

The fact is, the Bolsheviks had factions and serious internal disagreements for almost 20 years of rule without ever basically eliminating a significant portion of itself.


Political cohesiveness has no spectrum. Something is either politically cohesive, or it is not. You can't just play this game of 'balancing' here. It's obscene. And okay, you talk about competent people. VIS A VIS WHAT? Competence TO WHAT ENDS? IN DOING WHAT? What militaries are USED FOR is NOT a given. So you can have all the competent generals you want. If they are politically disloyal, then guess what? It doesn't mean shit that they are competent! You can have a rifle that is competent at firing bullets, but that doesn't mean shit if you can't control it. Any moron would rather have a shitty rifle they can control, then a competent one that is outside their control. Does this not make sense to you? What is the standard of political disloyalty here? Are you saying these people would attempt to sabotage the war effort for the good of their particular faction? Brusilov was hardly a committed Bolshevik, but he was able to use his military expertise to benefit the Soviet system.


You seem to mistaken the fact that many were falsely accused with the illusion that they were killed for a totally irrational reason, for no reason at all. I never said they were killed for an irrational reason. They furthered the ends of the clique around Stalin. I'm not convinced though that the total empowerment of a singular faction of the party and the literal liquidation of the rest of the Bolshevik party was a necessary and sufficient condition for the survival of the Soviet state as a whole, and not just Stalin's clique, however.


What regimes? What regimes had the EXACT SAME, or even SIMILAR character as that of the Soviet Union before the great purges that were able to overcome it without "extreme measures"?What about the USSR itself over the decade and a half before the purges? What changed that made purges a necessary method to unify the country politically?


"Totalitarian" mythology obfuscates this fact. The soviet state was not in complete, total, 100% control. Evaluate the context, there is no 'irrationality' to it.This isn't an argument about total control. I doubt anyone on this forum buys into the idea that Stalin and Mao were all knowing and all powerful bureaucratic demigods.


And say what you will of 'dishonesty', it's a worthless point. It has nothing to do with the fact that the political unity, no matter what 'dishonesty' that entails (an irrelevant point, actually - so there is dishonesty, at least there is a standard in place that would expect honesty: And don't make me laugh thinking that political disunity would have solved this problem in a way that would allow for the Soviet Union's survival.Dishonesty and careerism by officers and bureaucrats will obviously undermine any attempt at central planning. Central planning requires a system which is not just politically unified, but capable of obtaining accurate information about its operation. It also needs to be able to utilize differing perspectives on the same problem to ensure that the best alternative is made apparent.

[Antiochus]

Just to make it clear, Blitzkrieg is not simply quick combined arms, Blitzkrieg is the quick advance of combined arms operations into the heartlands of the enemy before he can react, destroying his defensive capability directly.

I placed "Blitzkrieg" in quotations for a reason. The point of Blitzkrieg however, was never to destroy the enemies "economy", rather destroy the armies on the field, as happened in France for example.


Actually, the principles of Blitzkrieg were developed in the First World War and expanded upon during the 1920s, read Fuller's 1919 plan and Basil Liddell-Hart.

Theoretical principles can be seen as far as German mission-based tactics,,,, in the 19th century. However if we take this approach we are left with the notion of Blitzkrieg being used in the Franco-Prussian war or whatever. The possibility of [I]independent[/I tank formations was not practically possible until the 1930s.


Blitzkrieg was a German military term for ''lightning war'', which was developed during WWI. Using effectively equipped soldiers and extremely quick strategic maneuvering to overwhelm opponents. The Russians used no such thing, instead relying on sheer numbers to hammer their enemies to dust.

That is just absolutely ridiculous, lol. "Effectively equipped soldiers", over 90% of the German military was horse-drawn. German tanks were qualitatively inferior to both French and Soviet tank models for much of the war. The notion the Soviets just used "numbers" to win, is just totally naive and wrong. Because at the end of the day, given that the Soviets had no deficiency in equipment, either artillery, small arms, tanks or aircraft or theoretical military strategy; we are left only with their supposed racial inferiority. The answer is, Stalin never modernized the military tactically when he could have. So the Soviets had excellent tanks (KV-1, T-34s) but most of them couldn't even be serviced properly and ran out of fuel because not enough fuel trucks were assigned to the mechanized corps (which was a bad formation anyway).

[Rafiq]

Well what do we mean by "political unity" here then? You can have different factions existing within a centralized system, so long as the ultimate decisions are made by a central authority. Factions don't preclude hierarchy. The Bolshevik party after all had a history of factionalism, yet had to that point stayed relatively in tact.

Political unity as in, total obedience to the political prerogatives of a centralized power. This is necessary in matters of military concern. You claim factions don't preclude hierarchy. I contest this notion. They DO preclude centralized hierarchy. You claim that it had "to that point stayed relatively in tact". This is nonsense for the simple reason that the purges were congruent with what was the potential destruction of this 'intactness' itself. So it is literally meaningless - the notion that the purges were some external act that had nothing to do with the inner-logic of the Bolshevik party itself is a false argument.

The decisions of a centralized authority have to be enforced by real organs of power. If these organs of power are rife with factionalism, not of the kind that is VIS A VIS an already existing, stable political state, but one whose destiny has yet to be determined insofar as it concerns ITS VERY CORE CHARACTER, socially and historically, then to simply and causally take it as a presupposition that the decisions of centralized authority are going to be enforced without sabotage, resistance, controversy, and various expressions of disobedience is ridiculous. It is not nonsense to think that the NKVD and the military could have been potential springboards for a coup, even. It is not! The Soviet state had not reconciled the ultimate question of: What course of action will it take in determining its own historical character? THAT is why factions existed in the first place, over disagreement about this. You could have had a bonapartist coup. You could have had all sorts of chaos ensue.


I've seen no real evidence that the existence of Trotskyists, the Right faction, the Left faction, and so on actually endangered the very existence of the party. On the contrary, they all believed in the primacy of the Bolshevik party, they just disagreed on what policies it should implement. They disagreed on the course it should take. Of course, those who stayed alive and in power argued that the elimination of these factions were necessary to preserve the state. It doesn't mean it actually was[/I

Policies? No, not policies, but the very character of the state itself that was entailed by those "differences in policies". The factions WERE NOT like different bourgeois political parties. They were factions which each had different visions, ENTIRELY DIFFERENT visions for the future of the Soviet state that would have changed its social character. You claim "you see no real evidence". I claim that your pretense to empiricism is a total falsity. What "evidence" would satisfy this, in your mind? Why is it that when faced with an argumentative deadlock, the knee jerk reaction for every postmodern intellectual is "prove it to me"? Evidence? What the hell do you mean by evidence? The most rudimentary employment of basic reason allows one to come to such conclusions. No, I can't literally FORCE you to see this with some magical panacea that doesn't require critical thinking (like a graph, or some numbers), but if arguments worked like that, THERE WOULD BE NO ARGUMENTS to begin with.

You claim that "they all believed in the primacy of the Bolshevik party". That is meaningless. What they envisioned for the Bolshevik party was entirely different from each other. So what that they were not mensheviks? What is your point? This is such a silly logic. We can find all sorts of least common denominators. Such as: Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks "believed in the primacy of socialism". Both Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SR's, Kadets, liberals, and reactionaries "believed in the primacy of a state". We can play these games all day and they are absolutely meaningless. This commonality is not an ESSENTIAL basis of differentiation in this regard - the essential basis of differentiation is at the level of juxtaposing these different factions to their actual context - understanding the real BASIS of their differences, that is. The Bolshevik party in 1938 was not the same Bolshevik party as in 1922. The party's fate was an undecided reality. You bet your ass that conflict over what this fate would be, endangered the safety of the Soviet Union's existence.

Did I say that because Stalin said this or that, it means it's true? No, frankly, I don't have to give a damn about what they said. So why even use this as an argument? You even italicize "was". Why? It doesn't mean it actually was? Okay, it doesn't. Does my argument hinge upon the self-proclaimed justifications of the Soviet state? It doesn't. In fact, this is what many people believed OUTSIDE of official justification, the official justifications were obviously rife with fabrication.


The fact is, the Bolsheviks had factions and serious internal disagreements for almost 20 years of rule without ever basically eliminating a significant portion of itself.

And that is another opportunist point. Who cares? I mean, this opportunist means by which you attempt to qualify the purges as totally unnecessary is so laughable, because it's so vague. "Serious internal disagreements for almost 20 years of rule" you say. Yet the nature of these disagreements were so unevenly different and contextually different that speaking of "disagreements" is totally pointless. You have yet to demonstrate how these disagreements were exactly the same.

Moreover, let's concede the point. Let's play the devil's advocate. All this demonstrates is that the great purges marked a turning point wherein one of these 'factions' had to triumph over all others. I mean, you say "almost 20 years of rule". WHAT? Are you trying to say those 20 years of rule were evenly proportional in terms of what happened? Are you trying to say that all was peace and quiet for 20 years until the great purges came out of nowhere? The NEP? Collectivization? The necessity of POLITICAL UNITY as a subsequent result of this collectivization, which had already altered the character of the Soviet state? You literally are just divorcing the actual real, historically contextual basis of the purges so that they seem like some external monster that came out of nowhere.


What is the standard of political disloyalty here? Are you saying these people would attempt to sabotage the war effort for the good of their particular faction? Brusilov was hardly a committed Bolshevik, but he was able to use his military expertise to benefit the Soviet system.

What is particularly stupid about this argument is the fact that there is nothing comparable about the Polish Soviet war and the German invasion which was to come. I mean, it is abominable, truly, to attempt to argue that political disunity would not have hindered the war effort because "Brusilov helped the Bolsheviks during the Polish Soviet war". Sorry, what? The conditions of sustaining the October revolution politically, were ENTIRELY DIFFERENT than sustaining the Soviet state towards the first world war.

Do I really need to go into detail here? Do I really? First, the Soviet state was already sustained by a lively proletarian dictatorship, it was on the trajectory path toward bringing this proletarian dictatorship to its highest conclusion. The same kind of factionalism DID NOT EXIST because at this point in time, the Soviet state was not facing a political existential crisis: it was juxtaposed toward the enemies of the revolution. That Brusilov proved helpful for the Soviet state is supposed to mean WHAT? WHAT IS YOUR POINT? How does Brusilov illustrate that political disunity among the military and NKVD apparatus, would have been possible in the context of WWII? Are you aware of the fact that almost every fucking red army unit was accompanied by a political commissar to ensure loyalty during the civil war? Are you aware of the fact that military specialists were often forced at gunpoint, or had their families taken hostage in order to serve in the red army? This course of action was entirely unsustainable in the context of the German invasion and operation Barbarossa. Comparing the marauding bands of Eastern European legions, limited allied intervention, and the white counter-revolution - rife with chaotic disorganization and eternal crisis, with the onslaught of the German war machine literally emanates such a lack of an understanding of both situations.

I am saying that whether or not they would deliberately sabotage the war effort is beyond the point: Political disunity and a lack of political homogeneity would have inevitably led to disagreement and internal conflict over overall military strategy and also particular tactics employed even when that is in common, considering the fact that the only fucking reason the military was even relevant was because it was fulfilling political ends.

By the way, it's funny that you mention the context of the polish soviet war, because even though the situation was entirely different, early signs of what could be interpreted as factionalism are argued by some to have contributed to the defeat of the Red army at Warsaw, as a result of disunity between the western command and the southwestern command. Not that the situations are even really comparable - it's just ironic that you use this as an argument.


I never said they were killed for an irrational reason. They furthered the ends of the clique around Stalin. I'm not convinced though that the total empowerment of a singular faction of the party and the literal liquidation of the rest of the Bolshevik party was a necessary and sufficient condition for the survival of the Soviet state as a whole, and not just Stalin's clique, however.

That you are not convinced doesn't tell us much. The inter-facitonalism in the Soviet state was inevitably going to culminate into some kind of confrontation. Thinking otherwise is pure nativity - as though the factions co-existed in harmony and in checks and balances. That is nothing more than a fantasy - the factions existed because they had different ends to what they wanted to do with the Soviet Union. And in the years that would culminate in the second world war, destroying this disunity was absolutely necessary. The degree of organization and sheer coordaintion would have otherwise been impossible in the second wolrd war. People point to the blunders and mistakes, but that's stupid: Yes the red army made huge blunders, but it was able to learn from them, and diffuse this knowledge in a coordinated, organized and top-down fashion to the red army as a whole. Sorry, but ANY LEVEL of political disunity would have made the red army's actions so chaotic and disorganized that it wouldn't withstand the war.

I mean my point is that you fail to appreciate how pivotal, how important it was for the red army to be totally subservient in the most dire instances where the survival of the state hinged on a thread: The battle of Moscow is just one example that comes to mind. Hitler himself would later understand how important political unity was in the military, considering that the lack-of political loyalty was a contributing factor to the defeat of the German state. He had very skilled generals and military leaders- and that didn't count for shit when push came to shove, you know, [B]when many were taking political matters into their own hands[/B.


What about the USSR itself over the decade and a half before the purges? What changed that made purges a necessary method to unify the country politically?

The backdrop of the qualitative historical change that was brought with collectivization, of course, what else? Various factions did not fully adjust to the new order of things, amidst all the chaos that was wrought from this. They were therefore a threat. This was the time when the POLITICAL character of the Soviet state met its maker, where its historical judgement was to be made. It was going to happen eventually, somehow. I'm not here to discuss alternative history: Whether things would have been different with a "napoleon" esque coup and whatever. Reason dictates that this would have not been viable, but who knows.


Dishonesty and careerism by officers and bureaucrats will obviously undermine any attempt at central planning. Central planning requires a system which is not just politically unified, but capable of obtaining accurate information about its operation.

What is your point? Hoesntly, what's your point? Am I saying that measures to ensure more accurate information shouldn't have been undertaken? No, I'm not. So what you are giving us is - in the context of this discussion - a worthless piece of information. It doesn't mater that central planning was disrupted here or there. POLITICAL UNITY is a necessary pre-requisite for us to even be talking about, to even have the context to sit down and address the fucking problems that come with it in the first place in a way that is organized and coordinated. My god.


It also needs to be able to utilize differing perspectives on the same problem to ensure that the best alternative is made apparent.

[I]The naivety here is shocking. "Different perspectives"? Do you actually think that the factionalism within the bureaucracy was a matter of people with "different perspectives" that could be "balanced out"? Different perspectives ALWAYS WILL EXIST. That is quite different from over-reaching controversies of a historically determining nature. Like the factions didn't fucking exist because of any perceived disagreement over how the sewage system should be managed. These are TECHNOCRATIC controversies. These controversies must exist under the substrate of a uniform political basis, holy shit. Wars are not waged over things like that. Factionalism in the Bolshevik party WAS NOT like the "democratic" and "republican" parties in the US. It was not. It was of a vicious, cutthroat nature, the kind that leads to coup's and internal conflict, not lively debates and "different perspectives".

What you say is literally so silly it boggles the mind. HOW would those PARTICULAR different "perspectives", what POWER basis, would have been able to ensure that the "best possible" alternative triumphed, for sustaining the Soviet state? Who would have judged this? You? Who? What organs existed in the context of the great purges that would have done this? And even if such an organ existed - guess what - IT WOULD STILL BE controversial.

What you say is literally JUST AS STUPID as saying that the Nazis and the Communists could have co-existed so that the "best alternative" can be made apparent. WHAT? We are not talking about disagreements over technical matters. We are talking about real existing POLITICAL disagreements of a historical kind. Of course not as polarizing as Nazis vs. Communists, but none the less - POLITICAL in nature. This is what you fail to understand. The purges did not happen because of technocratic disagreements. They happened as a result of hte necessity of making the soviet state politically homogeneous. End of story.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Rafiq, your tone and attitude is utterly inappropriate for the learning forum. Instead of calling people or their arguments silly, stupid or irrational misses the whole purpose of this forum. I am obviously trying to better understand the perspective of you and other posters who may agree with you more clearly. Forgetting that this is the learning forum, and not the history or theory forum, is far sillier and stupider than anything I said, or anything you apparently think I said (you have laid strawmans out a few times already).

Take this:


You literally are just divorcing the actual real, historically contextual basis of the purges so that they seem like some external monster that came out of nowhere.No, you dolt, I'm not divorcing anything from anything else, I'm asking what relevant historical contexts justify your position. I might not agree with you on all of these issues, but I obviously want to find out what your rationale is.

Or this:


What is particularly stupid about this argument is the fact that there is nothing comparable about the Polish Soviet war and the German invasion which was to come. I mean, it is abominable, truly, to attempt to argue that political disunity would not have hindered the war effort because "Brusilov helped the Bolsheviks during the Polish Soviet war". Sorry, what? The conditions of sustaining the October revolution politically, were ENTIRELY DIFFERENT than sustaining the Soviet state towards the first world war.No, I obviously want to know WHAT was different about the role of former Tsarist officers after WWI, and the Red Army prior to the purges which called for such a great destruction of talent.


I mean my point is that you fail to appreciate how pivotal, how important it was for the red army to be totally subservient in the most dire instances where the survival of the state hinged on a thread: The battle of Moscow is just one example that comes to mind. Hitler himself would later understand how important political unity was in the military, considering that the lack-of political loyalty was a contributing factor to the defeat of the German state. He had very skilled generals and military leaders- and that didn't count for shit when push came to shove, you know, [B]when many were taking political matters into their own hands[/B. Hitler was also guilty of unnecessary meddling in military affairs to the point of severely undermining the war effort, and there was little ability to check and counter his foolishness.


What you say is literally JUST AS STUPID as saying that the Nazis and the Communists could have co-existed so that the "best alternative" can be made apparent. WHAT? We are not talking about disagreements over technical matters. We are talking about real existing POLITICAL disagreements of a historical kind. Of course not as polarizing as Nazis vs. Communists, but none the less - POLITICAL in nature. This is what you fail to understand. The purges did not happen because of technocratic disagreements. They happened as a result of hte necessity of making the soviet state politically homogeneous. End of story.Instead of taking such a contemptuous tone, perhaps you should try to explain how these different factions actually posed a real risk to the survival of the state, instead of just treating it as a given and berating people for not recognizing it? You've made some vague references to possible plots and the fact that these factions represented different overarching historical visions - ok, but that's vague. So did the factions of the early 1920s. Instead of just arguing that collectivization changed the conditions under which this occurred, perhaps you should try to explain HOW collectivization changed those conditions. Additionally, replace your insults with an explanation of historical context. Perhaps if I gained a better understanding of your view of history and the facts you identify as relevant, I could have a more engaging and interesting debate.

Perhaps I am, as you suggest, understating the importance of the factional differences between the parties. What I am questioning is whether nor (from a pragmatic, not a moral POV) the benefits of eliminating the factionalism and the costs caused by the factionalism exceeded the costs of eliminating significant talent from the Bolshevik party and Red army. Yes, new people could learn and master the same knowledge as the old, but that's a slow process. Your argument is that there was a pragmatic, existential necessity for the regime to do this. I better want to understand what historical contexts you think are relevant, and for that matter, any textual sources which inform your view. I don't care whether or not you think something I say is "silly" or not. The purpose of this forum, last I checked, is to learn about the theoretical stances of others, not to identify what theoretical stances held by myself or others Rafiq holds to be "silly" or "stupid".

I must say, its not that I find your view implausible. I am merely skeptical of the claim that the USSR needed this to survive. There are certainly regimes which needed to be brutal to retain power, but there are also others which acted with excessive brutality to the point of undermining their own survival, due to paranoia or the exaggeration of threats or the particular needs of cliques within the regime.


Really Rafiq ... its stunning, you're obviously smart and knowledgeable but you seem incapable of actually expressing your intelligence in a reasonable way. Instead, you seem committed to assuming your own stance and berating people for not grasping its brilliance. I like reading some of your posts, because on occasion you raise some interesting points in an original way, but other times it's just painful.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

edit - delete double post

[Jacob Cliff]

Political unity as in, total obedience to the political prerogatives of a centralized power. This is necessary in matters of military concern. You claim factions don't preclude hierarchy. I contest this notion. They DO preclude centralized hierarchy. You claim that it had "to that point stayed relatively in tact". This is nonsense for the simple reason that the purges were congruent with what was the potential destruction of this 'intactness' itself. So it is literally meaningless - the notion that the purges were some external act that had nothing to do with the inner-logic of the Bolshevik party itself is a false argument.

The decisions of a centralized authority have to be enforced by real organs of power. If these organs of power are rife with factionalism, not of the kind that is VIS A VIS an already existing, stable political state, but one whose destiny has yet to be determined insofar as it concerns ITS VERY CORE CHARACTER, socially and historically, then to simply and causally take it as a presupposition that the decisions of centralized authority are going to be enforced without sabotage, resistance, controversy, and various expressions of disobedience is ridiculous. It is not nonsense to think that the NKVD and the military could have been potential springboards for a coup, even. It is not! The Soviet state had not reconciled the ultimate question of: What course of action will it take in determining its own historical character? THAT is why factions existed in the first place, over disagreement about this. You could have had a bonapartist coup. You could have had all sorts of chaos ensue.



Policies? No, not policies, but the very character of the state itself that was entailed by those "differences in policies". The factions WERE NOT like different bourgeois political parties. They were factions which each had different visions, ENTIRELY DIFFERENT visions for the future of the Soviet state that would have changed its social character. You claim "you see no real evidence". I claim that your pretense to empiricism is a total falsity. What "evidence" would satisfy this, in your mind? Why is it that when faced with an argumentative deadlock, the knee jerk reaction for every postmodern intellectual is "prove it to me"? Evidence? What the hell do you mean by evidence? The most rudimentary employment of basic reason allows one to come to such conclusions. No, I can't literally FORCE you to see this with some magical panacea that doesn't require critical thinking (like a graph, or some numbers), but if arguments worked like that, THERE WOULD BE NO ARGUMENTS to begin with.

You claim that "they all believed in the primacy of the Bolshevik party". That is meaningless. What they envisioned for the Bolshevik party was entirely different from each other. So what that they were not mensheviks? What is your point? This is such a silly logic. We can find all sorts of least common denominators. Such as: Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks "believed in the primacy of socialism". Both Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SR's, Kadets, liberals, and reactionaries "believed in the primacy of a state". We can play these games all day and they are absolutely meaningless. This commonality is not an ESSENTIAL basis of differentiation in this regard - the essential basis of differentiation is at the level of juxtaposing these different factions to their actual context - understanding the real BASIS of their differences, that is. The Bolshevik party in 1938 was not the same Bolshevik party as in 1922. The party's fate was an undecided reality. You bet your ass that conflict over what this fate would be, endangered the safety of the Soviet Union's existence.

Did I say that because Stalin said this or that, it means it's true? No, frankly, I don't have to give a damn about what they said. So why even use this as an argument? You even italicize "was". Why? It doesn't mean it actually was? Okay, it doesn't. Does my argument hinge upon the self-proclaimed justifications of the Soviet state? It doesn't. In fact, this is what many people believed OUTSIDE of official justification, the official justifications were obviously rife with fabrication.



And that is another opportunist point. Who cares? I mean, this opportunist means by which you attempt to qualify the purges as totally unnecessary is so laughable, because it's so vague. "Serious internal disagreements for almost 20 years of rule" you say. Yet the nature of these disagreements were so unevenly different and contextually different that speaking of "disagreements" is totally pointless. You have yet to demonstrate how these disagreements were exactly the same.

Moreover, let's concede the point. Let's play the devil's advocate. All this demonstrates is that the great purges marked a turning point wherein one of these 'factions' had to triumph over all others. I mean, you say "almost 20 years of rule". WHAT? Are you trying to say those 20 years of rule were evenly proportional in terms of what happened? Are you trying to say that all was peace and quiet for 20 years until the great purges came out of nowhere? The NEP? Collectivization? The necessity of POLITICAL UNITY as a subsequent result of this collectivization, which had already altered the character of the Soviet state? You literally are just divorcing the actual real, historically contextual basis of the purges so that they seem like some external monster that came out of nowhere.



What is particularly stupid about this argument is the fact that there is nothing comparable about the Polish Soviet war and the German invasion which was to come. I mean, it is abominable, truly, to attempt to argue that political disunity would not have hindered the war effort because "Brusilov helped the Bolsheviks during the Polish Soviet war". Sorry, what? The conditions of sustaining the October revolution politically, were ENTIRELY DIFFERENT than sustaining the Soviet state towards the first world war.

Do I really need to go into detail here? Do I really? First, the Soviet state was already sustained by a lively proletarian dictatorship, it was on the trajectory path toward bringing this proletarian dictatorship to its highest conclusion. The same kind of factionalism DID NOT EXIST because at this point in time, the Soviet state was not facing a political existential crisis: it was juxtaposed toward the enemies of the revolution. That Brusilov proved helpful for the Soviet state is supposed to mean WHAT? WHAT IS YOUR POINT? How does Brusilov illustrate that political disunity among the military and NKVD apparatus, would have been possible in the context of WWII? Are you aware of the fact that almost every fucking red army unit was accompanied by a political commissar to ensure loyalty during the civil war? Are you aware of the fact that military specialists were often forced at gunpoint, or had their families taken hostage in order to serve in the red army? This course of action was entirely unsustainable in the context of the German invasion and operation Barbarossa. Comparing the marauding bands of Eastern European legions, limited allied intervention, and the white counter-revolution - rife with chaotic disorganization and eternal crisis, with the onslaught of the German war machine literally emanates such a lack of an understanding of both situations.

I am saying that whether or not they would deliberately sabotage the war effort is beyond the point: Political disunity and a lack of political homogeneity would have inevitably led to disagreement and internal conflict over overall military strategy and also particular tactics employed even when that is in common, considering the fact that the only fucking reason the military was even relevant was because it was fulfilling political ends.

By the way, it's funny that you mention the context of the polish soviet war, because even though the situation was entirely different, early signs of what could be interpreted as factionalism are argued by some to have contributed to the defeat of the Red army at Warsaw, as a result of disunity between the western command and the southwestern command. Not that the situations are even really comparable - it's just ironic that you use this as an argument.



That you are not convinced doesn't tell us much. The inter-facitonalism in the Soviet state was inevitably going to culminate into some kind of confrontation. Thinking otherwise is pure nativity - as though the factions co-existed in harmony and in checks and balances. That is nothing more than a fantasy - the factions existed because they had different ends to what they wanted to do with the Soviet Union. And in the years that would culminate in the second world war, destroying this disunity was absolutely necessary. The degree of organization and sheer coordaintion would have otherwise been impossible in the second wolrd war. People point to the blunders and mistakes, but that's stupid: Yes the red army made huge blunders, but it was able to learn from them, and diffuse this knowledge in a coordinated, organized and top-down fashion to the red army as a whole. Sorry, but ANY LEVEL of political disunity would have made the red army's actions so chaotic and disorganized that it wouldn't withstand the war.

I mean my point is that you fail to appreciate how pivotal, how important it was for the red army to be totally subservient in the most dire instances where the survival of the state hinged on a thread: The battle of Moscow is just one example that comes to mind. Hitler himself would later understand how important political unity was in the military, considering that the lack-of political loyalty was a contributing factor to the defeat of the German state. He had very skilled generals and military leaders- and that didn't count for shit when push came to shove, you know, [B]when many were taking political matters into their own hands[/B.



The backdrop of the qualitative historical change that was brought with collectivization, of course, what else? Various factions did not fully adjust to the new order of things, amidst all the chaos that was wrought from this. They were therefore a threat. This was the time when the POLITICAL character of the Soviet state met its maker, where its historical judgement was to be made. It was going to happen eventually, somehow. I'm not here to discuss alternative history: Whether things would have been different with a "napoleon" esque coup and whatever. Reason dictates that this would have not been viable, but who knows.



What is your point? Hoesntly, what's your point? Am I saying that measures to ensure more accurate information shouldn't have been undertaken? No, I'm not. So what you are giving us is - in the context of this discussion - a worthless piece of information. It doesn't mater that central planning was disrupted here or there. POLITICAL UNITY is a necessary pre-requisite for us to even be talking about, to even have the context to sit down and address the fucking problems that come with it in the first place in a way that is organized and coordinated. My god.



The naivety here is shocking. "Different perspectives"? Do you actually think that the factionalism within the bureaucracy was a matter of people with "different perspectives" that could be "balanced out"? Different perspectives ALWAYS WILL EXIST. That is quite different from over-reaching controversies of a historically determining nature. Like the factions didn't fucking exist because of any perceived disagreement over how the sewage system should be managed. These are TECHNOCRATIC controversies. These controversies must exist under the substrate of a uniform political basis, holy shit. Wars are not waged over things like that. Factionalism in the Bolshevik party WAS NOT like the "democratic" and "republican" parties in the US. It was not. It was of a vicious, cutthroat nature, the kind that leads to coup's and internal conflict, not lively debates and "different perspectives".

What you say is literally so silly it boggles the mind. HOW would those PARTICULAR different "perspectives", what POWER basis, would have been able to ensure that the "best possible" alternative triumphed, for sustaining the Soviet state? Who would have judged this? You? Who? What organs existed in the context of the great purges that would have done this? And even if such an organ existed - guess what - IT WOULD STILL BE controversial.

What you say is literally JUST AS STUPID as saying that the Nazis and the Communists could have co-existed so that the "best alternative" can be made apparent. WHAT? We are not talking about disagreements over technical matters. We are talking about real existing POLITICAL disagreements of a historical kind. Of course not as polarizing as Nazis vs. Communists, but none the less - POLITICAL in nature. This is what you fail to understand. The purges did not happen because of technocratic disagreements. They happened as a result of hte necessity of making the soviet state politically homogeneous. End of story.
Would it not have been more viable, for the sake of the securing of the Soviet state's very existence and the survivability of the proletarian dictatorship, if a "left" or "Trotskyist" faction had won out, and focused on the continuation of the revolution into Germany? The outmanuvering of political opponents that the careerist Stalin did in the 20s was certainly not one for the sake of the "stability of the Soviet state." The execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and (the expulsion of) Trotsky wasn't necessary for the "survivability of the soviet state." Maybe in the end they were, when Stalinist counterrevolution had triumphed, but beforehand, in the 1920s at least, I cannot see any reason how one can justify the purge of the entire substance of the Bolshevik Party. Even into the 1930s, with the army purge and the execution of myriad political officers and Generals, I cannot see how this helped ensure the survival or maintainence of the Soviet state. In fact, with a military staff that was NOT purged earlier, victory over Germany would have been SIGNIFICANTLY more expedient. Even the less obedient, less loyal officers and generals would be drawn into unity and discipline against the fascist invaders. It is inconceivable to me to see how this was all necessary – and I think that this presumption that power is never for its own sake (which is the conclusion one draws from defending the necessity of the purges) falls short here. Yes, I can see your point on the necessity AFTER counterrevolution, but beforehand, Stalin's rise to power was nothing short of political careerism.

[Rafiq]

I don't care about how personally you take the arguments at hand. You are an adult. Get over it.


I'm not divorcing anything from anything else, I'm asking what relevant historical contexts justify your position.

If you actually bothered to even read the fucking response I've given you already, perhaps you could get a picture of such "relevant historical contexts". Meanwhile Sinister opportunistically attempts to make contextual equivalence of each and every year of the 20 years of Bolshevik rule, insinuating the purges came out of nowhere.


No, I obviously want to know WHAT was different about the role of former Tsarist officers after WWI, and the Red Army prior to the purges which called for such a great destruction of talent.

Not going to repeat myself for your sake.


Hitler was also guilty of unnecessary meddling in military affairs to the point of severely undermining the war effort, and there was little ability to check and counter his foolishness.

What you call "unnecessary meddling" were Hitler's desperate attempts to exert the primacy of the objectives of the Nazi party in matters of military concern. He utterly failed in exerting the necessary control to this end. So what you attempt to get out of pointing to the dissonance between the prerogatives of the Fascist state and those of the German military is unclear.


You've made some vague references to possible plots and the fact that these factions represented different overarching historical visions - ok, but that's vague. So did the factions of the early 1920s. Instead of just arguing that collectivization changed the conditions under which this occurred, perhaps you should try to explain HOW collectivization changed those conditions.

Every other post I have ever made which even includes the word "Soviet Union" has gone into great depth to this end. It is not my job to give you a beginner's guide to the history of the Soviet Union, if you lack awareness of this context, you shouldn't be here, arguing with me, you should be enriching your mind with the necessary context to produce an informed position on the matter. I am being "vague" because I have poured a great deal of thorough, theoretical insight on the matter and there is no reason why I should have to repeat myself. And it is not just me repeating myself. It is me repeating my rebuttals against those inevitable knee-jerk, uncritically wrought criticisms of my characterizations of the Soviet Union.

The factions of the 1920's all had different prerogatives, and it was Stalin's faction that was victorious. Stalin's faction, who, by 1928 sought the course of collectivization and Socialism in one country (and I will explain the dichotomy). However once this institutionally, socially, ideologically, etc. altered the character of the Soviet state, the remnants of older factions had to be swept away.

Collectivization fundamentally altered the character of the Soviet Union in every possible, every meaningful way. EVERY SINGLE dichotomy between "Stalinism" and old Bolshevism, was born out of the process of collectivization and the destruction of older, traditional bonds in the countryside which necessarily meant the destruction of the proletarian dictatorship, through the 'proto-proletarianization' of the countryside. This task could not be undertaken by the proletarian dictatorship for the simple reason that 1. The revolution did not spread, 2. Modernizing the countryside had the RECIPROCAL effect of altering the character of the Soviet state itself.

The pseudo-Bukhranite notion that the character of a state, or a 'superstructure' could remain untainted by changes in the social dimension has thoroughly been proven wrong time and time again. The notion that China is somehow still "developing its productive forces" for Communism is one that no sane person actually believes. In fact, the Chinese themselves do not claim to be striving toward Communism anymore, they have instead replaced this vision with the proto-Fascist notion of "harmonious society". What is significant in this case, however, is the fact that the great historical irony is that Stalinist collectivization altered the character of society in the same vein - through the process of negating old traditional bonds, the affirmative character of a romantic, radical Jacobin bourgeois politics and ideology took precedence. This reflects at every level of Soviet society: Culture (art, social norms, values, etc.), matters of state and law, and even military doctrine.


Your argument is that there was a pragmatic, existential necessity for the regime to do this. I better want to understand what historical contexts you think are relevant, and for that matter, any textual sources which inform your view.

Your posts do not even emanate a rudimentary, very basic understanding of the contexts at hand. The arguments I am giving do not demand some new empirical perspective on the context, it merely requires a rudimentary understanding of that context. Does this make sense to you? I am presupposing that what is very elementary knowledge of the contextual differences between the 1920's and 30's in all of my arguments. Because I do not consider you a total moron who has no knowledge of such differences, I accuse you of making opportunist arguments through vague abstractions.

So the controversy here has nothing to do with me not fleshing the context out enough, but on the contrary, your insistence on drawing basis of commonalities and similarities based on abstracted ideas which have no regard for essential context. You ask how two entirely different situations are incomparable. I am accusing you of comparing them based on a lack of rudimentary knowledge of them. That means I am wagering that at the onset of merely evaluating the contexts at hand, you would not be able to compare them in the way that you are.


Really Rafiq ... its stunning, you're obviously smart and knowledge

And stop. Please. I have no interest in the personal dimension of this discussion. Really, I don't. I am not smart, I am a total moron, I am an idiot, I am nothing. Just as it is for me, it is for you and everyone else on this anonymous online community. It doesn't extend beyond that. All we are, are our posts. For the last time.

[Rafiq]

if a "left" or "Trotskyist" faction had won out, and focused on the continuation of the revolution into Germany?

In what ways? What is the practical expression of this "focusing"?

It has been my contention that the best possible scenario would have been a figure like Mikhail Frunze rising to power (i.e. a military man, but with real political convictions). In the context of post-1919, focusing on external revolutions was synonymous with focusing military concerns.

But that's nothing more than wishful thinking. Things obviously didn't pan out that way.


The outmanuvering of political opponents that the careerist Stalin did in the 20s was certainly not one for the sake of the "stability of the Soviet state." The execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and (the expulsion of) Trotsky wasn't necessary for the "survivability of the soviet state." Maybe in the end they were, when Stalinist counterrevolution had triumphed, but beforehand, in the 1920s at least, I cannot see any reason how one can justify the purge of the entire substance of the Bolshevik Party.

The survival of the Soviet state and the survival of the proletarian dictatorship were absolutely inversely proportional, unfortunately, yes. Reliance on hope that a revolution will occur somewhere else, with no control over such an event in any meaningful way, was not going to cut it in a state whose existence was already quite precarious. The only alternative I could envision was spreading the revolution militarily. Frunze (who, unlike Tukhachevsky, was politically, ideologically and spiritually principled) was the man for this.

Lastly, the motivational basis of Stalin's actions as an individual are of no concern here.

[Invader Zim]

The Nazi attempts to assert their influence on the Wehrnacht were as considerable as they were deleterious. For instance, refusing to allow the Heer to retreat in 1944 prevented the formation of solid line following the June invasion. In fact, the greater the political control over the wehrmacht the less well it performed. The same was also true of the Red Army.

But this is not why the Wehrmacht lost, it was defeated because Germany lacked, a native source of oil and other key materiel, manpower, coordination, and fluid military doctrine able to change to match circumstances, and because it was facing powers which had far greater military potential. Despite their reputation, the Nazis were also anti-technocrats, and they fell behind massively in important r&d. The rocket development, the major exception, was a massive white elephant, and that got funding only because of senior Nazi patronage and contrary to military advice.

[R.Rubinelli]

I hesitate to enter into this discussion but casting discretion to the wind I think it's quite telling that the discussion itself is abstracted from the role the "party"-- the Bolsheviks-- were playing, had played, and would continue to play in the defeat of revolutionary struggles internationally.

The sanctimonious rationalization for the purges as somehow necessary to establish a "unified command" begs the question of command of what? Command for what?

Command for the success, the spreading of international revolution? not hardly. We have the historical evidence of such struggles for "unified command" in Spain, Vietnam, France, etc. etc.

The purges were part of this same wave of mobilization in opposition to proletarian revolution.

All the baloney about "modernizing" of the Soviet economy, requiring that other factions be "swept away," is precisely irrelevant. The point is as it was when Marx undertook his critique of political economy-- the purpose of the entire vocabulary of "economics" is to obscure class and class struggle.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Rafiq - you suggest that your reading of history should be obvious to anyone with even a basic understanding of the 20s and 30s of Soviet history. The fact is, the interpretation I usually come across is that the purges were more meant to solidify Stalin's clique, and that in itself was not a necessary condition for preserving the "fundamental character" and "political unity" of the USSR or the Bolshevik party. This is an interpretation I see more commonly among both historians and posters on this forum. Certainly, the Trots don't think that their opposition to Stalin would have destroyed the party or state. In fact, they seem to think that they would have saved the Soviet state and Bolshevik party from degeneration. Khrushchev argued that these acts were not necessary to save the Soviet state or the Bolshevik party in his speech denouncing Stalin (for what its worth). I don't know what those like Trotsky, Zinoviev or Bukharin would have done had they organized the removal of Stalin, or what consequences would have occurred which were outside of their control, but I see no reason to think at face value that it would have lead to actual dissolution of the party or State (the degree to which it would change the "character" of the ruling party notwithstanding). Nor do I see any reason to think that these factions would then have had to implement similar policies to remove those who supported Stalin or some other clique.

However, the purges didn't just impact the party elite, it also cut a swath through lower echelons of the party. There are legitimate questions of the extent to which the persecution of Bolsheviks was done to ensure the unity of the party, and to what extent otherwise innocent bureaucrats and party members were being targeted by an overly paranoid clique within the state. After all, you did not need to actually be a Trot to be executed for being a Trot, if one falsely confessed to being in that faction.

What I do know is that disastrously incompetent military leadership and disorganization in the military and economic hierarchy made it very difficult for the USSR to not only defend against German assault for over a year, but also left it woefully unprepared to even fight a small nation like Finland. The fact is that the USSR took a while to recover. Had Hitler not made particular choices like dividing his forces between Leningrad, Stalingrad and the Caucuses, or being overconfident about the ability of his armies to win before winter rolled around, the situation would have been even more devastating for the party and the state.

I do admit a certain level of ignorance about the conditions of the USSR in the 30s, which is the reason I asked this question, and why I found the tone of your reply inappropriate (we may all be adults here, but being adult means not only having a thick skin, but not lobbing insults at those asking genuine questions. Anyone taking such an attitude in a University class would be kicked out). It is difficult to find information on this period which is not being presented to "prove" the view of one particular sect over another. If you have any historical sources you think are relevant and support the claim that these moves were necessary for preserving the party, it would be appreciated if you shared them.

[Rafiq]

The fact is, the interpretation I usually come across is that the purges were more meant to solidify Stalin's clique,

And presumably, "Stalin's clique" wanted power just for the sake of it. Against all contrary evidence, people assume this. The reality is that "Stalin's clique" represented the newly formed state apparatus as a result of ideologically, socially, and even politically transformative conditions which had occurred as a result of collectivization. Virtually all the Bolshevik old guard were killed - this was done for a reason.


Certainly, the Trots don't think that their opposition to Stalin would have destroyed the party or state. In fact, they seem to think that they would have saved the Soviet state and Bolshevik party from degeneration.

And it has always been a conundrum for them. Don't think for a second Trotskyists have some sophisticated explanation as to how they could have prevented the degeneration of the Soviet Union. Not only do they not have a sophisticated answer, they don't have any answer at all. For Trotskyists, the failure of world revolution made the degeneration inevitable. There is nothing Trotsky could have done - and if we are speaking about the sustenance of the Soviet state, as I claimed countless times before, the only solution was collectivization (or, if we want to get into 'alternative history', which is already flimsy, military adventurism beforehand). An extension of the NEP would have NOT modernized agriculture, as the first NEP demonstrated, the peasants were not predisposed toward the reorganization of agricultural relations that would have allowed for the infrastructural, technical modernization of the countryside - instead what you would have are peasants fattening themselves without any real benefit to the modernization of the country. Stalin said, 10 years before operation Barbarossa, that they had ten years to industrialize, or the actual hostile capitalist powers that surrounded them would consume them. And he was right. Don't even try to pussyfoot around this - industrialization was the only means that which the Soviet state could have survived, and this was done at the expense of the proletarian dictatorship. Only with the help of an advanced country like a soviet Germany, would this have been prevented. That didn't happen.

But go ask them. Go ask any Trotskyist and see if there is a practical solution to what could have been done. In fact what makes you so painfully wrong is the fact that Trotskyists actually thought the Soviet bureaucracy was a hindrance to world revolution by the early 30's, and they literally admit that their goal was the destruction of the Soviet bureaucracy (and they will not admit it, but subsequently the destruction of the Soviet state). Of course they are more or less right to think that the Soviet state compromised the world revolution, manipulating foreign communist parties for the national interests of the Soviet state at the expense of foreign revolution.

Stalin's faction didn't just win because of his outmaneuvering. He also won because his solution was infinitely more viable than Trotsky's, who basically gambled on processes that no one had any control over. IF THERE WERE solutions to the problem beyond Stalin, before 1928, then Trotsky and Bukharin had nothing to do with them.


Khrushchev argued that these acts were not necessary to save the Soviet state or the Bolshevik party in his speech denouncing Stalin (for what its worth).

Please don't make me laugh. Khrushchev only said these things, when the Soviet state no longer necessitated such acts. I mean, literally what you say is so naive. Khrushchev said they were unnecessary? That is good for Khrushchev, himself a former Stalinist functionary and a political snake, the fact of the matter is that "such acts" WERE necessary for the survival of the Soviet state, de-Stalinization is no different in that regard than the denunciation of Yezhovschina. After "Stalinism" outlived its use, it was safe to denounce it as "unnecessary" retrospectively. And surely, just like the Yezhovschina, many things were unnecessary. But that which was unnecessary constituted NOTHING MORE than marginal excess that was 'safe' to denounce. Khrushchev is a known liar and a hypocrite anyway. The Soviet state enjoyed the fruits of the 'unnecessary' actions and safely denounced them once those actions were no longer necessary. So what do you hope to demonstrate by mentioning Khrushchev?


but I see no reason to think at face value that it would have lead to actual dissolution of the party or State (the degree to which it would change the "character" of the ruling party notwithstanding). Nor do I see any reason to think that these factions would then have had to implement similar policies to remove those who supported Stalin or some other clique.

That is because your conception of the events is coupled with the same naivety as any liberal. Like you literally think the purges were SIMPLY an act of needless brutality, when the reality is that they were an outburst of weakness on the soviet state's part, and they were necessary to rejuvenate it in every meaningful sense. The naivety of your post comes from a basic affront to reason: WHY then would the purges be conducted if they were so unnecessary? Because Stalin didn't want to share power? WHY DIDN'T HE? This is where you fail utterly, because your answer is inadequate for the conditions at hand: "Because Stalin was power hungry and didn't like people who disagreed with him", or some other juvenile argument that mistaken the proximity of arguments between friends with matters few state and politics. It's so painfully fucking stupid because I can literally see you coming to the conclusion that: "Well, when humans have too much power, it corrupts" or some other superstitious nonsense. Please, that's not going to slide here. The purges did not happen because of Stalin's personal ambitions, they happened because rivaling factions were a threat to the political homogeneity of the state. You ask why this political homogeneity was now necessary, AND I TOLD YOU: THE SOVIET STATE's DESTINY was decided via collectivization, Stalin's clique won, so now there could be no more "debate" about the future of the Soviet state beyond a coup, sabotage or insurrection. What would these factions debate about? This is what you fail to understand. You have attempted to say that "Well, different perspectives are necessary" and I ridicule such a naive assertion, as though the factions formed because differences in technocratic policies. The reality is that these factions were vestiges of different possible trajectory paths for the Soviet state. They had to be annihilated, because one trajectory was victorious, and the Soviet state had to adjust to this accordingly. You can't fucking have that when the military, the NKVD, and the bureaucracy in general that is supposed to fucking reproduce the new conditions at hand is ridden with factionalism. The SOCIAL CHARACTER of the Soviet state became decided by the late 30's, so the political character had to be homogeneous in approximating to it. This is literally what you fail to understand and it's so painful because it requires nothing more than CRITICALLY thinking about the events. You can't just say it was uncoordinated chaotic paranoia (which it was to a certain extent, at lower levels), it was very clearly a systemic process that targeted individuals for very rational reasons.

The fact of the matter is that yes, they would have, had another faction prevailed there would have absolutely been another purge. But what you fail to acknowledge is simple:

By the time of the great purges, Stalin's clique had already triumph. The remaining factions posed a threat, because the only reason they remained factions was because they thought they still had the opportunity to overthrow the "Stalinist clique" after the triumph of collectivization. Only after "Stalin's clique" solidified its power enough through collectivization that the purges were made possible. A Bukharinite program would have been possible, maybe, decades after collectiivzation. But not before. So yes, it would have led to the annihilation of the Soviet state one way or another.


However, the purges didn't just impact the party elite, it also cut a swath through lower echelons of the party.

With the overwhelming support of many ordinary people, who saw this as an opportunity to rise through the ranks, finally, who held such low echelons in contempt. The soviet state which ruled by coercion and violence until then - people saw it as an opportunity to change their bosses. This is the consensus of a REVISIONIST historian, mind you, not Grover Furr.


After all, you did not need to actually be a Trot to be executed for being a Trot, if one falsely confessed to being in that faction.

No, but you needed to be of a rivalring faction. Finally, many who were innocent (i.e. not of other factions) did die. It's true. This was out of nothing more than paranoia. And what is your point here? Had they not died, the purges would have went on. And "there are serious questions" about whether such a degree of violence could have even been controlled in such an atmosphere when yes, THERE WERE serious threats at hand. Could the "excesses" be controlled? Retrospectively, maybe. Good job for pointing it out.


What I do know is that disastrously incompetent military leadership and disorganization in the military and economic hierarchy made it very difficult for the USSR to not only defend against German assault for over a year, but also left it woefully unprepared to even fight a small nation like Finland.

For over a year, after which it gradually and then quickly was able to rejuvenate and destroy the enemy. The reality is that without the pre-requisite of political homogeneity in the military, this would not have been possible. Anyone else who thinks otherwise is fooling themselves - political homogeneity is necessary to fulfill OVER-REACHING objectives that are agreed upon by a centralized force. There is no other point to a military if its goal isn't to fulfill political objectives in the first place. The degree of coordination and control over the soviet military DID prove to be pivotal in winning the war, despite what anyone claims, and the inability of the Nazi party to exert control over the German military properly, was a factor in the defeat of Germany. It doesn't really mean anything that their "meddling" contributed to some tactical blunders, it doesn't, because ultimately the sustenance of the Fascist state was the goal of the war. If you abstract the 'military' from this PRIMARY objective, then it doesn't matter how well they do, they aren't fighting for anything if the political objectives aren't of primary and foremost importance.


why I found the tone of your reply inappropriate (we may all be adults here, but being adult means not only having a thick skin, but not lobbing insults at those asking genuine questions.

In fact it seems you are quite set in how you conceive the events, you're just looking for the "right" answer, the one that appeases some pre-conceived sensibilities or whatever.


If you have any historical sources you think are relevant and support the claim that these moves were necessary for preserving the party,

Any historical source that deals with the great purges will do (even non-revisionist ones). Of course, INTERPRETING this in a materialist fashion is not going to come from any history source, and it is not the job of empiricists to interpret social matters.

[Jacob Cliff]

"Well, when humans have too much power, it corrupts" or some other superstitious nonsense.


Why is this nonsense? It logically follows: an excess of power leads to excess privilege and abuse. History confirms this, no?

[Rafiq]

Why is this nonsense? It logically follows: an excess of power leads to excess privilege and abuse. History confirms this, no?

No, it doesn't. Power does not corrupt - if it leads to 'excess privilege and abuse' then this was already implicit in the relations of power to begin with. Besides, if anything the opposite was true - it was not the high echelon that committed abuses, but the middle-low ranking bureaucrats that did, who were outside of public accountability.

Of course, in times of revolution, then power certainly does need to be kept in check - by the broad, militantly and politically organized masses. Not because power 'corrupts', but to keep in check those leaders who deviate from the ideas of the revolution and retreat into cynicism when things might seem hopeless (i.e. so old demons do not return).

This didn't happen in the Soviet Union for obvious reasons (who would be given authority? The peasants who were forcefully proletarianized?). A democratic society must necessarily bestow power to the broad masses - not even through direct means of power on their part, but by their active, militant participation in matters of state, etc. - it is arguable, as Trotsky did, that compared to western countries workers in the Soviet Union even up to the 30's enjoyed more power than any other country. I believe this, whole-heartedly. Even when peasants were proletarianized they were encouraged to report local abuses, and so on.

Abuse can happen, when the ideas of the revolution are not disseminated at every level possible, it is true. But Stalin's rise to power was not a case of 'power corrupting' in any meaningful sense. The opposite was true - Stalin fought corruption harshly and bitterly in many cases. Such is true for any real central power - corruption is a hindrance to central power, it is a problem that pervades at more local levels, not central ones. You do have cases, say, in Africa where central power is very corrupt, but this is only because of their wider neo-colonial relationship with other powers (making them - not central powers after all).

[Guardia Rossa]

I placed "Blitzkrieg" in quotations for a reason. The point of Blitzkrieg however, was never to destroy the enemies "economy", rather destroy the armies on the field, as happened in France for example.

Which is EXACTLY what I said.

[Jacob Cliff]

No, it doesn't. Power does not corrupt - if it leads to 'excess privilege and abuse' then this was already implicit in the relations of power to begin with. Besides, if anything the opposite was true - it was not the high echelon that committed abuses, but the middle-low ranking bureaucrats that did, who were outside of public accountability.

Of course, in times of revolution, then power certainly does need to be kept in check - by the broad, militantly and politically organized masses. Not because power 'corrupts', but to keep in check those leaders who deviate from the ideas of the revolution and retreat into cynicism when things might seem hopeless (i.e. so old demons do not return).

This didn't happen in the Soviet Union for obvious reasons (who would be given authority? The peasants who were forcefully proletarianized?). A democratic society must necessarily bestow power to the broad masses - not even through direct means of power on their part, but by their active, militant participation in matters of state, etc. - it is arguable, as Trotsky did, that compared to western countries workers in the Soviet Union even up to the 30's enjoyed more power than any other country. I believe this, whole-heartedly. Even when peasants were proletarianized they were encouraged to report local abuses, and so on.

Abuse can happen, when the ideas of the revolution are not disseminated at every level possible, it is true. But Stalin's rise to power was not a case of 'power corrupting' in any meaningful sense. The opposite was true - Stalin fought corruption harshly and bitterly in many cases. Such is true for any real central power - corruption is a hindrance to central power, it is a problem that pervades at more local levels, not central ones. You do have cases, say, in Africa where central power is very corrupt, but this is only because of their wider neo-colonial relationship with other powers (making them - not central powers after all).
If by corruption we refer to any abuse of power, especially that of privilege, then we can certainly say that the predisposition for corruption is there with power. If one controls, via power, the distribution of foodstuffs and/or other things of that sort without a democratic process impeding his singular power, it is only natural that, especially in times of hardship, such figures would enjoy eloquent meals and comforting livings while the country was faced with terrible hardships and famine (a la Stalin and all Soviet statesmen succeeding him). Like, I'm hardly sure what you mean here. Checks and balances – and democratic processes which Marx spoke of in his writings on the Commune – aren't just necessary in times of revolutionary turbulence, but throughout all of a country's existence.
And is your position here on Stalin and the "necessity of the purges" from a neutral, bystander's position, or of an advocate? If the Soviet state's fate was sealed after collectivization as a country which had lost all traces of proletarian dictatorship (something I am not sure I understand, by the way – you can say this all you like, but what does it mean?), and consequently, was on the development towards capitalism/was a "jacobin state," then why justify its purges? If it's fate was sealed as a capitalist, bourgeois regime, then why not have supported its destruction/overthrow and consequently avoid all this death, all this misery and famine that resulted from it? Or, even more importantly, why not take the position of advocating the Soviet state's overthrow by a figure like, say, Fruze or Tukhachevsky? Sure, it had the possibility of destroying or weakening the state, but it also had the possibility, through "military adventurism," to continue the revolution into the West and save or revitalize the proletarian dictatorship. There would be no con to advocating this, even in the 1930s where the state was most precarious, because the collapse of the state would be no hindrance to socialism, and if it didn't collapse, it would be an obvious victory.

[Rafiq]

Checks and balances – and democratic processes which Marx spoke of in his writings on the Commune – aren't just necessary in times of revolutionary turbulence, but throughout all of a country's existence.

One should be careful here. What is traditionally understood as "checks and balances" might very well only refer to forcing public officials and their behavior into the public eye, accountable to the political culture of the revolution. That is quite different from traditional bourgeois-cynical notions of "power corrupting" just because.

So what's my point? Power doesn't need to be "kept in check" so it doesn't corrupt, it needs to be disciplined, every figure in power must be instilled with the ideas of the revolution and must be a of a communist morality. Why am I focusing on this 'semantical' argument? Because the point is rather simple: "Power" does not "corrupt" because cynical, personal, motivations that are 'implicit' in all people get in the way of revolutionary ideas. Rather, the worshiping, the devout, and selfless worshiping of gods that are hostile to the revolution and the ideology of the class enemy is susceptible to come back so long as those in positions of power lack ideological discipline and faith in the revolution. "Selfishness" does not exist. Such cynicism is pure nonsense. As for bureaucrats enjoying nice meals while people starved, sorry, but this wasn't the problem per se. The effect distributing the meals high-ranking officials were eating to the broad masses would be negligible in that regard. I agree though that if anything it signified a degenerate bureaucratic culture, no longer that of a proletarian dictatorship. But this had nothing to do with power corrupting. It had everything to do with the fact that mid and low ranking officials were hand-picked as 'pragmatic' functionaries in situations of emergency and crisis, namely, during the civil war, the NEP, through collectivization, and so on. So the ideological discipline that would exist in a proletarian dictatorship, that arguably existed before the early 30's, was not present becasue the necessary man-power to do this, and so on, wasn't there. Power never corrupted. It did exactly what it was supposed to in the context. When powers were 'abused' according to the logic of Stalinism, then leaders were harshly punished. Leftists who think otherwise are just naive.

I just want to emphasize that there is no room for cynicism. People do not have some trans-historic "self-interest", as some reactionaries think. One's self-interest is of an IDEOLOGICAL and POLITICAL nature by default. One does not fatten themsleves at the expesne of the revolution. One worships false gods out of faithlessness in the revolution.


And is your position here on Stalin and the "necessity of the purges" from a neutral, bystander's position, or of an advocate?

Of course I am not a "neutral bystander", I am a communist. But this question is like asking "IS your position regarding Oliver Cromwell that of a neutral, bystander's position, or an advocate"? In practical terms this would make no difference. What can be recognized is: What in practical terms, would it have meant to attempt to topple the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1930's? Every Communist should have, ought to have, supported the Soviet Union against Germany. The war against Fascism was pivotal here. Were it in my power to somehow prevent the purges from happening, save the lives of innocents, people like Bukharin, and so on, sure, why wouldn't I? But my point is that - this is quite irrelevant, because no Communist would have had such power. Furthermore, saving their lives, even if this was possible, would necessarily mean their exile from the Soviet Union at the very least. Stalin was not a criminal. That much is certain. The purges, like every other horror, was a tragedy. But one should place it in its context.

I mean honestly, who knows? I doubt I would have even been able to stomach living through such events had I lived in the context of the purges. I probably would have, like Bukrhain, eventually accepted my death at the hands of the Soviet state. But all this is irrelevant.

Here, my position is identical to that of Bordiga's, save for his position on WWII.


then why justify its purges?

Presumably, the point would be that this Jacobin state was progressive insofar as it was destroying old, traditional bonds. It was progressive insofar as any bourgeois revolution is progressive, historically. We are after all, ardent defenders of the legacy of the Jacobins of France, who were bourgeois revolutionaries.

I suppose one can put it this way: Stalin was a reactionary vis a vis the proletarian dictatorship, but progressive vis a vis the former Russian empire's march to modernity. One must understand such things retrospectively. That doesn't mean one should applaud or cheer for Stalin. But one should thoroughly reject reactionary, pseudo-romantic narratives against Stalin, especially by the 'totalitarian' historians. I am quite sure even some Trotskyists will agree.


If it's fate was sealed as a capitalist, bourgeois regime, then why not have supported its destruction/overthrow and consequently avoid all this death, all this misery and famine that resulted from it?

Because it is the duty of Communists to support bourgeois revolutions vis a vis pre-modern orders. Being a "capitalist, bourgeois regime" is not a proletarian dictatorship, but it also isn't a bastion of reaction and pre-modern backwardness as was the old Tsarist regime. Finally, death, misery and famine would not only not be prevented, with the overthrow of the bureaucracy and the ensuring chaos, we can assume that the horrors would have exponentially increased. To speak of the overthrow of a 'bourgeois regime' must necessarily insinuate its replacement by a proletarian dictatorship. This was not possible at the time. And even if it was, it would yet again hinge upon the success of foreign revolutions. On the contrary, it would greatly hinder them: It would cause disarray among the kremlin-backed communist parties and further divide the movement in Germany, Spain, France, and so on.


Or, even more importantly, why not take the position of advocating the Soviet state's overthrow by a figure like, say, Fruze or Tukhachevsky?

Frunze died way before such a thing was possible. After that I don't see a real candidate or even faction that was predisposed towards this. For one, Tukhachevsky's political convictions were questionable, and his dedication was practically non-existent. There is much reason to believe that he was, like Napoleon before him, a cynic, and not a Communist at heart. Even if he was ideologically committed, he was nothing like Frunze, the two greatly differed in that the latter greatly emphasized the necessity of ideological discipline in the military, serving the ideals of the revolution, and so on.

Tukhachevsky could have taken power, but he wouldn't have restored the proletarian dictatorship, or spread it westward. Instead, like Napoleon (compared to the Jacobins), he likely would have rolled back many of the progressive gains of the revolution and even Stalinism and perhaps might have even sought But hypothetically, if this was possible (before collectivization, afterwards, it would mean something entirely different), then sure, it would be supported. It's just that there is no reason to think it was, after Stalin had solidified power following the expulsion of the Left opposition, etc. From the period of 1924-26, a lot was possible, that is for sure.

Playing with 'alternative history' is very flimsy.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

That is because your conception of the events is coupled with the same naivety as any liberal. Like you literally think the purges were SIMPLY an act of needless brutality, when the reality is that they were an outburst of weakness on the soviet state's part, and they were necessary to rejuvenate it in every meaningful sense. The naivety of your post comes from a basic affront to reason: WHY then would the purges be conducted if they were so unnecessary? Because Stalin didn't want to share power? WHY DIDN'T HE? This is where you fail utterly, because your answer is inadequate for the conditions at hand: "Because Stalin was power hungry and didn't like people who disagreed with him", or some other juvenile argument that mistaken the proximity of arguments between friends with matters few state and politics. It's so painfully fucking stupid because I can literally see you coming to the conclusion that: "Well, when humans have too much power, it corrupts" or some other superstitious nonsense. Please, that's not going to slide here. The purges did not happen because of Stalin's personal ambitions, they happened because rivaling factions were a threat to the political homogeneity of the state.

...

In fact it seems you are quite set in how you conceive the events, you're just looking for the "right" answer, the one that appeases some pre-conceived sensibilities or whatever. You assume far too much about what I think and why. I'm not assuming the purges were unnecessary, nor am I asserting some kind of anarchist or liberal conclusion that "power corrupts", nor am I asserting the truth of a liberal historiography about the role of individual power in the state. What I AM trying to do is understand in what ways the interpretation of events given by liberals, Trotskyists, anarchists and anti-stalinist Leftists may oversimplify, overlook or misinterpret when they claim (a) that the purges damaged the party, state, military and economy and (b) that they were not necessary for preserving the Bolshevik project. I am also wondering the extent to which the Stalinists deluded themselves into exaggerating the size of the threat. The very fact that I asked the question in the first place should indicate this. If I wanted to defend the thesis that "power corrupts absolutely", I would have made that thread in the Theory forum, in which case I might have enjoyed reading your denunciations of that idea.

I am more familiar with the liberal and neo-Trotskyite interpretation that attributes the causality of the degeneration of the USSR to the power of Stalin. Its fair to say that argument is bullshit and inconsistent, but it doesn't show why. You've given some arguments why, all I've merely wanted was some further development of these arguments.


The fact of the matter is that yes, they would have, had another faction prevailed there would have absolutely been another purge.Would a purge by another faction have entailed the kind of devastation of the party and military apparatus? The fact is that the vast majority of Old Bolsheviks alongside hundreds of thousands of other party, state and military functionaries were eliminated. It is plausible that another faction with broader popular support among the old Bolsheviks, the military and the bureaucracy and without the nasty political baggage coming out of collectivization could have united the party with less trauma to the political, economic and military establishment. On the other hand, the fact that the purges caused so much devastation to the party indicates that the Stalinist faction was really far from the most popular in the party, even if it had the most institutional power.

Moreover, it assumes that there were not less destructive paths for the party to pursue. Purges don't necessarily entail execution, merely demotion or removal from the party. That removal can come by expulsion, imprisonment or death. However, an expelled bureaucrat or officer can be rehabilitated at a later date, while a dead one cannot. Sure, some bureaucrats got shipped to some god-forsaken Gulag to be frozen on ice for later, but many others were killed for dubious crimes.


By the time of the great purges, Stalin's clique had already triumph. The remaining factions posed a threat, because the only reason they remained factions was because they thought they still had the opportunity to overthrow the "Stalinist clique" after the triumph of collectivization. Only after "Stalin's clique" solidified its power enough through collectivization that the purges were made possible. A Bukharinite program would have been possible, maybe, decades after collectiivzation. But not before. So yes, it would have led to the annihilation of the Soviet state one way or another. If such extensive purges were necessary, it raises questions as to the extent of the triumph of his clique. After all, isn't a purge a mechanism for a specific clique to redefine the character of a party a state and party, and is not itself a response to the character of a party or state changing?

I want to know, aside from all the abstractions about the conflicts between various factions leading to a change in the character of the party, what would have been the practical consequence for the party, the state and the working class of Russia had they won out instead of Stalin's supporters? Would they actually have reversed the gains made so far? Would they have reversed collectivization, thereby causing even more economic upheaval and disorganization? It seems that collectivization was an established fact, as undoing it would just cause more disruption to the agricultural sector.


No, but you needed to be of a rivalring faction. Finally, many who were innocent (i.e. not of other factions) did die. It's true. This was out of nothing more than paranoia. And what is your point here? Had they not died, the purges would have went on. And "there are serious questions" about whether such a degree of violence could have even been controlled in such an atmosphere when yes, THERE WERE serious threats at hand. Could the "excesses" be controlled? Retrospectively, maybe. Good job for pointing it outYou needed to be suspected or accused of being in another faction, you didn't actually have to be one. This is a basic problem with unrestrained terror being implemented by the state apparatus - there's no ability for an individual to honestly confront the evidence against him and disprove it. That also doesn't answer the question of the degree to which the purge and the methods with which it was done damaged the party.

[Rafiq]

Would a purge by another faction have entailed the kind of devastation of the party and military apparatus? [...] the fact that the purges caused so much devastation to the party indicates that the Stalinist faction was really far from the most popular in the party, even if it had the most institutional power.

A purge by another faction... There is really absolutely no telling. If a man like Tukhachevsky were to take power, would this be different then some other right-Bukharinist bloc, or something? It is uncertain. No matter, the conditions that were hegemonic and those that prevailed in Russia, were at odds with the prerogatives of what should be better characterized as the remnants of previous, older factions that were defeated. Devastation, it is safe to say - one way or another - would have been an inevitability, only this time in the form of probably a complete collapse of the state, chaos, potential civil war, and so on. Remember that Soviet citizens themselves were quite involved and active at the level of social life and... arguably... Political life too. How would they have responded to it? Most were won over by Stalinism. That is the sorry truth of it. There are so many other possibilities, but then we are playing with alternate history. So it's speculation at this point.

As for the popularity of the Stalinist faction, as you call it, well that is quite why 700,000 were killed in the purges - the institutional power, the power bestowed to them by the rapid changes was quite enough in the midst of potentially less popular within the party. But this statement is confsuing. And why? Because, for all intensive purposes, the Stalinist faction was the most hegemonic (even 'popular' in a certain sense), insofar as other factions had to operate in secret on a practical level. So the party was already structured in favor of the Stalinist faction, with the whole state apparatus, etc. on its side. Even to the point where even if 90% of the party were of rivalring factions, the context of their denunciation would be that they are anamolous infilitrators and intruders. Such was the nature of the purges.


many others were killed for dubious crimes.

These were figures of prominence and power who fell victim. The great purges were a form of political terror (not of the revolutionary kind, of course). Their deaths were meant to send a message, full political obedience to the Stalinist apparatus. Their deaths were necessary to solidify the new order of things, permanently. So long as they remained alive, they remained potential threats. That is the kind of violence that was necessary for the Stalinist state. So it's quite pointless to ask why it had to happen (execution) - such is the nature of such kinds of state brutality and violence. Remember that the Soviet state ruled by coercion and violence, like any other state.


If such extensive purges were necessary, it raises questions as to the extent of the triumph of his clique.

The clique triumphed, but there were vestiges of the old guard and older factions. They could not properly adjust to the new order of things. That's why it was the Stalinist clique making the denunciations and carrying out the executions, and not the other way around. That's all the evidence we really need that they had already triumphed (amidst everything else, too, like the triumph of Stalin's prerogatives over all others).


I want to know, aside from all the abstractions about the conflicts between various factions leading to a change in the character of the party, what would have been the practical consequence for the party, the state and the working class of Russia had they won out instead of Stalin's supporters?

Honestly there is no exact telling. But there is no reason to think that the outcome could have been favorable. We don't know the extent to which the Soviet state lied - whether they were working with Germany, etc. after all. Were they plotting a coup? Possibly. We really can't tell. What we know is that they held onto positions of power, that could not be removed without something as aggressive as the purges - fully denouncing them, and assassinating their characters. People like Bukharin were very famous figures of the revolution, for example. So whether they were even plotting a takeover or not is besides the point - their full and unquestionable obedience was lacking, and removing them on the basis that they are not obedient enough was not really going to cut it. They had to be assassinated in every meaningful way.

The degree that which plotters and conspirators (or even the degree that which they existed) had a plan is unknown. I do not see how them winning could have resulted in anything more than chaos and more destruction.


This is a basic problem with unrestrained terror being implemented by the state apparatus - there's no ability for an individual to honestly confront the evidence against him and disprove it.

The kind of violence of the Great purges was not under the full control of anyone. That's why Yezhov was eventually denounced and executed for what was acknowledged to be 'excesses'. If the ability to control and maintain the terror in a perfect way was there, then sure, you're right, but that wasn't there. Remember that the terror really spread at every level of the apparatus - and a culture of paranoia and fear resulted from it. That is why many innocents did die. But for those who perished who were of prominence, the significance was not in whether they were guilty or not (of the charges handed to them) but the fact that they represented vestiges of power that were no longer compatible with the prevailing conditions.

[Invader Zim]

The idea that the murder of 2 million individuals (a conservative estimate) was necessary for the Soviet Union's survival is absurd nonsense devoid of any understanding of the Soviet Union in the 1930s or of historical processes more generally. The idea is so nonsensical and unsustainable to be unworthy of serious consideration.

And no, Yezhov was not liquidated because of excesses or a lack of control over events, but because, as ever with Stalin, once he concluded it was time for a reversal of direction someone had to take the fall. And Yezhov knew what was coming to him weeks in advance because he could see the wheels of changing policy turning and knew the routine.

[Jacob Cliff]

The idea that the murder of 2 million individuals (a conservative estimate) was necessary for the Soviet Union's survival is absurd nonsense devoid of any understanding of the Soviet Union in the 1930s or of historical processes more generally. The idea is so nonsensical and unsustainable to be unworthy of serious consideration.
And would you mind actually stating why?

[Invader Zim]

And would you mind actually stating why?

Because the purge had nothing to do with the survival of the Soviet Union, and in fact had everything to do with the further solidification of the regime's own power.

[Jacob Cliff]

Because the purge had nothing to do with the survival of the Soviet Union, and in fact had everything to do with the further solidification of the regime's own power.
The "regime's power" was synonymous with its survival. I don't know enough on this topic to actively debate, but it should be blatantly clear that without the purges, the tension between the varying factions would erupt into either a coup or general instability. Once the course of the USSR was set after collectivization, the other programs of the other factions ceased to be possibilities and only became threats to the regime.

[Invader Zim]

The "regime's power" was synonymous with its survival. I don't know enough on this topic to actively debate, but it should be blatantly clear that without the purges, the tension between the varying factions would erupt into either a coup or general instability. Once the course of the USSR was set after collectivization, the other programs of the other factions ceased to be possibilities and only became threats to the regime.
The Soviet Union =/= Stalin's regime

And you 're correct, you don't know anything about the subject and your opinion regarding what is "blatantly clear" is irrelevant.

[Jacob Cliff]

The Soviet Union =/= Stalin's regime

And you 're correct, you don't know anything about the subject and your opinion regarding what is "blatantly clear" is irrelevant.
Well it's good to see your intellectual capabilities showing with your ad hominem and regurgitated, empty-worded statements. I suppose that until you actually disprove the above arguments with something other than "Stalinism =\= da Soviet Regime" there'll be no reasonable discussion here.

I mean, seriously. I may be fairly new to Marxism, but that doesn't entitle pretentious users like you to get away with debunking entire arguments with some one-liners that really don't say anything. It's no wonder this forum has hardly any civil discussion that ends up with both sides knowing more. People like you are too caught up in always being right and not concerned with actual discussions, which newbies like myself are looking forward to because we just want to fucking learn this stuff.

[Invader Zim]

Hmm. You, and Rafiq, are the ones suggesting that mass murder was necessary to maintain the Soviet Union's survival, the onus is on you to prove it rather than your cretinous appeals to what you believe to be "blatantly clear", which is not evidence of anything.

It appears that you aren't merely new to Marxism, but also elementary logic.

[Rafiq]

Look how fucking arrogant he is. It's almost cute, honestly - look at how confident he comes in, the professor, to school us all. Like we have no right to speak about the matter - nevermind that Zim has nothing to actually fucking offer, nevermind that he fails so pathetically (that there is humor in it) in "correcting us", - he literally only posted because he was offended 'illegitimtae' and 'non-professional' discussion on the matter was. Becuase he is a professionla, he feels qualified to, in a few lines of nothing, have the authority to try and intellectually indimiate us.

What you look like is a fucking clown with his pants caught down. Like let's get something clear: You do not speak authority, not here, and certainly you wouldn't if I was one of your students (and thank god for you that I am not). Understand? You are no different from anyone else on this forum, so speak like it. Either thoroughly justify your arguments in a way that emanates deep consideration for the arguments you seek to dismiss, or get the fuck out.


The idea that the murder of 2 million individuals (a conservative estimate) was necessary for the Soviet Union's survival is absurd nonsense devoid of any understanding of the Soviet Union in the 1930s or of historical processes more generally.

There are two possibilities here. Zim's reading skills are literally that lacking ,or he feels confident enough about the entirety of the arguments at hand to throw out over-reaching straw men inferred from at best, skimming, more more likely selective reading.

Zim, who always stresses the necessity of being empirically cautious, of being sophisticated in how they handle information, it is such a wonder that you treat the arguments of your opponents - which you seek to strike down - so flimsily. And here are Zim's pretentions to "devoid of any understanding of the Soviet Union in the 1930's". Wonderful. Let's get to it then:

Nobody fucking said 2 million people (which is now a conservative estimate? From where? Provide sources! This is a directly EMPIRICAL claim) dying were necessary for the Soviet Union's survival. In fact it is a cute, pseudo-humanist, but historically illiterate emphasis on the fact that 2 million people died which is being taken for the essential basis of importance for the purges.

In fact the significance is that vestiges of a state apparatus that would not conform to the new, qualitatively new conditions which had occurred in the previous decade, which over-took, outpaced, and went far beyond the direct will of the Soviet state apparatus. If you actually even bothered fucking reading, say, Fitzpatrick (Everyday Stalinism, Stalin's peasants), who is infinitely more modest in proclaiming she doesn't have an actual theoretical explanation for her findings, you'd know the extent of how deeply things were transformed as a result of collectivization compared to the state's expectations. You'd know that the changes were reciprocal - the Stalinist apparatus itself transformed in various ways as well. The vestiges of pre-collectiivzation factionalism, the persistence of factions who would not conform to the new condtiiosn at hand, that was the basis of the purges. The "regime solidfying its own power" is a meaningless fuicking statement, because the context of this power is the reproduction of the new order of things. I'll ask you one question and the answer will blow away your contentions like a house of fucking cards: WHY WAS the regime not 'powerful enough' before the purges? Why did it have to solidify its power, so to speak, why didn't it already have total control? Answer, please.

Furthermore if you bothered to read Fitzpatrick regarding the purges, you'd know that they were welcomed by the new collectivized peasants and many of the RECENTLY proto-proletarianized peasants, because they de-throned the power of the previous, ad hoc administration which had been responsible for acts against them, and it also provided them with an opportunity to seize fresh, new key positions of power themselves in a way that conformed with their conditions of life.

The notion that the Soviet state, by the time of the purges was not synonymous with the already hegemonic Stalinist apparatus is so laughable it's not even worth going into detail. This is nothing more than a fucking pipe dream, by the time of the purges there was no alternative avenue of seizing power that would not have led to the full collapse of the Soviet Union. Of course, if someone like Zim also thinks the probability of another faction usurping power was even viable, then he should contest that the purges, rather than an act of random, irrational violence, actually did occur under the threat of potential internal threats, and so on. What a paradox indeed.

I mean the ultimate difference is that the purges were conducted in a 'legitimate', state ordained way. They were, largely, legal matters. It wasn't some internal revolution or takeover. That is why it was the Stalinists condemning the 'intruders', not the other way around. For a take over to occur in the late 30's, this would cause disarray and chaos at almost every level - what about those sections that were already totally loyal to the new Stalin regime? What about the politically active masses of people, were they just to sit idly by while a coup occurs without their consultation? Like you don't even think. Furthermore, we don't even have a semblance of an idea of what hte prerogatives of this potential clique would be, to qualify it, but that's just the point: Whether or not a coup was actually going to happen is largely unknown. We do know that sections of the bureaucracy were outpaced by the events which had occurred. So as I said, whether there was going to be a coup or not, is irrelevant - this bureaucracy had to be purged. It had to be terrorized into submission, or killed off.

That is the nature of over-reaching transformations in relations of power that are already sustained by violence and direct violent coercion.

But okay, "You don't know anything". We don't know anything? Good then, get the fuck out of here and be content with your knowledge, professor.


And no, Yezhov was not liquidated because of excesses or a lack of control over events

I did not claim this is why he was liquidated, I claimed that this was the state's reasoning for his liquidation, this is why his liquidation was justified. If you actually FUCKING BOTHERED TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FUCKING ARGUMENTS AT HAND, you'd know that, you'd know that the significance is that even the state acknowledged there were many excesses and needless deaths from the purges. THAT IS WHY I mentioned Yezhov, if you even read the fucking context in pertinence. NOT EVEN THE STATE claimed all of the deaths were necessary. So what makes you think I claim this? DID I FUCKING SAY there were no excesses? No, I didn't. Just shut the fuck up, honestly, you're such a fucking clown is what you are.

Like holy shit, who the fuck isn't sick of this one? Is this LITERALLY how he approaches arguments? Do you know how stupid you look? No, really, do you know how stupid you actually look and sound?


Hmm. You, and Rafiq, are the ones suggesting that mass murder was necessary to maintain the Soviet Union's survival

So cry about it, historical processes don't really give a fuck about your sensitivites. This clown talks about being a professional historians and hasn't quite come into terms with the fact that history is nothing more than a fucking slaughterhouse. What state is not built on horrors, my god?

And then, most clwonish of all, because this idiot has no notion of theory, because he is literally theoretically illiterate (to the point where he probably does not recognize its existence at all), he tells us: "Prove to us it was necessary". There is no empirical proof you clown, empirical facts do not by themselves give us any conclusion at all. With the empirical knowledge at hand, you can come to a wide assortment of conclusions, the difference is that at the onset of scientifically assessing (in a MATERIALIST fashion, that is, with no room for superstition, including idealist notions of "seizing power for no reason" etc.) the historical matters equipped with the necessary theoretical knowledge, we come to this conclusion.

The only way to consistently and theoretically approach the empirical findings of various revisionist historians, in a scientific manner, is through the description of the historical processes of change I have laid out, or one similar to it. In discussing Stalinism, THERE IS BLATANTLY NO ROOM for saying "the regime just wanted to solidify its own power". WHAT? WHAT THE UFKC DOES THAT MEAN? WHY DID THEY WANT TO SOLIDFY POWER? WHAT IS THE CONTEXT OF THIS POWER? POWER IN RELATION TO WHAT CONDITIONS?

All of these questions are TOTALLY fucking ignored, because Zim's positivist philistinism does not deal with the science of history, it deals with analyzing empirical facts in the most simplistic way possible. What is so fucking sad is that no argument I have ever laid forth about the Soviet Union was made without the deepest consideration for the empirical findings of the revisionist school of Soviet history. None. And this fucker still makes pretensions to 'empirically prove it to me'.

The professor wants us to make a fucking time machine for him, and literally somehow, stop the purges to see if the Soviet Union would collapse or not. He demands EMPIRICAL proof, where there can be none. Of course, empirical truth for him is synonymous with any kind of truth - anything else merely constitutes 'speculation'. So it is with the philistines.

[Rafiq]

Here's what I said about the Yezhovschina:

That is good for Khrushchev, himself a former Stalinist functionary and a political snake, the fact of the matter is that "such acts" WERE necessary for the survival of the Soviet state, de-Stalinization is no different in that regard than the denunciation of Yezhovschina. After "Stalinism" outlived its use, it was safe to denounce it as "unnecessary" retrospectively. And surely, just like the Yezhovschina, many things were unnecessary. But that which was unnecessary constituted NOTHING MORE than marginal excess that was 'safe' to denounce. Khrushchev is a known liar and a hypocrite anyway. The Soviet state enjoyed the fruits of the 'unnecessary' actions and safely denounced them once those actions were no longer necessary. So what do you hope to demonstrate by mentioning Khrushchev?

So I even compared the denuncaition of Yezhov as just as hypocritical as that of Khruschev's denuncation of Stalin. In other words, I insinuated the EXACT SAME ARGUMENT of Zim's vis a vis Yezhov: They did away with him after they needed him, and blamed a lot of what they were responsible for on him.

I also said:

The kind of violence of the Great purges was not under the full control of anyone. That's why Yezhov was eventually denounced and executed for what was acknowledged to be 'excesses'.

I DID NOT SAY Yezhov was actually killed because Yezhov was some bad apple, I said he was denounced for what was acknowledged to be 'excesses'. That was the partial justification for his excesses, that Yezhov was needlessly murdering people to make the Soviet people disloyal to the state, and whatever. That was the significance of my argument regarding Yezhov. The Soviet state needed a scapegoat.

And this clown doesn't even have the most rudimentary reading skills to arrive at this conclusion. He LITERALLY fucking read the bottom snip of my argument which was most visible, and qualified the whole of my argument. For fuck's sake. Are you trolling? If you're trolling, you can be forgiven.