View Full Version : How does dialectics apply to society?
Jacob Cliff
21st December 2015, 23:07
How does Hegel's "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis" reasoning apply to history? Does classless society mean the synthesis between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat? Like what does this mean?
Tim Cornelis
22nd December 2015, 16:45
Unfinished:
Overaching macro-dialectic of history, Wheat believes he sees in Marx:
primitive communism (thesis): poverty + common property
class society (antithesis): wealth + private property
communism (synthesis): wealth + common property
The synthesis therefore forms a higher form of common property. This fits neatly into the Classical Marxist narrative where each mode of production is progressive in comparison to the preceding one. Indeed, it is standard Marxist doctrine to argue that the materialisation of communism presupposes a capitalist period which functions as crucible of social production, a huge expansion of the production of wealth and its concentration in the hands of a few. I think here it is an appropriate moment to introduce the German phrase 'Aufhebung', used by Hegel and Marx. Aufhebung, which knows no exact translation in English, and at least not in Dutch either, nor in a lot of other languages probably, may be translated as .
Subperiod dialectics
At this point Wheat appears to become overzealous in his efforts to discover Hegelian synthesis dialectics in Marx. He thinks he has discovered two subperiod dialectics in Marx, but the evidence he provides is especially thin for these two. He provides few citations from Marx to support his claims, stretching thin his claims about Marx's application of Hegelian dialectics to history.
The two subperiod dialectics Wheat identifies span from the first three epochs in human history to the last three. We will first look at the second subperiod dialectic. This subperiod dialectic Wheat believes to have discovered is the transition from feudalism to capitalism to communism. Wheates cites the following statement by Marx: “the knell of capitalist private property sounds … it is the negation of the negation.” If Marx understood Hegel, and Wheat understood Hegel, then it follows that Marx appears to say that communism is a return of sorts to feudalism. If the abolition of capitalist private property, i.e. communism, is the negation of the negation (synthesis), then it follows that capitalism was the negation (antithesis) of feudalism (thesis). Wheat formulates the second subdialectic in Marx schematically as follows:
“thesis (feudalism): domestic or “pygmy” production + worker ownership of tools and place
antithesis (capitalism): factory or “huge” production + capitalist ownership of tools and place
synthesis: factory or “huge” production + worker ownership of tools and place.” (p. 263 Wheat)
I think it is readily apparent that Wheat stretches the definition of feudalism thin to, it almost seems, force the discovery of a two-concept antithesis element. Certain pre-capitalist forms of production may accurately be described as worker ownership of tools (manufacturing working classes), but this was not generally applicable to feudalism. The suggestion that communism is in part a return to feudalism does not appear plausible either. At the surface, then, it appears Wheat is projecting a Hegelian interpretation where none can be found. Especially because Wheat provides no citations to back up his somewhat far fetched interpretation of Marx's statement. It seems more akin to a 'Wheatian' version of Marxist dialectics than something that Marx himself believes. The evidence for Wheat's claim is thin. It would appear to be more plausible that Marx did not fully understand Hegel after all, or that he understood Hegel fully, but that this is an employment of non-Hegelian dialectics, or perhaps that he was merely phrasemongering—although most credible interpretative literature of Marx's literature would suggest he weighs phrases and terms carefully.
But perhaps this subperiod dialectic can be salvaged. In order to accomplish that we need to rephrase it and find additional prove in the literature that corroborates such an interpretation. Both flaws, I think, can be corrected. “Worker ownership of tools and place” is not an appropriate expression of the configuration of means of production and social relationships. Capitalist ownership, too, is merely a label. What is specifically capitalist about this form of private property? It is the separation of the producers from the means of production. This separation cannot be found in pre-capitalist feudal relations. Rather, producers were bound to the means of production. This is true for serfs and for manufacturing working classes, both forms of individual property. Producers being bound to the means of production, then, seems a more appropriate formulation to express the configuration of production in feudalism. If there is Hegelian dialectics hidden in Marx's statement then there needs be a separation and return theme, where the return, taking one concept from the two-concept thesis and two-concept antithesis join together to form a higher form of both. Our thesis becomes: 'domestic or “pygmy” production + producers bound to the means of production (feudalism)'; our antithesis becomes 'factory or “huge” production + producers separated from the means of production (capitalism)'. What is our synthesis? The answer can be found in Marx's Capital:
The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation [antithesis] of individual private property [thesis], as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation [synthesis]. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production [the synthesis]. (Das Kapital, Vol. 1, Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation)
This passage confirms Wheat's interpretation of Marxist dialectics, and indirectly it confirms Wheat's interpretation of Hegel's thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. Individual private property, characterised by the producers possessing the tools of their labour, is the thesis, as we can see. Capitalist private property is the negation of this thesis, and therefore forms the antithesis. The synthesis combines elements of both, and elevates both to a higher level (there is no abolition but aufhebung). Marx speaks of “cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production”, that is, the socialised character of production (see chapter X, Y) which results from the concentration of capital, or “huge production” as Wheat put it. The 'return' of 'individual property' (i.e. worker possession of the tools with which they labour) is in a higher form compared to pre-capitalist production because if its combination with socialised production. Finally, our schematic representation of Marx's second subperiod dialectic thus becomes:
thesis (feudalism): independent production + producers bound to the means of production
antithesis (capitalism): socialised production + producers separated from the means of production
synthesis (communism): socialised production + producers bound to the means of production
We will into this subdialectic in more detail in chapter X, Y. What does socialised production mean exactly? (chapter X, Y); what does 'bound to the means of production mean? (chapter X, Y); what is independent production?
The fist subperiod dialectic runs essentially the reverse of this. Wheat:
“Thesis (primitive communism): classless society + worker ownership of tools
Antithesis (slavery): class society + exploiter ownership of tools
Synthesis (feudalism): class society + worker ownership of tools”
Marx, then, believed that history developed according to a certain dialectical logic, consisting of two cyclical subdialectical processes that constituted the macro-dialectical movement of history. What are we to make of all this? Did he, like Hegel, distort history, intentionally, to fit it into a dialectical framework? This does not seem likely. Marx was very focussed on empirically corrected fact gathering to string together his theory of history. Wheat proposes that Marx was in fact a metaphysical atheist and argued Marx's theory of history was deterministic. In what way can we think of this? Did Marx believe the movement of history was necessarily dialectical, or was it merely accidental to Marx that this movement occurred ? Should we believe so as well? Is Wheat's conclusion of Marx correct? to be able to better place the discussion on metaphysics, teleology, and determinism.
Guardia Rossa
22nd December 2015, 17:23
Aufhebung, which knows no exact translation in English, and at least not in Dutch either, nor in a lot of other languages probably, may be translated as .
Is it that untranslatable?
RedMaterialist
22nd December 2015, 20:48
How does Hegel's "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis" reasoning apply to history? Does classless society mean the synthesis between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat? Like what does this mean?
Maybe this will give you some ideas.
Hegel himself never used the phrase "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis." I think his "negation of the negation" better describes the development of classes. It's not that the proletariat synthesizes itself with the bourgeoisie, but rather that the proletarian state negates, destroys, eliminates from history the bourgeoisie. One might say the proletariat sublimates the bourgeoisie into itself, i.e. the proletariat eats the bourgeoisie alive. Interesting thought.
After the bourgeoisie is eliminated from history the proletarian state is also subject to the process of negation. With the elimination of the last exploiting class there is no longer any need for the existence of the state as such, and the negation of the negation occurs, the last state withers away and dies. The class that negated the bourgeoisie is itself negated.
The process of negation of class society, as Marx shows, begins with the development of the contradictions of production based on class exploitation.
With capitalism the central contradiction is that of social production and private ownership of the product. The capitalist brings together large groups of people who work together (socially) to produce commodities which are owned privately. This social production is highly organized, managed and centrally planned (by the capitalist.) Although production is social, distribution and exchange of the products are, at first, based on the anarchy of the "free market."
As capitalism develops, everything, including the market, becomes socially organized and managed, but still for the benefit of the private capitalist. We are at the point where the most basic capitalist commodity, money, is strictly managed. The capitalist system requires highly trained technicians (Janet Yellen) to control, manage and plan the money supply.
It's obvious they don't know what the hell they are doing.
But the point is that the development of the contradictions of capitalism may have reached the point at which the working class becomes conscious of its own power (through a fascist like Trump) and simply takes over the federal reserve, and later, the rest of the state.
Who will tell them that it is not sufficient to simply take over the state, but that it is necessary to destroy the existing state? They probably don't read RevLeft, but I have noted that the price of Marx's Capital on Amazon has been increasing steadily for the past year or so. Maybe the demand for Marx is increasing.
Tim Cornelis
22nd December 2015, 21:39
Maybe this will give you some ideas.
Hegel himself never used the phrase "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis." I think his "negation of the negation" better describes the development of classes. It's not that the proletariat synthesizes itself with the bourgeoisie, but rather that the proletarian state negates, destroys, eliminates from history the bourgeoisie. One might say the proletariat sublimates the bourgeoisie into itself, i.e. the proletariat eats the bourgeoisie alive. Interesting thought.
The bourgeoisie is eliminated from history, and sublimated at the same time? Those aren't exactly the same thing. The whole point of aufhebung is that something is transcended and maintained: absorbed and picked up. It disappears yet is maintained in some form. So you don't make a whole lot of sense here. In fact, you contradict yourself. Hegel indeed did not use 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis', instead, he employed synonyms. 'Negation of the negation' is not a neat sounding phrase, it is a synonym for 'synthesis'. So on the one hand, you maintain that the proletariat does not 'synthesise' itself with the bourgeoisie (i.e. there's no aufhebung, since this is the process of synthesising in a sense), yet the proletariat 'sublimates' (i.e. synthesises) [with] the bourgeoisie. So which is it?
You use phrases without regard for their meaning, phrasemongering. And of course, this isn't the first time you display a frustrating lack of comprehension.
To maybe make it a bit clearer. In Hegelian dialectics, there is a two-concept thesis, a two-concept antithesis, and a two-concept synthesis which borrows a concept from both the thesis and antithesis (logically, as it is a synthesis). The synthesis, by combining the concepts, brings them to a higher level. This is aufhebung.
So we have
Thesis: poverty + common property = primitive communism
Antithesis: wealth + private property = class society
Synthesis: wealth + common property = industrial communism
So we see wealth, in the antithesis phase, is restricted by private property. And common property, in the thesis phase, is restricted by poverty. Aufhebung takes place when the two are combined. They are not 'abolished' an sich, they are absorbed into a new configuration which raises both of them to a new, higher level.
As for translation, there's no direct translation, I don't think it is that untranslatable though. Sublimation or transcend may be used, but both don't really capture the essence of aufhebung.
I was thinking maybe Majin Bu from DBZ is an example of aufhebung, but I'm not too familiar with DBZ to know for sure.
Jacob Cliff
22nd December 2015, 22:35
The bourgeoisie is eliminated from history, and sublimated at the same time? Those aren't exactly the same thing. The whole point of aufhebung is that something is transcended and maintained: absorbed and picked up. It disappears yet is maintained in some form. So you don't make a whole lot of sense here. In fact, you contradict yourself. Hegel indeed did not use 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis', instead, he employed synonyms. 'Negation of the negation' is not a neat sounding phrase, it is a synonym for 'synthesis'. So on the one hand, you maintain that the proletariat does not 'synthesise' itself with the bourgeoisie (i.e. there's no aufhebung, since this is the process of synthesising in a sense), yet the proletariat 'sublimates' (i.e. synthesises) [with] the bourgeoisie. So which is it?
You use phrases without regard for their meaning, phrasemongering. And of course, this isn't the first time you display a frustrating lack of comprehension.
To maybe make it a bit clearer. In Hegelian dialectics, there is a two-concept thesis, a two-concept antithesis, and a two-concept synthesis which borrows a concept from both the thesis and antithesis (logically, as it is a synthesis). The synthesis, by combining the concepts, brings them to a higher level. This is aufhebung.
So we have
Thesis: poverty + common property = primitive communism
Antithesis: wealth + private property = class society
Synthesis: wealth + common property = industrial communism
So we see wealth, in the antithesis phase, is restricted by private property. And common property, in the thesis phase, is restricted by poverty. Aufhebung takes place when the two are combined. They are not 'abolished' an sich, they are absorbed into a new configuration which raises both of them to a new, higher level.
As for translation, there's no direct translation, I don't think it is that untranslatable though. Sublimation or transcend may be used, but both don't really capture the essence of aufhebung.
I was thinking maybe Majin Bu from DBZ is an example of aufhebung, but I'm not too familiar with DBZ to know for sure.
Tim, excuse my ignorance but this conception of dialectics feels almost superficial and/or unnecessary. I don't think it makes much sense to rationalize communism in the sense that "dialectically, it is the synthesis of primitive communism & bourgeois society" or whatever. It sounds a bit metaphysical – that there's this "dialectical force" outside our will that will mean the combination of the best elements of both societies.
Is it not better, maybe, to just abandon this thesis-antithesis-synthesis philosophy and just maintain that communism will be superior based on empirical data, etc.? Like, what's the use of dialectical analysis, if I can put it another way?
RedMaterialist
23rd December 2015, 05:07
The bourgeoisie is eliminated from history, and sublimated at the same time? Those aren't exactly the same thing. The whole point of aufhebung is that something is transcended and maintained: absorbed and picked up. It disappears yet is maintained in some form. So you don't make a whole lot of sense here. In fact, you contradict yourself. Hegel indeed did not use 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis', instead, he employed synonyms. 'Negation of the negation' is not a neat sounding phrase, it is a synonym for 'synthesis'. So on the one hand, you maintain that the proletariat does not 'synthesise' itself with the bourgeoisie (i.e. there's no aufhebung, since this is the process of synthesising in a sense), yet the proletariat 'sublimates' (i.e. synthesises) [with] the bourgeoisie. So which is it?
You use phrases without regard for their meaning, phrasemongering. And of course, this isn't the first time you display a frustrating lack of comprehension.
Something is transcended and maintained, absorbed and picked up (maintained?) , disappears yet is maintained. The sublimate is transcendent and invisible yet always present. This is pure metaphysics. Also, it means that slavery is transcended, absorbed, disappears and yet is maintained in feudalism and capitalism. And slavery, feudalism and capitalism will be invisible yet maintained in a classless society?
It seems far more comprehensible to say that each stage negates the previous stage.
I phrasemonger when I say "negate?" What do you call it when somebody says "aufhebung?"
LuÃs Henrique
24th December 2015, 02:50
Is it that untranslatable?
Nothing is untranslatable, except perhaps poetry and jokes.
Aufhebung is sublation in English.
Luís Henrique
ckaihatsu
24th December 2015, 13:30
Tim, excuse my ignorance but this conception of dialectics feels almost superficial and/or unnecessary. I don't think it makes much sense to rationalize communism in the sense that "dialectically, it is the synthesis of primitive communism & bourgeois society" or whatever. It sounds a bit metaphysical
I find this use of the term 'metaphysical' -- *whenever* used this way -- to be summarily / blithely *dismissive*, indefensibly so.
This use of 'metaphysical', almost to the point of using it as a *slur*, is meant to convey that the subject matter at hand -- dialectics, in this case -- is *fatuous* and 'mystical', or *false*, in short.
But 'metaphysics' in the positive or *constructive* sense simply means 'based on abstract reasoning', which is synonymous with *science*, based either on deductive or inductive kinds of reasoning. (We can't practice such a disservice to ourselves as to pretend that all science and scientific investigations are *finished*, and that abstract-type reasoning and even hypothesizing, are no longer needed.)
– that there's this "dialectical force" outside our will that will mean the combination of the best elements of both societies.
For the sake of semantics let's simply ease-off the *cosmic-sounding* terminology of 'dialectical force', and just agree to agree that sometimes certain *concepts* (or 'frameworks') like 'dialectics' or 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' happen -- if applied correctly -- to turn out to be *correct*.
Is it not better, maybe, to just abandon this thesis-antithesis-synthesis philosophy and just maintain that communism will be superior based on empirical data, etc.? Like, what's the use of dialectical analysis, if I can put it another way?
The idea of 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' is that it's not just some nice-feeling, relatively subjective *philosophy*, but rather that it *can be applied* as a historical-deterministic *force*, or *dynamic*, that operates empirically, like the action of heat that turns water into water vapor.
The 'complication' or 'complexity' that *arises* out of an accepting of this historical dynamic, then, though, is the question as to whether the transcending into a communistic kind of social relations would then be necessarily *automatic*, or not. Sure, we can all inter-subjectively agree that communism would be *empirically* superior, but is class-conscious proactive class struggle *necessary* to bring it about, or can we just sit back and relax knowing that the overarching dialectical dynamics of social-historical *negation* will inexorably play its role to "cosmically" bring about communism -- ?
Something is transcended and maintained, absorbed and picked up (maintained?) , disappears yet is maintained. The sublimate is transcendent and invisible yet always present. This is pure metaphysics.
Actually I find this to be *more* accurate and descriptive of empirical reality than the coarser 'negation'-based division of historical eras of means of production -- it implies a 'messiness', or 'complexification' of these social-historical breaks where vestiges of the previous forms of production *linger on*, as we can see today with the examples of child labor (in cocoa production), human trafficking (akin to slavery), and commonplace everyday rentiership, which is like feudalism.
Also, it means that slavery is transcended, absorbed, disappears and yet is maintained in feudalism and capitalism. And slavery, feudalism and capitalism will be invisible yet maintained in a classless society?
It seems far more comprehensible to say that each stage negates the previous stage.
I think communism *would* be a 'clean break' from all that preceded it, though, because it would be the only transition that is the product of a *conscious* social mass-organization at a worldwide scale.
ckaihatsu
24th December 2015, 14:43
It seems far more comprehensible to say that each stage negates the previous stage.
I'll add that the complexity / messiness of it includes *any* instance of a 'black market' -- as in the ongoing, artificial 'War on (Some) Drugs' -- where an economic *bantustan* is the norm of the day.
Rafiq
24th December 2015, 18:55
Is it not better, maybe, to just abandon this thesis-antithesis-synthesis philosophy and just maintain that communism will be superior based on empirical data, etc.? Like, what's the use of dialectical analysis, if I can put it another way?
Please do not come to such a conclusion. Communism will most certainly not be 'superior' based on 'empirical data'. Throw away any hope you have of that. Empirical data is 'neutral' when it comes to matters of the social space, how one articulates it is a matter of partisanship. What Tim provides is ridiculous (it arbitrarily emphasizes essential historical forces which are nothing more than abstractions-in-thought of certain ideas). But your question is a false one.
Dialectics does not "apply" to society. Dialectics is merely a kind of logic which allows us to locate and understand change, where we would otherwise dismiss as a contradiction. Dialectics does not do 'anything'. Althusser said empiricism was the conflation between the abstraction of the essence in thought, and the actual essential object. We are anti-empiricists.
"Dialectics" is NOT a metaphysical force. It is simply our means of grasping change. What does change mean?
First, look at the dichotomy between what constitutes a qualitative thing, and a quantitative thing. Idealists conceive history in a quantitative way, a slow and gradual culmination with the same essential social, ideological, etc. basis 'manifesting' itself throughout history. This is what people who think a 'human nature' is real believe.
But at the onset of approaching history scientifically, that is, making it knowable in its particularities, one recognizes that history can be differentiated in a qualitative way. That is, capitalism is not just some elaboration of feudalism. It is an entirely different epoch which we qualify differently.
If a banana and an apple are similar enough, then we would merely explain away their differences by purely quantitative means. But we don't do that, because they are different - we can explain them by qualitative means. Now, ULTIMATELY, when it comes to difference as such - in nature - at the closest level of observation, ultimately all things can be understood in a qualitative way. One can call everything a "thing" and explain differences first at the level of chemical ones, and then atomic ones (Thought this is where things get tricky). I mean even at this level it is almost impossible to differentiate purely in a quantitative, mathematical way.
My point is that because we are to assume everything shares a common origin, of course ultimately you can quantitatively differentiate, rather than qualitatively, your keyboard from your feces in some way. But this would not be a proper means that which you qualify these things, and why? Because a keyboard and feces are quite more than their chemical, atomic composition - they are objects that relate to human life in certain ways. Perhaps in some Communist future, everything will be perceivable in the least common denominator, but even this would require profound dialectical knowledge insofar as one conceives, for example, being/non-being, and so on. This kind of 'gnostic' overcoming of human usage and consciousness of essential natural properties (including, therefore, the properties of the brain) was a common theme in Cosmism. A common question in cognitive science is: What would happen if you were 100% aware of your neurological processes? Could you change them? Only understanding this in dialectical terms can give you a question: The answer is that you could indeed change them, because the basis of human behavior is in the social domain, not the brain. The social dimension IS THE LAST substrate of being, even if this gnostic cosmist vision was fulfilled, i.e. seeing everything in its quantum particularities, the social would survive, determining everything.
Without dialectics, we are left with the worst idealist metaphysics that give ideas, and concepts, minds of their own that 'manifest' themselves throughout history. It is no magical panacea. It refers to processes of change and the simultaneous 'contradictions' that which underlie those changes. Ultimately dialectics is the language of motion.
Now this is a very simplistic, very brief overview of dialectics. It goes much deeper than this. But to this end, I beg you, please read Hegel or at least an introduction to Hegel. You should not jump to such ridiculous conclusions as pretenses to "empirical data" where it does not belong, when you are met with an answer you find unsatisfactory or ridiculous. One must go to the source, for we are all interpreters.
Jacob Cliff
24th December 2015, 21:21
Please do not come to such a conclusion. Communism will most certainly not be 'superior' based on 'empirical data'. Throw away any hope you have of that. Empirical data is 'neutral' when it comes to matters of the social space, how one articulates it is a matter of partisanship. What Tim provides is ridiculous (it arbitrarily emphasizes essential historical forces which are nothing more than abstractions-in-thought of certain ideas). But your question is a false one.
Dialectics does not "apply" to society. Dialectics is merely a kind of logic which allows us to locate and understand change, where we would otherwise dismiss as a contradiction. Dialectics does not do 'anything'. Althusser said empiricism was the conflation between the abstraction of the essence in thought, and the actual essential object. We are anti-empiricists.
"Dialectics" is NOT a metaphysical force. It is simply our means of grasping change. What does change mean?
First, look at the dichotomy between what constitutes a qualitative thing, and a quantitative thing. Idealists conceive history in a quantitative way, a slow and gradual culmination with the same essential social, ideological, etc. basis 'manifesting' itself throughout history. This is what people who think a 'human nature' is real believe.
But at the onset of approaching history scientifically, that is, making it knowable in its particularities, one recognizes that history can be differentiated in a qualitative way. That is, capitalism is not just some elaboration of feudalism. It is an entirely different epoch which we qualify differently.
If a banana and an apple are similar enough, then we would merely explain away their differences by purely quantitative means. But we don't do that, because they are different - we can explain them by qualitative means. Now, ULTIMATELY, when it comes to difference as such - in nature - at the closest level of observation, ultimately all things can be understood in a qualitative way. One can call everything a "thing" and explain differences first at the level of chemical ones, and then atomic ones (Thought this is where things get tricky). I mean even at this level it is almost impossible to differentiate purely in a quantitative, mathematical way.
My point is that because we are to assume everything shares a common origin, of course ultimately you can quantitatively differentiate, rather than qualitatively, your keyboard from your feces in some way. But this would not be a proper means that which you qualify these things, and why? Because a keyboard and feces are quite more than their chemical, atomic composition - they are objects that relate to human life in certain ways. Perhaps in some Communist future, everything will be perceivable in the least common denominator, but even this would require profound dialectical knowledge insofar as one conceives, for example, being/non-being, and so on. This kind of 'gnostic' overcoming of human usage and consciousness of essential natural properties (including, therefore, the properties of the brain) was a common theme in Cosmism. A common question in cognitive science is: What would happen if you were 100% aware of your neurological processes? Could you change them? Only understanding this in dialectical terms can give you a question: The answer is that you could indeed change them, because the basis of human behavior is in the social domain, not the brain. The social dimension IS THE LAST substrate of being, even if this gnostic cosmist vision was fulfilled, i.e. seeing everything in its quantum particularities, the social would survive, determining everything.
Without dialectics, we are left with the worst idealist metaphysics that give ideas, and concepts, minds of their own that 'manifest' themselves throughout history. It is no magical panacea. It refers to processes of change and the simultaneous 'contradictions' that which underlie those changes. Ultimately dialectics is the language of motion.
Now this is a very simplistic, very brief overview of dialectics. It goes much deeper than this. But to this end, I beg you, please read Hegel or at least an introduction to Hegel. You should not jump to such ridiculous conclusions as pretenses to "empirical data" where it does not belong, when you are met with an answer you find unsatisfactory or ridiculous. One must go to the source, for we are all interpreters.
But Rafiq, everyone knows that nobody actually reads Hege (http://https://pervegalit.wordpress.com/2012/06/09/how-to-fake-your-way-through-hegel/)l.
No, but in all seriousness I can understand, in its most basic, that dialectics is the language of motion, as opposed to eternal, metaphysical truths that, as you say, "manifests itself throughout history" (if I'm understanding correctly, the most classic example is the Libertarian conception that history has seen the battle between "big and small government," with the former being preferable in all instances).
But that is pretty much as far as I know about dialectics – in other words, yes, I know it denies any eternal, sacred truths and that everything is in motion (and that history moves in a "spiral fashion"), but this is the extent of my knowledge. I don't see the need for this "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" obfuscations – so I feel I'm "missing something" important in terms of dialectics.
I would gladly read Hegel, but I'm not sure where to start and I have no background understanding of philosophy and Hegel is notoriously difficult to understand, especially for newcomers to philosophy who are still unconsciously wrapped in bourgeois ideology.
Rafiq
24th December 2015, 22:03
Any beginners guide would help. Perhaps this http://www.hegel.net/en/faq.htm ?
"Thesis/antithesis/synthesis" is muddied - it is not some metaphysical formula. At best it can be read backwards. That is to say, this refers to processes of change that have already occurred. It gets trickier at the level of 'prediction', which Hegel said philosophy is not concerned with.
Jacob Cliff
24th December 2015, 22:58
Any beginners guide would help. Perhaps this http://www.hegel.net/en/faq.htm ?
"Thesis/antithesis/synthesis" is muddied - it is not some metaphysical formula. At best it can be read backwards. That is to say, this refers to processes of change that have already occurred. It gets trickier at the level of 'prediction', which Hegel said philosophy is not concerned with.
If it is only a retrospective process, then what good does it do to employ it?
My understanding has been, for a number of years, "Matetial conditions form the paradigm for the superstructure of society," and that we can conclude, given that today the class struggle has not disappeared, that the cyclical crises, exploitation and general oppression will lead to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, etc. I'm still confused as to how dialectics has to do with this, or what it's "process" (that distinguishes it from empiricism, positivism, etc.) is, but I'll find something Žižekian as a supplement for an introduction.
Rafiq
25th December 2015, 00:37
If it is only a retrospective process, then what good does it do to employ it?
Because understanding processes of change, just so happen to allow us to understand processes of change that are existing at the present moment, and to consciously, at a historical level, consciously act in seizing one's historic destiny.
The point of Communism.
RedMaterialist
25th December 2015, 02:43
"Sublate" means to contradict, negate. dictionary.com
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