Is the US technically fascist?

[Troika]

The US is an extremely authoritarian militaristic culture that uses ethnic and religious hatred to divide and control the people. The welfare of the nation is placed above the welfare of anyone or anything else. Extreme nationalism is used to galvanize and control people. The US is rabid in its expansion (often through war, though usually through economic skullduggery) into other nation-states.

Economically we are very similar to the old fascist regimes in that corporate representatives control a majority of the government. The police state executes people on the street regularly (my city just had one--ofc the news didn't report it). We even have a bit of an apartheid state going where people of color and surplus labor are funneled into slave camps dressed up as the largest prison complex in the world.

How are we not fascist? Am I missing something? Has US neoliberalism just gone so far beyond fascism already that it's now something completely different and somehow worse? Isn't the end result of capitalism fascism anyway?

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

All of the things you've listed are characteristic of bourgeois democracy.

Fascist "corporatism" referenced "corporations" in the sense of a guild; modern bourgeois democracies are ruled, as are all bourgeois states, by the bourgeoisie (shockingly enough), whether or not their business is incorporated.

[Tim Cornelis]

Basically none of what you describe are the essentials of fascism.

War is not a fascist characteristic. Nor is nationalism. Nor imperialism. Nor bourgeois control over the economy. Nor authoritarianism. Nor police brutality. Nor exploitation.

In fact, in fascism, the state stood above 'corporate representatives', not the other way around as you say. I suspect this has to do with a misinterpretation of "corporatism", that is so frustratingly common.

By these standards the USSR was fascist (though unfortunately a lot of people still call it "red fascism").

Fascism has a very specific meaning. Fascism developed unique forms of political rule when it first came to power in Italy. We have to look at these unique features to get to the essence of fascism, at an abstract level (zoomed out), and then look into the specifics of its development and content (zoomed in).

Then we find, palingenetic ultra-nationalism, corporatism, Bonapartist origins, controlled mass participation, state control over culture, economic, political life, (totalitarianism in a word), etc. Not your pretty much generic capitalist rule, as your description of the USA is.

Is the USA fascist?

1. Is political power the monopoly of one party? No;
2. Does this political power mobilise the masses to (physically) subdue political opponents? No;
3. Are all trade unions banned except for one state-controlled one? No;
4. Does the state draw its legitimacy from a national rebirth myth? No;
5. Are both the bourgeoisie and proletariat coerced to act in accordance with a fascist agenda of expansionism? No;
6. Can you criticise the government openly and publicly? Yes;
7. Etc. etc. etc.

[Rafiq]

In the US, nationalism takes the form of racism. American chauvinism, jingoism etc. Is not nationalist. There will never be a "US nationalist party" like in Europe.

[Faust Arp]

A lot of people use fascism as a synonym for "stuff I don't like". It's not. It trivializes actual fascism.

[Troika]

Basically none of what you describe are the essentials of fascism.

War is not a fascist characteristic. Nor is nationalism. Nor imperialism. Nor bourgeois control over the economy. Nor authoritarianism. Nor police brutality. Nor exploitation.

In fact, in fascism, the state stood above 'corporate representatives', not the other way around as you say. I suspect this has to do with a misinterpretation of "corporatism", that is so frustratingly common.

By these standards the USSR was fascist (though unfortunately a lot of people still call it "red fascism").

Fascism has a very specific meaning. Fascism developed unique forms of political rule when it first came to power in Italy. We have to look at these unique features to get to the essence of fascism, at an abstract level (zoomed out), and then look into the specifics of its development and content (zoomed in).

Then we find, palingenetic ultra-nationalism, corporatism, Bonapartist origins, controlled mass participation, state control over culture, economic, political life, (totalitarianism in a word), etc. Not your pretty much generic capitalist rule, as your description of the USA is.

Is the USA fascist?

1. Is political power the monopoly of one party? No;
2. Does this political power mobilise the masses to (physically) subdue political opponents? No;
3. Are all trade unions banned except for one state-controlled one? No;
4. Does the state draw its legitimacy from a national rebirth myth? No;
5. Are both the bourgeoisie and proletariat coerced to act in accordance with a fascist agenda of expansionism? No;
6. Can you criticise the government openly and publicly? Yes;
7. Etc. etc. etc.

Thanks. I normally pick up books on stuff I'm interested in, but I can't really bring myself to read something written by a fascist. Yeah, I noticed the corporatism thing was backwards, but I didn't know if it actually mattered considering the end result may as well be the same. The war thing was mostly about expansionism via war, which the US absolutely undertakes. We focus on economic rather than territorial expansion, however. The US also exercises state control over culture to an extent, though probably not to the extreme fascists did. The rest is under the control of the bourgeoisie. About your points though:

1. Democrats and Republicans may as well be the same party. That said, technically you're correct.
2. I'd say we do something similar. Jill Stein was arrested trying to attend a debate, for instance. Look at OWS. Look at how communes are regularly busted up. The state handles that shit though. Liberal rhetoric isn't anything like fascism.
3. Individual politicians really seem to be in favor of exactly this. I wonder how many individuals within government could be called fascist.
4. Is this central to fascism? That's actually really interesting. I've studied propaganda a bit in university and that sounds like some of the really old methods of instilling fervor. Some politicians seem to be flirting with that sort of propaganda. Look at the "make America great again" rhetoric coming out of the furthest right candidates. I get that it's just bullshit, but it's like nascent rebirth shit. I wonder if they'll take it in that direction or if they'll just leave it at that.
5. The US is all about economic expansionism and proles/underclass are forced into military service due to a paucity of welfare. The bourgeoisie direct it, however, so you're right there.
6. This depends. The liberal state has always been smart about allowing people to rattle the cage futilely. It's a modern tactic that's worked quite well to mitigate efforts toward radical change. That said, you're correct, fascism outright silences people.

I guess my followup question is is the US moving toward fascism or is it moving toward something completely new and horrible in a different way? Also, is fascism inherently capitalistic? I got that impression from the little I've read about it. It seems like neoliberalism is more or less fascism turned on its head, where the state is subservient to the bourgeoisie.

Do you have any book recommendations that aren't written by fascists? I'm interested in the subject because it seems to be mired in bullshit rhetoric and there's just as much confusion about the definition of fascism as there is socialism within the US.

[Tim Cornelis]

The USA doesn't regulate art in any meaningful sense. You are not instructed to make a certain kind of art. Instead, the CIA, during the Cold War, subsidised abstract and modern art because this was perceived to be more of a free expression, and therefore closer to liberalism, as opposed to 'socialist realism'.

National rebirth myth is essential to the fascist form, and in the USA it originates from two sources: neo-Confederates and Tea Party activists. The former use the South (The South Will Rise Again), the latter the era of the founding fathers. These ideas, in isolation, are proto-fascist. The Tea Party proto-fascist narrative is self-conflicting, because the Founding Fathers promoted limited government, so there's virtually no chance of it developing into fascism. The 'neo-confederate' narrative does have that opportunity. In fact, the KKK was the first fascist movement in history. We see this rebirth myth in lots of fascisms. Mongolian fascists upholding the Mongolian Empire, Dutch fascists the Dutch empire, Turkish fascists the Ottoman Empire, and Russian fascists we see borrowing the symbolism of the Russian Empire and, ironically, the Soviet 'Empire' (National-Bolshevism).

The liberal two-party system is quite distinct from a one-party state, even if the two parties are very similar.

In the study of fascism various rival definitions and methods of analysis have been proposed by various scholars and theorists. We will look at two major theories pioneered by bourgeois academics Roger Griffin and Robert Paxton, which stand, more or less, at opposite ends in their respective approaches, as well as Marxist and Marxian theorists of fascism to produce what we regard to be an accurate definition of fascism. In this, we largely follow Matthew Lyon's approach, who takes the theory of Thalheimer and develops this, what he calls, “skeletal analysis of fascism” (2011), and develops it further drawing from the theories of a number of independent Marxists.

Paxton correctly argues that “great difficulties arise as soon as one sets out to define fascism” noting that it may or may not encompass various strongman autocrats with widely diverging backgrounds and ideological positions (1998, p. 1), whom yet may appear bound by a common thread. Even Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had pronounced differences. Yet, as Paxton notes, it's clear that “a real phenomenon exists” (1998, p. 9), one which warrants analysis. The crux of the matter is that fascism developed unique forms of political rule distinct from previous authoritarian styles of governance.

One approach to fascism advanced by Paxton is to view fascism in motion (certainly appealing to adherents of dialectics) by analysing the successive stages it goes through. He argues that analysing fascism as doctrine is an inadequate approach in that fascist movements that have successfully rooted, as he calls it, have abandoned, but more importantly, ignored (as opposed to adapt, annul, and justify change of) their early programs (Paxton, 1998, p. 6). This results from the primacy given to action over intellectualism and doctrine in fascism. Thus, it appears to makes sense to observe fascism's development rather than its doctrine. More or less cynical or opportunistic adaptation, “undermine any effort to portray historical fascism as the consistent expression of one coherent ideology.” (Paxton, 1998, p. 16) Instead, Paxton argues, “it is in their functions that [fascisms] resemble each other.” (1998, p. 5). This apparent opportunistic manoeuvring of fascism may, however, have a slightly different cause as will be revealed by looking at Thalheimer's approach to fascism.

Marxist theorist August Thalheimer emphasised that fascism functionally represented a right-wing Bonapartism. To Marx, Bonapartism is a phenomenon where the capitalist class abdicates its control over the state to ultimately preserve its economic position and social power. This was, he argued, in the words of Paxton, the result of “a deadlock between between two evenly balanced classes”, which gives rise to a strongman able to rule automatised from class interests (2004, p. 265). Observing that the fascist movement in Italy entered power after “an unsuccessful proletarian onslaught”, this being the Biennio Rosso, which “ended with the demoralization of the working class” and therefore the bourgeoisie, being “exhausted, distraught and dispirited, cast around for a saviour to protect its social power” (Thalheimer, 1930). Marxists, among others, had proposed that fascism “came to the aid of capitalism in trouble” (Paxton, 2004, p. 10). The Communist International's Third Period theory of fascism, believing in capitalism's imminent demise at the hands of a new surge of revolutionary consciousness in the proletariat, had posited that fascism was a generic “counterrevolutionary trend within all bourgeois parties” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Social-democrats, from this perspective, were “social fascists”. The Comintern altered this position when the Nazis came to power, and articulated the quite well known definition of fascism as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.” (cited in Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Empirically, the notion of fascism as Bonapartist, arising, not at the height of class struggle, but out of a period of demoralisation and exhaustion, stands on stronger foundations (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Sociologist Talcott Parsons similarly argued that fascism “emerged out of uprooting and tensions produced by uneven economic and social development” and that “class tensions were particularly acute” as a result of late industrialisation also leading to compromise being “blocked by surviving pre-industrial elites” (Paxton, 2004, p. 209).

To many theorists, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, including mainstream academic Andrew Heywood, fascism was primarily a petty bourgeois phenomenon. Fascist movements drew its membership “drew their membership and support largely from such lower middle class elements” (Heywood, p. 173). Crushed between organised labour and the growing power of concentrated capital or big business the petty bourgeoisie sought a return to previous social stages. Fascism constituted “a revolt of the lower middle classes, a fact that helps to explain the hostility of fascism to both capitalism and communism.” (Heywood, 2012, p. 173). According to Paxton the reason for the over-representation of the petty bourgeoisie in interbellum fascist movements is not “due to some proletarian immunity to appeals of nationalism and ethnic cleansing” (2004, p. 50) but because the working class was “already deeply engaged, from generation to generation, in the rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and rallies,” they “were simply not available for another loyalty.” (2004, p. 50). Writing on socialism, Heywood argues that “[c]apitalism itself had matured and by the late nineteenth century the urban working class had lost its revolutionary character and been integrated into society” because the working class had “begun to develop a range of institutions – working men's clubs, trade unions, political parties and so on – which both protected their interests and nurtured a sense of security and belonging within industrial society.” (2012, p. 97). Thus, the rooted elements of the working class was far less inclined toward fascism. The socially uprooted elements, in contrast, were attracted to fascism, as Paxton (2004, p. 50) notes: “[w]orkers were more available for fascism if they stood outside the community of socialists” and the “unemployed were more likely to join the communists than the fascists, however, unless they were first-time voters or from the middle class”. Paxton (2004, p. 50) further notes that protestants were more likely to join the Nazis than were Catholics given the latter's numerous institutions that paralleled the socialist's.

It would seem that Thalheimers position of fascism as drawing support from the “socially uprooted elements from every class” including “from the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the workers” with the petty bourgeoisie being disproportionally more socially uprooted is a more accurate assessment than chalking fascism up to merely being propelled by a petty bourgeois reaction. Griffin (2003) similarly posits that the scholarly consensus is that fascism is “trans-class” paralleling Thalheimer's thesis of fascism as Bonapartist.
To return to the apparent opportunistic manoeuvring of the fascists, Paxton notes that at certain points the fascists maintained anticapitalistic positions (although selectively), lamenting finance capital and big landlords, (2004, p. 10) while once in power the fascist leadership also courted industrialists (2004, p. 104). When fascism exercises power, according to Paxton (1998, p. 18)., it does so through its leader and by balancing between the wants and interests of the various elites and institutions within its borders, such as the industrial, party, military, police, and religious elites. Thalheimer argued instead that this particular manoeuvring that he predicted would be common to all fascisms (as he articulated his theories on fascism before the rise of the Nazis to power) was due to the fascist parties being mass movements of various socially uprooted elements from various social classes and declassed elements forcing conflict “between the social interests of this mass following and the interests of the dominant classes which it has to serve.” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). From this perspective, fascism is inherently unstable and a fascist regime is being “pulled simultaneously in opposite directions” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). According to Thalheimer fascism, “like Bonapartism, seeks to be the benefactor of all classes; hence it continually plays one class off against another, and engages in contradictory maneuvers internally.” (cited in Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2).
Thus, manoeuvring between the particular type of petty bourgeois reaction ('radicalism' in mainstream scholarship), the appeasement and courting of the industrialists, or 'haute bourgeoisie', and in the case of Nazi-Germany specifically, threatening industrialists with nationalisation and economic coercion under certain conditions (Temin, 1990) and the repressing of the 'petty bourgeois socialist'1 worker- and unemployment-based Sturmabteiling (SA) would seem to be explained most appropriately by analysing fascism as right-wing Bonapartist movement.

It is dubious, however, to argue that right-wing Bonapartism represents the essence of fascism because it historically performed this function. Lyons argues that it's therefore more appropriate to define fascism as a type of right-wing revolutionary movement, but “not revolutionary in the socialist or anarchist sense” instead, citing Maoist theorist J. Sakai, “Fascism is revolutionary in a simpler use of the word. It intends to seize State power for itself … in order to violently reorder society in a new class rule” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Lyons (2011, 'Combining Two Approaches', para. 4) concludes by proposing a draft definition: “Fascism is a revolutionary form of right-wing populism, inspired by a totalitarian vision of collective rebirth, that challenges capitalist political and cultural power while promoting economic and social hierarchy”.

The “collective rebirth” aspect of fascism identified by Lyons (2011, 'The Myth of National Rebirth', para. 3) is based on Griffin's theory of palingenetic ultranationalism. To historian and political theorist Roger Griffin (2004) fascism is based on what he calls 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism', defined as the aspiration to stage a national rebirth on the basis of a romanticised golden age period from the national history. Griffin, as opposed to Paxton, proposes to look into the actual beliefs held by fascists to understand the essence of fascism—an approach he calls 'methodological empathy' after George Mosse's concept (Griffin, 2008, p. xiv). Before proceeding, we need to address some objections some may have. Isn't methodological empathy a form of sharing in the illusion? This does not follow. The ideological forms that social forces in conflict assume are not of no value. We need to consider the ideological form and content of fascism, both are important.

This 'palingenetic ultranationalism' is immediately obvious in the symbolism and rhetoric of fascist movements. Italian Fascism sought to restore the glory and might of the Roman Empire, and the infamous 'Hitler salute' brought back into fashion by Mussolini was of course the customary greeting to Ancient Roman magistrates. Hitler, likewise, spoke a of a Third Reich, in reference to preceding German 'Reichs' (Heywood, 2012, p. 133). The Ku Klux Klan—said to be the first fascist movement in history originating from the 1860s in the former Confederate States by, among others, Paxton (1998, p. 12)—too was preoccupied with national rebirth after suffering the humiliation of defeat in the American Civil War. This is most famously conveyed in the slogan 'The South Shall Rise Again'. Indeed, we can find endless examples of ultra-nationalists drawing inspiration from the golden age of their respective nations of origin. This golden age essentially always being the period of Empire. EXAMPLES.

Paxton, like Griffin, identifies fascism with a preoccupation with national decline and humiliation but the specific remedy appears under-emphasised, this remedy being the staging of such a national rebirth, this is summarised by Heywood (2012, p. 181) as “All fascist movements therefore highlight the moral bankruptcy and cultural decadence of modern society, but proclaim the possibility of rejuvenation, offering the image of the nation ‘rising phoenix-like from the ashes’.” Griffin's definition of fascism is very exact, and uses 'para-fascism' to define right-wing corporatist conservative authoritarian regimes. Lyons summarises para-fascism, “A para-fascist regime is imposed from above (often by the military) and represents traditional elites trying to preserve the old order, but surrounds its conservative core with fascist trappings” (2011, 'The Myth of National Rebirth', para. 3). These corporatist conservative authoritarian regimes did not “grew directly out of a seizure of state power by an 'extra-systemic' revolutionary movement”. Instead, “[a]ll of them … came to power as attempts by sections of the ruling elites or their military representatives to restore stability and strong government in a way which did not threaten the basis of the existing class structure or of traditional values”. Fascism, in contrast, restructured, or sought to restructure, political and socio-economic institutions and sought cultural renewal through popular mobilisation (Griffin, 2004, p. 121). Fascism is therefore revolution in the sense that it advocates extreme change in relation to political and socio-economic institutions as well as cultural values, considering the prevailing cultural vales decadent and corrupted by liberalism and socialism (which includes opposition to Enlightenment values), or as Paxton called it advocacy of “radical spiritual-cultural renewal and restored national community” (1998, p. 7).

We propose a definition for this paper similar to the draft definition proposed by Lyons. It differs on some minor details. Lyons' draft definition includes a reference to “collective rebirth” when the emphasis with fascism lies on the national aspect. We define fascism as a revolutionary form of right-wing ultra-nationalist populism seeking to stage a totalitarian national rebirth through a social Darwinian type struggle. From this it follows that it challenges conventional liberal and moderate conservative values because these reject such a power struggle.

The means to staging a totalitarian national rebirth is based on mass action. Fascism gives primacy of action over intellectualism. Action, moreover, in this particular case, stands in relation to struggle, or 'social Darwinian' struggle. Paxton (1998, p. 12) commented on this by saying that fascism considers “the beauty of violence and of will, when they are devoted to the group's success in a Darwinian struggle.” And Heywood (2012, p. 177) similarly argued that the principle of struggle, between nations and within nations against treacherous elements, is crucial to fascism:
In the first place, fascists regarded struggle as the natural and inevitable condition of both social and international life. Only competition and conflict guarantee human progress and ensure that the fittest and strongest will prosper … In contrast to traditional humanist or religious values, such caring, sympathy and compassion, fascists respect a very different set of martial values: loyalty, duty, obedience and self-sacrifice.

Lastly, the ability of success of fascism in the past was dependent on historical contingencies, a short window of opportunity, that allowed it to manifest itself as Bonapartist, drawing from socially uprooted elements from every class, manoeuvring between the interests of different class elements and elites, in a period of protracted crisis, manoeuvring into political power and its subsequent exercising thereof. This crisis including a crisis of liberal democracy allowing for fascists to exploit (in the neutral sense: use to the fullest benefit) this. Moreover, the liberal democracy in question must, according to Griffin, be “mature enough institutionally to preclude the threat of a direct military or monarchical coup,” as “Latin America, Africa, and the Far East provide abundant examples of fragile democracies being snuffed out by military dictatorships” , yet is must be “too immature to be able to rely on a substantial consensus in the general population that liberal political procedures … are the sole valid basis for a healthy society” (Griffin, 2014, p. 211).

Fascism is right-wing in that it promotes social inequality and social hierarchy; revolutionary in that it seeks to seize political power to violently restructure class rule; totalitarian in that it invites controlled mass participation (of conformity to fascist power) in order to stage a national rebirth, and the national rebirth is pivotal because the ultimate aim of violently restructuring class rule is revitalisation and the rebirth of the nation, which it seeks to achieve through a social Darwinian type struggle.

[Sibotic]

I feel that there's something misleading about representing fascism as fuelled by some form of 'third class,' as people seem to imply. As far as this goes, the police might kill people, the US State generally kills its own citizens through execution depending on the location, but unlike nearby in ISIS this general killing of people isn't generally attributable to the state authority. I feel that a lot of the case being made rests on adjectives like 'extreme' being used in perhaps vaguely loose ways here, although this might have more to do with the ambiguity of identifications of 'fascism' generally. You couldn't necessarily refer to the prisons as 'apartheid,' although you were close to identifying a different issue with them there regardless, although apartheid itself wasn't necessarily a characteristic of fascist states.

[cyu]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_dispute

A semantic dispute is a disagreement that arises if the parties involved disagree about the definition of a word, not because they disagree on material facts, but rather because they disagree on the definitions of a word (or several words) essential to formulating the claim at issue. It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all.

The question is, what is the point of defining something as fascist? Does it mean if it is fascist, we must oppose it, if it is not fascist, we cannot oppose it? Or if it is fascist, we must oppose it even more than normal? If there are aspects about something you don't like, whether it is common with fascism or not, there should be good reasons for opposing it, whether it is common to fascism or not.

[Armchair Partisan]

Then we find, palingenetic ultra-nationalism, corporatism, Bonapartist origins, controlled mass participation, state control over culture, economic, political life, (totalitarianism in a word), etc. Not your pretty much generic capitalist rule, as your description of the USA is.

Is the USA fascist?

1. Is political power the monopoly of one party? No;
2. Does this political power mobilise the masses to (physically) subdue political opponents? No;
3. Are all trade unions banned except for one state-controlled one? No;
4. Does the state draw its legitimacy from a national rebirth myth? No;
5. Are both the bourgeoisie and proletariat coerced to act in accordance with a fascist agenda of expansionism? No;
6. Can you criticise the government openly and publicly? Yes;
7. Etc. etc. etc.

The term 'fascist' is actually something I'm always at a trouble to properly identify as well, and I would like to take a moment to cast some doubts on this post. I get that corporatism is an important characteristic of fascism (I hope I have the correct idea of what that word means here), but as for the rest...



Surely things like "palingenetic ultranationalism", "draws its legitimacy from X" are just idealist hogwash that any state could use if it felt like, and which have no relationship to a materialist class analysis? I do not understand the difference - in one way or another, all national myths, fascist or not, are just fairytales designed to foster a form of false consciousness in one group of people and separate them from others.
As people have said before, total control over society, total suppression of dissent etc. seem not to be an ideological definer of fascism to me. They are just tactics, not strategy, to put it simply. Capitalist states too have used brutal suppression and "totalitarianism" to keep their subjects in line before, but have now moved on to providing an illusion of freedom, providing various dead-end outlets to popular unrest instead of galvanizing it. Again, just tactics. Could a fascist state not, likewise, function with "illusionary freedom"?
The way I understand it, fascism is a movement with its class basis in the petit-bourgeoisie, which feels threatened by the haute-bourgeoisie and doesn't want to forge ties with the workers or join their ranks, thus it seeks to set up a corporatist economy where financial power is curbed in favor of political power. On the other hand, another angle I've heard that makes sense is that fascism emerges as a reaction to a strong workers' movement, and the haute-bourgeoisie ally with it when they feel threatened. How much of this is true?
In 5), you say that "the bourgeoisie [are] coerced to [do stuff]" by the fascists, but I mean, Nazi Germany pretty much had its powerbase in a faction of the bourgeoisie (Krupp, IG Farben, Volkswagen), without which it would surely have crumbled. Right?
Overall, in what way did the fascist states of the early 1900s act differently from other particularly nasty right-wing shitholes? In what way is their role different from those, I mean? Italy and Germany didn't invent the concept of being crazy irredentist and expansionist. Japan acted similarly but it wasn't fascist, and there are other examples too.

Hope someone can clear some of this stuff up, if possible.

[Tim Cornelis]

Surely things like "palingenetic ultranationalism", "draws its legitimacy from X" are just idealist hogwash that any state could use if it felt like, and which have no relationship to a materialist class analysis? I do not understand the difference - in one way or another, all national myths, fascist or not, are just fairytales designed to foster a form of false consciousness in one group of people and separate them from others.

I think this implies a vulgar, probably mechanical view of materialism. It is in ideological forms that men becomes conscious of conflict and fight it out. They do not fight it out because of crude material self-interest. So to say that ideology is unimportant, and does not warrant analysis is just plain wrong. I suppose, in the abstract, any state could invoke divine right to rule, but the point is, most states don't. Recognising the relationship between ideology, ideological forms, as well as content,and their interaction, is not idealist, is is dialectical and materialist. Further, they are not consciously fairy tales made up to fool people. Fascists genuinely believe in fascism.


As people have said before, total control over society, total suppression of dissent etc. seem not to be an ideological definer of fascism to me. They are just tactics, not strategy, to put it simply. Capitalist states too have used brutal suppression and "totalitarianism" to keep their subjects in line before, but have now moved on to providing an illusion of freedom, providing various dead-end outlets to popular unrest instead of galvanizing it. Again, just tactics. Could a fascist state not, likewise, function with "illusionary freedom"?

As an individual component, no. Totalitarianism is not synonymous with fascism. But it is an essential part of it. A liberal fascism is impossible.


The way I understand it, fascism is a movement with its class basis in the petit-bourgeoisie, which feels threatened by the haute-bourgeoisie and doesn't want to forge ties with the workers or join their ranks, thus it seeks to set up a corporatist economy where financial power is curbed in favor of political power. On the other hand, another angle I've heard that makes sense is that fascism emerges as a reaction to a strong workers' movement, and the haute-bourgeoisie ally with it when they feel threatened. How much of this is true?

The answer is in the spoiler tags in my previous post. Fascism is not particularly petty bourgeois, it draws from all socially uprooted elements of all classes, and it manoeuvres between their interests.


In 5), you say that "the bourgeoisie [are] coerced to [do stuff]" by the fascists, but I mean, Nazi Germany pretty much had its powerbase in a faction of the bourgeoisie (Krupp, IG Farben, Volkswagen), without which it would surely have crumbled. Right?

The fascist government courted industrialists, and moderated their petty bourgeois reactionary positions, but once power was consolidated and exercised, they returned to their earlier reaction (google 5 stages of fascism), and coerced industrialists, threatening them with nationalisation, imposing prices, forcing them to behind an agenda that wasn't in their interests.



Overall, in what way did the fascist states of the early 1900s act differently from other particularly nasty right-wing shitholes? In what way is their role different from those, I mean? Italy and Germany didn't invent the concept of being crazy irredentist and expansionist. Japan acted similarly but it wasn't fascist, and there are other examples too.
Hope someone can clear some of this stuff up, if possible.

http://sdonline.org/47/two-ways-of-looking-at-fascism/

"Griffin’s definition of fascism also excludes most of the dictatorships that have often been labeled fascist. He has suggested the term para-fascist to describe many of these.47 A para-fascist regime is imposed from above (often by the military) and represents traditional elites trying to preserve the old order, but surrounds its conservative core with fascist trappings. These trappings may include an official state party, paramilitary organizations, a leader cult, mass political ritual, corporatism, and the rhetoric of ultranationalist regeneration. Para-fascist regimes may be just as ruthless as genuine fascist ones in their use of state terrorism. Unlike true fascism, para-fascism does not represent a genuine populist mobilization and does not substantively challenge established institutions. During the 1920s and 1930s, Griffin argues, para-fascist regimes arose in several European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Romania, and Austria, joined by the Vichy government after France surrendered to Germany in 1940. Para-fascist regimes regarded genuine fascist movements as a threat and used various strategies to contain, coopt, or crush them. In Spain during the Civil War, for example, General Franco “imposed a shot-gun marriage between Falangists and the traditional (that is non-fascist) radical right” as part of his strategy to establish a para-fascist dictatorship.48

Contrary to claims that an “ideal type” definition freezes our image of fascism in the past, Griffin is also alert to ways that fascism has changed. He writes in some detail about neo-fascism, by which he means post-1945 forms of fascism that have substantially modified or replaced inter-war versions of fascist ideology.49 Many fascists have concealed their politics behind a democratic façade through the use of coded rhetoric, helping to blur the line between hardline conservatism and the far right. Some have advanced new philosophical systems for rationalizing fascist politics, such as the Nouvelle Droit (New Right) of Alain Benoist’s GRECE think-tank in France or the Traditionalism of Julius Evola in Italy. Third Position groups have embraced the “leftist” anti-capitalist current on the margins of traditional fascism, rather than the mainstream of Hitler or Mussolini.

Among a range of neo-fascist innovations, Griffin highlights one trend in particular: a shift toward increased internationalism. From the 1960s on, international networking increased substantially, both through informal contacts and through organizations such as CEDADE (Spanish Circle of Friends of Europe), the NSDAP-AO (National Socialist German Workers Party-Overseas Organization), and WUNS (World Union of National Socialists). Such networking has fostered the sense of belonging to an international movement, and a belief that fascist principles can regenerate many nations, not just one’s own."

[ComradeAllende]

National rebirth myth is essential to the fascist form, and in the USA it originates from two sources: neo-Confederates and Tea Party activists. The former use the South (The South Will Rise Again), the latter the era of the founding fathers. These ideas, in isolation, are proto-fascist. The Tea Party proto-fascist narrative is self-conflicting, because the Founding Fathers promoted limited government, so there's virtually no chance of it developing into fascism. The 'neo-confederate' narrative does have that opportunity. In fact, the KKK was the first fascist movement in history. We see this rebirth myth in lots of fascisms. Mongolian fascists upholding the Mongolian Empire, Dutch fascists the Dutch empire, Turkish fascists the Ottoman Empire, and Russian fascists we see borrowing the symbolism of the Russian Empire and, ironically, the Soviet 'Empire' (National-Bolshevism).

But aren't the neo-Confederates more in-line with decentralization and "states' rights" rather than a totalitarian society? Many neo-Confederates are actually libertarians (classical liberals) on economic issues, and fascism as I understand it requires state planning (and to some degree autarky) alongside private property. Plus the Confederacy and its supporters, while embracing the ethnic nationalism and racial supremacy that is commonly identified with fascism (at least its German form), boasted a rather limited central government. The Klan (and its various offshoots and parallel organizations) may be a proto-fascistic movement, but I see some rather bourgeois liberal qualities in the neo-Confederate intellectual tradition.

[OGG]

On Imperial Japan, what is para-fascism?

[Antiochus]

It might seem like it because U.S 'nationalism' is a bit different from your standard nationalism. Traditional nationalists in Europe spout bullshit about how you are "French by blood" and this somehow gives you certain characteristics which they amplify by revising history and so forth. Americans basically say: "You fell out of a vagina in an imaginary circle of land called the U.S.A and that alone defines you as a person. Unless you don't support ruling ideology, in that case, get out".

[Rafiq]

Is the USA fascist?

1. Is political power the monopoly of one party? No;
2. Does this political power mobilise the masses to (physically) subdue political opponents? No;
3. Are all trade unions banned except for one state-controlled one? No;
4. Does the state draw its legitimacy from a national rebirth myth? No;
5. Are both the bourgeoisie and proletariat coerced to act in accordance with a fascist agenda of expansionism? No;
6. Can you criticise the government openly and publicly? Yes;
7. Etc. etc. etc.

I basically agree with you, but these are mere apparent characteristics. Doesn't China at least conform to most of this?

It doesn't touch on the ideological pathology of Fascism, and more importantly, its class character. Fascism, after all, gets wrought out from a specific context - if a state can magically "become" Fascist without the pre-requisite to a failed revolution, and mas demographics to mobilize, it's not Fascist and never was.

Regarding the "Fascist agenda of expansionism", this too is rather muddied. Expansionsim was pursued in Germany, for example, not because of "Fascism" but precisely because of existing class considerations. Individual members of the bourgeoisie might be "coerced", but for every Fascist state they form the basis of power. When the state conflates with their immediate prerogatives, it is in the long-term interests of capital. That is after all the role of any and every state - we should remember the Business Plot against FDR during the 1930's.

[Troika]

The USA doesn't regulate art in any meaningful sense. You are not instructed to make a certain kind of art. Instead, the CIA, during the Cold War, subsidised abstract and modern art because this was perceived to be more of a free expression, and therefore closer to liberalism, as opposed to 'socialist realism'.

National rebirth myth is essential to the fascist form, and in the USA it originates from two sources: neo-Confederates and Tea Party activists. The former use the South (The South Will Rise Again), the latter the era of the founding fathers. These ideas, in isolation, are proto-fascist. The Tea Party proto-fascist narrative is self-conflicting, because the Founding Fathers promoted limited government, so there's virtually no chance of it developing into fascism. The 'neo-confederate' narrative does have that opportunity. In fact, the KKK was the first fascist movement in history. We see this rebirth myth in lots of fascisms. Mongolian fascists upholding the Mongolian Empire, Dutch fascists the Dutch empire, Turkish fascists the Ottoman Empire, and Russian fascists we see borrowing the symbolism of the Russian Empire and, ironically, the Soviet 'Empire' (National-Bolshevism).

The liberal two-party system is quite distinct from a one-party state, even if the two parties are very similar.

In the study of fascism various rival definitions and methods of analysis have been proposed by various scholars and theorists. We will look at two major theories pioneered by bourgeois academics Roger Griffin and Robert Paxton, which stand, more or less, at opposite ends in their respective approaches, as well as Marxist and Marxian theorists of fascism to produce what we regard to be an accurate definition of fascism. In this, we largely follow Matthew Lyon's approach, who takes the theory of Thalheimer and develops this, what he calls, “skeletal analysis of fascism” (2011), and develops it further drawing from the theories of a number of independent Marxists.

Paxton correctly argues that “great difficulties arise as soon as one sets out to define fascism” noting that it may or may not encompass various strongman autocrats with widely diverging backgrounds and ideological positions (1998, p. 1), whom yet may appear bound by a common thread. Even Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had pronounced differences. Yet, as Paxton notes, it's clear that “a real phenomenon exists” (1998, p. 9), one which warrants analysis. The crux of the matter is that fascism developed unique forms of political rule distinct from previous authoritarian styles of governance.

One approach to fascism advanced by Paxton is to view fascism in motion (certainly appealing to adherents of dialectics) by analysing the successive stages it goes through. He argues that analysing fascism as doctrine is an inadequate approach in that fascist movements that have successfully rooted, as he calls it, have abandoned, but more importantly, ignored (as opposed to adapt, annul, and justify change of) their early programs (Paxton, 1998, p. 6). This results from the primacy given to action over intellectualism and doctrine in fascism. Thus, it appears to makes sense to observe fascism's development rather than its doctrine. More or less cynical or opportunistic adaptation, “undermine any effort to portray historical fascism as the consistent expression of one coherent ideology.” (Paxton, 1998, p. 16) Instead, Paxton argues, “it is in their functions that [fascisms] resemble each other.” (1998, p. 5). This apparent opportunistic manoeuvring of fascism may, however, have a slightly different cause as will be revealed by looking at Thalheimer's approach to fascism.

Marxist theorist August Thalheimer emphasised that fascism functionally represented a right-wing Bonapartism. To Marx, Bonapartism is a phenomenon where the capitalist class abdicates its control over the state to ultimately preserve its economic position and social power. This was, he argued, in the words of Paxton, the result of “a deadlock between between two evenly balanced classes”, which gives rise to a strongman able to rule automatised from class interests (2004, p. 265). Observing that the fascist movement in Italy entered power after “an unsuccessful proletarian onslaught”, this being the Biennio Rosso, which “ended with the demoralization of the working class” and therefore the bourgeoisie, being “exhausted, distraught and dispirited, cast around for a saviour to protect its social power” (Thalheimer, 1930). Marxists, among others, had proposed that fascism “came to the aid of capitalism in trouble” (Paxton, 2004, p. 10). The Communist International's Third Period theory of fascism, believing in capitalism's imminent demise at the hands of a new surge of revolutionary consciousness in the proletariat, had posited that fascism was a generic “counterrevolutionary trend within all bourgeois parties” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Social-democrats, from this perspective, were “social fascists”. The Comintern altered this position when the Nazis came to power, and articulated the quite well known definition of fascism as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.” (cited in Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Empirically, the notion of fascism as Bonapartist, arising, not at the height of class struggle, but out of a period of demoralisation and exhaustion, stands on stronger foundations (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Sociologist Talcott Parsons similarly argued that fascism “emerged out of uprooting and tensions produced by uneven economic and social development” and that “class tensions were particularly acute” as a result of late industrialisation also leading to compromise being “blocked by surviving pre-industrial elites” (Paxton, 2004, p. 209).

To many theorists, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, including mainstream academic Andrew Heywood, fascism was primarily a petty bourgeois phenomenon. Fascist movements drew its membership “drew their membership and support largely from such lower middle class elements” (Heywood, p. 173). Crushed between organised labour and the growing power of concentrated capital or big business the petty bourgeoisie sought a return to previous social stages. Fascism constituted “a revolt of the lower middle classes, a fact that helps to explain the hostility of fascism to both capitalism and communism.” (Heywood, 2012, p. 173). According to Paxton the reason for the over-representation of the petty bourgeoisie in interbellum fascist movements is not “due to some proletarian immunity to appeals of nationalism and ethnic cleansing” (2004, p. 50) but because the working class was “already deeply engaged, from generation to generation, in the rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and rallies,” they “were simply not available for another loyalty.” (2004, p. 50). Writing on socialism, Heywood argues that “[c]apitalism itself had matured and by the late nineteenth century the urban working class had lost its revolutionary character and been integrated into society” because the working class had “begun to develop a range of institutions – working men's clubs, trade unions, political parties and so on – which both protected their interests and nurtured a sense of security and belonging within industrial society.” (2012, p. 97). Thus, the rooted elements of the working class was far less inclined toward fascism. The socially uprooted elements, in contrast, were attracted to fascism, as Paxton (2004, p. 50) notes: “[w]orkers were more available for fascism if they stood outside the community of socialists” and the “unemployed were more likely to join the communists than the fascists, however, unless they were first-time voters or from the middle class”. Paxton (2004, p. 50) further notes that protestants were more likely to join the Nazis than were Catholics given the latter's numerous institutions that paralleled the socialist's.

It would seem that Thalheimers position of fascism as drawing support from the “socially uprooted elements from every class” including “from the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the workers” with the petty bourgeoisie being disproportionally more socially uprooted is a more accurate assessment than chalking fascism up to merely being propelled by a petty bourgeois reaction. Griffin (2003) similarly posits that the scholarly consensus is that fascism is “trans-class” paralleling Thalheimer's thesis of fascism as Bonapartist.
To return to the apparent opportunistic manoeuvring of the fascists, Paxton notes that at certain points the fascists maintained anticapitalistic positions (although selectively), lamenting finance capital and big landlords, (2004, p. 10) while once in power the fascist leadership also courted industrialists (2004, p. 104). When fascism exercises power, according to Paxton (1998, p. 18)., it does so through its leader and by balancing between the wants and interests of the various elites and institutions within its borders, such as the industrial, party, military, police, and religious elites. Thalheimer argued instead that this particular manoeuvring that he predicted would be common to all fascisms (as he articulated his theories on fascism before the rise of the Nazis to power) was due to the fascist parties being mass movements of various socially uprooted elements from various social classes and declassed elements forcing conflict “between the social interests of this mass following and the interests of the dominant classes which it has to serve.” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). From this perspective, fascism is inherently unstable and a fascist regime is being “pulled simultaneously in opposite directions” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). According to Thalheimer fascism, “like Bonapartism, seeks to be the benefactor of all classes; hence it continually plays one class off against another, and engages in contradictory maneuvers internally.” (cited in Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2).
Thus, manoeuvring between the particular type of petty bourgeois reaction ('radicalism' in mainstream scholarship), the appeasement and courting of the industrialists, or 'haute bourgeoisie', and in the case of Nazi-Germany specifically, threatening industrialists with nationalisation and economic coercion under certain conditions (Temin, 1990) and the repressing of the 'petty bourgeois socialist'1 worker- and unemployment-based Sturmabteiling (SA) would seem to be explained most appropriately by analysing fascism as right-wing Bonapartist movement.

It is dubious, however, to argue that right-wing Bonapartism represents the essence of fascism because it historically performed this function. Lyons argues that it's therefore more appropriate to define fascism as a type of right-wing revolutionary movement, but “not revolutionary in the socialist or anarchist sense” instead, citing Maoist theorist J. Sakai, “Fascism is revolutionary in a simpler use of the word. It intends to seize State power for itself … in order to violently reorder society in a new class rule” (Lyons, 2011, 'From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution', para. 2). Lyons (2011, 'Combining Two Approaches', para. 4) concludes by proposing a draft definition: “Fascism is a revolutionary form of right-wing populism, inspired by a totalitarian vision of collective rebirth, that challenges capitalist political and cultural power while promoting economic and social hierarchy”.

The “collective rebirth” aspect of fascism identified by Lyons (2011, 'The Myth of National Rebirth', para. 3) is based on Griffin's theory of palingenetic ultranationalism. To historian and political theorist Roger Griffin (2004) fascism is based on what he calls 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism', defined as the aspiration to stage a national rebirth on the basis of a romanticised golden age period from the national history. Griffin, as opposed to Paxton, proposes to look into the actual beliefs held by fascists to understand the essence of fascism—an approach he calls 'methodological empathy' after George Mosse's concept (Griffin, 2008, p. xiv). Before proceeding, we need to address some objections some may have. Isn't methodological empathy a form of sharing in the illusion? This does not follow. The ideological forms that social forces in conflict assume are not of no value. We need to consider the ideological form and content of fascism, both are important.

This 'palingenetic ultranationalism' is immediately obvious in the symbolism and rhetoric of fascist movements. Italian Fascism sought to restore the glory and might of the Roman Empire, and the infamous 'Hitler salute' brought back into fashion by Mussolini was of course the customary greeting to Ancient Roman magistrates. Hitler, likewise, spoke a of a Third Reich, in reference to preceding German 'Reichs' (Heywood, 2012, p. 133). The Ku Klux Klan—said to be the first fascist movement in history originating from the 1860s in the former Confederate States by, among others, Paxton (1998, p. 12)—too was preoccupied with national rebirth after suffering the humiliation of defeat in the American Civil War. This is most famously conveyed in the slogan 'The South Shall Rise Again'. Indeed, we can find endless examples of ultra-nationalists drawing inspiration from the golden age of their respective nations of origin. This golden age essentially always being the period of Empire. EXAMPLES.

Paxton, like Griffin, identifies fascism with a preoccupation with national decline and humiliation but the specific remedy appears under-emphasised, this remedy being the staging of such a national rebirth, this is summarised by Heywood (2012, p. 181) as “All fascist movements therefore highlight the moral bankruptcy and cultural decadence of modern society, but proclaim the possibility of rejuvenation, offering the image of the nation ‘rising phoenix-like from the ashes’.” Griffin's definition of fascism is very exact, and uses 'para-fascism' to define right-wing corporatist conservative authoritarian regimes. Lyons summarises para-fascism, “A para-fascist regime is imposed from above (often by the military) and represents traditional elites trying to preserve the old order, but surrounds its conservative core with fascist trappings” (2011, 'The Myth of National Rebirth', para. 3). These corporatist conservative authoritarian regimes did not “grew directly out of a seizure of state power by an 'extra-systemic' revolutionary movement”. Instead, “[a]ll of them … came to power as attempts by sections of the ruling elites or their military representatives to restore stability and strong government in a way which did not threaten the basis of the existing class structure or of traditional values”. Fascism, in contrast, restructured, or sought to restructure, political and socio-economic institutions and sought cultural renewal through popular mobilisation (Griffin, 2004, p. 121). Fascism is therefore revolution in the sense that it advocates extreme change in relation to political and socio-economic institutions as well as cultural values, considering the prevailing cultural vales decadent and corrupted by liberalism and socialism (which includes opposition to Enlightenment values), or as Paxton called it advocacy of “radical spiritual-cultural renewal and restored national community” (1998, p. 7).

We propose a definition for this paper similar to the draft definition proposed by Lyons. It differs on some minor details. Lyons' draft definition includes a reference to “collective rebirth” when the emphasis with fascism lies on the national aspect. We define fascism as a revolutionary form of right-wing ultra-nationalist populism seeking to stage a totalitarian national rebirth through a social Darwinian type struggle. From this it follows that it challenges conventional liberal and moderate conservative values because these reject such a power struggle.

The means to staging a totalitarian national rebirth is based on mass action. Fascism gives primacy of action over intellectualism. Action, moreover, in this particular case, stands in relation to struggle, or 'social Darwinian' struggle. Paxton (1998, p. 12) commented on this by saying that fascism considers “the beauty of violence and of will, when they are devoted to the group's success in a Darwinian struggle.” And Heywood (2012, p. 177) similarly argued that the principle of struggle, between nations and within nations against treacherous elements, is crucial to fascism:
In the first place, fascists regarded struggle as the natural and inevitable condition of both social and international life. Only competition and conflict guarantee human progress and ensure that the fittest and strongest will prosper … In contrast to traditional humanist or religious values, such caring, sympathy and compassion, fascists respect a very different set of martial values: loyalty, duty, obedience and self-sacrifice.

Lastly, the ability of success of fascism in the past was dependent on historical contingencies, a short window of opportunity, that allowed it to manifest itself as Bonapartist, drawing from socially uprooted elements from every class, manoeuvring between the interests of different class elements and elites, in a period of protracted crisis, manoeuvring into political power and its subsequent exercising thereof. This crisis including a crisis of liberal democracy allowing for fascists to exploit (in the neutral sense: use to the fullest benefit) this. Moreover, the liberal democracy in question must, according to Griffin, be “mature enough institutionally to preclude the threat of a direct military or monarchical coup,” as “Latin America, Africa, and the Far East provide abundant examples of fragile democracies being snuffed out by military dictatorships” , yet is must be “too immature to be able to rely on a substantial consensus in the general population that liberal political procedures … are the sole valid basis for a healthy society” (Griffin, 2014, p. 211).

Fascism is right-wing in that it promotes social inequality and social hierarchy; revolutionary in that it seeks to seize political power to violently restructure class rule; totalitarian in that it invites controlled mass participation (of conformity to fascist power) in order to stage a national rebirth, and the national rebirth is pivotal because the ultimate aim of violently restructuring class rule is revitalisation and the rebirth of the nation, which it seeks to achieve through a social Darwinian type struggle.

Thanks for the detailed reply. I wasn't aware that degenerate art was a concept central to fascism rather than something particular to Nazi Germany.

That was a good article. I think I get what makes fascism fascism now. I can definitely see how it's different from liberalism.

[Troika]

A semantic dispute is a disagreement that arises if the parties involved disagree about the definition of a word, not because they disagree on material facts, but rather because they disagree on the definitions of a word (or several words) essential to formulating the claim at issue. It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all.

The question is, what is the point of defining something as fascist? Does it mean if it is fascist, we must oppose it, if it is not fascist, we cannot oppose it? Or if it is fascist, we must oppose it even more than normal? If there are aspects about something you don't like, whether it is common with fascism or not, there should be good reasons for opposing it, whether it is common to fascism or not.

No, not really. I was just wondering whether the US could be defined as fascist or if it was just bourgeois liberalism. I honestly think they're both equally repellent.

[Armchair Partisan]

Hey Tim, all of the below quotes are from you, but the quote button is on strike again:


I think this implies a vulgar, probably mechanical view of materialism. It is in ideological forms that men becomes conscious of conflict and fight it out. They do not fight it out because of crude material self-interest. So to say that ideology is unimportant, and does not warrant analysis is just plain wrong. I suppose, in the abstract, any state could invoke divine right to rule, but the point is, most states don't. Recognising the relationship between ideology, ideological forms, as well as content,and their interaction, is not idealist, is is dialectical and materialist. Further, they are not consciously fairy tales made up to fool people. Fascists genuinely believe in fascism.

This is true, but then again, in my experience, most liberal capitalists also seem to genuinely believe in the meritocratic qualities of liberal capitalism and that it's the best system for human society. Aside from a few cynical ones at top, I think it's rare that someone genuinely invents an ideology that they can't self-rationalize as the best way to run society for everyone. Nonetheless, when doing materialist analysis, we ignore the self-delusions of liberal capitalists and other ideological veneers, recognizing that material interests consciously or subconsciously guide most people. Why is fascism an exception?


A liberal fascism is impossible.

Why? To me here, the logic doesn't seem to be "fascism couldn't be socially liberal because of reasons X and Y making this impossible" but rather "we define fascism as the kind of Bonapartism that isn't liberal or progressive in any way".


The answer is in the spoiler tags in my previous post. Fascism is not particularly petty bourgeois, it draws from all socially uprooted elements of all classes, and it manoeuvres between their interests.

Okay, I can understand this.

However, I still have some extra doubts about one more thing. You and your sources seem to repeat "national rebirth" many times as an important ideological element of fascism... but I see two issues with that. First, that it is so vague, not a concrete idea, and indeed, fascists through history were very inconsistent about what they had in mind for their nation and what rebirthing it means. Secondly, the way it seems to me, the "national rebirth" rhetoric might as well be a consequence of fascism being far-right, instead of it being the other way around and "national rebirth" defining fascism.

Could not fascism theoretically function without it, even if it doesn't tend to? So far, an emphasis on class collaboration and trying to erase class conflict in favor of the nauseatingly vague and Orwellian idea of "national unity" seems to be the key tenet that defines how fascism works. But in this case, is fascism just a right-wing version of Bonapartism in general?

[Black Panther]

The only fascism is American patriotism, American idea of exceptionalism. But it's not dangerous anymore, I think it's dying.

[Troika]

The only fascism is American patriotism, American idea of exceptionalism. But it's not dangerous anymore, I think it's dying.

I hope you're right. I've noticed more and more people seeming to realize that things aren't all that great. Not many are aware of how bad shit really is, but they're losing that weird jingoism. I think even Republicans are moving in this direction. Look at Trump's rhetoric. He's obviously full of shit and the people who think he makes any kind of sense are political illiterates, but there is more than a kernel of dissent in what he's saying and people are eating it up. Even the Kochs have distanced themselves from him. Shit, even Hillary is pretending to be opposed to lobbyists and superPACs and bourgeois dominance. I'm hoping Americans are smart enough to realize how full of shit she is. Bernie wouldn't transform the US into a socialist paradise by any means, but it's less likely that he'd sign any bill that guts welfare than anyone else.

I'd honestly love to see a debate between Bernie and Trump. That would be hilarious. It'd be like a thousand times funnier than the Ryan/Biden debate.



Why? To me here, the logic doesn't seem to be "fascism couldn't be socially liberal because of reasons X and Y making this impossible" but rather "we define fascism as the kind of Bonapartism that isn't liberal or progressive in any way".


Liberal as in classically/neoliberal, not as in Democrat party liberal.

[Sibotic]

Thanks for the detailed reply. I wasn't aware that degenerate art was a concept central to fascism rather than something particular to Nazi Germany.
To be fair, the concept as generally brought up is associated in some ways with the Nazi German crackdown on degenerate art, and the Soviet Union did have similar criticisms of such art without necessarily being associated with fascism in itself, although it obviously did sustain relations with the Germans and etc. when available. These art-forms weren't generally particularly participated in by socialists anyway, especially when they moved towards 'modernism' in art, which may now be consigned to the past along with 'post-modernism' which was only an academic fad, so in that sense such things weren't necessarily an issue as it happens in any case.

[Troika]

Ahh ok.

I don't know if I'd call post modernism an academic fad. It's still hanging around. Nothing really encapsulates the aesthetic of late capitalism better.

[ACME_MAN]

In true fascism, the corporations are there to serve the state. In the US, the bulk of the corporations are there to serve themselves and have in essence, co-opted the government. A true fascist state is ultra-nationalistic and although there is clearly a nationalistic streak that runs through elements of American society, it is not totally pervasive. There is a clear split in the military in terms of loyalties at present as well as within the intelligence agencies. A FACTION of our government may be fascist, but on the whole, no, I don't believe this government is fascist.



The US is an extremely authoritarian militaristic culture that uses ethnic and religious hatred to divide and control the people. The welfare of the nation is placed above the welfare of anyone or anything else. Extreme nationalism is used to galvanize and control people. The US is rabid in its expansion (often through war, though usually through economic skullduggery) into other nation-states.

Economically we are very similar to the old fascist regimes in that corporate representatives control a majority of the government. The police state executes people on the street regularly (my city just had one--ofc the news didn't report it). We even have a bit of an apartheid state going where people of color and surplus labor are funneled into slave camps dressed up as the largest prison complex in the world.

How are we not fascist? Am I missing something? Has US neoliberalism just gone so far beyond fascism already that it's now something completely different and somehow worse? Isn't the end result of capitalism fascism anyway?

[ACME_MAN]

With a black President I think it would be very hard to characterize the US as racist on the whole.


In the US, nationalism takes the form of racism. American chauvinism, jingoism etc. Is not nationalist. There will never be a "US nationalist party" like in Europe.

[Sobornost]

With a black President I think it would be very hard to characterize the US as racist on the whole.

I have a theory on that regarding racism, but this 'Black President' is the lackey of Wall Street, as much as were the others.