Is cultural capital a sound concept?

[G4b3n]

What are your thoughts on cultural capital?
I mostly see it employed by white liberals in regards to blacks who they find to be too entrenched in their own culture. It seems to be an intellectual concept masquerading under a guise of egalitarian notions that really reinforces that the ideals of the working poor ought to be to attempt to appear bourgeois in every sense possible.

[Mr. Piccolo]

If I understand cultural capital correctly it refers to those things such as informal and formal networks, trust within communities, respect for the law, etc., that supposedly determine the success or failure of societies or subgroups within societies. In the United States the concept is often used to develop ideas such as the "culture of poverty" that posits that the problem with poor people is their bad behavior.

Both conservatives and liberals like to use cultural capital arguments. Conservatives use cultural capital to show that the poor are responsible for their own misfortune and that more punitive measures are needed to get them to act better. Liberals, on the other hand, see it as problem to be tackled when creating their ideal meritocratic society based on education and credentials. Liberals usually then argue for more funding for education and the like.

The problem with the cultural capital argument is that it fails to see how cultural conditions are created by economic factors. For example, the "bad" culture of inner city African-Americans can be partially explained by referring to the lack of job opportunities available to black male ex-sharecroppers coming to the North from the South in the last wave of migration in the 20th century, which had a predictably negative impact on black families that lingers to this day.

This is not to deny the importance or reality of culture, but we can't look at culture and pretend that it has no material basis. However, this is how culture capital theory often operates, even if its proponents occasionally give nods to economic factors. Changing the economic system implies major changes in the culture. The Soviets, for example, knew this, and tried to forge a new Soviet culture over the decaying carcass of Imperial Russian culture.

[willowtooth]

if find it to be an extremely racist excuse for poverty, its answering the question why are blacks so poor when italians irish koreans etc who came after them are so rich. their answer beacuse african americans are essentially dark skinned whites. same names, religion, culture etc, but they dont have any country they can go back too they have no connection to their ancestry and theirs no reason to hire, or pray with, or do anything with only other african americans and not include whites. its a perverted argument that says if blacks were bigger racists theyd be better off

it's the fact that african americans and white americans are basically identical other than skin tone obviously, and is dismissive of the years of unimaginable absolute horror africans in america have suffered.

when fascists say blacks dont have dads or "proper families" or "why do blacks destroy their own community" like was repeated a million times during the recent Baltimore riots, their essentially saying blacks dont have enough "cultural capital" and by saying that, they completely ignore their own prejudice and discrimination and the centuries of discrimination based solely on skin tone.

italians and irish communities were extremely racist in america hiring only people of the same national origin, clinging too their racist churches refusing to speak english, and actually in a sense discriminating against all anglo saxons, sending money back home to their nation and/or receiving money from their country

the cultural capital argument is basically promoting racism

[ckaihatsu]

This is a particularly vile and insidious (liberal) concept, mostly because it inherently implies that the playing field is fundamentally a *level* one, and that the whole system is basically *meritocratic*.

On this premise, any shortfalls by any demographic groups (racial, ethnic, gender, etc.) are seen to be explainable -- and even justifiable -- on those same *demographic* terms, as though the mere observation also happens to be the *explanation*.

This is an ideological dependence on a crude and coarse empirical tautology, the same as saying 'Impoverished blacks are poor because they're black,' and does nothing in the service of a real explanation, which would obviously require a *deeper analysis*.

[Mr. Piccolo]

This is a particularly vile and insidious (liberal) concept, mostly because it inherently implies that the playing field is fundamentally a *level* one, and that the whole system is basically *meritocratic*.

Exactly. Meritocracy is the modern legitimizing ideology of capitalism. Cultural capital helps further this ideology by placing the blame for shortfalls on the victims of capitalism. Hence, the popularity of the cultural capital concept among both conservatives and liberals.

You even see these arguments applied to whole countries and regions. For example, East Asian development is attributed to "good culture" while African underdevelopment is attributed to "bad culture."

[ckaihatsu]

Exactly. Meritocracy is the modern legitimizing ideology of capitalism. Cultural capital helps further this ideology by placing the blame for shortfalls on the victims of capitalism. Hence, the popularity of the cultural capital concept among both conservatives and liberals.


Yup.





You even see these arguments applied to whole countries and regions. For example, East Asian development is attributed to "good culture" while African underdevelopment is attributed to "bad culture."


This facile 'good-vs.-evil' dualism can never hold up for more than a historical moment, no matter what the era is, or who the personages may happen to be -- any 'cultural' stereotyping collapses when viewed against the backdrop of shifting alliances and rivalries of imperialist opportunism, as very well illustrated in the run-up to World War I:





Britain was not the only imperial power. France controlled almost as much of the world, Holland had the giant archipelago we now call Indonesia, Belgium held an important chunk of central Africa, and the tsar had a huge area of territory to the east, west and south of Russia proper, all the way to the Indian border and across to the Pacific port of Vladivostok.

But Germany, the European power with the fastest industrial growth, was left virtually without an empire. Its heavy industry was increasingly organised through ‘trusts’—associations of companies which controlled production all the way from the extraction of raw materials to the disposal of finished products. They had grown up alongside the state and had none of the old small-capitalist distrust of state power which still characterised many British capitalists. They looked to the state to protect their domestic market through tariffs (taxes on imports) and to aid them in carving out foreign markets.

They looked in four directions: to China, where Germany grabbed its own treaty port; to Africa, where it was able to seize Tanganyika, Rwanda-Burundi and South West Africa; to the Maghreb, where Germany challenged France and Spain for control of Morocco; and to establishing a corridor, centred on a projected Berlin-Baghdad railway, through south east Europe and Turkey to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. But in whatever direction Germany’s capitalists and empire-builders moved, they bumped up against the networks of colonies, bases and client states run by the established empire—against the Russians in the Balkans, the French in north Africa, the British in the Middle East and east Africa, and everyone in China.

To put it crudely, the growth in profitability which had produced a recovery from the ‘Great Depression’ and enabled capitalism to concede some improvements in living standards to its workers depended upon the spread of empires. But as the empires spread they tended to collide with each other.

Those who ran the empires knew that the outcome of such collisions depended upon the strength of their armed forces. Therefore, Germany set about building battleships to challenge Britain’s domination of the seas, and Britain retaliated by building ‘Dreadnought’ battleships of its own. France increased military service in its conscript army from two years to three, so as to be able to match the German military. Tsarist Russia set up state-run arms factories, and designed its railway system with potential wars against Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire in mind. The drive towards war was the flipside of the illusion of stability which imperialism brought to capitalism—and which so impressed reformist socialists like Bernstein.




Harman, _A People's History of the World_, pp. 397-398

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

I think there are some mis-understandings of 'cultural capital'.

From what I understand, cultural capital is the accumulation of non-meritocratic means of privilege through informal networks, educated parents and 'the grapevine', as well as good schooling, that normally helps already better-off students/young people to entrench their social advantage.

For example, somebody whose parents are professionals (lawyers, accountants) might have been through to a certain level of education and thus when they have children have the know how to buy a second home near a good school, or send them to a known extra-curricular club that is financially out of reach of poorer students.

It's not a legitimising argument for meritocracy. In fact it's the opposite - it suggests that cultural capital can be accumulated and passed on, thereby entrenching inequality of opportunity.

[Fakeblock]

I think there are some mis-understandings of 'cultural capital'.

From what I understand, cultural capital is the accumulation of non-meritocratic means of privilege through informal networks, educated parents and 'the grapevine', as well as good schooling, that normally helps already better-off students/young people to entrench their social advantage.

For example, somebody whose parents are professionals (lawyers, accountants) might have been through to a certain level of education and thus when they have children have the know how to buy a second home near a good school, or send them to a known extra-curricular club that is financially out of reach of poorer students.

It's not a legitimising argument for meritocracy. In fact it's the opposite - it suggests that cultural capital can be accumulated and passed on, thereby entrenching inequality of opportunity.

Indeed. Bourdieu meant 'cultural capital' in the sense of one being 'cultured', not cultures as spaces, traditions and so forth. Being cultured means having certain skills (e.g. reading and writing), qualifications (e.g. a prestigious degree) and possessions, which give one access to the ruling classes. This is in fact a quasi-Marxist conception of ideological inculcation and how the family and education system hails and distributes subjects along class lines.

[ckaihatsu]

I think there are some mis-understandings of 'cultural capital'.

From what I understand, cultural capital is the accumulation of non-meritocratic means of privilege through informal networks, educated parents and 'the grapevine', as well as good schooling, that normally helps already better-off students/young people to entrench their social advantage.

For example, somebody whose parents are professionals (lawyers, accountants) might have been through to a certain level of education and thus when they have children have the know how to buy a second home near a good school, or send them to a known extra-curricular club that is financially out of reach of poorer students.

It's not a legitimising argument for meritocracy. In fact it's the opposite - it suggests that cultural capital can be accumulated and passed on, thereby entrenching inequality of opportunity.


I'll note, then, that this discrepancy in understandings of the term is probably due to the *scale* of the definition being used -- I'm used to thinking of it in large-scale, demographic / sociological terms, while the 'privilege' aspect of cultural capital is more on the *personal* level.

[Mr. Piccolo]

I'll note, then, that this discrepancy in understandings of the term is probably due to the *scale* of the definition being used -- I'm used to thinking of it in large-scale, demographic / sociological terms, while the 'privilege' aspect of cultural capital is more on the *personal* level.

Sometimes the two become interrelated. The development of cultural capital (such as education, networks, etc.) is sometimes deemed to be the product of good culture. This is the argument used to explain the success of "model minorities" such as East Asians and Jews. Certain people develop personal cultural capital because they came from cultural backgrounds that were already directed to positive ends as opposed to negative "cultures of poverty."

How this fits into meritocracy depends on whether one is a conservative or a liberal. A conservative will say that cultural capital is simply the outward manifestation of positive cultural qualities already in place in families, subcultures, and even countries. The conservative does not see differences in privilege as a problem for meritocracy because it is simply the results of the workings of meritocratic sorting; those with privilege justly deserve their privilege because they have earned it.

A liberal, though, sees cultural capital developed and passed down as privilege as a problem, so he/she is usually more willing to support state intervention to give the less fortunate a "leg up" through things like more funding for education, affirmative action, higher taxes on the rich, etc. But the liberal still accepts the meritocratic theory of capitalism; he or she just believes that contemporary capitalism is not meritocratic enough while the conservative typically believes that we have already reached meritocracy or something close to it ("the rich deserve everything they have because they have earned it, they are the job creators, etc.).

[ckaihatsu]

Sometimes the two become interrelated. The development of cultural capital (such as education, networks, etc.) is sometimes deemed to be the product of good culture. This is the argument used to explain the success of "model minorities" such as East Asians and Jews. Certain people develop personal cultural capital because they came from cultural backgrounds that were already directed to positive ends as opposed to negative "cultures of poverty."

How this fits into meritocracy depends on whether one is a conservative or a liberal. A conservative will say that cultural capital is simply the outward manifestation of positive cultural qualities already in place in families, subcultures, and even countries. The conservative does not see differences in privilege as a problem for meritocracy because it is simply the results of the workings of meritocratic sorting; those with privilege justly deserve their privilege because they have earned it.

A liberal, though, sees cultural capital developed and passed down as privilege as a problem, so he/she is usually more willing to support state intervention to give the less fortunate a "leg up" through things like more funding for education, affirmative action, higher taxes on the rich, etc. But the liberal still accepts the meritocratic theory of capitalism; he or she just believes that contemporary capitalism is not meritocratic enough while the conservative typically believes that we have already reached meritocracy or something close to it ("the rich deserve everything they have because they have earned it, they are the job creator, etc.).


Agreed on all of the above, but I'll have to add that the 'cultural capital' value system is problematic because of its short-sightedness -- it only recognizes the social variable of *culture*, as though it's an inert substance that lingers like an ether throughout the universe and over the surface of the earth.

So through this inherently neutral substrate we have the sum total of mass individual and group decisions, neatly discernable according to respective 'culture' categories, since the beginning of human existence. Everything else about the natural and human-social worlds can be safely disregarded -- according to this worldview -- since this 'culture ether' is always a-priori and is impervious to any and all outside influences and messiness.

It's no wonder that this all-too-common mindset inexorably leads one to a dark logical conclusion, a macabre 'musical chairs' of tribalistic group-based identities and in- and out-politics that revolve around this premise.

Obviously I don't like the kind of exhaust produced from 'culture'-based social machinations since the byproduct has historically been one of human lives *sacrificed* in all kinds of ways, whether through ceremony, scapegoating, or neglect.

It's critical to situate the human experience within a more-materialist context that includes individual freedom and discretion, of varying degrees, and also access to technological tools. Even just acknowledging the empirical existence of the *state* would go a long way in disabusing 'culture' types from their 'Planet of the Apes' way of thinking, as though all of human history is reducible to anthropological principles.

From what I can tell I think it's some kind of uneasiness with social *abstractions* -- like the state -- and a preference for simplistic explanations that don't have to answer to history and all of its baggage. I would like to remind this kind of person that there *are* daily personal interactions with the value systems that exist as a result of the undeniable existence of overarching society and civilization -- aspects like authority, power relations, economics, social stratification, and so on -- that are far from 'organic' and/or 'culture-based'.


G.U.T.S.U.C., Individualism - Tribalism

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Civilization - Humanity Framework

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