2nd thesis on Feuerbach

[Kill all the fetuses!]

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

As far as I understand it Marx attacks the Fuerbach's materialism as devoid of the active element, i.e. Feuerbach viewed the idea (truth?) as arising out of passive contemplation about the material reality, which simply exists outside one's consciousness. Marx, however, thought that even the material reality existing outside one's consciousness is a result of history, i.e. a result of historical practical activity. It seems that he furthermore thought that the ideas themselves can only reflect the activity and can only arise through activity (labour). So the idea of price can only come about through an already active (production) process, which then necessitates such an idea; ideas of simple objects can also come about only through a process of producing these objects etc.

However, I am not sure if I get any of this right and I am not sure what Marx means by "objective truth", "practical question", "proving the truth" etc. Maybe someone can help me out with this particular thesis?

[Kill all the fetuses!]

To make my question more to the point - why is objective truth a practical question, why and how does it have to be proved? What does Marx even mean by "objective truth" here?

Is it synonymous with the idea as such and should I simply read this thesis as indicating that ideas arise out of activity of human beings, out of their labour-process, i.e. out of their active interaction with nature? Or is it something different?

[Kronsteen]

What does Marx even mean by "objective truth" here?

Marx didn't have a worked out epistemology, and was rather loose with philosophical terms. But I think he recognised that the adjective "true" can't refer to some unknowable reality outside our senses, but to a statement being deemed provisionally sufficiently proven for whatever purpose we're using it for at that moment.

If I say "My car's stopped working", I don't mean every single component is unable to do anything at all. I mean "My car no longer enables me to get to work etc.". So if it's true that my car's stopped working, it means my car won't transport me for far enough, with enough safety, or fast enough.

So "It doesn't work" means "It doesn't work enough", where "enough" is defined not by some property of the car, but by what I want the car to do. If you want the car to do something different, it may work well enough for you.

As to "objective truth", I think Marx is trying to say the persuit of objective truth outside of human or personal purposes is either impossible or a contradiction in terms, so he's trying to block off that line of enquiry by changing the meaning of "Objective" to something like "Practical".

[Kill all the fetuses!]

Brilliant, thanks Kronsteen. Although, a very superficial question on top - to an extent that you are right in your last sentence, how would, say, a law of gravity or any other manifestation of law-like working of nature factor into this? Would it mean that, say, a law of gravity is "objectively true", but without practical activity of human beings it is useless, nay, one couldn't even conceive of such a law without practical activity of human beings. So as knowledge is necessarily gained through practical activity (as per first thesis on Feuerbach), then the objective truth can also only come through practical activity by necessity/definition.

Does that make sense? How would you deal with the question at hand?

[Kronsteen]

how would, say, a law of gravity or any other manifestation of law-like working of nature factor into this?

I think Marx wasn't consistent on this. On the one hand, he was a philosophical materialist who believed in a rule-governed, ateliological and godless universe outside of our senses made of something called "matter".

On the other hand, he believed that all knowledge is provisional and can only be of the contents of experience - gained by practical, social activity. Which of course presupposes an external world and other people.

The first is an ontology, the second an epistemology. So given the epistemology, how could we know the ontology? We couldn't.

Indeed, the only way to prove the existence of the social-practical world in Marxism is to assume that world. But that's not a problem unique to Marxism - any attempt to prove or disprove solipsism relies on circular reasoning.

As to the theory of gravity, I think Marx would say all laws of physics are mental abstractions of experience, which work when we put them into practice presumably because they approximate to the unknowable reality beyond, which presumably exists but is by definition unprovable.

[Rafiq]

The first is an ontology, the second an epistemology. So given the epistemology, how could we know the ontology? We couldn't.


The error is assuming that the ontology is somehow separate from the domain of social and political activity. But this isn't the case - it stems from a definite opposition to an existing, for example, social-symbolic order (metaphysics, idealism, all that sustains the existing order). There is no heliocentricism without the outright rejection of biblical dogma, and while the former is not dependent on the latter, it is only able to be conceived when the social space which makes this possible is opened up. The point is that our ability to conceive the universe around us is contingent upon its approximation to our social existence. That is to say, the only thing which sustains the power of gods is not some abstract, hollow and spontaneous idea, but its ability to perpetuate the conditions of rule of a given class. Only through social antagonism, and the possibility of conceiving an opposition to the rule of this class can the ideological space necessary be opened up (or to be more clear, closed) that would allow one to think outside of this.

What follows is the inevitable question: How do we know that the new truth is more true than the previous one? What are the qualifications for one class being able to be more true than another? And the point does not have its basis in consistency. Theology was in its respective historic circumstance largely just as consistent as bourgeois science. The point is to understand it negatively - that which sustains the idea does not have its basis in any kind of neutral, spontaneous observation of reality (an impossibility) but is contingent upon definite social relations to production. The underlying truth is a Hegelian one: The point is not that none are "more true" than the other, but that the ability to judge how true something is only becomes possible after it has been discarded. That is to say, it's not as though theology was "just as true" as bourgeois science but that on the contrary, bourgeois science has demonstrated that theology was invalid, i.e. that this could only ever have been realized after. Because attempting to apply theology today has different implications than the application of theology in the 13th century.

To be blunt, through Communism and the destruction of the ruling class arises a definite possibility of being able to approximate truth free from the necessity of perpetuating class relations. That is to say, truth can be conceived as a result of a direct relation between man and reality, which itself then constitutes a definite part of reality. Communism is the self-consciousness of the social.

[Tim Redd]

To make my question more to the point - why is objective truth a practical question, why and how does it have to be proved? What does Marx even mean by "objective truth" here?

Is it synonymous with the idea as such and should I simply read this thesis as indicating that ideas arise out of activity of human beings, out of their labour-process, i.e. out of their active interaction with nature? Or is it something different?

Yes what you said is the crux of what Marx means. Practice should be taken as meaning all of humanity's activities in the objective world within and around them.

"Correct" ideas and thinking mean that thought grasps and reflects the objective world (relative to some area of interest (context)) at least sufficiently enough to successfully achieve a desired goal or to successfully perform some intended act in the objective world.

What constitutes objective truth depends on the context in which reality is being approached. The world exists objectively (exists outside thought), but what can be termed objective truth depends upon the point of view or interests with which the objectively existing world is being approached.

- Tim Redd

[Kronsteen]

Thinking about the issue some more, consider these three questions:

(1) Is your love real?
(2) Is your marriage real?
(3) Is the moon real?

Each question has different criteria for judging an answer true.

(1) means "Do you feel the emotion". It's a matter of introspection. You can answer it for yourself, but I can't, because I don't have access to your internal states.

There is also the question of how accurate your introspection is. Is it possible to be mistaken about your own feelings? The short answer is that you can have false beliefs about your emotions, even as you're feeling them, but that takes us into some very thorny areas, not least what "false" means here.


(2) is a cultural, linguistic or semantic question. And these questions are full of ambiguity and blurred edges. If a muslim man marries two women and brings them to america, are they both still his wives? It depends who you ask, though the law adopts the workaround of calling the first wife the "wife" and any others "partners".

(3) means something like "would the moon have all the properties we ascribe to it, even if we didn't ascribe them". It's a question about "reality" in the sense of "that which exists whether or not you believe it".

The popular image of science is that it deals in this kind of question, but any scientist will tell you that science only deals in measurements. That's why questions about what's outside the observable universe aren't scientific.

So, it looks like Marx is simply not concerned with questions of type 1, and rules those of type 3 inadmissible, so when he speaks of "objective" truth, he's talking about type 2 questions - those which are objective in the sense of not being private, but not those which are objective in the sense of referring to the unknowable external universe.

"Objective" means "Public".

[Luís Henrique]

As far as I understand it Marx attacks the Fuerbach's materialism as devoid of the active element, i.e. Feuerbach viewed the idea (truth?) as arising out of passive contemplation about the material reality, which simply exists outside one's consciousness.

Yes. To Feuerbach (or, at least, to Feuerbach, according to Marx), knowledge is a product of contemplation. Marx disagrees with that.


Marx, however, thought that even the material reality existing outside one's consciousness is a result of history, i.e. a result of historical practical activity.

But I think this is mistaken. Marx probably didn't think that existence of the Sun is a result of history, or of human practical activity. What he seems to be saying is, however, that our knowledge about "material reality existing outside our consciousness" is eminently practical, ie, while the Sun exists independently of our practical activity, we only obtain knowledge about the Sun through practical activity (mapping its position in the sky regarding its seasonal ebbing).


It seems that he furthermore thought that the ideas themselves can only reflect the activity and can only arise through activity (labour).

I'm not so sure of that. Marx says that


The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

so he seems to think that there are ideas ("thinking") that are "isolated from practice"; those ideas, or, rather, the dispute over their reality, he dismisses as "scholastic", but doesn't seem to think "inexistent".

Moreover, I don't think that "activity" can be replaced by "labour"; there are many different forms of activity, of which "labour" is but one; you certainly can get "ideas" from war, love, exchange, research, political struggle, etc. You do not need to manufacture a fascist to understand what a fascist is; beating one (or being beaten by one) will do the trick.


So the idea of price can only come about through an already active (production) process, which then necessitates such an idea;

To the extent that this already active production process is a process of commodity production, I think so.


ideas of simple objects can also come about only through a process of producing these objects etc.

Again, I don't think that is the case. Ideas of simple objects can only come from practical interaction with such objects, not necessarily their production, but possibly their consumption (you understand what a tomato is when you realise it is edible, that it has a given taste, etc.)


However, I am not sure if I get any of this right and I am not sure what Marx means by "objective truth", "practical question", "proving the truth" etc. Maybe someone can help me out with this particular thesis?

My impression is that Marx is not defining "truth", but explaining what the process is to attain what we call "truth". If he is coherent with himself, then he needs to think that we only know what "truth" is in the process of obtaining "truth" - it makes no sence (within the frame of Marx's thought, that is) to start from an abstract definition of "truth" and then proceed to discuss how to reach such an abstraction.

Hope that helps.

Luís Henrique

[Tim Redd]

I think Marx wasn't consistent on this. On the one hand, he was a philosophical materialist who believed in a rule-governed, ateliological and godless universe outside of our senses made of something called "matter".

On the other hand, he believed that all knowledge is provisional and can only be of the contents of experience - gained by practical, social activity. Which of course presupposes an external world and other people.

The first is an ontology, the second an epistemology. So given the epistemology, how could we know the ontology? We couldn't.

Why is an epistemology that ultimately relies upon practice in a world external to the mind, incapable of making known an ontology that reality is rule/law governed, non-teleological and godless?


Indeed, the only way to prove the existence of the social-practical world in Marxism is to assume that world. But that's not a problem unique to Marxism - any attempt to prove or disprove solipsism relies on circular reasoning.

One can prove the existence of a material world external to the mind by coming to agreement with others on the nature of that world (positive intersubjectivity). Through practice in the world beings can come to a knowledge of the world and through communication can confirm that they have an accurate understanding of what is external to all minds collectively.

[Kronsteen]

Why is an epistemology that ultimately relies upon practice in an a world external to the mind incapable of making known the ontology that the reality is rule/law governed, non-teleological and godless?

What would constitute a test for the existence of god in a pragmatist epistemology? What hypothesis could you put into action such that getting the expected result - or not - would prove the existence of something outside of the observable universe?

The same for rules in the external universe, as opposed to patterns and regularities in experience?


One can prove the existence of a material world external to the mind by coming to agreement with others on the nature of that world.

So you want to decide whether other people exist by asking them whether they exist. And you don't see why that's a circular method?

[Rafiq]

There is no problem of solipsism. The burden of proof, so to speak, is theirs in that it is an axiom that a reality exists outside of my head. In merely observing the world, it would become at every level a violation of Occam's razor, it would become an accumulation of ad hoc upon ad hoc to justify the notion that there is no external world.

But never-mind this: It is an obscufatory and metaphysical question. The real question is: What do people MEAN when they say this? What wider point are they trying to convey?

[Kronsteen]

There is no problem of solipsism ... it is an axiom that a reality exists outside of my head. In merely observing the world, it would become at every level a violation of Occam's razor

Interesting - that you declare the problem doesn't exist, then immediately offer two solutions.

It's not possible to deductively prove or disprove solipsism. The arguments are always circular. It's just simpler to believe that there is something out there, and we each different parts, through a glass darkly.


What wider point are they trying to convey?

Metaphysical assertions tend to have a normative agenda. It's Marxism 101 that philosophical idealism reflects the notions that (1) Intellectual labour is more important than manual, (2) Thinkers are nobler people than workers, and (3) this state of affairs is not only inevitable but good.

So what do you think is the agenda of someone who keeps banging on about materialism? "Act first, and theory will take care of itself". "All theories are provisional (except this one) so we don't need a programme" etc.

Materialism may be true, but that doesn't mean we hold it for the right reasons.

[Luís Henrique]

So you want to decide whether other people exist by asking them whether they exist. And you don't see why that's a circular method?

Here we are back to what Marx criticises in Feuerbach. The vulgar materialist method is that of contemplation; consequently, we contemplate people and decide that they exist. Even if such "contemplation" is verbal instead of visual; we listen to people, instead of looking at them.

What Marx implies is, we believe in people because we interact with them. We greet them, kiss them, exploit them, are exploited by them, take care not to trample them...; in fewer words, we don't pretend that they don't exist.

And this is all the proof we need, and we realise that the solipsist cannot actually live according to his "philosophy". The solipsist tells us that he doesn't believe in an "objective" world, but behaves as if he believed (starting by telling us that the "objective" world doesn't exist; why would he tell us that if he doesn't believe in our existence?)

It is really not that complicated.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Metaphysical assertions tend to have a normative agenda. It's Marxism 101 that philosophical idealism reflects the notions that (1) Intellectual labour is more important than manual, (2) Thinkers are nobler people than workers, and (3) this state of affairs is not only inevitable but good.

It doesn't sound as Marxism 101 at all; rather it sounds like Vulgarity 101.


So what do you think is the agenda of someone who keeps banging on about materialism? "Act first, and theory will take care of itself". "All theories are provisional (except this one) so we don't need a programme" etc.

How many "materialists" do you know that subscribe to that semi-fascist view of the relations between practice and theory?

In my experience, people who say ridiculous things such as "act first, and theory will take care of itself" are almost invariably idealists.

And what would be Marxism 101 is Marx's reasoning about the worst architect and the best of bees, which implies a completely different (and properly materialist) view of the practice/theory conundrum:


But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.

Luís Henrique

[Rafiq]

It's not possible to deductively prove or disprove solipsism. The arguments are always circular. It's just simpler to believe that there is something out there, and we each different parts, through a glass darkly.

Only if we accept that it's not possible to disprove theology either. That does not mean (even in a historicist manner) that we cannot trace the power which sustains theology as being outside of the domain of scientific inquiry, relying on a set of unknown knowns. The power which sustains it amidst all of the evidence... Where does this come from? This is the question of science. One CAN disprove solipsism, because it would inevitably become theoretically inconsistent. In claiming that there is no external world, you inevitably, one way or another designate a world that concerns people outside of you. The most elementary forms of speech through which you use to weave such arguments are entirely contingent not only on its relationship to other people, but by merit of the fact that it is wrought out of a social-symbolic order.

Solipsism is then nothing more than a retreat to ignorance incapable of fathoming a world outside of immediate experience. But the most basic, and elementary ramifications that are part of personal experience necessarily include a pre-supposition that there is a world outside of my head, through language, through interaction, and so on. As a metaphysical theory, it would not even make a difference as far as historical materialism is concerned, but like theology, it would necessarily have to rely on a set of proof(s), because it is metaphysical. So we would have to measure precisely which neurons in the brain are responsible for not reflecting, but projecting the world around. The mechanisms at are disposal with regard to neurological science have shown this to be ridiculous - the brain adapts and changes in approximation with different environmental settings.

In the 21st century, solipsism makes empirically verifiable or falsifiable claims. But in order to test it, one would ALREADY have to pre-suppose a domain of externality which would confirm this as a universal truth.


So what do you think is the agenda of someone who keeps banging on about materialism? "Act first, and theory will take care of itself". "All theories are provisional (except this one) so we don't need a programme" etc.


The problem is that the distinction between metaphysical materialism and Marx's materialism, have political ramifications. Metaphysical materialism is bourgeois, while Marx' materialism is revolutionary. Marx's materialism pre-supposes metaphysical materialism because the latter was wrought out in a conflict with reactionary metaphysical idealism (religion). One could, for example, argue that Hegel was a metaphysical materialist.

The point of Marxist epistemology is that there is no "agenda" in spite of science, there is only space of epistemological possibility that is wrought out through being unbound by the ideological mechanisms which reproduce the existing order, an unspoken, unquestioned set of assumptions which are separate from scientific inquiry. This of course stems from the Communist (proletarian) opposition to the existing order, which is traceable in virtually every epoch of capitalism, from Muntzer to Babeuf (who was able to rally much of the emerging proletariat of France). In the same way, to be clear, as the emergence of a class which was able to challenge the power of the church by merit of being socially unbound by it, the bourgeois class, that could think outside of its dogma.

Marxists are materialists because they pre-suppose the achievements of bourgeois science and take them to their logical conclusion. Materialism for Marxists is nothing more than the scientific approximation of German idealism, taking it to a point where bourgeois ideology could not. This is coupled with English political economy and the French radical tradition in perfect synchronicity. German idealism was as close as could possibly be under the constraint of bourgeois ideology to understand the social dimension in a scientific manner.

[Kronsteen]

Only if we accept that it's not possible to disprove theology either.

Some theologies are undisprovable. They're designed that way. The earliest christian theology made a large number of testable claims, which were refuted. So the claims were reformulated to make them too nebulous to investigate. That's why, 2000 years later, the term "god" has no meaning.


One CAN disprove solipsism, because it would inevitably become theoretically inconsistent.Be careful - you're conflating several different notions of solipsism:

(1) There is no external worldA
(2) There is an external world, but experiences don't correspond to it
(3) It's unknowable whether there's an external world, but either way experiences don't correspond to it.


In claiming that there is no external world, you inevitably, one way or another designate a world that concerns people outside of you.Perhaps you've never met someone who hallucinated voices. They do indeed interact with their hallucinations, even telling the voices they don't exist. The voices, of course, don't disappear on being informed of this.


As a metaphysical theory, it would not even make a difference as far as historical materialism is concernedIndeed not. Whether the ruling class are business owners, shapeshifting alien lizards, or artificial intelligences inside The Matrix - the oppression is real and they still need to be overthrown.


we would have to measure precisely which neurons in the brain are responsible for not reflecting, but projecting the world around.To do so we would have to observe neurons. And according to solipsism(s), observation is unreliable.


In the 21st century, solipsism makes empirically verifiable or falsifiable claims.Perhaps, though I can't think of any. But the point is that you're still relying on empirical observation to prove that empirical observation is even possible.


one would ALREADY have to pre-suppose a domain of externality which would confirm this as a universal truth.That would be to test solipsism with the presupposition that solipsism is false - that a "domain of externality" exists and is accessible.


the distinction between metaphysical materialism and Marx's materialism, have political ramifications. Metaphysical materialism is bourgeois, while Marx' materialism is revolutionary.And what exactly is the difference between the two? That's a question Marx never got around to answering - at least not directly.


One could, for example, argue that Hegel was a metaphysical materialist.Zizek comes close to just that.


The point of Marxist epistemology is that there is no "agenda" in spite of science, there is only space of epistemological possibility that is wrought out through being unbound by the ideological mechanisms which reproduce the existing order, an unspoken, unquestioned set of assumptions which are separate from scientific inquiry.If you mean scientists under capitalism can have unscientific prejudices which can distort their work, that's obviously correct. If you mean science under socialism would be "pure" without assumptions created by material conditions, that's obviously false.


Marxists are materialists because they pre-suppose the achievements of bourgeois science and take them to their logical conclusion.

Yeah, right. Marxists are more scientific than the scientists. Have a look at "Reason in Revolt" by Ted Grant to see what happens when they try to do their super-scientific super-science.


Materialism for Marxists is nothing more than the scientific approximation of German idealism

Have you actually read Hegel?

This is the man who wrote that because the verb "to exist" implies no predicates, that made it identical with "to not exist" because that also implied no predicates...and that therefore the verb "to become" is an infinitely rapid oscillation between the two.

It's like watching a child play with words, inventing rules as he goes along.


taking it to a point where bourgeois ideology could not. This is coupled with English political economy and the French radical tradition in perfect synchronicity.

Um. Bullshit? That's exactly the kind of grandiose claim to superior insight made by Velikovsky, L Ron Hubbard, Richard Bandler and Deepak Chopra.

[Kronsteen]

we believe in people because we interact with them.Do we believe in stars because we interact with them? Or is some knowledge not the result of people's intersubjective needs?


this is all the proof we needYou have just conjoured an epistemological claim out of thin air.


that the solipsist cannot actually live according to his "philosophy".

So what? Someone who advocates polygamy can't live polygamously. Does that mean their arguments are thereby refuted?

The solipsist believes they're trapped in a consistent illusion. Knowing you're in a trap doesn't set you free.


The solipsist tells us that he doesn't believe in an "objective" world...why would he tell us that if he doesn't believe in our existence?He isn't telling us. He's telling his own experiences.

[Tim Redd]

So what do you think is the agenda of someone who keeps banging on about materialism? "Act first, and theory will take care of itself". "All theories are provisional (except this one) so we don't need a programme" etc.

That's some sort of crude materialism, pragmatism, or solipsism not Marxist (dialectical/scientific/dynamic) materialism.

Marxist materialism always attempts to know as much as relevant information possible before acting in some area. And during and after activity Marxist materialism evaluates what took place and refines future action on that basis. The pre-action thinking, and the evaluation of action are aspects of applying ideas, thinking and theory to human practice.

Indeed the whole correct approach to action in Marxism basis itself upon the leading role of theory in practice (aka praxis, the application of theory in practice). On the other hand practice has the ultimate say in correcting, modifying and verifying theory. I encourage anyone interested to see the material at the “THEORY LEADS, PRACTICE VERIFIES” (http://risparty.org/FORWARD%20WITH%20REVOLUTIONARY%20DIALECTICS.htm#_T oc164782505) link (also in my sig) for more on precisely this question.

- Tim Redd, 2015.

[Rafiq]

Perhaps you've never met someone who hallucinated voices. They do indeed interact with their hallucinations, even telling the voices they don't exist. The voices, of course, don't disappear on being informed of this.

The point of concern here is the question of whether it is possible to hallucinate voices and experience them as real. The point, however, of even talking about any sort of truth, whether it concerns your own experiences or everyone elses, is that on some level it has to be conceived on a social level. Remember that truth is a practical question: The minute you claim that these voices actually exist means that it has ramifications for others. If not, what is the point of trying to convince anyone? Why not retreat to a dark cave, cast away from all social life? And we can accurately understand these hallucinations and differentiate them from elementary social interactions, that is to say, as mere abstractions of real existing social life. What does this mean? A person living in New York, only familiar with English, will not hallucinate the voices of the Australian aborigines people.

So this is what you fail to conceive: to even talk about proving or disproving something pre-supposes a definite recognition that an inter-subjective external world exists. As Marx claimed, to talk of the "real world" independently of our relation to it is not a scientific question, though at the basis of all scientific inquiry the axiom that it exists independently of our consciousness and mind is necessary for any change in an understanding of it. We know the Earth proceeded the human species, and so on. Even taken to its logically consistent extreme, subjective idealism, it had to hypocritically rely upon the notion that the universe is constantly being perceived by god in order to continually exist, in order to account for the obvious fact that some kind of external world does exist independently of this or that individual.

So what are you saying? Is it impossible for someone to think that the world is a projection of their mind? It is not. But for this to be worth talking about, others have to be convinced of this truth. And in the process of attempting to convince others, definite theoretical qualifications have to be met by its own standards which are never met. Indeed it is puzzling why solipsism here is even worth mentioning.


Indeed not. Whether the ruling class are business owners, shapeshifting alien lizards, or artificial intelligences inside The Matrix - the oppression is real and they still need to be overthrown.


And this is a completely paradoxical assertion. Not to retreat to godwin's law, but imagine all Jews are of the petite-bourgeoisie or the bourgeoisie. If it doesn't matter who the enemy is, why can't it be Jews (or Freemasons?)? Political correctness aside, the dilemma here is not simply an ethical one. My point is that the nature of how one conceives those in power defines their definite opposition to it. To think that the ruling class are shape-shifting alien lizards has definite implications for the anti-lizard front. To dismissively ignore the complex pathological mechanisms at work here, undoubtedly reactionary, is to throw oneself to the devil. It begs the question: Why does one oppose the ruling class? Grounded in this opposition is a definite conception of the ruling class. If this is not understood scientifically, i.e. the ruling class as the capitalist class, then there is no direction, no definite aim, no lexicon of political positions that have defined our tradition (Anti-racism, for women's emancipation, militant egalitarianism, etc.). So it does precisely matter what the ruling class is, because one will never properly understand the nature of oppression, and therefore the means to destroy it, if one falsely conceives the ruling class in this or that way.

Furthermore, oppression is an ambiguous term. The petite-bourgeoisie certainly do not see the "oppression" in the same way a conscious proletarian would. For some, oppression can simply mean the restriction of one's liberty to do as they please to others. "The oppression" is therefore not simply there, for to see it has definite ideological and social implications. Understanding these is important. And my point had nothing to do with any kind of ethical opposition to capitalism, either, but historical materialism. My point was that even if everything as it is somehow coincidentally a projection of our minds as individuals, and that we just happen to be seeing the same thing at the same time, this would have no relevance as far as historical materialism goes because it is a metaphysical question. The point is: Who cares? What ramifications does this have for any understanding of the social dimension of humanity's existence? There's so much ad hoc here, so much coincidences that to actually believe this requires infinitely more effort than not to. Is this strength grounded in pure scientific inquiry? No more than the notion that a god is real is. That is to say, it is ideological.

The burden of proof lies with the solipsists because the scientific assertion that an external world exists independently of our minds is an axiom which is only argued in contrast to religion. That is to say, the affirmative notion that an external world exists only becomes a point of controversy when the solipsists enter the picture, and not vice versa. And how coincidental is it that the very same world they claim is a projection of the mind of an individual only became possible through the reality that very few people are solipsists. Being a solipsist in 2600 B.C. And being one in 1600 A.D. are two very different experiences, no? And these changes, what are they attributed to? The evolution of the human brain, certain neurons projecting a different world? A very stupid and nonsensical assertion.


But the point is that you're still relying on empirical observation to prove that empirical observation is even possible.


That it is possible is not a point of controversy. The real epistemological question is whether it is enough to conceive truth, or its "reality". Hence the hypocrisy.


That would be to test solipsism with the presupposition that solipsism is false - that a "domain of externality" exists and is accessible.


Solipsism makes claims that are testable, but we can't test them without "presupposing that solipsism is false". So again, the answer here is to retreat into a dark corner and never engage in any interaction with others. If these are the qualifications in place, then pre-supposing solipsism is false is not something that requires proof to sustain it. No more than pre-supposing that the church's understanding of the cosmos was false (wherein even questioning it already undermined it) made astronomy possible, which did not require proof to sustain it (you did not have to "prove" astronomy was possible against the backdrop of superstition). Definite qualifications are in place for "proving" or "disproving" things. Does this require a pre-supposition that the notion that this is an impossibility is false? Yes. But wrought out through practice the effects are there, the measurements and so on. Hence truth is a practical question.


And what exactly is the difference between the two? That's a question Marx never got around to answering - at least not directly.


Marx never bothered with metaphysics, while Engels is guilty of some minor flirtations with it. Actually, Marx explicitly stated that the overt field of metaphysics had already been discarded even by bourgeois science (even if it still pre-supposed metaphysical notions). To be clear, the distinction is rather simple: Metaphysical materialism is nothing more than the rejection of religious idealism, implicit in all bourgeois science, it is not necessary 'wrong' because it is metaphysical. Revolutionary materialism, on the other hand, concerns the subjugation of the social dimension to scientific comprehension in knowledge. It converts that which is designated ideologically already, and makes it scientifically knowable. Think about it: this whole time you yourself have already attributed ethical categories to inherently scientific ideas, i.e. historical materialism and so on. previously you claimed that dialectics was "politically useless" as an argument against it. You seem to be under the impression that everything merely exists to further substantiate the utopia of Communism, to realize an idea whose quality is only measurable by merit of its ethical substance, i.e. "it would lead to a better life for most people" or "it is against oppression". Abstractions of ruling morality.

The reality is that Communism makes historical materialism possible because invested in it is an opposition to the existing order, which means freedom from having to reproduce it. Think of the relationship between humanism and science as such as it emerged. This opposition is a social one, made possible by capitalism's antagonisms. What class can be unbound by reproducing the existing order to achieve its aims? The proletariat. The property-less. And it is the proletariat which confirms such ideas as not abstractions, but as ideas with a definite material substance.


If you mean scientists under capitalism can have unscientific prejudices which can distort their work, that's obviously correct. If you mean science under socialism would be "pure" without assumptions created by material conditions, that's obviously false.


I mean neither of those things. The first notion is a given, something everyone, bourgeois or revolutionary understands. The second is a nonsensical dichotomy, because no real qualifications for "pureness" are in place. Will there be material realities which distort science, in the long term, from subjecting all domains of life? No. Because science is used only in practice, for it to be hindered ideologically CONTINUALLY requires social antagonisms. That does not mean ideology will not exist - for as long as something is not known, it is designated by the social-symbolic order. But an order without class antagonism means that science's ineptness is owed purely to the fact that it is inept in conceiving something no one could know. Here's an example: Bourgeois ideologues will talk tacitly about how they think capitalism has existed trans-historically forever. They will assume this, and it is something most of society assumes tacitly. But to subject this notion to scientific inquiry, to question it, requires an opposition to the existing order to be possible in some way. The reproduction of any class-based social order necessarily requires the absence of a scientific understanding of its basic function at every level.

So Communism is not the end of problems, but the beginning. It is the beginning of a socially self-conscious society that is able to conceive problems as problems that are approachable, with no pretenses to vanity in the name of divine or natural laws. Assumptions could be created by material conditions, but in a society without social antagonisms those assumptions couldn't be criticized linguistically by anyone. It would be impossible.



Yeah, right. Marxists are more scientific than the scientists. Have a look at "Reason in Revolt" by Ted Grant to see what happens when they try to do their super-scientific super-science.


Understand the structure of the sentence - (If) Marxists are materialists (it is) because they pre-suppose the achievements of bourgeois science and take them to their logical conclusion. It is not (All) Marxists are materialists because they pre-suppose the achievements of bourgeois science and (they all) take them to their logical conclusion. The latter has absolutely no context to the conversation, as it refers to individuals.

So my point obviously has ambiguity as to what properly constitutes a "Marxist" and what does not. The likes of Ted Grant are hardly the heirs to the tradition of Marxism. How do we know this? Both Grant and Alan Woods, following the Leninist tradition (which has nothing to do with Lenin, remember) attempt to make compatible Marxism with new developments in science. But if we understand the Marxism of the First and second international, we should very well know that Marxism cannot be "made" compatible with the developments in science, it has to pre-suppose them. If Marxism has to be "updated" then it is already not Marxism as such. Marxism makes not grand metaphysical claims, it makes no grand empirical claims about the natural world around us either. I'll make this very simple:

One can criticize or subject to evaluation any number of scientific questions. But if you're doing this in the name of making it compatible, this suggests that what you are making it compatible with is not scientific. If your approach to a question is not framed already in a purely scientific manner, it likely does not concern a scientific question. In other words, one deals with science in this or that way and then calls it Marxism. One does not call an approach Marxist and deal with it accordingly. The latter is a vulgar, idealist and formal approach. There must exist a method independently of its label.


Have you actually read Hegel?

This is the man who wrote that because the verb "to exist" implies no predicates, that made it identical with "to not exist" because that also implied no predicates...and that therefore the verb "to become" is an infinitely rapid oscillation between the two.


A question you regularly ask me, which never ceases to be annoying. Most particularly irritating is how you manage to completely botch, mis-interpret and defile Hegel's works to form the basis of pointing out some kind of "obvious" problem of it. One can criticize Hegel all they want, but if they think that a "common sense" approach is going to cut it for the mighty thinker, they're in for something else. For all it's worth, Hegel is not one to be dismissed.

And quite honestly, for such a mis-reading to exist, one questions whether this is an innocent misreading. For all the complete nonsense you say about Hegel time and time again through "common sense" criticisms, it's almost like you can detect malice here. Do you even read? Hegels law of identity here has precisely no empirical value in the sense that he makes some kind of affirmative testable claim. The point is rather the opposite - something which is equal to itself is an abstraction which cannot be understood in its isolated form without conceiving its wider contradictory relationship with something else. Now this is NOT a point of controversy: one does not make a distinction without recognizing that two things are not the same. Hegel's point of being and nothing as being equal IS NOT that they have no difference in relation to becoming, but that they are the same in that they are equal to themselves.


The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps taken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest things thought expects itself to do: for Being and Nothing exhibit the fundamental contrast in all its immediacy — that is, without the one term being invested with any attribute which would involve its connection with the other. This attribute, however, as the above paragraph points out, is implicit in them — the attribute which is just the same in both. So far the deduction of their unity is completely analytical: indeed the whole progress of philosophising in every case, if it be a methodical, that is to say a necessary, progress, merely renders explicit what is implicit in a notion. It is as correct however to say that Being and Nothing are altogether different, as to assert their unity. The one is not what the other is. But since the distinction has not at this point assumed definite shape (Being and Nothing are still the immediate), it is, in the way that they have it, something unutterable, which we merely mean.

No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that Being and Nothing are the same, or rather to adduce absurdities which, it is erroneously asserted, are the consequences and illustrations of that maxim.


It is further obfuscated when you claim this has something to do with "to exist" or "not to exist". This implies itself some kind of empirical value, which is why one questions whether you're intentionally mis-representing the point. The difference is that being and nothing are only the same insofar as they posses the same relation to themselves. They are the same only insofar as they are just as each other.


If Being and Nought are identical, say these objectors, it follows that it makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe, this city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not. Now in some of these cases the objectors foist in private aims, the utility a thing has for me, and then ask, whether it be all the same to me if the thing exist and if it do not. For that matter indeed, the teaching of philosophy is precisely what frees man from the endless crowd of finite aims and intentions, by making him so insensible to them that their existence or non-existence is to him a matter of indifference. But it is never to be forgotten that, once mention something substantial, and you thereby create a connection with other existences and other purposes which are ex hypothesi worth having: and on such hypothesis it comes to depend whether the Being and not-Being of a determinate subject are the same or not. A substantial distinction is in these cases secretly substituted for the empty distinction of Being and Nought.

In others of the cases referred to, it is virtually absolute existences and vital ideas and aims, which are placed under the mere category of Being or not-Being. But there is no more to be said of these concrete objects, than that they merely are or are not. Barren abstractions, like Being and Nothing — the initial categories which, for that reason, are the scantiest anywhere to be found — are utterly inadequate to the nature of these objects. Substantial truth is something far above these abstractions and their oppositions. And always when a concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, empty-headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having in mind an image of, something else than what is in question: and in this place the question is about abstract Being and Nothing.


And what do we get from you? A casual, thoughtless accusation that Hegel is making up his own rules"? What rules? Tell me kronsteen, do you deliberately dismiss Hegel as a result of your own inability to understand him ("If I cannot understand him, he must be a charlatan)? It is the logic of self-worship... One should STRUGGLE with themselves in conceiving truth, struggle with their pre-conceived notions and so on. One should struggle to understand something of great confusion. Such dismissiveness harms only yourself.


Um. Bullshit? That's exactly the kind of grandiose claim to superior insight made by Velikovsky, L Ron Hubbard, Richard Bandler and Deepak Chopra.

Again with jumping to wild conclusions. My point is that Marx's materialism wrought out from German idealism is in perfect synchronicity with English political economy and French radicalism in the sense that neither of these two would have been able to exist in Marx's works without it, and vice versa (Marx's materialism would not have been able to exist without the radical tradition and the emerging discourses on political economy).

[Kronsteen]

that truth is a practical question: The minute you claim that these voices actually exist means that it has ramifications for others.

You're conflating "practical" with "social".


The minute you claim that these voices actually exist means that it has ramifications for others.

Not all communication is perlocutory.


truth is a practical question

For people who insist that reality is complex and theories are always provisional and partial, dogmatic marxists are very keen to have a simple, single, eternal epistemology: A kind of group-pragratism.

You have your practicalities and I have mine. So what is the truth when we don't share them? The question "Does Kronsteen want a cup of tea?" isn't one I need to consult others about. In fact, it would be nonsensical to do so.

Is it a practical question whether Pluto has an eliptical orbit? Who's interests and purposes does it affect? If it doesn't, then do you claim there is no truth to be known?


So this is what you fail to conceive: to even talk about proving or disproving something pre-supposes a definite recognition that an inter-subjective external world exists.

So it's impossible to prove something to oneself?


As Marx claimed, to talk of the "real world" independently of our relation to it is not a scientific question, though at the basis of all scientific inquiry the axiom that it exists independently of our consciousness and mind is necessary for any change in an understanding of it.

No. Science investigates experiences, and assumes that these experiences are common to different people - thus evidence and proof are public. That's not the same as assuming they "correspond" (whatever that means) to an inexperiencable reality. So yeah, Marx was right about that.


Is it impossible for someone to think that the world is a projection of their mind? It is not. But for this to be worth talking about, others have to be convinced of this truth.

"To be //worth// talking about"? You've just slipped from saying all communication serves a pratical inter-subjective purpose, to saying that's only true of all //significant// communication. Which is a tautology, as that's what makes it significant.


it is puzzling why solipsism here is even worth mentioning.

I only mentioned it as an aside. The question of solipsism is useful as a test case. If marxism claims to be able to answer it, and fails to do so, then marxism has a problem.

So, marxism should not try to pronounce on solipsism, just as it shouldn't pronounce on epigenetics or the big bang. It's just a bad habit of marxists that they like to do so. Hence the common comparison of marxism to religious cults.


My point is that the nature of how one conceives those in power defines their definite opposition to it.

The nature of the ruling class affects the tactics that can be used against them. The facts that they are the ruling class, and that ruling entails oppression, are the reasons they should be toppled.

Yes, revolution is a moral act.


"The oppression" is therefore not simply there, for to see it has definite ideological and social implications.

Yes, the nature of the ruling class affects how and who they oppress. The fact that there are different forms of oppression doesn't mean some shouldn't be resisted.


The burden of proof lies with the solipsists because the scientific assertion that an external world exists independently of our minds is an axiom which is only argued in contrast to religion.

You're conflating religion with idealism.

However, the burden of proof does indeed lie with the one making the assertion. Which is a problem for both the solipsist and the non-solipsism, because neither position can be proven. Thus the question is not scientific.


certain neurons projecting a different world?

Schopenhaur made the same mistake. He admitted that the external world could be doubted, but didn't doubt that sense organs existed. As though one's body and its organs were not part of the world.


Solipsism makes claims that are testable, but we can't test them without "presupposing that solipsism is false". So again, the answer here is to retreat into a dark corner and never engage in any interaction with others.

The answer is to admit that certain fundamental questions can't be answered. And then move on to those that can.


If these are the qualifications in place, then pre-supposing solipsism is false is not something that requires proof to sustain it.

Qualifications like...the assumption that solipsism is false. It's certainly true that axioms don't prove themselves. That's part of what "axiom" means.


Marx never bothered with metaphysics, while Engels is guilty of some minor flirtations with it.

The Grundrisse is full of metaphysics, as are the mathematical manuscripts, and there's a fair bit in the 1844 manuscripts and The German Ideology.

Is it a minor flirtation to set aside all other work to eat through Eugen Duering's enormous sour apple? And then write an extensive ripose? And years later study geology, geometry, electricity, mathematics and other fields to try to write a definintive marxist metaphysics?

The fact that Marx is dismissive of other people's metaphysical positions doesn't mean Marx didn't have deep metaphysical beliefs of his own.


Revolutionary materialism, on the other hand, concerns the subjugation of the social dimension to scientific comprehension in knowledge.

So seeing through ideology to how a society really works is a threat to that society. Hence the societies need for ideology in the first place.

That's....rather obvious. Calling it "revolutionary materialism" is obfuscation.


Think about it: this whole time you yourself have already attributed ethical categories to inherently scientific ideas, i.e. historical materialism and so on. previously you claimed that dialectics was "politically useless" as an argument against it.

It is politically useless. It's also false. Separate questions.


Bourgeois ideologues will talk tacitly about how they think capitalism has existed trans-historically forever. They will assume this, and it is something most of society assumes tacitly. But to subject this notion to scientific inquiry, to question it, requires an opposition to the existing order to be possible in some way.

...which is why they never say explicitly that capitalism is eternal. Firstly because it's obviously untrue, and secondly because to state it is to admit that it's possible to doubt it.

It's also why, when you hear christian nutcases say "Gay marriage is wrong", you know they're losing the battle against it. The fact that they need to say it means it's no longer seen as self-evident.

Ideology is covert, communicated by implication.


The reproduction of any class-based social order necessarily requires the absence of a scientific understanding of its basic function.

Why only class-based societies? Was there no false consciousness in primative communism? No lies or religion?


So Communism ... is the beginning of a socially self-conscious society that is able to conceive problems as problems that are approachable, with no pretenses to vanity in the name of divine or natural laws.

So all humans need to become rational is...to not have classes anymore.

The great delusion of 19th century enlightenment philosophy - that humanity is perfectable, if only we could find the one thing that holds them back...and kill it.


Assumptions could be created by material conditions, but in a society without social antagonisms those assumptions couldn't be criticized linguistically by anyone.

Banish bad thinking forever with the cleaning power of Magical Communism!


If Marxism has to be "updated" then it is already not Marxism as such.

Congratulations on having discovered the ultimate eternal truth.


Marxism makes not grand metaphysical claims, it makes no grand empirical claims about the natural world around us either. [...] one deals with science in this or that way and then calls it Marxism. One does not call an approach Marxist and deal with it accordingly.

I think you have just defined "marxism" as "science".


Hegel is not one to be dismissed.

Why not? Because he was influential? And why was he influential? Because he was useful to the ruling class of the time.

Hegel's work is a giant syncretic mash of mysticisms - pythagoreanism, kabala, freemasonry, astrology, alchemy etc etc., squeezed into a heretical christian teleology, and written up in the hermetic tradition of deliberate obscurantism.


Hegel's point of being and nothing as being equal IS NOT that they have no difference in relation to becoming, but that they are the same in that they are equal to themselves.

So all things which are equal to themselves are equal to each other. That's...painfully confused.

Anyway, the whole "being and nothing" notion is a grammatical artifact. It arises from that fact that germanic languages have auxiliary copulas, and can derive verbal-nouns from any non-modal verb. Thus from the purely grammatical word "be" we can derive the seemingly referential noun "being".

That's why we can form sentences like "I taste the tasting but don't touch the not touching". Grammatically it's fine - it just doesn't mean anything.


A casual, thoughtless accusation that Hegel is making up his own rules"?

I dismiss him because I understand him. He has no theory, just a bag of incompatible tropes which are applied ad-hoc, to get him to whichever conclusion he wants.


My point is that Marx's materialism wrought out from German idealism is in perfect synchronicity with English political economy and French radicalism in the sense that neither of these two would have been able to exist in Marx's works without it, and vice versa (Marx's materialism would not have been able to exist without the radical tradition and the emerging discourses on political economy).

It sounds like you've picked up some bad habits from George the Philosopher. Explaining platitudes in unnecessarily grandiose and obscure ways.

[Rafiq]

You're conflating "practical" with "social".

[...]

For people who insist that reality is complex and theories are always provisional and partial, dogmatic marxists are very keen to have a simple, single, eternal epistemology: A kind of group-pragratism.

You have your practicalities and I have mine. So what is the truth when we don't share them? The question "Does Kronsteen want a cup of tea?" isn't one I need to consult others about. In fact, it would be nonsensical to do so.

Is it a practical question whether Pluto has an eliptical orbit? Who's interests and purposes does it affect? If it doesn't, then do you claim there is no truth to be known?

For something to be a practical question does not reduce it to a mere political utility. There is nothing complicated about understanding this. When one sais truth is a practical question in response to the notion that for an individual, the voices they hear can seem just as real as "actual" voices, the point isn't that this is an impossibility. The point is that the minute one speaks of this in terms of proof, one enters a practical dimension. You can indeed "prove" something to yourself, but that requires definite qualifications for proof in place, i.e. some kind of mechanism that ensures something is real, or not. For this to be "proveable" to anyone else, those qualifications must have a practical basis. So the question of solipsism you're posing here is a rather ridiculous one: what you're really asking is simple - why don't all humans individually retreat from engaging each other at all? And the obvious answer is that humans are social beings, who can only survive and conceive truth by merit of their relations to each other. A human only becomes one by mimicking others. Thus, the hypocritical nature of "solipsism" is revealed: It requires definite pre-requisites that have their grounding in a definite universal rejection of solipsism in practice in order to be sustained.

The reason this has ramifications for others, is not because you're intentionally trying to convince them, but because you are making a statement about a reality we all share. Unless of course "others" do not exist, but is this some kind of given which we have to prove? Do I have to prove kronsteen exists? No. Again, because any idiot with a minor understanding of language itself can realize that all basic, and elementary modes of human thought and behavior necessarily rely on an inter-subjective symbolic order. Essentially it's you whose arguing like a religious person when you claim:


Qualifications like...the assumption that solipsism is false.


But this is not an affirmative assumption as such. In other words, is there a power which sustains this assumption that is beyond itself, without which the assumption would not be made? It is a given. Solipsists, and only solipsists make this dichotomy. It is therefore up to them to either convince us, or even themselves in a consistent manner, that they are correct. Like the question of theology, the burden of proof therefore does not lie with "non-solipsists" because we merely recognize the unscientific and invalid nature of the qualifications for proof being set forth, which is circular. If attempting to subject solipsism to empirical testing is already assuming it is false, then what qualifications for proof exist for the solipsist to justify themselves? How do they know? If anything, the fact that one would have to pre-suppose it is false to subject it to any meaningful test alone is alone proof that it is nonsensical.

Because humans are social animals, the idea that reality is a projection of the mind of an individual in practice has no reality. The false metaphysical question poses: who are you (sane people) to make pretenses to reality? Why should your reality be more true than the reality of a crazy person hallucinating, considering that with their sensory organs and such, they are just as much authentically experiencing "something" as you are? The answer of course is obvious: Because truth is a practical question! The question of whether "Kronsteen wants a cup of tea" is of course not something you have to consult others about, because we have nothing to do with what you want or what you don't. However, making pretenses about reality, which we all share, is something you would have to "consult" others about in order to "prove it", i.e. in the sense of relying upon inherently practical, socially refined mechanisms of proving something or not. Even to desire a cup of tea - the truth of this desire is indeed still a practical question, if one is looking to confirm or deny it. That's the point. The error here is the fact that desiring a cup of tea itself is not something which requires any sort of theoretical pre-requisite in your head to do, only after the fact can you say, linguistically that Kronsteen wants a cup of tea. Regarding the nature of Pluto's orbit, this is a practical question not because we can cynically reduce it to this or that class interest, but because we can recognize that knowing Pluto's orbit is possible, and certain scientific qualifications for knowing it exist, and that as a matter of practice it can be found. The question of whether we desire to know it or not is a false question, becuase like all things, the minute we can conceive something as possibly knowable is when we strive to know it (given social considerations, i.e. the fact that there is no social force whose existence relies on the rejection of astronomy helps). To claim that this is not knowable would be the only obstacle to it, but on what basis would this claim be sustained? Various social orders indeed required a static, monopolistic and unquestioned conception of the natural world, even the ancient Greeks sought only to uncover "divine laws" and so on. But the very nature of capitalism allows for an understanding of the natural world that is provisional, i.e. that is scientific because it is constituted by the constant revolutionizing of its means of production. Only, what is not provisional is the designation of the social, and all obfuscation of our understanding of the natural world irrevocably and solely can be accounted for by social realities.

These are only known to be obfuscations, however, because of the reality that this social order can be opposed, that it is composed of social antagonisms. Otherwise, how would we be able to conceive them as wrong? People did not have a spontaneous inclination toward science in feudalism, only to be stricken down by the Church. Science was only made possible by the rise of the bourgeoisie, and a social power which could challenge the church. The point for Marxists is not that truth (concerning science vs. ideology) is always provisional, this was the failure of Lenin in materialism and empirio criticism. The point, on the contrary, is that the act of taking sides and knowing truth are dependent upon each other, that truth is practical. What this means isn't that how we understand the world in Communism will never change, but that within capitalism, for example, only by taking the side of the international proletariat in the class struggle was it possible to realize the sham of WWI. This is the lesson of Lenin.


No. Science investigates experiences, and assumes that these experiences are common to different people - thus evidence and proof are public.


Science has to assume one way or another that a world exists independently of our consciousness, even if some pseudo-scientists might reserve some subjective idealist nonsense (i.e. that god always perceiving reality is what sustains it), otherwise no change in our understanding of the natural world could be possible.

The point is talking about what this world is, isn't a scientific question. We know it exists independently of our relation to it, but to actually attempt to qualify it "for what it is" would already designate a relation to it. This is the "popperesque" side of Lenin's empirio criticism, which shouldn't amount to the notion that "all truth is provisional" but that truth is practical (i.e. a relation to reality designates practice, HOW this relation is expressed possesses SOCIAL variance).


"To be //worth// talking about"? You've just slipped from saying all communication serves a pratical inter-subjective purpose, to saying that's only true of all //significant// communication. Which is a tautology, as that's what makes it significant.


O.K., let me correct myself. For it to be possible to talk about this in terms of proof or non-proof, the possibility that others can be convinced of its validity or invalidity has to be there. If Kronsteen wants tea, he certainly doesn't have to convince anyone else of this to assure himself of its validity. But for him to be able to know himself that it is true, he needs to know on a basic level that there are other ramifications, i.e .that others can know this. Because kronsteen has definite, practical qualifications for knowing whether something is true or not. These qualifications are a) socially derived b) of a practical nature. It's rather simple.


So, marxism should not try to pronounce on solipsism, just as it shouldn't pronounce on epigenetics or the big bang.


Think about what you're saying though. Think about the history of science. Marxists are not by default skeptical of genetics, they are skeptical of the unknown known, that is to say, the assumptions people have about things that solely result from their ignorance, or carelessness in for example rejecting the idea that our behaviors are genetically innate. Not only do they have no problem accepting this, they are highly predisposed to accept this in order to, in a process of reification, legitimize the existing order. Marxists here do not reject genetics, but they are able to distinguish science from ideology in this field. In that sense, something like epigenetics is of great importance, because something is opened up that otherwise wouldn't be.

The question then follows: What right do Marxists have to question this or that field of science in the first place, when this predisposition doesn't stem from direct empirical inquiry? The answer is simple: Marxists can be unbound by many of the assumptions geneticists have about the world, assumptions which have no empirical basis but are ideological. When you do away with those assumptions, other problems arise with the "empirical data" and thus something like epigenetics could be possible to study. I can forgive someone when they claim Marxists should stick their noses out of natural science, it is wrong, but it is somewhat forgivable. what is outrageous is the notion that Marxists have no "right" to deal with nonsense like solipsism. Do you even KNOW what Marxism is? It is not a moral framework, it is not an ideology, it is not irreducibly a political dogma.

And this is precisely what irritates you. Marxism is not reducible to being a "tool" for social change. Marxism deals precisely with these questions, as I said before, deriving itself from the traditions of German Idealism, French political radicalism and English political economy. If Marxism was merely an elaboration of Communism, it would be more akin to anarchism, an ethical substnatiation. But it isn't: it has inherent ramifications for, yes epistemology, philosophy and ontology. The error in dismissing it as "religious" stems solely from the pre-supposition that it is reducible a "political ideology" which seeks to conform the 'actual' mechanisms of conceiving truth to its 'agenda', but this is already a false assumption.


The nature of the ruling class affects the tactics that can be used against them. The facts that they are the ruling class, and that ruling entails oppression, are the reasons they should be toppled.

Yes, revolution is a moral act.


A revolution has moral ramifications, but the morality of the revolution is only part of the revolution itself. No the revolution is not a moral act in the sense that it is an abstraction of predominant morality, a revolution, while not being independent of a moral framework, is not caused by morals. Morals are not the cause-in-itself, morals have a definite grounding in reality, have definite causes and so on. So this is completely wrong: How one even conceives oppression, is a question of ideology, and therefore of a social reality with definite implications as to the nature of the enemy. You claim that "there are different forms of oppression" and "that doesn't mean some shouldn't be resisted". But which ones should be resisted, and why? How does one even go about asking this question? That's the point. So these questions do matter. To conceive "the" ruling class in an unscientific manner could entail conflating a celebrity (lizard shape-shifter) with the ruling class. It could entail all sorts of nonsense. You seem to pre-suppose that the Marxian notion of class is somehow universal, but it isn't. When people claim that Jews, reptilians or freemasons rule the world, they say so consciously regardless of class considerations. While ultimately such conspiracy theories are contingent upon class realities, these realities aren't known by their adherents.


The answer is to admit that certain fundamental questions can't be answered. And then move on to those that can.


We can answer them. When people say things, they in their head think they mean something. And this is knowable to critics. So the question of philosophy is simple: Not "is there truth?" but "what do you mean really?" when you say something is true. I paraphrase Zizek here.


The fact that Marx is dismissive of other people's metaphysical positions doesn't mean Marx didn't have deep metaphysical beliefs of his own.


But Marx did not concern with, or deal with the field of metaphysics. While one can say that ultimately we are always going to assume inherently metaphysical ideas, Marx literally discarded the field of metaphysics itself in that - you can claim he thought the world was made of Chimpanzee shit and he would not care, i.e. the power of his method and theory would not be really affected (though of course this is obviously an empirical claim, which wouldn't simply be ACCEPTED). For example, many claim that the idea that "matter" is the basis of all things is long discarded by physics, and therefore Marxism "needs to be updated". But that's ridiculous. In Marxist terms, matter simply signifies the common basis of all that exists. So with something like string theory, for example, all this demonstrates is that matter is more complicated than what was previously thought, i.e. we know matter better than we did before. I mean, the mass-energy equivalency alone is enough to discard all of these stupid new age, metaphysical proclamations about how "materialism" was wrong all along.


That's....rather obvious. Calling it "revolutionary materialism" is obfuscation.


I shouldn't have called it revolutionary materialism. It's historical materialism and it's revolutionary because it is sustained by the definite possibility of an opposition to the existing order. And frankly no, this is not obvious to most people.


Why only class-based societies? Was there no false consciousness in primative communism? No lies or religion?


Do you hear yourself? How could their be false consciousness in primitive Communism without class antagonism? For something to be a lie entails an alternative social reality was possible. This was only possible in a class-based society, or a society that was predisposed to it. Primitive societies however were, while classless, not societies which possessed consciousness of the social dimension. That is why the neolithic revolution was possible. For something to be conceived as a lie, or as wrong, would have to entail that a class society was at the least very possible. NOT that it wasn't wrong in this relativist manner, but that one could only know this as wrong AFTER it has been made possible.

Besides, all I said was: The reproduction of any class-based social order necessarily requires the absence of a scientific understanding of its basic function. I did not say "of only class-based social orders". So the logic is simple. All class societies, in order to be reproduced, require the absence of a scientific understanding of their function. Of course this is true for primitive societies, that they require an absence of a scientific understanding of their function, but the point is that a scientific understanding of primitive societies was always impossible. Only with capitalism has consciousness of the social become a possibility. The statement pre-supposes the POSSIBILITY of scientifically conceiving a society where ruling ideology hinders it. This is only a POSSIBILITY because of the antagonistic existence of the proletarian class which could undermine the existing order, so:


Banish bad thinking forever with the cleaning power of Magical Communism!


The real ridiculousness you're trying to imply is the idea that a society without social antagonisms is impossible. Of course, to assume the horizon of its possibility is ideological, and not scientific. What we do know, however, is that only with ideology can one make pretenses to its impossibility. What we are met with is an empty horizon that is unknowable by anyone. And we take a leap of faith! If in Communism the order would have to be reproduced in spite of science, this would suggest that it can be threatened by predispositions to its collapse already within it. Which could only ever be social antagonism. No one denies this will be a problem for a very long time, but if we assume classlessness is possible in a future society, then it will not always be one.

The point isn't that errors will never be made, but that they will not be systemically reproduced out of necessity in reproducing the conditions of life. I do not see how this is so difficult to conceive.


The great delusion of 19th century enlightenment philosophy - that humanity is perfectable, if only we could find the one thing that holds them back...and kill it.


I explicitly claimed Communism was the beginning of problems, and not the end. Far from being perfect, it is a society that will always, regularly and infinitely have problems. It will just, perhaps, be better equipped at dealing with them.


I think you have just defined "marxism" as "science".


... Or designated Marxism as scientific. There is a difference. Marxism is indeed an identifiable paradigm, but its basic foundations are conceived only scientifically. It is a question of freedom from those in power and their holy tongue.


Why not? Because he was influential? And why was he influential? Because he was useful to the ruling class of the time.

Hegel's work is a giant syncretic mash of mysticisms - pythagoreanism, kabala, freemasonry, astrology, alchemy etc etc., squeezed into a heretical christian teleology, and written up in the hermetic tradition of deliberate obscurantism.


Frankly, it's easy to see who inherited Hegel's tradition. To claim that Hegel was of some kind of utility to those in power is nothing short of hilarious. Any idiot can see that those in power who admired Hegel had so ignorantly misunderstood him. Take for example the notion that all that is real is rational. Those in power claimed that this meant everything exists because it ought to. But hegel's point was infinitely more subversive: All that is real is rational but subject to further qualification. Even when Hegel was at his worst conservatism, he still managed to be subversive. So Hegel may have been "used", but he wasn't used to his fullest extant (by those in power). This legacy was inherited by the Communist tradition. Hegel was taken a step further. And we've been over this. It doesn't matter what Hegel may or may have not been slightly influenced by. the idea that he is reducible to "this or that" ridiculous concept is akin to saying that the first practitioners of the scientific method might have been influenced by some fringe mysticism or whatever. It's meaningless. Hegel is not synonymous with these - "mysticisms", because he precisely approximated that which was worthy in them, in conceiving history. That is to say, these may have been "mysticisms", but that doesn't mean they had nothing insightful to offer at the time, especially considering most of Europe's history, one could not think outside of religion. Hegel did not adopt these things under the backdrop of a scientific revolution, but as I said before, as a means of approximating them to modern times.


So all things which are equal to themselves are equal to each other. That's...painfully confused.

Anyway, the whole "being and nothing" notion is a grammatical artifact. It arises from that fact that germanic languages have auxiliary copulas, and can derive verbal-nouns from any non-modal verb. Thus from the purely grammatical word "be" we can derive the seemingly referential noun "being".

That's why we can form sentences like "I taste the tasting but don't touch the not touching". Grammatically it's fine - it just doesn't mean anything.


They are equal to each other as they are to themselves for Hegel, and the point of being confused is to conceive something you wouldn't have already known with your immediate standards of reason and so on. That's the point. As for the linguistic reductionism, it doesn't matter; There IS a wider philosophic point being conveyed here, whether or not it's in Germanic or something else. Otherwise, Hegel wouldn't be conceivable to non-germanic language speakers. This isn't the case though, people STILL understand!


I dismiss him because I understand him. He has no theory, just a bag of incompatible tropes which are applied ad-hoc, to get him to whichever conclusion he wants.


So in other words, you don't understand him at all. Hegel has no conclusion to get to that is separate from his method. I mean, what would it be? The provisional, shaky and weak defense of constitutional monarchy? Considering his heirs, I don't think so.

[Tim Redd]

"Marxism has been changed; from a revolutionary theory it has become an ideology." - Karl Korsh (1950)

Marx and Engels considered all viewpoints as ideology or reflections of ideology.

Merriam-Webster: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture. 2 : a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture.

Vocabulary.com: An ideology is a set of opinions or beliefs of a group or an individual. Very often ideology refers to a set of political beliefs or a set of ideas that characterize a particular culture.

Oxford Dictionary: system of ideas (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/idea#idea__4) and ideals (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/ideal#ideal__9), especially one that forms the basis (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/basis#basis__5) of economic (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/economic#economic__6) or political (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/political#political__4) theory (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/theory#theory__4) and policy (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/policy#policy__4); The ideas (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/idea#idea__4) and manner (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/manner#manner__4) of thinking characteristic of a group (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/group#group__4), social (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/social#social__4) class (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/class#class__4), or individual (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/individual#individual__11): a critique (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/critique#critique__4) of bourgeois (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/bourgeois#bourgeois__6) ideology.

Oxford Dictionary (Archaic): Visionary (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/visionary#visionary__4) speculation (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/speculation#speculation__4), especially of an unrealistic (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/unrealistic#unrealistic__4) or idealistic (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/idealistic#idealistic__4) nature.

I suppose Korsh was using the archaic version of the definition of ideology.

I wanted to make the point that the word ideology is not necessarily or even in accepted modern use a perjorative.

Further I don't accept that the archaic use applies to the genuine Marxism of today.

[Rafiq]

And what has this to do with the topic at hand?

Christ, if it were possible to in any kind of systematized way form some kind of algorithm which would predict what Redd will go spontaneously rambling about completely out of context, perhaps solipsism might have some merit.

Anyway, Marxism is most definitely not an ideology, even though it is contingent upon an ideological force. One would not claim, for example, that astronomy is "ideology".

[Tim Redd]

And what has this to do with the topic at hand? Christ, if it were possible to in any kind of systematized way form some kind of algorithm which would predict what Redd will go spontaneously rambling about completely out of context, perhaps solipsism might have some merit.

Anyone who asserts that they can't relate what I'm saying to the initial quote in the message either has a problem with cognition, or a psychological problem.


Anyway, Marxism is most definitely not an ideology, even though it is contingent upon an ideological force. One would not claim, for example, that astronomy is "ideology".

Insofar as astronomy has a paradigm for research perhaps it is an ideology, or has an ideological aspect.

Based on the definitions yes Marxism is an ideology. Ideology connotes being unscientific only by those who can't accept the modern definition of ideology. However I do accept it.

[Tim Redd]

Thinking about the issue some more, consider these three questions:

(1) Is your love real?
(2) Is your marriage real?
(3) Is the moon real?

Each question has different criteria for judging an answer true.


(1) means "Do you feel the emotion". It's a matter of introspection. You can answer it for yourself, but I can't, because I don't have access to your internal states.

There is also the question of how accurate your introspection is. Is it possible to be mistaken about your own feelings? The short answer is that you can have false beliefs about your emotions, even as you're feeling them, but that takes us into some very thorny areas, not least what "false" means here.Often long term real physical behavior by the agent under question (the agent being the one we are determining if their love is real) can be evaluated to determine whether or not the agent loves someone or something. The matter being evaluated and the process and outcome of judgement regarding the matter is something that exists or may be expressed outside of the mind.


(2) is a cultural, linguistic or semantic question. And these questions are full of ambiguity and blurred edges. If a muslim man marries two women and brings them to america, are they both still his wives? It depends who you ask, though the law adopts the workaround of calling the first wife the "wife" and any others "partners".Depending on the criteria applied this kind of determination of what's true can be fairly straightforward. However, yes like many matters of judgement, there may be grey areas that work against an easy straightforward judgement. Again here for #2, the matter being evaluated and the process and outcome of judgement regarding the matter is something that exists or may be expressed outside of the mind.


(3) means something like "would the moon have all the properties we ascribe to it, even if we didn't ascribe them". It's a question about "reality" in the sense of "that which exists whether or not you believe it".? How can a thing have properties if we never ascribed properties to it. There is no definition (naming) of a thing without ascribing properties to it. Further, the only valid way to ascribe a thing properties is via a scientific process during and after practice with the thing. Importantly science is a contextually relevant objective study of a thing. And objective means a thing exists in space-time outside of the process of thinking about it.

(Ideas can be objective in form and content (what the idea conveys or is about). For an idea to be objective in form means there is some entity/process (brain or computer) that is in a state/configuration that signifies the existence of the idea.)


The popular image of science is that it deals in this kind of question, but any scientist will tell you that science only deals in measurements. That's why questions about what's outside the observable universe aren't scientific.Through measurement science can discover or impute the existence of objectively existing entities and processes. Measurement can confirm or deny the objective existence of a moon that meets the criteria which we define a moon to have.


So, it looks like Marx is simply not concerned with questions of type 1, and rules those of type 3 inadmissible, so when he speaks of "objective" truth, he's talking about type 2 questions - those which are objective in the sense of not being private, but not those which are objective in the sense of referring to the unknowable external universe.Per what I have just written, I don't think Marx wold have a problem with understanding truth in any of the 3 circumstances.


"Objective" means "Public".Something may exist objectively with only one person knowing it. Objective means that something exists in space-time. For a person to verify the objective existence of a thing the person must do scientific study and thereby find proof of the space-time presence of a thing.

- Tim Redd, 2015

[Tim Redd]

Rafiq:
Marx never bothered with metaphysics, while Engels is guilty of some minor flirtations with it.


The Grundrisse is full of metaphysics, as are the mathematical manuscripts, and there's a fair bit in the 1844 manuscripts and The German Ideology.

Is it a minor flirtation to set aside all other work to eat through Eugen Duering's enormous sour apple? And then write an extensive ripose? And years later study geology, geometry, electricity, mathematics and other fields to try to write a definintive marxist metaphysics?

The fact that Marx is dismissive of other people's metaphysical positions doesn't mean Marx didn't have deep metaphysical beliefs of his own.

When or whether Marx, or Engels wrote metaphysics depends upon how 'metaphysics' is being defined or understood. Marx defined metaphysics as thinking and speculation based upon an idealist foundation. Idealism bases philosophic argument upon taking the mental, ideas, spirit or gods as the primary cause and driver of reality. Given that, Marx wrote metaphysics while he was a Hegelian, which is a form of idealism. After he adopted materialism he no longer wrote metaphysics.

Marx was expansive in Grundrisse, but none of his writing stemmed from, or would lead to taking the mental, ideas, spirit or gods as the primary cause and driver of reality.

Metaphysics defined by idealism is not precisely the metaphysics of early 20th century analytic philosophy which asserts that any arguments that is not based or rooted in linguistic analysis is metaphysical. Accepting the analytic philosophy definition of metaphysics then yes Marx and Engels wrote metaphysics. However myself and others don't accept analytic philosophy's definition that what constitutes metaphysics is basing philosophical argument upon non-linguistic analysis. Metaphysics for us is taking the mental, ideas, spirit or gods as the primary cause and driver of reality, which Marx and Engels opposed 100%. That is considering Marx from the Grundrisse forward. Of course when Marx and Engels were Young Hegelians prior to adopting the communist viewpoint in the 1840's, they held and wrote idealist views.