Coercive communism

[Kingbruh]

An argument i'm getting from some libcaps is that you're forcing people under Communism during a revolution. How can I refute this?

[cyu]

Property itself is coercive. If you weren't allowed to use violence to enforce property claims, then there would be no property.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

I wish we could force people into communism. It beats the entire "global victory of the revolution and eventual withering of the state" deal. But yes, the revolution forces people to do a lot of things. The revolutionaries will force the bourgeoisie to relinquish their holdings, their money, their houses and cars etc. They will force the peasants to relinquish their grain. They will force hostages to relinquish their life. But what of it? Communists are not opposed to coercion in the abstract.

[Sinister Intents]

An argument i'm getting from some libcaps is that you're forcing people under Communism during a revolution. How can I refute this?

What're there sources? No one is getting forced into a society where there is no private ownership of the means of production, no one is getting forced into statelessness and classlessness, though to get to communism transition is going to be absolutely necessary. Besides the dictatorship of proletarian transition isn't even communism, communism is down the road from the transitional state though. Communism is the goal to be reached. I also think you might need some more info to go against, like, what do they say exactly?

[RedWorker]

I wish we could force people into communism. It beats the entire "global victory of the revolution and eventual withering of the state" deal. But yes, the revolution forces people to do a lot of things. The revolutionaries will force the bourgeoisie to relinquish their holdings, their money, their houses and cars etc. They will force the peasants to relinquish their grain. They will force hostages to relinquish their life. But what of it? Communists are not opposed to coercion in the abstract.

The thing is that this issue is simply completely subjective. In an objective consideration, any object simply belongs to the one who currently has power over it physically - everyone in control of something must be asserting some kind of force over it. When taking a moral dimension, or one involving the parameters of the current mode of production into account, one may argue that "communists are taking things by force from the bourgeoisie"... meanwhile, a communist may argue that it is the bourgeoisie establishing a violent, coercive and hierarchical relationship to property, while communism merely ultimately abolishes this relationship.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

The thing is that this issue is simply completely subjective. In an objective consideration, any object simply belongs to the one who currently has power over it physically - everyone in control of something must be asserting some kind of force over it. When taking a moral dimension, or one involving the parameters of the current mode of production into account, one may argue that "communists are taking things by force from the bourgeoisie"... meanwhile, a communist may argue that it is the bourgeoisie establishing a violent, coercive and hierarchical relationship to property, while communism merely ultimately abolishes this relationship.

No, that's the thing, violence is completely objective. If one has a pistol pointed to their head, no amount of casuistry can define that pistol away. And revolutionaries will put a lot of pistols to a lot of heads. Now it's true that the bourgeois state is also violent - although compared to the straightforward violence of the revolution the violence of the bourgeois state is often ideologically concealed. What of it, though? One being violent does not make the other non-violent, one using force does not mean the other is in accordance with the non-aggression principle or whatever silly moral rule people want to believe in. Why go to such lengths to portray the revolution as non-violent?

[Creative Destruction]

An argument i'm getting from some libcaps is that you're forcing people under Communism during a revolution. How can I refute this?

You can't, but you can charge them with hypocrisy and being dishonest fucks about their "non-aggression axiom" crap. People are forced to live under a capitalist society and a "libertarian" capitalist society would be no different. In fact, it's the reason why their usual argument about this -- "if people wanted communism, then you can have communism under a capitalist society or existing aside it" -- is non-sense. Capitalism is an all-consuming system, just as communism would be. The reason why utopian socialist communes failed is precisely because, in order for them to continue to existing, they had to, in some way, conform with capitalist economic laws. Those that resisted this failed. Those that gave into it because just another small town or even just eventually withered away.

[Kingbruh]

And revolutionaries will put a lot of pistols to a lot of heads. Now it's true that the bourgeois state is also violent
The way I see it, there is tyrannical violence and progressive violence. the bourgeoisie uses tyrannical violence for property protection, and the revolutionaries use violence for progression, to enhance the struggle. That's how I see it anyways.

[cyu]

https://scontent-sea.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xap1/v/t1.0-9/s720x720/1173907_538078372908453_1896898271_n.jpg?oh=2e7110 90447f7cd8e62ea47a652c9119&oe=559F74B3

[RedWorker]

No, that's the thing, violence is completely objective. If one has a pistol pointed to their head, no amount of casuistry can define that pistol away.

It is. And capitalism puts a pistol on everyone's head.


Why go to such lengths to portray the revolution as non-violent?

What I'm saying is that "communists are taking things by force from the bourgeoisie!" is an useless, subjective abstraction that most of the time has a moral dimension to it. Are the bourgeoisie not owning their things by asserting force on them and on others? Thus, the only possible meaning of this redundant assertion must be opposition to change, or the idea that the manner or context in which communists are using force is immoral. Meanwhile "the bourgeoisie is taking things by force from everyone" is not the same kind of thing, because it's an analysis rather than a pro-status quo slogan. Does that mean that the revolution will be non-violent? Certainly there are very low chances of no violence happening throughout the social revolution. As a side comment, some people like you use the term "revolution" in such a one-sided way here, used to mean some short-term violent insurrection instead of the concept of social revolution.

[tuwix]

An argument i'm getting from some libcaps is that you're forcing people under Communism during a revolution. How can I refute this?

People in capitalism are enforced to work for that who have more. Communism is liberation from that.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

It is. And capitalism puts a pistol on everyone's head.

And yet I woke up this morning without a pistol pointed at my head. So it seems your statement is only true if understood metaphorically. Yes, the capitalist society is coercive. But when I said that revolutionaries will point pistols at heads, I was talking quite literally. Of course, instead of pistols they might point rifles, machine guns and so on, but you get the idea. Revolutionary violence is direct and open.


What I'm saying is that "communists are taking things by force from the bourgeoisie!" is an useless, subjective abstraction that most of the time has a moral dimension to it.

Well, no, it's a description of (a part of) what the revolution entails. That you draw some moral "conclusions" from that is part of the problem.


Are the bourgeoisie not owning their things by asserting force on them and on others?

Of course they are. That is why the lolbertarian insistence on the "non-aggression principle" is hilarious - although not technically inconsistent, as the NAP is framed so that capitalist violence is excluded from consideration. (This is generally the case: the violence of the bourgeoisie and their hired armed men is ideologically concealed.) Which just underlines the futility of trying to engage them on the terrain of their own choosing.

But the bourgeois state being violent does not exclude the revolution being violent. Quite the contrary, these two facts are intimately connected!


Thus, the only possible meaning of this redundant assertion must be opposition to change, or the idea that the manner or context in which communists are using force is immoral.

Oh, it is. As morality is the tool of the ruling class, any opposition to the ruling class is immoral. This is something revolutionaries should accept instead of making these ridiculous ad hoc excuses that just concede the point to the bourgeoisie.

And the point of the assertion was, of course, that the revolution will not be non-violent, that it will involve force against the bourgeoisie and other groups (even if you accept this "the bourgeoisie is violent so if we're violent toward them it's not violence honest" narrative, what about things like grain procurement? is the workers' state simply to abandon seizing grain from peasants?), that it is therefore useless to try to "prove" that the revolution is acceptable from the standpoint of bourgeois pacifism.


Does that mean that the revolution will be non-violent? Certainly there are very low chances of no violence happening throughout the social revolution.

There is no chance - not just of "no violence" happening (!!!), but of the revolution not involving systematic state violence, including expropriation, grain requisitioning, seizing and shooting hostages etc.


As a side comment, some people like you use the term "revolution" in such a one-sided way here, used to mean some short-term violent insurrection instead of the concept of social revolution.

The refrain of the revolution as a process is what's really problematic. It's essentially the processism of the late Raptis-Pablo, and it's what allows people to pretend that e.g. the events in Venezuela are in any way revolutionary or that SYRIZA should be supported by communists.

[#FF0000]

Why go to such lengths to portray the revolution as non-violent?

I'm with you but I think an ethical case can and should be made in favor of revolution.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

I'm with you but I think an ethical case can and should be made in favor of revolution.

Why, though? Not only is morality an instrument of the ruling class, and particularly dangerous to minorities (and I do mean morality as it actually exists, socially, not something an academic concocted in his free time and which maybe ten people take seriously), what would we gain from that?

[Tim Cornelis]

We'd gain legitimacy. Of course this is moot as ideas of morality develop practically automatically, slogans like 'land, freedom, bread/peace' are already moral. Workers will instinctively feel, in a revolutionary situation, that capitalism is oppressive, exploitative, immoral. And communist literature has a lot of implicit moral commentary, so it's silly to pretend it does not factor in at all. As if people, communists, workers, are automatons motivated by pure rational self-interest. People have an intuitive sense of justice, and we can simply provide rhetorical devices to 'exploit' it for our purposes. It is precisely because the bourgeois side in bourgeois revolutions believed justice to have been on their side that they fought to the fullest extend of their powers. So these moral categories or whatnot may be but forms concealing the true motivations of historical actors, that doesn't make them any less significant, in fact, it enabled them to fight out class struggle on ideological grounds.

I just think Sparts have difficulty assessing human motivation. They think morality is useless, and instead think slogans like 'Defend the Deformed Workers' State of North Korea's Right to Nuclear Weapons' will recruit workers.

[consuming negativity]

rational self-interest leads to communism

coercion leads to capitalism

[Ele'ill]

Raze morality

[Rafiq]

Why, though? Not only is morality an instrument of the ruling class

Morality is no more an instrument of the ruling class than is the state, than is our relations to production. The point is simple: WHICH morality, WHOSE morality.

It's pathetic how you attempt to disavow the strive for revolution to anything but within a moral category. The point is that our morality has its foundations not in philosophical or metaphysical abstractions but real relationships to life and power - as any REAL morality does. Not that it is reducible, or even primarily owed to morality, but that it is dependent upon a moral, and ethical framework of thought whether you think so or not. One cannot be a Communist for pragmatic reasons - and EVEN IF you say so, not only is this a moral qualification (self interest), it is a bourgeois moral qualification. The point isn't that we have to construct a morality, but that through the very ideological expression of class struggle, morality is intregal. Any idiot with with a vague conception of the history of revolutions know this fact: that the ethical justification for revolution is already enshrined into the foundations of a revolutionary act. So sublime is the power of a revolution that it transcends, and displaces our present standard of morality to the point where it has no linguistic basis for use, it strikes at the very edifice of its basis.

And 870 will have us believe that we who "know better", whom have no time to explain to the masses that "it's in their self interest, in the long term" as a substitute for an ethical argument - is somehow a possibility. One cannot but be shocked by such clownish posturing: the "requisition of gain" as a primary consequence as though we're literally anticipating the exact conditions of the Russian civil war in 2015. Make no mistake, we are in uncharted territory: The October revolution was but a glimpse of a complete proletarian revolution. The fact of the matter is that if we recognise morality as having its basis in social relations, and not a conspiracy, than even an innate social opposition to those in power constitutes a moral position. 870 is frustrated in sight of the fact that we DONT have a moral language - it is important to know that a revolution has context in prevailing political-ideological frameworks as a culmination of the expression of social antagonisms and real political struggle. The revolution has its basis if not in a pre-existing mass movement (Which 870, who has so amply prepared himself for moral comfort with the reality of the Bolshevik basis of power having been in a minority to re-emulate its glory, fails to realize that the proletariat themselves were a minority, and this isn't the case for most countries today) then in conditions of intensified class struggle. But wait a minute: Violence and morality ARE NOT dichotomies, and to classify them as such is dangerous. Violence IS the expression of morality, how could it not be? Is it some kind of hedonistic desire to destroy, to kill which we ought to regulate with morals? No, revolutionary violence is wholly dependent on moral language. The point is that we don't abide by ruling morality, the morality of the bourgeoisie and the state apparatus. In doing so we irrevocably constitute our own.

870, it's YOU who concedes to the enemy, not just because you credit them trans-historic monopoly upon morality (is SAME morality a tool of different ruling classes? Is morality not historically relative?), but because you can only fathom a revolutionary act within the ideological terms laid out by those in power. Only in all your edginess, you accept this - being confined by the gaze of whom you claim to oppose. That we are "immoral", that we ought to accept this - your notion of revolution is solely within the domain of negativity, it is slave morality, it has no affirmative substance independent of the ruling class, or more importantly the basis of a future without them...

[Rafiq]

Revolutionary violence is nothing more than the bare unleashing of the violence which already sustains our social order which on a day to day basis we dismiss as a given.

[Kingbruh]

I'm with you but I think an ethical case can and should be made in favor of revolution.
Well I obviously believe there should be a peaceful revolution. Is that going to happen? I'd say it probably wouldn't.

[#FF0000]

Well I obviously believe there should be a peaceful revolution. Is that going to happen? I'd say it probably wouldn't.

Violent or non-violent I think an ethical case can be made. I'm not a pacifist.


Why, though? Not only is morality an instrument of the ruling class, and particularly dangerous to minorities (and I do mean morality as it actually exists, socially, not something an academic concocted in his free time and which maybe ten people take seriously), what would we gain from that?

Tim and Rafiq said pretty much everything I was going to say about this. First, a proletarian movement that aims to establish proletarian hegemony or whatever you want to say is going to have its own morality anyway. Second, sound appeals to ethics make for good rhetoric and exactly like Tim said, that means legitimacy.

Further, the morality/ies that exist today don't necessarily justify the domination of one class over another. I'd be willing to bet real money that the vast majority of people w/ anti-capitalist politics started developing those views after looking at the world around them and trying to make sense of it in a moral fashion, judging bourgeois society according to bourgeois moral concepts and standards like "justice", "fairness", "equality", etc.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

Tim and Rafiq said pretty much everything I was going to say about this. First, a proletarian movement that aims to establish proletarian hegemony or whatever you want to say is going to have its own morality anyway. Second, sound appeals to ethics make for good rhetoric and exactly like Tim said, that means legitimacy.

Legitimacy and £1 are going to buy you a Danish, more or less. The problem is that legitimacy, morality - all of these things are obfuscations of the actual material causes of social processes and structures. And no, the communist movement can't "use" them in the same way in which the bourgeoisie uses them today. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie requires the proletariat to be organised as a class for itself - for the most advanced elements to be fully conscious of reality and the tasks of the proletariat and for those strata that will be dragged behind the more advanced elements to have the objective, firm connection of interest to the revolution, not the flimsy imagined connection of morality.

Also I don't advocate any sort of "hegemony of the proletariat". I advocate workers' rule and the smashing of the bourgeois state. "Hegemony", on the most charitable interpretation, is "soft power" - that, or part of Gramsci's handwaving as to why the PCI was so shit at taking power.

I'm not going to reply to either Tim or Rafiq, for obvious reasons, but I do find it amusing that Tim complains that the slogans of the SL/US won't help "recruit workers". You don't recruit workers by slogans. You recruit workers by intervention into the class struggle, by political work. Slogans represent demands - they're an expression of programme. The SL do think the workers should defend the DPRK's right to nuclear weapons. If they didn't put that slogan forward because they were afraid it would scare the workers or something, they would be nothing more than populists.

The assumption Tim makes here is that the communist movement grows, not by splits and regroupment, but by linear recruitment into the mythical "party-movement of millions". This is... I can't really say anything polite here so I'll move along.

Rafiq, I see now, has pretty much made my case for me, with another one of his furious posts completely devoid of substance but informed by the same ridiculous idealism all his posts are informed by. The conclusion is that we can only wait for "red" intellectuals like Rafiq to formulate the morality of the revolution - the music of the future - but that in any case the revolution will not happen in our lifetimes. This is absurd. It reminds me of Pablo's "centuries of deformed workers' states", but is in fact far less sensible. In the mean time, we can of course support one or the other social-democratic formation which the messenger of the End Days so enthusiastically praises.

As for the comment about slave morality, if these supermen had paid more attention to material conditions and less to discourse nonsense, they might have avoided their persistent problem where they make grandiose claims about parties like SYRIZA, then have to furiously backtrack when it becomes clear that, yes, social-democrats are still social-democrats.


Further, the morality/ies that exist today don't necessarily justify the domination of one class over another. I'd be willing to bet real money that the vast majority of people w/ anti-capitalist politics started developing those views after looking at the world around them and trying to make sense of it in a moral fashion, judging bourgeois society according to bourgeois moral concepts and standards like "justice", "fairness", "equality", etc.

Some socialists came to socialism through fascism. Does that mean that fascism is part of socialism? If someone remains at this level - of justice and equality - they are not a leftist but a petit-bourgeois democrat at best. "Justice" and "equality" is behind schemes like distributism and parecon, not Marxism.

And of course morality justifies the rule of the bourgeoisie. You're supposed to work hard, to not be lazy, to not steal - in addition to things like forgiving your enemies, not being violent, not fucking people of the same sex, not having an abortion etc.

And seeking "legitimacy" and "non-violent solutions" and "morality" is how the peace police get started.

[consuming negativity]

And of course morality justifies the rule of the bourgeoisie. You're supposed to work hard, to not be lazy, to not steal - in addition to things like forgiving your enemies, not being violent, not fucking people of the same sex, not having an abortion etc.

And seeking "legitimacy" and "non-violent solutions" and "morality" is how the peace police get started.

no, that morality is not the morality of the bourgeoisie; the morality of the bourgeoisie is suspicious of others. it is security culture and watching COPS and serial killers and murder mystery after police drama on television. the world is dangerous, so lock your doors and thank the cops and soldiers who keep all the bad poor people in their parts of the city and world.

moreover, if the bourgeoisie is stealing some of the labor of every worker in the world, then how could "don't steal" be justifying the rule of the bourgeoisie? no, the fact that they are stealing from us and using the system against us is what de-legitimizes them. the more they fuck with the system and turn it against us, the more they make it impossible for the government to fulfill its role of re-negotiating class conflict, the more they de-legitimize their claims to private property which are upheld by that government. we do not live in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie - it is the fact that the working class sees the current system as at least partially legitimate that it still exists. and, in fact, the current system is legitimate in a way, because it gets its legitimacy from the belief that people believe it is legitimate. it's only when the peaceful solutions continue to fail that people will get on board for the violent ones; if people think they can go vote for change rather than fight for it, why wouldn't they? nobody is just going to take our word for it that they need to grab an ak and hit the streets tomorrow. a lot of people need to feel completely disenfranchised, and they need to know that they're all in agreement - that the situation is not an individual problem, but a systemic one, and that we have each other's backs in demanding what's ours.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

no, that morality is not the morality of the bourgeoisie; the morality of the bourgeoisie is suspicious of others. it is security culture and watching COPS and serial killers and murder mystery after police drama on television. the world is dangerous, so lock your doors and thank the cops and soldiers who keep all the bad poor people in their parts of the city and world.

What you're describing is not morality. Morality would be things like "legitimate self-defence" (gunning down black people for looking at you funny, if you're white, nothing if you're black, why do you even have a gun, thug?).


moreover, if the bourgeoisie is stealing some of the labor of every worker in the world

They aren't. We might say they are taking their labour, but they are not stealing it, just as taxes (for example) aren't theft. "Stealing" is defined with reference to private property.


we do not live in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie - it is the fact that the working class sees the current system as at least partially legitimate that it still exists. and, in fact, the current system is legitimate in a way, because it gets its legitimacy from the belief that people believe it is legitimate. it's only when the peaceful solutions continue to fail that people will get on board for the violent ones; if people think they can go vote for change rather than fight for it, why wouldn't they? nobody is just going to take our word for it that they need to grab an ak and hit the streets tomorrow. a lot of people need to feel completely disenfranchised, and they need to know that they're all in agreement - that the situation is not an individual problem, but a systemic one, and that we have each other's backs in demanding what's ours.

Of course we live in a bourgeois dictatorship - it's just that this dictatorship is not always exercised openly. And even when certain layers of society revolt, if there is no organisation, no political leadership, and no clear class consciousness among the workers, the bourgeoisie will survive.

[Rafiq]

The conclusion is that we can only wait for "red" intellectuals like Rafiq to formulate the morality of the revolution - the music of the future - but that in any case the revolution will not happen in our lifetimes. This is absurd.

Of course, only if one is predisposed with the practical clear-headedness of someone like 870, they would be able to draw this conclusion from my post. After all, everything I say must have some kind of hidden implication that is able to be transcribed by the narrowness and philistinism of 870's way of thinking. The fact of the matter is that not only was this not the implication of my post, this was the exact opposite of what was said. What was said was that an affirmative moral framework by the exploited class is irrevocably wrought out through the intensification of class antagonisms, through the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters. What is axiomatic? It is our social relationships to production and class antagonism - class struggle is not owed to morality, but it is still dependent upon the existence of morality in the same way it is ideology in general. That all morality must take the form of bourgeois morality and the morality of masters which preceded it, having its grounding in metaphysical abstractions or eternal truths - we can only come to the conclusion that all forms of societal organization are irrevocably bound by class antagonisms, and that the mere existence of the symbolic order prohibits emancipation in the long term.

The point is precisely the opposite: "Red" intellectuals as I might be able to have an idea of what proletarian morality can be constituted as, transcribing it from historic experience and in approximation to present conditions, but there is no way for a morality, or ethical framework to be formulated at will whether it is by "red" intellectuals or even by workers of good will. To abstract from ruling ideology, ruling morality even and re-organize it in such a way as to conform with ideas is not at all proletarian morality, but revolutionary phrase-mongering. The point is that the morality of the revolution is enshrined into the very force of revolution, there is no need to "formulate" it at will in that it is integral to the class antagonism, to the opposition of the exploiting class by the exploited, and thereby the previous order which sustained the rule of the former and impedes the emancipation of the latter. Proletarian morality is therefore not simply defined by its opposition to the bourgeoisie and the existing order, but by its affirmative act of class emancipation from the proletarian condition, vested in the revolution is a new order, and vested in the new order is a new morality. This is why you are accused of slave morality - for all it's worth attempting to constitute a "class" identity you are like a hysterical subject bombarding the master with impossible demands, you attempt to veil your innate and absolute fear of real power, of real destruction and violence with phrase-mongered pretenses to ideological discipline which is no more a threat to the existing order as the shell of a tortoise is to a shark.

The implications are very clear: It has nothing to do with any pretense to an estimate of when the revolution is or isn't possible, but the relationship between morality and the revolution. The revolution is only possible through the escalation of struggle on class lines, and I have not suggested anything otherwise. There need no talk of whether morality or ethics has anything to do with the revolution, because you yourself provide your own bourgeois-ethical framework for it - "rational self-interest". If there is anything which motivates the radical intellectual, it is not "rationality", it is a burning irrationality, it is the freedom to constitute necessity irreducible to any abstract moral framework or otherwise worldly existence. What you mistake is the peculiarities of bourgeois morality, or morality which preceded it as a means of reproducing their social existence in a manner devoid of self-consciousness. But Communist morality, which is ideological, is precisely the self-conscious approximation of the relationship between morality and class interest, because Communism itself represents consciousness of the social and therefore the destruction of class relations.

Communist morality does not mean the barbaric reduction of morality to mere proximity or utility, as this constitutes by definition might is right. If one were alone, locked into a room with a defenseless person for a prolonged period of time, what stops you from killing them to save yourself (i.e. assuming there is a scarce supply of food)? What stops you from, for example, rape so long as no one is looking? What happens when proximity violates what would otherwise be impossible, or "not in the interests of the revolution"? If one finds themselves in a situation wherein either way it makes no direct difference to the "utilitarian" revolution, and there are plenty, you throw it to the dogs... But this, let's call it "alienation" is precisely an achievement of history, to act beyond your own proximity... To botch this universality from Communism is to destroy Communism. It is idealist-metaphysics to assume that humans are otherwise naturally predisposed to avoid such situations - that we are "innately" good.

What then is the solution? What 870 cannot fathom is that one does not need eternal truths, superstitious or otherwise metaphysical moral frameworks divorced from one's living being to be possessed by universality. Communist moral discipline is the recognition that by your living being, you constitute a medium through which the new order is built, through which the old order is destroyed. To repeat that which was definitive of the old order, is to reproduce the existence of the old order and compromise the revolution through your lived existence. And to risk blathering on, it goes even further - isn't this Communism discipline, this universality precisely what Lenin recognized as the fullest actualization of proletarian struggle? That proximal trade-union consciousness will never organically lead to class-consciousness, and that universal Communist discipline, able to transcend mere proximity of "rational self interest" and yet approximate it even better because of this lack-of, is the only material expression of proletarian consciousness?

The lesson, which the Bolsheviks themselves failed to realize is therefore even more provocative than the "edginess" of 870 - the violence and terror of the revolution must not be articulated as the means justified by the ends, but as means justified in themselves, that is to say: The Bolsheviks lauded against violence, against executions and terror in principle and made exceptions for a "greater good". But it was precisely this moral weakness that partially led to the so-called excesses of Stalinism. Communists do not deal in moral exceptions - our morality must be fully ready to reconcile the blood-letting of the exploiting classes, the destruction of the counter-revolution in itself as a justifiable act, and the expression of proletarian violence and terror must be distinct from the old order as the guillotine was from the sword. The moral discipline, the uprightness and constitution of the Communist will always be in approximation to the interests of the proletarian class, interests which extend not an inch farther from the emancipation of the proletariat from the proletariat.


they might have avoided their persistent problem where they make grandiose claims about parties like SYRIZA, then have to furiously backtrack when it becomes clear that, yes, social-democrats are still social-democrats.


It is therefore Rafiq's lack of anti-intellectualism which led to the great blunder of mis-calculating Syriza, Rafiq who was forced to "backtrack" and re-evaluate his previous support because as it turns out, they weren't the revolutionaries he made them out to be. What a paradox this is, you truly think with your ass 870. I have never backtracked, because my "support" for Syriza never amounted to making them out to be anything more than what any idiot knew what they were, the point being that they were mass-mobilize many people through approximating issues which actually related to them. BEFORE EVERYTHING, I even claimed that Syriza themselves will probably not amount to much should they take power, but shift the standard of politics in Greece and Europe. And this is true, they have.

Why then does 870 still throw out the straw-man that I claimed Syriza were revolutionaries or radicals who would lead to revolution in Greece? Because he's a fucking anti-intellectual who can't bother to pay attention to an iota of the explanation as it is above, he simply translates it into "Rafiq want revolution. Rafiq no condemn Syriza. Rafiq therefore say Syriza bring revolution". That's the paradox! Only if you're an anti-intellectual can you think this way, and in that regard 870 is absolutely correct. Why do people keep prattling this complete bullshit? As though we were trying to sell them on something and failed - nobody made false predictions! The point was coming to the conclusion that there is a higher radical potential for Syriza, no prediction was made as to whether this potential would be wrought out or actualized, but that it was there, and could still be. I stand by this. So why this childish thinking? Not that Syriza is comparable to them specifically, but was the German revolution a sham because it failed? Did it HAVE to fail? It didn't!

[Q]

Moved from /theory to /learning.

[Kill all the fetuses!]

I am not familiar with the history between you two, but it's a pity that you wouldn't engage in a discussion with one another.

If I was to make a guess, I think that when 870 accuses you of idealism, what he means is cases such as the following, where you say:


The lesson, which the Bolsheviks themselves failed to realize is therefore even more provocative than the "edginess" of 870 - the violence and terror of the revolution must not be articulated as the means justified by the ends, but as means justified in themselves, that is to say: The Bolsheviks lauded against violence, against executions and terror in principle and made exceptions for a "greater good". But it was precisely this moral weakness that partially led to the so-called excesses of Stalinism. Communists do not deal in moral exceptions - our morality must be fully ready to reconcile the blood-letting of the exploiting classes, the destruction of the counter-revolution in itself as a justifiable act, and the expression of proletarian violence and terror must be distinct from the old order as the guillotine was from the sword. The moral discipline, the uprightness and constitution of the Communist will always be in approximation to the interests of the proletarian class, interests which extend not an inch farther from the emancipation of the proletariat from the proletariat.

Because ultimately, it seems that you are divorcing these sort of ideas from their material base and infusing them with more power than they warrant. I mean, whether the guillotine or the sword is used, whether this or that sort of violence is used, it might be important to an extent, but you give them way too much importance. As if revolution will succeed or fail based on what sort of violence will be used, as if it defines the revolution itself or its morality (even if it was the case, it isn't clear how it is important). Of course rape can't be used as a weapon to fight counter-revolution, as a weapon of terror, but were it used, it would neither define the revolution, nor make it fail or succeed, nor would it define the morality of subsequent post-revolutionary society or, for that matter, the revolution itself. Whether it's Bolsheviks or Spanish Anarchists, neither of them had the guillotine or any other fancy weapon distinct from the enemy and yet that didn't seem like a defining feature of the revolution, it didn't lead to the success or failure, I would say it wasn't all that important at all.

So the problem isn't whether you say that morality arises from the class struggle and proletariat morality will arise organically etc., the problem is that you seem to have this peculiar notion of ideology and you imbue it with more power than it warrants. At least I think this is what 870 means when he charges you with idealism, but fuck do I know.


BEFORE EVERYTHING, I even claimed that Syriza themselves will probably not amount to much should they take power, but shift the standard of politics in Greece and Europe. And this is true, they have.

Living in Europe, I have little idea as to how exactly did Syriza shift the standards in Greece or Europe, since I couldn't really notice it and it seems sort of counter-intuitive considering both Syriza's failures and electoral victories of the right-wing in other European states.

If I understand the argument that was made by the likes of Zizek, it was like the following: these left-reformist forces will come with their own political standards, being more friendly to left-wing forces, creating a sort of leftish political standard, which other parties would have to wrestle with
if they were to challenge them in elections etc. However, this argument, which Zizek made explicit, was contingent upon Syriza actually managing the situation and the bourgeois state better than other political forces, better than vehemently pro-capitalist conservatives or radical reactionaries. Now, considering the situation, I can't really see that happening - there were no real victories by Syriza in negotiations and there were no victories in the form of managing the bourgeois state that I am aware of. I mean, it might happen, they might actually succeed in this respect, but that's a mere potentiality at best, hence, why I find it weird that you are using the past tense, i.e. "they have [succeeded]." Care to explain why would you make such a claim?

[Rafiq]

Because ultimately, it seems that you are divorcing these sort of ideas from their material base and infusing them with more power than they warrant. I mean, whether the guillotine or the sword is used, whether this or that sort of violence is used, it might be important to an extent, but you give them way too much importance. As if revolution will succeed or fail based on what sort of violence will be used, as if it defines the revolution itself or its morality (even if it was the case, it isn't clear how it is important). Of course rape can't be used as a weapon to fight counter-revolution, as a weapon of terror, but were it used, it would neither define the revolution, nor make it fail or succeed, nor would it define the morality of subsequent post-revolutionary society or, for that matter, the revolution itself. Whether it's Bolsheviks or Spanish Anarchists, neither of them had the guillotine or any other fancy weapon distinct from the enemy and yet that didn't seem like a defining feature of the revolution, it didn't lead to the success or failure, I would say it wasn't all that important at all.


This is what is precisely idealism. Why? You're confusing the real for the real-in-thought. I mean, think about what you're saying: As a matter of vulgar utilitarianism, it doesn't mean shit whether the sword or rape is used, but that wasn't my point. My point was something very simple: What does it say about a revolution if these things are used? What implications are there for a post-revolutionary society if the founding sin is constituted in this manner? What does it say about the nature of this upheaval? That was my point. It couldn't have been a choice to use rape, and you are framing this problem as though the option is "there" and "could" be effective, but that we should oppose it on moral grounds. Is this what you think? So why then do you speak of qualifications that define morality? And if I'm wrong, tell me - why "can't" rape be used? Why wouldn't it be, in your mind? The fact of the matter is quite simple: A revolution isn't some kind of natural, ambiguous utilitarian project to achieve a simple demand. It is precisely the most naive vulgar idealism to think that a revolution doesn't encompass the entire edifice of not only relations to production and politics, but all domains of thought as well. Don't anyone dare try to look at me with a straight face and tell me that the profoundly explosive creativity which followed the October revolution in the arts, in culture, and in science was somehow divorced from the revolution. Even a crazed mystic could fathom it better than a bourgeois-empiricist.

Of course the victory of the revolution depends on what violence is used! The point isn't that this is the result of abstract theory, it is enshrined into the very revolutionary sentiment of those forces. Are you even giving this any thought at all? What in your mind constitutes a revolution? What is a revolution if not the employment of a new kind of violence? A proletarian revolution is a self-conscious act, so to talk of Idealism in this regard is nothing short of hilarious: The proletariat, unlike ANY class which proceeded it, knows it is a class and is acting as a class consciously. So the material interests of the proletariat, at the last instance, can only be expressed politically - that is, at will - YES the actions and decisions of men and women are ABSOLUTELY pivotal in this, YES choices can ultimately determine the fate of a revolution - that doesn't mean that if conditions were unfavorable, choices can surpass them, but that EVEN IF conditions are favorable, only through conscious will can the revolution succeed. Remember Lenin's break with Kautsky and the pseudo-Marxists who opposed this great violent intervention upon the "natural" processes of historical development. Is "this" your materialism, Fetus?

And to be clear, you're completely missing the point. It isn't about having a token, or LITERALLY different way of killing people, you're literally reading what is a metaphor for something else. The point is that the very nature of violence is different, this is only best represented by contrasting the guillotine from previous forms of execution (Wherein all were killed equally in the same way, quickly and humanely). What this means is that bare bones violent terror does vary between different historic epochs, even if they're not thinking about it. And likewise, a new epoch has different standards for employing it. And to be clear, the Bolsheviks initially wanted to abolish the death penalty in favor of rehabilitation, but were forced to use it during the course of the civil war - employing the distinct bullet to the neck method.


if they were to challenge them in elections etc. However, this argument, which Zizek made explicit, was contingent upon Syriza actually managing the situation and the bourgeois state better than other political forces, better than vehemently pro-capitalist conservatives or radical reactionaries. Now, considering the situation, I can't really see that happening - there were no real victories by Syriza in negotiations and there were no victories in the form of managing the bourgeois state that I am aware of. I mean, it might happen, they might actually succeed in this respect, but that's a mere potentiality at best, hence, why I find it weird that you are using the past tense, i.e. "they have [succeeded]." Care to explain why would you make such a claim?


Was it? No, it wasn't. It was contingent upon Syriza actually engaging and fighting the mainstream political powers of the EU and in Greece, which they are doing and which - as a result, have broadened the standard of politics. Don't underestimate this. Syriza's failures have nothing to do with their administrative incompetence, but their failures in negotiating with the leaders of the EU. Now frankly, all of Europe can see this, and clearly an idiot can see they are being held back by it. The fact that Syriza even won the elections has had significant implications for European politics. So yes, they have succeeded in shifting the political standards if not in all of Europe than at least in parts of it and most undeniably in Greece. There is even something of a growing hostility towards Syriza - from the Left. This alone is a victory.

[Kill all the fetuses!]

You are reading too much into my post. Let me be clear - I agree with the general gist of your post. When I say that rape "couldn't" be used by the communists during the revolution, I mean to say that rape is a fundamentally reactionary sort of violence. I think that means do define the revolution, but only to an extent. So for instance, it would be much more difficult to build a non-sexist post-revolutionary society if the entire revolutionary war is marked by widespread usage of rape etc. But that's because rape is fundamentally and in the most obvious ways opposed to the sort of society one is fighting for. It doesn't follow from this that hence all violence must be different during the revolution or that it must be unique etc. If the guillotine wasn't used during the French Revolution it wouldn't have made a damn of a difference, which should be evident from the fact that not every bourgeois revolution used guillotine (which is a metaphor for different sort of violence, sure) and yet they still were successful bourgeois revolutions and yet we are living in bourgeois societies based on the same bourgeois principles regardless of the sort of violence used during bourgeois revolutions hundreds of years ago. That's precisely the point - ideology isn't enshrined in the edifice of the revolution only; much more fundamental is the material basis of post-revolutionary society from which ideology will derive. It's not as if the revolutionary "mistakes" or "excesses" will haunt the post-revolutionary society forever, like a ghost of the past, which one can't get rid of.

As far as Soviet aesthetic is concerned, of course it wasn't owed to the revolution! How could it be? You yourself claimed that Bolsheviks used the sort of violence that shouldn't have been used ideally. And yet you claim that regardless of that they still created the communist arts, aesthetics etc. Aren't you literally contradicting yourself here? But let's push it further - how could all of that be owed to the revolution, when revolution ate its children, i.e. when swats of the proletariat were killed and so the revolutionary organisations destroyed? You also had a different sort of culture during the Spanish social revolution, which undoubtedly would have developed into its own culture, its own arts, sciences, aesthetics etc. And yet Spanish revolution was marked by nothing but the simplest sort of violence.

The point of all of this is that you are making a link between revolution to the entire ideological structure of society and while the link is there - and let me be clear about this - it's not as strong as you make it to be and I think the ideological structure is owed more to new material basis of society as opposed to some mythical link between revolution and new superstructure.

So, if I were allowed to be a little bit ironic and provocative, is "this" your materialism Rafiq, are you giving this any thought at all or are you just buying everything Zizek says on its face value?

With regards to Syriza, sorry, but it seems you just repeated yourself in different words. How is it that political standard has shifted, exactly? I mean, of course Syriza's success is conditioned upon it successfully managing the situation (including the bourgeois state) - I think Zizek (in so far as your argument resembles this) was rather clear about it. If Syriza fails miserably, if it leads to disaster economically etc. it won't maintain these new standards to an extent that they have shifted. I mean, of course, the victory of Syriza immediately leads to some sort of shift (otherwise it wouldn't be elected, logically), but the point is in maintaining the shift and you can only do so by administering the bourgeois state better than the right-wing bourgeois parties themselves. Otherwise, saying that political standards have shifted as in here and now is pretty useless and trivial, since it was a logical immediate consequence of Syriza winning the elections.

And your comment about there being a growing hostility towards Syriza from the Left seems rather... perplexing? What is it that you mean by the Left? If you mean your average radical you were arguing against with regards to Syriza all along so it's only natural since their hostility is enshrined in them being (such) radicals in the first place. If you mean that there is hostility from the Left Platform et al., then who cares?

[mushroompizza]

An argument i'm getting from some libcaps is that you're forcing people under Communism during a revolution. How can I refute this?

Wouldn't a libcap revolution also force people into their ideology? What is their point? They could also just leave to a libcap state after the revolution. I also hope the revolution is peaceful, but I doubt a revolution will even happen in my lifetime.

[Rafiq]

As far as Soviet aesthetic is concerned, of course it wasn't owed to the revolution! How could it be? You yourself claimed that Bolsheviks used the sort of violence that shouldn't have been used ideally. And yet you claim that regardless of that they still created the communist arts, aesthetics etc. Aren't you literally contradicting yourself here? But let's push it further - how could all of that be owed to the revolution, when revolution ate its children, i.e. when swats of the proletariat were killed and so the revolutionary organisations destroyed? You also had a different sort of culture during the Spanish social revolution, which undoubtedly would have developed into its own culture, its own arts, sciences, aesthetics etc. And yet Spanish revolution was marked by nothing but the simplest sort of violence.

This had nothing to do with my point. It is not that the Bolsheviks employed violence which shouldn't have been used, but that the worker's movement, and its political structure was not prepared for the violence which followed (Given the unique situation of social antagonism in Russia). Does this make sense to you? The point isn't that violence wasn't used "ideally" but that the widespread usage of violence had a traumatic impact upon the "children" of the revolution, from demoralized party members to suicidal Chekists - furthermore, it gave way to a reality wherein the organs of state repression had no clear, or definitive limits. Only an idiot would argue otherwise - the organs of state repression developed throughout the civil war, both as a result of the physical elimination of the industrial proletariat (by white terror and the war in general) and synonymously with the employment of red terror. Not that there was something deeply problematic with the terror, but that due to the conditions experienced by Russia, eventually (and this was a slow process) the structure of the terror would remain and used perversely in order to retain the dying spirit of the revolution. You really, and quite honestly have absolutely haven no clue about what I'm talking about: Eitehr that, or you're completely unfamiliar with Soviet culture during the 1920's. While the death of the revolution should have been obvious, it hadn't died then, and there was an aesthetic change unprecedented in history. This was undoubtedly and wholly owed to the revolution, and we can see clearly how when revolutionary organization was actually, at least officially destroyed, it coincided with the shift to more modest means of art - i.e. Socialist realism, and in cinema with the decline of the kinoks. Even so, Soviet cultural life and creative means of organization sprouted after the october revolution, though their implementation was made impossible for obvious reasons... (attempts toward) the re-organization of schools, the change in sexual relations - yes there was a complete ideological overhaul and this isn't even up for debate. So profound was the effect of the October revolution that few who experienced it ever seriously make pretenses to capturing its entirety through words, it is simply too sublime to be translated wholly in any meaningful sense. With regard to the Spanish revolution, let's be absolutely clear here - this was not a true revolution in any meaningful sense of the word because the most pivotal, and important qualification for one, that is, the capturing of state power and the transformation of society as a whole simply did not occur. The "Spanish revolution" was in a state of precarity infinitely worse than the Bolsheviks were ever in after the October revolution. To add, because of the absence of any widespread appropriation of the foundations of society as a whole, rather than a largely military insistence upon certain forms of economic organization - such a transformation couldn't have happened anyway. Even if we want to discard all of these realities - the Russian civil war was won by the Bolsheviks and the revolution in Spain didn't even have time to fail. So these are completely incomparable - one represented an actual proletarian revolution and the other lacked none of the political sophistication, or all-encompassing power - largely taking advantage of the chaos of civil war (and before we talk about how the "Bolsheviks took advantage of chaos too" the difference was that this chaos was mostly actually the result of the immense pressure of the worker's movement, while hardly the same could be said about Franco's rebellion..). Perhaps the comparisons with the Rojava kurds aren't so far-fetched, after all.

Typically, a genuine revolution spreads to at least some minor degree. This didn't happen in Europe during 1936. Anarchist cataolonia had absolutely no affirmative social qualities whatsoever, providing nothing close to an example which could have been followed by the rest of the world - perhaps because of the unique particularities of the national situation not unlike the Rojava kurds today? Who knows. The bottom line is that the October revolution actually represented the shattering of the bourgeois state power, while in Spain, Franco's rebellion more or less did this for the anarchists anyway.


t's not as strong as you make it to be and I think the ideological structure is owed more to new material basis of society as opposed to some mythical link between revolution and new superstructure.

So, if I were allowed to be a little bit ironic and provocative, is "this" your materialism Rafiq, are you giving this any thought at all or are you just buying everything Zizek says on its face value?


That's cute, but let's leave Zizek out of this: considering that this has nothing to do with Zizek, even though he would probably agree with me. I mean, is this how a fucking argument works? I know I have stressed how much I take from Zizek, but I am hardly his mouthpiece. Furthermore, in order to actually articulate Zizek, which barely any of you have actually bothered doing, you actually have to give things thought. Isn't that something, Fetus? In order to actually parrot Zizek, you have to know what he's talking about - and as far as most people ardently critical of Zizek on idiotic lines go, there's no need for this because he's just "babbling" and "talking nonsense".But to be clear, what you still fail to grasp is the reality that the so-called "mateiral" base of society cannot be divorced from the ideological realities of a proletarian revolution go, because a proletarian revolution is a self-conscious act. If I'm parroting Zizek, then you're most certainly parroting the same old garbage analytic-Marxist vulgarism which let's us look at the "material base" and "ideological" sphere as separate, isolated entities rather than completely interdependent forces completely contingent upon each other for their own respective existence, wherein only in the last instance is ideology finally determined by material processes. What you fail to realize, however, is that you're committing the same error most idealists too: Ideology is not simply a result of the processes of the material base, it is part of the material base itself. Class interests, and social forces cannot express themselves without ideology, and to approximate reality is to sustain a reality (i.e. in the sense that the various methods of interpretation of the world are the result of social processes, and thereby contribute to the reproduction of those social processes, literally constituting a reality - if ideology is not constitutive of reality, then it isn't dependent on reality either).

So you CANNOT separate the "new material base" of society from the "grand mythical link" between revolution and superstructure, because a revolution previously was the bloody blossoming of the superstructure, and in a proletarian revolution, it is a rupture in the "material base" itself.


With regards to Syriza, sorry, but it seems you just repeated yourself in different words. How is it that political standard has shifted, exactly?


Judging by your last comment, you don't have an iota of an idea of what I mean by a change in political standards. Let me be more clear: Someone like Viktor Orban changed the political standards of Hungary by establishing a reference point of power wherein something like Jobbik is less distasteful than it would in any western European country fifty years ago. That's what that means. The golden road fallacy has some truth to it - people do look for a middle path en masse, and that's how power works by default. A lot of people don't know, for example, that in Allende's Chile there was a massive far-left opposition to the popular government. This was ONLY made possible when the standards were shifted left. And honestly, stop talking about Zizek. Whether it's him, or DNZ, or someone else, you all really have to make it as though I'm speaking on behalf of someone. It's so fucking obnoxious.


What is it that you mean by the Left? If you mean your average radical you were arguing against with regards to Syriza all along

No, the difference is that there's a pre-supposition of Syriza's promises and an elaboration upon them. Because that's how politics works - you start with the status quo, and you move from there. With the exception, of course, of things like armed insurrection, terrorism - something which also levels the playing field too (I.e. and contributed greatly to revolutionary movements in general in a place with such reactionary politics as Russia).

[Kill all the fetuses!]

God you are quick to jump to unsubstantiated conclusions about people you are discussing with. Why do you always have to assume that anyone who is questioning you must be a vile idiot who doesn't get what you are saying?


This had nothing to do with my point. It is not that the Bolsheviks employed violence which shouldn't have been used, but that the worker's movement, and its political structure was not prepared for the violence which followed (Given the unique situation of social antagonism in Russia). Does this make sense to you?

I will concede that I know very little about the Soviet culture, but I don't think I am following you on this one. What does it mean to be prepared to a particular form of terror? Let me be very blunt about my problem with this - can communist be prepared to use rape as a form of violence?


Typically, a genuine revolution spreads to at least some minor degree. This didn't happen in Europe during 1936. Anarchist cataolonia had absolutely no affirmative social qualities whatsoever, providing nothing close to an example which could have been followed by the rest of the world - perhaps because of the unique particularities of the national situation not unlike the Rojava kurds today? Who knows. The bottom line is that the October revolution actually represented the shattering of the bourgeois state power, while in Spain, Franco's rebellion more or less did this for the anarchists anyway.

Maybe it was not a typical revolution. I mean, what sort of examples do we really have to make judgements about typical revolutions? Some bourgeois revolutions didn't have to spread, but it didn't stop them from being genuine revolutions, did it?


So you CANNOT separate the "new material base" of society from the "grand mythical link" between revolution and superstructure, because a revolution previously was the bloody blossoming of the superstructure, and in a proletarian revolution, it is a rupture in the "material base" itself.

I am certainly not implying anything of that sort. I mean, let me be very clear on this - of course ideology is an irrevocable part of material reality, a constituent part of it, of course there can't be a material base without a corresponding ideological superstructure (and vice versa), of course making crude distinctions between base and superstructure is vulgarisation of Marxism - it's all true. How do I "fail to grasp it" exactly, when I am quite sure that I am aware of the things you just brought up?

I was also very clear about the fact - and I even stressed it - that there is clear link between proletarian revolution and new material base of society. If you wish, we can say that the proletarian revolution is a part of new material base of society (although, how that changes the point is beyond me). I didn't deny the link. What I am merely saying is that the link is not as strong as you would make it to be. To put it in the most blunt terms possible - can post-revolutionary communism be successfully developed if rape etc. is used during the revolution? Were bourgeois defeated in a global revolution with such crude weapons of violence with proletariat being unprepared, if such methods form an original sin of the revolution, what then?


Judging by your last comment, you don't have an iota of an idea of what I mean by a change in political standards.

No, I know exactly what you mean. The way we approach social democratic politics today is distinct from the way we approached them in 1960s, which is owed to the degeneration of political standards, for instance. Were we to start debating publicly whether rape is actually justified, without any self-censorship, that would be another example of degeneration of political standards. Right-wing forces in Latin America or post-WWII Europe having to incorporate social-democratic politics in their platform is another example and so on and so on (ha, get the reference?). What else could possibly be meant by a change in political standards? Don't take me for a complete idiot Rafiq. I am not questioning the theory, I am questioning the conclusions you draw from it.

I am asking you specifically how the standards were shifted "already" (because you said that Syriza has already shifted them). The reason why I brought up elections was that a shift in political standards by winning the election is a logical conclusion of your theory - you yourself claimed that it was enough for Syriza to fight for political power. The fact that people voted for Syriza already means that other political forces have to wrestle with the ideas of the left by the virtue of Syriza successfully representing them in elections - that's just elementary stuff. But if that is your point, if by "they have already shifted political standards" you mean merely this, i.e. that a shift was a result of Syriza successfully participating in elections, then it's the most redundant and useless piece of evidence for your argument you could come up with.

However, the point is, Rafiq, that momentum of such a shift and the force of such a shift is absolutely contingent upon Syriza successfully managing the situation and the bourgeois state. I mean, it should be clear that if Syriza collapsed a year later, if they leave an economic disaster behind them - it should be obvious that the political standards will collapse and they will collapse beyond the level of the ones that existed prior the election of Syriza. That's why I am saying that the shift of political standards is contingent upon Syriza successfully managing the situation and the bourgeois state. If they fail to do that, the right-wing won't have to wrestle with Syriza's ideas, because they don't represent anything successful. The only reason why I brought Zizek here is because I am more familiar with his argument rather than yours (that's why I said "to an extent that your argument is similar...").

So I still stand by my question, because it's not entirely clear to me how exactly Syriza has shifted the political standards in Europe and/or Greece?


No, the difference is that there's a pre-supposition of Syriza's promises and an elaboration upon them. Because that's how politics works - you start with the status quo, and you move from there.

Yeah, fine, you could also say that the sky is blue or whatever. It's a fact that you start from a status-quo, that's literally how everything works. How could you possibly not start from a status-quo? But that's besides the point. The point is whether Syriza is worth supporting, whether they did and do shift the political standard, what implications does it have etc. For instance, it's not a given that there will be elaboration upon Syriza's promises, if it fails and represents a failure as opposed to success etc.

And as far as my comment about Zizek goes, it was a joke, maybe an obnoxious one, but a joke nevertheless. If I can handle all your insults, I hope you can take a simple joke.

[Rafiq]

Let me be very blunt about my problem with this - can communist be prepared to use rape as a form of violence?

You express dissatisfaction with my accusation that you are completely mis-reading my posts, and then you proceed with unequivocally confirming this. Here's my point: Due to the various peculiar social antagonisms present in Russia, and an underestimation of the brutality and terror of the counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks were not equipped with the predispositions to utilize revolutionary terror or violence until they were forced to. This violence left an irrevocable trauma (as a result of the revolution's ultimate failure - the terror was not a cause of it). The point isn't that the violence they employed reproduced the previous order, but that they themselves could not come into terms with it properly. It's not that they were unprepared for "particular" forms of terror (which is beyond confusing) but that they were unprepared for the use of any form of terror as such. It is precisely the inability to come into terms with any terror that opens up the space for all terror to be used (though, this is not exactly what happened). Recall how most decent historians will say that Stalinist terror was PURELY a result of the weakness of the system, both ideological and social - it is not that Stalinism was too brutal, the problem was that it was unable to incorporate into its official foundations the acceptance of terror. The movement was not equipped, or predisposed to it - the ferocity and strength of the counter-revolution was primarily owed to the conditions present. All of the violence of the revolution was merely a result of the unleashing of the violence which sustained the system.


Maybe it was not a typical revolution. I mean, what sort of examples do we really have to make judgements about typical revolutions? Some bourgeois revolutions didn't have to spread, but it didn't stop them from being genuine revolutions, did it?


No, but most of them, if not all of them had incredible implications for the regions surrounding them, or more precisely, the states which were within their economic proximity (states wherein conditions were similar). The bourgeois revolutions which didn't have to spread were almost all by-products of bourgeois revolutions in places with stronger degrees of influence, or in other words, were a part of the spreading of another revolution in one way or another. A genuine revolution is able to spread precisely because it is able to approximate conditions beyond its mere proximal boundaries. Which suggests that what happened in Spain was not a revolution in the most meaningful sense of the word.


What I am merely saying is that the link is not as strong as you would make it to be. To put it in the most blunt terms possible - can post-revolutionary communism be successfully developed if rape etc. is used during the revolution?


Again, this is an incredibly ignorant way of thinking. Rape is a practice which reproduces the sexual relations of a previous order - if this is indeed a real revolution, then rape cannot be incorporated any more than the church in order to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class. It is you who is gravely underestimating how strong this link is - you are isolating things without bothering to evaluate their relationship, even on practical terms. I mean, it's simple: Where does rape come form? In a a revolution, which destroys the social foundations of rape, unless inscribed into it new foundations for rape to occur are present, then rape as a form of revolutionary terror is an impossibility. Historically speaking, rape is not simply rape, its form changes, and as a tool if its function persists, all this demonstrates is that the predispositions to utilizing this tool systemically are still present. In a stupid, abstract way - of course it could be used to defeat the bourgeoisie and there would be no problems in-itself. But even presuming this logic, what would this founding violence have upon the new order? If rape was used as a tactic, how could this be reconciled ideologically? That the "ends justifies the means"? It is true, but anyone can see that the ends also define the peculiar expression of the means. The point is simple: It is not just about destroying the bourgeoisie, subduing them or terrorizing them into submission - it is in what way, what aims do we strive for in the process of employing against them terror? Their pacification on what terms?

For example, reactionary hordes of Islamists, ISIS, might attack members of the bourgeoisie en masse in hopes to subdue them. Is there a level of equivalence of tactics between ISIS and, let's say, the Red Army because superficially they have the same goal? No! Not even simply on moral grounds, it is that their living expression as movements are entirely different, and that while they might want to kill the same person, it is for entirely different reasons. The same logic that you're employing here is akin to those prattlers of identity politics who somehow think that a political correctness, superficial vigilance against sexism and racism have to be "imposed" on a real-existing movement because we are, despite being Communists, being organization to a movement which destroys the foundations of these, still predisposed to it. This is a completely reactionary form of logic, in that it assumes these problems (rape included) to be timeless ones that we simply have to "consciously" fight against. No wonder then, why liberals are so keen on downplaying the fact that virtually all facets of political correctness which we have to "impose" on what we are otherwise predisposed to, have their origins organically in revolutionary movements which did not need political correctness because it was already enshrined into their foundations, because a revolutionary movement able to evade the reactionary temptation was not predisposed to racism or sexism. If our issues are "simply" singular, as you attempt to describe (Proletariat vs bourgeoisie) rather than all-encompassing of our social and ideological edifice (or, in your terms, "not as strong as you'd like to think"), how do you explain the fact that there didn't have to be much of a theoretical insistence upon the integration of women's emancipation into the Communist movement, anti-racism and so on? Why were these logical consequences of Communism? Why isn't there more variety in a revolutionary movement, i.e. why are things like sexism and racism always coupled with harrowing projections in the domain of how social relations are perceived (i.e., for example, even Strasserite, or early Nazbol "socialism" was completely petite-bourgeois, always with these stupid specific qualifications here and there about class), using YOUR logic? So in effect, what appears to be an innocent question "why would this have any effect?" Is in itself anything but one - it would not only have a detrimental effect on a post-revolutionary society, being that the founding violence reproduced the sexual relations of a previous order, it would SIGNIFY that the class character of the revolution is not proletarian, and that it is not even a revolution at all. Does THAT make sense? Rape will not destroy the revolution, it will merely signify that it was not a revolution, because in a proletarian revolution this is an impossible form of 'revolutionary' violence. As Marxists, we either accept this or renounce Marxism - i.e. does rape have its basis in social relations, or something else?

Then you will say "What of violence in general, however? does this too not have its basis in social relations" - and this is precisely my point all along, the violence of a revolution is not simply some tool but the expression of proletarian violence, whose existence is wholly justified, whose existence not only would not spill over into a post-class society, it is absolutely vital to the emergence of one. Because we simply start here - does violence employed against the class enemy signify a reproduction of the old order? No. Does rape signify the reproduction of the old order? If it doesn't, then what predispositions would a post-revolutionary society have to rape, because everyone knows a proletarian dictatorship is already built upon violence - are sexual relations, too, built upon rape? The question is not why we shouldn't rape, but that the mere temptation existing signifies that there is no affirmative social qualities to this "revolution" - one shouldn't even be linguistically able to fathom, register into one's standard of normality rape during war.


So I still stand by my question, because it's not entirely clear to me how exactly Syriza has shifted the political standards in Europe and/or Greece?


And I will tell you the same thing: What was your rebuttal here? That in the long term, the retention of this shift of standards depends on Syriza's success, legitimization and whatever you want. What is your point? That in the long term the retention of this change in political standards is dependent on Syriza not being cast down into the rubble does not mean that the political standards have already changed. And if you're asking me how they have changed, it's not difficult to see - go look at the standard of political debate today in Greece. It is UNTHINKABLE to even talk about fully accepting the EU's plan for Greece, or completely compromising to them. What in your mind does this constitute, if not a shift in political standards? Even three years ago, something like Syriza would be too abruptly radical for to bear as far as mainstream politics went. And now, the question of Syriza's success, and this is something EVERYONE sees, has nothing to do with their own incompetence but, I will repeat, the stubbornness of Brussels and Berlin. It has been made clear to most people that if Syriza was left to its own devices, they would solve most of their problems. Think about it - what has Syriza offered, and how in any meaningful sense could this fail with the cooperation of the EU? Syriza has broadened the standard of possibility. It has made clear something very obvious: There is no such thing as "failure" or "success" as such, because these varying degrees are relative to classes. Ordinary people in Greece can see that their well-being is inversely proportional to the well being of the oligarchs and the EU technocrats. It has nothing to do with this superstitious bullshit of harming the economic ecology, or "succeeding" in managing the country's economic affairs. The stock market might be doing okay, but people here in the United States are not.


But that's besides the point.


No, IT IS the point. If Syriza constitutes a new status quo, then all political debate as such would have to follow from there. That alone signifies a shift in political standards.

[#FF0000]

Legitimacy and £1 are going to buy you a Danish, more or less. The problem is that legitimacy, morality - all of these things are obfuscations of the actual material causes of social processes and structures. And no, the communist movement can't "use" them in the same way in which the bourgeoisie uses them today. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie requires the proletariat to be organised as a class for itself - for the most advanced elements to be fully conscious of reality and the tasks of the proletariat and for those strata that will be dragged behind the more advanced elements to have the objective, firm connection of interest to the revolution, not the flimsy imagined connection of morality.

If this is the case then why even bother with political programmes? Obviously the material conditions are important, and people massively over-inflate the importance of "subjective" conditions, but any party that's going to try to take power is going to need at least some popular support, passive or otherwise.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

If this is the case then why even bother with political programmes? Obviously the material conditions are important, and people massively over-inflate the importance of "subjective" conditions, but any party that's going to try to take power is going to need at least some popular support, passive or otherwise.

Far be it from me to downplay the importance of consciousness and political leadership. But the point is precisely that passive support is not enough - what is necessary is a class for itself, a progressive proletariat that is fully conscious of its interest and its historical tasks. Moral, religious and ideological (nationalist, democratic, corporatist, whatever) consciousness is precisely the opposite - at best it is an expression of real material interests in obscurantist, mystical forms. The programme is a guide to action, not marketing material.

[#FF0000]

Far be it from me to downplay the importance of consciousness and political leadership. But the point is precisely that passive support is not enough - what is necessary is a class for itself, a progressive proletariat that is fully conscious of its interest and its historical tasks. Moral, religious and ideological (nationalist, democratic, corporatist, whatever) consciousness is precisely the opposite - at best it is an expression of real material interests in obscurantist, mystical forms. The programme is a guide to action, not marketing material.

I agree but the "marketing material" is important in its own right. Having the right analysis of the immediate situation is fine but it's useless if it can't be communicated well.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

I agree but the "marketing material" is important in its own right. Having the right analysis of the immediate situation is fine but it's useless if it can't be communicated well.

But you don't attract the sort of support you want by marketing - you attract bored student types who are going to drop you in a few years when they figure out moral outrage doesn't really pay and they have that trust fund they've been ignoring. Like I said, winning workers over to communism is a matter of intervention into the class struggle, of political work. And in political work Marxist clarity is extremely important. Morality, mysticism, religion and so on - these are incompatible with clarity.

[#FF0000]

Yep.

I don't think we disagree at this point.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

[QUOTE=Xhar-Xhar Binks;2825779]I wish we could force people into communism.

What sort of communist does this make you? The whole point of the 'blueprint' ideas for a communist society (abolition of class, property, and currency) is that this will be emancipatory. In what way would being forced to go along with such a 'blueprint' be emancipatory?


It beats the entire "global victory of the revolution and eventual withering of the state" deal.

True. Anything beats this sort of wishful bullshitting.


But yes, the revolution forces people to do a lot of things.

Why do you use the phrase 'the revolution'? It's not the second coming of christ. 'It's' not even a thing. Revolutions will take different forms, at different times, in different places, and will have different natures, different extents to which change occurs. If history has taught us anything, it is that revolutions happen, 'the revolution' doesn't happen like some tidal wave of homogeneous, blueprinted change.


The revolutionaries will force the bourgeoisie to relinquish their holdings, their money, their houses and cars etc. They will force the peasants to relinquish their grain. They will force hostages to relinquish their life. But what of it?

What of it, is that there is no concrete basis for accepting this 'fairytale' version of events concocted within your mind. So this is just a pointless shopping list, really.

[cyu]

you attract bored student types who are going to drop you in a few years when they figure out moral outrage doesn't really pay and they have that trust fund they've been ignoring

Would the oppressed be treated differently from the way they were treated yesterday, if they had a loaded rifle on their backs all day today? The greater the difference in how they're treated, the greater the degree of oppression they were under before they had the ability to fight back.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

What sort of communist does this make you? The whole point of the 'blueprint' ideas for a communist society (abolition of class, property, and currency) is that this will be emancipatory.

No, it's not. The point is that communism (what you derisively call "blueprint" ideas, probably because like so many democratic idealists on RL, you wish to deny that communism has any positive content) brings the productive forces of society under social control. The development of the productive forces, their objective socialisation and the degenerate character of modern capitalism - these are the real material reasons why communism is a possibility today. To the extent that communism is "emancipatory" (which to be honest is vague as all arseholes), it would have been equally emancipatory in the Ur III period. But communism was not a real possibility in the Ur III period.


In what way would being forced to go along with such a 'blueprint' be emancipatory?

I have no idea. It's not important.


True. Anything beats this sort of wishful bullshitting.

Ah yes, Marxist theory is "wishful bullshitting" whilst the firm belief that, no really you guys, this time "radical" social-democracy is going to make everything better, you'll see, that's not "wishful bullshitting". Right.


Why do you use the phrase 'the revolution'? It's not the second coming of christ. 'It's' not even a thing. Revolutions will take different forms, at different times, in different places, and will have different natures, different extents to which change occurs. If history has taught us anything, it is that revolutions happen, 'the revolution' doesn't happen like some tidal wave of homogeneous, blueprinted change.

If history has thought us anything, it's that socialism in one country is a deranged fairytale built on the failure of the world revolution, and that the revolution either advances or degenerates. "Different forms" of revolutions are how opportunists justify their adherence to this or that bourgeois "revolution".


What of it, is that there is no concrete basis for accepting this 'fairytale' version of events concocted within your mind. So this is just a pointless shopping list, really.

Except all of these things have been part of social revolutions - and are required if society is to be reorganised. But apparently you don't want a reorganisation of society, you consider that to be "wishful bullshitting".

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

No, it's not. The point is that communism (what you derisively call "blueprint" ideas, probably because like so many democratic idealists on RL, you wish to deny that communism has any positive content) brings the productive forces of society under social control. The development of the productive forces, their objective socialisation and the degenerate character of modern capitalism - these are the real material reasons why communism is a possibility today. To the extent that communism is "emancipatory" (which to be honest is vague as all arseholes), it would have been equally emancipatory in the Ur III period. But communism was not a real possibility in the Ur III period.

This isn't logical. Bringing the 'productive forces of society under social control' has to have some greater end-goal, since the idea of having 'social control' over the MoP is to then use that social control to enact some social change for the better (i.e. an emancipation of workers from having to sell their labour power). It is a really odd thing to say that the point of everything we do is to own the means of production. That seems to be a really limited way of conceptualising communism, and closer to Social Democracy than anything I advocate.


I have no idea. It's not important.

The whole point of conceptualising, and imagining, a future communist society is that it provides a permanent/semi-permanent situation of dignity and social freedom for all people, especially those who were previously workers under capitalism.

I think that this surely has to be the main strand of our thinking - is a future society going to emancipate, or free, workers from the chains of capital that force them to sell their labour power and re-produce capitalist social relations in order to survive? If it is, then it is worth working towards. If not, then we should discard that strand of thought and adjust our thinking. Of course, a communist society should be one that is freeing and dignifying for workers, by freeing them from being forced to sell their labour power to survive. That is a far greater conceptualisation than merely bringing the MoP under social control, which could really mean many different things to many people.


Ah yes, Marxist theory is "wishful bullshitting" whilst the firm belief that, no really you guys, this time "radical" social-democracy is going to make everything better, you'll see, that's not "wishful bullshitting". Right.

You're reducing the entire body of revolutionary thought into a (false) binary choice. In reality, the ideas of 'the revolution' being some tidal wave, worldwide phenomenon, and SIOC are ridiculous and outdated, respectively.


If history has thought us anything, it's that socialism in one country is a deranged fairytale built on the failure of the world revolution, and that the revolution either advances or degenerates.

Agree on the first part. On the second part, it only advances or degenerates according to our own narrow, ideological conceptions of 'progress' and 'degeneration'. In reality, history viewed as a series of long-run phenomena does not show linear progress. England was, as part of the Roman Empire, one of the more advanced civilisations, before plunging into the dark ages for centuries, and finally becoming 'enlightened' with the end of the medieval period. The geographical areas contained in the former Abbasid Empire followed a similar trajectory, being the centre of intellectual and enlightened thought from the late 8th century before itself plunging into an age of darkness a few centuries later. Within these greater phenomena, there was progress and regression, reform and reaction.


"Different forms" of revolutions are how opportunists justify their adherence to this or that bourgeois "revolution".

Given the above, your statement here just indicates a complete intolerance towards the truth contained in the study of history. History - the real experiences of people and societies past - seems to just be an inconvenience to your own world view as it clashes with your pipe-dream of 'the revolution'. This is a real shame. Respect history.

[Kill all the fetuses!]

You express dissatisfaction with my accusation that you are completely mis-reading my posts, and then you proceed with unequivocally confirming this. Here's my point: Due to the various peculiar social antagonisms present in Russia, and an underestimation of the brutality and terror of the counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks were not equipped with the predispositions to utilize revolutionary terror or violence until they were forced to. This violence left an irrevocable trauma (as a result of the revolution's ultimate failure - the terror was not a cause of it). The point isn't that the violence they employed reproduced the previous order, but that they themselves could not come into terms with it properly. It's not that they were unprepared for "particular" forms of terror (which is beyond confusing) but that they were unprepared for the use of any form of terror as such. It is precisely the inability to come into terms with any terror that opens up the space for all terror to be used (though, this is not exactly what happened).

Well, the reason why it appears that I am mis-reading your point here is because I simply didn't understand it when you put it like that, in other words that particular question was a genuine one, not a challenge or whatever. Could you tell me if I got this right (especially the bolded part):

When terror isn't incorporated into the edifice of the revolution and subsequently it isn't incorporated into the ideological structure of the post-revolutionary society, then terror must necessarily be positioned as an exception for a greater good. To that extent, then it opens up the possibility of the terror being used subsequently (hence, Stalinist terror and so on), because it could simply be framed by the way of exception (defending the revolution, the greater good etc). If, on the other hand, the terror is incorporated into very edifice of the revolution and the ideological structure of post-revolutionary society, then such terror becomes unfathomable, because then it couldn't be framed as an exception and so on, because violence would have a particular place in the ideological structure and couldn't be excused "for the greater good". Is this anywhere close to your actual point?


Does THAT make sense?

Yes! I think this made it click in my head, brilliant, appreciate the effort.


And I will tell you the same thing: What was your rebuttal here? That in the long term, the retention of this shift of standards depends on Syriza's success, legitimization and whatever you want. What is your point? That in the long term the retention of this change in political standards is dependent on Syriza not being cast down into the rubble does not mean that the political standards have already changed. And if you're asking me how they have changed, it's not difficult to see - go look at the standard of political debate today in Greece. It is UNTHINKABLE to even talk about fully accepting the EU's plan for Greece, or completely compromising to them. What in your mind does this constitute, if not a shift in political standards? Even three years ago, something like Syriza would be too abruptly radical for to bear as far as mainstream politics went. And now, the question of Syriza's success, and this is something EVERYONE sees, has nothing to do with their own incompetence but, I will repeat, the stubbornness of Brussels and Berlin. It has been made clear to most people that if Syriza was left to its own devices, they would solve most of their problems. Think about it - what has Syriza offered, and how in any meaningful sense could this fail with the cooperation of the EU? Syriza has broadened the standard of possibility. It has made clear something very obvious: There is no such thing as "failure" or "success" as such, because these varying degrees are relative to classes. Ordinary people in Greece can see that their well-being is inversely proportional to the well being of the oligarchs and the EU technocrats. It has nothing to do with this superstitious bullshit of harming the economic ecology, or "succeeding" in managing the country's economic affairs. The stock market might be doing okay, but people here in the United States are not.

The point, though, is that the possibilities that Syriza represent were always there. I don't mean this in some abstract idealist sense, but that it was there in the social sphere, I mean people were struggling against austerity - very explicitly - for years before, New Democracy was elected on the electoral promises of ending austerity and so on. These possibilities that you uniquely ascribe to Syriza didn't come with Syriza - they were always there and that's the point.

To put it in other words, wouldn't it make more sense to formulate Syriza's victory in this way: after a failure of social struggles and after failure of New Democracy to live up to its anti-austerity promises, Syriza simply inherited what was already there, it took up the political standard that was already there for years. I mean, New Democracy aren't some vile bourgeois that were implementing austerity for the fuck of it - such claim would be very vulgar - it backed down, because of the same pressure of the troika. Think about it - what has New Democracy to get from implementing austerity after it promised not to? Anti-austerity very clearly benefits the Greek bourgeoisie and bolsters party's electoral prospects and to that extent it's in the interest of New Democracy, yet they didn't do so, it was forced to back down. So the possibility was there. Syriza was elected not because political standards have shifted, but because other political forces failed to live up to the promise that Syriza merely inherited.

But even if we assumed that all of the above is false, to what extent Syriza shifting political standards is useful when it does so not on class, but on national lines? Is social-democracy (and I mean more in ideological sense, not economic) in your mind somehow necessarily and inherently more predisposed to communism?

[Rafiq]

Is this anywhere close to your actual point?

That is.


But even if we assumed that all of the above is false, to what extent Syriza shifting political standards is useful when it does so not on class, but on national lines? Is social-democracy (and I mean more in ideological sense, not economic) in your mind somehow necessarily and inherently more predisposed to communism?


The point is that the foundations for class based politics and discipline, for Communism ideologically are there, as a radical elaboration of Syriza's soft politics. That does not mean they are going to be wrought out, but that the opportunity is there. That's the point. Syriza is not the messiah, but there are many lessons we can learn from it beyond disappointment or dismissal.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

This isn't logical. Bringing the 'productive forces of society under social control' has to have some greater end-goal, since the idea of having 'social control' over the MoP is to then use that social control to enact some social change for the better (i.e. an emancipation of workers from having to sell their labour power).

History does not have "end-goals". Social movements do, but whether these goals are attainable is determined, not by the ideas of the movement and how attractive they are to certain social milieus, but by the development of the means of production. And the "end-goal", if you want to call it that, of the communist movement, is socialisation of production. To treat this as some minor detail that lays the groundwork for "social change" to be "enacted" is bizarre - it signifies that you have completely lost touch with the standpoint of the worker, who experiences the brunt of present relations of production, and taken up the standpoint of the philantropic petit-bourgeois liberal.

It is furthermore bizarre to say that "emancipation of workers from having to sell their labour power" is "social change" that will be "enacted" after the socialisation of the means of production. The end of wage labour is part of the process by which the means of production are socialised. The same goes for the abolition of private ownership, the market, the family, stratification of certain workers into colour-castes etc.

And of course, terms like "emancipation", "dignity" etc. are vague. Communism will certainly not "emancipate" the petty craftsman. Nor will people be "emancipated" to sell themselves into slavery or buy or sell anything they choose - as the market, which many people view as essential to freedom, emancipation, call it what you will, will have been abolished. As would private ownership, another institution generally viewed as crucial to freedom. The same goes for dignity. In fact, things like same-sex relations or having "more" children than you "should" (you lazy scrounger) are generally viewed as undignified. A communist movement that can't see beyond freedom and dignity would be a really poor communist movement.


It is a really odd thing to say that the point of everything we do is to own the means of production. That seems to be a really limited way of conceptualising communism, and closer to Social Democracy than anything I advocate.

Except, of course, social-democracy explicitly does not stand for - has never stood for - the socialisation of the means of production. "Ethical socialism", freedom and dignity, etc., have always been cornerstones of social-democracy, from Bernstein to DeMan.


[M]erely bringing the MoP under social control, which could really mean many different things to many people.

Well, no. The followers of Pablo, Tito, Ben Bella, and the pretender king of Spain notwithstanding, the socialisation of the mean of production has a clear meaning.


You're reducing the entire body of revolutionary thought into a (false) binary choice. In reality, the ideas of 'the revolution' being some tidal wave, worldwide phenomenon, and SIOC are ridiculous and outdated, respectively.

The revolution is global by virtue of constituting the overthrow of the - also global - capitalist mode of production. It is bizarre to say anything else unless you either believe that capitalism is a merely national mode of production, or that revolution is some kind of long drawn out "process" (we Trotskyists, who have a derogatory name for everything, including several for ourselves, call this "processism") which begins by enthusiastically tailing social-democrats and popular fronts, and ends up with communism, somehow.


Agree on the first part. On the second part, it only advances or degenerates according to our own narrow, ideological conceptions of 'progress' and 'degeneration'. In reality, history viewed as a series of long-run phenomena does not show linear progress. England was, as part of the Roman Empire, one of the more advanced civilisations, before plunging into the dark ages for centuries, and finally becoming 'enlightened' with the end of the medieval period. The geographical areas contained in the former Abbasid Empire followed a similar trajectory, being the centre of intellectual and enlightened thought from the late 8th century before itself plunging into an age of darkness a few centuries later. Within these greater phenomena, there was progress and regression, reform and reaction.

If you're going to give this long spiel about "respecting history", the least you could do is get the facts right. "The Dark Ages" are an early modern ideological construct. During the migration period, of course, there was extensive social disruption in Europe, outside the Roman Empire in the east. But the notion that the societies of this period were less advanced is unwarranted. In some regions, including if I recall correctly Sardinia, notorious for its extensive agricultural slavery, nutrition and life expectancy improved. Intellectual activity did not cease, as evidenced by Boethius, Eriugena, Abelard and others (and I'm restricting myself to the end of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages here; if someone seriously thinks there was no intellectual activity in the high Middle Ages they haven't done their homework). Artistic production was also extensive in the period, particularly in Ireland.

Most importantly, the period saw several technological advances, including improvements in milling techniques, in plows, the first manufacture of silk in Europe etc. To make matters worse, the term "Dark Ages" was an invention of the Renaissance era, which exhibited all of the problems associated with the Middle Ages in popular consciousness - lack of hygiene, witch-burning etc. - much, much more than the actual Middle Ages. Now, is this directly relevant to the discussion? Not really, but the misconceptions about the early mediaeval period do inform a lot of bad "theoretising".

The important thing, of course, is that human history exhibits long-term, aggregate progress in the growth and organisation of the productive forces. This is what is important, not judging previous social periods by the standards of present bourgeois ideology. One might appreciate the inventiveness of the early pit-comb ceramic culture, but it seems difficult to deny that whereas these people had cleverly decorated, hand-made pottery vessels, today we have steel containers suitable for transoceanic movement of cargo.

But all of this is besides the point - the point being that a revolution that does not advance degenerates. The revolution is either spreading to new territory, or it becomes isolated and degenerates. This is, again, pretty much a historical fact, best illustrated by the isolation and degeneration of the October Revolution after the failure of the revolution in Germany.


Given the above, your statement here just indicates a complete intolerance towards the truth contained in the study of history. History - the real experiences of people and societies past - seems to just be an inconvenience to your own world view as it clashes with your pipe-dream of 'the revolution'. This is a real shame. Respect history.

The unintentional humour here is astounding. Do you really think you are the first to talk about revolution as something that has various local forms etc. etc.? It's just that the rest of us have been paying attention to history, and don't think it's prudent to repeat the mistakes of Belgian workers who gave confidence to DeMan's party, or the Chilean workers who sided with Allende, Italians who supported Nenni etc.