Greece: Beyond United Fronts and Popular Fronts

[Die Neue Zeit]

In a past letter to the Weekly Worker:

http://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/988/letters/


An interesting part of the article dealt with the right-populist but anti-fascist Independent Greeks. Previous discussions in the Weekly Worker criticised the ‘workers’ government’ framework called for by the Comintern, but I think balanced lessons from that can be applied to this possibility - a communitarian, populist front beyond the collaborationism of popular fronts and sheer hypocrisy of united worker fronts. Their leader, Kammenos, has aspired to be a defence minister and, if lessons are to be learned from Chile, this is a dangerous concession.

Well, as the Greek left may illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of both the "workers government" framework of the Comintern and the "majority socialist coalition" framework of inter-war social democracy (The Labour Revolution), meanwhile it is indeed breaking away from the collaborationism of popular fronts and the sheer hypocrisy of united fronts:

"I'm going to meet Alexis Tsipras Monday morning and agree [...] There has already been a preliminary agreement." (Panos Kammenos) (http://www.nasdaq.com/article/syriza-in-coalition-deal-with-rightwing-independent-greeks-20150125-00043)

[Die Neue Zeit]

On the deal between Syriza and ANEL (http://rs21.org.uk/2015/01/26/on-the-deal-between-syriza-and-anel/)



Greece has a new Government. After the euphoria of Syriza’s stunning victory yesterday, came the disappointing realisation that they had to form a coalition to govern, and that that coalition would be with the right-wing Independent Greeks (ANEL). Kevin Ovenden, who has covered the election in depth, offers some immediate thoughts.

1) Do not cry, do not wax indignant, understand. The great enlightenment philosopher Spinoza’s advice is pertinent. Let’s understand the logic (of which I am critical). This is not a time for absolutism. But neither for being mealymouthed.

2) This is not a surprise. The meeting lasted an hour between Alexis and Kammenos. It was finalising things. Discussions have been underway for some time. It will not do to say this is an emergency measure caused by falling short of 151 seats. And it certainly will not do to blame the Left – in or outside Syriza. Why?

3) As I explained in running commentary – seeking a coalition partner was never a matter of parliamentary arithmetic. It is about political logic.

4) The argument for including ANEL goes like this: we face a national humanitarian disaster. Greece faces international foes. Just as it did under the Mussolini invasion and the Third Reich occupation. We cannot face up to that with 36 percent support. The Left must broaden its base. To Potami and Pasok would weaken the anti-memorandum position. ANEL will have to stick with an anti-memorandum line. So we will strengthen the anti-memorandum hand in the negotiations with the Troika by having them in the tent. Additionally, this will discombobulate the Right. For the moderates in Syriza it also gives a counterweight to the Left.

5) (I am trying to do justice to the argument above. I do not agree with it.) This is not just tactics. It is a product of strategy. The theory of how to win hegemony this works from looks to the building of political blocs (resting on class blocs). That finds intellectual resource in a variety of traditions – Communist, eurocommunist, Maoist, even variants of the Trotskyist. I can justify those claims, but not right now. Put the ideological tradition to one side. The issue is political strategy. Consider that and then you can make sense of the ideological justification which, like mathematics to the natural sciences, comes in as handmaiden.

6) How can a party of the radical Left be in alliance with that Greek Ukip? Well – the memorandum cuts through politics in Greece orthogonally (at right angles) to the Left/Right divide. It is possible to be Right wing on all the social questions and against the memorandum. ANEL may loosely be compared with Ukip. But it was formed out of a split from New Democracy on an anti-memorandum basis. Ukip in Britain is Thatcherite and struggles to articulate the mood against austerity.

7) What is ANEL? It is a nationalist, xenophobic, anti-German party. But it has not built its support – unlike GD – on the basis of popular racism. It has built it by not being part of the coalitions which implemented austerity. That is an important distinction. But it is racist. Kammenos voted against the Pasok (when in government alone) law to grant citizenship rights to children of immigrants. Syriza supported the law. It has opposed the concentration camps for immigrants.

8) How does that pan out? Some on the Left of Syriza – many – are saying that with 149 MPs to ANEL’s 13, Syriza will “hegemonize” Kammenos. Friends from the internationalist wing of formal majority of Syriza – 70 percent of the Congress – say that. But they are worried by the move and do not like it.

9) The position of the Left Platform? Most of the Left Platform – led by Panayiotis Lafazanis – were privately more against a deal with To Potami or Pasok than with ANEL. Why? Because they share the strategy of building broad “popular alliances” shaped by what they frame as a “national struggle” against the Troika. Alexis Tsipras played with that language a lot in his victory speech last night. He spoke of sovereignty and national dignity. He did not describe the election as a victory for the Left. But it was a Left victory.

10) The anti-racist mobilisations and demands to do better than Pasok immigration, human rights, police brutality and jailing GD therefore become even more important in providing a counter pole to the presence of ANEL in the government. Kammenos – a poster boy of the shipping magnates – is pitching for shipping minister. That ministry has been in the hands of the maritime oligarchs for the last 40 years whoever is office. People voted for a break with the old corruption, not for tolerating it under a Left government born of hope.

11) The KKE? Its leader did not stick the boot into ANEL in his speech last night (but rightly attacked the GD as neo-Nazis). It will lambast the government as “more of the same”.

12) The anti-capitalist Left is in a position to make a clear political explanation of what is wrong with the forming of the coalition. The clarity and strength of that argument is immediately bound up with the movements, against racism and for migrant rights especially.

13) Was there an alternative? Yes. Syriza could have formed a minority government. But that would mean being very clear that the strategy was of using all positions of strength of the Left, inside and outside government, to conduct a fight with the Right, the oligarchs and the Troika. It is perfectly constitutionally possible to form a minority government. And politically. An aggressive challenge to the minor parties to vote against the government would put them under enormous pressure. In fact, with ANEL in the coalition, the government will have to rely on this tactic anyway. For example, if it wants to propose decent measures over migrants, racism, police behaviour, LGBT equality, it will have to challenge the likes of Pasok and the liberal modernising To Potami to dare vote against them, while facing down objections from ANEL. Either that or, despite the 149 to 13 balance of the coalition, the tail will wag the dog.

14) We are at the beginnings of this process. Not the end. There will be much more of this kind of thing. We must prepare for it and calmly understand and explain. Tout comprendre c’est tout pardoner: to understand all is to excuse all, goes another maxim. It can lead to that. But it should not. There is a debate. Some genuinely believe this to be a correct policy. I am one of those who does not. There is nothing wrong in friends of the Greek movement and Left saying so. And if you do think so, you should say so.

15) But we don’t want to demoralise people? No, we must not. The Left depends on hope and we must approach this – as all the future questions – from the standpoint of how we develop hope. That rests on deepening the impact of the electoral success in Greece and the breach it opens up over austerity and, whatever the political machinations here, over racism too.

16) So we should make our case from the standpoint of

a) developing the resistance and movements of hope where we are
b) seriously and acknowledging that these are major questions of strategy. That means debating them through and not foreclosing the argument with outraged indignation. It also requires talking to those from other traditions – with other viewpoints – an not just the comfort of those who agree with us.
c) placing a premium upon fraternal and intelligent political arguments. The aim is to convince, not to denounce.
d) taking account of the big lines of division – with the right and with the elites imposing austerity. The argument against putting ANEL in government is that it weakened the front on those battle lines. That has to be shown.

Concretely – a massive and unified display of opposition on the international day of action on 21 March, which originated in Greece, against racism and fascism and for migrant and Muslim rights is now a date which all on the Left should bookmark and take action on.

There will be much more too. But we should approach it all in this spirit.

[Die Neue Zeit]

How can the radical left and far-right work together in Greece? (http://theconversation.com/how-can-the-radical-left-and-far-right-work-together-in-greece-36787)



By Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou

The victory of the radically left Syriza in the Greek election is a historical moment for the country. It is the first time since the modern Greek state was founded in 1832 that a left-wing party will govern. It’s also the first time that traditional political families will not participate in the government.

But Syriza secured only 149 out of the 151 seats it needed to win an absolute majority in parliament and has decided to form a government with Independent Greeks. This is a right-wing party that believes in nationalism and strict immigration controls. It came in sixth place in the election with 4.75% of the vote and 13 parliamentary seats.

While the partnership might seem an unlikely one, the potential for a coalition bringing together Syriza and Independent Greeks has been cultivated ever since the latter was established in 2012 in reaction to the terms set for the Greek bailout.

In fact, the coalition is consistent with Syriza’s pre-election commitment to ally only with anti-austerity political parties. With the Greek Communist Party refusing to cooperate and the centrist Potami unclear about its position on austerity, Independent Greeks has emerged as the most sensible choice.

And indeed, the manifesto put forward by Independent Greeks is not incompatible with Syriza’s Thessaloniki Programme. The party favours also debt relief, austerity easing and the restoration of salaries and pensions to pre-2009 levels. It wants to restore Labour relations, alleviate poverty and punish those responsible for the crisis. Like Syriza, it also believes in constitutional reform to repair the political system.

Fragile friendship

All that said, there are disparities between Syriza and Independent Greeks that could shake the coalition. The smaller coalition partner wants the European bailout programme to be unilaterally denounced, while Syriza’s Thessaloniki Programme includes renegotiating with the EU over the Greek debt. The course of these negotiations and the compromise to be reached are fundamental to the economic future of the country, the longevity of the coalition and possibly the unity of Syriza itself.

Then there are the deep ideological disparities that separate the two parties. The manifesto of Independent Greeks declares their commitment to the values of the Greek Orthodox Church, the defence of the Greek nation and the protection of the family. Not surprisingly, it was pushing for and eventually gained control of the Ministry of defence as the government line-up was announced. Syriza, in contrast, is committed to the separation of the state from the church and believes in cutting arms spending.

New prime minister Alexis Tsipras is also committed to an inclusive immigration policy – a stance that doesn’t chime particularly well with its choice of coalition partner. Panos Kammenos, leader of Independent Greeks, has made xenophobic and racist comments about immigrants and ethnic minorities in the past.

Perhaps even more importantly for their working relationship, there are disparities in terms of social ethics. Kammenos’s party was formed by a number of breakaway members of New Democracy, a party that appeals to traditional voters. Along with PASOK, it has shaped and perpetuated the forces of clientelism and patronage that drive Greek politics.

According to a recent study by Transparency International, the majority of Greeks believe that bribery and “string-pulling” are acceptable parts of getting along and have little faith in the idea of justice towards fellow citizens.

Like other left-wing groups in Europe, Syriza is expected to have little tolerance for this kind of thinking. The Thessaloniki Programme involves transforming Greek politics by curtailing parliamentary immunity. It also includes introducing institutions based on direct democracy and self-organisation, such as a people’s legislative initiative, a people’s veto and a people’s initiative to call a referendum.

Syriza MPs already contribute 20% of their monthly salary to fund Solidarity for All, an umbrella organisation that provides logistical support to grassroot actions that help vulnerable people.

We can work it out

Despite these stark differences, it would be premature and fatalistic to say that the coalition between Syriza and Independent Greeks cannot last. Syriza is aware that this is a historical moment and is committed to succeeding.

If the coalition manages to end austerity without damaging the European profile of the country, then Independent Greeks will be the only right-wing party to have contributed to the Greek revival.

Failure would plunge the country deeper into crisis and austerity. It would probably annihilate Independent Greeks and the left as a political force – not just in Greece but in other countries too – for many years to come. The stakes are high. Tsipras has already adopted a more conciliatory discourse. He also made an experienced journalist and member of Independent Greeks responsible for its communicative strategy, in an effort to ensure the coalition will speak with one voice.

Success also depends on the left in Europe reacts. This could significantly influence the dynamics of negotiations and potentially recalibrate the process of European integration. If the left can rise in other member states, Syriza’s chances of success are increased. In the meantime, the party needs to smooth out its differences with Independent Greeks – or at least work out how to keep them contained – to get this coalition up and running.

[ckaihatsu]

Despite these stark differences, it would be premature and fatalistic to say that the coalition between Syriza and Independent Greeks cannot last. Syriza is aware that this is a historical moment and is committed to succeeding.


Is this also *your* position, DNZ -- ?

While we know that the social ills of capitalism cannot be reformed-away, even by an elected Syriza, I don't see why the direction at this moment should be one of aiming for a continued codependency with the Independent Greeks -- from Syriza's perspective it would seem to be preferable to organize and build more popular support so that its own political base is self-sustaining, irrespective of the IG.

[Rudolf]

All that said, there are disparities between Syriza and Independent Greeks that could shake the coalition. The smaller coalition partner wants the European bailout programme to be unilaterally denounced, while Syriza’s Thessaloniki Programme includes renegotiating with the EU over the Greek debt. The course of these negotiations and the compromise to be reached are fundamental to the economic future of the country, the longevity of the coalition and possibly the unity of Syriza itself.


I think it's interesting that Independent Greeks appears to have a harder line on austerity than Syriza. I wonder how it's gonna play out.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Is this also *your* position, DNZ -- ?

While we know that the social ills of capitalism cannot be reformed-away, even by an elected Syriza, I don't see why the direction at this moment should be one of aiming for a continued codependency with the Independent Greeks -- from Syriza's perspective it would seem to be preferable to organize and build more popular support so that its own political base is self-sustaining, irrespective of the IG.

Indeed, comrade, but the purpose of this Theory thread was to introduce a relatively new framework to replace the twin shams of Popular Fronts and United Fronts. I'll admit that my recent online polemical slant has been slanted in one direction, but that's because others' have been slanted in different directions.

Marx admitted his premature error of declaring the Paris Commune the DOTP, but he was on to something about the inter-dynamics of the "working classes" (plural) during that episode. In the 20th century, "working classes" became "popular classes" in Spanish jargon, once the working class and the petit-bourgeoisie were more fully differentiated. In the 21st century, "Communitarian Populist Front" recognizes the bourgeois limitations of using "popular"; nationalist segments of the bourgeoisie can claim to be popular, but not both communitarian and populist.

By this new logic, some blogs and articles have dismissed ANEL as a bourgeois party, but here I sharply disagree with them. They are a thoroughly petit-bourgeois party.

[Die Neue Zeit]

http://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1043/letters/



Ushered

January 25 marked the ushering in of what is hoped to be the world’s first genuine, but non-dictatorship of the proletariat, ‘workers’ government’ since the Popular Front in Spain. However, January 25 also marked the ushering in of what the inter-war social democracy hoped to be the ‘labour revolution’.

Indeed, ever since discussions on ‘workers’ governments’ resurfaced, I can’t help but think why criticisms of this Comintern framework, such as those found in the Weekly Worker, did not compare it to what the renegade Kautsky wrote about coalition governments comprised predominantly of parliamentary ‘democratic socialist’ forces. This is something which not even Chile’s Salvador Allende had, but now which Greece’s Alexis Tsipras has, not least because of the efforts invested in service-oriented solidarity networks.

As a comrade told me, there is not just public support, but public pressure on the party to take responsibility. However, the political and economic conditions aren’t there for the push towards scrapping private property relations.

Coincidentally, this week also marks the ushering in of the world’s first Communitarian Populist Front since the Chartist movement and Paris Commune of the ‘working classes’ in Britain and France, respectively, with Syriza working with the anti-fascist, stridently anti-austerity, but right-populist Independent Greeks to break away from the class-collaborationism of popular fronts and sheer hypocrisy of united fronts.

[Noa Rodman]

It would be interesting to specify what those lacking "political and economic conditions" are which even someone like Léon Blum assumed were necessary for the *conquest* of power: (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1095710/f9.image). A letter by Gilman in Weekly Worker, opposed to Syriza's exercise of power, points out that:
Syriza may have become the next government, but it will not be ‘taking power’ (‘Avoid the temptation of power’, January 22). Elections are passive theatrical contests, but real power does not change in the ballot box. Allende in Chile was leader of a government (also a minority) without power. The Chilean state apparatus from previous regimes - including the army, etc - was largely untouched.
For Marxists, taking power means destroying the previous apparatus.

Kautsky said this in 1922 still about France:


To-day there are only two great States in Europe where the destruction of the “fearful parasitic excrescence of bureaucracy and militarism” is still necessary for a “real people’s revolution” in the Marxian sense, and they are France, the Empire without an Emperor, and to a far greater extent Russia, the Czardom without a Czar. It is a legitimate inference from Marx’s words that the destruction of the existing State machinery of Russia is an indispensable preliminary to any working class progress. https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1924/labour/ch02_c.htm#sa

But talk about required conditions can turn into endless postponement (in Germany after the war with Versailles treaty, how can you expect to start socialization in such conditions etc.).

[Rafiq]

One has to consider the strategic connotations of Syriza outside of Greece as well, however. It is clear that Europe as a whole represents a political universe in the 21st century whereby the real value of Syriza is whether it is capable of mustering or strengthening a pan-European political alternative. Presently the dichotomy is between a pro-Russian wave which represents an alternative state-political apparatus for capitalism and the old European technocrats. With the present geopolitical situation, Syriza looking eastward to Russia is quite possibly their greatest mistake in that it endangers them into becoming just another manifestation of reactionary Euroskepticism. What could destroy any hope for the revival of Leftist politics is the subjugation of Syrizas victory as an event to the pseudo-conflicts of capitalist barbarism articulated solely on national lines.

There are already alarming indications of this possibility. The ultimate act of caving in is not simply going back on promises but subordinating Greece as merely a pro Russian vassal in Europe. Frankly this would be a terrible defeat for all Communists - there is already evidence that the reactionary vultures of the Kremlin have supported the Golden Dawn in one way or another. It may be inferred that this (good will to Russia) is a means of opening up the possibility of aligning with the Russian bloc a la Hungary or perhaps Turkey in case of a Euro exit, but this is a grave mistake. If Syriza is unwilling to place all her bets on a new current of European politics, it stands on flimsy foundations. This effect (I.e. influencing political standards) won't happen with taking steps closer to Russia.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Comrade, SYRIZA wants, first and foremost, the EU to become a fiscal union now and even some form of a political union at some point (but not way too down the road). That's the pan-European political alternative it offers, in contrast to the nationalist euroskepticism on the right (a la UKIP) and the left (a la CWI). Turning to Russian bailout conditions would be bad, but on the strict question of refinancing, why hasn't SYRIZA considered China?


It would be interesting to specify what those lacking "political and economic conditions" are which even someone like Léon Blum assumed were necessary for the *conquest* of power: (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1095710/f9.image). A letter by Gilman in Weekly Worker, opposed to Syriza's exercise of power, points out that

Comrade, Gilman's letter is an interesting attempt at making sophistry of the word "power."

Anyway's here's a longer version of my letter cobbled up from prior posts and submissions, turned into a new blog:

Communitarian Populist Fronts: History and Current Events (http://www.revleft.com/vb/blog.php?b=19192)

In response to comradely demand, I anticipate it will be edited to be even longer, to take into account submissions in the near future.

[ckaihatsu]

---





All progressive and revolutionary-minded people need to stand with the Greek workers as they face this enormous challenge. The banks are likely to take a hard line not because Greece’s debt is so huge and economically important, but because they are worried of a precedent of reversing austerity that could reverberate widely through Europe and be emulated next in Spain. Ultimately, the balance of forces in the international class struggle, and particularly throughout the Eurozone, will be of decisive importance.




http://www.liberationnews.org/greece-shift-left-class-struggle-communist-tactics-statement-psl/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=shared_article&utm_campaign=Liberation%20Newsletter

[Noa Rodman]

Comrade, Gilman's letter is an interesting attempt at making sophistry of the word "power."


This distinction between the exercise and the conquest of power, was also repeated by the Podemos leader:


I remembered what Salvador Allende said to the young members of the MIR: “We haven’t chosen the terrain. We have inherited it. We have the government, but we don’t have power.” That bitter clarity ofAllende is something I also found among our brother-presidents in Latin America.
...
it’s entirely possible that Podemos in Spain, like Syriza in Greece and Sinn Fein in Ireland, will lead a political change. But it is essential that we understand that winning an election does not mean winning power.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/01/pablo-iglesias-speech-syriza/

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

One has to consider the strategic connotations of Syriza outside of Greece as well, however. It is clear that Europe as a whole represents a political universe in the 21st century whereby the real value of Syriza is whether it is capable of mustering or strengthening a pan-European political alternative. Presently the dichotomy is between a pro-Russian wave which represents an alternative state-political apparatus for capitalism and the old European technocrats. With the present geopolitical situation, Syriza looking eastward to Russia is quite possibly their greatest mistake in that it endangers them into becoming just another manifestation of reactionary Euroskepticism. What could destroy any hope for the revival of Leftist politics is the subjugation of Syrizas victory as an event to the pseudo-conflicts of capitalist barbarism articulated solely on national lines.

There are already alarming indications of this possibility. The ultimate act of caving in is not simply going back on promises but subordinating Greece as merely a pro Russian vassal in Europe. Frankly this would be a terrible defeat for all Communists - there is already evidence that the reactionary vultures of the Kremlin have supported the Golden Dawn in one way or another. It may be inferred that this (good will to Russia) is a means of opening up the possibility of aligning with the Russian bloc a la Hungary or perhaps Turkey in case of a Euro exit, but this is a grave mistake. If Syriza is unwilling to place all her bets on a new current of European politics, it stands on flimsy foundations. This effect (I.e. influencing political standards) won't happen with taking steps closer to Russia.

Indeed, this would be an alarming geo-political mistake and, given the reactionary nature of the state political system in Russia, would prematurely cut off any hope of SYRIZA-style left-populism spreading across Europe (through Spain, for example).

It would appear obvious to me that the more natural home for SYRIZA internationalism would be Latin America where, even if for political reasons Cuba were to be shunned, the rest of the ALBA political/economic bloc would provide sensible political support and, in the case of Venezuela, potentially useful economic support, too.

[Die Neue Zeit]

This distinction between the exercise and the conquest of power, was also repeated by the Podemos leader:

https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/01/pablo-iglesias-speech-syriza/

The quotes you mentioned neglected one aspect of power: the ability to push through constitutional amendments. If I'm not mistaken, it's in the middle of normal government and "conquest of power."

[Die Neue Zeit]

MurdoRitchie posted this blog: Understanding SYRIZA's Alliance with ANEL (http://murdoritchie.blog.co.uk/2015/02/01/understanding-syriza-s-alliance-with-anel-20042620/)



This is a tactical alliance not alteration in principles. A strategic change would require the principles on which Syriza exists to be abandoned. After only a few days in office, it seems bizarre to claim that such a position has been adopted. Syriza has promoted the idea of substantially reducing the debt burden placed on the Greek people by the Troika of European Union, European Central Bank, & IMF. This cannot happen immediately requiring a policy of negotiation to reduce it. It is unlikely it will be abolished; it cannot simply be wished out of existence.

These are fluid times and new entities, especially Syriza, are constant forming and re-forming. It will be a period of short-term coalitions as issues and classes work themselves out. A strategy of building alliances to achieve the central core principles as defined in the Thessaloniki Programme. Coalitions to broaden the base of support are not surrenders of principle. To date, there is no reason to assume otherwise.

The coalition with the Independent Greeks (ANEL) does arise out of parliamentary arithmetic. After all, there are others who could have become possible coalition partners. Syriza was short by one member of an outright majority and required another member to become the speaker. This was a victory for the working class of which Syriza is now its chosen representative. International capital’s preferred representative is the New Democracy party, however, Pasok and To Potami also have ambitions for that position. ANEL is essentially a party of the petty bourgeoisie that have also been victims of the austerity drive.

There are no direct analogues with this type of political formation because petty bourgeois parties of this type do not exist in the UK. This is why a comparison with UKIP is of little use. However, such parties have arisen and do exist on mainland Europe. Undoubtedly, all these kinds harbour individuals and segments that are anti-migrant, anti-Semitic and many other repulsive characteristics. But ANEL is not founded on these principles and is just as affected by the processes of secular modernisation that have affected everyone else. However, it is an alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie that has suffered by international capital’s actions. That is why it is a substantial alliance. But like all petty-bourgeois groupings, it can only exist on the basis of either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. It has no real independent political existence.

Despite the enormous sufferings of the Greek people, it is clear that they do not wish to leave either the Eurozone or the European Union. There is a fear that leaving either would make circumstances even worse. Syriza has recognised that. It will only be by experiencing the hostility and opposition of the EU, IMF, Germany and others that such a sentiment can arise. Perhaps that may become a possibility. But it must be seen as necessary within the Greek people before such a feeling gains any political currency. Currently, it is not present. This is why the autocratic dogmatism of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) isolated it from building on the enormous anger that exists.

Professor Leo Panitch summed them up well saying they, “are nationalists [who] refuse to accept the humiliation and the torture, the economic torture that was being visited on the Greek people… not left nationalists, but right nationalists, in the sense that they have been very critical of the free flow of immigration inside the E.U. and critical of the extent to which immigrants are present in Greece and, they would say, taking jobs from Greek people. In that sense, insofar as that matters much,” Adding, “I don't think it'll have a great influence, in fact, on the cabinet in that respect, because the cabinet contains more people who have taken a very good line on immigration.” The Greek cabinet of around forty has only one senior member from ANEL as Defence Minister and three another junior ministers. ANEL are very clearly the minority partner.

Could Syriza have become a minority government daring all others to vote against much wanted legislative reforms? It is a possibility but all opposition can easily claim to be voting against reforms because either they cost too much or are irrelevant to the needs of Greek people. This unfortunately carries a lot of weight during a crisis as severe as the current one. Moreover, it makes more sense to have a binding commitment from forces who have an interest in the outcome that Syriza desires at this point. But, most importantly, Syriza as a new untested force must show the Greek people that it has the will to seek power. An abstentionist approach, at this time, would do more damage to Syriza than holding office in the face of hostile opposition.

In capitalism, debt and the other side of the coin credit, have enormous importance. Debt is not just a number; it is a process. Simply declaring that debt will be defaulted upon makes future loans more difficult and costly. To escape from debt often requires more debt to build the necessary resources base and growth. It is a difficult balancing act. Imposing debt has been a feature of capitalism for some time. It shouldn’t surprise anyone that the forced loan under the Nazi occupation is still an important issue with the Greeks. While much can be done to lessen the pressures of austerity, these will take time even if the will is present.

Perhaps the biggest achievement the Syriza government can make will not be in addressing austerity but in dismantling the Greek oligarchy and its stranglehold over politics and the economy. There are very few oligarchies currently in Europe with as cruel and as violent an outlook as can be found in Greece. Their better integration into global capitalism’s institutions principally the EU and NATO has done little to tame them. They are not only tax avoiding ship owners and bankers but police and armed forces with a history that stretches unbroken through two post war coups, a civil war and the occupation. Syriza will need pursue policies similar to Hugo Chavez performed in Venezuela in November 2001 to begin the process of dismantlement of their power. This may become the task for which Syriza will be best remembered.

[Die Neue Zeit]

http://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1044/letters/



Wrong

I think CPGB comrades have got things really wrong with the new Communitarian Populist Front, ‘workers’ government’, ‘majority socialist coalition’, etc, in charge of Greece.

First, the new coalition has been described as a “popular front sui generis” (‘Victory tainted by right populists’, January 29). Was the historically notorious Third-Period collaboration between the German Communist Party and the Nazis, traditionally seen as the polar opposite of the later popular front turn, also a “popular front sui generis”? No, I am not comparing the Syriza-ANEL cooperation to that, but some ultra-lefts have.

Second, ANEL has been characterised as a “bourgeois party”. This is highly inaccurate: Richard Seymour has suggested that its electoral support is demographically more similar to a leftist party than to typical centre-right parties. It would be more accurate to describe them as a thoroughly petty bourgeois party.

Third, ANEL has been characterised as being reactionary on all constitutional issues. Every single issue? According to Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou, Anel also supports constitutional overhaul of the political system. It may be possible to win them over to average skilled workers’ compensation and living standards, as well as recallability, for all politicians and civil servants, and also to implement a ‘party tax’, not unlike Sinn Féin’s.

All these counterpoints suggest that the new Communitarian Populist Front implies a dual insistence on radical, participatory-democratic overhaul and on predistributionist economic policy (how ‘socialist’ depends on the mass consciousness of class-based public policy-making), and concession on identity and related ‘social’ issues to a ‘radical center’ standstill - but not pushing through bans on games of chance (Paris Commune) or violent video games (Hugo Chávez), or other socially conservative policy.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Greece: Why SYRIZA made the deal with the Independent Greeks (ANEL) (http://links.org.au/node/4283)



By Haris Triandafilidou

February 5, 2015 -- Transform!, posted at Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal -- The first projections already revealed that the Greek election on January 25, 2015, would lead to a fundamental change of political direction. This turned out to be true even though the goal of achieving an absolute majority was just missed. Instead of the required number of 151 parliamentarians, SYRIZA won 149 out of 300 deputies in the parliament (Vouli).

The election campaign

At the heart of SYRIZA’s election campaign was the government program presented in September 2014 in Thessaloniki. An updated version of the program was presented by Alexis Tsipras on January 3 at the party congress. The program’s validity and binding nature was stressed repeatedly and is based on the following pillars:

1. The renegotiation of the terms of credit and debt repayment;
2. Resolving the humanitarian crisis;
3. Institutional and democratic reform of the state, the fight against corruption and fair taxation;
4. The “Labour Action plan” (restoration of employees’ rights, strengthening employees’ negotiating power, job creation) and economic reconstruction.

It was frequently emphasised that the measures the paper contains are not mere pre-election promises, but binding pledges. They do not contain everything the party would like to implement, but merely reflect what can be immediately implemented under the given circumstances. SYRIZA’s defined goal was to achieve a share of the vote thath would give the party an absolute majority in parliament and therefore enable it to implement the full party program without compromises.

The slogan, “Hope is on its way”, was ever-present, on everybody’s lips and could be seen on election posters in rainbow colours. Tsipras spared no effort and replied to each and every question he was asked regarding the party program and the party’s political goals in press conferences, TV interviews and queries under the hashtag #asktsipras. Scaremongering about a potential SYRIZA victory remained the main goal of the ruling New Democracy party. The reluctance of European and German officials to intervene in the Greek election campaign -- unlike in 2012 when they fanned fears of national bankruptcy and a "Grexit" in order to secure Prime Minister Samaras’ position of power -- made it almost impossible for ND to stand up to SYRIZA.

Potential coalitions and formation of government

The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) – SYRIZA’s preferred coalition partner – had made it clear repeatedly that it was not available for negotiations and had categorically refused to form a coalition. A meeting set up for the day after the election between Tsipras and the secretary-general of the KKE Dimitris Koutsoumpas was rejected by the latter, suggesting that the KKE had nothing to talk about.

Neither “To Potami” (“the river”) – a party wrongly depicted as left-wing liberal by the international media – nor the former parties of government: the ND and PASOK, were options as coalition partners.

Potami was founded in spring 2014 in the run-up to the European election by the journalist Stavros Theodorakis. The party’s continuous presence in the media and its image as a new and innovative party went hand in hand with an absence of well-defined political positions on austerity, privatisation and the memoranda. The situation of the country and Greek society were depicted as negative or even catastrophic. However, it is not contextualised with neoliberal political patterns.

To Potami presented 21 theses to the public which envisage a further reduction of income for social insurance providers, as well as opening up the education sector to private investors. During the election campaign, party founder Theodorakis emphasised repeatedly that it was necessary for Potami to take part in the negotiations with European partners and to present its political positions. He was not able, however, to formulate the party’s positions upon multiple requests.

Furthermore, in the short period of its existence the party has “excelled” at producing sexist TV ads and at voicing racist and homophobic statements. Party leader Theodorakis’ authoritarian leadership style, the party’s collaboration with the ultra-neoliberal party, Drasi, as well as the participation of certain public figures that had changed party affiliation as “reformers” in the course of their political career, had led to resentment and members leaving the party.

Theodorakis usually has a casual appearance and used to work for MEGA, a private TV channel, for a long period of time. Giorgos Bobolas, a large-scale business entrepreneur, owns about one quarter of this TV channel. As the owner of Pegasus Publishing S.A, Bobolas also (partially) owns and/or operates several daily newspapers, online information portals and magazines. Bobolas’ construction business, Ellaktor, is involved in dubious tendering procedures and owns shares in the gold mines in Chalkidiki.

Potami boss Theodorakis has repeatedly advocated the implementation of projects contracted to Bobolas relating to garbage disposal in the Attica region. Even though Theodorakis resembles a motivational speaker more than a member of Greek big capital, this by no means hides the fact that the waters of Potami were too deep and murky to come into the equation as a possible coalition partner for a party that justified its candidacy by its wish to break the “entangled triangle between political parties, economic oligarchy and banks” (Alexis Tsipras, January 1, 2015).

AN.EL

The swift formation of the coalition between SYRIZA and the Anexartitoi Ellines (AN.EL., “Independent Greeks“) party was met with incomprehension in other European countries. While the indignation of middle-class parties and the mainstream media is to be ascribed to hypocrisy rather than to serious concerns regarding democracy and rule of law, the concerns of numerous SYRIZA supporters in other European countries makes a closer examination of the coalition partner necessary:

AN.EL. was founded by the former ND deputy Panos Kammenos in February 2012. In its founding manifesto, the party pledged itself to popular sovereignty, the protection of the constitution, national pride and parliamentary democracy. Apart from that, the party calls for the abolition of the memoranda, which are perceived as an attack by the new world order. In item 6 AN.EL. pledges itself to equal rights (isonomy), solidarity, justice, meritocracy and equality and commits itself to protecting Greek families and all citizens from the attacks of the market. Its commitment to the values of the Greek Orthodox church and its positive impact on the people and the nation go hand in hand with the protection of religious freedom.

At a press conference a few days before the election, Kammenos had declared himself against the Dublin II Regulation that provides for undocumented migrants being detained in Greece against their will and underlined that every human life is of equal value, independent of its country of origin. “Illegal migrants must be given the possibility to travel to a country in which they can live without being subjected to violence or the methods of Mr Voridis or the Golden Dawn. In Greece this is not possible”, Kammenos stated.

The delegates’ speeches in the course of the party’s founding convention in February 2012 mainly focused on praising the chairman, Greek cultural heritage and the Greek Orthodox religion and condemning Greece’s sell-out to its creditors. The political agenda of the years between 2012 and 2015 shaped and accentuated this seemingly chaotic accumulation of patriotic, anti-neoliberal and Christian Orthodox positions that rarely had matched the right-wing extremist profile pinned on the party.

For example, in June 2013, the party positioned itself clearly against the shut-down of the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT). It supported the 595 cleaners who were laid off by the ministry of economy and called for the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 12 persons in the Farmakonisi refugee tragedy. Associating Kammenos and his party with the right of the political spectrum is out of the question.

Pro-memoranda and anti-memoranda attitudes have overtaken the political division between right and left. In other words, the self-positioning of AN.EL as an anti-memoranda party results in certain positions being adopted on privatisation and the dismantlement of workers’ rights but also on “side effects” such as dismantling democracy, the state and police violence becoming more and more authoritarian. These positions shape the party’s political profile and the relationship with its voters in a way that cannot be taken back without political losses.

The election of January 25 has led to a unique situation. The avalanche of neoliberalism in the past five years has brought radical changes to the established patterns of political attitudes and the party spectrum. For the first time in European history, a party of the left has emerged as the winner of an election. For the first time in post-war European history, a national-socialist party [Golden Dawn] whose leaders are facing trial for establishing a criminal association and for contract killings is the third strongest force in a parliament.

New election?

The answer to the question of why SYRIZA has preferred to establish a coalition with AN.EL. rather than opting for new elections is a complex one. First, the people (who took to the streets between spring 2011 and February 2012 and took part in mass protests) had already been waiting for two years for SYRIZA’s victory. Second, the majority of the Greek population did not vote for SYRIZA because of the party’s positions on migration, women’s rights and gay marriage, but rather for an improvement in their individual living conditions which they could actually notice.

For these reasons, a second ballot would have been hard to explain. Also, Greek electoral law contains rules that result in travel costs for many voters. These would have been impossible for SYRIZA voters to pay for a second time. Therefore, achieving the absolute majority of votes in the second ballot would have been far from secured.

The distribution of government roles has shown that SYRIZA is not exclusively focusing on the abolition of the memoranda, as claimed by certain sources. Critical areas such as migration policies and policing are assigned to ministries led by SYRIZA. The damage Kammenos may cause as secretary of defence can be estimated to be rather limited with his deputy being SYRIZA’s Kostas Isychos. The subministry for the regions of Macedonia and Thrace used to occupy a full ministry in the past. The fact that SYRIZA has many voters in these regions makes it less worrying that this subministry is now assigned to ANEL deputy Maria Kollia-Tsaroucha.

Tsipras is the first head of government who did not swear the oath of office to a Greek Orthodox priest, but to the president of the state. In addition, Tsipras’ highly symbolic wreath-laying ceremony in Kaisariani, the place of execution of numerous fighters of the left resistance against the German occupation, highlights the fact that the Greek government undoubtedly is committed to left-wing positions and to its left-wing identity.

The election on January 25 has shown that the left can achieve a victory. This victory cannot be called into question by the necessary formation of a coalition and the missed absolute majority. The electoral result in Greece shows that sustainably changing societal balances of power is indeed a process that takes a long time. If the left wants to persevere and serve the purpose of promoting emancipatory processes, creating scope for action, providing a voice and political home to subaltern societies, it cannot refrain from taking certain tactical steps in order to get closer to its strategic goals.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Excerpt from First Days, First Decisions (https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/02/syriza-first-days-coalition-government/) by Catarina Principe:



The Coalition Question

Syriza fell short of an absolute parliamentary majority, electing 149 of the 151 MPs necessary to form a single-party government. Its decision to enter a coalition government with the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a right-wing anti-austerity party, has been the subject of much debate.

The outcome is certainly not ideal. But in assessing whether the decision amounts to an error, we must take into account the difficulties of the situation and political dynamics within parliament.

Had Syriza failed to form a majority government in three days, that opportunity would have been given to the second leading vote getter, New Democracy. To prevent this, Syriza would have had to ask for a “tolerance vote” in parliament — a request that other parties promise not to vote against Syriza’s proposals.

But this alternative was no alternative at all: the only other anti-austerity party on the Left, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), would have not backed Syriza in such a vote. The other potential partners for a coalition government would have been To Potami or Pasok, which would have forced Syriza to an unthinkable withdrawal from its debt renegotiation and broader social agenda.

A failed tolerance vote would likely have precipitated new elections — an outcome favored by New Democracy, which has already begun reorienting itself by repudiating the leadership of former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras.

The “soap affair” (the absurd moment when Alexis Tsipras arrived at the presidential palace to find that all the soap, toilet paper, towels, and even the Wi-Fi passwords had been taken away by Samaras and his crew) sparked intense criticism of Samaras in many right-wing newspapers, and some anticipate a new political trajectory in which the party competes for the center by rhetorically softening its neoliberal policies.

New elections could very well have given New Democracy a victory, especially since so many Greek people say that they are willing to give Syriza, a brand-new political force of outsiders and mavericks, “just one opportunity” to show that it is capable of governing.

Even if a new round of elections were not called instantly, the constant instability of a minority government would have risked showing Syriza (and, by extension, the entire radical left) to be “irresponsible” and incapable of taking steps to end the country’s humanitarian crisis. This would have benefited the Right enormously.

Many on the Left rightly say that a certain amount of “irresponsibility” is precisely what is needed. But if in the eyes of the majority a Syriza failure is reason for a turn to the right, Greek society will be no closer to this “irresponsibility,” which can only be implemented with mass support.

Moreover, a minority government would have had to compromise much more of its program than Syriza has had to (so far) in its coalition with ANEL. ANEL, after all, completely accepted Syriza’s Thessaloniki Program and received in return the only ministry they wanted — the Ministry of Defense.

It’s true that this is not a small appointment, but it’s worth noting that Syriza designated Kostas Isichos of its Left Platform to be deputy minister of defense, a position the party can use to monitor and control the ANEL leader assigned to head up the ministry. So it can hardly be said that Syriza is unaware of the coalition’s risks and is not doing what it can to mitigate these risks.

Syriza also assigned Tasia Christodoulopoulou, an important radical lawyer, to lead the Ministry of Migration. Called by the mainstream media “the soulless lawyer who wants to legalize all migrants,” Christodoulopoulo is also well known as one of the founders of the Solidarity 4 All Network.

This is a sign that Syriza is not willing to compromise on its basic demands concerning migrants. Indeed, one of the government’s first measures immediately grants Greek citizenship to all children of migrants born in Greece. It is estimated that this measure will affect more than 200,000 young people, providing them access to school, education, and social security, as well as stopping expatriation proceedings.

The only programmatic issue that is being temporarily postponed is Greece’s potential NATO exit. This is by no means a minor issue, but is perhaps also not the most urgent. Those standing in solidarity with Syriza will need to closely watch developments related to NATO extrication.

Although a minority government has never taken power in Greece, it is legally possible to do it. But our answer should not be a pure “legalistic” one, but one that is capable of assessing the concrete political situation and the relation of forces within the parliament and society.

Many criticisms leveled at the decision to form the coalition government are important and principled. It’s also true that this was not “the only option.” But in assessing them and drawing lessons, we must make sure our criticism does not ignore the real political dynamics at work, especially if we are to equip ourselves to effectively critically support Syriza in the months and years to come.

We don’t get to choose the conditions in which we make history, but if we refuse to back down when history invites us onto its stage today, we can shape the conditions in which we make history tomorrow.

[cyu]

I think it's interesting that Independent Greeks appears to have a harder line on austerity than Syriza.


Much of Syriza's new support comes from converts from the old mainstream "center-left" party. When you mix liberals, especially establishment liberals, in with radical leftists, what do you get? Maybe they can get the old rank-and-file liberals to wake up from establishment-controlled opiates... or maybe the establishment liberals will end up pulling the whole thing back into the "center-left".

[Die Neue Zeit]

On the Independent Greeks; and on Alliances (https://livesrunning.wordpress.com/2015/03/07/on-the-independent-greeks-and-on-compromise/)



By David Renton

Six weeks ago, when Syriza formed a coalition with the Independent Greeks a common view among my friends was that this was Syriza’s first betrayal and that others would inevitably follow. The story was familiar; outside government, Syriza had promised to do politics differently, including granting 100,000 migrant children in Greece full citizenship, tearing down the refugee camps and rehousing the people in them. It would be the greatest challenge to Fortress Europe in a generation. But electoral parties are no different, the pressure of keeping in office always moderates reformists. And by joining with the racists of the Independent Greeks, Syriza was indicating its willingness to compromise on everything.

This pessimism was always unconvincing. After 40 years of left-wing parties exercising ever greater efforts to show how little they differ from the press-business neoliberal consensus, paling their flags an ever lighter pink as they went, Syriza is very clearly a different sort of project. And it was never going to be exhausted merely by its first, incomplete, compromise.

Being short of a majority in parliament, Syriza had no real option but to do a deal with someone. The KKE had already refused an alliance, foreshadowing its present position which is to vote with New Democracy and PASOK. The only other option, the River, was a party of neoliberal enthusiasts for cuts; on the central issue facing Greece – austerity – the Independent Greeks were Syriza’s only possible allies.

And there are many different kinds of alliance. Such was the Parliamentary arithmetic (Syriza only needing two votes for a majority) that Tsipras had no need to water down on his commitments. This was reflected in his party’s deal with the Independent Greeks, where the two parties agreed to vote for migration policy along party lines (ie Syriza will get these measures through without needing the Independent Greeks’ support).

Far from dropping its promises, Syriza has renewed its commitments, on citizenship, and on the camps. The migration minister is Tasia Christodoulopoulou, doyenne of Greek migrants’ lawyers – the equivalent in England of giving our unreconstructed CLR James-ite Ian Macdonald the job. Indeed even the wretched four-month bailout deal has given Syriza additional reasons to maintain its promises to migrants. Precisely because its economic programme has become harder to implement, Syriza has needed to show that its social programme remains undiluted.

At this point, the voice of conscience intrudes. Isn’t the whole point about left-wing governments (or, at least, those worthy of the name) that they make no compromises, and in particular they do not, under any circumstances, make an alliance with conservatives or racists?

It may be helpful to review at this point some of the compromises that the party most often cited as a comparison, the Lenin-era Bolsheviks, made with its enemies. Brest-Litovsk, the recruitment of Tsarist officers to senior positions in the Red Army, one-man management in industry, the NEP, the Rapallo peace treaty under which the German military hosted its research facilities in tanks and chemical weapons on Bolshevik soil. The pamphlet in which the Bolsheviks drew up a balance-sheet on their experiences drew the inevitable conclusions – “to reject compromises ‘on principle’, to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to consider seriously. A political leader who desires to be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must be able to distinguish concrete cases of compromises that are inexcusable and are an expression of opportunism and treachery.”

Some of the Bolsheviks’ compromises went deep. As Isaac Babel pointed out, long ago in Red Cavalry (and as Brendan McGeever has shown again in research which, when it makes it into print, should be compulsory reading for anyone nostalgic for a time which never existed), these compromises included in 1918-1919 leaving local Soviet power in many areas in the hands of people who were murderously anti-Semitic. This approach proved temporary because the Civil War finished and there was then a struggle within the fragile Soviet regime to purge itself of these elements.

So, a compromise with conservatives or racists is always unwanted and undesirable (means and ends always interconnect), but may be necessary as a temporary device provided as a minimum that it is the right making the principal compromises and the direction of travel is towards liberation.

Panos Kammenos, the leader of the Independent Greeks is no outsider, having been an MP for New Democracy for 20 years and a former minister for the shipping industry. The majority of its MPs were recruited like Kammenos from the anti-bailout wing of New Democracy, although they have had at least one MP come over from PASOK. The party is fiercely nationalist, and enthusiastic about the Orthodox church. Its racism expresses itself in two ways, first, in a hostility to migrants, and second, in a tendency to explain the Greek debt crisis in terms of banks, and therefore Jews, who stand in familiar anti-Semitic trope as the imaginary, physical embodiment of all that is wrong with finance as opposed to industry.

Just as Syriza has profited from “pasofikation” (ie the dramatic collapse of the main party of the centre-left, in conditions where it ceased to offer its voters anything), the Independent Greeks seem to have their own plan to become over 5-10 years the main party of Greece’s political right. They act as if they believe that austerity will ultimately be cancelled, and that all the parties which attempted to enforce Greece’s debts will wither. One of the Independent Greeks’ key proposals is therefore to investigate the terms under which during the second half of the 2000s New Democracy agreed to a massive increase of Greece’s debts, and to prosecute the ministers responsible. A deal with Syriza, from this perspective, is merely the means to an end: the complete reconstruction of the Greek political system and the defeat of New Democracy, after which it will be left vs right politics as usual.

English writers tend to compare them to UKIP, but they are in other respects more akin to the kinds of far-right “independents” that became the third power in the House of Commons between 1918 and 1920, in a period of intense paranoia about German power. To understand their appeal you may recall the inventor and champion of middle-class life but serial debtor, Caractus Potts, in his war with the Vulgarian (i.e. German) Baron Bomburst. Beneath the castles of the Baron’s power are the children of the poor, held in debt bondage through the medium of the (Jewish) childcatcher. The secret of German power, it follows, is its hold over the debt. If only the Baron can be captured, the children will go free. But who will defeat the Baron? You could scour Ian Fleming’s books (or those of his predecessors Erskine Childers or John Buchan) for an answer but you will find none.

Kammenos’ thinking suffers from the same weakness: the Independent Greeks are furiously anti-austerity, and blame Troika, and behind them “Germany”. During the negotiations, they were if anything harder against compromise with the Eurozone than Syriza. In contrast to them, Syriza has an idea of how to renegotiate the balance of forces within Germany – by encouraging the election of anti-austerity parties in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, and by promoting anti-austerity leftists in Britain, German, etc. The Baron can be defeated in other words, by the German Left Party, or (beneath it) by the German working class. Short of switching Greece’s client status to some alternative backer wealthier than Germany, Kammenos has no equivalent plan. His racism, in other words, constantly limits the desire for national independence which is his party’s rationale.

Syriza’s strategic thinking in response to the Independent Greeks appears to be as follows. The tasks facing the left (which remains a minority) remain too large for the social forces available. Therefore, the left has to try to split the right into two parts, a first with which it is possible to work, and a second (New Democracy, Golden Dawn), who are or will be beyond the pale. The Independent Greeks are sufficiently robust allies, not merely because they are committed to anti-austerity politics but because their social base reflects above all the influence of the Orthodox church, which has a very wide but very shallow hold over large parts of the Greek people and even dispossessed classes. If the recomposition of the left happens on the terms that both Syriza and the Independent Greeks want, Syriza predicts, the destruction of both Pasok and New Democracy, will not just result in the replacement of one old left-right rivalry with a new one (Syriza versus the Independent Greeks), it will also lead to a shift between left and right, with the future balance of powers foreshadowed by Syriza’s present hegemony in the coalition (it has 12 times as many seats as the Independent Greeks). Syriza will win because it will prove to have been the better fighters against austerity – and the (limited) polling evidence to date appears to be that it, rather than Independent Greeks, has been winning the most voters from New Democracy since the election.

An obvious attraction of this thinking to those of us outside Greece is that is a strategy for dealing which the right which envisages a victory over it. As such, it has an advantage over our usual way of thinking in which the right represents a significant social layer (the petty bourgeoisie) which has a static position of utter hostility to the workers’ movement, and whose racism is permanent and unsatisfiable. We have an idea that if this class throws up outlier parties, they may become so unpopular that we might isolate and physically defeat them. But we have seemingly no conception at all of how to go beyond a situation where they are not outliers but more respectable, and we (rather than they) are the unpopular minority.

Now the fact that a party has a plan does not mean that it is guaranteed to succeed. The gamble (as it is best characterised) risks treating the “left” and the “right” as if they were objective political realities rather than temporary relationships. Precisely because Syriza has had some success in quarantining off the bad parts of the right, they risk over-using the tactic. You can see this danger when it comes to the pending prosecution of the leaders of Golden Dawn, Greece’s neo-Nazi revivalists, with their base in the police and their 5% of the vote.

Critics of Syriza to its left have taken umbrage at Syriza’s suggestion that elected Golden Dawn MPs should be released from custody to attend votes in Parliament suggesting that Syriza is extending too much deference to the right, and warning that Syriza may be cooling as to the prosecution itself. At this distance, it is impossible to know whether they are right about the prosecution itself (which is necessarily in the hands of the judiciary rather than the politicians) or these are the exaggerated fears of people who have committed themselves in advance to the narrative that Syriza will betray its supporters. But Syriza’s friends should be watching closely and urging the government to take no steps which help the fascists.

There is a second area where the alliance with the Independent Greeks bears a risk; and it is in terms of Syriza’s analysis of its problems with Europe. Because they are advocates of simple, conspiratorial thinking, the Independent Greeks tend to explain all of Greece’s difficulties simply in terms of “Germany”. Here they risk bolstering some in Syriza for whom neo-liberalism in Europe is a German phenomenon, and all sorts of alliances (with the United States or Britain or with Italian or French technocrats) remain potentially open. The alternative tentatively emerging within Syriza, which gives the greatest weight to explaining the balance of forces honestly to the party’s supporters, is incompatible with that sort of fantastical thinking.

The alliance with the Independent Greeks remains a difficulty, then; even if it is not yet the fatal germ against which Syriza’s original critics warned.