On the Road to Hegel

[FieldHound]

I understand that Hegel's works are written more for those that already have a strong footing in the history of philosophy. I'm not in any serious rush but using this as a line of direction might be useful for somebody that's interested in studying the history of philosophy anyway. I've been working through Plato's works, and if somebody has the time to write me a short timeline of the most significant stuff that leads upto Hegel and German Idealism (and beyond that into Nietzsche and Existentialism) I'd appreciate that. I know this is no superficial undertaking and am not expecting to be knowledgeable on the topic any time soon but I enjoy the studying and the journey so any pointers would be really useful. Also including modern books that might teach about various key philosophers and the development of philosophical thought.

Thanks!

[Lev Ulyanov]

The Presocratics are pretty significant in any reading of Hegel. The concept of the dialectic is in many ways a fusion of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Following Plato, Aristotle is also quite important - especially his discussion and elaboration of the categories. Then, there's Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Berkeley, Leibniz and Hume (perhaps the most important of the moderns) - all of whom are huge influences on Hegel either directly or through his predecessors. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the inspiration for the Hegelian dialectic, so there's that, and you might want to take a look at Fichte and Schelling too.

Books (primary reading)
Plato (especially Meno onwards)
Aristotle, Organon (I personally despise reading Aristotle, so haven't done much of it)
Descartes, Meditations
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (have a bottle of booze ready for this, you'll need it)

Books (secondary reading):
F. Coplestone, A History of Philosophy (Most of this History is very good, the sections following Kant leave much to be desired, however);
P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?;
E. Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems;
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy
J. Cottingham, Western Philosophy: An Anthology

Hope this is of some help to get started.

[blake 3:17]

I only started getting anything from Hegel once I stopped thinking of myself as a Hegelian. He's a dizzying thinker!

[blake 3:17]

A lot of his asides are far more interesting than the big blah blah abstractions.

"A single person, I need hardly say, is something subordinate, and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Hence if the state claims life, the individual must surrender it. But may a man take his own life? Suicide may at a first glance be regarded as an act of courage, but only the false courage of tailors and servant girls. Or again looked upon as a misfortune, since it is inward distraction n it may be which leads to it. But the fundamental question is: Have I a right to take my life? The answer will be that I, as this individual, am not master of my life, because life, as the comprehensive sum of, my activity, is nothing external to personality, which itself is this immediate personality. Thus when a person is said to have a right over his life, the words are a contradiction, because they mean that a person has a right over himself. But he has no such right, since he does not stand over himself and he cannot pass judgement on himself. When Hercules destroyed himself by fire and when Brutus fell on his sword, this was the conduct of a hero against his personality. But as for an unqualified right to suicide, we must simply say that there is no such thing, even for heroes."

[Thirsty Crow]

I understand that Hegel's works are written more for those that already have a strong footing in the history of philosophy. I'm not in any serious rush but using this as a line of direction might be useful for somebody that's interested in studying the history of philosophy anyway. I've been working through Plato's works, and if somebody has the time to write me a short timeline of the most significant stuff that leads upto Hegel and German Idealism (and beyond that into Nietzsche and Existentialism) I'd appreciate that. I know this is no superficial undertaking and am not expecting to be knowledgeable on the topic any time soon but I enjoy the studying and the journey so any pointers would be really useful. Also including modern books that might teach about various key philosophers and the development of philosophical thought.

Thanks!It might be best to go through Hegel's own lectures on the history of philosophy https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpconten.htm

In short, much leads up to Hegel. The entire (neo)Platonic-Christian tradition, and also the preceeding so called presocratic philosophy, as well as openly Hermetic thinkers like Paracelsus, Bruno, Boehme and so on (there is an interesting book on Hegel as practicing Hermeticist, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, which I'd recommend wholeheartedly). For some immediate perspective, Hegel considers Spinoza as laying some of the fundamentals of what would become Hegel's own philosophy.


The Presocratics are pretty significant in any reading of Hegel. The concept of the dialectic is in many ways a fusion of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Following Plato, Aristotle is also quite important - especially his discussion and elaboration of the categories. Then, there's Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Berkeley, Leibniz and Hume (perhaps the most important of the moderns) - all of whom are huge influences on Hegel either directly or through his predecessors. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the inspiration for the Hegelian dialectic, so there's that, and you might want to take a look at Fichte and Schelling too.

There are significant ambiguities here.

With the exception of Spinoza - to an extent - the philosophers mentioned here, especially Descartes, Leibniz and Hume - are in a way "predecessors" but insofar as Hegel saw himself as correcting their fundamental error which made their philosophy lose sight of the core of any philosophy (the stance that the finite is ideal). He argued that their method - chiefly the use of the Aristotelian view of non-contradiction - is to blame for this. This also applies, with even more force, to Kant whom Hegel saw as pretty much the chief contemporary opponent of his own project of realizing philosophy (in contradistinction to Jacobi, who was also criticized but for other reasons and by other means but who was also considered an ally and a co-thinker).

[Kronsteen]

Hegel was trying to reconcile the new philosophy and science of his time with older philosophy and theology.

The new philosophy was especially Hume and Kant, but also Fichte, Schelling and other contempories of Hegel himself. The old philosophy is diverse, but included stoicism, cynicism, medieval christianity, hermeticism, gnosticism, plus bits of kabala, freemasonry and alchemy.

The most important thinkers for Hegel were not philosophers like Kant, but religious thinkers like Jakob Boehme, Meister Eckhardt and Hermes Trismegistus. He was trying to fold the new rationality into the old mysicism - to reinterpret a break with mysticism as part of the grand plan of that mysticism.

If you want to understand Hegel, you'll need at the least to get a basic grasp of
* The Hermetic ideas of "as above, so below", the destiny of the universe, and the use of riddle-speech to provoke enlightenment
* Freemasonic symbols and their notions of word magic
* Christian ideas of teleology and purpose, derived from ancient athenian thought - especially Heraclitus, Plato and the stoics.

Finally, be prepared to find Hegel badly misunderstanding the sciences of his time. He was fighting against them, so often didn't take the trouble to get them straight in his head.

[Rafiq]

Hegel was trying to reconcile the new philosophy and science of his time with older philosophy and theology.

The new philosophy was especially Hume and Kant, but also Fichte, Schelling and other contempories of Hegel himself. The old philosophy is diverse, but included stoicism, cynicism, medieval christianity, hermeticism, gnosticism, plus bits of kabala, freemasonry and alchemy.


Tell us, Kronsteen: What "new" philosophy has ever existed which did not concern itself with the old? Hegel's was not a "return" to older mysticism but a re-vitalization of philosophy. What great movement or change in philosophy in history did not perceive or articulate itself as some kind of grand continuation of the old? Did renaissance thinkers seek a 'return' to classical thought in light of new developments of Catholicism? Are you suggesting that Hegel can be summarized as a desperate attempt for old, displaced ideas to have a semblance of relevance in the 19th century? The fact of the matter is that Hegel made no grand claims to scientific discovery - only an anglo-rationalist philistine can judge Hegel based on the alleged proposed validity of his claims as though Hegel was some kind of empirical scientist. This alone would pre-suppose vulgar empiricist foundations alien to continental philosophy in general.

Hegel's real significance is that he represented the first attempt to not only understand history, but historical development and movement. Influences of old for him only held relavence in an articulation of the world which was new.

[Georg Lukacs]

It is best to start with an "angle" when reading Hegel, because Hegel can only be understood in the context of his interpreters. In which case start with Marx, "Hegel's Philosophy of Right" and the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", hen go back to the Left Hegelians such as Feurbach and Bauer, then forward to Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks. Form there, if you feel like delving into the nightmarish complexity of Western Marxism (Hegelian Marxism), go ahead, but you have been warned. Of all these latter Hegelians I like Adorno the best because at least he admits that he is being obscure on purpose. After that, go back to Kant (very important to understand his epistemology). Now you are ready to read the Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic, and The Philosophy of Right (the only substantial works in the hand of Hegel, and not lecture notes or notes by pupils). Then go back to German Idealism and trace the trajectory of Western philosophy up to that point, especially paying attention again to Kant, but also to Descartes and Spinoza. You can leave out Ancient Philosophy and Scholastic Philosophy. Knowledge of Kantian epistemology and a smattering of Christian theology is enough to read Hegel. The dialectic is hard to pin down in Hegel. The best place for a Marxist to understand it is by searching out Marx's Grundrisse for references to the Science of Logic. Engels on Hegel is also little read, but very important for a Marxist take on Hegel, if a little simplistic and historicising.

[Kronsteen]

Tell us, Kronsteen: What "new" philosophy has ever existed which did not concern itself with the old?

None. No one has claimed there ever was.


Hegel's was not a "return" to older mysticism but a re-vitalization of philosophy.

That's how he saw it. It was also a reaction against Kant's revitalisation of philosophy.


What great movement or change in philosophy in history did not perceive or articulate itself as some kind of grand continuation of the old?

Logical Positivism, the ancient sophists, Postmodernism, Descartes, Russell and Frege - all saw themselves as doing away with the philosophical muck of ages and starting anew.

With the luxury of perspective, we can see how they weren't such clean breaks with the past after all.


Are you suggesting that Hegel can be summarized as a desperate attempt for old, displaced ideas to have a semblance of relevance in the 19th century?

That's a large part of what he was doing.


Hegel made no grand claims to scientific discovery

He thought he'd found a science of history. Which was also a Science of Logic.


only an anglo-rationalist philistine can judge Hegel based on the alleged proposed validity of his claims as though Hegel was some kind of empirical scientist. This alone would pre-suppose vulgar empiricist foundations alien to continental philosophy in general.

If you're going to call me rude names, make sure they mean something first.


Hegel's real significance is that he represented the first attempt to not only understand history, but historical development and movement.

So Hegel was the first to have a theory of historical change? The first philosopher who thought he'd found a teleology to the universe? Don't think so.

[Rafiq]

That's how he saw it. It was also a reaction against Kant's revitalisation of philosophy.

Kant did not represent a revitalization of philosophy but the birth of a very incomplete carcass, an embryo of a revitalization of philosophy which was to come. It can be argued that, for example, all German idealism following Kant was a "reaction" against him, as though this makes for an argument for a return to the father. Rather, what this indicates is that Kant represented the beginning of a wave of philosophy whereby those who responded to him attempted to solve an unarguably erroneous, inconsistent and problematic philosophic paradigm. In other words, Kant was not sufficient upon himself insofar as the rebirth of western philosophy went. This "missing link" was precisely the inability to reconcile, and articulate the "philosophic muck" of previous ages, un-accounted for and roaming the noosphere restlessly, into the new.

What this means is precisely not a pathetic attempt at ad hoc (because this would assume that some kind of ultimate epistemological point of reference has its groundings in a dogmatic adherence to 'outdated' ideas) but the re-vitalization of philosophy as such - the western-historic tradition of philosophy itself. All points of meta-philosophy which articulated themselves as "doing away with previous muck" in general - as you yourself acknowledge, was precisely incapable of doing this - the articulation had its groundings not in vanity but in ignorance.


Logical Positivism, the ancient sophists, Postmodernism, Descartes, Russell and Frege - all saw themselves as doing away with the philosophical muck of ages and starting anew.

With the luxury of perspective, we can see how they weren't such clean breaks with the past after all.


Aside from the fact that by no means would I designate Logical positivsim or Postmodernism as "great changes in philosophy" (rather, systematized perpetuated means of its hindrance), you are precisely right in such a way that you are wrong. Great changes in philosophy do present themselves as radical breaking points, but this misses the opint. What was Hegel if not a radical breaking point from previous philosophy? Without the erratic internalization of old "mystic" ideas, of whom by the way were not some kind of retreating marginal force but an untouched carcass shortly before Hegel, what radical breaking point could there be for Hegel? In the process of starting anew, philosophy necessarily uniquely incorporates previously existing ideas as a grand continuation, with a radical re-interpretation of their history and content. This is precisely what Hegel did in reference to "old" philosophy, as Descarte did for the likes of Aquinas, as Renaissance thinkers did for classical thought and so on. This is why Hegel did not represent a reaction but a substantive revitalization.


That's a large part of what he was doing.


This simply is not true - Hegel was not some kind of dogmatic devotee to misplaced ideas for no reason - his incorporation of them was consequential of a wider wave of German Idealism, NOT the other way around.


So Hegel was the first to have a theory of historical change? The first philosopher who thought he'd found a teleology to the universe? Don't think so.


Hegel was indeed the first to formulate a systemized, ordered consistent paradigm of historical development, absolutely. Teleology is hardly a, or the distinguishing feature of Hegel's understanding of history.

[blake 3:17]

I've been very very curious to read Susan Buck Morss's book on Hegel and Haiti. Here's a good chunk of a review of it:
In 2000, Susan Buck-Morss published an essay in the journal Critical Inquiry that positively crackled with provocations for research, scholarly imagination, and political action. It had the unlikely title “Hegel and Haiti,” and now she has expanded it into a slim book, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. It still packs a powerful punch.

Its strength lies in the development of a specific claim in the history of philosophy into a general theme concerning universality and politics. The claim is that Hegel was inspired by the Haitian revolution of the 1790s when developing his fundamental concept known as the master-slave dialectic. In 1791, the blacks of Saint-Domingue mounted a series of armed struggles against the island’s white slaveholders; the insurgents abolished slavery in Haiti (and would go on to develop a multiracial constitution) at the cost of the destruction of the island’s white population.

Hegel wrote that history served as the revelation of truth and that philosophy is “its time grasped in thought.” In Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), he wove allusions to historical events into his account of how knowledge emerged over time, but he never named those events explicitly. Scholars have long recognized the Reformation and the French Revolution in the narrative, but until now they hadn’t identified the Haitian revolution as a key ingredient in Hegel’s thought. Buck-Morss identifies Eurocentric racism as a more than probable reason for this omission.

In Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, two “consciousnesses” meet, and for each to have his (a very male story, this) identity affirmed, he needs the other’s recognition. Each strives to obtain it through a struggle to the death. When one gives up, he becomes the slave. The master receives recognition but is not satisfied by it because it comes from a mere slave. So he accumulates slaves, striving for recognition but always reaching what philosopher Alexandre Kojève called “an existential impasse.” Eventually, the slaves overthrow the masters and realize that only equality can lead to mutual recognition and an end to violence.

Buck-Morss argues that eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers were focused on slavery as an idea, and this allowed them to build the core concepts of liberalism around the notion of freedom. The antithesis of freedom played a crucial role for Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, to name a few. But these same thinkers ignored the acutal growth of slavery, which played a central role in the world economy at the time they were writing. In some respects, Hegel was different. Buck-Morss offers historical proof of his awareness of and interest in the Haitian revolution and makes a strong case for reading the master-slave dialectic as alluding to the struggle of the “black Jacobins” for freedom: “This is the crucial point for understanding the originality of Hegel’s argument, by which philosophy burst out of the confines of academic theory and became a commentary on the history of the world.” Her claim is not that Hegel was immune from the racism of his time—he wasn’t—but that, despite his prejudices, he moved past chauvinistic particularity to recognize the world-historical importance of the events in Haiti.

Here’s where Hegel, Haiti and Universal History goes beyond the scholarly frisson that comes from linking the first two nouns in the title. Buck-Morss conjoins Hegel and Haiti as an allegory for overcoming isolated ideas and histories. For her, the aim of expanding our historical imagination is to develop ideals that are universally applicable. She realizes that some who applaud her criticism of Eurocentrism will be surprised by her goal of “salvaging modernity’s universal intent, rather than calling for a plurality of alternative modernities.” Buck-Morss’s foray into the history of philosophy, then, is not just to correct the record of Hegel’s source material for Phenomenology of Spirit. She is also trying to find a path toward a generally useful concept of history through the idea of antislavery: “Is it possible to reimagine universal history out of bounds of exclusionary conceptual frames? . . . Can collective subjectivity be imagined as inclusive as humanity itself?”

Buck-Morss wants to explore the “porous” boundaries of “meaning systems” in order not only to show the power and relevance of the idea of antislavery but also to reimagine the historical efforts that aimed to realize this ideal. She is searching the ruins of an authentic cosmopolitan revolutionary experience for inspiration and hope. “The Haitian Revolution is a triumph for universal history only in our imaginations,” she writes. But by expanding the reach of our imaginations, we may be better able to construct political ideals that escape the cycle of violence. After all, that’s what Hegel tried to do in his story of a way out of the master-slave dialectic.

full text and links here: http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/015_05/3285

[Kronsteen]

The master receives recognition but is not satisfied by it because it comes from a mere slave.

Yes, it's an interesting notion - that the victor finds no joy in defeating a weak adversary. But surely there's a converse - that the slave finds no shame in being defeated by a strong master.

If the master-slave relation doesn't make the master feel validated, then it also wouldn't make the slave feel invalidated.

Transferring this to the capitalist class system, a ruling class that comfortably has confident control over the workers would take no pleasure in this control - much as you only take pleasure in controlling the air you breathe when breathing is difficult. Thus, hoping to gain the pleasure it hoped for, it tries to exercise more and more control - like an addict taking ever greater quantities of a drug which no longer gives a hit.

So what does the ruled-class feel? It only feels oppressed when it's strong enough to fight oppression. And when it isn't...it doesn't.

[Kronsteen]

Kant did not represent a revitalization of philosophy but the birth of a very incomplete carcass

Translation: Rafiq doesn't agree with Kant.


What was Hegel if not a radical breaking point from previous philosophy?

A continuation. He was trying to save the old hermeticism from the new rationalism by placing the new inside the old.

Certain marxists do the same thing when they try to pretend a new idea was always implicit in Marx.


his incorporation of them was consequential of a wider wave of German Idealism, NOT the other way around.


Yes, Hegel was following a trend, not initiating it. No one has claimed otherwise. Except you when you said "What was Hegel if not a radical breaking point from previous philosophy?".


Hegel was indeed the first to formulate a systemized, ordered consistent paradigm of historical development, absolutely.


Hegel was probably the last of the great system builders, not the first. And to suggest he was the first to have a grand theory of history - that's just bizarre.


Teleology is hardly a, or the distinguishing feature of Hegel's understanding of history.

So a system built on a notion of history moving forward to apotheosis isn't teleological. And even if it is, it's not central. Somehow.

[Rafiq]

Translation: Rafiq doesn't agree with Kant.

What? Is this actually how you interpret this? Such pompous ignorance! How could it be argued that Kant is self-sufficient unto himself? Some argue that German Idealism itself was entirely responsive to Kant: to solve the problem of Kant. The notion that Hegel was somehow going against the grain, as a "reaction" to Kant is ridiculous: The same could be said for the whole of German idealism in general.

It is impossible to 'agree' with Kant in the way which you describe. Would you mind telling me who exactly agrees with Kant, Kronsteen? Your philosophic philistinism apparently only allows you to interpret posts in such a shallow manner, i.e. "Raifq not like kant, mystifies simple disagreement with long winded drivel". As I had previously stated:

It can be argued that, for example, all German idealism following Kant was a "reaction" against him, as though this makes for an argument for a return to the father. Rather, what this indicates is that Kant represented the beginning of a wave of philosophy whereby those who responded to him attempted to solve an unarguably erroneous, inconsistent and problematic philosophic paradigm. In other words, Kant was not sufficient upon himself insofar as the rebirth of western philosophy went. This "missing link" was precisely the inability to reconcile, and articulate the "philosophic muck" of previous ages, un-accounted for and roaming the noosphere restlessly, into the new.


How does Kronsteen approach this? Dismissively, as though these are all simply fancy words trying to cover up a simple "disagreement" with Kant (disagree with what?). Frankly, "ordinary language" has no place here.


A continuation. He was trying to save the old hermeticism from the new rationalism by placing the new inside the old.

Certain marxists do the same thing when they try to pretend a new idea was always implicit in Marx.


Without the erratic internalization of old "mystic" ideas, of whom by the way were not some kind of retreating marginal force but an untouched carcass shortly before Hegel, what radical breaking point could there be for Hegel? In the process of starting anew, philosophy necessarily uniquely incorporates previously existing ideas as a grand continuation, with a radical re-interpretation of their history and content. This is precisely what Hegel did in reference to "old" philosophy, as Descarte did for the likes of Aquinas, as Renaissance thinkers did for classical thought and so on. This is why Hegel did not represent a reaction but a substantive revitalization.

[...]
This simply is not true - Hegel was not some kind of dogmatic devotee to misplaced ideas for no reason - his incorporation of them was consequential of a wider wave of German Idealism, NOT the other way around.


Your means of finding meaning in my posts, evident by that which you quote, are absolutely despicable. Nowhere has Hegel ever argued, or even implied that new ideas were "in the old the whole time". One would have to literally go out of their way to misinterpret Hegel to even come close to this conclusion. The fact of the matter is that anyone with a semblance of any understanding of Hegel's life can understand that Hegel was a philosopher of German Idealism first and foremost, what influence was derived from previous philosophic trends was a substantiation of a wider revitalization of philosophy, and not the other way around. The fact of the matter is that Hegel was not some dogmatist engaging in ad hoc - the fact that he had derived influence from previous philosophic trends has nothing to do with some kind of external, mysterious loyalty to them but the fact that he recognized they still had truth in them which could be reconciled with new. The notion that ideas are somehow isolated, externalized abstractions whereby you can declare "loyalty" or identify with them for no reason is nonsense! Ideas are not people, they do not have agency. What we can draw from this is whatever misplaced aversion you yourself have towards what traces of them present in Hegel's thought: frankly Hegel didn't, and never gave a damn about this - he did not care for the dichotomy between the "older" and "newer" ideas in such a way. You do. And you're projecting your petty criticism of Hegel on those grounds. You simply commit the greatest epistemological crime: the legacy of something, of ideas, or of a person need not anything to do with what they intended to say but their model of understanding which has relevance today. The point is not to paint people like Marx as prophets when recognizing that new ideas confirm an association with him - but that his theoretical legacy continually changes and is refined in accordance with changes in the world - our understanding of Marx changes. This is, specifically what Marx and Engels concerned themselves with themselves.

The fact of the matter is that because rationalism was able to do away with superstition and mysticism does not mean that it provided philosophers the means to "do away" with previous muck. Christianity might be empirically false, but to say that Christianity did not represent the birth of a new form of logic which endured, to suggest that the "whole thing is bullshit" is profoundly ignorant. The fact of the matter is that "new ideas" did not even come close to addressing the alleged 'old mysticism" that Hegel employed -


Yes, Hegel was following a trend, not initiating it. No one has claimed otherwise. Except you when you said "What was Hegel if not a radical breaking point from previous philosophy?".


First, Hegel is some kind of desperate reaction against the onslaught of Kantianism, and now, he's part of the wave of German idealism all along? It would appear that you are, at every which turn attempting to dismiss Hegel in whichever way possible. Hegel, as a thinker cannot be dismissed, the only possible dismissal of Hegel one could employ is through sheer ignorance of Hegel. The fact of the matter is that Hegel was a radical breaking point with previous forms of philosophy, through being a part of a wider trend of German idealism. This is not hard to understand at all - Marx, a Hegelian, represented a radical breaking point too - that does not mean he was irrevocably reducible to a part of a "wider' Hegelian trend characterized by Feuerbach or Stirner and so on. Being a part of a trend, and initiating a new trend through the pre-supposion of a previous one are not mutually exclusive. I cannot even fathom how it could be otherwise. This is the whole of philosophic history in general, at least as far as the enlightenment goes.

It is like saying Hegel merely "borrowed" Spinoza or represented a mere continuation of him. Where can we draw the line? Is everyone simply the offspring of Descartes? Newton? How is a new trend of philosophy even possible in your mind? By simply dismissing everyone before you, only to find yourself falling into the same trap that they did, just as every "breaking point" (I.e. Philistine reaction to philosophy, as logical positivism) did? The point is that if Hegel can be identified with any trend, it is not "old" philosophic ideas, it is German idealism - which was new. The former remained untouched, unbroken and unbent - they simply had fallen out of popularity not through the direct employment of reason but because they were ignored and associated with an epoch long passed. Philosophy which cannot rationally articulate previous philosophic trends is no philosophy at all, and likewise, in every circumstances whereby philosophy is revitalized, it does so while presuming a previous philosophic trend.


Hegel was probably the last of the great system builders, not the first. And to suggest he was the first to have a grand theory of history - that's just bizarre.
So a system built on a notion of history moving forward to apotheosis isn't teleological. And even if it is, it's not central. Somehow.

Hegel was the first to develop a consistent, systematized paradigm of understanding historical development. This is not synonymous with a "grand theory" of history, because no previous theory of history concerned historical development as such but explanations for history itself (ignorantly derived from pre-conceived articulations of the present). There is a crucial difference - Hegel specifically was the first to deal with this contradiction. Fatalism, and teleology as underlying notions by philosophers existed long before Hegel - Hegel hardly presented anything new, but that's only if we pre-suppose that these were vital components of his works. They are not - again, they stem from a long line of continually perpetuated misconceptions and misinterpretations. For Hegel, the process of "moving forward to apotheosis" was infinite, the point was not that history was moving to a final phrase of development but that, in simplistic terms, it is infinitely trying to. What this designates is not the idea of a grand finality but an understanding of history in terms of continual processes - Hegel's "apotheosis" is wholly retrospective (it can only be articulated retrospectively - and any understanding of the present derives from this as such) - he had explicitly stated, not simply implied, but explicitly stated that he was not concerned with predictions of the future.

For such an ardent, avowed opponent of Hegelianism, this should be something of a banality.

[Ilstar]

I never heard of Hegel until I've read Dr. Michael Kosok's work. I highly recommend him. He is a contemporary American dialectician who tried to integrate Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. He derived his realism out of, what I would call, an idealist/materialist meta-dialectic.


Marx, a Hegelian

I would not call a materialist an idealist, and idealistic is not the same as idealist.

[Tim Redd]

I never heard of Hegel until I've read Dr. Michael Kosok's work. I highly recommend him. He is a contemporary American dialectician who tried to integrate Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. He derived his realism out of, what I would call, an idealist/materialist meta-dialectic.

I would not call a materialist an idealist, and idealistic is not the same as idealist.

Marx was 180 degrees opposite of Hegel in terms of being a materialist whereas Hegel was an idealist. Marx was Hegelian to the extent that he adopted Hegel's method/logic of how things develop - that being dialectics. A great example of how Marx uses dialectics is in the analysis he uses in his work Capital (especially the first volume).

[blake 3:17]

“People who are too fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality, but linger in abstraction, and their light dies away.”

[Ilstar]

Marx was 180 degrees opposite of Hegel in terms of being a materialist whereas Hegel was an idealist. Marx was Hegelian to the extent that he adopted Hegel's method/logic of how things develop - that being dialectics. A great example of how Marx uses dialectics is in the analysis he uses in his work Capital (especially the first volume).

Then I would call Marx an idealistic materialist so not to confuse him with idealists like Hegel and Plato. In my terminology, the adjective with -ic(al) is the method or philosophical direction. I agree with you that Marx is '180 degrees' opposite to Hegel in that they applied the same method (namely, dialectics) but had opposite directions of its application as reflected by their different philosophical positions (i.e., materialism versus idealism).


“People who are too fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality, but linger in abstraction, and their light dies away.”

Interesting. And isn't (metaphysical) actuality an abstraction (i.e., Being or Existence)? An epistemological reality is a whole, though, not a part. Frankly, I think Hegel was really confused. He should not have listened to Kant.

[Tim Redd]

“People who are too fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality, but linger in abstraction, and their light dies away.”

Not sure how this relates to the theme of the thread. However what comes to my mind upon reading your statement is that you think that anyone focusing upon what is finite in space or time can never have a concrete understanding of the what is being thought about. They can only have an abstract understanding of what they are thinking about.

I don't see why that would necessarily be true. In fact when analyzing a thing both a concrete and a higher level abstract analysis of the thing should be undertaken and related to one another. That is the totality and wholeness of life that must be grasped in order to truly grasp the nature of reality.

[Rafiq]

I would not call a materialist an idealist, and idealistic is not the same as idealist.

As if the qualifications for being a Hegelian, within the context of the broad spectrum that is philosophy, is adherence to Idealism. Idealism was hegemonic in European philosophy for almost the entirety of its existence (before the mid 19th century) with few exceptions (and to call these exceptions is a stretch - they might have laid a foundation for what only later we could call materialism). Hegel, however, was certainly and most definitely unique, distinguishable from other idealists.

Hegel's legacy was beyond himself, and only through its radical transformation was the spirit of Hegel carried forward. Such is the way of history. From a god's eye view, Marx was certainly a Hegelian to the very end. What is being argued here is not that Marx and Hegel are interchangeable. How could thinkers even be distinguished if they are exactly the same? Not that I think Marx was simply applying Hegel's ideas to new conditions - undoubtedly a radical break with idealism did occur. But your logic makes absolutely no sense - merely by being a Marxist, this alone qualifies you to have differences with Marx on such a direct level - because you are living in a different epoch than he did, and the expression of Marxism in appropriation to these new conditions is different (how could it not be?).

As far as Marx's break with Hegelianism - this was already under the substrate of Hegelianism - Marx didn't break from Hegel insofar as he regarded Hegel as having been a philosophical mistake of history, he superseded him. The only way to keep a religion alive is through acts of heresy, it is the heresy of Protestantism which kept Christianity alive.

[Ilstar]

Hegel, however, was certainly and most definitely unique, distinguishable from other idealists.

I agree.


But your logic makes absolutely no sense - merely by being a Marxist, this alone qualifies you to have differences with Marx on such a direct level - because you are living in a different epoch than he did, and the expression of Marxism in appropriation to these new conditions is different (how could it not be?).
I disagree. Either you are a true Marxist, or you are not. That's why taxonomical view of philosophy (rather than your "broad spectrum") is so important. Yes, philosophy sometimes is really hard to categorize because of all the details that need to be differentiated, but I think it's possible. Hegel, of course, is an extremely challenging example. The following are my philosophical categorizations of some philosophers:

Plato - realistic idealist
Aristotle - idealistic realist/mystic
Kant - idealistic materialist (position - mind)
Hegel - mystical idealist
Marx - idealistic materialist (position - society)
Rand - materialistic/realistic idealist

[blake 3:17]

Not sure how this relates to the theme of the thread. However what comes to my mind upon reading your statement is that you think that anyone focusing upon what is finite in space or time can never have a concrete understanding of the what is being thought about. They can only have an abstract understanding of what they are thinking about.

I don't see why that would necessarily be true. In fact when analyzing a thing both a concrete and a higher level abstract analysis of the thing should be undertaken and related to one another. That is the totality and wholeness of life that must be grasped in order to truly grasp the nature of reality.

It's relevant because it's a quote from Hegel. I'm not saying it's right or true, but I do think it better to actually read a philosopher, even badly, than to read warmed over interpretations full of bias.

[Tim Redd]

I never heard of Hegel until I've read Dr. Michael Kosok's work. I highly recommend him. He is a contemporary American dialectician who tried to integrate Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. He derived his realism out of, what I would call, an idealist/materialist meta-dialectic.

I would not call a materialist an idealist, and idealistic is not the same as idealist.

I would suggest that you read Hegel's original works. They are available at: https://www.marxists.org.

I suggest reading Hegel's The Science of Logic (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl000.htm) first since it delineates Hegel's ideas on dialectical logic.

[Tim Redd]

“We stand for organized terror - this should be frankly admitted. Terror is an absolute necessity during times of revolution. Our aim is to fight against the enemies of the Revolution and of the new order of life. ”
― Felix Dzerzhinsky

Why the emphasis on terror versus various forms of mass struggle - coops, rallies, marches, boycotts, shut downs, strikes - which should be the main form of struggle for revolution? Those are the foundation of fighting the enemy and bringing forward the new order. Terror should be ancillary to that.

[Rafiq]

I disagree. Either you are a true Marxist, or you are not. That's why taxonomical view of philosophy (rather than your "broad spectrum") is so important. Yes, philosophy sometimes is really hard to categorize because of all the details that need to be differentiated, but I think it's possible. Hegel, of course, is an extremely challenging example. The following are my philosophical categorizations of some philosophers:

Plato - realistic idealist
Aristotle - idealistic realist/mystic
Kant - idealistic materialist (position - mind)
Hegel - mystical idealist
Marx - idealistic materialist (position - society)
Rand - materialistic/realistic idealist

You disagree, and you somehow think yourself exempt from having to explain yourself. How loosely you employ your false right to conceit! The fact of the matter is that "taxomizing" philosophy on any level leads to an obfuscation of not only philosophy but the history of philosophy. Why? Because it is impossible to characterize a philosopher without knowing the context from which philosophy is derived, without knowing its lineage, and its axiom of dichotomy (what separates them from others). What a vague, utterly ridiculous reduction of Plato - "realistic idealist" - how the is this unique to Plato? The fact of the matter is that this is not how "I" look at philosophy, it is not "mine", it is how one correctly understands philosophy. Frankly, 'your' taxonomy is confused and rather schizophrenic. By your qualifications, if I were to refer something as Platonic, what this would mean is "realistic idealism".


Why the emphasis on terror versus various forms of mass struggle - coops, rallies, marches, boycotts, shut downs, strikes - which should be the main form of struggle for revolution? Those are the foundation of fighting the enemy and bringing forward the new order. Terror should be ancillary to that.


And what the fuck does this have to do with anything in pertinence? Explain to me carefully how posting this here, rather than sending me a message directly is more appropriate. In any case, I made no claims as far as the "main" form of struggle as far as tactics or strategy go. I merely strive to remind everyone that there is a price to pay for all of this, and if you are not willing to pay it, you are unworthy of the ideas you speak of. The revolution is sanctified in terror, and a pre-conceived discipline of the employment of terror when taking power is imminent, integrated and internalized by the movement itself can lead to a better means of defining its character in such a way that is true to the movement (though not completely, of course). Without this, than the irrevocably necessary terror will mean all is permitted for employing terror characteristic of the old order - rape and so on.

The enemy will not give a shit about you if the enemy does not fear you. The enemy will not be convinced by the sublimity of Communism, if they do not use everything at their disposal to fight back, they only hesitate out of fear.

[Tim Redd]

And what the fuck does this have to do with anything in pertinence? Explain to me carefully how posting this here, rather than sending me a message directly is more appropriate.

Why would I send you anything direct, you're an arse of dork.

And the strongest force is the people united in mass political struggle. Not dork, prove I'm a man, terror leads the way silliness.

[Tim Redd]

From a god's eye view,...

Genius, there is no "god's eye view".

[Tim Redd]

...The fact of the matter is that "taxomizing" philosophy on any level leads to an obfuscation of not only philosophy but the history of philosophy. Why? Because it is impossible to characterize a philosopher without knowing the context from which philosophy is derived, without knowing its lineage, and its axiom of dichotomy (what separates them from others)...

I disagree, that its impossible to know the context from which a philosophical stance is derived. I disagree that its impossible to know the lineage of a philosophical position. And I disagree its impossible to know the axiom of dichotomy of a philosophical position. Thus I do see that it's possible to "taxonomize" philosophical positions. Understanding such taxonomy is often a useful way to understand the philosophical position(s) of interest as well as other philosophical positions noted in the taxonomy.

There's no magic to it. You do the study and eventually you may be able to make some useful statements regarding philosophy, including how various philosophical positions stand in taxonomical relation to one another.

[Rafiq]

And the strongest force is the people united in mass political struggle. Not dork, prove I'm a man, terror leads the way silliness.

Are you a troll, Redd? Be honest. Because If I remember correctly, I explicitly mentioned how this has fuck all to do with tactics or strategy. A mass political struggle cannot consolidate power unless it has wrought mass fear from the class enemy. Through this terror, the terror becomes superseded whereby reverting to the old order becomes an impossibility.


Genius, there is no "god's eye view".

No, Redd, I was actually implying a god is real, rather than trying to say that if one was capable of looking at the history of philosophy in a holistic manner they would see that Marx was firmly a Hegelian.


I disagree, that its impossible to know the context from which a philosophical stance is derived. I disagree that its impossible to know the lineage of a philosophical position. And I disagree its impossible to know the axiom of dichotomy of a philosophical position.

In case anyone might conisder my accusations of trolling groundless:

it is impossible to characterize a philosopher without knowing the context from which philosophy is derived, without knowing its lineage, and its axiom of dichotomy (what separates them from others)

[Tim Redd]

Are you a troll, Redd? Be honest. Because If I remember correctly, I explicitly mentioned how this has fuck all to do with tactics or strategy. A mass political struggle cannot consolidate power unless it has wrought mass fear from the class enemy. Through this terror, the terror becomes superseded whereby reverting to the old order becomes an impossibility.

My point is that revolution primarily oriented upon mass revolutionary events is the most effective base for revolution. To me that has been shown in Russia and China. It wasn't terror based but rather mass mobilization based struggle that led to their success. I can't think of a successful revolution based primarily upon terror that was successful.



No, Redd, I was actually implying a god is real, rather than trying to say that if one was capable of looking at the history of philosophy in a holistic manner they would see that Marx was firmly a Hegelian.

[Do you mean "good" rather than "god"?]

Marx was a Hegelian to the extent that he adopted Hegel's dialectical method. Of course Marx says that he controverted Hegel's idealist perspective and that he adopted a materialist basis for his dialectics.


In case anyone might conisder my accusations of trolling groundless: it is impossible to characterize a philosopher without knowing the context from which philosophy is derived, without knowing its lineage, and its axiom of dichotomy (what separates them from others)

Yes, you meant without, apology for getting that wrong. However here you say no taxonomizing is valid because you must understand what you are taxonomizing in context.



...The fact of the matter is that "taxomizing" philosophy on any level leads to an obfuscation of not only philosophy but the history of philosophy. Why? Because it is impossible to characterize a philosopher without knowing the context from which philosophy is derived, without knowing its lineage, and its axiom of dichotomy (what separates them from others)...

It's true that one must understand context and sometimes the analyst does understand the context and on that basis they may be able to properly taxonomize. So it's false when you say that necessarily, "'taxomizing' philosophy on any level leads to an obfuscation of not only philosophy but the history of philosophy.". If one properly understands context one may very well be able to taxonomize on one more or levels without obfuscation both in philosophy per se, and in the history of philosophy as well.

[Asero]

My point is that revolution primarily oriented upon mass revolutionary events is the most effective base for revolution. To me that has been shown in Russia and China. It wasn't terror based but rather mass mobilization based struggle that led to their success. I can't think of a successful revolution based upon terror that as successful.

Red Terror is but the violent manifestation of open class struggle, comrade.

[Tim Redd]

My point is that revolution primarily oriented upon mass revolutionary events is the most effective base for revolution. To me that has been shown in Russia and China. It wasn't terror based but rather mass mobilization based struggle that led to their success. I can't think of a successful revolution based upon terror that as successful.



Red Terror is but the violent manifestation of open class struggle, comrade.

I understand that terror is an aspect of most revolutions. My point is that it is secondary to the overall mass struggle aspect, rather than being the leading, and or primary aspect. It is mass struggle that historically has been shown to be the primary and leading force for most successful revolutions with terror often being a useful supplement/complement to mass struggle.