An Ethically Consequential Question

[The Intransigent Faction]

So in one of my late-night inner dialogues I started to wonder...

Does consequentialism not necessitate fatalism, or perhaps nihilism? In the absence of a supernatural influence, it seems more than likely that this planet and galaxy as we know it will ultimately come to an end, leaving only an infinite void lacking any consciousness in its wake. So, over a very long-term, the ultimate consequence of everything is nothing. That's not necessarily meant in a depressing way. It might even be liberating, perhaps?

Assuming for the moment that this fatalistic claim is true, does it then make sense to prescribe "what one ought do"? The only way to argue for this from a consequentialist perspective seems to be to assign some cutoff point after which we stop considering "consequences". I.e., the ultimate end of our galaxy, if not our universe, is a circumstance beyond our control, and to assign it a moral significance in consequentialism is to try to work a "butterfly effect" into our moral considerations. So take utilitarianism, for instance. In deciding on the most moral action, the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" would have to be considered in terms of the plausibly predictable consequences of one's actions, not the longest of long-term ones. Is that a solid enough cutoff, after which we need to set aside consideration of consequences for practical reasons if nothing else? We can't, after all, speculate about every hypothetical moral outcome of every decision, small or large---except that we can perhaps reasonably speculate that it will all be "inconsequential" in the "grand scheme of things". I feel like there may be holes in this defense of "short-view" consequentialism.

I'm not suggesting that because of the ultimate end to the world as we know it, we should all go out and do terrible shit. Rather, I'm just wondering if consequentialism can fully account for the immorality of wrong behaviours, or if there's not something inherently wrong in them, consequentialism aside.

I realize that rules such as the "harm principle" have been suggested as ways to prevent the most egregious possibilities of utilitarian rationalization, but the idea of imprinting inflexible moral rules on an otherwise highly circumstantial moral calculus seems to be a case of trying to have it both ways.


Short version: Does a moral "butterfly effect" delegitimize consequentialism as a framework for determining ethical behaviour, or can morality be salvaged without having to claim "inherently good or evil" moral absolutes?

I hope I wasn't just babbling. I just needed to type out these thoughts somewhere to see if they make any sense later.

[blake 3:17]

You're making a lot of sense. It's a very tricky path to navigate. There are reasons people are into Blake, Chuang Tzu, and Kierkegaard. The small things can be the big things. We just don't know.

[Skyhilist]

I don't think we should be worrying about what happens when the world ends, because that's a very long ways off. Any decision you make, whether viewed as "moral" or "immoral" isn't going to have much impact left by the time the world ends most likely. And even if it did, that would mean it had some type of impact most likely leading up to that point, so it was still worthy of moral consideration.

And yes, I do think what you're saying can lead to nihilism, if we define nihilism in this case as there being no inherent meaning to life, and no such thing as objective morality. But I don't see why this has to be a bad thing. So what if there's not an objective morality? I can't objectively say that killing people is bad, but I can say that someone who holds the opposite moral view is likely a psychopath. Whether there's such a thing as an objective morality or not, we're predisposed to be empathetic, and there's no reason why we shouldn't be - after all what sane person wants to harm others?

So yes, I think consequentialism in some ways can lead to nihilism, but I don't think that's a bad thing. And there's nothing wrong with judging actions by their consequences just because the world will eventually end. There are still going to be a lot of consequences before then.

I hope I understood your question correctly.

[consuming negativity]

I realize that your argument is predicated on assuming that:


So, over a very long-term, the ultimate consequence of everything is nothing.However, I feel that this assumption is what screws up the logic of the whole thing.

First and foremost, that something else will inevitably happen does not mean that that inevitable end to everything is a consequence of any of our actions.

Furthermore, that there is an ultimate end for everything that will negate the eternal consequences of our actions does not make superfluous the subjective reality that happens in the meantime.

For example, the pain that my dogs would feel if I were to start smacking them around is quite real, even if they're going to eventually die anyway. Even if the entire world will cease to exist eventually, there's a lot of time between now and the end during which the consequences of our actions will matter, even if temporarily.

Besides, any system of morality that can see me smacking my dogs around for no reason and go "well that doesn't matter" isn't really morality at all.

[The Intransigent Faction]

I realize that your argument is predicated on assuming that:

However, I feel that this assumption is what screws up the logic of the whole thing.

First and foremost, that something else will inevitably happen does not mean that that inevitable end to everything is a consequence of any of our actions.

Oh, sure. When I suggested that the end to everything could figure into consequentialist ethic, that wasn't to suggest that said end would come about as a "consequence of our actions" in the sense of being actively brought about by our agency. Rather it's a sort of "fatalistic consequence" that happens as a result of everything regardless of which "path" moral agents take.


Furthermore, that there is an ultimate end for everything that will negate the eternal consequences of our actions does not make superfluous the subjective reality that happens in the meantime.

That's certainly what I'd *like* to believe. I was just seeking a philosophical foundation for it beyond the instrumental.


For example, the pain that my dogs would feel if I were to start smacking them around is quite real, even if they're going to eventually die anyway. Even if the entire world will cease to exist eventually, there's a lot of time between now and the end during which the consequences of our actions will matter, even if temporarily.

Besides, any system of morality that can see me smacking my dogs around for no reason and go "well that doesn't matter" isn't really morality at all.

I agree, though. That was pretty much the solution I posited. I was just looking for second opinions to test it.

[synthesis]

I guess I don't see the point of questions like this - nothing personal to you Brad, it's still an interesting line of thought. We're social animals with varying degrees of empathy, from sociopaths to Chris Crocker, and that's what determines things like "moral considerations" and what you're calling "wrong behaviors," not the resolution of existential quandaries such as what you've (correctly) described here as the logical conclusion of consequentialism. In a broader sense, then, it doesn't matter whether we "salvage morality," with or without Manichean absolutes - all these things are determined first and firstmostly (http://www.funnyordie.com/topic/bobby-bottleservice) by our nature as social animals.

[The Intransigent Faction]

I don't think we should be worrying about what happens when the world ends, because that's a very long ways off. Any decision you make, whether viewed as "moral" or "immoral" isn't going to have much impact left by the time the world ends most likely. And even if it did, that would mean it had some type of impact most likely leading up to that point, so it was still worthy of moral consideration.

Certainly, so how far do we go in considering the impact, or lack thereof, of our actions in determining their morality? It sounds like you'd go along with the answer in my original post, the "short-term view", perhaps. It's the validity of setting that as the consequential "cutoff" point that concerned me.
Does our consideration of the morality of an act stop where our direct or better yet indirect impact on its consequences ends? I suppose it would be hard to decipher in every case just how far our actions' impact reaches, but that's part of the problem in deciding "okay, after this point the consequences are irrelevant because we have no discernable impact".


And yes, I do think what you're saying can lead to nihilism, if we define nihilism in this case as there being no inherent meaning to life, and no such thing as objective morality. But I don't see why this has to be a bad thing. So what if there's not an objective morality? I can't objectively say that killing people is bad, but I can say that someone who holds the opposite moral view is likely a psychopath. Whether there's such a thing as an objective morality or not, we're predisposed to be empathetic, and there's no reason why we shouldn't be - after all what sane person wants to harm others?

There would be consequentialist grounds for doing so in certain cases (i.e. the trolley case of killing one to save several, although a bizarre rule utilitarianism not generally upheld by utilitarians could, I suppose, potentially put a greater negative utility on directly killing one than on letting many more die), but I agree, under 'normal circumstances', harming people is bad, or at best a necessary evil as in self-defense. From a more fatalistic perspective, of course, that whole dilemma seems to lose its significance as neither choice "matters". That's not something I would want to embrace, and the way to avoid that without objective morality seems to be, as I suggested and others seem to agree, considering the more "short-term" reality or consequences.

Something about your response feels unsatisfying, though...I don't know them very well, but I know there are arguments in favour of keeping objective morality even in a "secular" materialist worldview, yet a lot of atheists (myself in the past included) seem to find the "easy answer" in moral relativism. Without some standard to "rank" subjective moralities (even if that standard is itself subjective), it doesn't seem like one could be put above the other...and the *consequences* of that are thoroughly disturbing to me. I might be getting side-tracked if I stick with this train of thought, though.


So yes, I think consequentialism in some ways can lead to nihilism, but I don't think that's a bad thing. And there's nothing wrong with judging actions by their consequences just because the world will eventually end. There are still going to be a lot of consequences before then.

I hope I understood your question correctly.

I think so. I'm not so sure how convinced I am, though. If nihilism doesn't just throw objective morality out the window, but dispenses with all questions even of adopting subjective moralities, well...naturally from a nihilist perspective that's not a "bad" thing ("bad" would be meaningless). Even if it's "short-sighted", consequentialism of the sort most responses here described seems more reasonable to adopt, even just instrumentally speaking, than outright rejecting morality (if that's what nihilism does).

I probably need some rest now, heh. I gather you're a nihilist yourself, though, and I'm sorry if I came across as judgmental about it at any point. As I said I can see how it's liberating in a sense. It just also seems disturbing, or at the very least tough to wrap one's head around.

[The Intransigent Faction]

I guess I don't see the point of questions like this - nothing personal to you Brad, it's still an interesting line of thought. We're social animals with varying degrees of empathy, from sociopaths to Chris Crocker, and that's what determines things like "moral considerations" and what you're calling "wrong behaviors," not the resolution of existential quandaries such as what you've (correctly) described here as the logical conclusion of consequentialism. In a broader sense, then, it doesn't matter whether we "salvage morality," with or without Manichean absolutes - all these things are determined first and firstmostly (http://www.funnyordie.com/topic/bobby-bottleservice) by our nature as social animals.

Okay, that actually makes a heck of a lot of sense!

[Red Economist]

Ok, so early morning. Not huge on general knowledge of philosophy, so I don't know how helpful this might be, but doing this might wake me up.


Does consequentialism not necessitate fatalism, or perhaps nihilism? In the absence of a supernatural influence, it seems more than likely that this planet and galaxy as we know it will ultimately come to an end, leaving only an infinite void lacking any consciousness in its wake.

I'll turn this into something simpler and more concrete; Does Death negate life? Does the fact our own individual existence come to an end render meaningless our actions during our lifetime.
The answer is no, because the 'world' exists objectively of our own consciousness and therefore our actions, irrespective of moral intent, endure beyond our own lifetime because their effects are physical not mental or existing in a purely 'moral' realm.

your argument appears to be based on the assumption that the very existence of the physical realm is dependent on consciousness (the "supernatural influence") and therefore that 'real', physical life is dependent on the existence of an independent 'moral' life or consciousness. Could you elaborate on why you think this is the case?

I detect an ever so slight hint of Nietzsche in this; the 'death of god' [absence of supernatural influence] leading to the 'trans valuation of values' [nihilistic/fatalistic re-valuation of ethics]. Would I be right in that you've read about him or some of his ideas?


So, over a very long-term, the ultimate consequence of everything is nothing. That's not necessarily meant in a depressing way. It might even be liberating, perhaps?

"everything is nothing" sounds like a much broader debate on existence and non-existence. In absolute terms, we cannot know exactly if the universe exists, or if it exists as we perceive and conceptualize it. what actually is the difference between the two? what is the difference between existence and non-existence?
In practice, very little. So we work based on the assumption that it indeed does exist and that we do have knowledge of it, even if it is approximate.


Assuming for the moment that this fatalistic claim is true, does it then make sense to prescribe "what one ought do"? The only way to argue for this from a consequentialist perspective seems to be to assign some cutoff point after which we stop considering "consequences". I.e., the ultimate end of our galaxy, if not our universe, is a circumstance beyond our control, and to assign it a moral significance in consequentialism is to try to work a "butterfly effect" into our moral considerations.

The relationship between 'truth' and (the moral sense of) 'right' is a complex one. If we assume that what is 'truth' logically leads to conclusions which are morally right, it is based on what we expect the consequences of our actions to be. This is not the same as what actually happens, just our expectations. As I have already said, we cannot establish absolute standards of truth, so therefore we cannot establish absolute standards of right.
So the cut off point is not a point in time (in how long our consequences endure- though this is helpful in the very short-term) but the limits of our knowledge of the physical realm and the knowledge of what we expect the results of our actions to be.

How can you be so sure that the 'end of the galaxy' is indeed beyond our control, when your assuming a relationship between consciousness (human or supernatural) and existence?


So take utilitarianism, for instance. In deciding on the most moral action, the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" would have to be considered in terms of the plausibly predictable consequences of one's actions, not the longest of long-term ones. Is that a solid enough cutoff, after which we need to set aside consideration of consequences for practical reasons if nothing else?


I think I've answered this in reference to the previous quotation in terms of the limits of our knowledge, not the limits of our actions.


We can't, after all, speculate about every hypothetical moral outcome of every decision, small or large---except that we can perhaps reasonably speculate that it will all be "inconsequential" in the "grand scheme of things". I feel like there may be holes in this defense of "short-view" consequentialism.

Again, accepting uncertainty helps 'ease' a lot of the stresses in this model of ethics. We can only act based on what we expect our consequences to be. We cannot have knowledge of the future outside of the present because the future has not happened yet.

.


I'm not suggesting that because of the ultimate end to the world as we know it, we should all go out and do terrible shit. Rather, I'm just wondering if consequentialism can fully account for the immorality of wrong behaviours, or if there's not something inherently wrong in them, consequentialism aside.

"right" or "wrong" represent moral capacities of human beings. (I'm assuming that our labor power means we have the productive capacity to produce 'right' and 'wrong' results). So "good" and "evil" represent potentialities in each individual.
Neither are "good" or "evil" distinct moral qualities, but overlap in the physical realm. Both represent qualities in the realization of the freedom of action of an individual. This is how you can get round the "terrorist"/"liberator" dilemma ethically- because objectively their is only one outcome, even if their are two (or more) interpretation to that outcome based on the physical separation of two people with a different 'moral'/emotional perspective. right and wrong a psychological/biological functions of the human animals pursuit of happiness and avoidance of pain, not objective qualities independent on the subject.

[I'm probably going to reject saying that as it certifiably has nihilistic outcomes, not matter how I rationalize it.]


I realize that rules such as the "harm principle" have been suggested as ways to prevent the most egregious possibilities of utilitarian rationalization, but the idea of imprinting inflexible moral rules on an otherwise highly circumstantial moral calculus seems to be a case of trying to have it both ways.

the ability to cause harm is a function of human freedom. It is one that has a strongly negative connotation based on the emotional response people feel to violence and doing violence to others (assuming your not a narcissist without empathy).
the harm principle can only ever be a principle for 'self-regulation' of ethical behavior based on a willingness [I]not to cause harm to others. If it represents an authoritarian principle external from the person it is a restriction on their freedom of action and you end up with a hell of a lot of conflict over the freedom of a person to cause harm and the 'authority' of the state (or god as embodiment of a moral principle) to exercise a monopoly of force.
The "imprinting of inflexible moral rules" on a "highly circumstantial moral calculus" represents an attempt to reconcile this authoritarian ethic with a person's freedom of action, and I think there might be your problem.

It may well be that in thinking about the end of the universe, your thinking about the role of an authority rationalized as an objective quality ('god' perhaps, but the state would do) in negating your own freedom of action.

[Rafiq]

When morality assumes some kind of grand metaphysical place, it does so with a very real social character. Morality is not defined by what is most ethical, morality is not defined by the superior ways by which we determine what we "ought" to do, it is defined by the ruling interests by which's hegemony it reproduces. Morality is thus not rational, but ideological.

What I mean to say is that as animals, on absolutely no level was our morality defined, or will ever be defined by our alleged existential being in relation to the 'universe' or everything, but in relation to our social being.

[The Intransigent Faction]

Ok, so early morning. Not huge on general knowledge of philosophy, so I don't know how helpful this might be, but doing this might wake me up.



I'll turn this into something simpler and more concrete; Does Death negate life? Does the fact our own individual existence come to an end render meaningless our actions during our lifetime.
The answer is no, because the 'world' exists objectively of our own consciousness and therefore our actions, irrespective of moral intent, endure beyond our own lifetime because their effects are physical not mental or existing in a purely 'moral' realm.

your argument appears to be based on the assumption that the very existence of the physical realm is dependent on consciousness (the "supernatural influence") and therefore that 'real', physical life is dependent on the existence of an independent 'moral' life or consciousness. Could you elaborate on why you think this is the case?

I detect an ever so slight hint of Nietzsche in this; the 'death of god' [absence of supernatural influence] leading to the 'trans valuation of values' [nihilistic/fatalistic re-valuation of ethics]. Would I be right in that you've read about him or some of his ideas?



"everything is nothing" sounds like a much broader debate on existence and non-existence. In absolute terms, we cannot know exactly if the universe exists, or if it exists as we perceive and conceptualize it. what actually is the difference between the two? what is the difference between existence and non-existence?
In practice, very little. So we work based on the assumption that it indeed does exist and that we do have knowledge of it, even if it is approximate.

So there's an instrumental justification for presuming the world objectively exists? I understand that, sure. You definitely grasped the question I was trying to ask (which I put in bold above), but unless I made some implicit assumption of which I was unaware, I don't see where the inference that I was implying objective reality doesn't exist comes from. Rather it was that "objectively", "everything leads to nothing" (with all the implications this would have for "objective morality").


The relationship between 'truth' and (the moral sense of) 'right' is a complex one. If we assume that what is 'truth' logically leads to conclusions which are morally right, it is based on what we expect the consequences of our actions to be. This is not the same as what actually happens, just our expectations. As I have already said, we cannot establish absolute standards of truth, so therefore we cannot establish absolute standards of right.
So the cut off point is not a point in time (in how long our consequences endure- though this is helpful in the very short-term) but the limits of our knowledge of the physical realm and the knowledge of what we expect the results of our actions to be.

I agree, except that I'm not so sure that's an either/or (either the limits of our knowledge etc or a point in time). The issue, though, is that the limits of our knowledge at least theoretically extend far beyond the limits of our actions. That's
where fatalism poses a problem for consequentialist ethics. Of course, if the alternative is that rather than fatalism we have uncertainty, at some point our "knowledge of what we expect the results to be" would be too convoluted a standard for practical application, or just outright degenerate from "knowledge" to conjecture. So setting the limited effects of our actions as a standard would allow us to at least calculate probabilities and act on them. Uncertainty doesn't play nice with consequentialist ethics, after all.


How can you be so sure that the 'end of the galaxy' is indeed beyond our control, when your assuming a relationship between consciousness (human or supernatural) and existence?

I think I've answered this in reference to the previous quotation in terms of the limits of our knowledge, not the limits of our actions.

Again, accepting uncertainty helps 'ease' a lot of the stresses in this model of ethics. We can only act based on what we expect our consequences to be. We cannot have knowledge of the future outside of the present because the future has not happened yet.

.



"right" or "wrong" represent moral capacities of human beings. (I'm assuming that our labor power means we have the productive capacity to produce 'right' and 'wrong' results). So "good" and "evil" represent potentialities in each individual.
Neither are "good" or "evil" distinct moral qualities, but overlap in the physical realm. Both represent qualities in the realization of the freedom of action of an individual. This is how you can get round the "terrorist"/"liberator" dilemma ethically- because objectively their is only one outcome, even if their are two (or more) interpretation to that outcome based on the physical separation of two people with a different 'moral'/emotional perspective. right and wrong a psychological/biological functions of the human animals pursuit of happiness and avoidance of pain, not objective qualities independent on the subject.

[I'm probably going to reject saying that as it certifiably has nihilistic outcomes, not matter how I rationalize it.]



the ability to cause harm is a function of human freedom. It is one that has a strongly negative connotation based on the emotional response people feel to violence and doing violence to others (assuming your not a narcissist without empathy).
the harm principle can only ever be a principle for 'self-regulation' of ethical behavior based on a willingness [I]not to cause harm to others. If it represents an authoritarian principle external from the person it is a restriction on their freedom of action and you end up with a hell of a lot of conflict over the freedom of a person to cause harm and the 'authority' of the state (or god as embodiment of a moral principle) to exercise a monopoly of force.
The "imprinting of inflexible moral rules" on a "highly circumstantial moral calculus" represents an attempt to reconcile this authoritarian ethic with a person's freedom of action, and I think there might be your problem.

It may well be that in thinking about the end of the universe, your thinking about the role of an authority rationalized as an objective quality ('god' perhaps, but the state would do) in negating your own freedom of action.

Well put. As for Nietzsche, though, I have indeed read him (though mostly Beyond Good and Evil), but my contention was never that objective reality didn't exist outside of our consciousness. We could enter the assumption that it does into the question and still be left with the same question about consequentialism. I didn't posit a "supernatural influence", either, in fact I was presuming (with reason, I think) the absence of one. I'm not clear on how the objective existence of reality beyond our consciousness would resolve the dilemma for consequentialist ethics---that the "infinite regression" of events beforehand leads, either objectively or at least as far as humanity is concerned, to the same endpoint. If anything an objective end of "everything lead to nothing" is the presumption of this dilemma.

As for "How can you be so sure that the 'end of the galaxy' is indeed beyond our control"...As certain as science can make us, at least. I can't be "certain", but all indications are that it will and it would be far more of a speculative leap to suggest that we'll somehow devise a technology in the meantime to prevent our galaxy's collapse on itself and/or collision with another and the probable cataclysmic results for Earth.

Now that I think about it (sorry if my response is insanely disjointed), though, if the cutoff point is based not on the limits of our actions' effect on objective reality, but on our limited knowledge, that would bring us right back to the initial dilemma...our limited knowledge suggests, as I said, that the "everything will lead to nothing", unless we posit a something (supernatural) in place of the nothing. That something may (arguably even would have to be) an uncertainty, to escape the fatalist dilemma, but are we really so "uncertain" about the inevitable end, whether of our own consciousness alone or of the reality that existed outside of it before and could exist for a while after?

I'm wired (caffeine!) right now...I might have more to say later. As for time-travel, though, don't worry, there are plenty of hypotheticals to muddle the issue, but I'm more concerned with "practical" implications for ethics. I'm trying to break out of the habit of being overly apologetic, but there is a lot you wrote which I probably didn't touch on enough, and I'm sorry about that. :o

[The Intransigent Faction]

When morality assumes some kind of grand metaphysical place, it does so with a very real social character. Morality is not defined by what is most ethical, morality is not defined by the superior ways by which we determine what we "ought" to do, it is defined by the ruling interests by which's hegemony it reproduces. Morality is thus not rational, but ideological.

What I mean to say is that as animals, on absolutely no level was our morality defined, or will ever be defined by our alleged existential being in relation to the 'universe' or everything, but in relation to our social being.

Again, that makes a lot of sense...more to say later, probably.

[Red Economist]

Ok, a lot of things going on here intellectually. So I'll try to put this into some kind of order I feel can respond to.

My approach to Philosophy is mainly through what I've read about Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis (with a few Wikipedia entries to give me ideas), so my apologies if it's a little eccentric as I lack a body of wider knowledge to draw from, but I hope it just gives some food for thought.


I'm wired (caffeine!) right now...I might have more to say later. As for time-travel, though, don't worry, there are plenty of hypotheticals to muddle the issue, but I'm more concerned with "practical" implications for ethics. I'm trying to break out of the habit of being overly apologetic, but there is a lot you wrote which I probably didn't touch on enough, and I'm sorry about that. :o

No probs. It's a habit I'm having to break too. :grin:


So there's an instrumental justification for presuming the world objectively exists? I understand that, sure.

Yes and No. I hit a 'wall' philosophically a while ago when I thought about the Matrix movies. I decided that in fact it was not a question of whether I existed or not as irrespective of my answer to the question I would continue to exist. Therefore my existence was objective to my idea of existence. So irrespective of what is absolutely true, in practice it is a 'safe' assumption to work on.


You definitely grasped the question I was trying to ask (which I put in bold above)


Does Death negate life? Does the fact our own individual existence come to an end render meaningless our actions during our lifetime.

but unless I made some implicit assumption of which I was unaware, I don't see where the inference that I was implying objective reality doesn't exist comes from. Rather it was that "objectively", "everything leads to nothing" (with all the implications this would have for "objective morality").

The 'end of the universe' stuff is going to draw me into a whole load of philosophical questions, so I'll try to focus on the important one.

If you ask the question "does death negate life" and your answer is "everything leads to nothing", you are assuming that 'everything' is dependent on you living and on being conscious. existence (and it's meaning) becomes a property of consciousness. Hence death is final and absolute because it is the death of individual consciousness. However, I would dispute that and argue that the world exists independently of whether we are alive or dead, whether we possess consciousness or not.

In moral terms, because of this relationship between existence and consciousness, in the sense you've described the morality of existence is dependent on the morality of consciousness. Hence your moral concepts determine the moral value you ascribe to your existence. I would assert that moral consequences exist independently of whether we are alive or dead, conscious or unconscious.

It would appear that your assuming to some extent that the concept of mind and the physical brain are separate, and therefore moral faculties (mind) are separate from physical reality (brain/body/physical existence). My proposition is that the pain-pleasure stimuli which human beings have evolved, regulates their behavior in relation to their environment, both natural and social. (i.e. "ouch that hurts" > "I'm not doing that again") and therefore 'moral' ideas independent of this are superfluous to this because 'consequence' is felt as a pain-pleasure stimuli through interaction with an objective, physical world.

Therefore morality as a property of the mind is, in your sense, distinct from the physical existence of the body and is not objective in a material sense as being based on pain-pleasure.

[at this point I don't really know what I'm writing and am just feeling 'zen' and going with it. I really don't have a clue whether it's nonsense or not].



I didn't posit a "supernatural influence", either, in fact I was presuming (with reason, I think) the absence of one. I'm not clear on how the objective existence of reality beyond our consciousness would resolve the dilemma for consequentialist ethics---that the "infinite regression" of events beforehand leads, either objectively or at least as far as humanity is concerned, to the same endpoint. If anything an objective end of "everything lead to nothing" is the presumption of this dilemma.

The absence of a 'supernatural influence' acts as the (or 'a') cause for the end of the universe. So if you invert it, the existence of the universe is dependent on the existence of a 'supernatural influence'. This matters because the dependence of matter on mind/consciousness necessarily means you define morality as dependent on the consequences as perceived in the mind in accordance with a set of rules, not as they actually are in a material sense according to pleasure-pain stimuli.



Now that I think about it (sorry if my response is insanely disjointed), though, if the cutoff point is based not on the limits of our actions' effect on objective reality, but on our limited knowledge, that would bring us right back to the initial dilemma...our limited knowledge suggests, as I said, that the "everything will lead to nothing", unless we posit a something (supernatural) in place of the nothing. That something may (arguably even would have to be) an uncertainty, to escape the fatalist dilemma, but are we really so "uncertain" about the inevitable end, whether of our own consciousness alone or of the reality that existed outside of it before and could exist for a while after?

The fatalism is the result of you attributing existence of consciousness as independent of material reality. It is the same sense as attributing a moral 'law' as to the 'supernatural force' and that implicit in your assumptions in the belief that consequences are measured by a supernatural 'moral law' not a purely physical one.

Ok. if any of that even made sense, just tell me because I don't know. it's just how I work these problems through in my head. :confused:

[The Intransigent Faction]

Ok, a lot of things going on here intellectually. So I'll try to put this into some kind of order I feel can respond to.

My approach to Philosophy is mainly through what I've read about Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis (with a few Wikipedia entries to give me ideas), so my apologies if it's a little eccentric as I lack a body of wider knowledge to draw from, but I hope it just gives some food for thought.

No probs. It's a habit I'm having to break too. :grin:

I took a whole bunch of philosophy courses in my undergrad, and like to at least think I learned from them, keeping in mind the nature of "answers" in philosophy and the difference between "real" and "presumed" knowledge. That's a big part of my background and interest in philosophy, if it matters.
These sorts of questions are something you don't need a degree to struggle with, though, (not that you "need" one for everything else, but the basic questions of philosophy about why we're here, what defines right vs. wrong, etc., are especially pervasive, and more complicated in declaring a person an "authority" on them, so I appreciate input).


Yes and No. I hit a 'wall' philosophically a while ago when I thought about the Matrix movies. I decided that in fact it was not a question of whether I existed or not as irrespective of my answer to the question I would continue to exist. Therefore my existence was objective to my idea of existence. So irrespective of what is absolutely true, in practice it is a 'safe' assumption to work on.

Our objective and finite existence would be a safe assumption, yes.


The 'end of the universe' stuff is going to draw me into a whole load of philosophical questions, so I'll try to focus on the important one.

If you ask the question "does death negate life" and your answer is "everything leads to nothing", you are assuming that 'everything' is dependent on you living and on being conscious. existence (and it's meaning) becomes a property of consciousness. Hence death is final and absolute because it is the death of individual consciousness. However, I would dispute that and argue that the world exists independently of whether we are alive or dead, whether we possess consciousness or not.

I think you're misinterpreting or attaching something to the original claim that deals with a different area of philosophy here. Claiming that things in objective reality can be or even are finite (including but not limited to ourselves) is not predicated on a solipsistic reality determined by individual consciousness (things don't stop objectively existing because we stop perceiving them). In fact part of my original post, if you'll recall, was the claim that a cataclysmic end of the galaxy will occur irrespective of our agency. You could certainly add that it will occur despite many of us probably not being around to perceive it. "Everything leads to nothing" precisely because things can objectively exist yet still be finite, just as we are. That doesn't resolve or really address the dilemma of the problems with consequentialism, though, except perhaps to say that it is our knowledge that 'everything leads to nothing' that would pose a problem for us adopting consequentialist ethics in the "long view".


In moral terms, because of this relationship between existence and consciousness, in the sense you've described the morality of existence is dependent on the morality of consciousness. Hence your moral concepts determine the moral value you ascribe to your existence. I would assert that moral consequences exist independently of whether we are alive or dead, conscious or unconscious.

Sure, but that's precisely the problem! If our actions have moral consequences after we're gone, if those consequences trace a convoluted web that ultimately reaches the same dead-end, say, the "fatalist consequence", and if those consequences and the fatalist consequence figure into the ethics of our decisions even though they would be beyond our control, then consequentialist ethics do not justify one decision over another and are useless as a system of ethics for the way in which we would use such a system. That's where we're left to choose between either a short-term consequentialism that posits a cut-off point, or a rejection of consequentialist morality in favor of inherent good and evil, or perhaps non-ethical justifications for considering our actions' consequences.


It would appear that your assuming to some extent that the concept of mind and the physical brain are separate, and therefore moral faculties (mind) are separate from physical reality (brain/body/physical existence). My proposition is that the pain-pleasure stimuli which human beings have evolved, regulates their behavior in relation to their environment, both natural and social. (i.e. "ouch that hurts" > "I'm not doing that again") and therefore 'moral' ideas independent of this are superfluous to this because 'consequence' is felt as a pain-pleasure stimuli through interaction with an objective, physical world.

Therefore morality as a property of the mind is, in your sense, distinct from the physical existence of the body and is not objective in a material sense as being based on pain-pleasure.

Your proposition seems to be hedonistic utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, and a form that would be susceptible to the "fatalistic consequence" problem. I don't conceive of the mind/brain as separate (though the spiritualist in me has probably tried to at some point[s]). It's because I don't that I don't see the implications of that mind's decisions escaping the fatalistic consequence of long-term consequentialism.


[at this point I don't really know what I'm writing and am just feeling 'zen' and going with it. I really don't have a clue whether it's nonsense or not].

I hear ya. I got an hour's worth of sleep last night, it's 10:30 P.M., and some sadist just made a pot of coffee. I still feel better putting these things in writing than babbling them verbally, though. I thought of asking a fellow philosophy student or two on Facebook, then I realized how utterly out of my mind I would be to try to use that venue for that purpose.


The absence of a 'supernatural influence' acts as the (or 'a') cause for the end of the universe.

"A" cause, perhaps, but it's not the only conceivable cause. There are plenty of "secular" doomsday theories regarding the end of the world/galaxy/universe, though my understanding of the scientific details aside from, perhaps, the "big crunch" theory (even there I could only explain the general model vaguely), is between minimal and nil.

A 'supernatural force' is an immaterial hypothetical...if I brought it up it was only to remove it as a factor in the quandary I presented, because the consequentialist dilemma I'm trying to address just presumes the absence of such a force in the absence of material proof. So the question was how to handle the "fatalistic consequence" without positing something supernatural to follow up and undo or just stave off the problem.


So if you invert it, the existence of the universe is dependent on the existence of a 'supernatural influence'. This matters because the dependence of matter on mind/consciousness necessarily means you define morality as dependent on the consequences as perceived in the mind in accordance with a set of rules, not as they actually are in a material sense according to pleasure-pain stimuli.

The fatalism is the result of you attributing existence of consciousness as independent of material reality. It is the same sense as attributing a moral 'law' as to the 'supernatural force' and that implicit in your assumptions in the belief that consequences are measured by a supernatural 'moral law' not a purely physical one.

I think I pretty much addressed this above


Ok. if any of that even made sense, just tell me because I don't know. it's just how I work these problems through in my head. :confused:

Well, I think there was some confusion over the difference between epistemologically justifying a claim of objective existence and ethically justifying consequentialism. My thoughts on that confusion and whatever sense I made of it should be in my response, of course.

[blake 3:17]

@Brad -- have you read Simon Critchley? I've been enjoying a collection of interviews with him from a few years ago.

[Red Economist]

Your proposition seems to be hedonistic utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, and a form that would be susceptible to the "fatalistic consequence" problem.

Yeah. After Checking Wikipedia that would sound right.

I think this is going beyond my level of knowledge, but I'll have a go. Marxists have a particular problem with fatalism and determinism in the philosophy of history.



The idealism of such theories lies in the fact that they see the laws of development of society as a "fate" imposed upon society from outside, so that men and women are mere instruments of fate, the tools of an external necessity. If such theories are accepted, then we are indeed driven to fatalism. If what takes places is in the hands of God, or is decreed by fate, or follows by some iron necessity- it makes little difference in practice which you say- then it follows that there is indeed little we can do to determine our own destinies for ourselves.
For Marxism, on the other hand, men make their own history. Materialism can recognize no divine plan, no fate, no external necessity determining historical events. The events are determined wholly and entirely by men's own actions in the historical circumstances in which men find themselves.
"Men make their own history", wrote Marx, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past".
This is the objective condition and limitation of men's historical activities. But these "circumstances given and transmitted from the past" were themselves made by men. If, then, we can come to know the economic and class forces which men themselves create in their historical activity, and the laws of their operation, then we can know what can be achieved and what must be done to achieve it. Far from leading to fatalistic inaction, therefore, the materialist conception of history leads to a programme of action.
(p. 29-30, Historical Materialism (1953), Maurice Cornforth)


Whilst Marxism can claim to "know what can be achieved and what must be done to achieve it", I'm using a hedonistic philosophy as a way of explaining the why of economic-historical necessity on an individual and psychological level (because theories of history can obviously be a way of rationalizing an external necessity as a part of the 'self' and unintentionally concealing an authoritarian ethic as a 'reality principle' ).

I think with regards the fatalistic consequence I am resigned to accepting the determination of my actions by psychological stimuli and economic necessity as something which is objective and beyond my control and so I may well be trapped in a fatalistic consequentialism without even knowing it. Whilst I recognize the 'reality' of the necessity of my actions, and in this sense I am passive or determined, I am active in so far that I must decide both to follow this necessity and how to do so based on the tools and knowledge available to me. I emphasize the uncertainty of a future unfolding because I retain a certain agency in deciding what the future may be and recognize that it does not yet exist.


I don't conceive of the mind/brain as separate (though the spiritualist in me has probably tried to at some point[s]). It's because I don't that I don't see the implications of that mind's decisions escaping the fatalistic consequence of long-term consequentialism.

I think I operate under a very messy and 'dialectical' approach where I have necessity (experienced as a hedonistic ethical system) and the illusion of agency in my mind, but the reality of agency in my actions as physical and real.

If I'm going to borrow from Psychoanalyisis, I would say that the 'id' or pleasure principle is experienced as 'real' where as the reality principle is a more of a 'choice', though a deeply ingrained one, itself also determined by past experiences. The pleasure principle/hedonistic ethic comes first because of the need for survival simply as a biological organism. It is in reconciling these two in a conception of self/ego, that gives me the illusion of agency, but I remain determined both by my conception of reality (which includes the actual reality and some illusions as well) and my experience of pleasure/pain as a psychological and biological function.


I think you're misinterpreting or attaching something to the original claim that deals with a different area of philosophy here. Claiming that things in objective reality can be or even are finite (including but not limited to ourselves) is not predicated on a solipsistic reality determined by individual consciousness (things don't stop objectively existing because we stop perceiving them).

I think I might be hinting at the possibility that scientific theories regarding the 'big crunch' are actually a projection of our own sense of morality, rather than a purely objective 'reality'. This goes into the relationship between science, philosophy and religion.
I think I'm attaching a meaning to the statement based on a heavy handed Marxian Materialism. I'm attributing a super-natural quality of consciousness in the way that I think Feurubach would in discussing religion.

The idea of a 'big crunch' doesn't seem to fit in with a materialist conception of reality (though with a lot o dialectics it might) and this is one of the 'limits of tolerance' of Marxism as a dogma, where if it is not 'materialist', it is 'idealist'.


In fact part of my original post, if you'll recall, was the claim that a cataclysmic end of the galaxy will occur irrespective of our agency. You could certainly add that it will occur despite many of us probably not being around to perceive it. "Everything leads to nothing" precisely because things can objectively exist yet still be finite, just as we are.

Is it possible for matter to exist in a finite space, whilst also being finite in time? If matter cannot be destroyed but simply moved around space (even at an atomic level)- it cannot therefore have a definite 'end' in time.
[This is almost certainly wrong by current scientific thinking and probably goes back to Newton. Einstein might have a different answer].

The death of an individual is experienced as the death of consciousness. the actual physical self continues to be part of a physical reality and we decompose, become compost and then continue to be part of a 'cycle'.

Basically, I appear to be stuck on disagreeing with you that everything does indeed turn into nothing. I would dispute that everything can be nothing except in a realm of abstract thought.


That doesn't resolve or really address the dilemma of the problems with consequentialism, though, except perhaps to say that it is our knowledge that 'everything leads to nothing' that would pose a problem for us adopting consequentialist ethics in the "long view".

is it actually the identification with the self as possessing free will that is the 'problem'. In Marxism (I think it is the case that) If the self is simultaneously determined and determining, the self ceases to be individual and instead becomes socialized as a collective entity both as effect and cause.

The ethical properties of this sense of self are therefore 'diluted' with responsibility being blurred as simultaneously socially determined in the past experiences, whilst individually determining in the creation of new experiences.
Hence the ethical values of 'consequences' changes from being the property of an individual, to the property of a collective group.

In other words I might be fatalist without realizing it but retain a sensation if self whilst possessing a philosophy view which poses very strong limits on it.


Sure, but that's precisely the problem! If our actions have moral consequences after we're gone, if those consequences trace a convoluted web that ultimately reaches the same dead-end, say, the "fatalist consequence", and if those consequences and the fatalist consequence figure into the ethics of our decisions even though they would be beyond our control, then consequentialist ethics do not justify one decision over another and are useless as a system of ethics for the way in which we would use such a system.

That sounds basically right and I'm not sure if my use of dialectics is creating a new solution or is avoiding the question. I'm making some considerable dialectical leaps over the relationship between being simultaneously an effect and cause in social relations.
Consequentalist ethics may not justify the consequence on an individual level, but may do so at a social level, if the consequence for society takes priority, whilst relegating the individual to a secondary role (potentially fatalistic).


That's where we're left to choose between either a short-term consequentialism that posits a cut-off point, or a rejection of consequentialist morality in favor of inherent good and evil, or perhaps non-ethical justifications for considering our actions' consequences.

I think there was an old American Indian ethic of considering the consequences of an action for a number of generations (I think it was four).
it is possible that good and evil can only be measured by the existence/consciousness of a person who feels the consequences and that the two concepts (short-term consequential and inherently good and evil) in fact overlap.
BUT now I'm clearly in messy territory as I'm attributing good or evil to consciousness, rather than necessity. This would imply I have some strong solipsistic tendencies regarding the 'realness' of ethical consequences because of my use of Psychoanalysis as a method.


"A" cause, perhaps, but it's not the only conceivable cause. There are plenty of "secular" doomsday theories regarding the end of the world/galaxy/universe, though my understanding of the scientific details aside from, perhaps, the "big crunch" theory (even there I could only explain the general model vaguely), is between minimal and nil.

Same here. I know of these theories, but very little about them. They caused problems in the scientific establishment of the USSR because they had to deal with the philosophical problems posed by the physics of the big bang/big crunch and finding a way of making it compatible with dialectical materialism as a politically sanctified philosophy. I wish I knew more as they sound pretty interesting.


A 'supernatural force' is an immaterial hypothetical...if I brought it up it was only to remove it as a factor in the quandary I presented, because the consequentialist dilemma I'm trying to address just presumes the absence of such a force in the absence of material proof. So the question was how to handle the "fatalistic consequence" without positing something supernatural to follow up and undo or just stave off the problem.

Noted. But it may be the case that the 'end of the universe' is actually a projection of human qualities of mortality onto the objective world and religion dressed up as science. But that is more of a 'get out of jail free' card for me.
The only thing I could add is that hedonism implies an intrinsic value to existence (i.e. pleasure=survival) and simply to having consequences, irrespective of what the consequence actually is.

[Red Economist]

I hear ya. I got an hour's worth of sleep last night, it's 10:30 P.M., and some sadist just made a pot of coffee. I still feel better putting these things in writing than babbling them verbally, though. I thought of asking a fellow philosophy student or two on Facebook, then I realized how utterly out of my mind I would be to try to use that venue for that purpose.

ah, the days when I lived communally as a student. enjoy. I have some very happy memories from then. :grin:

I was unlucky enough to be a light-sleeper with the bedroom next to the kitchen. ear plugs didn't work, so I ended up just having to join in with everyone else in what ever combination of drink and poker they were up to that particular night until I was so tired I just nodded off.

Watch out btw; caffeine and alcohol reduce sleep quality, so you end up needing more sleep, whilst you're actually having less and you can run up a major sleep deficit. I think alot of students end up using pills to keep them going in the second and third years (I left after my first year so I don't know except from what my friends said) because of they don't have enough time to do things to the best of their ability given the workload.

Facebook is only as good as the friends you have on it and most of the time conversations are really poor anyways because most people I know only use it whilst multitasking with everything else, which is a shame really. I have no far-left friends to speak of, so I use revleft instead.