Should leftists reject post-modernism?

[Loony Le Fist]

From what I gather, it seems many leftists (who usually happen to be post-modernists) seem to dismiss epistemic realism and empiricism. Why should this be? Epistemic realism can help us reinforce our views from a more universal context. Just because Marx is considered a post-modernist doesn’t mean we should simply accept it as valid.

Often I have seen what appears to be a complete rejection of what are perceived to be enlightenment values. That somehow science is a social construction of the bourgeois. It is clear that this would create a rift between the left and science. While there might be truth to the claim that the development of science is strongly tied to the bourgeois, science is much more than that. Whether one accepts it or not, science and empiricism are the best way to explain the natural world. It is the best way of obtaining knowledge about how things work. Science is not merely a social construction, it is the best way of obtaining information about the nature of the universe.

Why do so many leftists reject science? I object to the idea that science or empiricism is bourgeois. Indeed it can be a force for emancipation. We can demonstrate scientifically that there is very little biological difference between races, for example. Technology can not only enslave, but can liberate society in the right hands. Things like nuclear energy and automation aren’t necessarily and fatalistically destined to be used to build horrible weapons, but can provide us with nearly boundless energy and more freedom, respectively: something that would be required for a highly advanced, organized, post-scarcity society.

Furthermore I don’t see how leftists be a moral relativists or a nihilists. Moral values are part of what drive us to promote egalitarianism. In fact, science can provide strong empirical undergirding for this view. There is very little genetic variation between human beings, implying nearly every individual has the potential to be just as productive and useful to society as any other.

Nihilism rejects that any of this matters. How can one be forceful in the promotion of moral values while subscribing to a nihilistic worldview? The true nihilists, subjectivists and moral relativists are capitalists, who seem to claim that exploitation is relative. Said another way, capitalists claim that it is only exploitation if a party to a transaction perceives it as such. They claim at how as long as subjective utility like happiness is maximized, society is somehow better off.

It would seem to me that nihilism and moral relativism (rampant in post-modernism) only hand our opposition tools to beat us over the head with. After all, if we grant moral relativism or nihilism, than who is to say our opposition is morally unjustified in wage slavery?

[ARomanCandle]

Marx is considered a post-modernist? According to who? Post-modernism is generally considered a response to late capitalism, the fall of radical movements in the 70s, and a general resignation that liberal capitalism is the "end of history." This sort of shattered the worldview of history as being somehow progressive, and many people just began to adopt moral relativism.

Anyhow, on other substantive points, I agree.

Re:Science - Science is fine. It's the application of science for propertied interests and in defense of capitalist ideology that is bothersome. Science currently is being used by producers for production, and not to satisfy human needs. This plays out in the ideological realm as well.

Re: Morality - You cannot advocate the overthrow of capitalism without a morality. You can't say humans should do something without some conception of what is good for humans. Marx dealt with this repeatedly, and he indeed had a notion that humans should be able to control their productive lives. He maintained a concept of alienation, which happens to also have been written about by Rousseau, Humboldt, and other enlightenment thinkers.

[BIXX]

While I don't know a ton about post-modernism, I can reply to a bit of this.


Often I have seen what appears to be a complete rejection of what are perceived to be enlightenment values. That somehow science is a social construction of the bourgeois. It is clear that this would create a rift between the left and science. While there might be truth to the claim that the development of science is strongly tied to the bourgeois, science is much more than that. Whether one accepts it or not, science and empiricism are the best way to explain the natural world. It is the best way of obtaining knowledge about how things work. Science is not merely a social construction, it is the best way of obtaining information about the nature of the universe.

Why do so many leftists reject science? I object to the idea that science or empiricism is bourgeois. Indeed it can be a force for emancipation. We can demonstrate scientifically that there is very little biological difference between races, for example. Technology can not only enslave, but can liberate society in the right hands. Things like nuclear energy and automation aren’t necessarily and fatalistically destined to be used to build horrible weapons, but can provide us with nearly boundless energy and more freedom, respectively: something that would be required for a highly advanced, organized, post-scarcity society.

I have yet to meet a leftist who rejects the findings of scientists, but we should keep in mind that the average scientist (specifically scientific researcher) is still a white male who is rich or well-off (normally). So some of it will carry certain assumptions and thought processes due to the privilege those people have (not that rich people think fundamentally different from poor people or men from women or whites from non-whites, it's the privilege that changes the thought processes). It doesn't mean that they are necessarily incorrect, but that they may be missing this or that detail or implication.


Furthermore I don’t see how leftists be a moral relativists or a nihilists. Moral values are part of what drive us to promote egalitarianism. In fact, science can provide strong empirical undergirding for this view. There is very little genetic variation between human beings, implying nearly every individual has the potential to be just as productive and useful to society as any other.



Nihilism rejects that any of this matters. How can one be forceful in the promotion of moral values while subscribing to a nihilistic worldview? The true nihilists, subjectivists and moral relativists are capitalists, who seem to claim that exploitation is relative. Said another way, capitalists claim that it is only exploitation if a party to a transaction perceives it as such. They claim at how as long as subjective utility like happiness is maximized, society is somehow better off.



It would seem to me that nihilism and moral relativism (rampant in post-modernism) only hand our opposition tools to beat us over the head with. After all, if we grant moral relativism or nihilism, than who is to say our opposition is morally unjustified in wage slavery?

I am a nihilist (but also not a leftist so maybe I am not the best person to answer this question) but I take nihilism to free me from moral constraints, and leaves me to do what I want (namely being free), which requires everyone to be free (an injury to one is an injury to all).

[Leftsolidarity]

I feel like you equate a lot of things a little falsely. I don't think many leftists "reject science". Engels' whole "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" deals with the basic fact that we hold our positions based on a scientific analysis of society and its structures. The only 'leftists' I know who "reject science" are utopians and primmies. The rest embrace it and only reject certain things about the bourgeois institutions that uses 'science' to advance their class interests. I don't see why you think rejecting enlightenment values as rejecting science.

And on that same note, it is exactly the reason why we can be nihilists and reject morals as the foundations for our positions. Morals are relative and based on class society and class interests. I don't want the destruction of capitalism and oppression merely for moral reason but because of the fact that this system is in its death spiral where it can no longer be progressive for the world. Its very nature is against my interests and the rest of the oppressed and workers so I want to replace it with a system that will work in my interests.

It's not to say that our own morals don't come from this outlook. But that's not the basis for it.

[Creative Destruction]

what serious leftists reject science?

[Loony Le Fist]

I feel like you equate a lot of things a little falsely. I don't think many leftists "reject science". Engels' whole "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" deals with the basic fact that we hold our positions based on a scientific analysis of society and its structures. The only 'leftists' I know who "reject science" are utopians and primmies. The rest embrace it and only reject certain things about the bourgeois institutions that uses 'science' to advance their class interests.


Point taken. And I appreciate the clarification on what is being rejected, namely the bourgeois institutions that use science to justify class interests. I would say that economics and the finance sector are excellent examples.


I don't see why you think rejecting enlightenment values as rejecting science.

I think you are referring to what I said here.



...
Often I have seen what appears to be a complete rejection of what are perceived to be enlightenment values. That somehow science is a social construction of the bourgeois.
...


I can see how I should have been more clear. That should probably have been phrased, "It often appears that science is rejected on the grounds of being perceived as part of enlightenment values." I felt as if the baby was being thrown out with the bath-water.



And on that same note, it is exactly the reason why we can be nihilists and reject morals as the foundations for our positions. Morals are relative and based on class society and class interests. I don't want the destruction of capitalism and oppression merely for moral reason but because of the fact that this system is in its death spiral where it can no longer be progressive for the world. Its very nature is against my interests and the rest of the oppressed and workers so I want to replace it with a system that will work in my interests.

It's not to say that our own morals don't come from this outlook. But that's not the basis for it.

Here's where we might part ways a bit. Assuming you are a moral nihilist (correct me if I'm wrong in this assumption or the definition that follows) moral values are abstractly conceived. Why would it then matter to you if "the fact that this system is in its death spiral where it can no longer be progressive for the world"? And wouldn't you just grant our opponents equal intellectual footing to counter claim that it isn't? The idea that capitalism is destroying people's lives is not a social construction, but is a testable empirical claim. The question of whether something should be done is a moral question. Doesn't nihilism simply allow our adversaries to beat us over the head by claiming their position is equally valid?

[Loony Le Fist]

While I don't know a ton about post-modernism, ...we should keep in mind that the average scientist (specifically scientific researcher) is still a white male who is rich or well-off (normally). So some of it will carry certain assumptions and thought processes due to the privilege those people have (not that rich people think fundamentally different from poor people or men from women or whites from non-whites, it's the privilege that changes the thought processes). It doesn't mean that they are necessarily incorrect, but that they may be missing this or that detail or implication.


I agree privilege would shape the interpretation of the data, especially in fields like economics, finance, chemistry and medicine.



I am a nihilist (but also not a leftist so maybe I am not the best person to answer this question) but I take nihilism to free me from moral constraints, and leaves me to do what I want (namely being free), which requires everyone to be free (an injury to one is an injury to all).

I have some trouble with nihilism. Namely trying to understand how we can raise objections to our opponents moral arguments, if we simply accept that moral values are simply abstract constructions.

[BIXX]

I have some trouble with nihilism. Namely trying to understand how we can raise objections to our opponents moral arguments, if we simply accept that moral values are simply abstract constructions.


For me (I'm a post-leftist individualist) I raise it objection to their morals by the fact that they constrain myself and other individuals.

[Loony Le Fist]

For me (I'm a post-leftist individualist) I raise it objection to their morals by the fact that they constrain myself and other individuals.

Forgive me if I seem a bit dense, but isn't that in and of itself another moral position? Namely that it matters to you that you are being constrained.

[BIXX]

Forgive me if I seem a bit dense, but isn't that in and of itself another moral position? Namely that it matters to you that you are being constrained.


It's a preference- not a moral position. It's like not liking being punched in the head- I'd rather not have it happen, but it isn't "wrong".

Again, my opinion on freedom for others is in relation to how I will be limited if they are, so that extension is also amoral.

[Loony Le Fist]

Marx is considered a post-modernist? According to who?

It appears that Dr. Stephen A. Resnick seemed to think so.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-w12bkm9g8o&list=PL8B2364D7C0D31D63

It seems he classified dialectics as post-modernism due to his claim that it rejects both realism and idealism. Though it could be a misunderstanding on my part.

[Loony Le Fist]

It's a preference- not a moral position. It's like not liking being punched in the head- I'd rather not have it happen, but it isn't "wrong".

Lets say someone's preference is to punch you in the head and you don't like being punched in the head. For sake of argument, let's say you can't dodge their punches. How do we resolve this circumstance given that your preferences come into conflict? Given a set of conflicting preferences, how do we resolve them? Or would a nihilist reject the need to resolve these conflicts of interest completely?



Again, my opinion on freedom for others is in relation to how I will be limited if they are, so that extension is also amoral.

Let's say you were a white person living in the US prior to abolition, or a white person living in South Africa during apartheid. Would you have any reason to care about the freedoms of black people, since they wouldn't affect you?

[Dodo]

You have a bit of a serious misunderstanding there. Marxism is not post-modernist, a lot of post-modernist thinking however is based on Marxism.

Marxism does not reject science, Marxism embraces science. Engels and Marxs were obsessed with Darwin. What Marxism rejects is the classic positivism of the bourgouisie science, that we can understand the world through simple empirical analysis and quantitative data. That we can create concepts purely based on empirical knowledge.

Marxism in fact claims to be scientific with its employment of a "method" for whole processes. What Marxism does differently however, lies in dialectics, which is the core of Marxist method. Use of materialist concepts in a dialectical way. This include not making absolute claims based on existing empirical data. Because things always change,atoms always change and our tools in observing them are not "absolute" but ideological. We understand the world through our existing norms, we are not external to the process, we are part of what we observe and that can lead to obvious problems. That is where Marxism rejects "science" and as far as I understand that the best scientific method is the one which "flows with history", and is dynamic rather than static=dialectical.

[Loony Le Fist]

You have a bit of a serious misunderstanding there. Marxism is not post-modernist, a lot of post-modernist thinking however is based on Marxism.

It seems that either my sources must be confused or I am misunderstanding them. Your post along with others have made this clarification.



Marxism does not reject science, Marxism embraces science. Engels and Marxs were obsessed with Darwin. What Marxism rejects is the classic positivism of the bourgouisie science, that we can understand the world through simple empirical analysis and quantitative data. That we can create concepts purely based on empirical knowledge.


We might part ways a bit here. But perhaps I misunderstand. If by world you mean the totality of human existence and experience, then I completely agree. However if by world you mean specifically how the natural world functions, then I would disagree. In that case, I am all ears to hearing a more complete way of knowing other than empiricism.



Marxism in fact claims to be scientific with its employment of a "method" for whole processes. What Marxism does differently however, lies in dialectics, which is the core of Marxist method. Use of materialist concepts in a dialectical way. This include not making absolute claims based on existing empirical data. Because things always change,atoms always change and our tools in observing them are not "absolute" but ideological.


Here we may, again, part ways. No scientist that understands epistemology would claim anything in absolute. However from a practical perspective of deriving working models and technology, it is not necessary to know things with the same rigour as say how a mathematical theorem is proved. I also don't see how you derive from the fact that we now know there is a degree of uncertainty at the quantum level, that these tools become "ideological". Perhaps you can elaborate.



We understand the world through our existing norms, we are not external to the process, we are part of what we observe and that can lead to obvious problems. That is where Marxism rejects "science" and as far as I understand that the best scientific method is the one which "flows with history", and is dynamic rather than static=dialectical.

I certainly see how that can be the case in very ideologically neoliberal bound sciences, such as economics and finance. However, I don't observe this same ideological bias in more natural sciences. Maybe you could give a more concrete example on how this would apply to them. A true scientist changes his theory to fit the data, and that is definitely dynamic. But I don't see how you derive that it is dialectical. I would welcome more input on this.

[BIXX]

Lets say someone's preference is to punch you in the head and you don't like being punched in the head. For sake of argument, let's say you can't dodge their punches. How do we resolve this circumstance given that your preferences come into conflict? Given a set of conflicting preferences, how do we resolve them? Or would a nihilist reject the need to resolve these conflicts of interest completely?

That depends on you nihilist. I personally would hope one of my friends would save my ass but if they didn't I would kinda have to deal with it. I mean, I feel it's my problem.

If I can't dodge, do you also mean to say I can't strike back?

In that case I would utilize self defense.

When two sets of self interest that comes from being free and equal collide and contradict each other, I refer to it as a struggle, not where one dominates the other but where they are simply going after the things they want, no reason to keep hurting the other person after that.

Finally, there are other safeguards such as destroying power as a reality and a concept, which would make it impossible for someone to want to dominate another person.


Let's say you were a white person living in the US prior to abolition, or a white person living in South Africa during apartheid. Would you have any reason to care about the freedoms of black people, since they wouldn't affect you?


Well the freedoms of black folks actually would affect me. When you're in a position like that your interactions have to follow certain patterns to not be rejected by society (the force which decides morals). So I would wanna have free and total expression.

(Continue to ask follow up questions if you need- I like answering)

[Dodo]

We might part ways a bit here. But perhaps I misunderstand. If by world you mean the totality of human existence and experience, then I completely agree. However if by world you mean specifically how the natural world functions, then I would disagree. In that case, I am all ears to hearing a more complete way of knowing other than empiricism.

Here we may, again, part ways. No scientist that understands epistemology would claim anything in absolute. However from a practical perspective of deriving working models and technology, it is not necessary to know things with the same rigour as say how a mathematical theorem is proved. I also don't see how you derive from the fact that we now know there is a degree of uncertainty at the quantum level, that these tools become "ideological". Perhaps you can elaborate.



I certainly see how that can be the case in very ideologically neoliberal bound sciences, such as economics and finance. However, I don't observe this same ideological bias in more natural sciences. Maybe you could give a more concrete example on how this would apply to them. A true scientist changes his theory to fit the data, and that is definitely dynamic. But I don't see how you derive that it is dialectical. I would welcome more input on this.

I do not think Marxists had problems with the existing "scientific methods", as they themselves were limited by it. You also have to understand Marxists trouble with science within their own life-time context. Up to then, science was(as Marxists of the day claim) much more rigid, un-connected categorizations of nature. What Darwin did was to show that nature is in motion, in change and in constant evolution. In that sense, "reason becomes unreason", one of the favorite quotes of Marx(I think taken from Hegel). Because reasonable people, scientists and philosophers base their analysis on their existing ideology and limit themselves by its "absoluteness".
Were people who explained the world through hell&heaven and god idiots? Porbably not, but existing ideology gave them limited tools.
For Marx, science was thus empowered greatly by rise of "materialism".

Now I understand the thing you are asking being more based on "positive sciences" rather the social sciences. I only recently got interested in Marxist epistomology so do not take my word for these things as I only show the surface. But I am assuming that "positivists" justified their method by existing positive-scientific methods. So in that sense, Marxism's dispute is with this, and only in this context it attacks positivism.

Rather than arguing for it I'll direct you to some works on this issue
From this article for instance
http://www.marxist.com/karl-marx-130-years.htm
Marx’s Philosophical Revolution

Of all the theories of Marx, no other has been so attacked, distorted and slandered as dialectical materialism. And this is no accident, since this theory is the basis and foundation of Marxism. It is, more or less, the method of scientific socialism. Marxism is much more than a political programme and an economic theory. It is a philosophy, the vast scope of which covers not only politics and the class struggle, but the whole of human history, economics, society, thought and nature.
Today, the ideology of the bourgeoisie is in the process of disintegration, not only in the field of economics and politics but also in that of philosophy. In the period of its ascent the bourgeoisie was capable of producing great thinkers like Hegel and Kant. In the period of its senile decay it produces nothing of value. It is impossible to read the barren products of the university philosophy departments without a feeling of tedium and irritation in equal measure.
The fight against the power of the ruling class cannot stop in the factories, the streets, parliament and local councils. We must also carry out the battle in the ideological field, where the influence of the bourgeoisie is no less pernicious and harmful by being hidden under the guise of a false impartiality and a superficial objectivity. Marxism has a duty to provide a comprehensive alternative to the old and discredited schemes.
The young Marx was heavily influenced by Hegelian philosophy that dominated the German universities at that time. The whole of Hegel’s doctrine was based on the idea of constant change and development through contradictions. In that sense it represented a real revolution in philosophy. It is this dynamic, revolutionary side that inspired the young Marx and is the starting point for all his ideas.
Marx and Engels negated Hegel and turned his system of ideas into its opposite. But they did so while simultaneously preserving all that was valuable in his philosophy. They based themselves on the “rational kernel” of Hegel’s ideas and carried them to a higher level by developing and making actual what was always implicit in them.
In Hegel, the real struggle of historical forces is expressed in the shadowy form of the struggle of ideas. But, as Marx explains, ideas in themselves have no history and no real existence. Therefore, reality appears in Hegel in a mystified, alienated form. In Feuerbach things are really not much better, since Man here appears also in a one-sided, idealistic and unreal manner. The real, historical men and women only appear with the advent of Marxist philosophy.
With the philosophy of Marx, philosophy at last returns to its roots. It is both dialectical and materialist. Here theory and practice once again join hands and rejoice together. Philosophy comes out of its dark and airless study and enjoys the sun and air. It becomes an inseparable part of life. In place of the obscure conflict of ideas without substance, we have the real contradictions of the material world and society. Instead of a remote and incomprehensible Absolute, we have real men and women, living in real society, making real history and fighting real battles.
The dialectic appears in the work of Hegel in a fantastic and semi-mystical guise. It is “upside down”, so to speak. Here we do not find the real processes taking place in nature and society, but only the pale reflection of those processes in the minds of men, especially of philosophers. In the words of Engels, the dialectic in Hegel’s hands, despite his great genius, was a colossal miscarriage.
He points out that Marx was the only one who could strip away the mysticism contained in Hegelian logic and extract the dialectical kernel. This represented the real discoveries in this field. Through the reconstruction of the dialectical method, Marx managed to provide the only true development of thought.
While the philosophy of Hegel interpreted things only from the point of view of the mind and spirit (i.e. from the idealist standpoint), Marx showed that the development of ideas in the minds of men is only a reflection of developments that occur in nature and society. As Marx says: “Hegel’s dialectic is the basic form of all dialectic, but only after being stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this which distinguishes my method.” (Letter to Kugelmann, 6 March 1868, MECW, Volume 42, p. 543)
What is Dialectics?

Trotsky, in his brilliant little article The ABC of Dialectical Materialism, defined dialectics thus: “The dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics.”
The combination of the dialectical method with materialism created an extremely powerful analytical tool. But what is the dialectic? For reasons of space, it is impossible to explain here all the laws of dialectics developed by Hegel and perfected by Marx. I have attempted to do this elsewhere, in Reason in Revolt: Marxist Philosophy and Modern Science, published by Wellred Books. In a few lines I can only give the sketchiest of outlines.
In his book Anti-Dühring Engels characterised it as follows: “The dialectic is simply the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.” In Dialectics of Nature Engels also sketches in outline the main laws of dialectics:
a) The law of transformation of quantity into quality. b) The law of the unity and struggle of opposites and transformation into each other when they are taken to extremes. c) The law of development through contradictions, or put another way, the negation of the negation.
Despite its unfinished and fragmentary nature, Engels’s book Dialectics of Nature is very important, along with Anti Dühring, for the student of Marxism. Obviously, Engels had to rely on the knowledge and scientific discoveries of the time. Consequently, certain aspects of the content have a mainly historical interest. But what is surprising in Dialectics of Nature is not this or that detail or fact that has been inevitably overtaken by the march of science. On the contrary, what is astonishing is the number of ideas advanced by Engels—often ideas that ran counter to the scientific theories of his day—which have been corroborated brilliantly by modern science.
Throughout the book, Engels emphasises the idea that matter and motion (now we would call it energy) are inseparable. Motion is the mode of existence of matter. This dynamic view of matter, of the universe, contains a profound truth that was already understood, or rather guessed as, by the early Greek philosophers like Heraclitus. For him “everything is and is not, because everything is in flux”. Everything is constantly changing, coming into being and passing away.
For common sense, the mass of an object never changes. For example, a spinning top when rotating, has the same weight as one that is motionless. Mass was therefore considered to be constant, regardless of speed. Later it was discovered that this is wrong. In fact, mass increases with speed, but such an increase is only appreciable in cases where the velocity is approaching that of light. For the practical purposes of everyday life, we can accept that the mass of an object is constant regardless of the speed with which it moves. However, for very high speeds, this claim is false, and the higher the speed, the falser is the claim.
Commenting on this law, Professor Feynman’s says: “[…] philosophically we are completely wrong with the approximate law. Our entire picture of the world has to be altered even though the mass changes only a little. This is a very peculiar thing about the philosophy, or the ideas, behind the laws. Even a very small effect sometimes requires profound changes in our ideas…” (R. Feynman, Lectures on Physics)
This example clearly demonstrates the fundamental difference between elementary mechanics and advanced modern physics. Similarly, there is a big difference between elementary mathematics, used for simple everyday calculations, and higher mathematics (the differential and integral calculus), discussed by Engels in Anti Dühring and Dialectics of Nature.
The same difference exists between formal logic and dialectics. For everyday life, the laws of formal logic are more than enough. However, for more complex processes, these laws are often turned upside down. Their limited truth becomes false.
Quantity and Quality

From the point of view of dialectical materialism, the material universe has no beginning or end, but consists of a mass of material (or energy) in a constant state of movement. This is the fundamental idea of Marxist philosophy and it is completely supported by the discoveries of modern science over the last one hundred years.
Take any example from everyday life: any phenomenon apparently stable, and we will see below the surface it is in a state of flux, although this change is invisible at first glance. For example, a glass of water: “To our eyes, our crude eyes, nothing is changing, but if we could see it a billion times magnified, we would see that from its own point of view it is always changing: molecules are leaving the surface, molecules are coming back.” (Richard P. Feynman, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, chapter 1, p. 8.)
These words are not of Engels, but a renowned scientist, the late Professor Richard P. Feynman, who used to teach theoretical physics at the California Institute of Technology. The same author repeats Engels’ famous example of the law of transformation of quantity into quality.
Water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen atoms in a state of constant motion. Water does not break up into its component parts due to the mutual attraction of the molecules. However, if it is heated to 100 ° C at normal atmospheric pressure, it reaches a critical point where the attractive force between the molecules is insufficient and they fly apart suddenly.
This example may seem trivial, but it has tremendously important consequences for science and industry. It is part of a very important branch of modern physics: the study of phase transitions. Matter can exist in four phases (or states), solid, liquid, gas, and plasma, plus a few other extreme phases, like critical fluids and degenerate gases.
Generally, as a solid is heated (or as pressure decreases), it will change to a liquid form, and will eventually become a gas. For example, ice (frozen water) melts into liquid water when it is heated. As the water boils, the water evaporates and becomes water vapour. But if this vapour is heated to a very high temperature, a further phase transition occurs. At 12,000 K = 11,726.85 Celsius, steam becomes plasma.
This is what Marxists call the transformation of quantity into quality. That is to say, a large number of very small changes finally produces a qualitative leap—a phase transition. Examples may be cited at will: If one cools a substance such as lead or niobium, there is a gradual reduction of its electrical resistance, up to a critical temperature (usually a few degrees above -273 ° C). Precisely at this point, all resistance will suddenly disappear. There is a kind of “quantum leap”, the transition from having a small resistance to having none.
One can find a limitless number of similar examples in all the natural sciences. The American scientist Marc Buchanan wrote a very interesting book called Ubiquity. In this book, he gives a long series of examples: heart attacks, forest fires, avalanches, the rise and fall of animal populations, stock exchange crises, wars, and even changes in fashion and different schools of art (I would add revolutions to this list).
All these things seem to have no connection, yet are subject to the same law, which can be expressed by a mathematical equation known as a power law. What this is, in Marxist terminology, is the law of the transformation of quantity into quality. And what this study shows is that this law is ubiquitous, that is to say, it is present at all levels in the universe. It is a truly universal law of nature, just as Engels said.
Dialectics versus Empiricism

“Give us the facts”! This imperious demand appears to be the acme of practical realism. What can be more solid than the facts? Only what appears to be realism turns out to be just the opposite. What are established facts at one time, can turn out to be something very different. Everything is in a constant state of change, and sooner or later everything changes into its opposite. What appears to be solid dissolves into thin air.
The dialectical method allows us to penetrate beyond appearances and see the processes that are taking place beneath the surface. The dialectic is first of all the science of universal interconnection. It provides a comprehensive and dynamic view of phenomena and processes. It analyses things in their relationship, not separately; in their motion, not statically; in their life, not death.
Knowledge of dialectics means freedom from the slavish worship of the established fact, of things as they are, which is the chief characteristic of superficial empirical thinking. In politics this is typical of reformism that seeks to cloak its conservatism, myopia and cowardice in the philosophical language of pragmatism, the art of the possible, “realism “and so on.
Dialectics permits us to penetrate beyond the “given”, the immediate, that is, the world of appearance, and to uncover the hidden processes that are taking place beneath the surface. We point out that behind the appearance of calm and absence of movement, there is a process of molecular change, not only in physics but also in society and in the psychology of the masses.
It was not so long ago that most people thought the boom was going to last forever. That was, or appeared to be, an unquestionable fact. Those who did question it were regarded as deluded cranks. But now that unquestionable truth lies in ruins. The facts have changed into their opposite. What seemed to be an indisputable truth turns out to be a lie. To quote the words of Hegel: Reason becomes unreason.
Using this method more than a century ago, Frederick Engels was able, in a number of instances, to see further than most contemporary scientists, anticipating many of the discoveries of modern science. Engels was not a professional scientist, but had a fairly extensive knowledge of the natural sciences of his time.
However, based on a deep understanding of the dialectical method of analysis, Engels made a number of very important contributions to the philosophical interpretation of science today, although they have remained unknown to the overwhelming majority of scientists until now.
Of course, philosophy cannot dictate the laws of the natural sciences. These laws can only be developed on the basis of a serious and rigorous analysis of nature. The progress of science is characterised by a series of approximations. Through experiment and observation we get closer and closer to the truth, without ever being able to get to know the whole truth. It is a never-ending process of a deepening penetration of the secrets of matter and the universe. The truth of scientific theories can only be established through practice, observation and experiment, not by any commandments of philosophers.
Most of the questions with which philosophers have wrestled in the past have been solved by science. Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that philosophy has no role to play in science. There remain only two aspects of philosophy which remain valid today which have not been absorbed by the different branches of science: formal logic and dialectics.
Engels insisted that “the dialectic, stripped of mysticism, becomes an absolute necessity” for science. The dialectic, of course, has no magical quality to solve the problems of modern physics. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and coherent philosophy would be of inestimable help in guiding scientific investigation onto the most fruitful lines and prevent it from falling into all manner of arbitrary and mystical hypotheses that lead nowhere. Many of the problems facing science today arise precisely because of its lack of a firm philosophical foundation.
Dialectics and Science

Many scientists treat philosophy with contempt. As far as modern philosophy is concerned, this contempt is well deserved. For the past one and a half centuries the realm of philosophy resembles an arid desert with only traces of life. The treasure trove of the past, with its ancient glories and flashes of illumination, seems utterly extinguished. Not only scientists but men and women in general will search in vain in this wasteland for any source of illumination.
Yet on closer inspection the contempt displayed by scientists to philosophy is not well grounded. For if we look seriously at the state of modern science—or more accurately at its theoretical underpinnings and assumptions, we see that science has in fact never freed itself from philosophy. Unceremoniously expelled by the front door, philosophy slyly gains an entry through the back window.
Scientists who proudly assert their complete indifference to philosophy in reality make all kinds of assumptions that are philosophical in character. And in fact, this kind of unconscious and uncritical philosophy is not superior to the old fashioned kind but immeasurably inferior to it. Moreover, it is the source of many errors in practice.
The remarkable advances of science over the past century seem to have made philosophy redundant. In a world where we can penetrate the deepest mysteries of the cosmos and follow the complex motions of sub-atomic particles, the old questions which absorbed the attention of philosophers have been resolved. The role of philosophy has been correspondingly reduced. However, to repeat the point, there are two areas where philosophy retains its importance: formal logic and dialectics.
A major advance in the application of the dialectical method to the history of science was the publication in 1962 of TS Kuhn’s remarkable book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This demonstrated the inevitability of scientific revolutions and showed the approximate mechanism whereby these occur. “All that exists deserves to perish” holds good not only for living organisms but also to scientific theories, including those which we currently hold to be of absolute validity.
As a matter of fact, Engels was far ahead of his contemporaries (most scientists included) in his attitude towards the natural sciences. He not only explained motion (energy) as inseparable from matter, but also explained that the difference between the sciences consisted only in the study of the various forms of energy and the dialectical transition from one form of energy into another. This is what is now known as phase transitions.
The whole evolution of science in the twentieth century has rejected the old compartmentalisation, recognising the dialectical transition from one science to another. Marx and Engels in their day caused great indignation amongst their opponents, when they said that the difference between organic and inorganic matter was only relative. They explained that organic matter—the first living organisms—arose from inorganic matter at a given time, representing a qualitative leap in evolution. They said that animals, including man with his mind, his ideas and beliefs were simply matter organised in a certain way.
The difference between organic and inorganic matter, which Kant considered an insurmountable barrier, has been eliminated, as Feynman points out: “Everything is constituted by atoms. This is the key assumption. For example, the most important assumptions in biology are that everything that animals do, atoms do. In other words, there is nothing living things do that cannot be understood from the point of view that they are made of atoms, acting in accordance with the laws of physics.” (R. Feynman, Lectures on Physics)
From the scientific perspective, men and women are aggregations of atoms arranged in a particular way. But we are not merely agglomeration of atoms. The human body is an extraordinarily complex organism, in particular the brain, the structure and functioning of which we are only now beginning to understand. This is something far more beautiful and wonderful than all the old fairy stories of religion.
At the same time that Marx was carrying out a revolution in the field of political economy, Darwin was doing the same in the field of biology. It is no accident that while Darwin’s work aroused a storm of indignation and incomprehension, it was immediately recognised by Marx and Engels as a masterpiece of the dialectic, although Darwin himself was unaware of it. The explanation for this apparent paradox is that the laws of dialectics are not an arbitrary invention, but reflect processes that actually exist in nature and society.
The discovery of genetics has revealed the exact mechanism that determines the transformation of one species into another. The human genome has provided a new dimension to Darwin’s work, showing that humans share our genes not just with the humble fruit fly but with the most basic forms of life, the bacteria. In the next few years, scientists will carry out an act of creation in a laboratory, producing a living organism from inorganic matter. The last patch of ground will be cut from under the feet of the Divine Creator, who will finally be rendered utterly redundant.
For a long time scientists argued as to whether the creation of new species was the result of a long period of accumulation of slow changes or arose from a sudden violent change. From a dialectical point of view, there is no contradiction between the two. A long period of molecular changes (quantitative changes) reaches a critical point where it suddenly produces what is now termed a quantum leap.
Marx and Engels believed the theory of evolution of species was clear proof of the fact that nature ultimately works in a dialectical way, i.e. through development, through contradictions. Three decades ago, this statement received a powerful boost from such a prestigious institution as the British Museum, where a furious debate broke the decorous silence of centuries. One of the arguments against the defenders of the idea of qualitative leaps in the chain of evolution was that it represented Marxist infiltration in the British Museum!
However, despite itself, modern biology has had no choice but to correct the old idea of evolution as a gradual, linear, uninterrupted process, without abrupt changes, and admit the existence of qualitative leaps, characterised by the mass extinction of some species and the emergence of new ones. On 17 April 1982 The Economist published an article on the centenary of Darwin that said:
“It will be increasingly clear that fairly small mutations that affect what happens at a key stage of development can cause major evolutionary changes (for example, a small change in the mode of operation of certain genes could lead to a significant increase in brain size). Evidence is also accumulating that many genes undergo a slow but steady mutation. Thus, little by little, scientists solve the ongoing controversy of whether species change slowly and continuously for long periods, or remain unchanged for a long time and then experience a rapid evolution. Probably both types of changes occur.”
The old version of evolutionary theory (phyletic gradualism) maintained that species change only gradually as individual genetic mutations arise and are selected. However, a new theory was put forward by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge called “punctuated equilibrium” according to which genetic change can take place through sudden leaps. Incidentally, the late Stephen Jay Gould pointed out that if the scientists had paid attention to what Engels had written about human origins, they would have saved themselves a hundred years of error.


Or there is the book of Ted Grant and Alan Woods, you can read from here
http://www.marxist.com/rircontents.htm

They deal with Marxist epistomology. It is also important to get a little bit into theories of knowledge. Popper, Feyeraband, Lakatos, Quine are in the list of names I have to read to understand this clash of "scientific method", what is science and Marxism's role in this. But as far as I understand right now, there is a bit of emphasis on Kuhn's theories that scientific norms change in time greatly and what is scientific is defined by the norms of the existing society.

[The Garbage Disposal Unit]

Hrm.

I think that talking about "post-modernism" is a bit like talking about "science" in that both terms refer to contested and often conflicting sets of ideas, lend their names to various politics (though typically in apolitical guise), and so on. I think that there is a great deal to be gleaned from both - but that doesn't mean embracing Baudrillard's nihilism or liberal scientific positivism!

I'd say part of what is useful in "post-modernism" is the theorization of subjectivity that lets us problematize, for example, science, without necessarily rejecting the idea that things we drop tend to fall. So, like, when people extrapolate from quantitative data things like, "Oh, this is the gay man gene!" we can step back and ask, "Well, what is 'man', and what is its history?" or "Does gayness concern sexual practice, or desire? Can these be located 'outside' of the liberal notion of the individual?"

[Dodo]

@Loonyleftist
It is in a way a requirement for philosophy to justify science. Science without philosophy can not guide itself and can get lost in its own objective reality which can actually be completely subjective. Science for the sake of science, the existing science.

For everyday life, the laws of formal logic are more than enough. However, for more complex processes, these laws are often turned upside down. Their limited truth becomes false.

This part I think relates to your question regarding understanding nature in simple terms. Things are only problematic when it comes to understand more complex relations/processes and rigid science can lead to problems.

[Thirsty Crow]

@Loonyleftist
It is in a way a requirement for philosophy to justify science. Science without philosophy can not guide itself and can get lost in its own objective reality which can actually be completely subjective. Science for the sake of science, the existing science.
Completely bogus. Philosophy justifying science? What would that even mean? That "science cannot guide itself", which is a vague, unsubstantiated and frankly ridiculous claim. I'm not even going to try to disentangle the confusion about science losing itself in its own objective reality which is, on closer inspection, subjective.


For everyday life, the laws of formal logic are more than enough. However, for more complex processes, these laws are often turned upside down. Their limited truth becomes false.
Oh yeah, unleash the sophisticated criticism of formal logic by means of...well, what?
What's formal logic? Can you show how is it defective and in relation to which purpose?



This part I think relates to your question regarding understanding nature in simple terms. Things are only problematic when it comes to understand more complex relations/processes and rigid science can lead to problems.
Now we have rigid science. Would you enlighten us as to what's this curious rigidity about?

[Loony Le Fist]

...
If I can't dodge, do you also mean to say I can't strike back?
...


That was poorly thought out example. Allow me another.

Let's say there are two states: A and B. A decides that it is their preference to act aggressively and without provocation and invade B for their resources. B's preference is to be left alone. Additionally, it is A's preference to not be struck by retaliation by B. How does the nihilist resolve these preferences? Is there no one here that is actually right, in your view?



Finally, there are other safeguards such as destroying power as a reality and a concept, which would make it impossible for someone to want to dominate another person.


While the idea of removing all power structures is very tempting to me, I have a hard time wrapping my head around it. For example, wouldn't there be some things that just naturally require authority. Like a parent having some degree of authority over their child? Say to prevent that child from being injured. In any case, I'm not sure you can destroy power, Though I do believe you can design a society where power is decentralized enough that no single person can dominate another. Is this really what you meant?



Well the freedoms of black folks actually would affect me. When you're in a position like that your interactions have to follow certain patterns to not be rejected by society (the force which decides morals). So I would wanna have free and total expression.


I need to think about that some more.

[BIXX]

That was poorly thought out example. Allow me another.



Let's say there are two states: A and B. A decides that it is their preference to act aggressively and without provocation and invade B for their resources. B's preference is to be left alone. Additionally, it is A's preference to not be struck by retaliation by B. How does the nihilist resolve these preferences? Is there no one here that is actually right, in your view?

Neither is morally right, in my point of view. However, given what I know, I am more inclined to like B.

How the conflict would be resolved is however those involved see fit. They will struggle against one another most likely, and one of them will come out on top.


While the idea of removing all power structures is very tempting to me, I have a hard time wrapping my head around it. For example, wouldn't there be some things that just naturally require authority. Like a parent having some degree of authority over their child? Say to prevent that child from being injured. In any case, I'm not sure you can destroy power, Though I do believe you can design a society where power is decentralized enough that no single person can dominate another. Is this really what you meant?

I do mean the removal of all power structures.

I can't think of a single instance where authority is required. With the child parent example, I don't buy the idea that it's authoritative to prevent a child from running out in the street (the danger people commonly cite) as it tends to fall more into the category of mutual aid. Here is a thread that partially deals with the subject of authority: http://www.revleft.com/vb/authority-t186332/index.html

Plus, I now like to use the definition of authority helot used in that thread: authority is an institutionalised form of particular power-dynamics that are invariably unequal.


I need to think about that some more.


Give it time, and come to your own conclusions :)

[Jimmie Higgins]

From what I gather, it seems many leftists (who usually happen to be post-modernists) seem to dismiss epistemic realism and empiricism. Why should this be? Epistemic realism can help us reinforce our views from a more universal context. Just because Marx is considered a post-modernist doesn’t mean we should simply accept it as valid.pomo is a really broad term with different meanings and implications. In fact I favor a view that post-modernism is just a phase of a more general modernism, but one based on pessimism in the post-war era (belief in workers movements dashed for radicals, belief in a kind of unlimited social or scientific progress dashed for professionals and academics, etc). But at any rate I do reject a lot of common Pomo arguments and conceptions, but I also think there is a lot of valuable insights that can be reincorporated into or useful to revolutionary politics.

I also have never heard anyone but anti-Pomo right wing Christians argue that Marxism is Pomo. In fact most of the common anti Marxist arguments I hear from non right wingers are based in some Pomo assumptions. But many early postmodernists were Marxists or had some background in those ideas.


While there might be truth to the claim that the development of science is strongly tied to the bourgeois, science is much more than that.IMO, I have no doubt that class society and the development of modern conceptions of science are inherently interwoven. Just the desperation of science into generally autonomous fields shows the fingerprint of a system that usually operates by breaking things up into useful compartments. But I think you are also correct that in general science goes beyond the ideological limits of capitalism. It can be both objective in knowledge, but subjective in application and focus. Science can show how the environment is being destroyed by fossil fuel use, and this can be true, but at the same time, the bourgeois scientific institutions can not draw systemic conclusions from this (and wouldn't have any power of enforcement even if they did) and the private ownership of production means they have no say in what can be done about fossil fuel extraction and production anyway.


Furthermore I don’t see how leftists be a moral relativists or a nihilists. Moral values are part of what drive us to promote egalitarianism. In fact, science can provide strong empirical undergirding for this view. There is very little genetic variation between human beings, implying nearly every individual has the potential to be just as productive and useful to society as any other. materialism is pretty fundamental to my view of things as a Marxist, and I don't think that it's at odds with also having a healthy skepticism of science, not in the abstract but within the bounds of bourgeois society and institutions. And while I don't consider myself a nihilist at all, I think moral relativity, rather than absolute or universal morality is consistent with a materialist view of a society divided by class and different ideas about the world that arise from those divisions. No one likes to have something stolen from them, but when there are class conscious workers demanding that their labor no longer be stolen, and bosses on the other side fearing that their factories will be "stolen" through revolution... What good are universal morals to determine things?


Nihilism rejects that any of this matters. How can one be forceful in the promotion of moral values while subscribing to a nihilistic worldview? The true nihilists, subjectivists and moral relativists are capitalists, who seem to claim that exploitation is relative. Said another way, capitalists claim that it is only exploitation if a party to a transaction perceives it as such. They claim at how as long as subjective utility like happiness is maximized, society is somehow better off.i don't know, they seem to argue whatever they will at their convenience. Historically I think the ruling class in capitalism have tended to present their values as the universal ones: hard work is it's own reward, frugality is a virtue, productivity, patriotism, order. These are all presented as universal goods when they really either reflect the experience of the bourgeois or are guidelines for how our rulers want the masses to behave.


It would seem to me that nihilism and moral relativism (rampant in post-modernism) only hand our opposition tools to beat us over the head with. After all, if we grant moral relativism or nihilism, than who is to say our opposition is morally unjustified in wage slavery?they will grasp at any views to argue against us and did fine creating propaganda long before Pomo.

And academics or liberal dilettantes can navel gaze and equivocate regardless of postmodernism. But I do find some of the abstract relativism you hear from middle class types to be annoying. But it's generally not the worldview, just an underlying mistrust or disbelief, that at the root of t IMO. Empire it's have their own version of equivocation... "Well I just don't know all the facts about this... That's not my field... You're not an expert, so your views are not valid".

[Dodo]

Completely bogus. Philosophy justifying science? What would that even mean? That "science cannot guide itself", which is a vague, unsubstantiated and frankly ridiculous claim. I'm not even going to try to disentangle the confusion about science losing itself in its own objective reality which is, on closer inspection, subjective.
Oh yeah, unleash the sophisticated criticism of formal logic by means of...well, what?
What's formal logic? Can you show how is it defective and in relation to which purpose?
Now we have rigid science. Would you enlighten us as to what's this curious rigidity about?

Why dont you sit down, get a whiskey and relax man? I am not swearing at your mother here.
These are not my claims, this is my interpretation of Marxism's troubles with positivism. It does not reject science, it questions what science is and that it is not absolute-static. You should read that post of mine in relation to the previous one.
I might have transferred it wrong/partially-wrong but those are not even my claims. If you read the stuff in spoilers, you would see his problems with "formal logic" based methods and the more dialectical understandings of processes and how absolute obsession with "objective" empirical knowledge can lead to trouble in processes on the long run.

[RedMaterialist]

I think there is some validity in the concept of "post-structuralism," in that modernist structure, capitalist structure, specifically, is in the process of breaking down, deconstructing, etc.

[BIXX]

I think there is some validity in the concept of "post-structuralism," in that modernist structure, capitalist structure, specifically, is in the process of breaking down, deconstructing, etc.


I think more validity comes from the fact that post-structuralism advocates a break from all structures, as they oppress us.

[Axiomasher]

I tend to think of postmodernism as reactionary, rubbishing goals of scientific knowledge and political change.

[Axiomasher]

I think there is some validity in the concept of "post-structuralism," in that modernist structure, capitalist structure, specifically, is in the process of breaking down, deconstructing, etc.

In linguistics post-structuralism grows specifically out of, and indeed is an extension of, structuralism - which posits a relationship between signifiers and the signified but otherwise having no fixed relationship with 'the world'. Marxism, in opposition to structuralism (and therefore in opposition to poststructuralism) posits language as being always, ultimately, materially and socially situated, because, not least, the authors, and readers/listeners of language are always materially and socially situated. Poststructuralism, at least in linguistics, is a dead-end, promoting the idea that nothing that we read, write, say or listen to, can ever be 'understood' as having a relationship with a shared physical reality.

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

Post-modernism is valuable insofar as it reminds us to be constantly critical of our way of thinking.

[BIXX]

In linguistics post-structuralism grows specifically out of, and indeed is an extension of, structuralism - which posits a relationship between signifiers and the signified but otherwise having no fixed relationship with 'the world'. Marxism, in opposition to structuralism (and therefore in opposition to poststructuralism) posits language as being always, ultimately, materially and socially situated, because, not least, the authors, and readers/listeners of language are always materially and socially situated. Poststructuralism, at least in linguistics, is a dead-end, promoting the idea that nothing that we read, write, say or listen to, can ever be 'understood' as having a relationship with a shared physical reality.


I think you refer to something else than the people here when you refer to structuralism, or post-structuralism.