A Marxist approach to the hard problem of consciousness?

[Dialectical Wizard]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

[Hit The North]

No, this is more than explained by evolution and natural selection.

[ChrisK]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

The hard problem of consciousness is a non-sense. It assumes that we have something called "consciousness" which is an attempt to make a concept word "conscious" and treat it as an object which can be analyzed.

Peter Hacker dismantled the philosophical notion of consciousness here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/To%20be%20a%20bat.pdf) and here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/ConsciousnessAChallenge.pdf).

[RedMaterialist]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

The means and relations of the production of life determine consciousness?

[Sabot Cat]

The hard problem of consciousness is a non-sense. It assumes that we have something called "consciousness" which is an attempt to make a concept word "conscious" and treat it as an object which can be analyzed.

I don't believe so. Consciousness isn't treated as an object, but a state or condition that some beings are subject to as the -ness suffix implies. There is a mystery as to why we are conscious, or have the capacity for qualitative experiences, when our brains are like any other kind of thing in the universe at the atomic and subatomic levels. Why does this particular structure of atoms exhibit this unique phenomenon, and is it really unique?

[ChrisK]

I don't believe so. Consciousness isn't treated as an object, but a state or condition that some beings are subject to as the -ness suffix implies. There is a mystery as to why we are conscious, or have the capacity for qualitative experiences, when our brains are like any other kind of thing in the universe at the atomic and subatomic levels. Why does this particular structure of atoms exhibit this unique phenomenon, and is it really unique?

You are right that consciousness is correctly understood as a state (states are concept words), such as when you are brought back into consciousness after being knocked out.

However, the part I bolded is where this concept is being treated as an object. If consciousness were a state, then it is not something that we possess. The idea of the primacy of consciousness is derived from Descartes dualism and is an echo of the Ancient and Medieval conceptions of the soul.

I further direct you to the two papers I posted before.

[tallguy]

The hard problem of consciousness is a non-sense. It assumes that we have something called "consciousness" which is an attempt to make a concept word "conscious" and treat it as an object which can be analyzed.

Peter Hacker dismantled the philosophical notion of consciousness here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/To%20be%20a%20bat.pdf) and here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/ConsciousnessAChallenge.pdf).
It may well be a nonsense. But, I suspect from the rather breezy tone of your dismissal of its existence (whatever its form), that you have not really thought through the profound philosophical implications of that lack of existence

[ChrisK]

It may well be a nonsense. But, I suspect from the rather breezy tone of your dismissal of its existence (whatever its form), that you have not really thought through the profound philosophical implications of that lack of existence

I am not dismissing its existence. I am saying that any question of consciousness is a non-sense. That means questions of its existence and non-existence equally.

[argeiphontes]

Wouldn't consciousness only be a problem for reductionist materialists? Those who accept that systems can have emergent properties would be sitting pretty sipping drinks, right?

[tallguy]

Wouldn't consciousness only be a problem for reductionist materialists? Those who accept that systems can have emergent properties would be sitting pretty sipping drinks, right?
Good question. However, as a reductionist myself, I don't have any problem with emergent phenomena. My contention would be, however, that such emergent phenomena are namely that; emergent. That is to say, after the fact of underlying physical action. It is also true to say that such emergent phenomena may represent a feedback loop to the original (pre-emergent) action, in some way causing it's character to be altered. Nevertheless, in terms of consciousness as an emergent phenomena, this merely relegates it to a kind of after-the-fact and passive narrative of action as opposed to the a priori agent of that action. Even if that narrative causes changes to the underlying action via a feedback loop, it is still a passive, non-intentioned feedback loop. In other words, it merely provides the illusion of intent.

For consciousness (defined as agency) to exist, it must exist outside of space and time. In other words, outside of causality. And that's impossible. I don't say all of this lightly. But, unless the laws of causality are not what we have come to suppose them to be, there is no other conclusion to be drawn without invoking metaphysics. And metaphysics is basically just making shit up.

Then again, maybe we should just say that if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then we should functionally consider it to be a duck and not ask too many more searching questions. It's safer that way.

[Hit The North]

I am not dismissing its existence. I am saying that any question of consciousness is a non-sense. That means questions of its existence and non-existence equally.

Why? Because it doesn't exist as an object?

[argeiphontes]

Good question. However, as a reductionist myself, I don't have any problem with emergent phenomena. My contention would be, however, that such emergent phenomena are namely that; emergent. That is to say, after the fact of underlying physical action. It is also true to say that such emergent phenomena may represent a feedback loop to the original (pre-emergent) action, in some way causing it's character to be altered. Nevertheless, in terms of consciousness as an emergent phenomena, this merely relegates it to a kind of after-the-fact and passive narrative of action as opposed to the a priori agent of that action.

Even if that narrative causes changes to the underlying action via a feedback loop, it is still a passive, non-intentioned feedback loop. In other words, it merely provides the illusion of intent.

For consciousness to exist, it must exist outside of space and time. In other words, outside of causality. And that's impossible. I don't say all of this lightly. But, unless the laws of causality are not what we have come to suppose them to be, there is no other conclusion to be drawn without invoking metaphysics. And metaphysics is basically just making shit up.

I'm not up on my philosophy, but I do think about consciousness a lot. I don't see why consciousness has to exist outside of space and time. The generation of consciousness by the brain occurs within space and time. Within the subjective experience of consciousness, alterations of space and time perception is possible without having to say that it actually is outside of space and time.

I can't deny that consciousness exists because I am a consciousness being, in that I am a subject of experiences and understand myself to be such a being. I can follow Fromm's advice and meditate on the experience 'I' if I choose. edit: It doesn't make any sense to claim that this is an illusion, since there has to be a subject to illusion, so you're stuck in infinite regression. (I think.)

Damn, I can't find the link but this thread is synchronicity since I was just surfing around materialism and consciousness Wikipedia articles last night to try to determine what the fuck I believe... There was some distinction between people who believe that there has to be an exact correspondence/correlation between the contents of consciousness and brain states, and those who think that consciousness is like an independent "field" that has it's own interactions apart from the underlying substrate. I can't remember what the formal names for those positions are, though.

In any case, I think that it's not anti-materialist to claim that emergent properties can have their own interactions that are not directly analogous to the substrate. It might be anti-reductionist though. I would just say that the causality between objects of consciousness (like ideas) operates on its own level. But I might be a transcendental idealist or transcendental materialist ;)

edit: And despite operating on its own level, it can still feed back to the physical system.

[ChrisK]

Why? Because it doesn't exist as an object?

The question is based on a misuse of a concept-word as an object-word. The very question is a non-sense because the term "conscious" is not an object, but a state. Thus, the question of existence doesn't even come up.

[argeiphontes]

If consciousness were a state, then it is not something that we possess.

Like 'solid' is not something possessed by ice?

[ChrisK]

Like 'solid' is not something possessed by ice?

Exactly. Ice does not posses solid, ice is solid.

[blake 3:17]

Exactly. Ice does not posses solid, ice is solid.

And I slipped it on today on the sidewalk. Ouch.

[Sabot Cat]

You are right that consciousness is correctly understood as a state (states are concept words), such as when you are brought back into consciousness after being knocked out.

There is two meanings for 'conscious': one is a state of awareness distinct from sleeping, and the other is a state of experiential reception. I'd argue that one is conscious by the second definition of the term while sleeping, but not the first.


However, the part I bolded is where this concept is being treated as an object. If consciousness were a state, then it is not something that we possess.

I did not treat it like an object, actually. I said, "why we ARE conscious", and "have the capacity". If I said, "it's a mystery why we are athletic, or have the capacity for athleticism", or 'it's a mystery why we are kind, or have the capacity for kindness' it's not implied that I think athleticism or kindness are objects.

[Sabot Cat]

Like 'solid' is not something possessed by ice?

Ice can (only) have or possess the capacity to be solid. Again, this isn't a philosophical position, but differing grammatical constructions to express the same concept, one more metaphorical than the other.

[The Garbage Disposal Unit]

The hard problem of consciousness is a non-sense. It assumes that we have something called "consciousness" which is an attempt to make a concept word "conscious" and treat it as an object which can be analyzed.

Peter Hacker dismantled the philosophical notion of consciousness here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/To%20be%20a%20bat.pdf) and here (http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/ConsciousnessAChallenge.pdf).

And, of course, one can dismantle philosophical notions all day without needing to grapple at all with reality. Of course, once does away with subjectivity/subjectivities, one might wonder from whence came the dismantler - plausibly they are either a) the pure (pseudo-)atomic liberal individual or b) an eternal robot from beyond time.

In any case, you're conflating two notions of "object" in this thread, an "object" as in a "thing" and an object in the sense of a relation (as in objectification).

[RedMaterialist]

Exactly. Ice does not posses solid, ice is solid.

Ice is solid, until a quantitative change converts it to a liquid.

If consciousness is not real, then it is pointless to raise the consciousness of the working class?

What does this statement mean? "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."

[Five Year Plan]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

I find Margaret Archer's work on the self and the internal conversation to be pretty useful. Hopefully this is what you were asking about.

[ChrisK]

There is two meanings for 'conscious': one is a state of awareness distinct from sleeping, and the other is a state of experiential reception. I'd argue that one is conscious by the second definition of the term while sleeping, but not the first.

And I argue that the second is derived from a misunderstanding of the first.


I did not treat it like an object, actually. I said, "why we ARE conscious", and "have the capacity". If I said, "it's a mystery why we are athletic, or have the capacity for athleticism", or 'it's a mystery why we are kind, or have the capacity for kindness' it's not implied that I think athleticism or kindness are objects.

That very state you describe is derived from a misunderstanding of the first advanced by Descartes. Descartes's argument about consciousness turned it into a distinct "thing" as opposed to a state. This was an idealist position that philosophers today have started to call a state. But this state that they talk about is derived from an idealist non-sense which treats consciousness as an object instead of an actual state.

I really encourage you to read the first link I posted, Peter Hacker deals with this issue in a much clearer manner than I find myself able to.

[ChrisK]

Ice can (only) have or possess the capacity to be solid. Again, this isn't a philosophical position, but differing grammatical constructions to express the same concept, one more metaphorical than the other.

Ice has the capacity to be solid? Does this mean that there is some non-solid ice out there?

[ChrisK]

And, of course, one can dismantle philosophical notions all day without needing to grapple at all with reality. Of course, once does away with subjectivity/subjectivities, one might wonder from whence came the dismantler - plausibly they are either a) the pure (pseudo-)atomic liberal individual or b) an eternal robot from beyond time.

What makes you think that this method gets rid of subjectivity?


In any case, you're conflating two notions of "object" in this thread, an "object" as in a "thing" and an object in the sense of a relation (as in objectification).

How so? I am only using object to mean a thing.

[ChrisK]

If consciousness is not real, then it is pointless to raise the consciousness of the working class?

You are using to different meanings of consciousness. In the first use, you are using it in the philosophical way. In the second, you use it to mean awareness.


What does this statement mean? "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."

That is Marx's statement against idealism. I need to read the whole section again, but I am fairly certain Marx was using consciousness in a strange manner. More to come on this subject.

Edit: Here is the whole passage:


In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.

Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical development of men. Viewed apart from real history, these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement – the real depiction – of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident. We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use in contradistinction to the ideologists, and shall illustrate them by historical examples. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm

Based on the context of the passage, Marx was criticizing the idea that consciousness is a thing. This is particularly clear when he writes, "In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness." The first method defines consciousness in the philosophical way. The second method defines consciousness in terms of being aware. In other words, our understanding of the world (which Marx poetically calls consciousness) is determined by our material conditions, instead of some consciousness or idea creating our material conditions.

Of particular interest is when Marx writes, "Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence." As Marx points out, the problem of consciousness is not a problem, it is an invention by philosophers. Once we end our speculations, we no longer need to talk of consciousness and theoretical philosophy loses its use.

[Sabot Cat]

And I argue that the second is derived from a misunderstanding of the first.

I believe the second accords to reality just as well as the first.


That very state you describe is derived from a misunderstanding of the first advanced by Descartes. Descartes's argument about consciousness turned it into a distinct "thing" as opposed to a state. This was an idealist position that philosophers today have started to call a state. But this state that they talk about is derived from an idealist non-sense which treats consciousness as an object instead of an actual state.

I disagree. I'm consistently describing it is a state of being, in line with my epiphenomenalist views of the mind.


Ice has the capacity to be solid? Does this mean that there is some non-solid ice out there?


Ice can (only) have or possess the capacity to be solid.

I think you're trying to find irrelevant errors where none exist. Furthermore, your attempt at a critique takes the form of an illogical syllogism, because you're deriving a negative affirmation from a positive premise. Object A having Property X does not imply that there is an Object A without Property X. (Although this isn't a traditional example of that fallacy because I only presented one positive premise as opposed to two, but your logic remains invalid.)

[ChrisK]

I believe the second accords to reality just as well as the first.

I disagree. I'm consistently describing it is a state of being, in line with my epiphenomenalist views of the mind.

It doesn't matter if you are describing it as a state. The state that you are attempting to describe was invented when idealists treated consciousness as an object. Once again, Hacker gives the complete history of how this came about.

Additionally, your epiphenomenal point of view runs into the problem of confusing the conceptual with the empirical.


I think you're trying to find irrelevant errors where none exist. Furthermore, your attempt at a critique takes the form of an illogical syllogism, because you're deriving a negative affirmation from a positive premise. Object A having Property X does not imply that there is an Object A without Property X.

Apologies, I did read over your use of the qualifier "only".

However, my point did not make use of a bad argument (syllogism doesn't apply here since a syllogism is by definition an argument with two premises and a conclusion). My point was that by definition ice must be solid, but if your point had been "Ice can be solid" then I would be deriving the possibility of non-solid ice from "Some ice is solid."

Actually, my misreading you has given us an example of the difference between what is conceptual and what is empirical. Ice being solid is not an empirically known thing, it is conceptual (ie, known by definition).

[Sabot Cat]

It doesn't matter if you are describing it as a state. The state that you are attempting to describe was invented when idealists treated consciousness as an object. Once again, Hacker gives the complete history of how this came about.

I remained unconvinced by the link you've given me with this work, unfortunately; I can expound upon why, but I don't want to take up a few pages in so doing.


Additionally, your epiphenomenal point of view runs into the problem of confusing the conceptual with the empirical.


Qualitative experiences are necessarily empirical.


Apologies, I did read over your use of the qualifier "only".


Admittedly, it was in a parenthesis, so I understand. :)


However, my point did not make use of a bad argument (syllogism doesn't apply here since a syllogism is by definition an argument with two premises and a conclusion).

I think you also read over the part where I noted this.


My point was that by definition ice must be solid, but if your point had been "Ice can be solid" then I would be deriving the possibility of non-solid ice from "Some ice is solid."

Actually, my misreading you has given us an example of the difference between what is conceptual and what is empirical. Ice being solid is not an empirically known thing, it is conceptual (ie, known by definition).

But the property of 'solid' is an experiential quality, and as such it is empirically known.

[Rafiq]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

No, what we can explain is the nature of these experiences and their overall social function.

[Cheese Guevara]

Nevetheless, the issue of "consciousness" and "Marxism" have important linkages, I think.

By dismantling conventional notions of the self, you dismantle conventional notions of hard free will, which dismantles conventional notions of free angecy and the ego, which helps people understand that what they are - their "value" - never belongs wholly to "themselves", but is instead intimately related to a unbroken, social, causal chain. In other words, the self is always social; the Other.

[Rafiq]

Is there a historical materialist approach to the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences?


Are there tools within Marxist theory that can tackle this philosophical problem?




Opinions please....

The materialist conception of history can, most definitely intertwine with biology, however historical materialism pre-supposes the validity of the materialist conception of natural history, as espoused by Darwin. Human consciousness, in all it's glorified distinctiveness, is a product of our revolutionary relationship with nature. Humans are the most imperfect of animals, we exist by mistake, a flaw in the natural balance, if you will. We are a geological factor because we were not constrained by the indifference of nature, our will was forced. All that is desirable is unnatural, and the path toward decadence, barbarism and slavery natural. We can thus tie harmony and peace with oppression in contrast with war - real war, have you, as the struggle towards freedom.