Defending Nihilism

[Czy]

This was posted in the nihilism group, so I'll use this quote to try and make clear the nihilist position, which often seems to be misrepresented and is 'refuted' by those arguing against it creating elaborate straw-men and then knocking them down.


Is Nihilism true? But doesn't this belie the claim that there is no objective truth?

Should we live life as though there were no objective moral claims? But doesn't this contradict the claim thather is no way we should live life by?
So how can anyone seriously support the nihilist world view?

Nihilists can have values like any other person. Humans normally have the need to express themselves. By being a nihilist, they are not giving up that value, they are just realizing that their values are dependent on their own minds only, and therefore their values/morals are subjective.

Nihilists have morals, values and motivation like everyone else. They just realize that not all of us have the same morals, and values.

The nihilist realizes that, value is in the eye of the beholder. One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. There is no invisible price tag on everything that determines the value of anything.

Another way to look at this, nihilists don’t believe that there is some invisible, objective morality in the sky guiding humans down on earth. Instead, they see that morality is dependent on the human who defines them, and independent of the external world. Perhaps the moral views of all humans are only similar because of evolution; we have evolved to have certain values in order to survive.

If anyone has any questions concerning nihilism, post them here.

[tuwix]

My understanding of nihilism (maybe false) that they're against all political streams. Is that true? If so, it doen't make any sense to me.

However, Wikipedia's definition says about "the negation of one or more putatively meaningful aspects of life". If only one, then we are all nihlists because I don't know anyone who wouldbe for everything. :)

[Czy]

For me, nihilism is the rejection of the necessity of the most fundamental social and political structures that exist today (law enforcement, government, etc). So this includes the more common rejection of all religious and moral principles. Most commonly when people say nihilism they mean existential nihilism, which states life has no intrinsic meaning or objective purpose, but nihilism is not exclusively this.


My understanding of nihilism (maybe false) that they're against all political streams. Is that true? If so, it doen't make any sense to me.

What are political streams other than man subjugating man? How doesn't it make sense to you? The rejection of all political structure is a final goal of Marxism afterall, the establishment of a classless society.

[tuwix]

But Marxism is still political stream and not even weakest one. Some anarchist streams are even weaker. Nonetheless, they are all streams. :)

[Fourth Internationalist]

This was posted in the nihilism group, so I'll use this quote to try and make clear the nihilist position, which often seems to be misrepresented and is 'refuted' by those arguing against it creating elaborate straw-men and then knocking them down.



Nihilists can have values like any other person. Humans normally have the need to express themselves. By being a nihilist, they are not giving up that value, they are just realizing that their values are dependent on their own minds only, and therefore their values/morals are subjective.

Nihilists have morals, values and motivation like everyone else. They just realize that not all of us have the same morals, and values.

The nihilist realizes that, value is in the eye of the beholder. One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. There is no invisible price tag on everything that determines the value of anything.

Another way to look at this, nihilists don’t believe that there is some invisible, objective morality in the sky guiding humans down on earth. Instead, they see that morality is dependent on the human who defines them, and independent of the external world. Perhaps the moral views of all humans are only similar because of evolution; we have evolved to have certain values in order to survive.

If anyone has any questions concerning nihilism, post them here.

If this is Nihilism, then Marxism is inherently Nihilistic?

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

This was posted in the nihilism group, so I'll use this quote to try and make clear the nihilist position, which often seems to be misrepresented and is 'refuted' by those arguing against it creating elaborate straw-men and then knocking them down.



Nihilists can have values like any other person. Humans normally have the need to express themselves. By being a nihilist, they are not giving up that value, they are just realizing that their values are dependent on their own minds only, and therefore their values/morals are subjective.

Nihilists have morals, values and motivation like everyone else. They just realize that not all of us have the same morals, and values.

The nihilist realizes that, value is in the eye of the beholder. One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. There is no invisible price tag on everything that determines the value of anything.

Another way to look at this, nihilists don’t believe that there is some invisible, objective morality in the sky guiding humans down on earth. Instead, they see that morality is dependent on the human who defines them, and independent of the external world. Perhaps the moral views of all humans are only similar because of evolution; we have evolved to have certain values in order to survive.

If anyone has any questions concerning nihilism, post them here.

That account seems to be more a kind of moral solipsism than nihilism.

If morality is wholly subjective, how does it happen that people can relate to one another's moral views to the point where they agree on an issue without ever needing to discuss it? You can't explain that by "evolution" alone because people with similar genealogies have different moralities, too. If it's wholly subjective, then why would I think my values really matter?

Why differentiate between people's moral sensibilities and their empirical senses in terms of subjectivity and objectivity? How is my experience of the sky as blue and rape as wrong substantively different?

I'm not taking a position I'm just curious to see your answers.

[Czy]

That account seems to be more a kind of moral solipsism than nihilism.

The solipsist believes he is the centre of everything. The nihilst believes that everything is empty at the centre. But comparing nihilism and solipsism isn't helpful as they focus on different branches of philosophy.


If morality is wholly subjective[...]

Moral nihilism isn't a denial of descriptive moral truths. Moral nihilists recognize that moral beliefs exist and exert influence on human behavior just as other fictitious beliefs do. (Here's a key point).



[...]how does it happen that people can relate to one another's moral views to the point where they agree on an issue without ever needing to discuss it?

But this isn’t an example of morality, just preference. Moral nihilism isn't the stance that people aren't inclined toward or against certain behaviors. In fact many moral nihilist stances reduce the meaning of moral statements to expressions of liking or disliking.

Perhaps an analogy will make this clearer to the moral absolutists who are shaking their heads.

Imagine that three people are discussing their favorite types of pizza.
The first person says, "Pepperoni pizza tastes the best."
The second says, "No way. Pineapple pizza tastes much better than pepperoni pizza."
The third says, "Opinions about what type of pizza tastes the best aren't true because they don't make sense."
The second retorts, "If opinions about what type of pizza tastes the best can't be true, then how can what you just said be true?"

At this point the third person can only blink in bewilderment, since his statement was not about what type of pizza tastes the best, but about opinions presented as absolute facts.


If it's wholly subjective, then why would I think my values really matter?

Moral nihilism is not an ought claim. It is not the stance that we ought to act against or differently from what is claimed to be moral behavior.


If this is Nihilism, then Marxism is inherently Nihilistic?

To determine this would be using your own interpretation. A nihilist, at least in Nietzsche's view, believes that there is no divine, natural or innate purpose for living. However, that does not exclude a belief in purposeful living born out of human construct. So nihilism in that sense is compatible with anarchism.

[BIXX]

But Marxism is still political stream and not even weakest one. Some anarchist streams are even weaker. Nonetheless, they are all streams. :)

How are you defining "political stream"? I am unfamiliar with this term.

A political stream, if I am guessing correctly, would be ideology?

In that case, post-left anarchism is not a political stream.

[Rusty Shackleford]

From your description of 'morals' and so on are not intrinsic or inherent to humanity but are nevertheless real in that humans exert influence on one another.

Would a Nihilist agree with the assumption that the only 'nature' of humanity is sociability* then? And in agreeing to that, reject individualism in favor of individual relations where the individual only becomes whole (if there is a whole, though no point to it) through interaction?

This probably sounds like I am vomiting out words through my fingers. I haven't really read a lick of Nihilist literature, that I remember at least.


*Sociability in that naturally we cannot reproduce asexually and that even if we were are able to be produced artificially that it would require the existence of another and genetic material from others to make 'us' exist. We do not come into existence spontaneously. So, at the most basic level, a relationship of some sort has to exist between one or more humans. Everything else from there on out is just a product of relations; morality and language even for example.

[BIXX]

From your description of 'morals' and so on are not intrinsic or inherent to humanity but are nevertheless real in that humans exert influence on one another.

I fail to see how beings exerting influence upon one another implies the existence of morals.


Would a Nihilist agree with the assumption that the only 'nature' of humanity is sociability then? And in agreeing to that, reject individualism in favor of individual relations where the individual only becomes whole (if there is a whole, though no point to it) through interaction?

Not really. One can be a nihilist egoist/individualist (like myself) as I am an existential and moral nihilist, and a political nihilist (rejecting politics). Individualists don't reject interaction, but we do reject interaction that doesn't aid us. This is more complicated than it may seem, however, and I'm much better at explaining it in conversation or in one of the pieces I've written.

Another point, I (and all other nihilists, I believe) reject "becoming whole". But especially egoists.


This probably sounds like I am vomiting out words through my fingers. I haven't really read a lick of Nihilist literature, that I remember at least.

It's cool. I'm barely read any myself, I just look to myself for the answer I give. However, I am trying to get more involved in reading philosophical and anarchist texts.

[BIXX]

*Sociability in that naturally we cannot reproduce asexually and that even if we were are able to be produced artificially that it would require the existence of another and genetic material from others to make 'us' exist. We do not come into existence spontaneously. So, at the most basic level, a relationship of some sort has to exist between one or more humans. Everything else from there on out is just a product of relations; morality and language even for example.

This changes some things.


From your description of 'morals' and so on are not intrinsic or inherent to humanity but are nevertheless real in that humans exert influence on one another.

Morals are what society has decided is right and wrong (some people, the rulers of a society, have a greater influence over this decision).


Would a Nihilist agree with the assumption that the only 'nature' of humanity is sociability* then? And in agreeing to that, reject individualism in favor of individual relations where the individual only becomes whole (if there is a whole, though no point to it) through interaction?

I wouldn't consider it the nature so much, but an intrinsic quality. The rest of my earlier reply still applies.


This probably sounds like I am vomiting out words through my fingers. I haven't really read a lick of Nihilist literature, that I remember at least.


Again, no worries :)

[tuwix]

A political stream, if I am guessing correctly, would be ideology?

In that case, post-left anarchism is not a political stream.

It is. They're trying to reject ideology but they refer to that. And just referring to any ideology makes it a political steram IMO

[BIXX]

It is. They're trying to reject ideology but they refer to that. And just referring to any ideology makes it a political steram IMO

How so?

[tuwix]

Post-left anarchy is a recent current in anarchist thought that promotes a critique of anarchism's relationship to traditional leftism


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-left_anarchy

Current is an synonym of stream in terms of philosophy, ideology, etc. And IMO post-left anarchism isn't nihilism as I understand it. In my understanding, nihilist is one who is against any ideology or even a part of it. He wants that all be "good", but he is against all discussed solutions and has nothing to offer in term of solutions.
And this is why it doesn't make any sense to me.

[Czy]

You should have read the entire article. . . from the very next sentence:


Some post-leftists seek to escape the confines of ideology in general also presenting a critique of organizations and morality

tuwix, I disagree that rejecting ideology is itself an ideology.


Apart from the obvious lack of favor for the state, anarchists and political nihilists have a profound rebellious nature against many aspects which act to hinder individual freedom in general, either because of their lack of meaning or because they are intended to control. The “meaning” of these controlling factors that are overarching in all decision making factors within nations and communities is what is particularly repulsive to both intellectual groups. Both wish for the state to desist its tyrannical/pointless acts because they will or cannot do anything for real human development or enhancement of freedom

with the crucial difference being:


[...]at the heart of the division between political nihilism (which if self contained with politics alone is ultimately paradox) and anarchy lies in the decision one must make, which is: what is your rationale against the state?


From your description of 'morals' and so on are not intrinsic or inherent to humanity but are nevertheless real in that humans exert influence on one another.

Echoshock answered this pretty well. I'm not sure I see your point. As I said, fictitious beliefs exert influence on people, but the fact that these beliefs have an influence doesn't make them true.


Would a Nihilist agree with the assumption that the only 'nature' of humanity is sociability* then? And in agreeing to that, reject individualism in favor of individual relations where the individual only becomes whole (if there is a whole, though no point to it) through interaction?

For me, the logical extension of nihilism is egoist anarchism. In the words of its formulator Stirner, the egoist rejects pursuit of devotion to "a great idea, a good cause, a doctrine, a system, a lofty calling."

This doesn't mean we're against social organisation. First of all, I strongly believe in psychological egoism, the view that humans are always motivated by self-interest, even in what seem to be acts of altruism (read up on this if you're no sure).

Egoism and collectivism is not necessarily mutually exclusive. If the self-interest of the individual coincides with that of others they'll form a group (In Stirnerite terminology a Union of Egoists) which can be seen as a commune.

Communism, I believe, is not only in the self-interest of the "collective" but also in that of the individual. In that sense every anarchist, socialist, etc. is somewhat of an egoist.

Stirner is brilliant. His concept kinda revolved around the fact that common notions about the state, society, morality, etc are illusions or ghosts in the mind, saying of society that "the individuals are its reality." Stirner wanted to "abolish not only the state but also society as an institution responsible for its members."


I say: liberate yourself as far as you can, and you have done your part; for it is not given to every one to break through all limits, or, more expressively, not to everyone is that a limit which is a limit for the rest. Consequently, do not tire yourself with toiling at the limits of others; enough if you tear down yours. [...] He who overturns one of his limits may have shown others the way and the means; the overturning of their limits remains their affair. ...."

As I mentioned earlier, but I'll say again, this is not a form of bourgeois individualism. It acknowledges, and vociferously so, the problems with private property, capitalism and the state. The main function is to drum in that every political institution is merely man subjugating man.

[The Feral Underclass]

From whom and for what reason are you "defending" nihilism?

[Czy]

Don't take the title too literally. I just thought I'd make a thread discussing nihilism as it is often misconceived/misunderstood.

[Hit The North]

Morals are what society has decided is right and wrong (some people, the rulers of a society, have a greater influence over this decision).


Yes but this is different to the point Czy made, and which Rusty was responding to. Czy stated that morals were subjective. Rusty, I think, is defending a position that morals arise from social relations and are, therefore, inter-subjective - a product of lived social relations, rather than mere ghosts of the mind as Czy and Stirner argue (an essentially idealist position).

[Hit The North]

Echoshock answered this pretty well. I'm not sure I see your point. As I said, fictitious beliefs exert influence on people, but the fact that these beliefs have an influence doesn't make them true.


Or so you believe.


Stirner is brilliant. His concept kinda revolved around the fact that common notions about the state, society, morality, etc are illusions or ghosts in the mind, saying of society that "the individuals are its reality." Stirner wanted to "abolish not only the state but also society as an institution responsible for its members."

This is awful. The kind of methodological individualism that marks most bourgeois social science and was certainly superseded by historical materialism. Individuals are caught up in webs of determination - social relations which are indispensible to the maintenance of social life in a given historical period, modes of production which act upon them - so it is not true to say that individuals are its reality and the state and society are ghosts of the mind.

[Czy]

Czy stated that morals were subjective.

That is moral relativism and not what I'm saying at all. Universal and contextual truths are both equally invalid. You're confusing subjective truth with Stirner's 'spooks of the mind' - understandably so - Stirner is one of the most misunderstood writers - not surprising, considering he is a so-called forerunner of not only nihilism but postmodernism and existentialism.


mo·ral·i·ty (m-rl-t, mô-)
n. pl. mo·ral·i·ties
1. The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct.
2. A system of ideas of right and wrong conduct

I reject the entire notion of good (right) vs bad (wrong) behaviour.

When I said this earlier:


Instead, they see that morality is dependent on the human who defines them

I meant exactly what EchoShock said, when he said "Morals are what society has decided is right and wrong."

Except, when I say society, I mean the sum of individual consciousness. That's all that society is, and I'm up to debate this point if you're interested.

Whether we're talking about an island of 10 people living together or a large nation, the concept of morality is arbitrarily decided upon in the minds of people and it is translated into their actions - including the fact that the 'ghost' in one's mind of morality has been shaped by those more powerful than them.


[...] morals arise from social relations and are, therefore, inter-subjective

Intersubjectivity, in a broad sense à la Kant, refers to agreement and shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions.

Morals are intersubjective, but that doesn't make them true; the concept was manufactured in the mind of Man - his consciousness has manufactured these notions - influenced by the outside world, of course, in that the individual consciousness of Man manifests itself in the external - the outside world/realm. I concede that point. But the acceptance of these concepts is very much an internal process. People are sponges and sap up that around them, often not questioning the origin of their thought processes.

In a broad sense, the meaning of moral statements can be reduced to expressions of liking or disliking, but not truth in a universal or contextual manner (this dispels the parallel to moral relativism).


rather than mere ghosts of the mind as Czy and Stirner argue (an essentially idealist position).

Stirner asserted that the original sources of law and morality are the power and the might of the individual personality. The will of the individual establishes the truth of phenomena (When he said ”I am the criterion of truth" for e.g)

I won't deny that is is a very idealist position, Stirner did describe man, law, morality, etc as “specters,” in other words, alienated forms of the individual consciousness. But I'm not sure what your point is? Stirner was and never claimed to be a Marxist and nihilism is not compatible with Marxism in my opinion.

I would like to know more about the Marxist position: when one says that morality is a product of social relations, which I generally understand to be property relations and the division of labour and the productive forces, is the particular code of morality that arises from these social relations true; in other words, is it a contextual truth? Morality changes as these social relations changes (Feudalism's code of ethics changed drastically to capitalism's) - so when communism is reached, will the set of ethics and code of morality that arises be true either universally (so a kinda telos - the end goal of communism brings about true morality) or contextually (in the context of communism, that set of ethics is true - in capitalism the set of ethics and morality is true, and so on)?

[Loony Le Fist]

Nihilists can have values like any other person. Humans normally have the need to express themselves. By being a nihilist, they are not giving up that value, they are just realizing that their values are dependent on their own minds only, and therefore their values/morals are subjective.

Nihilists have morals, values and motivation like everyone else. They just realize that not all of us have the same morals, and values.

The nihilist realizes that, value is in the eye of the beholder. One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. There is no invisible price tag on everything that determines the value of anything.

Perhaps I misunderstand here, but if values are all subjective, what is the context for which human slavery could ever be considered justified? What is the context where genocide could ever be justified? What is the context where child rape is ever justified?

If values are subjective then how can we ever justify holding those that would cause harm to others accountable? If values are subjective then it becomes impossible to hold those that transgress against you accountable for their actions. Accountability is the glue of society. Justice is impossible with moral relativism.

While it's true that some values are subjective, other's are far less so. I am a socialist because I think some values are rather objective and share a common thread among us all.

[Sabot Cat]

That is moral relativism and not what I'm saying at all. Universal and contextual truths are both equally invalid.

This assertion that universal and contextual truths are equally invalid is itself a universal truth. Thus, it is necessarily false.



I reject the entire notion of good (right) vs bad (wrong) behaviour.

When I said this earlier:



I meant exactly what EchoShock said, when he said "Morals are what society has decided is right and wrong."

Except, when I say society, I mean the sum of individual consciousness. That's all that society is, and I'm up to debate this point if you're interested.

Whether we're talking about an island of 10 people living together or a large nation, the concept of morality is arbitrarily decided upon in the minds of people and it is translated into their actions - including the fact that the 'ghost' in one's mind of morality has been shaped by those more powerful than them.



Morality may require a consensus based on observations, and analysis thereof, but so does any field of empirical inquiry. Right and wrong are as part of our world as hard and soft, wet and dry, etc. They are experiential qualities, and their reliance on subjectivity does not diminish their truth.


Intersubjectivity, in a broad sense à la Kant, refers to agreement and shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions.

Morals are intersubjective, but that doesn't make them true; the concept was manufactured in the mind of Man - his consciousness has manufactured these notions - influenced by the outside world, of course, in that the individual consciousness of Man manifests itself in the external - the outside world/realm. I concede that point. But the acceptance of these concepts is very much an internal process. People are sponges and sap up that around them, often not questioning the origin of their thought processes.

In a broad sense, the meaning of moral statements can be reduced to expressions of liking or disliking, but not truth in a universal or contextual manner (this dispels the parallel to moral relativism).

Statements about the world can be "reduced" to experiencing this and that, but I fail to see why this would except them from the category of truth. Whether or not someone likes something is a factual matter, subject to possible falsehood.



I would like to know more about the Marxist position: when one says that morality is a product of social relations, which I generally understand to be property relations and the division of labour and the productive forces, is the particular code of morality that arises from these social relations true; in other words, is it a contextual truth? Morality changes as these social relations changes (Feudalism's code of ethics changed drastically to capitalism's) - so when communism is reached, will the set of ethics and code of morality that arises be true either universally (so a kinda telos - the end goal of communism brings about true morality) or contextually (in the context of communism, that set of ethics is true - in capitalism the set of ethics and morality is true, and so on)?

People's understanding of ethics changed, yes. The Feudal era consensus on all of the sciences changed with the times, but I see no reason to doubt scientific claims simply because our comprehension of them fluctuates according to societal conditions.

[bcbm]

Morality may require a consensus based on observations, and analysis thereof, but so does any field of empirical inquiry. Right and wrong are as part of our world as hard and soft, wet and dry, etc. They are experiential qualities, and their reliance on subjectivity does not diminish their truth.


i can feel the ground and deduce from my senses that it is soft and wet or hard and dry, but what proves 'right' or 'wrong?'

[Czy]

This assertion that universal and contextual truths are equally invalid is itself a universal truth. Thus, it is necessarily false.

*sigh*

If I say there are no moral truths, that is not a moral statement so it is not contradictory. Not all statements are moral statements.


Right and wrong are as part of our world as hard and soft, wet and dry, etc. They are experiential qualities, and their reliance on subjectivity does not diminish their truth.

This is just as epistemologically unfounded as the objective morality claim.


Statements about the world can be "reduced" to experiencing this and that, but I fail to see why this would except them from the category of truth.

According to your logic, an opinion about pizza (see analogy) would be an absolute fact and truthful, not an opinion. Morality is an opinion masquerading as an absolute fact. Prove to me otherwise.


People's understanding of ethics changed, yes. The Feudal era consensus on all of the sciences changed with the times, but I see no reason to doubt scientific claims simply because our comprehension of them fluctuates according to societal conditions.

So is a truth universal or contextual for you?


I am a socialist because I think some values are rather objective and share a common thread among us all.

How do you differentiate between what's objective and what's not? By objective, I take it you mean universal - independent of context.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

i can feel the ground and deduce from my senses that it is soft and wet or hard and dry, but what proves 'right' or 'wrong?'

We don't deduce with our senses. We induce with our senses. I could feel the ground is wet, then find I have some neurological disorder that tells me the ground is wet when it isn't. There's no logical validity with empirical, worldly knowledge any more than there is with what could be called "moral knowledge". There is a sense that I get useful information from it though, and information that I am compelled to assert. If I see a rape, I have a feeling of revulsion telling me that the act is repugnant due to the suffering, violation and disregard of the victim just as much as I have a feeling of the ground being wet after someone hosed it down with water. In fact, that moral knowledge is as useful as the view that the ground is wet because it guides me to make the choice of not doing that behavior myself on behalf of the victims and of trying to discourage others from doing the same thing.



According to your logic, an opinion about pizza (see analogy) would be an absolute fact and truthful, not an opinion. Morality is an opinion masquerading as an absolute fact. Prove to me otherwise.


Prove that sensory knowledge of the world is any more absolute and certain. Hume showed why we should be skeptical of moral knowledge claims but his skeptical arguments about empirical knowledge are no less compelling.

Moral skepticism and an understanding of the cultural contingency of moral claims doesn't justify denying the existence of morality as such. It is certainly true that people make dubious moral claims all the time, and that most people and cultures assert moral beliefs that they don't understand or have no justification. But when they assert that quantum physics is accurate or that humans are biochemical beings, we know that they may not understand the scientific justifications for these claims yet we still can say that a belief in quantum physics or the biochemical human being is reasonable and accurate. Even scientists don't yet understand these phenomena fully! Yet that lack of complete understanding or perfect knowledge is not reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater

[Sabot Cat]

i can feel the ground and deduce from my senses that it is soft and wet or hard and dry, but what proves 'right' or 'wrong?'

The amount of utility that is produced as a consequence of that action.


*sigh*

If I say there are no moral truths, that is not a moral statement so it is not contradictory. Not all statements are moral statements.

You didn't say there was no moral truths, you said there was no universal or contextual truths, which is a proposition that can be true or false (and it is necessarily false).


This is just as epistemologically unfounded as the objective morality claim.


The amount of pleasure or suffering produced by an action is almost always verifiable (the caveat of "almost" is placed there in acknowledgement of our limited ability to ascertain knowledge scientifically).



According to your logic, an opinion about pizza (see analogy) would be an absolute fact and truthful, not an opinion. Morality is an opinion masquerading as an absolute fact. Prove to me otherwise.


Opinions are statements of fact about one's preferences. Whether or not I prefer a certain kind of pizza is something that can be verified or refuted. Whether or not most people will like a certain kind of pizza, likewise. What kind of pizza would be optimal for a population according to the principles of utility, that is, which pizza toppings would be good or bad in this situation, is something verifiable. So preferences and the morality of actions are all factual matters, because propositions about them can be true or false.


So is a truth universal or contextual for you?


All propositions are either true, false, or meaningless.

[The Feral Underclass]

I could feel the ground is wet, then find I have some neurological disorder that tells me the ground is wet when it isn't.

So we start from the premise that the ground is dry? How have you arrived at this conclusion?

[Rafiq]

Nihilism is a bunch of dribble that equates recognition of objective reality with belief in objective morality. It's foolish. You can recognize the ground objectively exists regardless of your senses while knowing morality is intristically subjective. Well actually, in a way it isn't. Morality is intertwined with very real social relations which construct it, therefore because it has an objective basis, it may very well exist abstractly of individual points of view and exist objectively. But a different mode of production holds a different morality to supplement it.

[Sabot Cat]

So we start from the premise that the ground is dry? How have you arrived at this conclusion?

Feeling it, presumably.

[The Feral Underclass]

Feeling it, presumably.

But he claimed that you cannot deduce things through your senses. So if he starts from the premise that the ground is dry, which is what he is doing, but feels it's wet because of a neurological disorder, how has he concluded it's actually dry?

Using Sinister's example, if we induce with our senses instead of deducing, is he saying that it's probably dry because he has a neurological disorder? If we cannot deduce with our senses, how can the premise of the example be that the ground is not wet (dry)?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something...

[Sabot Cat]

But he claimed that you cannot deduce things through your senses. So if he starts from the premise that the ground is dry, which is what he is doing, but feels it's wet because of a neurological disorder, how has he concluded it's actually dry?

Using Sinister's example, if we induce with our senses of deducing, is he saying that it's probably dry because he has a neurological disorder? If we cannot deduce with our senses, how can the premise of the example be that the ground is not wet (dry)?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something...

Yes, you're misunderstanding the meaning of deduction in this epistemological context. When you deduce something, you have a set of premises that you deduce a conclusion from. The most common deductive reasoning tool is inference, with a proposition's validity stemming from consistency with other propositions. Induction, and the process of inductive reasoning, is when one arrives at one's conclusion through means outside of mere consistency of premises, such as observation. Through deduction and induction, one can have arguments that are both valid and sound.

[The Feral Underclass]

So if someone has a neurological disorder that makes them feel the ground as wet, how do we start from the premise that it's dry?

[Sabot Cat]

So if someone has a neurological disorder that makes them feel the ground as wet, how do we start from the premise that it's dry?

We observe that it's dry, either through touch or measuring the relative moisture of that ground compared to a statistical analysis of the amount of moisture necessary for people to use the term 'wet' in reference to ground.

[The Feral Underclass]

We observe that it's dry, either through touch or measuring the relative moisture of that ground compared to a statistical analysis of the amount of moisture necessary for people to use the term 'wet' in reference to ground.

How do you observe a moral right?

[Sabot Cat]

How do you observe a moral right?

Did an action cause people to suffer more than benefit? If so, it was wrong. If not, it was right. You have to observe the experiential consequences, and then deduce from the aggregate of those to know whether "right" or "wrong" would be a more appropriate denotation for that action.

[The Feral Underclass]

Did an action cause people to suffer more than benefit? If so, it was wrong. If not, it was right.

An action causing people to suffer more than it benefited is not the observation of a moral right, it is simply the existence of an occurrence. What you are describing is simply an interpretation of a phenomenon.

You are not observing a moral right, you are constructing a moral right based upon your observance of an occurrence.


You have to induce the experiential consequences, and then deduce from the aggregate of those to know whether "right" or "wrong" would be a more appropriate denotation for that action.

This assumes there is a premise from which to start. You have established an equation by which to judge phenomenon that occur. On what basis does this negate the opposite in a way similar to your observations negating the person with the neurological disorders conclusion?

[BIXX]

Nihilism is a bunch of dribble that equates recognition of objective reality with belief in objective morality. It's foolish. You can recognize the ground objectively exists regardless of your senses while knowing morality is intristically subjective. Well actually, in a way it isn't. Morality is intertwined with very real social relations which construct it, therefore because it has an objective basis, it may very well exist abstractly of individual points of view and exist objectively. But a different mode of production holds a different morality to supplement it.

That is incorrect. Nihilists don't believe there are any objective values (ranging from the reasons for existing to morals, etc...), that doesn't mean you can't recognize there is an objective reality.

Morality is created by humans, and their relations. That makes it subjective. If morality was something that was always there, independent of human creation, then it would be objective.

[Rugged Collectivist]

Czy, can you please elaborate more on the difference between subjective morality and moral nihilism? I still don't understand the difference. I also have a hard time understanding contextual truth. How can something be true in a certain context but not in another?

[Rafiq]

Echoshock who can seriously believe that morality exits independently of human creation besides the religious

[Sabot Cat]

An action causing people to suffer more than it benefited is not the observation of a moral right, it is simply the existence of an occurrence. What you are describing is simply an interpretation of a phenomenon.

You are not observing a moral right, you are constructing a moral right based upon your observance of an occurrence.

How am I constructing suffering or benefits, or detonating right and wrong actions from therein? These terms and classifications are not arbitrary; they are qualities which can be verified or falsified.


This assumes there is a premise from which to start. You have established an equation by which to judge phenomenon that occur. On what basis does this negate the opposite in a way similar to your observations negating the person with the neurological disorders conclusion?

There is a premise from which you start, that is, what terms mean based on their usage and experiential precedents.


Morality is created by humans, and their relations. That makes it subjective. If morality was something that was always there, independent of human creation, then it would be objective.

Science and mathematics were also created by humans. Are the conclusions from those "subjective"? Morality is a branch of knowledge that happens to usually be about humans, like psychology, anthropology or linguistics, and I see no reason to except it from the categories of truth or falsehood on the grounds that it relates to people.


Echoshock who can seriously believe that morality exits independently of human creation besides the religious

Morality is about people, so of course it can't be "independent" of them. But morality is a factual matter, nonetheless.

[BIXX]

Echoshock who can seriously believe that morality exits independently of human creation besides the religious

You would, unfortunately, be surprised.

However, you appear to have not read or not realized how important the word "relations" was in my sentence. You see, different humans have different relations, so their morals will be different (in many places, rape isn't seen as morally wrong, but look at the "morals" of revleft, where rape is seen as inescapably wrong), plus our morals change over time, which makes them subjective (i.e. if in the past I thought that hurting people for fun was ok, but later I realized it was not, that moral saying it was ok would be subjective to the past version of me). This is because our relations (which constantly change) have led us to that conclusion. If all relations between everything in existence were the same and unchanging (which is impossible because every thing in the universe must be in motion) then there would be an objective morality.


Science and mathematics were also created by humans. Are the conclusions from those "subjective"? Morality is a branch of knowledge that happens to usually be about humans, like psychology, anthropology or linguistics, and I see no reason to except it from the categories of truth or falsehood on the grounds that it relates to people.

Science and mathematics are things we have developed to describe the world, i.e. why does an apple fall when dropped? Well, we eventually figured out it was because of gravity, which was (surprise!) there before humans. Mathematics is a tool of science as well as a science in its own right, but it is again primarily used to describe relations that are in existence.

Morality is not used to describe what is right and wrong, it is used to decide what is right and wrong.

[Sabot Cat]

Science and mathematics are things we have developed to describe the world, i.e. why does an apple fall when dropped? Well, we eventually figured out it was because of gravity, which was (surprise!) there before humans.

Psychology describes the world itself, but the object of its study didn't exist before humans because they are the object of the study. The same is true of ethics.


Mathematics is a tool of science as well as a science in its own right, but it is again primarily used to describe relations that are in existence.

Morality is not used to describe what is right and wrong, it is used to decide what is right and wrong.

I think the difference between description and prescription in ethics is overstated. What one ought to do is based on what is. So, "one shouldn't murder one's grandmother because it's bad" is just a deflated form of "if one hopes to not cause suffering, one shouldn't murder one's grandmother because it's bad, in that it usually causes more suffering than not".

[Rafiq]

Morality is not factual. The moral framework from which you attribute the causing of suffering on others as immoral is of your own design. That is different from objectively existing, measurable phenomena like the dryness of the ground. The problem with many nihilists is that they presume morals are just as 'real' as the heat of a fire and therefore deduce both simply to our senses.

[Art Vandelay]

Morality is not factual. The moral framework from which you attribute the causing of suffering on others as immoral is of your own design. That is different from objectively existing, measurable phenomena like the dryness of the ground.

It honestly amazes me how many 'Marxists' on this site reconcile their 'Marxism' with morality; who fail to uphold the basic materialist position that no universal morality exists, unrelated to social classes, their economic underpinnings, and abrupt historical change.

[Sabot Cat]

Morality is not factual. The moral framework from which you attribute the causing of suffering on others as immoral is of your own design. That is different from objectively existing, measurable phenomena like the dryness of the ground. The problem with many nihilists is that they presume morals are just as 'real' as the heat of a fire and therefore deduce both simply to our senses.

I did not design ethical distinctions. The presence of suffering is verifiable. Whether or not an action will cause suffering is also a factual matter. The fact that bad actions are ones that cause more suffering than not is something true of the term by its most common usage. Morality is a science akin to sociology, psychology, etc.

However, a better metaphor might be medicine. There is an experiential difference between "healthy" and "sick", while actions and substances can be judged on these qualities. These qualities may rely on a certain understanding of what these terms mean or universal preferences, and they pertain only to living beings, but does that mean they are meaningless or arbitrary distinctions? No, and I find it evident that there is a verifiable, factual difference between a type of medical practice that makes you sick and an action that makes you healthier, just as there is a verifiable, factual difference between an action that will make you happier and one that will cause you to suffer.


It honestly amazes me how many 'Marxists' on this site reconcile their 'Marxism' with morality; who fail to uphold the basic materialist position that no universal morality exists, unrelated to social classes, their economic underpinnings, and abrupt historical change.

Consequentialist ethical systems such as Utilitarianism takes all of these factors in account, while not resorting to deities or conjecture that would fail to be parsimonious. What would be good for a situation depends on the particulars of that situation, but the meaning of good does not change. To continue the medical analogy, some people are allergic to certain medications, but that does not make us confused about the universal goal of healthiness in light of how different treatments work better in different circumstances.

[Hit The North]

It honestly amazes me how many 'Marxists' on this site reconcile their 'Marxism' with morality; who fail to uphold the basic materialist position that no universal morality exists, unrelated to social classes, their economic underpinnings, and abrupt historical change.

But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes. Because human beings live in a world of meaning, the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other. Morality appears to be an anthropological fact.

Isn't morality one of those contested arenas of the class struggle? Their morals versus ours?

[Hit The North]

I did not design ethical distinctions. The presence of suffering is verifiable. Whether or not an action will cause suffering is also a factual matter. The fact that bad actions are ones that cause more suffering than not is something true of the term by its most common usage. Morality is a science akin to sociology, psychology, etc.


But the quantity of suffering is not a sufficient condition for establishing the morality of an action.

If, one evening, returning from a baseball game, I come across three young men beating up a homeless guy and I wade in to protect him and hospitalise the three assailants with my baseball bat, then my actions have increased the sum total of human suffering, but would it have been more moral or ethical to stand bye, let the homeless guy get beaten, and therefore minimise the quantity of human suffering through my inaction?

[Sabot Cat]

But the quantity of suffering is not a sufficient condition for establishing the morality of an action.

If, one evening, returning from a baseball game, I come across three young men beating up a homeless guy and I wade in to protect him and hospitalise the three assailants with my baseball bat, then my actions have increased the sum total of human suffering, but would it have been more moral or ethical to stand bye, let the homeless guy get beaten, and therefore minimise the quantity of human suffering through my inaction?

True, the amount of suffering isn't the only salient factor for felicific calculus, although I don't think there's only two options in your scenario. You should apply the minimum amount of pain necessary to deter the attackers, which may or not be to hospitalize them. And I don't see how you increased the sum of total human suffering by preventing these assailants from beating up this homeless person and possibly others. This is also not to mention what you could be doing by establishing that those who beat on the homeless in your community will see swift retribution from your baseball bat, or others who share these values (which can be seen as more common than they would have if not for your intervention). These situations are more complex in the analysis than they are at first brush, at the very least.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

It honestly amazes me how many 'Marxists' on this site reconcile their 'Marxism' with morality; who fail to uphold the basic materialist position that no universal morality exists, unrelated to social classes, their economic underpinnings, and abrupt historical change.

There are different accounts of morality, ethics, metaethics etc - some of which are less inconsistent with materialist analysis than others. For instance, Abrahamic duty-based ethics is really difficult to make consistent with Marxist materialism, but Aristotle's ethics have some interesting similarities, including a focus on actual human psychology relative to an actual introduction to a social context over placing moral blame on supposedly atomic free agents. In other words, it's not so abstract and metaphysically curious.


But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes. Because human beings live in a world of meaning, the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other. Morality appears to be an anthropological fact.

Isn't morality one of those contested arenas of the class struggle? Their morals versus ours?

Yeah we *have* morality whether or not that morality is universal. I find the most amoral Marxists on and off this forum frequently use the most moralistic reasoning of all. I can't begin to say how many people have described the words or acts of some member of the bourgeoisie, media, state etc or some rapist, bigot or other reactionary as "disgusting" or "pathetic" before swinging around and denying that morality exists. In other words they make moral claims while denying that those claims are "moral" because, after all, "morality" is just something for those pesky, idealist liberals and Christians. Not that their reasons to be skeptical of morality aren't justified, but the desire to deny its ability to tell us anything useful about the world altogether is curious.

I tend to think that people generally unviersalize the moral intuitions that they gained within their culture and class context, and that some moral beliefs are better to be made universal than others - for instance, the right to private property is something the proletariat should not want as a universal moral right while working class solidarity is often worth encouraging as a moral virtue. Thus, we understand that breaking private property is not good but scabbing is something actually one should not do since it undermines some greater end which we desire - the goal of working class liberation.


But he claimed that you cannot deduce things through your senses. So if he starts from the premise that the ground is dry, which is what he is doing, but feels it's wet because of a neurological disorder, how has he concluded it's actually dry?

Using Sinister's example, if we induce with our senses instead of deducing, is he saying that it's probably dry because he has a neurological disorder? If we cannot deduce with our senses, how can the premise of the example be that the ground is not wet (dry)?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something...

The point isn't that we get to a new premise that the ground was dry (perhaps it was, as Red Rose says we can use other means to determine that), the point is that we can't know for sure because causal reasoning through induction is imperfect. This is why optical illusions work the way they do. This is why "objective" science is constantly changing. It used to be "objective knowledge" of the "real world" that time and space were absolute until Einstein threw that out and made the dimensions of our universe relative.

The other issue is that sensory knowledge is always grounded in inductive reasoning before we can try to use it to deduce facts, meaning that sensory knowledge always has this lack of certainty contained within it.

[BIXX]

True, the amount of suffering isn't the only salient factor for felicific calculus, although I don't think there's only two options in your scenario. You should apply the minimum amount of pain necessary to deter the attackers, which may or not be to hospitalize them. And I don't see how you increased the sum of total human suffering by preventing these assailants from beating up this homeless person and possibly others. This is also not to mention what you could be doing by establishing that those who beat on the homeless in your community will see swift retribution from your baseball bat, or others who share these values (which can be seen as more common than they would have if not for your intervention). These situations are more complex in the analysis than they are at first brush, at the very least.

You keep talking about using some sort of moral calculation or some shit like that, with the assumption that human suffering is bad, and you seem to be acting as if that makes it objective.

I doubt that people who hurt the homeless, rape people, hurt people unnecessarily, and oppress us would agree that human suffering is bad. So no, morals are not objective.

Also, I have a question for all of you who are trying to claim there is an objective morality/reason for existing, why do you have a hard time accepting that there isn't?

I mean, I personally don't believe there are any morals (that are not just a spectacle)/reason to exist for anyone, which I can understand having a hard time accepting, but why is it so hard to accept that there is no objective objective morals/reasons to exist?

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

I doubt that people who hurt the homeless, rape people, hurt people unnecessarily, and oppress us would agree that human suffering is bad. So no, morals are not objective.


The fact that people don't agree about something doesn't mean morals aren't "objective". Those rapists and oppressors might be WRONG about morality the way Ptolemy was WRONG that the sun went around the earth (note - universal and objective aren't the same thing. perhaps they are universally intersubjective?)



I mean, I personally don't believe there are any morals (that are not just a spectacle)/reason to exist for anyone, which I can understand having a hard time accepting, but why is it so hard to accept that there is no objective objective morals/reasons to exist?Because they disagree with you? :rolleyes: If you're a consequentialist your moral intuition is that morality can be quantified in terms of suffering. If you're a virtue ethicist then you think that morality can be seen in a person's psychology/character traits. If you are a deontologist or duty ethicist you see morality as ideal duties which are as objective as a law of nature.

I think it's a good question to ask what someone means by objective morality and it's good to challenge this claim but there are a lot of people who do support various moral systems with good reasons. I would recommend doing some reading on the subject - wiki is a good point of reference. Then you can build a more interesting critique of "objective morality" than banging your head in the wall over how dense some people seem to you.

[The Feral Underclass]

How am I constructing suffering or benefits, or detonating right and wrong actions from therein?

Because you're sapient.


These terms and classifications are not arbitrary

Insofar as they have infinite meanings they are.


they are qualities which can be verified or falsified.

In accordance with what?


There is a premise from which you start, that is, what terms mean based on their usage and experiential precedents.

In order for something to be true, something has to be false. For something to be, something has to not be. In order for 2+2 to equal 4, 2+2 cannot equal 5.

If you think something is "morally wrong," how is it that someone else can think it is "morally right"? If morality was an observable occurrence, why is it not definitive?

Even Christian's don't try and claim that morals just exist.


The point isn't that we get to a new premise that the ground was dry (perhaps it was, as Red Rose says we can use other means to determine that), the point is that we can't know for sure because causal reasoning through induction is imperfect.

Your example started from the basis that you were sure the ground was dry.


This is why optical illusions work the way they do. This is why "objective" science is constantly changing. It used to be "objective knowledge" of the "real world" that time and space were absolute until Einstein threw that out and made the dimensions of our universe relative.

Those theories were based on observable, verifiable objects. Morality is neither observable, verifiable or an object.


The other issue is that sensory knowledge is always grounded in inductive reasoning before we can try to use it to deduce facts, meaning that sensory knowledge always has this lack of certainty contained within it.

The entirety of knowledge contains uncertainty. You can never be absolutely certain that something is something. That is the limit of our sapience and the boundary of our intellect. Without a clear, holistic and definitive understanding of our existence and the universe, there is never the possibility of certainty in anything we do or understand.

But we use what we have: objects. Things that we can see and touch and smell to construct our reality (in all probability). We use approximations and probabilities because we can observe and verify the existence of objects (in so far as we understand those concepts).

From all of that comes the phantoms of our mind: Religion, morality, politics. All of those things are real only insofar as they are articulated into the world from our mind, premised and given form based upon our interaction with the material world.

That doesn't make them real. Morality, politics, religion are not verifiable objects, they are not observable phenomenon, they are, for most people just an opinion; a throw away view that's been shaped by a material world they predicted on class division. For revolutionaries, we make different choices based on our understanding, but it doesn't make us right in any definitive sense.

There is a difference between someone having a moral and that moral being real. Morality isn't real. It is a figment of the mind, just like the belief in Santa.

[Fakeblock]

I did not design ethical distinctions. The presence of suffering is verifiable. Whether or not an action will cause suffering is also a factual matter. The fact that bad actions are ones that cause more suffering than not is something true of the term by its most common usage. Morality is a science akin to sociology, psychology, etc.

However, a better metaphor might be medicine. There is an experiential difference between "healthy" and "sick", while actions and substances can be judged on these qualities. These qualities may rely on a certain understanding of what these terms mean or universal preferences, and they pertain only to living beings, but does that mean they are meaningless or arbitrary distinctions? No, and I find it evident that there is a verifiable, factual difference between a type of medical practice that makes you sick and an action that makes you healthier, just as there is a verifiable, factual difference between an action that will make you happier and one that will cause you to suffer.

Not really. You're making the convenient choice to believe that "causes suffering"="bad" in wider society, but most people have no consistent method of establishing what is good and bad. It's, for example, widely believed that homosexuality is immoral (or bad, sinful, wrong, etc.), even though a consensual homosexual relationship causes no more suffering than a consensual heterosexual one.

You could perhaps scientifically determine which actions cause suffering (though this is very individual and only possible to determine in retrospect), but it isn't scientific to say that actions that cause suffering are objectively wrong and shouldn't be practiced. Then you're entering the very unscientific realm of opinion.

[Tolstoy]

Wow this is the second place this has come up and im going to end up going outside and screaming until I cough up blood

Nihilism is not a legitiamate philosophical position, it is a danger of realizing the absurdity of the universe and refusing to give it your own meaning. When you do and come to terms with absurdity and develop a hard optimism in the fa e of the universe, you are an existentialist. If there is absolutely no meaning, than why not kill yourself?

[The Feral Underclass]

Nihilism is not a legitiamate philosophical position

Says whom?


it is a danger of realizing the absurdity of the universe and refusing to give it your own meaning.

Why is that dangerous?


When you do and come to terms with absurdity and develop a hard optimism in the fa e of the universe, you are an existentialist.

Really? Is that really what existentialism is?


If there is absolutely no meaning, than why not kill yourself?

Why is that the choice?

[Czy]

Nihilism is not a legitiamate philosophical position

So you're saying a position that has a rich history and enormous sphere of influence is not legitimate? Cool.


it is a danger of realizing the absurdity of the universe and refusing to give it your own meaning

You'll need to elaborate here as this is extremely vague. There is no way to verify whether one's constructed meaning conforms to any inherent meaning of the universe, so why give any meaning?


When you do and come to terms with absurdity and develop a hard optimism in the fa e of the universe, you are an existentialist.

Existentialism is a position where one recognizes no inherent meaning and then goes and constructs their own meaning. I ask you, why construct this meaning, this 'optimism'?


If there is absolutely no meaning, than why not kill yourself?

Why does the impossibility of meaning logically conclude in suicide?


All propositions are either true, false, or meaningless.

Answer the question: is a truth universal or contextual? You're a utilitarian; your consequentialist ethics is contextual. Murder is wrong for you - but if the scenario stipulated that killing one could save two, you'd choose that option. So murder is not universally wrong for you, but contextually wrong - unless you want to renegade on that position.


Did an action cause people to suffer more than benefit? If so, it was wrong. If not, it was right.

Fail. This could justify any "horror" if it resulted in more people being saved than killed. Therefore genocide is not wrong; only in context it is. The way you ascribe general maximization of happiness and minimization of pain is just a construct, probably through evolution, used to justify human decisions. It doesn't prove that morality exists or that there are true moral statements.


But morality is a factual matter, nonetheless
[...]

So you're saying that basing decisions off of a maximization of happiness, utilitarian approach makes morality factual? How? The usual test for a statement of fact is verifiability. Please demonstrate.


Czy, can you please elaborate more on the difference between subjective morality and moral nihilism? I still don't understand the difference.

Moral nihilism = no true code of morality exists

Subjective morality (moral relativism) = nobody is objectively correct in decisions, therefore we ought to tolerate the behaviour of others even when we disagree about the morality of it


I also have a hard time understanding contextual truth. How can something be true in a certain context but not in another?

Think of international law. There's things you can do in war that you can't outside of war. People who support this will say that murder is justified in war, outside of it not so. To these people, murder depends on context.

Think of other cultures. To you, I'm sure human sacrifice is wrong. To the Mayans, not so. The moral judgement depended entirely on context. This is the basis of moral relativism; that no objectivity in moral decisions means we must accept everyone cultures basis for their own morality.


Science and mathematics were also created by humans. Are the conclusions from those "subjective"?

Science and mathematics are falsifiable. Morality not so. There is clearly a difference. As I challenged you above, prove the falsifiability of morality (if possible, then it would be allowed to be compared to science and maths, a la Karl Popper's falsifiability theory).


It is, indeed, a fact that, in the midst of society and sociability every evil inclination has to place itself under such great restraint, don so many masks, lay itself so often on the procrustean bed of virtue, that one could well speak of a martyrdom of the evil man. In solitude all this falls away. He who is evil is at his most evil in solitude: which is where he is at his best - and thus to the eye of him who sees everywhere only a spectacle also at his most beautiful.

Does 'morality', which according to you is factual, exist in every kind of scenario? How about a man born on an island, abandoned and never integrated into society. Is there a basis for determining whether he does the 'right' or 'wrong' thing? If so, then we are imposing our morality on him, ignoring context. And then, logically, we must accept that morality is arbitrary, used as a basis for justifying actions in a specific context. And it is nothing more than an opinion masquerading as fact.


But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes.

I never claimed that humans do not apply moral codes. I claim that these moral codes are not objective, verifiable, and therefore merely opinion. Human sacrifice was right for the Mayans and wrong now. Who is correct, us or them, and why?


Because human beings live in a world of meaning

Proof?


the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other.

I don't dispute this; obviously this is so. The point is that what is good and bad is constituted arbitrarily; maybe for survival purposes; maybe for allegiance to a deity. The point is that it is all opinion, not fact.


Morality appears to be an anthropological fact.

Its basis appears to be arbitrary, though. The fact that humans are inclined to act in a certain way doesn't prove that these acts are right or wrong.


But the quantity of suffering is not a sufficient condition for establishing the morality of an action.

Al right, you do not use utilitarianism as a basis for your moral code. How, then, do you arrive at your moral code, and how can you prove that the acts that are permitted from this moral code are right or wrong?


but would it have been more moral or ethical to stand bye, let the homeless guy get beaten, and therefore minimise the quantity of human suffering through my inaction?

You tell me. You believe morality exists in a verifiable way; so tell me, which action would be more 'moral' and why?


Yeah we *have* morality whether or not that morality is universal.

Humans might be inclined to act in a certain way, but that fact doesn't prove that *a* morality is correct. Therefore the fact that some code of morality has been drawn up to justify actions doesn't mean anything other than the opinion of a group or individual was acted upon.

If you're still unsure about my position:

All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.

[The Feral Underclass]

^Great Nietzche quote.

[Rugged Collectivist]

Moral nihilism = no true code of morality exists

Subjective morality (moral relativism) = nobody is objectively correct in decisions, therefore we ought to tolerate the behaviour of others even when we disagree about the morality of it

In the definition you gave for subjective morality, how does the second part follow from the first?


Think of international law. There's things you can do in war that you can't outside of war. People who support this will say that murder is justified in war, outside of it not so. To these people, murder depends on context.

Think of other cultures. To you, I'm sure human sacrifice is wrong. To the Mayans, not so. The moral judgement depended entirely on context. This is the basis of moral relativism; that no objectivity in moral decisions means we must accept everyone cultures basis for their own morality.

I may just be hung up on the semantics here but those statements can't be true. As you said earlier moral judgements are like opinions. "human sacrifice is wrong" isn't a true or false factual statement. What the person really means is "I think human sacrifice is wrong".

[BIXX]

The fact that people don't agree about something doesn't mean morals aren't "objective". Those rapists and oppressors might be WRONG about morality the way Ptolemy was WRONG that the sun went around the earth (note - universal and objective aren't the same thing. perhaps they are universally intersubjective?)

If morality (the idea of what is right and wrong) can be verified to be correct, then be my guest, show me that it is correct. Until then, it is subjective, as it is up to the individual who holds them what they are.


Because they disagree with you? :rolleyes:

No, I'm curious. Perhaps I should have said "why do you all believe in an objective morality?"


If you're a consequentialist your moral intuition is that morality can be quantified in terms of suffering. If you're a virtue ethicist then you think that morality can be seen in a person's psychology/character traits. If you are a deontologist or duty ethicist you see morality as ideal duties which are as objective as a law of nature.

Except morality is a spectacle of the mind, constructed by us, with no basis in nature.


I think it's a good question to ask what someone means by objective morality and it's good to challenge this claim but there are a lot of people who do support various moral systems with good reasons. I would recommend doing some reading on the subject - wiki is a good point of reference. Then you can build a more interesting critique of "objective morality" than banging your head in the wall over how dense some people seem to you.

I went ahead and took the definition of objective from some dictionary or another: Objective: (of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

Seeing as morals are changed by our relations, they are subjective, as they are influenced by our feelings, and they have no basis in facts other than the facts that humans have decided are important.




Wow this is the second place this has come up and im going to end up going outside and screaming until I cough up blood

Nihilism is not a legitiamate philosophical position, it is a danger of realizing the absurdity of the universe and refusing to give it your own meaning. When you do and come to terms with absurdity and develop a hard optimism in the fa e of the universe, you are an existentialist. If there is absolutely no meaning, than why not kill yourself?

There is absolutely no meaning to life, but there is also no meaning in death.

Also I think you're confused about existentialism.




I did not design ethical distinctions. The presence of suffering is verifiable.

But you designed the distinction that suffering is wrong.


Whether or not an action will cause suffering is also a factual matter. The fact that bad actions are ones that cause more suffering than not is something true of the term by its most common usage.

Common usage doesn't determine objectivity, it just means consensus.


Morality is a science akin to sociology, psychology, etc.

No.


However, a better metaphor might be medicine. There is an experiential difference between "healthy" and "sick", while actions and substances can be judged on these qualities.

There is a difference, but sick is only seen as bad cause we have decided it is, and vice versa.


These qualities may rely on a certain understanding of what these terms mean or universal preferences, and they pertain only to living beings, but does that mean they are meaningless or arbitrary distinctions? No, and I find it evident that there is a verifiable, factual difference between a type of medical practice that makes you sick and an action that makes you healthier, just as there is a verifiable, factual difference between an action that will make you happier and one that will cause you to suffer.

However, we decide whether suffering is good or bad, we decide what suffering is.


Consequentialist ethical systems such as Utilitarianism takes all of these factors in account, while not resorting to deities or conjecture that would fail to be parsimonious. What would be good for a situation depends on the particulars of that situation, but the meaning of good does not change. To continue the medical analogy, some people are allergic to certain medications, but that does not make us confused about the universal goal of healthiness in light of how different treatments work better in different circumstances.

The meaning of good is not objective. It is changed depending on our feelings.


Psychology describes the world itself, but the object of its study didn't exist before humans because they are the object of the study. The same is true of ethics.

Psychology describes a material world, also the animals the predate us can have psychology applied to them. Morality doesn't describe something physical, it describes something you made up.

[QUOTE=Red Rose;2692358]I think the difference between description and prescription in ethics is overstated.

Oh dear.
Description: this rock is a rock with this or that weight with this or that quality etc... Eventually determining what the rock is composed of.

Prescription: I have decided the rock is made of cotton, and I will use it to make pillows.

What you should notice about this analogy is that description (while still subject to mistakes being made) does not readily lend itself to outrageous claims.


What one ought to do is based on what is.

What you perceive as existing (is) is based on your subjective understanding of the world, which is molded by opinions and feelings.


So, "one shouldn't murder one's grandmother because it's bad" is just a deflated form of "if one hopes to not cause suffering, one shouldn't murder one's grandmother because it's bad, in that it usually causes more suffering than not".

But you just decided that suffering is bad. What if suffering is good?

Prove to me that suffering is bad.




But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes. Because human beings live in a world of meaning, the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other. Morality appears to be an anthropological fact.

Isn't morality one of those contested arenas of the class struggle? Their morals versus ours?

I do not believe we love in a world of meaning, except for those we have created.

Also no, morality is not. We have reasoning that goes beyond morals.




True, the amount of suffering isn't the only salient factor for felicific calculus

What are the others? Cause doesn't that kinda ruin morality if there's no rule to make sure something is moral?


I have more to say on the topic but I'm at school and class is gonna start soon.

[Czy]

In the definition you gave for subjective morality, how does the second part follow from the first?

If no one is objectively correct, then it is merely an opinion, and different cultures have different opinions, therefore there is no reason to condemn the behaviour of other cultures.


may just be hung up on the semantics here but those statements can't be true. As you said earlier moral judgements are like opinions. "human sacrifice is wrong" isn't a true or false factual statement. What the person really means is "I think human sacrifice is wrong".

Exactly. Well said, in fact. What your conclusion leads to, is that the entire Western (or Mayan or Chinese etc etc) code of morality is arbitrary, in that it is an opinion. This conclusion affirms the nihilist position that nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral.

[Decolonize The Left]

Basically there are three positions here, as far as I see this discussion:

1) Utilitarianism. Red Rose is occupying this ethical philosophy and is quite eloquent.
2) Deontology. I have a feeling that many readers and participants are of this persuasion, although it has not emerged formally in the debate. One might say something like: "rape is just wrong. It just is, in all cases, and it's not to be tolerated in any sense or ever." I think that many people on this forum would agree with this claim and it is a deontological one. All religious moral claims are of this style.
3) "Nihilism." The OP and others are holding this perspective, advocating that a severe moral relativism and subjectivism are equivalent to what they are calling nihilism. While the term 'moral nihilism' would be more apt given that there are many forms of nihilism, I do not find this term acceptable in the least.

In the first place, utilitarianism and deontology are both unacceptable as moral philosophies precisely because they are that: moral philosophies. The notion that one can write out a plan for action for all, that one could bind a personal will up in a structure for action, is a failure from the start. Human beings are absurdly complex creatures and no moral code will suffice forever, nor even remain consistent in times of stress (one may reference the red army rape thread for a perfect example of this). Both utilitarianism and deontology lay claim to the totality of human moral experience and as such should be discarded as insulting and degrading, for we - as humans - cannot be encompassed in any totality of thought.

As to this 'nihilism,' which is described in the OP, I cannot accept this terminology. Moral nihilism does indeed reject objective morality but leads us down a treacherous path. This is because all nihilism (moral and beyond) is bottomless. Nihilism, as a tool, is deconstructive or destructive. One does not reach a point in nihilism where one says "ah, now I get it!" There is no bottom to nihilism, it is endless and offers no recourse once one is deep enough.

Recall that the point of nihilism is to unravel meaning - to expose the fundamental fact that all meaning is subjective and that even this subjectivity and be broken down as one's perspective upon oneself is itself a structure of meaning. Very well, we are all for understanding what's actually going on so why not run with it? Precisely because what is 'actually going on' is entirely meaning-dependent. Nihilism runs into its own wall, which is not actually a wall but an abyss: one cannot be 'a nihilist.' To be something is to will meaning into existence: I am a nihilist! Yet a nihilist acknowledges and accepts that this itself is a meaningless phrase. Hence one is not a nihilist. Hence one's nihilism is not anything, really, and one ought not speak at all.

Nihilism is anti-human and must be overcome.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Your example started from the basis that you were sure the ground was dry.


My example started with the basis that we have a belief that we gained through our senses, be it "wet" or "dry", yet cannot verify independently. I'm referring to Hume's thoughts on inductive reasoning.



Those theories were based on observable, verifiable objects. Morality is neither observable, verifiable or an object.
Morality is verifiable to someone with a similar moral perspective on reality. Just as theories about observable, verifiable objects are only observable and verifiable to people with similar sensory and rational abilities. You can't convince a delusional flat-earther that the earth is round with reason if they're delusional. It's not as different from morality as you propose.



The entirety of knowledge contains uncertainty. You can never be absolutely certain that something is something. That is the limit of our sapience and the boundary of our intellect. Without a clear, holistic and definitive understanding of our existence and the universe, there is never the possibility of certainty in anything we do or understand.

But we use what we have: objects. Things that we can see and touch and smell to construct our reality (in all probability). We use approximations and probabilities because we can observe and verify the existence of objects (in so far as we understand those concepts).

From all of that comes the phantoms of our mind: Religion, morality, politics. All of those things are real only insofar as they are articulated into the world from our mind, premised and given form based upon our interaction with the material world.

That doesn't make them real. Morality, politics, religion are not verifiable objects, they are not observable phenomenon, they are, for most people just an opinion; a throw away view that's been shaped by a material world they predicted on class division. For revolutionaries, we make different choices based on our understanding, but it doesn't make us right in any definitive sense.

There is a difference between someone having a moral and that moral being real. Morality isn't real. It is a figment of the mind, just like the belief in Santa.They are evaluative claims about the world. We cannot "prove" them in the same sense that a scientist can prove evolution to a creationist, but you can't go from that to "well then they must not exist".


Not really. You're making the convenient choice to believe that "causes suffering"="bad" in wider society, but most people have no consistent method of establishing what is good and bad. It's, for example, widely believed that homosexuality is immoral (or bad, sinful, wrong, etc.), even though a consensual homosexual relationship causes no more suffering than a consensual heterosexual one.

You could perhaps scientifically determine which actions cause suffering (though this is very individual and only possible to determine in retrospect), but it isn't scientific to say that actions that cause suffering are objectively wrong and shouldn't be practiced. Then you're entering the very unscientific realm of opinion.

That's because Red Rose is arguing from a UTILITARIAN/CONSEQUENTIALIST point of view. This is an ethical position that associates ethical decisions and the "moral good" with happiness or suffering.

If you want to argue against that, go ahead, but you need to recognize it for what it is and not straw man him. Most utilitarians probably don't care about homosexuality as a "wrong" and would say that anyone who does is making a moral error.



Humans might be inclined to act in a certain way, but that fact doesn't prove that *a* morality is correct. Therefore the fact that some code of morality has been drawn up to justify actions doesn't mean anything other than the opinion of a group or individual was acted upon.

If you're still unsure about my position:

I don't necessarily disagree with Nietzsche on power and perspectivism, but FYI his critique applies to the sciences just as much as it does to morality.

Anyway, Nietzsche thought that we should work on imposing our morality - and on becoming the kind of person who is great enough to be worth having his morality imposed. His views on truth and power are complicated.


If morality (the idea of what is right and wrong) can be verified to be correct, then be my guest, show me that it is correct. Until then, it is subjective, as it is up to the individual who holds them what they are.


Perhaps they are not verifiable in the same way as the kinds of things we see as "objective facts". For instance, being the victim of oppression tells us that it's wrong.



Except morality is a spectacle of the mind, constructed by us, with no basis in nature.
You are just begging the question



I went ahead and took the definition of objective from some dictionary or another: Objective: (of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

Seeing as morals are changed by our relations, they are subjective, as they are influenced by our feelings, and they have no basis in facts other than the facts that humans have decided are important.Personally I dispute whether anything can be clearly distinguished as "objective" or "subjective"


In the first place, utilitarianism and deontology are both unacceptable as moral philosophies precisely because they are that: moral philosophies. The notion that one can write out a plan for action for all, that one could bind a personal will up in a structure for action, is a failure from the start. Human beings are absurdly complex creatures and no moral code will suffice forever, nor even remain consistent in times of stress (one may reference the red army rape thread for a perfect example of this). Both utilitarianism and deontology lay claim to the totality of human moral experience and as such should be discarded as insulting and degrading, for we - as humans - cannot be encompassed in any totality of thought.

Not all ethical systems and moral philosophies are binding, however. Aristotle's ethics - virtue ethics - contains moral claims that aren't binding and recognize the fact that people make kinds of moral claims relative to the kinds of knowledge and development they have. There's no focus on placing moral blame and just on how we develop as moral beings. There is a "should" involved of course - there is a normative claim. But this normative claim is no more radical than the kind which Marxist revolutionaries posit - we "should" fight for a revolutionary state. Kierkegaard's morality too transcends any "ethical universals" yet is still clearly a moral philosophy in a sense (though I could also see someone disputing that perhaps - Kierkegaard isn't exactly an easy thinker to pin down - but he did see "Religion" as the highest goal and transcending the bourgeois moral universals of his time).

TBH its closer to my own view, although there are some duties I think which should be universal (do not rape is the most obvious example - also don't assault an oppressed person or use bigoted terms that an oppressed person might find offensive). Most moral choices cannot be reduced to duties however, even though I think Kant had a pretty creative and interesting way to try to do that anyways. I also think that consequentialism or utilitarianism is a useful heuristic for people to make good choices, even if it doesn't necessarily include what is right or wrong. Of course, there are different accounts of utilitarianism - some of which are more compelling than others (Mill is better than Bentham for instance, at least in my opinion). I think a lot of the posts in this thread have had a very naive view of moral claims though, and I think that most of the folks responding to Red Rose and others were mischaracterizing their views.

[Fakeblock]

That's because Red Rose is arguing from a UTILITARIAN/CONSEQUENTIALIST point of view. This is an ethical position that associates ethical decisions and the "moral good" with happiness or suffering.

If you want to argue against that, go ahead, but you need to recognize it for what it is and not straw man him. Most utilitarians probably don't care about homosexuality as a "wrong" and would say that anyone who does is making a moral error.

I get what he's saying, but I don't think I'm strawmanning him at all. Red Rose said:


The fact that bad actions are ones that cause more suffering than not is something true of the term by its most common usage.

I explained why I don't agree with this. Unless I've missed something, this is the only reasoning Red Rose has given for his consequentialism, the rest of the time it has just been (falsely) assumed. I can only argue against his position if he gives reasoning for it, i.e. explains why it is good to give pleasure and bad to cause suffering?

[Hit The North]

Originally Posted by Hit The North
But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes. I never claimed that humans do not apply moral codes. I claim that these moral codes are not objective, verifiable, and therefore merely opinion. Human sacrifice was right for the Mayans and wrong now. Who is correct, us or them, and why?


Firstly, my comments were not to you, so I'm not claiming you deny this. But neither have I argued that morality is objective or verifiable (whatever you mean by that). My argument is that morality is inter-subjective, a socially constituted phenomenon and is, therefore, not purely subjective or arbitary (as you claim). From this, you can guess that my view of Mayan morality, or rather, the religious ritual of human sacrifice, which you allude to, is historical and context-bound. But if we were test the validity of the Mayan belief that human sacrifice will find favour with the Gods who will then provide bountiful harvest, then we would have to conclude that they were wrong and that the spilling of so much human blood was something of a tragedy for both the sacrificed and the wider society which was failed by such an epic miscalculation between cause and effect.



Originally Posted by Hit The North
Because human beings live in a world of meaning
Proof?


Religion, science, philosophy, fictional narrative. The search for meaning is everywhere in human culture.



Originally Posted by Hit The North
the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other. I don't dispute this; obviously this is so. The point is that what is good and bad is constituted arbitrarily; maybe for survival purposes; maybe for allegiance to a deity. The point is that it is all opinion, not fact.

Once again, this comment was not addressed to you so I don't know why you take it as a personal assault on your ideas. But, once again, you propose that morality is arbitrary and I have a problem with this because if it was the case that morality was subjective and arbitrary then it would be in a constant state of flux, which any historical or anthropological study could easily disprove. Note that if morality was merely arbitrary then "survival purposes", "allegiance to a deity" would have no influence over it and morality itself would have no collective power.





Originally Posted by Hit The North
Morality appears to be an anthropological fact. Its basis appears to be arbitrary, though. The fact that humans are inclined to act in a certain way doesn't prove that these acts are right or wrong.


No, its basis is in the material relations and cultural life of a given human community.




Originally Posted by Hit The North
But the quantity of suffering is not a sufficient condition for establishing the morality of an action. Al right, you do not use utilitarianism as a basis for your moral code. How, then, do you arrive at your moral code, and how can you prove that the acts that are permitted from this moral code are right or wrong?


I take my morals from Tom Mann ;).




Originally Posted by Hit The North
but would it have been more moral or ethical to stand bye, let the homeless guy get beaten, and therefore minimise the quantity of human suffering through my inaction? You tell me. You believe morality exists in a verifiable way; so tell me, which action would be more 'moral' and why?

The question aside, of course morals exist in a verifiable way. It can be verified that they play a role in human interaction. Of course, this isn't the same as saying that they exist objectively, independently of human communities. But I've never argued that.

[Czy]

Perhaps they are not verifiable in the same way as the kinds of things we see as "objective facts".

Morality leads to a demarcation problem, indeed. This distinguishes it from science, and results in it being a pseudoscience. Morality is not based on the scientific method which leads to a whole host of problems, epistemologically speaking.

Just for clarification on what the demarcation problem is (and what it isn't):


Aristotle described at length what was involved in having scientific knowledge of something. To be scientific, he said, one must deal with causes, one must use logical demonstration, and one must identify the universals which 'inhere' in the particulars of sense. But above all, to have science one must have apodictic certainty. It is the last feature which, for Aristotle, most clearly distinguished the scientific way of knowing.

[Hit The North]

Originally Posted by Hit The North http://www.revleft.com/vb/revleft/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showthread.php?p=2692480#post2692480)
But to say no universal morality exists is not the same as saying that no morality exits or that human beings do not universally apply moral codes. Because human beings live in a world of meaning, the question of what constitutes good and bad action inevitably arise in our relations with each other. Morality appears to be an anthropological fact.

Isn't morality one of those contested arenas of the class struggle? Their morals versus ours? I do not believe we live in a world of meaning, except for those we have created.


I think you misunderstand me. Of course, all meaning is constructed by human agents. My point is that morality emerges from this search for meaning. Meanwhile, meaning itself is grounded in community.


Also no, morality is not. We have reasoning that goes beyond morals.There is no Chinese wall between morality and reasoning. In fact, morality is impossible unless it is reasoned.

[Czy]

My argument is that morality is inter-subjective, a socially constituted phenomenon and is, therefore, not purely subjective or arbitary (as you claim).

Again, the fact that morality is inter-subjective means there's agreement, and perhaps inclination, in doing certain actions and in deciding what to do and why. But we're discussing truth here. Unless you can prove the truth of what is right and wrong, morality has to be subjective (opinion).


But, once again, you propose that morality is arbitrary and I have a problem with this because if it was the case that morality was subjective and arbitrary then it would be in a constant state of flux, which any historical or anthropological study could easily disprove.

The morality today in all Western cultures has been heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian values. These founding values were subjective and arbitrary and therefore any values derived from them will be subjective and arbitrary. Morality is not in a state of flux for this very reason: the state has imposed these values on its citizens, and built up legal systems and whatnot from these and other similar values.


Note that if morality was merely arbitrary then "survival purposes", "allegiance to a deity" would have no influence over it and morality itself would have no collective power

Not so. Allegiance to a deity shapes moral systems in a very concrete way. These systems are imposed on people. People do not form their own, unique values, of course not. The prevailing ideas of society impose ideas on its citizens. But that doesn't detract from the fact that these ideas that society imposes on its subjects are subjective and arbitrary. They were drawn up through the whim of someone, not by codifying truth (unless you can prove otherwise).


No, its basis is in the material relations and cultural life of a given human community.

Which doesn't prove that morality is true in any sense, other than the fact that 'imposed morality' shapes our decisions concretely, which I have never argued against. Again, your response here doesn't prove that the morality that arises from these material and cultural relations are true and not merely an opinion, which is what this argument is about.


I take my morals from Tom Mann

Please answer the question. The answer is that the Western legal system, Judeo-Christian values and a dash of evolutionary ethics has shaped the way you view the world and essentially compels you to act a certain way in a certain situation. But what makes this system superior to any other? Power. You were forced under this system, born in India you would think differently. Both systems are valid in their own contexts, which means morality is merely an opinion.


The question aside, of course morals exist in a verifiable way. It can be verified that they play a role in human interaction.

Religion plays a role in human interactions. Does that make it true? The scope of the debate should be geared to whether these morals that "play a role in human interaction" have any truth in their underpinnings.

[Hit The North]

Again, the fact that morality is inter-subjective means there's agreement, and perhaps inclination, in doing certain actions and in deciding what to do and why. But we're discussing truth here. Unless you can prove the truth of what is right and wrong, morality has to be subjective (opinion).


Well, you appear considerably caught up in the question of whether morality is "truth" but my concern is to defend a conception of morality from a historical materialist point of view and against the psychologistic conceptions of that windbag, Stirner; so we appear to be talking at cross-purposes.

But what do you mean by truth, anyway? For sake of discussion if I assert that it is always immoral to murder another human being for mere pleasure, how will you set about proving otherwise? You might present me with another individual who believes that it is perfectly ok to do this, but then I would just point to this person as an example of an immoral person. Prove me wrong.


The morality today in all Western cultures has been heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian values. These founding values were subjective and arbitrary and therefore any values derived from them will be subjective and arbitrary. Morality is not in a state of flux for this very reason: the state has imposed these values on its citizens, and built up legal systems and whatnot from these and other similar values.


So if this is the case, you are arguing against yourself because individual morality cannot be both "heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian values" and "subjective and arbitrary", not unless you are redefining the term "subjective and arbitrary".


Not so. Allegiance to a deity shapes moral systems in a very concrete way. These systems are imposed on people. People do not form their own, unique values, of course not. The prevailing ideas of society impose ideas on its citizens. But that doesn't detract from the fact that these ideas that society imposes on its subjects are subjective and arbitrary. They were drawn up through the whim of someone, not by codifying truth (unless you can prove otherwise).

So now you freely admit that individual morality is not subjective and arbitrary but imposed upon people by social forces! But you have a very simplistic idea about the historical journey of human ethics if you think, somewhere in the past, someone just made shit up and then got everyone else to buy into it.


Please answer the question. The answer is that the Western legal system, Judeo-Christian values and a dash of evolutionary ethics has shaped the way you view the world and essentially compels you to act a certain way in a certain situation.


So if I'm "essentially compelled to act a certain way" then my morality cannot be "subjective and arbitrary." It cannot be mere whim. You put it nicely and I'm glad that we finally agree.


But what makes this system superior to any other? Power. You were forced under this system, born in India you would think differently. Both systems are valid in their own contexts, which means morality is merely an opinion.


I have no problem in seeing the shaping of morality as a function of power, the question is what is the basis of this power? For Marxists, it is found in the material relations. For you, the basis of this power appears to reside in the ideological deceptions of someone, somewhere, who made shit up on a whim.

[Sabot Cat]

Insofar as they have infinite meanings they are.

"Infinite meanings" is a phrase I'm unfamiliar with outside of the name of a Buddhist sutra. What do you mean by this?




In accordance with what?


In accordance to the benefits or suffering produced by those affected by one's action.


In order for something to be true, something has to be false. For something to be, something has to not be. In order for 2+2 to equal 4, 2+2 cannot equal 5.

If you think something is "morally wrong," how is it that someone else can think it is "morally right"? If morality was an observable occurrence, why is it not definitive?


There is no universal consensus on any number of verified theories, such as the Big Bang theory or evolution.


Even Christian's don't try and claim that morals just exist.


This is a misrepresentation of my arguments and the concepts involved in them, although I don't assume it to be a willful one.



Those theories were based on observable, verifiable objects. Morality is neither observable, verifiable or an object.


The morality is the study of the ethical consequences of actions, which are readily observed and verified.


The entirety of knowledge contains uncertainty. You can never be absolutely certain that something is something. That is the limit of our sapience and the boundary of our intellect. Without a clear, holistic and definitive understanding of our existence and the universe, there is never the possibility of certainty in anything we do or understand.

But we use what we have: objects. Things that we can see and touch and smell to construct our reality (in all probability). We use approximations and probabilities because we can observe and verify the existence of objects (in so far as we understand those concepts).

We can also verify the existence of processes and qualities that those objects participate in or exhibit.


That doesn't make them real. Morality, politics, religion are not verifiable objects, they are not observable phenomenon, they are, for most people just an opinion; a throw away view that's been shaped by a material world they predicted on class division. For revolutionaries, we make different choices based on our understanding, but it doesn't make us right in any definitive sense.


On the contrary, the processes of politics and religion are observable phenomenon. Obviously, the claims made by the religious and politicians do not always (and usually don't) correspond to reality, but these institutions do exist.

And while there is no way to prove we who advocate for the liberation of the proletariat are right as elegantly or indisputably as mathematics, it's simply because ethics is a field of knowledge with more complex foundations that can be confused, especially because the subject matter is more directly salient to our lives (that is, "capitalism is unjust" is an assertion with more emotional torque than "a square has four sides".)


There is a difference between someone having a moral and that moral being real. Morality isn't real. It is a figment of the mind, just like the belief in Santa.

Santa is a character that doesn't wholly correspond in the consensual conception of the figure associated with that name to any living or dead person, and thus can be dismissed as not real. Morality is an analysis of actions on the basis of their human consequences.


Not really. You're making the convenient choice to believe that "causes suffering"="bad" in wider society, but most people have no consistent method of establishing what is good and bad.

No, that's not a convenient choice on my part. Suffering without later or overall benefit is bad; "good suffering" with the aforementioned conditions is a phrase that suggests one doesn't understand the meaning of either term. Most people are able of making that distinction at least in theory.


It's, for example, widely believed that homosexuality is immoral (or bad, sinful, wrong, etc.), even though a consensual homosexual relationship causes no more suffering than a consensual heterosexual one.

But these people wish to avoid same-sex relationships because they have a belief it will cause them to suffer forever, and thus it is bad for that reason. Divine command theory can be reduced to utilitarianism when one considers that most people would chose to disobey what they perceive to be God's demands if the "penalty" for such transgressions is eternal bliss, while dutiful observation would cause one to suffer forever. The dichotomy between Heaven and Hell as a place of pleasure and a place of suffering is perhaps the clearest illumination of how people are aware of what would be a generally good place and what be a generally bad place.


You could perhaps scientifically determine which actions cause suffering (though this is very individual and only possible to determine in retrospect), but it isn't scientific to say that actions that cause suffering are objectively wrong and shouldn't be practiced. Then you're entering the very unscientific realm of opinion.


I disagree. Actions that are wrong can be called as much with the same certainty as cancer or cardiovascular ailments can be labeled ailments. Sure this assumes that when one says "ailment" we mean a bodily state that inhibits one from doing what brings happiness to oneself and causes suffering, but the distinction of "disease" isn't unscientific if the methodology for classifying it as such is sound and valid. The only reason we believe so is because the church successfully angled itself as the sole purveyor of morality, monopolizing the institution of ethical study since times immemorial, thus prompting the reaction we see in moral nihilism.


So you're saying a position that has a rich history and enormous sphere of influence is not legitimate? Cool.

How can you defend the "legitimacy" of nihilism on the grounds that it's history is "rich"? Wouldn't a nihilist be opposed to these valuations being presented as if they are authoritative or the like?


Answer the question: is a truth universal or contextual?

A proposition is universally true if the claim it represents is sound and specific enough to not be construed as representing another proposition that would also be sound. A proposition is contextually true if the claim that it represents is sound yet not specific enough for the purposes of distinction from other claims.


You're a utilitarian; your consequentialist ethics is contextual. Murder is wrong for you - but if the scenario stipulated that killing one could save two, you'd choose that option. So murder is not universally wrong for you, but contextually wrong - unless you want to renegade on that position.


Situations in real life are usually not that simple or binary, but that seems like a fair enough characterization of my views.


Fail. This could justify any "horror" if it resulted in more people being saved than killed. Therefore genocide is not wrong; only in context it is.

There is no such thing as a contextless genocide. Actions do not exist in a vacuum. Furthermore, committing genocide is categorically wrong because it always causes more suffering than benefits when compared to not committing genocide.


The way you ascribe general maximization of happiness and minimization of pain is just a construct, probably through evolution, used to justify human decisions.

What do you mean when you say it is "just a construct"? All of our analytic knowledge is constructed.


It doesn't prove that morality exists or that there are true moral statements.


I find it evident that you are misconstruing what a proof of morality's existence or the truth of moral statements is like.


So you're saying that basing decisions off of a maximization of happiness, utilitarian approach makes morality factual? How? The usual test for a statement of fact is verifiability. Please demonstrate.


The presence of suffering or pleasure is something verifiable; "goodness" and "badness" are designations like "healthy" and "sick" that describe the quality of a situation in relation to people. This is done specifically through the presence of more suffering or more pleasure, which again, are verifiable phenomena. Thus, good and bad are verifiable qualities of an action's consequences.


Science and mathematics are falsifiable. Morality not so. There is clearly a difference. As I challenged you above, prove the falsifiability of morality (if possible, then it would be allowed to be compared to science and maths, a la Karl Popper's falsifiability theory).


How can you prove the falsifiability of mathematics? There is no possible way to have two things, and then add two more things, and have there be four things before you. You cannot falsify basic arithmetic, or numeric qualities of groups. Similarly, you cannot falsify the basic qualities of "good" and "bad", and so the task you set before more is insurmountable as far as it relates to the premises of any field of inquiry.

However, there are falsifiable conclusions in science and ethics. Did an action you appraised to be good really cause more suffering than you realized? Then you have discovered that your appraisal was erroneous, and hence you must label it as bad if you wish to be accurate. Thus, ethical claims are falsifiable by way of evaluating their consequences.


I never claimed that humans do not apply moral codes. I claim that these moral codes are not objective, verifiable, and therefore merely opinion. Human sacrifice was right for the Mayans and wrong now. Who is correct, us or them, and why?


Them, because they were applying utilitarian calculus on faulty premises. Mayans believed human sacrifice was necessary to fertilize their crops and that death really doesn't end consciousness. If I believed that one would continue to live after death and that we needed to kill a few in order to feed the many, I could see why I would think human sacrifice was a necessary evil. Indeed, most grave variations in ethics can be attributed to a faulty understanding of the processes of reality than a faulty understanding of right and wrong.


But you designed the distinction that suffering is wrong.


I find it evident that more suffering than not has generally been considered a bad thing.


There is a difference, but sick is only seen as bad cause we have decided it is, and vice versa.

However, we decide whether suffering is good or bad, we decide what suffering is.


Suffering is suffering. Blue is blue, tall is tall, etc. We don't decide what suffering is, we just decide what to call it. Even if we all labeled it "pleasure" and affirmed in our daily lives that it was a "good" thing, more suffering than not would still be bad because that's what is in of itself.


The meaning of good is not objective. It is changed depending on our feelings.


The truth can be distorted by a person depending on one's wants, but that does not make any particular fact less objective.


Oh dear.
Description: this rock is a rock with this or that weight with this or that quality etc... Eventually determining what the rock is composed of.

Prescription: I have decided the rock is made of cotton, and I will use it to make pillows.

What you should notice about this analogy is that description (while still subject to mistakes being made) does not readily lend itself to outrageous claims.

Those are both descriptions, one of which is erroneous. I'm not sure of the point you're making.


What you perceive as existing (is) is based on your subjective understanding of the world, which is molded by opinions and feelings.


This assertion is also based on your subjective understanding of the world, and one can't defensibly assert that all truth is uncertain with certainty. So I'm not sure why you brought it up.


But you just decided that suffering is bad. What if suffering is good?

Prove to me that suffering is bad.

Suffering is bad. If you know what experiences correlate to those terms, you know that to be true already.


What are the others? Cause doesn't that kinda ruin morality if there's no rule to make sure something is moral?


The amount of pleasure produced is salient as well, and I was merely asserting that I didn't describe all of these factors exhaustively.


1) Utilitarianism. Red Rose is occupying this ethical philosophy and is quite eloquent.


Thank you. :)


In the first place, utilitarianism and deontology are both unacceptable as moral philosophies precisely because they are that: moral philosophies. The notion that one can write out a plan for action for all, that one could bind a personal will up in a structure for action, is a failure from the start. Human beings are absurdly complex creatures and no moral code will suffice forever, nor even remain consistent in times of stress (one may reference the red army rape thread for a perfect example of this). Both utilitarianism and deontology lay claim to the totality of human moral experience and as such should be discarded as insulting and degrading, for we - as humans - cannot be encompassed in any totality of thought.


I don't believe one can claim something is beyond knowledge, because where or not something is unknowable is unknowable. How do you know that human moral experience cannot be sufficiently accounted for without accounting for it in making that appraisal? Couldn't I assert that mathematics is a failure because it cannot encompass the totality of numeric thought, as we are limited by our lifespans in tabulating the high quantities accounted for within it? Or really, any field of knowledge is incomplete and will always remain that way if we refuse to pursue it on the grounds that we cannot achieve absolute realization of the whole of the object of our inquiry; this line of argumentation is inherently indefensible because of this.


That's because Red Rose is arguing from a UTILITARIAN/CONSEQUENTIALIST point of view. This is an ethical position that associates ethical decisions and the "moral good" with happiness or suffering.

If you want to argue against that, go ahead, but you need to recognize it for what it is and not straw man him. Most utilitarians probably don't care about homosexuality as a "wrong" and would say that anyone who does is making a moral error.

Thanks for clarifying my position; indeed, they often are making an error because they believe that same-sex relationships are wrong on the basis of a false understanding of reality and the consequences involved. I don't believe they are confused about what is good and what is bad.


I get what he's saying, but I don't think I'm strawmanning him at all. Red Rose said:

I explained why I don't agree with this. Unless I've missed something, this is the only reasoning Red Rose has given for his consequentialism, the rest of the time it has just been (falsely) assumed. I can only argue against his position if he gives reasoning for it, i.e. explains why it is good to give pleasure and bad to cause suffering?

The terms "good" and "bad" relate to the qualities of an action and the amount of pleasure or suffering caused by it, because that is how they are used. Meaning is use, while pleasure and suffering are verifiable phenomena directly observed by everyone with no substantive exceptions.

[Also, this is slightly tangential but I've noticed some confusion about my gender here, and so I would like to establish that I am a comrade of the female persuasion, and so "she, her" would be the correct pronouns; this is just for future reference, so don't worry about apologizing or the like if you were going to. :)]

[The Feral Underclass]

"Infinite meanings" is a phrase I'm unfamiliar with outside of the name of a Buddhist sutra. What do you mean by this?

That a moral can be whatever you want it to be.


In accordance to the benefits or suffering produced by those affected by one's action.

So you accept that morals are constructed in the abstract?


There is no universal consensus on any number of verified theories, such as the Big Bang theory or evolution.

But there is a general consensus that the universe exists. That there are objects in it.


The morality is the study of the ethical consequences of actions, which are readily observed and verified.

If that's how you want to study it, be my guest. It doesn't mean that morals inherently exist.


We can also verify the existence of processes and qualities that those objects participate in or exhibit.

Yeah, you can do that. Again, it doesn't mean that morals inherently exist.


On the contrary, the processes of politics and religion are observable phenomenon.

No they aren't. Objects are observable phenomenon. Ideas and thoughts aren't objects.


Obviously, the claims made by the religious and politicians do not always (and usually don't) correspond to reality, but these institutions do exist.

Institutions of the state and Church are observable institutions, but the ideas behind them are not.

Provide me with evidence that an idea inherently exists in the universe.


And while there is no way to prove we who advocate for the liberation of the proletariat are right as elegantly or indisputably as mathematics, it's simply because ethics is a field of knowledge with more complex foundations that can be confused, especially because the subject matter is more directly salient to our lives (that is, "capitalism is unjust" is an assertion with more emotional torque than "a square has four sides".)

It sounds to me that you are just trying to attribute some kind of inherent meaning to your values. Fine. If that's what you want to do, go right ahead. But you're not in any way convincing.


Santa is a character that doesn't wholly correspond in the consensual conception of the figure associated with that name to any living or dead person, and thus can be dismissed as not real. Morality is an analysis of actions on the basis of their human consequences.

And once you have analysed those human consequences you abstractly construct a moral. I.e. it doesn't exist. If morals inherently existed, you wouldn't have to construct them.

[Sabot Cat]

That a moral can be whatever you want it to be.

I'm still not sure what you mean in saying that.


So you accept that morals are constructed in the abstract?


Yes: the abstract concepts in moral evaluations, much like the abstract concepts in scientific appraisals of evidence, are constructed based upon the real qualities of the things being evaluated.


But there is a general consensus that the universe exists. That there are objects in it.


There is a general consensus that it is bad to suffer and good to have pleasure.


If that's how you want to study it, be my guest. It doesn't mean that morals inherently exist.


Ethics is about people, so of course they don't exist "inherently", if you mean that something that is inherent could exist without people.


Yeah, you can do that. Again, it doesn't mean that morals inherently exist.


I wasn't using that as a proof, I was merely telling you that your conception of reality is too limited. Red is not an object, but the quality of red is an experience that exists.


No they aren't. Objects are observable phenomenon. Ideas aren't objects.

Institutions of the state and Church are observable institutions, but the ideas behind them are not.

Provide me with evidence that an idea inherently exists in the universe.

1. Brains are a part of the universe.
2. An "idea" is something that is thought of.
3. All thoughts are actions that a brain does.
4. Ergo, ideas are a part of the universe.

I'm not sure what you mean by "inherently" exist or why it is relevant that something exists "inherently", but I believe that it's evident that ideas are clearly existent entities or you would be unable to conceive of them.


It sounds to me that you are just trying to attribute some kind of inherent meaning to your values. Fine. If that's what you want to do, go right ahead. But you're not in any way convincing.


This rhetoric is logically vacuous. I don't care if it doesn't sound convincing, or what you think my motivations are, I want you to demonstrate how my arguments fail to be sound or valid if you're going to dispute them.


And once you have analysed those human consequences you abstractly construct a moral. I.e. it doesn't exist. If morals inherently existed, you wouldn't have to construct them.

All numbers are a part of an abstract modelling that is real, and the qualities they describe are real. I believe the same is true of ethics.

[The Feral Underclass]

I'm still not sure what you mean in saying that.

You don't understand what the sentence, "that a moral can be whatever you want it to be," means?


Yes: the abstract concepts in moral evaluations, much like the abstract concepts in scientific appraisals of evidence, are constructed based upon the real qualities of the things being evaluated.

So they don't inherently exist then?


There is a general consensus that it is bad to suffer and good to have pleasure.

You appear to live in a very westernised, romantic bubble. I suggest you pay more attention to the rest of the world. There is absolutely not a consensus that suffering is bad and pleasure is good; none whatsoever.

That is because morals do not inherently exist and therefore can be whatever you want them to be. Your view that suffering is bad has no more truth in it than saying suffering is good.


Ethics is about people, so of course they don't exist "inherently", if you mean that something that is inherent could exist without people.

What about animals and trees and foetuses?

By inherently exist I aim to mean pre-designed.


I wasn't using that as a proof, I was merely telling you that your conception of reality is too limited. Red is not an object, but the quality of red is an experience that exists.

And I was telling you that your point is redundant.


1. Brains are a part of the universe.
2. An "idea" is something that is thought of.
3. All thoughts are actions that a brain does.
4. Ergo, ideas are a part of the universe.

I've never denied that ideas aren't part of the universe. What I've denied is that they inherently exist or that they can be observed and verified. The object that gives rise to the idea can be verified and you can verify the abstract process that leads to your idea, but you can't demonstrate the idea as a existing thing.


I'm not sure what you mean by "inherently" exist or why it is relevant that something exists "inherently", but I believe that it's evident that ideas are clearly existent entities or you would be unable to conceive of them.

This discussion was about nihilism and it's view on morals, i.e. that there is no pre-existing, inherent morality that governs human behaviour; that they are not objects that you can verify and claim exist beyond that which we construct abstractly.


This rhetoric is logically vacuous. I don't care if it doesn't sound convincing, or what you think my motivations are, I want you to demonstrate how my arguments fail to be sound or valid if you're going to dispute them.

I think what you sound like and what your motives are, are incredibly pertinent. A person who clambers for meaning, intent on rejecting any notion that their clambering is inherently pointless, should be viewed accordingly.


All numbers are a part of an abstract modelling that is real, and the qualities they describe are real. I believe the same is true of ethics.

And I hope you find all the meaning you are looking for in that belief.

[Czy]

Well, you appear considerably caught up in the question of whether morality is "truth" but my concern is to defend a conception of morality from a historical materialist point of view and against the psychologistic conceptions of that windbag, Stirner; so we appear to be talking at cross-purposes.

This thread is about nihilism, more specifically moral nihilism, so being caught up in truth is the entire point of this discussion. My position asserts that no action is inherently moral or immoral. Also, I mentioned Stirner just to throw some ideas on the table. I don't worship the guy and I am in disagreement with him over many things. I'm always up for a good discussion concerning philosophy so don't confuse me for someone who takes a specific philosopher's ideas as gospel. If this discussion leads my ideas in another direction, I'll critically evaluate my current ones. That's the entire point of this conversation.


But what do you mean by truth, anyway? For sake of discussion if I assert that it is always immoral to murder another human being for mere pleasure, how will you set about proving otherwise? You might present me with another individual who believes that it is perfectly ok to do this, but then I would just point to this person as an example of an immoral person. Prove me wrong.

Truth here refers to an action being inherently moral or immoral. Your example's a good one, as it illustrates my point. I cannot argue against your logic here. That's the point - morality is not falsifiable or verifiable, merely an opinion. You asserting I'm immoral with no basis other than your opinion doesn't escape the fact that it is an opinion. You didn't prove why murder is immoral any way, so I would have no reason to argue. The burder of proof is on you as you assert that an action could be inherently moral or immoral, and I oppose that.


So if this is the case, you are arguing against yourself because individual morality cannot be both "heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian values" and "subjective and arbitrary", not unless you are redefining the term "subjective and arbitrary".

Of course it can. Subjective is the opposite of objective in this context. Judeo-Christian values cannot be proven to be objective. They are subjective. A human applying them still falls prey to being subjective. If I draw up a unique code of morality, I'm being as arbitrary as the cornerstone of Judeo-Christian values.
I never denied those around us shape our morality. The fact is that the foundation of the morality of those around us is subjective. Your parents taught you what is wrong and right based on society's wishes. What makes society's wishes a more accurate codification of some sort of morality than the Mayans' code?


So now you freely admit that individual morality is not subjective and arbitrary but imposed upon people by social forces! But you have a very simplistic idea about the historical journey of human ethics if you think, somewhere in the past, someone just made shit up and then got everyone else to buy into it.

Obviously social forces play a role. The question is not whether social forces impact individual ideas but whether the foundation of these social forces is objective or subjective in its codification of morality.

Tell me about the 'journey of ethics', then? This is a discussion afterall and I promise you I would not participate unless I was genuinely interested in what you have to say. Go on.

In my understanding, "someone just made shit up and then got everyone else to buy into it" is actually fairly accurate. Think of prohibition, criminalization of drugs, etc. Drugs are deemed immoral by society because some government agency decided they were immoral. Even though marijuana has been part of several cultures for millennia, Western culture, as a part of its codification of morality, deems it immoral, literally because some person 'made shit up' and convinced everyone to 'buy into it' - essentially through might and power, not truth.


So if I'm "essentially compelled to act a certain way" then my morality cannot be "subjective and arbitrary." It cannot be mere whim. You put it nicely and I'm glad that we finally agree.

Maybe so, but the foundations of the forces that compel you to act in a certain way are subjective and arbitrary, rendering the entire paradigm of morality arbitrary, whether on a collective or individual scale.


I have no problem in seeing the shaping of morality as a function of power, the question is what is the basis of this power? For Marxists, it is found in the material relations. For you, the basis of this power appears to reside in the ideological deceptions of someone, somewhere, who made shit up on a whim

Good point. I retract any sentiment that suggests your latter point. However, I still maintain that the foundation of the morality set out by this power is subjective and arbitrary, rendering, as I said above, all moral decisions as incomplete, unfactual; merely used by the ruling elite to further its own credo.

I don't think I disagree with much of what you're saying when you refer to 'material relations'. However, the morality that arises out of material relations is subjective in that it is used by the bourgeoisie to further its class interests (to be a little more materialist for you). This doesn't, however, devalue the cornerstone of my position: that no action is inherently moral or immoral.

Thanks for your contribution. You've made me think long and hard about some of my thoughts on Stirner. I used to be a Marxist and some of these thoughts are clashing in my head big time. Maybe I should start a thread specifically for Stirner so you can lambaste and roast him through a materialist conception.

I think this moral nihilist position is compatible with Marxism. An evaluation of society that stipulates that morality arises from material and social relations doesn't clash with the notion that what this code of morality tells you to do is not inherently moral or immoral despite the system's attempt to prove that actions are inherently moral or immoral.

[Sabot Cat]

You don't understand what the sentence, "that a moral can be whatever you want it to be," means?

Not in context, no.


You appear to live in a very westernised, romantic bubble. I suggest you pay more attention to the rest of the world. There is absolutely not a consensus that suffering is bad and pleasure is good; none whatsoever.

That is because morals do not inherently exist and therefore can be whatever you want them to be. Your view that suffering is bad has no more truth in it than saying suffering is good.

Really? Are you telling me that the difference between stubbing your toe and eating some delicious fruit is a contentious distinction that depends heavily on cultural context? That it is typical for one to seriously ponder upon whether or not they'll press a button that will burn them as opposed to a button that will dispense delicious ice cream in a chilled bowl (perhaps they may not like ice cream, but having a treat you don't like dispensed is obviously better than being burned). Your view, that a situation that has a greater amount of suffering than not can be good more often that it would be considered bad, is at least not very widespread.


So they don't inherently exist then?

What about animals and trees and foetuses?

By inherently exist I aim to mean pre-designed.


Nothing is pre-designed. Everything is produced without thought by natural processes, including human "creations". So nothing inherently exists, by that definition. I don't think that's what you meant though, so I'm wondering what you do mean.


I've never denied that ideas aren't part of the universe. What I've denied is that they inherently exist or that they can be observed and verified. The object that gives rise to the idea can be verified and you can verify the abstract process that leads to your idea, but you can't demonstrate the idea as a existing thing.

All ideas exist; existence is a necessary property of any thing. Whether or not a claim is true or false, or that an object, process or quality articulated in an idea is correspondent to that which is evident, is correspondent to the quality of reality (and not existence). Technically, "God" exists as a mythological character, but it's not a real being.


This discussion was about nihilism and it's view on morals, i.e. that there is no pre-existing, inherent morality that governs human behaviour; that they are not objects that you can verify and claim exist beyond that which we construct abstractly.


There is no moral "law" "governing" human behavior, like gravity, but there are ethical qualities of actions that are readily verifiable.


I think what you sound like and what your motives are, are incredibly pertinent. A person who clambers for meaning, intent on rejecting any notion that their clambering is inherently pointless, should be viewed accordingly.

And I hope you find all meaning you are looking for in that belief.

I don't care about "meaning" or anything being "pointless". I'm not looking for a purpose in life, and when I assert that suffering is bad and happiness is good, I'm stating that which is evident in defiance of ignorance that can only be cultivated by intelligent people, and I do so in order to enable a better understanding of the world around them.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

I get what he's saying, but I don't think I'm strawmanning him at all. Red Rose said:

I explained why I don't agree with this. Unless I've missed something, this is the only reasoning Red Rose has given for his consequentialism, the rest of the time it has just been (falsely) assumed. I can only argue against his position if he gives reasoning for it, i.e. explains why it is good to give pleasure and bad to cause suffering?

The thing is that utilitarians start from the premise that suffering is bad and happiness/pleasure is good. It's how they define good and bad. If people have different views its because they, in the mind of a utilitarian, don't understand the link, though most would agree that suffering is bad for me and happiness/pleasure is good for me. The point is that the utilitarian thinks that people can still be morally ignorant.


Morality leads to a demarcation problem, indeed. This distinguishes it from science, and results in it being a pseudoscience. Morality is not based on the scientific method which leads to a whole host of problems, epistemologically speaking.


Not all non-science is a pseudoscience - only something claiming to be scientific can be pseudoscience. Not saying there are or aren't moral "Sciences" I don't want to speak to that. Generally though when someone says "I think it was wrong for that man to beat their child" they wouldn't say that the thought came from some empirical science.


That a moral can be whatever you want it to be.


...


You don't understand what the sentence, "that a moral can be whatever you want it to be," means?


Why would I genuinely want something to be moral unless I already had a conviction that it is moral?


You appear to live in a very westernised, romantic bubble. I suggest you pay more attention to the rest of the world. There is absolutely not a consensus that suffering is bad and pleasure is good; none whatsoever.

That doesn't make him wrong. Electricity was something very few people in the world believed in during the early 1800s, but they turned out to be right whatever "western" and "romantic" bubble they lived in. Moral thinkers aren't dumb, they know most people disagree with them.

Also there were consequentialists in other parts of the world.


That is because morals do not inherently exist and therefore can be whatever you want them to be. Your view that suffering is bad has no more truth in it than saying suffering is good.

You're begging the question though - you're asserting that morality is something that doesn't exist. The whole point is that suffering and happiness does exist and consequentialists associate suffering with immoral behavior and happiness with moral behavior. Argue against that assertion (for which they have other reasons and arguments) you can't just hit your hand on the table.

[Hit The North]

Red Rose and SCM, how do you explain moral discourses which disapprove of pleasure and elevate suffering as a moral principle? Mother Teresa, for example, was a staunch advocate of suffering as salvation - especially for the poor. She is but one example out of many.

[Fakeblock]

The thing is that utilitarians start from the premise that suffering is bad and happiness/pleasure is good. It's how they define good and bad. If people have different views its because they, in the mind of a utilitarian, don't understand the link, though most would agree that suffering is bad for me and happiness/pleasure is good for me. The point is that the utilitarian thinks that people can still be morally ignorant.

Well, I don't have the mind of a utilitarian. So Red Rose will have to give reasoning for her assumptions and premises to convince me and problably most others in this thread.



No, that's not a convenient choice on my part. Suffering without later or overall benefit is bad; "good suffering" with the aforementioned conditions is a phrase that suggests one doesn't understand the meaning of either term. Most people are able of making that distinction at least in theory.


The terms "good" and "bad" relate to the qualities of an action and the amount of pleasure or suffering caused by it, because that is how they are used. Meaning is use, while pleasure and suffering are verifiable phenomena directly observed by everyone with no substantive exceptions.

You're confusing the different meanings of the words. That "good" and "bad" can mean both "pleasurable" and "painful" and also "morally right" and "morally wrong" doesn't lead to pleasurable=morally right. Just goes to show that "good" and "bad" have different meanings in different contexts.

"Good suffering" is a contradiction in terms, because "good", in this instance, is synonymous with pleasurable, enjoyable or desirable, but not with "morally right" or "virtuous" (as Hit the North said many people believe in virtuous suffering).

It's the same with bad. For example, if someone says "I got food poisoning from a bad tortilla", they obviously mean spoiled or contaminated when they say bad, not "evil" or morally wrong.


But these people wish to avoid same-sex relationships because they have a belief it will cause them to suffer forever, and thus it is bad for that reason. Divine command theory can be reduced to utilitarianism when one considers that most people would chose to disobey what they perceive to be God's demands if the "penalty" for such transgressions is eternal bliss, while dutiful observation would cause one to suffer forever. The dichotomy between Heaven and Hell as a place of pleasure and a place of suffering is perhaps the clearest illumination of how people are aware of what would be a generally good place and what be a generally bad place.

You have it backwards. These people, in some cases, think same-sex relationships will make them suffer forever, because they're immoral, not vice versa. All this about Heaven and Hell goes to show that people, in general, don't like to suffer too much. That doesn't mean that causing suffering is immoral though.

Not to mention that some people take an atheistic opposition to homosexuality and say it's "unnatural" or "barbaric" etc. There are also examples of people who think that suffering is good in some cases, and that, for example, spanking your child is virtuous because it will make the child more hardened or obedient. Hit the North's example applies to this as well. Furthermore there are those who call sexual promiscuity and hedonism immoral for no discernible reason.


I disagree. Actions that are wrong can be called as much with the same certainty as cancer or cardiovascular ailments can be labeled ailments. Sure this assumes that when one says "ailment" we mean a bodily state that inhibits one from doing what brings happiness to oneself and causes suffering, but the distinction of "disease" isn't unscientific if the methodology for classifying it as such is sound and valid. The only reason we believe so is because the church successfully angled itself as the sole purveyor of morality, monopolizing the institution of ethical study since times immemorial, thus prompting the reaction we see in moral nihilism.

As has already been said, science and medicinal categories merely describe the world. Ethics/morals/whatever are necessarily prescriptive, dictating which actions should and should not be done. You can't take this element out of ethics. So you're going to have to objectively and scientically explain why I shouldn't cause suffering.

...

On a slightly unrelated note, why do you think that killing is bad? You can't suffer when you're dead.

[The Feral Underclass]

Really? Are you telling me that the difference between stubbing your toe and eating some delicious fruit is a contentious distinction that depends heavily on cultural context?

That is not a question for morality or ethics.


That it is typical for one to seriously ponder upon whether or not they'll press a button that will burn them as opposed to a button that will dispense delicious ice cream in a chilled bowl (perhaps they may not like ice cream, but having a treat you don't like dispensed is obviously better than being burned).

Algolagniacs or pyraphilics may prefer to be burned. But this isn't a moral question and even if it were, the answer would depend on a whole host of factors.

If pressing the button to be be burned meant that I would save the life of my mother, then I would press the button, but likewise if pressing the button to eat ice cream saved my mother's life but resulted in your mother's death, then I would choose the ice cream.

My individual choices, whether they are to stub my toe or eat ice cream, are not dependent on some pre-destined moral code, because no such code exists. In fact, the only reason the knowledge and the choice even exists is simply a fluke of evolution.


Your view, that a situation that has a greater amount of suffering than not can be good more often that it would be considered bad, is at least not very widespread.

That's not my view.


Nothing is pre-designed.

You nihilist!


All ideas exist

The only thing that exists is matter. Ideas and thoughts are simply a consequence of matter. They are a transient result of our interaction with the world of objects and a complete accident of nature.


existence is a necessary property of any thing.]

Of any "thing" yes. Ideas, thoughts, morals aren't "things."


Whether or not a claim is true or false, or that an object, process or quality articulated in an idea is correspondent to that which is evident, is correspondent to the quality of reality (and not existence).

I understand the argument you are making and it is decidedly anti-materialist.


Technically, "God" exists as a mythological character, but it's not a real being.

Do mythological characters "exist" or do they simply endure? I do not think it's safe or proper to start a philosophical argument using language premised on the notion that things which are not real "exist."


There is no moral "law" "governing" human behavior, like gravity, but there are ethical qualities of actions that are readily verifiable.

Those qualities "exist" only insofar as you choose to understand and accept them as such. If I choose the opposite, which is my free will to do so, then I negate them as qualities.


I don't care about "meaning" or anything being "pointless". I'm not looking for a purpose in life, and when I assert that suffering is bad and happiness is good, I'm stating that which is evident in defiance of ignorance that can only be cultivated by intelligent people, and I do so in order to enable a better understanding of the world around them.

What happens if you need to torture someone to extract information that will save the lives of 1,000 of your comrades? What if being happy required you to execute a fascist in front of their spouse and children?

[Niccolo]

I think that consequentialism is an attractive position as it dodges the various hurdles that deontology faces while still giving us a concrete system to make moral decisions. Doesn't it seem sensible to base ethics on the consequences of what we do, since we usually take decisions about what to do by considering what results will be produced?


On a slightly unrelated note, why do you think that killing is bad? You can't suffer when you're dead.

Your question leads me to believe that you might interpret utilitarianism in a specific way, and Red Rose interprets in another. I believe you are referring to number one in this question when Red Rose would apply number two:

1. Acts should be made that maximize pleasure and minimize suffering

2. Acts should be made that minimize unhappiness and maximize happiness

The first interpretation, as you rightly point out, cannot sufficiently explain why murder is wrong without attaching unhappiness into the definition of utilitarianism, as in point #2 above. Using point #2, murder is wrong as it is an act that causes unhappiness and suffering - not to the individual who has died but to those around that individual. When death exists we do not, so you cannot object to utilitarianism but simply claiming that one does not suffer when dead; the flipside is true, when we exist death does not, so simply looking at an individual through a narrow lens misses the point of utilitarianism: what was the outcome for society at large?

[Decolonize The Left]

Not all ethical systems and moral philosophies are binding, however. Aristotle's ethics - virtue ethics - contains moral claims that aren't binding and recognize the fact that people make kinds of moral claims relative to the kinds of knowledge and development they have. There's no focus on placing moral blame and just on how we develop as moral beings. There is a "should" involved of course - there is a normative claim. But this normative claim is no more radical than the kind which Marxist revolutionaries posit - we "should" fight for a revolutionary state. Kierkegaard's morality too transcends any "ethical universals" yet is still clearly a moral philosophy in a sense (though I could also see someone disputing that perhaps - Kierkegaard isn't exactly an easy thinker to pin down - but he did see "Religion" as the highest goal and transcending the bourgeois moral universals of his time).

All moral claims are binding. All morals, be they claims or systems or whatever, relate and stipulate notions of right/good and wrong/bad/evil. These terms are binding.

Perhaps you'd like to provide an example of a "non-binding moral claim"?


TBH its closer to my own view, although there are some duties I think which should be universal (do not rape is the most obvious example - also don't assault an oppressed person or use bigoted terms that an oppressed person might find offensive).

If someone rapes and kills my daughter and I manage to find them and shackle them and I want to rape them with an object as revenge, are you going to tell me that my action is not in accordance with your "universal duty"?

[Decolonize The Left]

I don't believe one can claim something is beyond knowledge, because where or not something is unknowable is unknowable.

Sure we can. For example: before the existence of telescopes galaxies were 'beyond knowledge.' Before the existence of atomic microscopes, atoms were beyond knowledge. Etc... The universe is absurdly complex - there's no telling how much of it can be understood, will be, or won't be. But it is certain that much of it is unknowable.


How do you know that human moral experience cannot be sufficiently accounted for without accounting for it in making that appraisal?

I'm arguing that we ought not 'account for' all human moral experience, or all experience for that matter.


Couldn't I assert that mathematics is a failure because it cannot encompass the totality of numeric thought, as we are limited by our lifespans in tabulating the high quantities accounted for within it?

Numeric thought has nothing to do with individual will and action so it's not of much relevance to this discussion. As a contrast, morality directly dictates human decisions, wills, and actions - it makes claims on these systems while mathematics makes no claims on material reality at all (it being confined to the world of numbers).


Or really, any field of knowledge is incomplete and will always remain that way if we refuse to pursue it on the grounds that we cannot achieve absolute realization of the whole of the object of our inquiry; this line of argumentation is inherently indefensible because of this.

One cannot "know" anything about morality in the way that one can "know" that one is standing up or that it is raining, etc... They are not analogous.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Red Rose and SCM, how do you explain moral discourses which disapprove of pleasure and elevate suffering as a moral principle? Mother Teresa, for example, was a staunch advocate of suffering as salvation - especially for the poor. She is but one example out of many.

I'm not a utilitarian, I was just frustrated by the level of argumentation of those opposing Red Rose. I think a utilitarian would say that Mother Teresa had the wrong priorities, however, based on her particular Catholic, Christian viewpoint.


All moral claims are binding. All morals, be they claims or systems or whatever, relate and stipulate notions of right/good and wrong/bad/evil. These terms are binding.

Perhaps you'd like to provide an example of a "non-binding moral claim"?


I think Aristotle makes a good account in the Nichomachean Ethics about how one cannot make an absolute moral claim regarding many moral behaviors, but there are good heuristic rules to follow. Drinking alcohol is not ALWAYS bad, and one should not make the universalized moral claim that "alcohol consumption is always wrong". However, clearly excessive alcohol consumption leads people very often to do bad things to others which they wouldn't otherwise have done, so drinking in moderation is important to develop one's character so that they are good to themselves and to their society.



If someone rapes and kills my daughter and I manage to find them and shackle them and I want to rape them with an object as revenge, are you going to tell me that my action is not in accordance with your "universal duty"?I would tell you not to do it - although I could certainly appreciate your desire for eye-for-an-eye vengeance.

I think moral claims should be things that help us flourish as people.


Algolagniacs or pyraphilics may prefer to be burned. But this isn't a moral question and even if it were, the answer would depend on a whole host of factors.

Those people clearly get pleasure out of being burned - which only proves his point.



If pressing the button to be be burned meant that I would save the life of my mother, then I would press the button, but likewise if pressing the button to eat ice cream saved my mother's life but resulted in your mother's death, then I would choose the ice cream.Again, this only goes to show that suffering is something morally significant for people.

That said, the point you bring up is a fair critique of consequentialist ethics - most people clearly care more about the consequences to those they love than those they don't. It seems that consequentialists, while they have a consistent and coherent moral theory (for the most part), don't fully account for moral psychology.


My individual choices, whether they are to stub my toe or eat ice cream, are not dependent on some pre-destined moral code, because no such code exists. In fact, the only reason the knowledge and the choice even exists is simply a fluke of evolution. But she's NOT saying that her choices are dependent on some "pre-destined moral code" just that everyone has moral opinions guiding their actions and that their moral opinions should account for the consequences of actions on another. Which, on some level, many moral codes *are* based on, even if only a minority.

[The Feral Underclass]

suffering is something morally significant for people.

That's not the question at stake here. Clearly "morals" are significant to people.

[Sabot Cat]

Red Rose and SCM, how do you explain moral discourses which disapprove of pleasure and elevate suffering as a moral principle? Mother Teresa, for example, was a staunch advocate of suffering as salvation - especially for the poor. She is but one example out of many.

I would say they are confused about reality, as Mother Teresa was an orthodox Catholic who believed in an afterlife of eternal reward for comparatively minuscule pain.


You're confusing the different meanings of the words. That "good" and "bad" can mean both "pleasurable" and "painful" and also "morally right" and "morally wrong" doesn't lead to pleasurable=morally right. Just goes to show that "good" and "bad" have different meanings in different contexts.

"Good suffering" is a contradiction in terms, because "good", in this instance, is synonymous with pleasurable, enjoyable or desirable, but not with "morally right" or "virtuous" (as Hit the North said many people believe in virtuous suffering).

It's the same with bad. For example, if someone says "I got food poisoning from a bad tortilla", they obviously mean spoiled or contaminated when they say bad, not "evil" or morally wrong.

True, these words have different meanings, but good as in "morally right" and bad as in "morally wrong" have their experiential precedents in that which causes more pleasure and that which causes more pain. Suffering can be appraised as good to some if it leads to pleasure dependent on false metaphysical premises, or it actually can be good overall when all of the consequences are assessed (that is, momentary pain for later tangible or communal pleasure; altruism is good on this principle).




You have it backwards. These people, in some cases, think same-sex relationships will make them suffer forever, because they're immoral, not vice versa. All this about Heaven and Hell goes to show that people, in general, don't like to suffer too much. That doesn't mean that causing suffering is immoral though.
Not to mention that some people take an atheistic opposition to homosexuality and say it's "unnatural" or "barbaric" etc. There are also examples of people who think that suffering is good in some cases, and that, for example, spanking your child is virtuous because it will make the child more hardened or obedient. Hit the North's example applies to this as well. Furthermore there are those who call sexual promiscuity and hedonism immoral for no discernible reason.


But they do so in the belief that the overall amount of suffering would be lower than it would have been, even if there was some immediate unpleasantness that allowed it to happen. And those who decry these are doing so with a misunderstanding of the consequences and the underlying reality of their actions. Pluralistic views on morality does not demonstrate that morality itself is pluralistic.


As has already been said, science and medicinal categories merely describe the world. Ethics/morals/whatever are necessarily prescriptive, dictating which actions should and should not be done. You can't take this element out of ethics. So you're going to have to objectively and scientically explain why I shouldn't cause suffering.


The is-ought distinction is a matter of semantics, as you can express any moral fact without saying it imperatively. Saying that one should do X, is always stated with the implicit condition that one should do X "if one hopes to [do goal Y]". So you shouldn't murder innocent people who are not evidently doing anything to cause someone fatal harm [because it would be morally wrong].



On a slightly unrelated note, why do you think that killing is bad? You can't suffer when you're dead.

Niccolo explained this better than I would have.


That is not a question for morality or ethics.

I was countering your statement that "Your view that suffering is bad has no more truth in it than saying suffering is good.", which is a plain absurdity when one considers the experiential precedent of suffering and bad that are one and the same.


Algolagniacs or pyraphilics may prefer to be burned. But this isn't a moral question and even if it were, the answer would depend on a whole host of factors.

Yes, they would prefer to be burned because it would please them more.


If pressing the button to be be burned meant that I would save the life of my mother, then I would press the button, but likewise if pressing the button to eat ice cream saved my mother's life but resulted in your mother's death, then I would choose the ice cream.

Your articulation of your principles, in that whether or not you would press the button is dependent on if the amount of pleasure outweighed the amount of suffering, is an exact reflection of my own. We are not in disagreement that these would be the good things to do in this situation, we are in a disagreement in acknowledging that we can objectively describe those as the good things to do.



My individual choices, whether they are to stub my toe or eat ice cream, are not dependent on some pre-destined moral code, because no such code exists. In fact, the only reason the knowledge and the choice even exists is simply a fluke of evolution.


There is no cosmic code or celestial law book, yes, and morality is a product of evolution. But that does not make it any less real, as we are all are products of evolution and very real.


That's not my view.


You stated that, "Your view that suffering is bad has no more truth in it than saying suffering is good.", so I don't think I'm not characterizing your view correctly unless you disagree with what you said now.


You nihilist!


Atheist.


The only thing that exists is matter. Ideas and thoughts are simply a consequence of matter. They are a transient result of our interaction with the world of objects and a complete accident of nature.


The only thing that exists is matter; ideas and thoughts are qualities or processes of matter, but they are still real. Furthermore, everything is a complete accident of nature because there isn't any creators.


Of any "thing" yes. Ideas, thoughts, morals aren't "things."


They are qualities and processes.


I understand the argument you are making and it is decidedly anti-materialist.


How? All qualities and processes relate to material things, and I never asserted otherwise.


Do mythological characters "exist" or do they simply endure? I do not think it's safe or proper to start a philosophical argument using language premised on the notion that things which are not real "exist."


I'd argue that mythological creatures do exist as mythological "creatures", but that is indeed a tangential semantics debate.


Those qualities "exist" only insofar as you choose to understand and accept them as such. If I choose the opposite, which is my free will to do so, then I negate them as qualities.


These qualities exist even if you deny them. Reality is that which remains even if you don't believe in it, and whether or not you do has no bearing on whether or not it is.


What happens if you need to torture someone to extract information that will save the lives of 1,000 of your comrades? What if being happy required you to execute a fascist in front of their spouse and children?


First of all: I'm not sure what those have to do with my denial of purpose.

Secondly, for the first scenario, if it is the only thing I can do to save those lives, then it is the right thing to do and objectively so.

But the last scenario depends on believing myself as a somehow unique moral agent, when there is no evident reason to believe that I am. It would not be good overall if unusually cruel (and probably unnecessary) execution was a socially permissible way to satisfy one's pleasures.


Sure we can. For example: before the existence of telescopes galaxies were 'beyond knowledge.' Before the existence of atomic microscopes, atoms were beyond knowledge. Etc... The universe is absurdly complex - there's no telling how much of it can be understood, will be, or won't be. But it is certain that much of it is unknowable.

We didn't know they were beyond our current knowledge at the time until learning more about them.


I'm arguing that we ought not 'account for' all human moral experience, or all experience for that matter.


Why? It would be more beneficial to account for it partially than it would be to ignore it entirely.


Numeric thought has nothing to do with individual will and action so it's not of much relevance to this discussion. As a contrast, morality directly dictates human decisions, wills, and actions - it makes claims on these systems while mathematics makes no claims on material reality at all (it being confined to the world of numbers).


Mathematics is a model dependent and descriptive of reality; it wouldn't be meaningful without experiential precedents. There is no world but this world, parsimoniously speaking.


One cannot "know" anything about morality in the way that one can "know" that one is standing up or that it is raining, etc... They are not analogous.

Some actions are evidently morally wrong and evidently morally right, due to their verifiable consequences. They are analogous.


I'm not a utilitarian, I was just frustrated by the level of argumentation of those opposing Red Rose. I think a utilitarian would say that Mother Teresa had the wrong priorities, however, based on her particular Catholic, Christian viewpoint.

Indeed, and I appreciate your argumentation in my stead at points. :)


That said, the point you bring up is a fair critique of consequentialist ethics - most people clearly care more about the consequences to those they love than those they don't. It seems that consequentialists, while they have a consistent and coherent moral theory (for the most part), don't fully account for moral psychology.


Our belief in the specialness of a few individuals is not correspondent to reality as it is. However, familial bonds, friendships and self-worth are things that can help cultivate communities bound by mutual love without a lot of tinkering, so I'm not opposed to valuing some people more than others by devoting one's time to them because it causes more benefits than suffering overall.


Those people clearly get pleasure out of being burned - which only proves his point.

But he's NOT saying that his choices are dependent on some "pre-destined moral code" just that everyone has moral opinions guiding their actions and that their moral opinions should account for the consequences of actions on another. Which, on some level, many moral codes *are* based on, even if only a minority.

Your points are spot on, so I have nothing to add but something slightly tangential: those pronouns should be she and her, respectively. It's no big deal, but I want you to know for future reference. Thanks~ :)

[The Feral Underclass]

There is no cosmic code or celestial law book, yes, and morality is a product of evolution. But that does not make it any less real, as we are all are products of evolution and very real.

I feel that this discussion is really going no where. If you just repeat yourself, it only means that I have to repeat myself.

Matter is the only thing that exists. Period. Morals are not matter, therefore they do not exist. Matter will shape our thoughts and we can use matter to articulate a complex idea that we can choose to call a moral, but that complex idea is transient and completely at the whim of other matter, which may choose to call it something else. There is no truth. There is no universal moral code. There is nothing except matter.

Your individual choice to call suffering bad and happiness good is not the foundation of anything other than your personal view on phenomenon.

[Sabot Cat]

I feel that this discussion is really going no where. If you just repeat yourself, it only means that I have to repeat myself.

I'm trying to address all of your points in the most honest way possible, and I apologize if I have to repeat the same facts to do so.


Matter is the only thing that exists. Period. Morals are not matter, therefore they do not exist. Matter will shape our thoughts and we can use matter to articulate a complex idea that we can choose to call a moral, but that complex idea is transient and completely at the whim of other matter, which may choose to call it something else. There is no truth. There is no universal moral code. There is nothing except matter.

Your individual choice to call suffering bad and happiness good is not the foundation of anything other than your personal view on phenomenon.

Numbers are also not matter. Numbers represent quantities, which are real and existent qualities of material things. True and false, moral rightness and wrongness are qualities as well, although more complex. I think you are making a mistake in asserting that morals and epistemological categories are not material things, and are thus not things at all for the reason that all things are material, because I am not asserting that morals or truth are things. I am saying they are qualities of things, or the processes of things.

Also, the assertion that "There is no truth." is necessarily false. This is because if it were true, it would not be true. Thus, I'm having difficulty understanding your epistemology when it's built upon a premise that cannot be true.

[The Feral Underclass]

I am not asserting that morals or truth are things. I am saying they are qualities of things, or the processes of things.

Then you accept that morals do not exist.


Also, the assertion that "There is no truth." is necessarily false. This is because if it were true, it would not be true. Thus, I'm having difficulty understanding your epistemology when it's built upon a premise that cannot be true.

Do you have an accurate, certain, authentic or definite understanding of human existence and the universe? Are you saying there is such an understanding for us to accept?

[Sabot Cat]

Then you accept that morals do not exist.

Morally rightness and moral wrongness identify verifiable consequences of actions- suffering and pleasure- that I experience everyday of my life.


Do you have an accurate, certain, authentic or definite understanding of human existence and the universe? Are you saying there is such an understanding for us to accept?

Why is universal knowledge a prerequisite for any knowledge, or being able to distinguish between claims that do correspond to known reality, and claims that fail to correspond to known reality? Furthermore, just because my understanding of reality could be invalid, there is an absence of evidence necessary to overturn the extensive evidence available to me which I justifiably identify as true.

As well, this is not a direct response to what I said, which is that your assertion that "there is no truth" cannot be true.

[The Feral Underclass]

Morally rightness and moral wrongness identify verifiable consequences of actions- suffering and pleasure- that I experience everyday of my life.

So you keep saying.


Why is universal knowledge a prerequisite for any knowledge, or being able to distinguish between claim that do correspond to reality, and claims that fail to correspond to reality? Furthermore, just because my understanding of reality could be invalid, there is an absence of evidence necessary to overturn the extensive evidence available to me which I justifiably identify as true.

So in other words there is no truth.

[Sabot Cat]

So you keep saying.

Yes, because it is true, and your argument that it isn't true because "morals aren't material things" is incredibly weak in that it responds to a position I don't even have (that "morals are things and that there are things which aren't material").


So in other words there is no truth.

I may sound like a broken record here but: this makes absolutely no sense. The statement that there is no truth cannot be true. It's impossible for it to be true. There is no way that you can positively assert it as if it were true, because in so doing you are contradicting yourself.

[The Feral Underclass]

Yes, because it is true, and your argument that it isn't true because "morals aren't material things" is incredibly weak in that it responds to a position I don't even have (that "morals are things and that there are things which aren't material").

Had you really been paying attention to what I am saying to you, you would see that I have the position that morals are a consequence of matter, much the same as you. I have also not accused you of saying that morals are things.

What I am saying to you is simple:

All that exists is matter
Morals are not matter
Morals do not exist.

You can claim they exist and you can use the fact that phenomenon exist to try and qualify your assertion, but it doesn't make it real. The only way you could make the claim that morals exist is if you could provide some pre-existing code or god.


I may sound like a broken record here but: this makes absolutely no sense. The statement that there is no truth cannot be true. It's impossible for it to be true. There is no way that you can positively assert it as if it were true, because in so doing you are contradicting yourself.

There's nothing contradictory about accepting that you are unable to find truth in your existence, in the knowledge that you construct and in the understandings we have about the universe. There isn't even truth in the statement "there is no truth" since we can never know the truth of that statement. This is the human condition.

[Sabot Cat]

Had you really been paying attention to what I am saying to you, you would see that I have the position that morals are a consequence of matter, much the same as you. I have also not accused you of saying that morals are things.

What I am saying to you is simple:

All that exists is matter
Morals are not matter
Morals do not exist.

The first premise is unsound; movement is no matter but it exists, for instance. While all things that exist are matter or energy, and morals are definitely not things, they are still the qualities of the processes of things. And if I'm to take your claims to epistemological nihilism seriously, on what basis do you assert any of these premises?


You can claim they exist and you can use the fact that phenomenon exist to try and qualify your assertion, but it doesn't make it real. The only way you could make the claim that morals exist is if you could provide some pre-existing code or god.


I disagree. If there is a universal creator with notions of what is morally good and what is morally wrong, they would not be correct unless they accord to what they actually are. If a universal creator thought that gay marriage and eating clams was morally wrong, they would be incorrect, and their status as what we would call God is irrelevant.


There's nothing contradictory about accepting that you are unable to find truth in your existence, in the knowledge that you construct and in the understandings we have about the universe.

It is completely contradictory, because if you accept that you are unable to find truth as true, you are finding truth in that premise.


There isn't even truth in the statement "there is no truth" since we can never know the truth of that statement.

This is an argument from ignorance that employs circular reasoning, to justify a premise that is impossible.


This is the human condition.

It's sophistry.

[Fakeblock]

I would say they are confused about reality, as Mother Teresa was an orthodox Catholic who believed in an afterlife of eternal reward for comparatively minuscule pain.

True, these words have different meanings, but good as in "morally right" and bad as in "morally wrong" have their experiential precedents in that which causes more pleasure and that which causes more pain. Suffering can be appraised as good to some if it leads to pleasure dependent on false metaphysical premises, or it actually can be good overall when all of the consequences are assessed (that is, momentary pain for later tangible or communal pleasure; altruism is good on this principle).

But they do so in the belief that the overall amount of suffering would be lower than it would have been, even if there was some immediate unpleasantness that allowed it to happen. And those who decry these are doing so with a misunderstanding of the consequences and the underlying reality of their actions. Pluralistic views on morality does not demonstrate that morality itself is pluralistic.

The is-ought distinction is a matter of semantics, as you can express any moral fact without saying it imperatively. Saying that one should do X, is always stated with the implicit condition that one should do X "if one hopes to [do goal Y]". So you shouldn't murder innocent people who are not evidently doing anything to cause someone fatal harm [because it would be morally wrong].


Niccolo explained this better than I would have.

First of all, I don't think there's any case to be made that people have also associated what's immoral with what causes pain or pleasure. I think many of the enemies of same-sex relations or transexuality or promiscuity don't believe that any of these things will cause suffering - and they surely don't care whether the people they condemn suffer from marginilisation and abuse. Most of them think it's a problem of either sin or simply an erosion of family values. Whether religious purity or good family values lead to pleasure is a secondary matter to them, because they're ends in themselves.

Secondly, the descriptive and prescriptive difference is pretty important in ethics imo. In ethics you're not merely saying "if one hopes X happens then one should do Y". "If one hopes to minimise suffering then one shouldn't do things that cause suffering" is a tautology, but has nothing to do with morals. When you're judging the moral value of an action you're assuming a specific purpose or goal that humanity should strive to achieve (maximum possible happiness, spiritual purity etc.), irrespective of material circumstances. The overall questions are "do such goals exist" and "why should we try to achieve them".

If we say that "bad" is just a synonym of "causes suffering" the entire debate about whether morals exist becomes one of whether pleasure or suffering exists. I think most people can agree that it does. But when you say that someone is doing something moral or immoral, you're not just observing that it causes suffering. You're judging the merits and disadvantages of the action, to, in part at least, decide whether or not it should be replicated on a societal scale (in order to achieve an overall goal). And that is a subjective valuation. So when I say "objective morals don't exist", I'm not saying "pleasure and suffering doesn't exist". I'm saying that, when it comes down to it, all behaviours are equal and no kind of behaviour is objectively better suited to help follow the overall purpose of our existence or the ideal way of life, because no such purpose or way of life exists. Whether we choose to pillage, murder and rape or not is, in the eyes of the universe, inconsequential.

[The Feral Underclass]

Your argument is unsound, because all things that exist are matter or energy, but morals are not things, but qualities of the processes of things.

I don't understand what more you are trying to argue here. What is the purpose of this intervention. You are accepting my point of view, but somehow trying to make it seem as if you aren't.

Morals are not things, but qualities of the processes of things. Yes. This is my position also. The difference is that you still try and attribute some kind of significance in an effort to justify yourself. That's fine. You do that. I prefer to stay honest with myself.


And if I'm to take your claims to epistemological nihilism seriously, on what basis do you assert any of these premises?

The basis that I can observe and verify the existence of matter.


It is completely contradictory, because if you accept that you are unable to find truth as true, you are finding truth in that premise.

I understand your position and I have responded to it.


This is an argument from ignorance that employs circular reasoning, to justify a premise that is impossible.

So firstly you tell me that it's impossible to believe the statement that "there is no truth", but when I accept that the statement "there is no truth" is in itself questionable, since we can never know truth, I am employing circular reasoning? It appears that nothing other than your opinion can possibly be acceptable. o

Out of interest, if human beings didn't exist, would the statement: "there is no truth" be true or not?


It's sophistry.

I'm not the one who is desperately trying to erect some complex meaning to their beliefs. My views are quite simple to understand.

[The Feral Underclass]

Whether we choose to pillage, murder and rape or not is, in the eyes of the universe, inconsequential.

Yes!

[Sabot Cat]

I'm sorry Anarchist Tension, but I'm not sure how to specifically counter those points because they are literally nonsensical to me. The fact that there is truth simply cannot be dissented from in a sound and valid manner. Please consider that "true" and "false" are mutually exclusive categories, that the former refers to facts that correspond to our reality, that the latter refers to claims that don't correspond to reality, and for that reason epistemological nihilism is as fallacious and as it is vacuous. Again, I'm sorry, and I'm not trying to seize the last word or shut down debate; I just don't know how to find common ground enough to argue well with you.


First of all, I don't think there's any case to be made that people have also associated what's immoral with what causes pain or pleasure. I think many of the enemies of same-sex relations or transexuality or promiscuity don't believe that any of these things will cause suffering - and they surely don't care whether the people they condemn suffer from marginilisation and abuse. Most of them think it's a problem of either sin or simply an erosion of family values. Whether religious purity or good family values lead to pleasure is a secondary matter to them, because they're ends in themselves.

Unless we are to believe them all insincere (and trust me when I say that I sympathize with that position, but there isn't sufficient evidence for it), they believe that gay and trans people will suffer forever unless they intervene, and that their pain here is marginal compared to the pain they would be subjected to in Hell. Thus, their actions can be explained by these definitions of moral good and moral wrong, but not justified because they have a faulty understanding of the world.


Secondly, the descriptive and prescriptive difference is pretty important in ethics imo. In ethics you're not merely saying "if one hopes X happens then one should do Y". "If one hopes to minimise suffering then one shouldn't do things that cause suffering" is a tautology, but has nothing to do with morals. When you're judging the moral value of an action you're assuming a specific purpose or goal that humanity should strive to achieve (maximum possible happiness, spiritual purity etc.), irrespective of material circumstances. The overall questions are "do such goals exist" and "why should we try to achieve them".

If we say that "bad" is just a synonym of "causes suffering" the entire debate about whether morals exist becomes one of whether pleasure or suffering exists. I think most people can agree that it does. But when you say that someone is doing something moral or immoral, you're not just observing that it causes suffering. You're judging the merits and disadvantages of the action, to, in part at least, decide whether or not it should be replicated on a societal scale (in order to achieve an overall goal). And that is a subjective valuation. So when I say "objective morals don't exist", I'm not saying "pleasure and suffering doesn't exist". I'm saying that, when it comes down to it, all behaviours are equal and no kind of behaviour is objectively better suited to help follow the overall purpose of our existence or the ideal way of life, because no such purpose or way of life exists. Whether we choose to pillage, murder and rape or not is, in the eyes of the universe, inconsequential.

I disagree that the notions of moral and immoral rely on any kind of authority or are dependent on any kind of purpose. If "morally good" means "causes the most pleasure possible and the least amount of suffering", which it does, then it is a completely objective evaluation, with applications in the determination of actions and policy.

As well, the goal of maximum possible happiness is dependent upon material circumstances. I want to be happy, and the vast majority of people would like to be as happy as possible too, and furthermore I don't want to suffer as much as possible, and the vast majority of people would like to not suffer too; the attainment of certain material conditions in the world is necessary to meet this end. Those who can be perceived from these goals often have a faulty (read: non-materialist) perspective on reality, and in absence of that, they would probably clearly follow these goals as most do. Moral goodness and moral wrongness always correlate, when framed by an adequate materialist understanding of the world, with the above. Indeed, even without that, they tend to do so. Although there are exceptions here and there, most cultures hold that murder and rape are wrong. Most cultures hold that kindness, charity, etc. are good. This is all consistent with the maximum happiness principle, and the definition of morally good and wrong that relates them to objective consequences. Where things get sketchy is in the determination of moral agents, and again, their understanding of what the world which informs their ability to recognize the true consequences of their actions.

[The Feral Underclass]

I'm sorry Anarchist Tension, but I'm not sure how to specifically counter those points because they are literally nonsensical to me.

Which is unusual, since I am largely agreeing with your views. The only real difference seems to be about emphasis.


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[Sabot Cat]

Which is unusual, since I am largely agreeing with your views. The only real difference seems to be about emphasis.

We agree on a materialist reality, but I think the reason why you do not recognize truth for what is largely stems from how religious organizations have corrupted the concept in public discourse in order to give themselves an epistemological fig leaf. Religious organizations are also guilty for proposing the concepts of inherent meaning and purpose and alleging that they are somehow necessary. Does the universe have a purpose? Do we? No, because we weren't created. But I don't care. If some alien scientist created this universe and uses it to express some sort of artistic statement or has goals in mind for its inhabitants, I think it's largely irrelevant to our lives.

But yeah, this kind of thing is why I don't want to try to debate with you anymore on this topic, because now I'm not addressing your arguments but your motivations and the circumstances that created them, as I don't know how to respond your individual points without repeating myself over and over; that gets pretty tedious for both of us after awhile.

[Niccolo]

So in other words there is no truth.

Define truth. You certainly do not deny the truth of mathematics? I'm not sure if you're familiar with the Peano axioms, but they tell us

What about the truths of analytic logic. All A's are Q's and all Q's are D's. All A's = D's is truthful, is it not?

We're both materialists. Do you deny that there is an objective reality, which is a truth, although your perceptions and understanding of it may be completely wrong?

Denying truth is a useless epistemological position as it is inherently contradictory as Red Rose pointed out. So is there no truth other than the statement 'there is no truth' or is there no truth including the statement 'there is no truth'?


Whether we choose to pillage, murder and rape or not is, in the eyes of the universe, inconsequential.

The universe has no eyes and of course no capacity to judge. But we humans can judge each other. Red Rose and I (at least I am inferring the rest of her position from what has been written) do not believe that there exists some capacity in the universe to judge us according to some grand list of rules, but rather that humans construct a very real code of morality based on the faculty of reason in order to co-operate more efficiently and live in greater harmony as a society.

[The Feral Underclass]

Define truth.

Things we can be absolutely, definitively, unquestionably certain of.

We have created concepts and ideas and knowledge based upon our limited understandings of ourselves and the universe. We are nothing more than an incidental phenomenon in the expanse of a universe so immense, mysterious and complex that it is highly probable we can never fully grapple with its "truth". The things we understand to be truth are confined within those parameters; within the boundaries of our finite collective experience as a sapient animal, and nothing else. We can confirm the laws of our own understandings, but can we ever be absolutely, definitively and unquestionably certain of anything? Is that possible?...If human beings had never existed, what would "truth" be then?

The indescribable nature of the universe is far greater and far more profound than some primate scurrying around a piece of rock "thinking." We are irrelevant and insignificant and what we believe truth to be is most likely never possible to be confirmed. Not unless some prodigious and revealing event occurs in our life time.

[Czy]

Fucking beautiful man^

Poetic and profoundly majestic.

[LifeSexDeath]

What is the point of life? Human's want there to be a point to life. This is found in our nature and thought process. Without a point to life, why not stop living? That is where the role of religion comes into place as some kind of reward system for your good moral. What are good morals is a different story and a different post. Most people confine their minds to religion and pretty much brainwash themselves to the point they can't live without a goal in life. Religion gives us the promise of an afterlife that can not be proved, nor disprove. In order to obey the morals of that religion, they typically have some kind of hell like in the bible, or a reincarnation system like in Jainism or Buddhism.

[Sabot Cat]

Things we can be absolutely, definitively, unquestionably certain of.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of truth is "a (1) : the state of being the case : fact (2) : the body of real things, events, and facts ". What truth means, as it is commonly used, is a category of claims that is inclusive to all facts, or all that is real.

The most popular and often overlapping philosophical definitions of truth are:

1) claims that best reflect reality are true (Correspondence Theory of Truth)
2) claims that are derived from (a) certain foundational premise(s) that's accepted as self-evidently true, are also true (Foundational Theory of Truth)
3) claims that are consistent with (a) premise(s), are the most true (Coherence Theory of Truth)

Positions two and three are simply the result of the system-building approach to philosophy popularized by Descartes, as well as rationalists and other Enlightenment thinkers. I believe these systems miss the point in that our words and claims are empty without experiential precedent, and they do not exist in some sort of realm apart from ourselves. Truth are all of the claims that correspond to our world (position one), which is similar to the commonplace meaning of the term.

So when you say that there is no truth, in the vernacular and in philosophical circles that can only be most plausibly interpreted as meaning "There is no such thing as facts", "There is no such thing as claims that correspond to reality", which are both incoherent positions that contradict themselves. I would say then that our dispute arises because you have a specialized definition of the term that almost no one else shares.


We have created concepts and ideas and knowledge based upon our limited understandings of ourselves and the universe. We are nothing more than an incidental phenomenon in the expanse of a universe so immense, mysterious and complex that it is highly probable we can never fully grapple with its "truth". The things we understand to be truth are confined within those parameters; within the boundaries of our finite collective experience as a sapient animal, and nothing else. We can confirm the laws of our own understandings, but can we ever be absolutely, definitively and unquestionably certain of anything? Is that possible?...If human beings had never existed, what would "truth" be then?

Mystery is only beautiful when filled with imagination, which can never exist or flourish without knowledge. When you are finding wonder in "mystery", you are not likely to be saying "wow, these lack of facts and absence of knowledge sure is neat". Mystery is only interesting because of the possible answers. If we failed to try to find any answers, or ascertain any truth, mystery would lose its antithesis and thus, its luster.


The indescribable nature of the universe is far greater and far more profound than some primate scurrying around a piece of rock "thinking." We are irrelevant and insignificant and what we believe truth to be is most likely never possible to be confirmed. Not unless some prodigious and revealing event occurs in our life time.

To who are we are irrelevant and insignificant, and why should I value the opinion of that person? Unless you are committing a category error in ascribing the universe or nature as a whole characteristics that are only known to be the sole domain of people in particular, such as empathy, and then asserting that the lack of a quality it cannot have as if it implies anything. It does not. I am not sad when the ground or sky doesn't express love for me, because it cannot do so. But there are people who do love me, and who I can love, and I see no reason why I should care more that there exists things that cannot do so.

[The Feral Underclass]

I hope you manage to convince yourself.

[The Feral Underclass]

I am not going to keep arguing with you. Aside from the fact you somehow always manage to miss my point, that post wasn't even directed at you. Yet you seem so eager to talk to me and make sure I understand how valuable you are.

I've made my argument and after considering your post I have nothing more to add at this point.


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[Sabot Cat]

What is the point of life? Human's want there to be a point to life. This is found in our nature and thought process. Without a point to life, why not stop living? That is where the role of religion comes into place as some kind of reward system for your good moral. What are good morals is a different story and a different post. Most people confine their minds to religion and pretty much brainwash themselves to the point they can't live without a goal in life. Religion gives us the promise of an afterlife that can not be proved, nor disprove. In order to obey the morals of that religion, they typically have some kind of hell like in the bible, or a reincarnation system like in Jainism or Buddhism.

Actually, if a belief in an afterlife cannot be proven, we cannot assume it to be true unless new evidence comes to light; it is thus disproven by the absence of supporting evidence.


I am not going to keep arguing with you. Aside from the fact you somehow always manage to miss my point, that post wasn't even directed at you. Yet you seem so eager to talk to me and make sure I understand how valuable you are. I've made my argument and after considering your post I have nothing more to add at this point.

I just happen to be the person who is on this thread almost as often as you are. I respond to everyone more or less if their posts are directed at me or anyone in general. I deleted the post you were responding to because that wasn't directed at me; I made that mistake because your post came right after mine, without addressing anyone or using any quotes from the poster you were responding to. In any case, I'm sorry for being curt with you.

Also, my goal is not to convince you of my worth; I just want to have conversations about ethics and epistemology with people here, because forums with people willing to share and expound upon their informed opinions have helped me to formulate my worldview. I hope my philosophy continues to develop, and I hope that perhaps I can help others to do the same.

[Fakeblock]

The universe has no eyes and of course no capacity to judge. But we humans can judge each other. Red Rose and I (at least I am inferring the rest of her position from what has been written) do not believe that there exists some capacity in the universe to judge us according to some grand list of rules, but rather that humans construct a very real code of morality based on the faculty of reason in order to co-operate more efficiently and live in greater harmony as a society.
Of course the "in the eyes of the universe" bit was metaphorical. Perhaps a better phrase would've been "in the greater scheme of things" or "ultimately", I don't know. The point was that humans attach an imaginary significance to these practices.

If you accept that morals are nothing more than social constructions, I’d say you’ve already won half the battle. The next step is to realise that if morals only exist ideologically, they obscure the world as it exists, the way we relate to it and the ways in which we relate to each other (as do other such ideological constructions such as nations, race, gender). Furthermore I think you have the wrong idea about the function of moral codes. They don't exist to help us "co-operate more efficiently and live in greater harmony as a society”, but to reflect, ideologically, the individual’s relation to his or her conditions of existence. The difference between moral codes is not one of understanding/misunderstanding of reality, but one of difference in class interests. If one abandons morality, one has taken the first steps towards an understanding of the real dynamics of our social relations.

[Sabot Cat]

Of course the "in the eyes of the universe" bit was metaphorical. Perhaps a better phrase would've been "in the greater scheme of things" or "ultimately", I don't know. The point was that humans attach an imaginary significance to these practices.

But that's the thing: values and significance are that which only people can have. There is no "real" significance or value that the cosmos can have as itself, or a greater scheme of things, that invalidates which we find important.


If you accept that morals are nothing more than social constructions, I’d say you’ve already won half the battle. The next step is to realise that if morals only exist ideologically, they obscure the world as it exists, the way we relate to it and the ways in which we relate to each other (as do other such ideological constructions such as nations, race, gender). Furthermore I think you have the wrong idea about the function of moral codes. They don't exist to help us "co-operate more efficiently and live in greater harmony as a society”, but to reflect, ideologically, the individual’s relation to his or her conditions of existence. The difference between moral codes is not one of understanding/misunderstanding of reality, but one of difference in class interests. If one abandons morality, one has taken the first steps towards an understanding of the real dynamics of our social relations.

Actions that are good cause more pleasure than pain and actions that are wrong causes more pain than pleasure. I don't see how these fail to describe reality as it truly is. If one "abandons morality", one is simply being willfully ignorant to these consequences of one's actions, or rather, one is likely to appraise them as if oneself is the only moral agent. Aesthetics based ethics based purely on what one wants to do without analysis of the consequences are merely egoist morality systems masquerading as nihilistic.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Of course the "in the eyes of the universe" bit was metaphorical. Perhaps a better phrase would've been "in the greater scheme of things" or "ultimately", I don't know. The point was that humans attach an imaginary significance to these practices.


Something is not less real just because it is "attached" by the human mind. As far as I am concerned my values are as "real" as I am. After all they make up a part of who I am. These values aren't delusions like looking at a rope and seeing a snake.



If you accept that morals are nothing more than social constructions, I’d say you’ve already won half the battle. The next step is to realise that if morals only exist ideologically, they obscure the world as it exists, the way we relate to it and the ways in which we relate to each other (as do other such ideological constructions such as nations, race, gender). Furthermore I think you have the wrong idea about the function of moral codes. They don't exist to help us "co-operate more efficiently and live in greater harmony as a society”, but to reflect, ideologically, the individual’s relation to his or her conditions of existence. The difference between moral codes is not one of understanding/misunderstanding of reality, but one of difference in class interests. If one abandons morality, one has taken the first steps towards an understanding of the real dynamics of our social relations.Well, EVERYTHING is with some kind of ideological framework. Ideology is just an anthropological fact. If morality "skews" reality because of its "ideology" then we're shit out of luck, because even things like science have their own "ideology" broadly speaking. The whole point is that we make value judgements - that truth is useful, that sex is fun, that pizza is tasty, and that certain acts are inherently "wrong".

Anyway, I agree that anthropologically speaking class interest shapes morality - but that doesn't then follow that morality doesn't "exist" or that the proletariat needs to be somehow "amoral." All you can derive from that is that bourgeois morality is something which must be overcome. Why not embrace a proletarian morality?

If we have NO morality, then everything is permitted and we have no motivation to chose one thing over another. Why can't workers use their women as sex slaves? Why can't they turn their children into toothpaste? On what basis do we have to tell people who do horrid things to their fellow man that they should not have done so?

[Czy]

Why not embrace a proletarian morality?

Morality is a form of social control. I'd imagine, as did Marx, that a communist society would do away with morality altogether, as it entails the emancipation of individuals from all kinds of constraints - both ideological and material.

[Sabot Cat]

Morality is a form of social control. I'd imagine, as did Marx, that a communist society would do away with morality altogether, as it entails the emancipation of individuals from all kinds of constraints - both ideological and material.

The kind of social control that discourages someone from stabbing innocents, poisoning the water supply and committing wanton rapes is one that is inherently desirable.

[Czy]

So you think people refrain from stabbing others because someone else tells them to? People will stab others if they're set on it.

I was envisaging a society where there would be no urge to perform such acts.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

So you think people refrain from stabbing others because someone else tells them to? People will stab others if they're set on it.


Morality =/= Authority. They don't stab people if they see people as morally considerable.



I was envisaging a society where there would be no urge to perform such acts.

Because they have a moral inclination not to. Or because they have a moral bond with their fellow man.

If you took someone from this Communist society and placed them in a non-communist society with different traditions, do you think they might stab and rape people because they are in a society where there is an "urge" to perform such acts? Why would I want to envisage a society where there is no urge to perform such acts unless I think that they are somehow bad?


Morality is a form of social control. I'd imagine, as did Marx, that a communist society would do away with morality altogether, as it entails the emancipation of individuals from all kinds of constraints - both ideological and material.

I think when Marx said he wanted to get rid of "morality" he meant religious duties and bourgeois norms, not "morals" in an abstract or psychological sense. Marx himself certainly seemed to have some moral values.

Morality is more than just social control, it's what people see as intrinsically valuable.

[Sabot Cat]

So you think people refrain from stabbing others because someone else tells them to? People will stab others if they're set on it.

I was envisaging a society where there would be no urge to perform such acts.

I understood "social control" to mean the regulation of one's conduct by cultural promotion of certain norms, more than it would be coercion from empowered authorities. Hence, a community where those kind of acts are discouraged through a common understanding that those acts are morally wrong would be exhibiting the kind of social control I mean.

In addition to that, I support the points Sinister Cultural Marxist has been eloquently edifying.

[Philosophos]

what I got from all the thinking I've put in nihilism is that nothing really matters BUT that doesn't mean we should stop trying doing something to change this. Ofcourse there are more ways to explain and it all depends on the individual but that's the 'main concept'.

[Bolshevik Sickle]

If you were a nihilist wouldn't you not care to defend nihilism?

[Fakeblock]

But that's the thing: values and significance are that which only people can have. There is no "real" significance or value that the cosmos can have as itself, or a greater scheme of things, that invalidates which we find important.

But who are “we”? Apart from a few generalisations there are immense differences between the value systems of different cultures and modes of production. As nothing has any real, extra-human significance, it follows that all these conflicting value systems are equally valid/invalid.


Well, EVERYTHING is with some kind of ideological framework. Ideology is just an anthropological fact. If morality "skews" reality because of its "ideology" then we're shit out of luck, because even things like science have their own "ideology" broadly speaking. The whole point is that we make value judgements - that truth is useful, that sex is fun, that pizza is tasty, and that certain acts are inherently "wrong".

And all these value judgements are, per definition, subjective. “Pizza is tasty” is not a scientific statement. If I say that pizza is disgusting, you won’t be able to find any objective standard by which you can prove me right or wrong.

Whether or not we can separate ourselves from ideology is another matter that isn’t really relevant to the question at hand.


Anyway, I agree that anthropologically speaking class interest shapes morality - but that doesn't then follow that morality doesn't "exist" or that the proletariat needs to be somehow "amoral." All you can derive from that is that bourgeois morality is something which must be overcome. Why not embrace a proletarian morality?

I’ve said nothing of what the proletariat needs to do. I have said that if one wishes to achieve a scientific understanding of social relations, one should recognise the subjective character of moral statements. A proletarian morality, derived from the struggle, should indeed be embraced by communists, because it is necessary to achieve our goals. However, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that this morality is in any way objective or scientific.

[Sabot Cat]

But who are “we”? Apart from a few generalisations there are immense differences between the value systems of different cultures and modes of production. As nothing has any real, extra-human significance, it follows that all these conflicting value systems are equally valid/invalid.

Why would being extra-human make them more real? It would just make them the values of an extraterrestrial culture, wouldn't it? This is the trap that most theists want you to fall into: they think the only alternative to divine command theory is relativism. It is not.



And all these value judgements are, per definition, subjective. “Pizza is tasty” is not a scientific statement. If I say that pizza is disgusting, you won’t be able to find any objective standard by which you can prove me right or wrong. Whether or not we can separate ourselves from ideology is another matter that isn’t really relevant to the question at hand.


"Most people find this kind of pizza tasty" is a scientific statement, however, that can be verified or falsified. This kind of pizza is tasty" would also be a scientific statement if it is understood to be equivalent to the previous sentence. "I find this pizza tasty" is also a proposition that could be true or false, although I could not say that "I find this pizza tasty, therefore it is tasty" because it can only be stated that the general quality of tastiness for the pizza can only be verified through broad testing of the experiences associated with it, as meaning is the aggregate of use.



I’ve said nothing of what the proletariat needs to do. I have said that if one wishes to achieve a scientific understanding of social relations, one should recognise the subjective character of moral statements. A proletarian morality, derived from the struggle, should indeed be embraced by communists, because it is necessary to achieve our goals. However, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that this morality is in any way objective or scientific.

Why should we do all of these things? Is it because you believe moral realism would be an obstacle for the proletariat in achieving their goals, and thus prevent them from alleviating their subjugation and suffering under the heel of their capitalist exploiters? And thus we shouldn't label our moralities scientific and objective because it would cause more suffering than not for workers? I believe it evident that your desire for a revolution isn't likely to rest upon a metaphysical sense of justice or an aesthetic appreciation of socialist theories, but upon the quality of life for the proletariat.

[Fakeblock]

Why would being extra-human make them more real? It would just make them the values of an extraterrestrial culture, wouldn't it? This is the trap that most theists want you to fall into: they think the only alternative to divine command theory is relativism. It is not.

Apparently I'm not communicating my message clearly enough.

I'll rephrase: If there is nothing that can invalidate our value systems, then it follows that all these different value systems are equally valid/invalid.


"Most people find this kind of pizza tasty" is a scientific statement, however, that can be verified or falsified. This kind of pizza is tasty" would also be a scientific statement if it is understood to be equivalent to the previous sentence. "I find this pizza tasty" is also a proposition that could be true or false, although I could not say that "I find this pizza tasty, therefore it is tasty" because it can only be stated that the general quality of tastiness for the pizza can only be verified through broad testing of the experiences associated with it, as meaning is the aggregate of use.


What, so if I say that pizza isn't tasty I'm objectively wrong, because "most people" think otherwise?


Why should we do all of these things? Is it because you believe moral realism would be an obstacle for the proletariat in achieving their goals, and thus prevent them from alleviating their subjugation and suffering under the heel of their capitalist exploiters? And thus we shouldn't label our moralities scientific and objective because it would cause more suffering than not for workers?

Whether moral realism is an obstacle to any goal is beside the matter. I believe moral realists are wrong and that it would be untrue to label our moralities scientific and objective.


Your desire for a revolution isn't likely to rest upon a metaphysical sense of justice or an aesthetic appreciation of socialist theories, but upon the quality of life for the proletariat.

Not really, if proletarian revolution were to lower the living standards of the average proletarian (or population, in general) I would still support it. If I merely wanted a better quality of life for the proletariat I would be a social-democrat.

[Remus Bleys]

What, so if I say that pizza isn't tasty I'm objectively wrong, because "most people" think otherwise?
Yay! Moral Democracy!

[Sabot Cat]

Apparently I'm not communicating my message clearly enough.

I'll rephrase: If there is nothing that can invalidate our value systems, then it follows that all these different value systems are equally valid/invalid.

Doesn't that presuppose what is and isn't valid by defining what can and can invalidate something, thus applying a value system in your evaluation of value systems, making said analysis circular?



What, so if I say that pizza isn't tasty I'm objectively wrong, because "most people" think otherwise?


You could mean or specify that the pizza isn't tasty to you but not un-tasty in general or to most people. This doesn't threaten the validity of the concept of tastiness, and if we're trying to maximize the incidence of tastiness in our community, it would be critical to remember your reaction to pizza and accommodate accordingly if such allotments can be made.


Whether moral realism is an obstacle to any goal is beside the matter. I believe moral realists are wrong and that it would be untrue to label our moralities scientific and objective.

I find it evident that the full meaning of moral wrongness and goodness are qualities that correspond to reality as we know it and can be empirically accounted for.


Not really, if proletarian revolution were to lower the living standards of the average proletarian (or population, in general) I would still support it. If I merely wanted a better quality of life for the proletariat I would be a social-democrat.

There's a difference between a better quality of life and the best possible quality of life probably able to be achieved and maintained; the difference between social-democracy and communism, in my mind. Nonetheless, why do you support the liberation of the proletariat?

[Skyhilist]

The subjective morality thing people brought up: yes, in fact, notions like "rape is wrong" are most certainly subjective.

It's just that if you don't happen to agree with them you're kind of likely to be a psychopath or someone with very few morals in the first place.

We can't really objectively say harm is bad. However, the idea that harm is bad is important in humans being a product of our development of empathy, which is one of our most important traits.

[Usawa]

I don't believe that there is any logically or empirically compelling reason to accept nihilism. It's not shown through evidence to be probable or direct experience to be definitely true and the alternative isn't logically incoherent (self-contradicting). We directly experience the value and dis-value of happiness and distress whether we accept this rationally or not.


For me, the logical extension of nihilism is egoist anarchism.

I haven't read most of the posts in this thread but this caught my eye. If nihilism is true it has no 'logical' conclusion in regard to what normative view is 'best'.

[BIXX]

I haven't read most of the posts in this thread but this caught my eye. If nihilism is true it has no 'logical' conclusion in regard to what normative view is 'best'.


It'd be most logical as when the world has no reason and no morality to conform to, then you are free to do whatever you want.

[Usawa]

It'd be most logical as when the world has no reason and no morality to conform to, then you are free to do whatever you want.

From the nihilistic point of view being free to do whatever you want to isn't objectively valuable. People wouldn't necessarily be free to do whatever they wanted to do in an anarchist society.

[Doctor Hilarius]

I am no expert in philosophy, so I could be wrong.

I always thought nihilism was practically impossible. Existentialism is the realization that there is no universal or objective purpose or truth about our existence. The existentialist then creates their own meaning for existence from this nothingness and continues to live.

The nihilist would be somebody who, hypothetically, would not create meaning. The nihilist would likely just be compelled by human needs like food, water etc. Even that might be accepting the value of life however, or the value of avoiding pain or discomfort.

I guess I do not see how one could be a nihilist. If my understanding of nihilism is accurate, you would have to be nothing to embrace nothing.

[BIXX]

I am no expert in philosophy, so I could be wrong.

I always thought nihilism was practically impossible. Existentialism is the realization that there is no universal or objective purpose or truth about our existence. The existentialist then creates their own meaning for existence from this nothingness and continues to live.

The nihilist would be somebody who, hypothetically, would not create meaning. The nihilist would likely just be compelled by human needs like food, water etc. Even that might be accepting the value of life however, or the value of avoiding pain or discomfort.

I guess I do not see how one could be a nihilist. If my understanding of nihilism is accurate, you would have to be nothing to embrace nothing.


You're a little off. We construct no meaning- taking food water etc... May be taking what we want/need, but that does not mean there is any meaning (in the sense of value).

Unless I misunderstood your point.

[Comrade Thomas]

Despite there being no objective claims in any sphere political or ethical we should abide by objective principles for the sake of living in a stable, productive society.

[BIXX]

Despite there being no objective claims in any sphere political or ethical we should abide by objective principles for the sake of living in a stable, productive society.


"Should" implies that there is a higher value in living in a "stable, productive society". I (as a nihilist) can't accept that.

[Marshal of the People]

I'm a nihilist!:grin:

[Thirsty Crow]

Nihilists can have values like any other person. Humans normally have the need to express themselves. By being a nihilist, they are not giving up that value, they are just realizing that their values are dependent on their own minds only, and therefore their values/morals are subjective.

Completely bunk.

There's such a thing called upbringing and socialization. That alone guarantees that any fancy "-ism" story about values dependent on individual minds only are in fact just that - stories.

The values and morals are intersubjective inherently.

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

Yet why do people, if that is the case, still label themselves as "nihilists"?

[Црвена]

Wait, so is nihilism the belief that moral principles are meaningless or that they have subjective meanings? I've always thought it was the former.

[Leo]

Doesn't the act of consciously defending nihilism automatically disqualify the person doing it from being a nihilist? If you are a true nihilist, why bother to defend nihilism, or anything for that matter? Nihilist literally means nothingist, hence a nihilist is by definition a person who has nothing to defend.

For all the interest in nihilism is some anarchist and even marxist circles, I find it hard to believe that anyone who is political can be a full-fledged nihilist. Nihilism seems to me to be quite apolitical - true nihilists often rising from the ranks of lumpens, the petty bourgeoisie and even the bourgeoisie, yet not so often the working class.

In fact why would a nihilist even bother to call himself or herself a nihilist? What is the point?

[bcbm]

http://pistolsdrawn.org/a-history-of-russian-nihilism/

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

http://pistolsdrawn.org/a-history-of-russian-nihilism/

Coincidence? I just looked at that twenty minutes ago and it didn't do an iota of good. Amusingly the second article about socialism was more interesting.

[bcbm]

Nihilist anarchism isn’t concerned with a social revolution that adds a new chapter to an old history but the ending of history altogether. If not revolutionaries then possibly epochanaries, for the transformation of society without a positive program.

Strategic nihilism argues for a new approach to social transformation that resembles the burning of a field rather than building the new world within the shell of the old or one last push by the working class to seize the means of production. An approach that concerns itself with exactly what the forms of social control are and their suppression
http://pistolsdrawn.org/when-all-dictionaries-are-burned-will-we-start-over/

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

A definition of nihilism[2] could be the realization “that conditions in the social organization are so bad as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility.”

Isn't there a significant issue with this? Namely that acting out such destruction is likely to rebound upon oneself and destroy one's own possibilities to gain the resources to engage in the activity.

[Leo]

bcbm, I know that historically a certain tendency within anarchism tended to see itself as nihilists. I would question to what extent they can be defined as nihilists.

You may recall the character Souvarine from Emile Zola's Germinal, the Russian nihilist anarchist. In many parts of the book, he denounces emotions such as love and affection and argues like a nihilist. Yet when the rabbit he's been petting in the workers' pub is grilled and he eats it without knowing, he almost bursts into tears. Is he really a nihilist? Well Zola at least seemed to think that none of these Russian nihilists were really nihilists. You can also look at Camus' Les Justes, and even there I don't think any of them can be described as a nihilist.

Lets look at your quotes:


Nihilist anarchism isn’t concerned with a social revolution that adds a new chapter to an old history but the ending of history altogether.

For a nihilist, history doesn't exist (I don't necessarily mean that nihilists claim this on an ontological level, its more like history is so irrelevant that it doesn't exist). Hence there can be no question of ending history or adding a new chapter to it. Additionally, a nihilist doesn't have any concerns in the first place.


Strategic nihilism argues for a new approach to social transformation that resembles the burning of a field rather than building the new world within the shell of the old or one last push by the working class to seize the means of production.

Again, for the true nihilist the "field" or lets say the world and its totality is so irrelevant and unimportant that they don't even exist. Being a nihilist and offering a strategy for a revolution, no matter of what kind, is contradictory at least etymologically.

[bcbm]

i dont think trying to contain concepts to their etymology is particularly useful in understanding why they were adopted or why people continue to use them to this day. people call themselves nihilists because they identify with the ideas and actions of those who called themselves nihilists in 19th century russia and want to develop them further or in a new way.

reading the history i linked above, i don't think it is hard to see why.


The lifestyle of the nihilist, or New People, is worth reviewing, if for no other reason, because of its similarity to youth movements of the modern era. While advocating for a callous hedonism and radical subjectivity, in practice nihilists actually tended towards a utilitarian and ascetic lifestyle. The fashion is a case in point. “Both sexes favoured blue-tinted spectacles and high boots. Other common features were a heavy walking-stick and a rug flung over the shoulders in cold weather; they called it a plaid, but it was not necessarily a tartan.” (Hingley) This, coupled with huge beards for men and bobs for women, a voracious appetite for cigarettes, an unwashed dirty appearance, and rude and outspoken behavior made the New People a sight to behold. The nihilists attempted to challenge the values of the day in a more meaningful way too. At the time, the question of woman’s emancipation was of great interest to reformers. For the nihilist the issues were regarding work and sexual freedom. Because a woman’s passport (which was used for general travel and not just travel abroad) was legally controlled by men — a father, or husband, had ultimate control of a woman’s life. The nihilists solved this problem by having ‘fictitious’ marriages. This allowed for an emancipation of women de jure if not de facto. This resulted in women having the freedom of mobility to pursue some academic pursuits (which were curtailed during the White Terror) and some enterprise. Finally, the nihilists adopted the credo that adultery was a natural, and even desirable trait, in contrast to the spirit of their time, or their own cultural composition (i.e. they were prudes).
;)

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

i dont think trying to contain concepts to their etymology is particularly useful in understanding why they were adopted or why people continue to use them to this day. people call themselves nihilists because they identify with the ideas and actions of those who called themselves nihilists in 19th century russia and want to develop them further or in a new way.

reading the history i linked above, i don't think it is hard to see why.


;)

You didn't answer my question.

[bcbm]

Isn't there a significant issue with this? Namely that acting out such destruction is likely to rebound upon oneself and destroy one's own possibilities to gain the resources to engage in the activity.

*shrug*

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

*shrug*

Why can't you answer the question?

[Leo]

i dont think trying to contain concepts to their etymology is particularly useful in understanding why they were adopted or why people continue to use them to this day.

No, you're right. Why these concepts were adopted by political tendencies and why people still use them is still worth understanding. However can we not question whether they are truly what they say they are? Besides, while a concept shouldn't be contained to its etymology, how valid is our definition if there is an open contradiction between the etymology and what we are to understand from the concept? I don't think anyone can claim that the etymology is utterly irrelevant.

[bcbm]

Why can't you answer the question?

that was my answer. i think your concern is worked into the idea to begin with. if there is no constructive possibility it seems quite probable your actions could lead to consequences for yourself, but i think they don't consider this sufficient reason not to act.


No, you're right. Why these concepts were adopted by political tendencies and why people still use them is still worth understanding. However can we not question whether they are truly what they say they are? Besides, while a concept shouldn't be contained to its etymology, how valid is our definition if there is an open contradiction between the etymology and what we are to understand from the concept? I don't think anyone can claim that the etymology is utterly irrelevant.

my dates may be off, but my understand is that most of the philosophical aspects of nihilism were developed after the russian movement, or concurrently without overlap at most. so when people reference political nihilism drawing from the russian movement and its ideas, i don't think its useful to consider whether later developments mean they weren't what they called themselves. wasnt it nihilism because 'they liked nothing in present society,' or something of the sort? so it seems odd to judge them by later meanings of the word.

[Leo]

my dates may be off, but my understand is that most of the philosophical aspects of nihilism were developed after the russian movement, or concurrently without overlap at most.

Well, the Nihilist movement started in the 1860ies so you can say that this overlaps with Nietzsche however other philosophers and writers (Jacobi, Kierkegaard, Stirner) such have been describing nihilism or related concepts, negatively or positively, starting from the beginning of the 19th century. To be honest, I'd start it much earlier, with extreme Greek Sophists such as Gorgias.


so when people reference political nihilism drawing from the russian movement and its ideas, i don't think its useful to consider whether later developments mean they weren't what they called themselves.

Earlier or later developments, why not? We don't have to take their word about what they were. The Stalinists and Trotskyists called themselves communists, we don't have to take their word for it either.


wasnt it nihilism because 'they liked nothing in present society,' or something of the sort?

Yes, it was as far as I know. I would argue that liking nothing in present society is far from enough for someone to be described as a nihilist.

[Rafiq]

Russian nihilism was the Yin of the Tsarist apparatus's yang. Because it openly and explicitly rejected any positive program it effectively negatively supplemented everything it claimed to despise about society. It isn't hard to see the class character of nihilism either, as student based and petty bourgeois. To concede to the enemy the whole of society and all of the contradictions of society is to concede Communism directly.

Morality may be subjective, but any Marxist knows it possesses real social characteristics. Morality is a component, an offspring of ideology - ideology which forms out of a social relationship to production which is very real and not subjective. To reject a Communist morality, struggle as true and just is to proclaim your recognition of hegemonic morality as legitimate by which you simply 'oppose' it. It is still ruling ideology, ideology encompasses BOTH what it claims positively, and what it perceives to be it's own opposition, it's negative side.

[Slavoj Zizek's Balls]

Russian nihilism was the Yin of the Tsarist apparatus's yang. Because it openly and explicitly rejected any positive program it effectively negatively supplemented everything it claimed to despise about society. It isn't hard to see the class character of nihilism either, as student based and petty bourgeois. To concede to the enemy the whole of society and all of the contradictions of society is to concede Communism directly.

Morality may be subjective, but any Marxist knows it possesses real social characteristics. Morality is a component, an offspring of ideology - ideology which forms out of a social relationship to production which is very real and not subjective. To reject a Communist morality, struggle as true and just is to proclaim your recognition of hegemonic morality as legitimate by which you simply 'oppose' it. It is still ruling ideology, ideology encompasses BOTH what it claims positively, and what it perceives to be it's own opposition, it's negative side.

Why does ideology encompass both sides? Not saying I disagree by the way.

[Rafiq]

Why does ideology encompass both sides? Not saying I disagree by the way.

Ideology must encompass what it opposes it as well in order to truly exist as ideology. Ideology can never simply recognize itself as ideology, ideology is not some a series of grandiose proclamations. Ideology is that which we presume to be a given, ideology defines the very presumptions we have about the world in the first place (FROM WHICH such grandiose positions are expressed).

Ideology functions as a universality that can leave no space for true opposition, it must claim that which opposes it as well. This is what we perceive to be a series of false dichotomies. What I mean to say, however, is that in the process of opposing the cosmetic hegemonic ideology, often times they breathe life into it, they further solidify the ideological presumptions by exalting them in just a different way. For example if we presume that the claim those in power have towards justice, holiness and so on - and simply oppose those things, we are already agreeing with them. Communist ideology, which is affirmative will conversely have its own claim on those things.

[Trap Queen Voxxy]

But Marxism is still political stream and not even weakest one. Some anarchist streams are even weaker. Nonetheless, they are all streams. :)

Most urine streams are also incredibly strong. Can we stop talking about streams now?

[Decolonize The Left]

Ideology must encompass what it opposes it as well in order to truly exist as ideology. Ideology can never simply recognize itself as ideology, ideology is not some a series of grandiose proclamations. Ideology is that which we presume to be a given, ideology defines the very presumptions we have about the world in the first place (FROM WHICH such grandiose positions are expressed).

Ideology functions as a universality that can leave no space for true opposition, it must claim that which opposes it as well. This is what we perceive to be a series of false dichotomies. What I mean to say, however, is that in the process of opposing the cosmetic hegemonic ideology, often times they breathe life into it, they further solidify the ideological presumptions by exalting them in just a different way. For example if we presume that the claim those in power have towards justice, holiness and so on - and simply oppose those things, we are already agreeing with them. Communist ideology, which is affirmative will conversely have its own claim on those things.

Exactly. So to return this to the OP:
Nihilism necessarily encompasses the meaning which it is so opposed to. It is, in itself, a meaning structure (a worldview, a philosophy). In this light, it is the most absurd of philosophies as it is a fundamental contradiction.

"Nihilists" are likewise contradictory human beings, if they were to exist at all. Our society, our lives, are all stories we write, stories dependent upon and filled with meaning. There is no such thing as a 'nihilist' for this would imply a personless person.

All this said, I have a feeling that the nihilism being argued here is nothing more than a spiced up absurdism and that the use of the term 'nihilism' is a tool to gather more attention to the philosophy than it would otherwise command as absurdism.

[The Feral Underclass]

Exactly. So to return this to the OP:
Nihilism necessarily encompasses the meaning which it is so opposed to. It is, in itself, a meaning structure (a worldview, a philosophy). In this light, it is the most absurd of philosophies as it is a fundamental contradiction.

"Nihilists" are likewise contradictory human beings, if they were to exist at all. Our society, our lives, are all stories we write, stories dependent upon and filled with meaning. There is no such thing as a 'nihilist' for this would imply a personless person.

All this said, I have a feeling that the nihilism being argued here is nothing more than a spiced up absurdism and that the use of the term 'nihilism' is a tool to gather more attention to the philosophy than it would otherwise command as absurdism.

I'm not really confident your conceptualisation of nihilism is entirely correct. Is it the case that nihilism (and there are a few different kinds) rejects all meaning in all things? Isn't that a rather sensationalist interpretation of what nihilism is actually about?

[cyu]

Destroy Nihilism!

Joking aside, I can easily imagine someone rejecting all the choices that mainstream society has placed before him.

F**k the Democrats! F**k the Republicans!

...for an American who knows only mainstream political thought, what comes after probably resembles nihilism. The more control that the ruling class has over political thought, and even political alternatives, dissent, or even infiltration into anti-establishment organizations, then the more likely nihilism would become attractive to those who correctly recognize that there is no hope in anything touched by the ruling class.