Does free will exist within the Marxist framework?

[Yet_Another_Boring_Marxist]

I recall a conversation I had with a good comrade of mine a few months ago when we were discussing questions of philosophy and he mentioned that dialetical materialism incooperated free will and could not exist in a deterministic framework. I tried to look it up on the internet but I couldn't find any source to answer this question.

So, is Marxist philosophy determinist on the question of freedom of the will?

[motion denied]

If I understood you correctly, I think Marx puts it greatly:


Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

Or even Plekhanov:


Bismarck said that we cannot make history and must wait while it is being made. But who makes history? It is made by the social man, who is its sole “factor.” The social man creates his own, i.e. social, relationships. But if in a given period he creates given relationships and not others, there must be some cause for it, of course; it is determined by the state of his productive forces.

Men have free will, limited to a certain level development of the productive forces and relations of property (which are product of men's relationship with nature and other men). If we don't take these into account, we shall consider that ideas develop according to their own logic, regardless of concrete (and aforementioned) realtions; ie, idealism.

But then again, I'm no philosopher or expert on anything, I just might be completely full of shit.

[Skyhilist]

All actions are determined by something. Therefore if you don't determine that something you don't technically determine your actions. Also, seeing as such a large number of Marxists are determinists, I wouldn't say "free will" is a part of Marxism. Whether or not Marx believed in it is irrelevant; we should blindly but trust into conclusions arrived at decades ago. What we should put trust in is the usually sound methodology and scientific technique that Marx used to arrive at those conclusion. In my opinion if we use that now, we should arrive at the conclusion that there is no free will.

[motion denied]

Also, seeing as such a large number of Marxists are determinists

How so?

[The Garbage Disposal Unit]

I think the idea of "free will" fundamentally misses the point, because it's rooted in an individualist notion that draws a sharp line between "me" and "my environment" - a line that doesn't exist in reality. I think what we're dealing with, talking about "free will", is some weird baggage from Abrahamic religions filtered through enlightenment liberalism. I'm far more interested in talking about subjects and subjectivity than individuals and wills.

Funny enough, given the aghast reactions of a whole lot of stodgy "Marxist" purists, I think Marx actually lays the groundwork for a whole lot of what gets labeled (in an ignorant reductionist way) "post-modern", especially as regards to problematizing narratives of "the individual" and approaching the construction of subjectivities.


Far from it being true that “out of nothing” I make myself, for example, a “speaker”, the nothing which forms the basis here is a very manifold something, the real individual, his speech organs, a definite stage of physical development, an existing language and dialects, ears capable of hearing and a human environment from which it is possible to hear something, etc., etc.

[Yet_Another_Boring_Marxist]

If I understood you correctly, I think Marx puts it greatly:



Or even Plekhanov:



Men have free will, limited to a certain level development of the productive forces and relations of property (which are product of men's relationship with nature and other men). If we don't take these into account, we shall consider that ideas develop according to their own logic, regardless of concrete (and aforementioned) realtions; ie, idealism.

But then again, I'm no philosopher or expert on anything, I just might be completely full of shit.

But of course, both of those quotes are compatible with either position. The question of free will is a question of whether we or our surroundings is what formulates the "will", and on that basis, if we are not those who form our own will and it is instead formed on a cause and effect basis, then it leads to the conclusions that mankind is not responsible for his actions and that they are the result of his material conditions.

[Skyhilist]

How so?

Well, there's this for example (and I'd assume most people who voted are sympathetic towards or at least agree with most aspects of Marxism):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/determinism-vs-free-t95396/index.html

[Art Vandelay]

One cannot be a Marxist and reject the concept of free will.

[Skyhilist]

We should accept or reject free will on the basis that it "makes us Marxist"; we should instead make that decision based on what seems most logical (although I'd argue that could involve using scientific methods used by Marx but just arriving at different conclusions). Deciding one thing or another simply because it does or doesn't fit into a category is dogmatic whether the categories are political, religious, or otherwise.

[Thirsty Crow]

Sigh.

The issue with Marxist philosophy - called dialectical materialism - is a non-issue for me. What's important is what kind of a concept we are working with and how it relates to social life.

So, the issue with free will is imo as follows.

If it denotes the idea of an uncaused thought, free from any "constraints", it is obviously completely useless. The argument in its favour would rest on word play, in my opinion, or on openly theistic or quasi-theistic ideas.

If on the other hand the notion includes the recognition of the historical construction of social life - embracing multiple causes, as a kind of a polideterminism opposed to defective unideterminism of the economic conceived as only a technical process, called "economic reductionism", "productivism" (though the key issue is the understanding of "the economic"), then sure - it is apparent that people want things, have goals and desires.

The question is what this will is free from.


One cannot be a Marxist and reject the concept of free will.
Of course you can, and I'd say that this is a condition of consistently practicing Marxism.

For instance, what I just described in this post is starkly different to the traditional concept of free will, and its adherents would strongly object to my claim that I'm still using the concept!

Which is fine by me. I can change words, and don't need to cling to that exact wording.

So, the issue is the rejection of the traditional concept of free will.

[Questionable]

I'll probably have people jumping all over me for sharing this, but the Soviets wrote an interesting article on the concept of free will in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:



a philosophical category that designates the philosophical and ethical problem of whether human actions are self-determined or determined by outside forces—that is, the question of the conditionality of the human will.
Since the Socratic period bitter disputes have centered on the problem of free will, which is of crucial significance because its resolution determines whether man is recognized as responsible for his actions. On the one hand, if all actions are strictly predetermined and inevitable, they cannot be the object of praise or blame. On the other hand, if the human will is viewed as a “final principle” not preconditioned by anything, a break conflicting with the requirements of scientific explanation is introduced into the chain of causality linking phenomena.
The antinomy in the interpretation of free will has given rise to two corresponding philosophical positions: determinism, which asserts that the will is causally determined, and indeterminism, which denies that the will is dependent on causality. Depending on whether a physical or psychological factor is recognized as the cause of volitional acts, it is customary to draw a distinction between mechanistic determinism (for example, the philosophical determinism of Spinoza and Hobbes) and psychological determinism, which is less stringent (for example, T. Lipps). The theories of J. G. Fichte and M. F. Maine de Biran are representative of the most consistent indeterminism.
In the history of philosophy the most common theories of free will are eclectic ones combining opposite positions, such as Kant’s dualism. According to Kant, man, as a rational creature belonging to the intelligible world, possesses free will. In the empirical world, however, where natural necessity prevails, the human being does not have freedom of choice, and the human will is causally determined. Traces of a similar inconsistency are found in the theories of F. W. J. von Schelling, who defined freedom as internal necessity, at the same time recognizing the self-assertive character of the initial act of choice. Hegel proclaimed freedom of will but attributed it not to human beings but to the “world spirit,” which embodies the “pure” concept of free will.
In bourgeois philosophy of the late 19th through early 20th centuries, voluntarist and personalist indeterminism prevailed in the interpretation of free will. The positivist orientation, which avoided the problem, was also popular. Both tendencies are interwoven in the work of some philosophers, including Bergson. Defending freedom of will, Bergson refers to the organic unity of spiritual states that are not readily broken into separate elements and that are not causally determined. W. Windelband argued that volitional acts are sometimes causally determined and sometimes free. The problem of free will is a focal concern of the atheistic existentialists, including J.-P. Sartre and M. Heidegger, who believe that human beings possess an absolute freedom that is counterposed to the external world. Thus, the atheistic existentialists reduce the concept of free will to self-will, or willfulness.
In theistic religious doctrines the problem of free will is posed on the level of human autonomy in relation to god. Thus, the concept of free will, without which a religious ethic is impossible, clashes with the concept of “grace” and unalterable divine predestination. Attempts to resolve the contradictions arising in this regard have produced a variety of contradictory currents in religious philosophy, including Thomism and Molinism in Catholic theology and Calvinism and Arminianism in Protestant theology. In addition to naturalistic determinism and the pagan belief in fate, the main components of fatalism include the extreme religious doctrines of predestination, which make the individual absolutely dependent on supernatural forces or on the divine will.
In Marxist philosophy the dialectic of freedom and necessity serves as the foundation for assessing the problem of free will.


http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/free+will

[Thirsty Crow]

Since the Socratic period bitter disputes have centered on the problem of free will, which is of crucial significance because its resolution determines whether man is recognized as responsible for his actions.Just to clarify, this is going way to far. In no way to basic legal forms - which are necessary for every social formation - depend on a resolution to a pseudo-problem.

[Questionable]

Just to clarify, this is going way to far. In no way to basic legal forms - which are necessary for every social formation - depend on a resolution to a pseudo-problem.

I didn't think the revisionists were approaching it from a legal standpoint, but from a philosophical standpoint. I'll admit that the wording is odd, though.

[Thirsty Crow]

I didn't think the revisionists were approaching it from a legal standpoint, but from a philosophical standpoint. I'll admit that the wording is odd, though.
The wording is very clear. The resolution to a philosophical problem will have important ramifications for life.

Oh yeah, just to add:


In Marxist philosophy the dialectic of freedom and necessity serves as the foundation for assessing the problem of free will.I wonder what this amounts to.

Perhaps to a rehash of that arch-idealist Hegel, and his dictum that freedom is the recognition of necessity? Probably, as it is clear what ideological advantages this mystification might bring.

[Decolonize The Left]

One cannot be a Marxist and reject the concept of free will.

:confused: The concept of free will is absurd. It posits an un-conditioned thing totally unaffected by context existing within a material world but being somehow immaterial itself which then 'decides' according to 'choices' which are arbitrary and rooted in that context and condition which the thing is not.

Free will is bunk and is used against the working class as a tool to continue our oppression: when you are free to choose something you are immediately held responsible for it. Hence we are responsible for our own situation of oppression and exploitation.

No, Marxists do not hold a secure 'position' of free will because free will (and it's counterpart - determinism) is bourgeois idealism at it's finest.

[JPSartre12]

Of course man has free will. To believe otherwise is a disservice to the human spirit.

[Thirsty Crow]

Of course man has free will. To believe otherwise is a disservice to the human spirit.
What's the will free from? And how does it work and take form?

[JPSartre12]

What's the will free from? And how does it work and take form?

Free will comes from the existential facticity of the in-itself. I would recommend reading all three sections of Chapter Two, "Mauvaise Foi" (Bad Faith) of Sartre's opus Being and Nothingness. Or, his Existentialism is a Humanism, which is only about as long as the Manifesto.

The question you're asking is so deeply phenomenologic that it's impossible to define with any apodictic certainty in a single thread post.

[Jimmie Higgins]

Subjective agency within a range of material possibilities -- yes. Abstract free will detached from the world -- no.

[Thirsty Crow]

Free will comes from the existential facticity of the in-itself. I honestly have no idea what that means, or what it refers to, or how it explains anything.


I would recommend reading all three sections of Chapter Two, "Mauvaise Foi" (Bad Faith) of Sartre's opus Being and Nothingness. Or, his Existentialism is a Humanism, which is only about as long as the Manifesto.
If the former is even remotely similar to your approach above, I'll avoid it at all cost. The latter perhaps I'll read.


The question you're asking is so deeply phenomenologic that it's impossible to define with any apodictic certainty in a single thread post.Again, try to be more clear.

Phenomenologic? One dictionary source defines phenomenology as movement (Husserl) as


A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.
http://www.answers.com/topic/phenomenology

Which doesn't at all clarify anything (apart from the fact that I completely reject this approach).

[JPSartre12]

Subjective agency within a range of material possibilities -- yes. Abstract free will detached from the world -- no.

Comrade Higgins puts it well here.

The "free will" that we have exists within a particular material framework; what is possible is restricted by boundaries of discourse and economic possibilities.

[Thirsty Crow]

Comrade Higgins puts it well here.
The "free will" that we have exists within a particular material framework; what is possible is restricted by boundaries of discourse and economic possibilities.
So, in other words, people want stuff, people choose stuff, as well as their actions, but on definite bases.

Okay, then we agree.

[JPSartre12]

I honestly have no idea what that means, or what it refers to, or how it explains anything.
....
Again, try to be more clear.
.....
Phenomenologic? One dictionary source defines phenomenology as movement (Husserl)

I'll try to be clearer. If I'm not, please point out where I'm not and I'll try to re-word it and explain it better.

"Facticity" is the Heideggerian term (Heidegger being a German philosopher who later joined the Nazi Party; he was a fan of Husserl, but was also unapologetically critical of him) used to describe what is commonly translated from his original German as "being thrown-in-the-world". To put it crudely, it means that we don't have any control over where, how, and when we are born and live our lives - it's the particular sociologic and economic conditions that exist while you live your life. The "in-itself' is human consciousness, with the presupposition that it is not aware of its being conscious. Think of it along the lines of proletarian class consciousness. Under industrial capitalism, the proletariat is a class in-itself (because it does not have the cohesive social consciousness of realizing that it is the revolutionary majority), but during the socialist revolution it is a class for-itself (because it is aware of its social and economic status, and gains self-awareness). The human in-itself is the consciousness that goes about its business day-to-day without giving any intense or system-shaking critical thinking.

Phenomenology is a particular school of thought in continental philosophy. It's intimately related with Cartesian subjectivism, existentialism, nihilism, etc. It's radically subjectivist in that it spends time worrying about the dynamic relation that exists between people and the objects or experiences that they encounter in the world, and it uses those personal experiences as a means of working to define reality and being. It uses socio-psychologic "personal experience" as the relative basis to understand one's relation with other things that exist and one's own psychological make-up. It may be helpful to think of it as a form of materialism that draws philosophic conclusions from interacting with actual material things.

[Questionable]

The wording is very clear. The resolution to a philosophical problem will have important ramifications for life.

Well yes, I don't think that viewing the problem of free will as important is an odd way for anyone to behave.

This seems a bit different than what you were saying earlier. Talking about the abolition of "basic legal forms" (by which I'm assuming you mean the law?) and saying it will have important ramifications for life aren't the same thing.

[Skyhilist]

All actions are predetermined by the conditions that will inevitably influence them. We don't determine those conditions and therefore don't technically determine our actions freely, but have them determined for us by such conditions.

[Devrim]

Surely the basis of the question is not a philosophical one, but a scientific one. The most important question behind this is that of the nature of the universe itself. If we live in a 'deterministic' universe (which many physicists think we do), there can be no free will. If this is proven to be true (not that I think it will be soon), it is argument over and time for the philosophers to pack their bags and go and find a real job instead.

Devrim

[JPSartre12]

All actions are predetermined by the conditions that will inevitably influence them. We don't determine those conditions and therefore don't technically determine our actions freely, but have them determined for us by such conditions.

I don't agree with you, comrade. To assume that "all actions are predetermined by the conditions that will inevitably influence them" is a radically determinist paradigm that takes life-changing decision-making power out of the hands of individuals and resigns them to a fate preordained by external, abstract factors. It's not so much that "all actions are predetermined", but that the boundaries of possibilities that people can operate in are limited by pre-influencing factors.

"We ... don't technically determine our actions freely"? No, we do not determine the peripheral conditions wherein we act existentially, but we do have the sober consciousness to make our own choices. I don't believe that "all actions are predetermined" at all, and I think that there are too many on the Left who are willing to throw away all human agency and assume that every individual action is the manifestation of superstructure-base determinism.

[Decolonize The Left]

I don't agree with you, comrade. To assume that "all actions are predetermined by the conditions that will inevitably influence them" is a radically determinist paradigm that takes life-changing decision-making power out of the hands of individuals and resigns them to a fate preordained by external, abstract factors. It's not so much that "all actions are predetermined", but that the boundaries of possibilities that people can operate in are limited by pre-influencing factors.

"We ... don't technically determine our actions freely"? No, we do not determine the peripheral conditions wherein we act existentially, but we do have the sober consciousness to make our own choices. I don't believe that "all actions are predetermined" at all, and I think that there are too many on the Left who are willing to throw away all human agency and assume that every individual action is the manifestation of superstructure-base determinism.

I understand your argument, and I don't agree with Skwisgaar, but don't you think it's pretty obvious that "choices" don't actually exist anymore than "the sober consciousness" exists? Doesn't positing a "consciousness" get us into a host of metaphysical problems and, likewise, aren't "choices" a simple result of linguistics?

[Flying Purple People Eater]

and, likewise, aren't "choices" a simple result of linguistics?

What do you mean?

[Hit The North]

aren't "choices" a simple result of linguistics?

There is a strike at a factory. One worker decides to staff the picket-line, another decides to stay at home and dig the garden, yet another worker tries to cross the picket-line. These choices aren't merely linguistic tricks but are real choices of how to act, based on a number of determining factors - but they are choices nonetheless and need to be explained.

[Decolonize The Left]

There is a strike at a factory. One worker decides to staff the picket-line, another decides to stay at home and dig the garden, yet another worker tries to cross the picket-line. These choices aren't merely linguistic tricks but are real choices of how to act, based on a number of determining factors - but they are choices nonetheless and need to be explained.

Not if we're dealing with them in common language. In common language they are choices and we don't really need to explain anything any further than that. Your hypothetical stands on it's own. You could have ended the statement at "cross the picket-line." and everyone would understand what you just said.

But once you introduce the term "free will" you are abstracting out of common language and entering into nonsensical philosophical jargon. And when you do this you are opening the door to a simple linguistic critique whereby our philosophical framework of the world "subject-object-choices in between" is based entirely upon the linguistic structure of the sentence as this is how we process information in our brains. In short, reason (and subsequently, rational "choice") is dependent upon language to function.

[Hit The North]

Not if we're dealing with them in common language. In common language they are choices and we don't really need to explain anything any further than that. Your hypothetical stands on it's own. You could have ended the statement at "cross the picket-line." and everyone would understand what you just said.

But once you introduce the term "free will" you are abstracting out of common language and entering into nonsensical philosophical jargon. And when you do this you are opening the door to a simple linguistic critique whereby our philosophical framework of the world "subject-object-choices in between" is based entirely upon the linguistic structure of the sentence as this is how we process information in our brains. In short, reason (and subsequently, rational "choice") is dependent upon language to function.

That's not what you stated. You stated that "it's pretty obvious that "choices" don't actually exist anymore than "the sober consciousness" exists?" Which sounds to me that you want to consign "choice" to the same dustbin of philosophical abstraction where you have placed "consciousness".


In common language they are choices and we don't really need to explain anything any further than that.


If we want to understand why the choices were arrived at, then surely we need to dig deeper and this then requires us to investigate the causal connection between different factors, both outside the social actor and within the social actor.

[Decolonize The Left]

That's not what you stated. You stated that "it's pretty obvious that "choices" don't actually exist anymore than "the sober consciousness" exists?" Which sounds to me that you want to consign "choice" to the same dustbin of philosophical abstraction where you have placed "consciousness".

"Choice" is a philosophically loaded term. It posits the existence of a subject (which chooses) as well as supposed clearly defined options. Furthermore, it abstracts as we must now figure out "what" was choosing, "how" it was choosing, and "what" it was choosing between. All of this is unnecessary and a simple result of linguistic malfunction.


If we want to understand why the choices were arrived at, then surely we need to dig deeper and this then requires us to investigate the causal connection between different factors, both outside the social actor and within the social actor.

Sure. But we don't need to do that with abstract jargon like "free will" or "consciousness."

[Hit The North]

"Choice" is a philosophically loaded term.

Except when it is used in "common language"?


It posits the existence of a subject (which chooses) as well as supposed clearly defined options.I'd suggest that my example above only makes sense if we assume that choices are made by (knowing) subjects.


Furthermore, it abstracts as we must now figure out "what" was choosing, "how" it was choosing, and "what" it was choosing between. All of this is unnecessary and a simple result of linguistic malfunction.
Again, in order to fully understand why particular subjects make particular choices we need to build up a picture of their values, motivations, material constraints, etc. As to what was being chosen between this will be apparent in the particular situation being investigated (whether to enforce a picket or cross a picket, for example). If we wish to provide meaningful explanations for forms of social action then it doesn't help in the slightest to avoid the question altogether by designating it as a "linguistic malfunction".


Sure. But we don't need to do that with abstract jargon like "free will" or "consciousness."
Perhaps you are right, but my reservation was about your claim that choices don't actually exist.

[Ann Egg]

was there free will in Marxist gulags of the 20th century?

[Decolonize The Left]

Perhaps you are right, but my reservation was about your claim that choices don't actually exist.

Well, philosophically they don't (like all "things"). In terms of common sense of course they do; just like I exist in this sense, and you. But philosophically, it's all lost in jargon because in order to 'justify' something as simple as a choice you need to abstract out into 'what is the self?' etc... And once you abstract out the logic all ends up in linguistics.

So since this thread is asking about "free will" (abstract philosophical jargon), choices don't exist because they are abstracted from subjectivity which is itself an abstraction from consciousness which is itself an abstraction from thought which is linguistics.

[Hit The North]

Well, philosophically they don't (like all "things"). In terms of common sense of course they do; just like I exist in this sense, and you. But philosophically, it's all lost in jargon because in order to 'justify' something as simple as a choice you need to abstract out into 'what is the self?' etc... And once you abstract out the logic all ends up in linguistics.

So since this thread is asking about "free will" (abstract philosophical jargon), choices don't exist because they are abstracted from subjectivity which is itself an abstraction from consciousness which is itself an abstraction from thought which is linguistics.

It's a good thing that neither of us place any value in philosophy then, given this further example of its incompetence.

[Decolonize The Left]

It's a good thing that neither of us place any value in philosophy then, given this further example of its incompetence.

Indeed? I'm not sure if this is a jab but if it is it's delivered impeccably.

[TiberiusGracchus]

All actions are determined by something. Therefore if you don't determine that something you don't technically determine your actions.

Our ability to act according to reasons ("free will") is surely determined by properties of our brain. But that doesn't mean that we can't act according to reasons.

Mechanical materialism (i.e. behaviorism) holds that man is just passive, an object of external forces. Dialectical materialism holds that much of what influence us first have to be interpreted in order to affect our behaviour, and that interpretation is a subjective and creative affair.

Reductionist materialism holds that human reason, creativity etc. is reducible to neurology, chemistry, atoms, quarks... So in fact everything is just quarks. Dialectical materialism hold that there's non-addative interaction among lower-level enteties that gives rise to a emergent characteristics at a higher level that cannot be reduced because these emergent features does not exist until you get to the higher level.

It also holds that operations on a higher level control the conditions under which the laws of the lower level applies. Ie. social structures like the market economy conditions the use of our productive forces, eg. machine technology which in turn conditions the effects of particular laws of physics. The fact that higher levels work back upon lower levels - society on life, life on dead matter etc. causes serious problems for reductionist ideas and does make it perfectly understandable that we can in fact have a certain autonomy and act according to reasons.





:confused: The concept of free will is absurd. It posits an un-conditioned thing totally unaffected by context existing within a material world but being somehow immaterial itself which then 'decides' according to 'choices' which are arbitrary and rooted in that context and condition which the thing is not.

This concept of free will is certainly absurd.

Why would freedom require that our feelings, thougths, wills and actions are acausal, unintelligible emanations from a ghostly realm of ideas? Where it not for causality freedom could not exist, only a material chaos where not only thoughts and wills but life itself would be impossible.

Thus I find it amussing how libertarians and idealists seek to "save" the concept of freedom by refering to the apparant "indeterminism" of quantum physics.

I also find it ironic how right-wingers assume that providing an explanation for a deed, is equivalent with providing an excuse for the deed, removing individual responsibility. That is saying that you can only be responsible for irrational, inexplicable acts. The truth, on the contrary, is that reason and freedom are bond closely together.

[The Garbage Disposal Unit]

was there free will in Marxist gulags of the 20th century?

There more than anywhere. Read Camus. Duh.

[nominal9]

I recall a conversation I had with a good comrade of mine a few months ago when we were discussing questions of philosophy and he mentioned that dialetical materialism incooperated free will and could not exist in a deterministic framework. I tried to look it up on the internet but I couldn't find any source to answer this question.

So, is Marxist philosophy determinist on the question of freedom of the will?

I'm into "thematic dialectics"......

Destiny / Predetermination....... Free Will / Chance

Destiny / Chance................... Free Will / Predetermination



Freedom / Choice.........Dominance / Compel

Freedom / Compel........Dominance / Choice


Privilege / Exclusive few......Right / Inclusive all

Privilege / Inclusive all.........Right / Exclusive few


Physical / Cause and Effect..... Social / Action- Reaction

Physical / Action-Reaction.......Social / Cause and Effect

Knowledge / Adept..... Ignorance / Inept

Knowledge / Inept.......Ignorance / Adept


Can anyone define dialectical materialism for me.... please?

[Ultra-Imperialist]

I believe Christopher Caudwell made the best argument in regards to this particular subject:



Causality and freedom are thus aspects of each other. Freedom is the consciousness of necessity. The universe as a whole is completely free, because that which is not free is determined by something else outside it. But all things are, by definition, contained in the universe, therefore the universe is determined by nothing but itself. But every individual thing in the universe is determined by other things, because the universe is material. This material is not “given” in the definition of the universe, but is exactly what science establishes when it explains the world actively and positively.
Thus the only absolute freedom, like the only absolute truth, is the universe itself. But parts of the universe have varying degrees of freedom, according to their degrees of self-determination. In self-determination, the causes are within the thing itself; thus, in the sensation of free will, the antecedent cause of an action is the conscious thought of an individual, and since the action is also that of the individual, we talk of freedom, because there is self-determination.
The freedom of free will can only be relative. It is characteristic of the more recently evolved categories that they contain more freedom. The matter of which man is composed is in spatio-temporal relation with all other matter in the universe, and its position in space and time is only to a small degree self-determined. Man’s perception, however, is to a less degree in relation to the rest of the universe; it is a more exclusive kind of perception that sees little not in the immediate vicinity of man, or in which it is not interested, and it is largely moulded by memory, that is, by internal causes. Hence it is freer, more self-determined, than the spatio-temporal relations of dead matter. Man’s consciousness is still more self-determined, particularly in its later developments, such as conscious volition.

[Buttress]

Choices in life are determined by the material conditions that make up that life. Someone may say they are offered a platter of potential decisions in which they can make, determinant on of course the platter itself (the base in which these numerous potential decisions have context and are limited). But the choice to make a particular decision is itself informed by the platter arrangement, there is a certain probability for a conscious being to choose a decision over another due to the suitability of the decision to their situation at the time, or due to the conscious inaccessibility of other possible decisions. I think it would be difficult to argue that consciousness in-itself can override the decision probability platter in a conscious manner on its own. I would argue the only way to be able to do this is to somehow come to know how to override the platter/platter arrangement, which may require a change in material conditions and almost definitely in social relations before one is free to choose differently.

[Thirsty Crow]

Freedom is the consciousness of necessity.When will Marxists stop repeating this meaningless Hegelian mantra?

[nominal9]

I'll try to be clearer. If I'm not, please point out where I'm not and I'll try to re-word it and explain it better.

"Facticity" is the Heideggerian term (Heidegger being a German philosopher who later joined the Nazi Party; he was a fan of Husserl, but was also unapologetically critical of him) used to describe what is commonly translated from his original German as "being thrown-in-the-world". To put it crudely, it means that we don't have any control over where, how, and when we are born and live our lives - it's the particular sociologic and economic conditions that exist while you live your life. The "in-itself' is human consciousness, with the presupposition that it is not aware of its being conscious. Think of it along the lines of proletarian class consciousness. Under industrial capitalism, the proletariat is a class in-itself (because it does not have the cohesive social consciousness of realizing that it is the revolutionary majority), but during the socialist revolution it is a class for-itself (because it is aware of its social and economic status, and gains self-awareness). The human in-itself is the consciousness that goes about its business day-to-day without giving any intense or system-shaking critical thinking.

Phenomenology is a particular school of thought in continental philosophy. It's intimately related with Cartesian subjectivism, existentialism, nihilism, etc. It's radically subjectivist in that it spends time worrying about the dynamic relation that exists between people and the objects or experiences that they encounter in the world, and it uses those personal experiences as a means of working to define reality and being. It uses socio-psychologic "personal experience" as the relative basis to understand one's relation with other things that exist and one's own psychological make-up. It may be helpful to think of it as a form of materialism that draws philosophic conclusions from interacting with actual material things.

Hi, nice to make your acquaintance.... I'm nominal9 and as the name states, I prefer nominalism along the lines of William of Ockham. I wrote another thread here regarding the "epistemological" differences between "Idealism vs. Realism vs. Nominalism vs. Phenomenology".... different applications of "Subjective vs. Objective" I contend.... If you have a chance, I'd appreciate your input..... Sadly, I believe that your Phenomenology is greatly mistaken..... but you may have the same opinion as to nominalism.....

[JPSartre12]

Sadly, I believe that your Phenomenology is greatly mistaken..... but you may have the same opinion as to nominalism.....

I'll admit that I'm being very reductionist, but what part of what I said is greatly mistaken, in your view?

[Rafiq]

Surely the basis of the question is not a philosophical one, but a scientific one. The most important question behind this is that of the nature of the universe itself. If we live in a 'deterministic' universe (which many physicists think we do), there can be no free will. If this is proven to be true (not that I think it will be soon), it is argument over and time for the philosophers to pack their bags and go and find a real job instead.

Devrim

The dichotomy of "free will vs determinism" is entirely unscientific. Surely we can recognize that free will does not exist while at the same time acknowledging that determinism is garbage. The framework of which we are able to make choices is one that is definitely determined or sustained by our mode(s) of production and organization, and it is proven that our choices are made in our heads before we actually 'make' them.