Egypt: The Revolution That Wasn't

[blake 3:17]

This is a very dense article -- I'd suggest just going to the link at the bottom and reading it through.


The Revolution That Wasn’t
Hugh Roberts

The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life by Roger Owen
Harvard, 248 pp, £18.95, May 2012, ISBN 978 0 674 06583 3

Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria by Joshua Stacher
Stanford, 221 pp, £22.50, April 2012, ISBN 978 0 8047 8063 6

Raging against the Machine: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism in Egypt by Holger Albrecht
Syracuse, 248 pp, £25.00, October 2012, ISBN 978 0 8156 3320 4

Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt by Hazem Kandil
Verso, 303 pp, £16.99, November 2012, ISBN 978 1 84467 961 4

Western opinion has had difficulty working out what to think, or at any rate what to say, about Egypt. It now seems that the pedlars of hallucinations have been cowed and it is no longer fashionable to describe the events of 3 July in Cairo as a ‘second revolution’. But to describe them as a counter-revolution, while indisputably more accurate, presupposes that there was a revolution in the first place. The bulk of Western media commentary seems still to be wedded to this notion. That what the media called ‘the Arab spring’ was a succession of revolutions became orthodoxy very quickly. Egypt was indispensable to the idea of an ‘Arab spring’ and so it had to have had a revolution too.

In part this was wishful thinking. The daring young Egyptians who organised the remarkable demonstrations in Tahrir Square and elsewhere from 25 January 2011 onwards were certainly revolutionary in spirit and when their demand that Mubarak should go was granted they couldn’t help thinking that what they had achieved was a revolution. They were of course encouraged in this by the enthusiastic reporting of the Western media, disoriented as they have been since the rise of the ‘journalism of attachment’ during the Balkan wars. But it was also the result of the influence of accomplished fact. The events in Tunisia were certainly a revolution. The role of the Tunisian army was a very modest one, essentially that of refusing, in its moment of truth, to slaughter the demonstrators to save Ben Ali. The role of the Egyptian army in February 2011, however, was not modest; it only seemed to be. Where the Tunisian army showed itself to be a genuinely apolitical servant of the state, the Egyptian army struck an attitude of neutrality and even sympathy for the demonstrators that masked its commanders’ real outlook. That was good enough for reporters who couldn’t tell the difference between appearances and realities. In outward form, both countries had had revolutions, and practically identical ones at that. So the ‘Arab spring’ was up and running and the question was simply: ‘Who’s next?’

To think about the recent appalling turn of events in Egypt in terms of an original ‘revolution’, with 25 January 2011 as the start of Year One, is to amputate the drama of the last two and half years from its historical roots, the story of what the Egyptian state became during the later stages of Hosni Mubarak’s protracted presidency. This is not a simple affair. It is the story of what the Mubarak presidency signified for the Egyptian state, for its various components, especially the army, and for its form of government, but also of what it signified for the various types of opposition his rule provoked or allowed. All this combined in the gathering crisis of the state itself, a crisis that was building long before the revolution in Tunisia got underway.

Mubarak ruled Egypt for more than thirty years, longer than Nasser (18 years) and Sadat (11 years) put together, and he made clear his intention to remain in office until he died, while simultaneously giving the impression that he intended his son Gamal to succeed him. His reign was thus an instance of both the wider phenomena that Roger Owen discusses in exemplary depth: the rise of ‘presidents for life’ in the Arab world and these leaders’ tendency – or at least the temptation – to try to secure the presidency for their families by instituting a dynastic succession. Mubarak concentrated power in the presidency to an arguably unprecedented degree, building on what Sadat had done but taking it much further.

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n17/hugh-roberts/the-revolution-that-wasnt

[GerrardWinstanley]

The left needs a moratorium on the word 'revolution' when talking about the Middle East and North Africa, including Tunisia.

[Os Cangaceiros]

The events in Egypt and elsewhere are probably the closest thing there's been to a revolution (ie, a violent political rupture w/ wide social implications & mass participation) in the modern era, at least since Iran 1979.

[ckaihatsu]

'The Square' - Egypt's Revolution Alive on Screen

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSQQDuhi-sU

[ckaihatsu]

http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.org/2014/05/20/mahienour/


Take action in solidarity with Mahienour and jailed activists

egyptsolidarityinitiative / 1 week ago

http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/mahienour_poster2005141.png?w=700&h=494

Revolutionary Socialist activist Mahienour el-Masry and 8 other activists saw their sentences upheld by a court in Alexandria on 20 May. They were sentenced to serve 2 years in jail for breaking Egypt’s repressive anti-protest laws last year.

Read more on the background to the case here (http://menasolidaritynetwork.com/2014/01/06/egypt-alexandrian-activists-face-two-years-in-prison/).

Take action now:

- Write to the Egyptian authorities in protest at the sentences, calling for the immediate release of Mahienour and all other political detainees. Thousands of Egyptians have been jailed for exercising their right to protest. If you are in the UK find the contact details for the Egyptian Embasssy here (http://www.mfa.gov.eg/english/embassies/egyptian_embassy_london/contactus/pages/default.aspx)

- Organise a solidarity photo at your union meeting or workplace using the poster you can download here mahienour_poster200514 (http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/mahienour_poster2005141.pdf).

- Join activists from Egypt Solidarity at our workshop in London on 24 May to help us plan the next steps in our solidarity campaign. Sign up here (http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.org/2014/04/11/sign-up-now-for-egypt-solidarity-london-workshop-24-may/)

- Join us at the Egyptian embassy in London at 4pm on 5 June when we will hand in petitions condemning the mass death sentences (http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.org/2014/03/25/take-action-on-egypt-death-sentences/) against opponents of the military regime, and the imprisonment of Mahienour and other activists. Download a leaflet / poster here [5June_embassy_protest pdf (http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/5june_embassy_protest.pdf)]

http://egyptsolidarityinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/5june_embassy_protest.png?w=700&h=494

[TheCultofAbeLincoln]

It's too bad for the secular protesters, but I can't help but feel that anyone could have been seen coming. I do not believe that it was a predetermined path from the ouster of Mubarak, rather it was the mass protests and removal (and disappearance) of his democratically elected successor that made it painfully obvious where the country was going.

When you leave the democratic process, as hundreds of thousands of protesters drove and supported the military doing, please don't act surprised when that institution decides it likes its position of unquestionable authority and doesn't rush to embrace fair elections ever again. Obviously that resulted in someone taking power whom the true power structure doesn't approve of, and that structure played the secular protesters for being ridiculously, almost pathetically naive.

Is secular dictatorship is preferable to religious 'democrats'? That seems to be a central question emerging from the arab spring.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

The events in Egypt and elsewhere are probably the closest thing there's been to a revolution (ie, a violent political rupture w/ wide social implications & mass participation) in the modern era, at least since Iran 1979.

Surely a revolution is the overthrow of one class by another. Disturbances such as the one in Iran are only called "revolutions" because, hey, someone has to tail them and it might as well be the centrist left.


Is secular dictatorship is preferable to religious 'democrats'? That seems to be a central question emerging from the arab spring.

No, I think the central question is why some people still insist on supporting one form of bourgeois rule over another. Particularly when it demonstrably doesn't work, never has and by God never will.

[Hrafn]

Why on earth would revolution, in the basic sense of the word, imply anything relating to class? I don't see that in the dictionaries.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

Why on earth would revolution, in the basic sense of the word, imply anything relating to class? I don't see that in the dictionaries.

What "basic sense"? That is what revolution means to socialists; why we don't call the March on Rome an "Italian revolution" etc. Dictionaries are horrible if you want a serious argument.

[Lynx]

If you were a President-for-life and saw masses of people demonstrating against your rule, what would you call it?
It was not a revolution in terms of radical reform to Egypt's socioeconomic system.

[Hrafn]

What "basic sense"? That is what revolution means to socialists; why we don't call the March on Rome an "Italian revolution" etc. Dictionaries are horrible if you want a serious argument.

Then stop making up definitions for words. Just because I say "movement" only applies to class-based movements, it doesn't only mean that.

[TheCultofAbeLincoln]

No, I think the central question is why some people still insist on supporting one form of bourgeois rule over another. Particularly when it demonstrably doesn't work, never has and by God never will.

I agree with you in principle, but we should analyze the movements currently underway in the middle east and elsewhere for what they are individually, and not simply lump them all together as one type of "bourgeois rulers" or another. There are significant differences between Bashar al Assad and ISIL, for instance, and there has to be legitimate questions among non-radical sunnis over which is preferable (pretty much all minorities in the region seem to, after some initial hesitation, thrown all their wait behind the secular dictator).

Simply put, your central question does not seem to address the region as it stands and ignores the very real and profound differences between the bourgeois forces vying for control. There is a profound difference between a secular dictator and a theocratic one who wishes to make it state policy to mutilate girls genitals at birth and marry them off at 16.

The fact that the class struggle is largely ignored is unfortunate, I agree with that. Or when it does emerge the populism of the religious extremists seem to be the ones to benefit.

[Jimmie Higgins]

I agree with you in principle, but we should analyze the movements currently underway in the middle east and elsewhere for what they are individually, and not simply lump them all together as one type of "bourgeois rulers" or another....yet you're lumping religious and secular groups as two homogenous masses.


Simply put, your central question does not seem to address the region as it stands and ignores the very real and profound differences between the bourgeois forces vying for control. There is a profound difference between a secular dictator and a theocratic one who wishes to make it state policy to mutilate girls genitals at birth and marry them off at 16. there are differences... And these are not them. But from a bigger perspective, there are more similarities than differences, both factions want to maintain some form of neoliberal capitalism... One maybe wants more state-capitalism and wants to keep the large social and economic role of the military, the other wants to liberalize the economy more and talks a lot about morals. But in the sense that Vincent and others are talking about it, both are just flavors of factions wishing to be the best figurehead for capitalism... Which means proving they can keep the revolution (yes, revolution) contained and prevent strikes and mass protests better than the other.


The fact that the class struggle is largely ignored is unfortunate, I agree with that. Or when it does emerge the populism of the religious extremists seem to be the ones to benefit.the brotherhood tailed the uprisings and had trouble containing even their own members from breaking left in the heat of the main uprisings. What they had that the underground working class groups and suppressed revolutionaries didn't was a large organization (which had also been repressed, though recently Decriminalized) with roots in tons of neighborhoods and community groups and workplaces, etc. spontanious mass power can be good at negating things, but it can't take over very easily (mass organization is required for that, for mass rule anyway... Just organization is sufficient for rule over the masses and the brotherhood and the military were best set up for that).

[TheCultofAbeLincoln]

Ok first keep in mind I was referring to the arab spring in general with my first post which Vincent responded to, as the question pervading the thread was whether or not these were revolutions at all.


...yet you're lumping religious and secular groups as two homogenous masses.

True, but my point being that many citizens, in Syria especially but also in Egypt to a lesser extent, are siding with the counter revolution instead of contending with the possibility of the can of worms being opened and radical political sunni islam being allowed to grow.


there are differences... And these are not them.

Protection of minority and womens rights are most certainly forces driving people to support Baathism in Syria and support the protests against the Muslim Brotherhood while it was in power in Egypt. Leftists ignore these profound differences for their singular focus on the class struggle at their own peril.


But from a bigger perspective, there are more similarities than differences, both factions want to maintain some form of neoliberal capitalism... One maybe wants more state-capitalism and wants to keep the large social and economic role of the military, the other wants to liberalize the economy more and talks a lot about morals. But in the sense that Vincent and others are talking about it, both are just flavors of factions wishing to be the best figurehead for capitalism... Which means proving they can keep the revolution (yes, revolution) contained and prevent strikes and mass protests better than the other.

From the leftist perspective yes, none of the movements are embracing the class struggle and endorsing an overthrow of the capitalist system. At least, none of the major players and there is no Soviet Union anymore to support these groups on ideological grounds. But that ignores the massive difference between a liberal country and the Taliban, which is how many Syrians seem to see the lines in their conflict.

Are you honestly going to contend that a liberal democracy has more in common with a theocracy than it has differences? Such a position would be both overly dogmatic and, sadly, typically leftist.


the brotherhood tailed the uprisings and had trouble containing even their own members from breaking left in the heat of the main uprisings. What they had that the underground working class groups and suppressed revolutionaries didn't was a large organization (which had also been repressed, though recently Decriminalized) with roots in tons of neighborhoods and community groups and workplaces, etc. spontanious mass power can be good at negating things, but it can't take over very easily (mass organization is required for that, for mass rule anyway... Just organization is sufficient for rule over the masses and the brotherhood and the military were best set up for that).

I agree, but I believe you ignore that in much of Egypt the religious organizations often are the working class groups and it seems the poorer a neighborhood is the more Salafist support there will be. The spine and foundation of the mass demonstrators, the students and liberals in Cairo especially, did all the hard work for the military junta to seize power. And like I said in my first post, anybody could see that one coming.

Which is sad, because it is this aspiring middle class that is clamoring for basic human rights, liberal values, and tolerance and not the poor or working class which is where the support for Morsi overwhelmingly came from. I am not saying that all poor or working class people supported the MB/Salafist movements, but that is absolutely where the heart of there support lies.


edit BTW I want to say again I see your point and agree with much of your principle but believe that there are real differences between the major actors despite either side being capitalists and that simply instilling a government that is some form of populist socialist may not be the best way forward if it means aspects of sharia law are going to be implemented along with.