Idealism V. Realism V. Nominalism V. Phenomenology

[nominal9]

Idea / Physical "thing"
Conceptus / Res
Mind / Body

Idealism = Subjective Concept / Subjective Reference
Realism = Objective Concept / Objective Reference
Nominalism = Subjective Concept / Objective Reference
Phenomenology = Objective Concept / Subjective Reference


Put them in Aristrotle's "logical sqaure" you get something like this....

Idealism.........................Realism
Conceptus / Res.............Conceptus / Res
Subjective / Subjective....Objective / Objective

(Aristotle square in middle)

Subjective / Objective......Objective / Subjective
Conceptus / Res..............Conceptus / Res
Nominalism......................Phenomenology


It seems so damned obvious and "sensical" to me......This should be the starting point that all agree on.....

[BIXX]

What is your point? I fail to understand it.

[nominal9]

Hello EchoShock, nice to make your acquaintance.

My point is, some people call it a branch of Epistemology. I'm trying to show you-all the founding principles that underlie the four major branches of Philosophy.... from Plato to Aristotle to William of Ockham to Kant and Husserl.....Each of these directions are basically quarreling with each other over the notions of whether Concepts and References ( Mind and Body... Idea and Physical thing) are Subjective=All in the mind (Eye of the beholder) or rather Objective= Actually separate existents and "out there" beyond "our" conscious control.....
For Example, There are apparently a lot of self-proclaimed Marxists or Communists hereabouts.... they speak of "materialism" which sounds pretty real and "objective".... and yet, Marx and the other Communists got their "epistemological" foundations from Hegel who was a pure-bred Idealist for whom all physical things were ultimately "subjective"..... this leads the Marxist "materialism" discussions to be "subjective",too. The same applies to mall other basic directions, they all have their "subjective" or "objective" biases or preferences. At least the "ubiquitous everyman ".... ONE... should be aware that this is where a ;lot of the tension between "philosophies and philosophers comes from......Me, I prefer nominalism... but I see what I and all the other "guys" are doing.... most or all of the other "guys"..... haven't got a clue.....

[blake 3:17]

I'm all for shaking up epistemology but if you don't communicate it, who cares? And not to be too snooty but
"logical sqaure" doesn't do you any service.

[nominal9]

I'm all for shaking up epistemology but if you don't communicate it, who cares? And not to be too snooty but doesn't do you any service.

Hello Blake 3:17, nice to make your acquaintance. Sorry to be so late to reply, I lost track of this thread.
Anyway, as to my use of the Aristotle logical square.... beg to differ, it serves me better than you know.... for example... one quirk of my usage is that the square can be disposed in one of two equally valid ways, either concept-based or reference-based... which account for different outcomes.... but anyway.... just be advised that what you see is the bare rudiments.... one must walk before he-she runs....
Would you care to ask some questions or make comments that you'd like me to "communicate" on? I'd like to explain what I can, if you are interested....the Concept / Reference distinctions harken back to William of Ockham "categorematic signs"..... but modified by me.... I also use the same notion to account for, call it, motivated actions....(i.e., not just physical or other such "things")....the Square, is just logical principles of contrary or contradictory, at work....

Of course... if you really don't want to be "snooty"..... can I suggest that you offer your alternative?.... or your "correction"?.... educate me, please,.... if you can..... HAR...

[Decolonize The Left]

Hello Blake 3:17, nice to make your acquaintance. Sorry to be so late to reply, I lost track of this thread.
Anyway, as to my use of the Aristotle logical square.... beg to differ, it serves me better than you know.... for example... one quirk of my usage is that the square can be disposed in one of two equally valid ways, either concept-based or reference-based... which account for different outcomes.... but anyway.... just be advised that what you see is the bare rudiments.... one must walk before he-she runs....
Would you care to ask some questions or make comments that you'd like me to "communicate" on? I'd like to explain what I can, if you are interested....the Concept / Reference distinctions harken back to William of Ockham "categorematic signs"..... but modified by me.... I also use the same notion to account for, call it, motivated actions....(i.e., not just physical or other such "things")....the Square, is just logical principles of contrary or contradictory, at work....

Of course... if you really don't want to be "snooty"..... can I suggest that you offer your alternative?.... or your "correction"?.... educate me, please,.... if you can..... HAR...

I honestly think that you are a bot.

[Althusser]

For Example, There are apparently a lot of self-proclaimed Marxists or Communists hereabouts.... they speak of "materialism" which sounds pretty real and "objective".... and yet, Marx and the other Communists got their "epistemological" foundations from Hegel who was a pure-bred Idealist for whom all physical things were ultimately "subjective"..... this leads the Marxist "materialism" discussions to be "subjective",too.

Marx and Engels got their dialectics from Hegel and their materialism from Feuerbach, and ultimately flipped the whole materialism/idealism - metaphysics/dialectics paradigm on it's head. Marx wasn't taking the idealist aspects of Hegel, just the dialectics, which he applied to the class struggle (motor of history) and to the material world, which had previously been looked at in a metaphysical, mechanistic way.

There are class instincts and material interests that would make even the most educated bourgeois less likely to understand how capitalism's internal contradictions will ultimately be its downfall, over that of a worker who doesn't have the luxury of a wonderful education and the spare time time to read Capital. This, however, doesn't mean Marxism is subjectivist or idealist.

[the demoralist]

Hegel who was a pure-bred Idealist for whom all physical things were ultimately "subjective"..... this leads the Marxist "materialism" discussions to be "subjective",too.

I kind of agree with your square. But I don't agree with this.

Hegel thought that subjects and objects were dialectically related. Your square doesn't really deal with dialectics very well.

Dialectically speaking, concepts and references are both objective and subjective depending on what they are doing and how you are looking at them.

[nominal9]

I kind of agree with your square. But I don't agree with this.

Hegel thought that subjects and objects were dialectically related. Your square doesn't really deal with dialectics very well.

Dialectically speaking, concepts and references are both objective and subjective depending on what they are doing and how you are looking at them.
Hello demoralist, thanks for your reply....
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!search/nominal9$20snow$20white/humanities/2YYdPcw5_XE/ialG56bQewEJ
here's a link to an analysis of Grimm's "snow white" tale that I did on google groups.....
I call my "method" thematic dialectic logic....Let me refer you to the "circle" of roles.... as a way to understand something of dialectic as I see it. (differently from Hegel and Marx, et al ). I see it more "practically" than .... the whole Hegelian "historical" Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis progression.....I view it as more "practically" an interplay between various people assuming various roles.... there's a "agent" who thinks up a motivated course of action.... there's a "patient" who carries the motivated course of action out....there's a "recipient" who gets the effect of the "done" motivated course of action... and there's the "prompter" who although not immediately involved somehow witnesses the motivated course of action and goes on from there....

live modestly / work.... live affluently / steal


live modestly / steal....live affluently / work

Let's take a standard case.... simple action reaction.. Bernie as "agent" thinks up a motivated course of action.... let's say..."live affluently / steal".... so Bernie sets up a process called a pyramid whereby Bernie Madoff talks lots of other people (as "patients")to give Bernie as "recipient loads of money.... the people (patients) expect Bernie to "work" for them and give them back their money with gain or interest... BUt Bernie lied.... instead Bernie steals their money and gives nothing back ..... At this stage, the same people who were "patients" become the "recipients" (of the victim sort) of Bernie's stealing..... so the people (patients turned recipients) complain to the authorities who as "prompters", although they had no direct part or interest in the whole original course of action, decide to go after Bernie and put him in jail....So, that's a standard motivated course of action sequence..... where's the whole Hegelian Thesis -Antithesis- Synthesis historical process in that?.....

anyway.... the "square" gives the initial set of "motivated course of action" set of thematic options.... when any chosen motivated course of action is put into effect (or applied) by people performing in diverse "roles".... that's where I get the "dialectic".....

morally.... just plug in your own versions of "Good" and "Bad" value judgments for every stage of the process.....

[nominal9]

Marx and Engels got their dialectics from Hegel and their materialism from Feuerbach, and ultimately flipped the whole materialism/idealism - metaphysics/dialectics paradigm on it's head. Marx wasn't taking the idealist aspects of Hegel, just the dialectics, which he applied to the class struggle (motor of history) and to the material world, which had previously been looked at in a metaphysical, mechanistic way.

There are class instincts and material interests that would make even the most educated bourgeois less likely to understand how capitalism's internal contradictions will ultimately be its downfall, over that of a worker who doesn't have the luxury of a wonderful education and the spare time time to read Capital. This, however, doesn't mean Marxism is subjectivist or idealist.

Hello echo shock, nice to make your acquaintance....let me ask you... what would you say that Fuerbach 's own materialism was grounded in.... Idealism, Realism, Nominalism, or Phenomenology?.... Frankly, most all German philosophers (especially of that era) tend to be "Idealist".... with the exception of Kant who went the other way toward phenomenology (in my own opinion, I'll grant and admit).... did Feuerbach ground himself in Aristotle or in the "empiricists"?

When I use the words "idealist" or "subjective" i look to the distinction between "mind and body" or "concept and reference".... the mind is idea... the body is material.... the concept is idea... the reference is material.....maybe it would help to think about "physicality".... instead of materialism in this sense.....When you consider the "materialist discussions that are made or had by the Marxis or the Fuerbachs..... how much "physicality" is there in the "things that they are talking about? are they truly materially "objective" things being spoken of .... I'll look into Fuerbach more, at your suggestion.... it's been a while.... but I think I'm more or less on track.....

[nominal9]

I honestly think that you are a bot.

Okay.... maybe I can improve your opinion of me, with time.... look at it this way.... as your opinion of me improves... your own own opinion of yourself must deflate.... HAR.....Just kidding .... maybe we just do not understand one another.... ignorance can be cured....

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

How does conceptualism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptualism) fit into your schema?

[nominal9]

[.... did Feuerbach ground himself in Aristotle or in the "empiricists"?

When I use the words "idealist" or "subjective" i look to the distinction between "mind and body" or "concept and reference".... the mind is idea... the body is material.... the concept is idea... the reference is material.....maybe it would help to think about "physicality".... instead of materialism in this sense.....When you consider the "materialist discussions that are made or had by the Marxis or the Fuerbachs..... how much "physicality" is there in the "things that they are talking about? are they truly materially "objective" things being spoken of .... I'll look into Fuerbach more, at your suggestion.... it's been a while.... but I think I'm more or less on track.....[/QUOTE]

Hello echoshock, I did some looking into Feuerbach and I must admit I like what I found toward the end.....I definitely think he was on the correct track and his thought closely parallels William of Ockham (as does my own)....


To be able to post links or images your post count must be 25 or greater. You currently have 20 posts.

Please remove links from your message, then you will be able to submit your post.

unfortunately, it seems that links to other websites don't work here (or at least I am not adept enough to do it).....(answered the question for me, they did

.......if you go there, i.e. plato.stanford.edu, I refer mostly to the last section of the Feuerbach article... [5. The "New" Philosophy] ..... Feuerbach gets it almost entirely correct.... Still and all, he travails under the burden of seeking the "universal" answer to whatever it is he was seeking.... morality.... a Divine Being....etc. Ockham and the Nominalists don't have that burden.... the be all and end all is forever expanding as the understanding of "it" (whatever the "it" in question happens to be) increases.....sort of like the "scientific method.... it's all a "most plausible theory".... until there's a glitch ...or something further or more reasoned comes along....So, in that sense, I would say that Feuerbach, for all his progress was still looking for... the Ideal Answer to it all....but he had the Concept / Reference.... Mind / Body distinction understood very well.... He must have gone back and studied the Scholastics (Ockham and his like) pretty well.... just like the early naturalists did in their studies of especially the biological sciences.....All in all .... thank you for the education.... echo shock....

[nominal9]

.... HelloNoXion.... nice to make your acquaintance... I read the wiki article.... I like William of Ockham a lot.... I tend to agree with him on this point.....so I guess this person would call me a conceptualist-nominalist....but please.... DO NOT group Kant in with the others , as the author of the article implies.... that would be anathema to nominalists and to Ockham in particular.... Kant is a "phenomenologist on this.... the reason Kant does not give universals Physical universality is because he does not credit Physicality as being "objective"... but you can bet that Kant gives "universals" Coceptual-objectivity.... to Kant Universals are "a priori" noumena.... the top of the "crap-pile" HAR....

[Decolonize The Left]

Okay.... maybe I can improve your opinion of me, with time.... look at it this way.... as your opinion of me improves... your own own opinion of yourself must deflate.... HAR.....Just kidding .... maybe we just do not understand one another.... ignorance can be cured....

I don't have a negative opinion of you; I think you are a machine. Also, use periods. Your use of ellipses is grammatically incorrect and makes reading your posts difficult to the point that I would like to discuss your OP with you but cannot as I cannot get past your posting style.

[nominal9]

I don't have a negative opinion of you; I think you are a machine. Also, use periods. Your use of ellipses is grammatically incorrect and makes reading your posts difficult to the point that I would like to discuss your OP with you but cannot as I cannot get past your posting style.

Sorry if I offended you. Manoir de mes reves.I apologize for my sharp tongue. I explained my use of ellipses on another thread here. Let me repeat it below

It basically fits in with my "nominalist" way of thinking. I believe that, often, good grammar and good syntax tend to obscure the importance of the actual words-as-terms being used to express a meaning. My ellipses serve to break down the grammatical structure and highlight the meaning or sense of "things", ideas or processes, etc. Anyway, I think that's what I am trying to do. My education was in languages and literature, so I should know something about the "grammatical" and "stylistic". Then again, maybe that's why I use the ellipses, as a rebellion against the strictures that I should have learned, long ago.

So, I hope I can induce you to look at some of the.... ellipses.... as a pause to look more closely at the meaning of the terms that I separate out. But in any event, I apologize if my words above were off-putting to you. Sometimes I am too thin-skinned and jump to the wrong conclusions. I am only human.
Sincerely, it is nice to make your acquaintance

[Decolonize The Left]

Isn't nominalism rather taken for granted within general leftist thought? I don't think anyone will argue that the color blue exists as some sort of universal - most will concede that blue is the term we give to a specific color spectrum of light (a physical thing).

[nominal9]

Isn't nominalism rather taken for granted within general leftist thought? I don't think anyone will argue that the color blue exists as some sort of universal - most will concede that blue is the term we give to a specific color spectrum of light (a physical thing).

Hello Manoir de mes reves,
I can't say what the general view of leftists is. I suspect it is as varied as the general view of most others. I have known one "leftist" whom I consider more than fairly knowledgeable who call himself a " scientific realist", but when he's pushed to explain what it means, it turns out to be rife with abstractions and "idealisms" , at best, and or "phenomenology", at worst. { have you noticed? I've been replacing my preferred ellipses with commas..... boring}. Even the scientists and the technologists get roped in by the "theorizing" and go off on their hypothetical fantasy trips.
To get to your final sentence above, can you explain what you mean? Which is to ask, where do you think the "universal" resides? Is blue a universal light "wavelength"?... A PHYSICALLY existing .... "THING"? If that's your opinion, then Universals are actually objective, correct?... But then....why is it that one light particle (photon?) can be blue by oscillating at one frequency.... but suppose that it was somehow sped up or slowed down in its oscillations it would change color?..... so the oscillation is an action..... not an object thing..... like you or I dancing a waltz instead of the twist..... Ah.... that's better..... back to my ellipses.....

[JPSartre12]

Even the scientists and the technologists get roped in by the "theorizing" and go off on their hypothetical fantasy trips.To get to your final sentence above, can you explain what you mean? Which is to ask, where do you think the "universal" resides? Is blue a universal light "wavelength"?... A PHYSICALLY existing .... "THING"? If that's your opinion, then Universals are actually objective, correct?... But then....why is it that one light particle (photon?) can be blue by oscillating at one frequency.... but suppose that it was somehow sped up or slowed down in its oscillations it would change color?..... so the oscillation is an action..... not an object thing..... like you or I dancing a waltz instead of the twist..... Ah.... that's better..... back to my ellipses.....

Comrade, the "hypothetical fantasy trips" that we scientists go on aren't just pointless, self-righteous rhetoric. I suppose that the best example I can give you off-hand is chemistry. When working in the lab, I don't just sit there and fantasize or daydream about theoretical concepts, but actually have to use intangible abstractions to help explain concepts that are too microscopic to materially manipulate to understand. It's one thing to discuss an atom, and quite another to actually do a chemical reaction, regardless of what the reaction is. By abstracting chemistry, we're able to abstract "atoms" so that we can view them in our mind's eye and reduce them to understandable ideas - you can't "see" atom-to-atom bonds, for example, but you can do a "hypothetical fantasy trip" to mentalize and analyze it in non-physical space.

There is such a thing as a universal "wavelength" for blue. On the electromagnetic spectrum, "blue" (as we call it) manifests at a specific wavelength (about 450-500nm or so, depending upon the shade in question) and has a specific physical structure. It's called wave-particle duality, an extremely rare phenomenon wherein the photon can exhibit both the behavior of an energy wave or a matter particle. It does this because photons are generated by the residue lost when subatomic electrons (usually valence electrons, but not necessarily; radiation, etc presents a host of other possibilities) fall from one orbital "shell" to a lower one. Because it's generally thought of as both physical matter and negative energy it's currently being postulated as the quantum "mass-energy" transition state that both go through when converting into the other.

And yes, some would argue that "universals are actually objective", because their objectivity is generally what characterizes them as being universal to begin with. But that is another topic.

[nominal9]

Comrade, the "hypothetical fantasy trips" that we scientists go on aren't just pointless, self-righteous rhetoric. I suppose that the best example I can give you off-hand is chemistry. When working in the lab, I don't just sit there and fantasize or daydream about theoretical concepts, but actually have to use intangible abstractions to help explain concepts that are too microscopic to materially manipulate to understand. It's one thing to discuss an atom, and quite another to actually do a chemical reaction, regardless of what the reaction is. By abstracting chemistry, we're able to abstract "atoms" so that we can view them in our mind's eye and reduce them to understandable ideas - you can't "see" atom-to-atom bonds, for example, but you can do a "hypothetical fantasy trip" to mentalize and analyze it in non-physical space.

There is such a thing as a universal "wavelength" for blue. On the electromagnetic spectrum, "blue" (as we call it) manifests at a specific wavelength (about 450-500nm or so, depending upon the shade in question) and has a specific physical structure. It's called wave-particle duality, an extremely rare phenomenon wherein the photon can exhibit both the behavior of an energy wave or a matter particle. It does this because photons are generated by the residue lost when subatomic electrons (usually valence electrons, but not necessarily; radiation, etc presents a host of other possibilities) fall from one orbital "shell" to a lower one. Because it's generally thought of as both physical matter and negative energy it's currently being postulated as the quantum "mass-energy" transition state that both go through when converting into the other.

And yes, some would argue that "universals are actually objective", because their objectivity is generally what characterizes them as being universal to begin with. But that is another topic.

Hello PostPhenomenologist, Thank pou for taking the time to come and reply to my overall post topic....
So, you would say that there actually are "objective" (as in Physical) universals? Now, I appreciate that you are a knowledgeable person, but maybe you can stipulate just what the Physical universality consists of..... Let me ask the Particular versus the Plural question.... is one photon oscillating at the specific wavelength identical in all ways to another photon oscillating at the same exact wavelength?.... I would think that just by being separate individual photons, there might be some other difference between them.... maybe that is not knowable at this stage of knowledge... an open question....but I would think that if the two (or more) blue photons differed somehow one to the other.... in mass or energy or something else.... then their "universality" would be suspect.... Is it just a matter of the wavelength and nothing more or less, is my question....which means that universality is... what?... r.p.m.? (not the right scale, but I think you get the question)
Anyway, as a nominalist along the lines of William of Ockham, I can say that Ockham distinguished between what he calls two "levels of intention". at the FIRST level of intention the observing person is dealing with (he calls it "intuitive") direct apprehension sense or experiment relation with one specific object or thing.... empirical hands on, literally and metaphorically. However, say that the person then proceeds to make a similar FIRST level of intention examination of other similar objects or "things"... the person collates all his various recalled observations, groups them and arrives at commonalities or logical-mathematical-mechanical etc. "rules" to explain how the person understands the similar "things" to operate... etc... Well this "abstract" thinking process about a bunch of similar but not particular the single same thing Ockham calls the "SECOND" intention stage and this accounts (for Ockham) for what you do in chemistry when you consider in your mind how the chemical reactions are progressing at physical states that you are not (yet) able to observe directly through the senses.
Basically, I don't think that there is much difference in opinion between you and I (Although, you are definitely a lot more knowledgeable about this that I am, no question)... Let me ask you the Universality question this way, is there an identical physical objective "thing" that all the separate particular individuals (let's say exact same wavelength Blue photons) in a group all share in common....or is it all in the (abstracted) conceptualized way that they are all known to "act". Is the universal a shared physical "object" or something else? My friend's name mentioned above was relayed to me as "Archytas".... he was into chemistry, too....I am glad that you are a"Post" phenomenologist... I am hoping that the "post" signifies that you got over the phenomenological affliction :).

[ChrisK]

Idea / Physical "thing"
Conceptus / Res
Mind / Body

Idealism = Subjective Concept / Subjective Reference
Realism = Objective Concept / Objective Reference
Nominalism = Subjective Concept / Objective Reference
Phenomenology = Objective Concept / Subjective Reference


Put them in Aristrotle's "logical sqaure" you get something like this....

Idealism.........................Realism
Conceptus / Res.............Conceptus / Res
Subjective / Subjective....Objective / Objective

(Aristotle square in middle)

Subjective / Objective......Objective / Subjective
Conceptus / Res..............Conceptus / Res
Nominalism......................Phenomenology


It seems so damned obvious and "sensical" to me......This should be the starting point that all agree on.....

It seems to me that you are trying to force all of philosophy into a cookie cutter mold of only four possible categories. For example, I notice that you place nominalism and realism in a contradictory relationship, but what then of Aristotle's moderate realism or Peter Abelard's conceptualism? Both of these ideas are born from combining nominalism and realism. But if they are contradictory, then they cannot work together. In other words, your model is overly simplistic in its outlook.

Further, at the risk of seeming like I am contradicting myself, the reason that these tendencies in philosophy all exist and conflict with one another while never resolving issues is because they are non-sense. That is that.

[nominal9]

It seems to me that you are trying to force all of philosophy into a cookie cutter mold of only four possible categories. For example, I notice that you place nominalism and realism in a contradictory relationship, but what then of Aristotle's moderate realism or Peter Abelard's conceptualism? Both of these ideas are born from combining nominalism and realism. But if they are contradictory, then they cannot work together. In other words, your model is overly simplistic in its outlook.

Further, at the risk of seeming like I am contradicting myself, the reason that these tendencies in philosophy all exist and conflict with one another while never resolving issues is because they are non-sense. That is that.

Hello ChistoferKoch, glad to make your acquaintance. Sorry for the delay in replying, hope this message gets to you.
Yes, I place nominalism and realism in a contradictory relationship on the basis of their varying estimations of concepts. In my opinion, Realists think everything, including concepts is objective.... But contradictorily (in part) nominalists agree that references are objective but disagree as to concepts which nominalists hold to be subjective. So getting to the examples you give of Abelard's conceptualism and of Aristotle's moderate realism, let me ask you, how did Abelard and Aristotle change their views? was it on the Concept side or was in on the Reference side of their views? and did they therefore tend more toward another of the noted four-corners of the possible views that I mention... a change from Realism to what? on the part of Aristotle..... and a change from nominalism to what on the part of Abelard. By the way, I do not vouch in any way for Abelard as a nominalist.... my prototype for nominalism is William of Ockaham.... so keep that in mind, please. I am not saying that you are wrong regarding any changes in view on their parts, I' just asking you to explain how those changes in view put an end to the Subjective versus Objective criteria that I propose.
As to the "non-sense" charge part of your message, I would ask you to explain that for me..... I like sense and straight-forward "common sense" very much.... that's why I support nominalism.
I also have an "epistemological" "sense" of humor... I tell people that my motto is.... "I have never met a circle and its diameter but your ass resembles them. Like it or not, your ass stinks."..... Most people get offended by this at first blush, but consider that a circle and its diameter is (or are) a (SUBJECTIVE) concept or an idea. they are not actually physical and therefore no one has ever met either to touch them or shake their hands, as it were. However, in a certain sense, your (OBJECTIVE) ass ...anyone's ass... does hold a resemblance to a circle and its diameter (what with the butt crack and all) and further, it is possible to meet your ass and if not touch it.... smell it certainly at some time or another... You see... the whole Mind / Body duality is expressed right there.... it makes a very definite mundane "sense"... don't you think?... sort of on the common side, too....

[ChrisK]

Hello ChistoferKoch, glad to make your acquaintance. Sorry for the delay in replying, hope this message gets to you.
Yes, I place nominalism and realism in a contradictory relationship on the basis of their varying estimations of concepts. In my opinion, Realists think everything, including concepts is objective.... But contradictorily (in part) nominalists agree that references are objective but disagree as to concepts which nominalists hold to be subjective. So getting to the examples you give of Abelard's conceptualism and of Aristotle's moderate realism, let me ask you, how did Abelard and Aristotle change their views? was it on the Concept side or was in on the Reference side of their views? and did they therefore tend more toward another of the noted four-corners of the possible views that I mention... a change from Realism to what? on the part of Aristotle..... and a change from nominalism to what on the part of Abelard. By the way, I do not vouch in any way for Abelard as a nominalist.... my prototype for nominalism is William of Ockaham.... so keep that in mind, please. I am not saying that you are wrong regarding any changes in view on their parts, I' just asking you to explain how those changes in view put an end to the Subjective versus Objective criteria that I propose.

What I am saying is that your criteria is flawed and overly simplistic. To use Abelard as the example, his conceptualism argued universals do not exist within particulars, but exist within the mind only. This circumvents realism's belief in objective universals and nominalism's out right rejection of universals. Thus, he is using elements of two so-called contradictory positions. This cannot be done unless they are not actual contradictory.


As to the "non-sense" charge part of your message, I would ask you to explain that for me..... I like sense and straight-forward "common sense" very much.... that's why I support nominalism.
I also have an "epistemological" "sense" of humor... I tell people that my motto is.... "I have never met a circle and its diameter but your ass resembles them. Like it or not, your ass stinks."..... Most people get offended by this at first blush, but consider that a circle and its diameter is (or are) a (SUBJECTIVE) concept or an idea. they are not actually physical and therefore no one has ever met either to touch them or shake their hands, as it were. However, in a certain sense, your (OBJECTIVE) ass ...anyone's ass... does hold a resemblance to a circle and its diameter (what with the butt crack and all) and further, it is possible to meet your ass and if not touch it.... smell it certainly at some time or another... You see... the whole Mind / Body duality is expressed right there.... it makes a very definite mundane "sense"... don't you think?... sort of on the common side, too....

I render the general term "nonsense" as "non-sense" because I am using it in a very technical way. To put it as simply as I possibly can, we can broadly divide propositions in the indicative mood into sense, senseless and non-sense. To illustrate these we need to understand what each one can contain:

Sensical propositions are empiricial propositions. They can be either true or false.
Senseless propositions are either tautologies, which are always true, or contradictory, which are always false.
Non-sense propositions are neither and contain no possibility of being true or false.


To illustrate:
The proposition, "George W. Bush wears a Che shirt," is understandable whether it is true or not. This is an empirical proposition because it can be either true or false and is understandable either way.

The proposition, "If it is raining, then it is raining," is senseless, since it can only be true. Conversely, "If it is raining, then it is not raining," is self-contradictory and can only be false, thus it is senseless. For our purposes, we can ignore this category from now on.

The proposition, "Particulars participate in universals," is non-sense because it does not take to being either true or false. This sounds unusual at first. However, compare it to the first proposition. That proposition could be either true or false. This proposition, which looks like the first, purports that it must be true no matter what.

How do these propositions become true no matter what? By thought experiment. Starting from words, philosophers use more words to reason to some ultimate truth that cannot be wrong. Here we see the difference.

If we have the two propositions "George W. Bush wears a Che shirt" and "George W. Bush does not wear a Che shirt" only of them can be true, the other must be false. But if we have the propositions "Particulars participate in universals" and "Particulars do not participate in universals", then they are both true no matter what, because both of them define a universal. Thus, they can both be true at the same time since in both of them "Particular" means something different. They both are said to be true by only the words involved and speak about two different things.

All philosophical propositions are like this. All philosophical theories are, thus, non-sense.

[nominal9]

What I am saying is that your criteria is flawed and overly simplistic. To use Abelard as the example, his conceptualism argued universals do not exist within particulars, but exist within the mind only. This circumvents realism's belief in objective universals and nominalism's out right rejection of universals. Thus, he is using elements of two so-called contradictory positions. This cannot be done unless they are not actual contradictory.



I render the general term "nonsense" as "non-sense" because I am using it in a very technical way. To put it as simply as I possibly can, we can broadly divide propositions in the indicative mood into sense, senseless and non-sense. To illustrate these we need to understand what each one can contain:

Sensical propositions are empiricial propositions. They can be either true or false.
Senseless propositions are either tautologies, which are always true, or contradictory, which are always false.
Non-sense propositions are neither and contain no possibility of being true or false.


To illustrate:
The proposition, "George W. Bush wears a Che shirt," is understandable whether it is true or not. This is an empirical proposition because it can be either true or false and is understandable either way.

The proposition, "If it is raining, then it is raining," is senseless, since it can only be true. Conversely, "If it is raining, then it is not raining," is self-contradictory and can only be false, thus it is senseless. For our purposes, we can ignore this category from now on.

The proposition, "Particulars participate in universals," is non-sense because it does not take to being either true or false. This sounds unusual at first. However, compare it to the first proposition. That proposition could be either true or false. This proposition, which looks like the first, purports that it must be true no matter what.

How do these propositions become true no matter what? By thought experiment. Starting from words, philosophers use more words to reason to some ultimate truth that cannot be wrong. Here we see the difference.

If we have the two propositions "George W. Bush wears a Che shirt" and "George W. Bush does not wear a Che shirt" only of them can be true, the other must be false. But if we have the propositions "Particulars participate in universals" and "Particulars do not participate in universals", then they are both true no matter what, because both of them define a universal. Thus, they can both be true at the same time since in both of them "Particular" means something different. They both are said to be true by only the words involved and speak about two different things.

All philosophical propositions are like this. All philosophical theories are, thus, non-sense.

Hello ChristopherKoch. thanks again for your reply.....

I think the difficulty between us lies with our uses of the term :logic" and of Aristotle's square.... My novelty. like it or not or agree with it or not, is that I replace the "propositions".... the "quantitative" identity syllogistic poles of "realist" logic with Ockham's theory of of composite Conceptus / Res signs.... this is my own creation from (20 or more) years back....so my version of logical contrary or contradictory relates to the whole two-part "sign".... not just one part of it....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism
I depart entirely from that whole traditional approach... I call my "stuff" thematic dialectic logic....

here's some of my examples... thematically... if you care to look....

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/humanities/2YYdPcw5_XE

I gave up on traditional syllogism sorts of logic... I think that they are an anchronism in this day and age of scientific inquiry, but some of their thinking tools (like contrary - contradictory) can be valid and useful if they are directed and used to pertain to same "categorematic" elements.... like concepts or like references.....also, look into the "ontological" questions about differences between fact or fancy.... combined with.... manifest or conceal.....
My point is.... traditional "one-part" logic systems can't handle it... you need different tools....

[ChrisK]

Hello ChristopherKoch. thanks again for your reply.....

I think the difficulty between us lies with our uses of the term :logic" and of Aristotle's square.... My novelty. like it or not or agree with it or not, is that I replace the "propositions".... the "quantitative" identity syllogistic poles of "realist" logic with Ockham's theory of of composite Conceptus / Res signs.... this is my own creation from (20 or more) years back....so my version of logical contrary or contradictory relates to the whole two-part "sign".... not just one part of it....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism
I depart entirely from that whole traditional approach... I call my "stuff" thematic dialectic logic....

here's some of my examples... thematically... if you care to look....

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/humanities/2YYdPcw5_XE

I gave up on traditional syllogism sorts of logic... I think that they are an anchronism in this day and age of scientific inquiry, but some of their thinking tools (like contrary - contradictory) can be valid and useful if they are directed and used to pertain to same "categorematic" elements.... like concepts or like references.....also, look into the "ontological" questions about differences between fact or fancy.... combined with.... manifest or conceal.....
My point is.... traditional "one-part" logic systems can't handle it... you need different tools....

I think our problem is that I am using the results from predicate (not syllogistic) logic to analyze propositions. Your propositions are non-sense, the same as the rest. I derive these ideas from Ludwig Wittgenstein's works, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar.

I am a bit rusty on my Ockham, when you are referring to Ockham's conceptus / res and the whole two part sign, are you referring to the theory that a whole proposition is a sign and that the sign, "Tim is tall" is comprised of "Tim" (the res) and "is tall" (the conceptus)?

[nominal9]

I think our problem is that I am using the results from predicate (not syllogistic) logic to analyze propositions. Your propositions are non-sense, the same as the rest. I derive these ideas from Ludwig Wittgenstein's works, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar.

I am a bit rusty on my Ockham, when you are referring to Ockham's conceptus / res and the whole two part sign, are you referring to the theory that a whole proposition is a sign and that the sign, "Tim is tall" is comprised of "Tim" (the res) and "is tall" (the conceptus)?

Here below are two examples of how I use Ockham's theory of the "Vox" (i.e, sign) taken from my Grimm snow white tale rudimentary analysis..... As you can see, I view the sign as the concept and reference that is (functionally in most cases) associated with some "thing".... the single particular "apple" (First Intention Vox, Ockham calls it) itself.... (upon empirical examination and observation by one or eventually lots of people-minds).... holds the concept of "sustenance" and the reference of "fruit" since that is the primary use to which it is put by most people But apple has other concepts and reference components depending on how well and to what use particular people put apples to.
In this Snow White tale context I found it useful and story-appropriate to "logically oppose" the sign "Apple" with its "Apple Seed" constituent part... did you know that in small quantities Apple Seeds contain arsenic poison?... it has relevance to this tale.... now, as you see, the Apple and the Seed in this context give rise to other "words" that are abstracted ("Second Intention" Vox, Ockham calls it) and do not refer directly to one single particular "thing"
.....................Vox (Sign).........................
Conceptus (Idea).......................... Res (Matter)....

Deos my addition of the dots help you visualize the "Triangle", as a
diagram?
If you have difficulty with "how" or "what" a Vox(sign)
"signifies"...... here's a very rough sample....
...........................Apple.................. ........
Sustenance...............................Red,Round ,Fruit....


Let's start with the "Sign" APPLE (since that's the one I happened to
use as an example). I said that the sign APPLE could be thought of as
the following "Triangle":
..................Apple.................
Sustenance................... Red, Round, Fruit
Now... here's a chance (?) complication.... what do y'all know about
Apple Seeds? Here are two links that explain what I'm getting at...
http://www.hsus.org/pets/pet_care/protec...
http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/ge...
So... it would appear that APPLE SEEDS, to the contrary, have the
following "triangle":
...............Apple Seed........
Poison.........................Small, Brown, Pit

So.... If you dispose the Possible "sign aspects" in the logical
"square".... you come up with something like the following: (Concept-
based Disposition... notice)
Sustenance/Fruit.....................Poison/Pit

Sustenance/ Pit......................Poison/Fruit

(Whatta y'all think?.... Pretty neat, Huh????)
Now, if y'all want to continue this.... Lemme know.
nominal9
That was taken from the tale analysis... the Wicked Queen gives Snow White an "Apple"... problem (for Snow White) is that the queen has altered (infused with arsenic or something) the apple from a Sustenance /Fruit to to a Sustenance / Toxin.... The queen then "concealed-by-lying" the toxin and called it fruit, though. This I call the Fact or Fancy.... combined with Manifest or Conceal ontology level..... of examination.
This is what I do and how I view the "logical' workings at the level of total "meaning" of signs.....the process expands into actual understanding of all component "concepts" and "references" at play in any given factual situation or course of action.... some "words" are used as composites of concepts and references all in one.... other words are used as separate concepts or separate references....etc. Your own Propositional or predicate logic has to be very careful that it compares apples with apples and oranges with oranges (as the metaphor goes).... I read a little of Wittgenstein ... I know that he underwent a radical revision in his thought from first version to last version in his later production.... but through it all, I still consider him to be a "phenomenologist".....What I mean is that he was still looking for the "ultimate" meaning of the "thing"... the Kant-Husserl Noumenom.... not the ever-developing (nominalist) Concept
By the way.... a "Fancy" is something like a "Unicorn"... there's no such "thing".... but it's fun to think about if you (knowingly) suspend belief.....

Hope I don't put you off ... Christopher Koch.....

[ChrisK]

Here below are two examples of how I use Ockham's theory of the "Vox" (i.e, sign) taken from my Grimm snow white tale rudimentary analysis..... As you can see, I view the sign as the concept and reference that is (functionally in most cases) associated with some "thing".... the single particular "apple" (First Intention Vox, Ockham calls it) itself.... (upon empirical examination and observation by one or eventually lots of people-minds).... holds the concept of "sustenance" and the reference of "fruit" since that is the primary use to which it is put by most people But apple has other concepts and reference components depending on how well and to what use particular people put apples to.
In this Snow White tale context I found it useful and story-appropriate to "logically oppose" the sign "Apple" with its "Apple Seed" constituent part... did you know that in small quantities Apple Seeds contain arsenic poison?... it has relevance to this tale.... now, as you see, the Apple and the Seed in this context give rise to other "words" that are abstracted ("Second Intention" Vox, Ockham calls it) and do not refer directly to one single particular "thing"
.....................Vox (Sign).........................
Conceptus (Idea).......................... Res (Matter)....

Deos my addition of the dots help you visualize the "Triangle", as a
diagram?
If you have difficulty with "how" or "what" a Vox(sign)
"signifies"...... here's a very rough sample....
...........................Apple.................. ........
Sustenance...............................Red,Round ,Fruit....


Let's start with the "Sign" APPLE (since that's the one I happened to
use as an example). I said that the sign APPLE could be thought of as
the following "Triangle":
..................Apple.................
Sustenance................... Red, Round, Fruit
Now... here's a chance (?) complication.... what do y'all know about
Apple Seeds? Here are two links that explain what I'm getting at...
http://www.hsus.org/pets/pet_care/protec...
http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/ge...
So... it would appear that APPLE SEEDS, to the contrary, have the
following "triangle":
...............Apple Seed........
Poison.........................Small, Brown, Pit

So.... If you dispose the Possible "sign aspects" in the logical
"square".... you come up with something like the following: (Concept-
based Disposition... notice)
Sustenance/Fruit.....................Poison/Pit

Sustenance/ Pit......................Poison/Fruit

(Whatta y'all think?.... Pretty neat, Huh????)
Now, if y'all want to continue this.... Lemme know.
nominal9
That was taken from the tale analysis... the Wicked Queen gives Snow White an "Apple"... problem (for Snow White) is that the queen has altered (infused with arsenic or something) the apple from a Sustenance /Fruit to to a Sustenance / Toxin.... The queen then "concealed-by-lying" the toxin and called it fruit, though. This I call the Fact or Fancy.... combined with Manifest or Conceal ontology level..... of examination.

You've started from a bad premise. You start with Ockham's theory of the sign as being made up of conceptus and res. I have three objections to dividing all terms into conceptus and res:

Terms like "the" don't seem to have any res at all.
This idea requires all words to be names since they refer to something. If they are all names, then what are sentences? You simply have lists of objects and no other parts of speech. A list is not a sentence at all.
An extension of the problems associated with all words being names is that you are now open to Bradley's regress. As an example, "Tom sits" is made up of a particular name, "Tom" and a general name, "sits". The general name must be true of the particular, which means that the sentence could be rendered, "Tom possess sitting", which has a third general name, thus "Tom possess possess sitting" and so on and so forth. Meaning that all sentences are infinitely long and communication becomes near impossible.

By starting from a false premise, your argument fails to hold.


This is what I do and how I view the "logical' workings at the level of total "meaning" of signs.....the process expands into actual understanding of all component "concepts" and "references" at play in any given factual situation or course of action.... some "words" are used as composites of concepts and references all in one.... other words are used as separate concepts or separate references....etc. Your own Propositional or predicate logic has to be very careful that it compares apples with apples and oranges with oranges (as the metaphor goes).... I read a little of Wittgenstein ... I know that he underwent a radical revision in his thought from first version to last version in his later production.... but through it all, I still consider him to be a "phenomenologist".....What I mean is that he was still looking for the "ultimate" meaning of the "thing"... the Kant-Husserl Noumenom.... not the ever-developing (nominalist) Concept
By the way.... a "Fancy" is something like a "Unicorn"... there's no such "thing".... but it's fun to think about if you (knowingly) suspend belief.....

The myth that Wittgenstein completely changed his tune was rejected by his literary executors, who he considered to be his best students.

As to him looking for the ultimate meaning of the thing, he never did any such thing. Wittgenstein rejected any and all philosophical theories. He fits into none of your categories.

[nominal9]

You've started from a bad premise. You start with Ockham's theory of the sign as being made up of conceptus and res. I have three objections to dividing all terms into conceptus and res:

Terms like "the" don't seem to have any res at all.
This idea requires all words to be names since they refer to something. If they are all names, then what are sentences? You simply have lists of objects and no other parts of speech. A list is not a sentence at all.
An extension of the problems associated with all words being names is that you are now open to Bradley's regress. As an example, "Tom sits" is made up of a particular name, "Tom" and a general name, "sits". The general name must be true of the particular, which means that the sentence could be rendered, "Tom possess sitting", which has a third general name, thus "Tom possess possess sitting" and so on and so forth. Meaning that all sentences are infinitely long and communication becomes near impossible.

By starting from a false premise, your argument fails to hold.



The myth that Wittgenstein completely changed his tune was rejected by his literary executors, who he considered to be his best students.

As to him looking for the ultimate meaning of the thing, he never did any such thing. Wittgenstein rejected any and all philosophical theories. He fits into none of your categories.

Hello ChristopherKoch, thanks for the continuing dialogue.
As to your point 1., 2., 3., Regarding Ockham's thought.....his sign theory is well-developed.... he did distinguish between "Categorematic" and "Syncategorematic"... consider the Syn to refer also to "syntax" and you get an explanation for "the" and other such words... And , besides Ockham also proposed a distinction between the "First Intention and Second Intention" (i.e., direct single empirical as distinguished from multiple reasoned abstract) stages of "thinking"....which gets "one" away from a slavish dependence on "first intention categorematic" names of particular things and gets into all other aspects of abstract or comparative thought etc.
http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE/ LOGIC

[1] [See especially Commentaries on the Sentences, I, 2 passim.] Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. Propositions consist of terms. These are of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things; (2) syncategorematic terms, which have only a logical function — to link categorematic terms. Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are called conventional signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English, 'homo' in Latin, for example). But these different signs express the same state of mind (intentio) and thus have something in common. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning (terminus conceptus) of the conventional sign [Comms I, 2, vii] [a (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1a)]. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention' [see also Quodlibetal Questions IV, 19]. Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog, tree. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs (concepts). In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. The referring characteristic of terms is brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. Ockham says they then have a 'suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in a variety of ways. And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century . (1) A term can be said to be 'material' (suppositio materialis). This is the word itself considered as a sound — the sound made when we utter 'man'. (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). Words functioning in this way are called 'personal' (suppositio personalis). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind (man as that which is common to all individual men — the species man). Such terms are called 'simple' ([I]suppositio simplex). It is only in its second function that a word actually relates to something other than itself. Building on Aristotelian foundations, Ockham also examined formally and extensively the logic of modalities, modal terms such as as contingency, possibility, and necessity being regarded by him as properly applicable only to propositions. [B]Contingent propositions state facts about things actually existing (as determinable by the user of the proposition). But if such propositions can be translated into negative or hypothetical propositions involving possibility, then they are said to be necessary [c] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1c), for example, 'All the tables in this room are brown' is contingent, while 'All men are mortal' is necessary (because it means 'If there is a man he is mortal'). As for the truth-values of propositions, Ockham says all propositions must be determinately true or false [d] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1d): there can be no propositions which do not have a truth-value.
.Ockham's views on logic and language, underpin his conceptualism (or 'nominalism') and his attack on what he sees as redundant or superfluous abstract entities. This is important for an understanding of his metaphysics [sec. 3 (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ocksec3)] and theory of knowledge [sec. 2 (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ocksec2)]. His criterion is implicit in 'Ockham's Razor' — "entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary". (There is no evidence that he actually used these words, though he did write "plurality is never to be assumed unless required" [Comms., I, 27, 2] ). He says that misunderstanding of the way language works often leads us to postulate the existence of such, abstract entities. Consider, for example, the proposition 'Socrates is wise'. 'Socrates' always 'supposits' the same entity — the term is absolute. But 'wise' is a connotative term; and although it primarily qualifies Socrates we may also take it to refer secondarily to something else, namely wisdom. It is this tendency that Ockham criticizes, for it shows that we have failed to appreciate the nature of logical predication. However, he does allow the use of abstract names of sensible qualities of things such as whiteness and sweetness. Otherwise he wants to eliminate references to abstract entities by rephrasing or 'reducing' the language in which they occur or are implied. Thus general names are turned into connotative predicates and proper names become descriptions [e] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1e).
This article got the part copied above right, pretty much, but the rest of the article is a jumble in places.

As you can see, Ockham also developed a set of distinctions in what he calls "Supposition"...
I am not as "exclusive" or rigid as Ockham, himself,..... but I think he was on the proper track.....

As for Wittgenstein, I think I read his Tractatus and some other of his later works.... when he was subsequently reconciled with Bertrand Russell (his teacher) and tried to get closer to scientific empiricism, than before....

In my opinion, Wittgenstein in all his work always sought to delimit and absolutely define his terms, be it (so-called) empirically (which in his sense is a disputable term) or even by establishing a definitive "technically" unalterable definition of the word in question....

That's what I mean by Wittgenstein's recourse to Kant's and Phenomenology's view of the "Noumenon" or the Objective Concept.....
In my opinion (nominalist sort) any truly empirical understanding (as in name definition) of "things" necessarily changes as the (scientific or newly discovered) understanding of the "thing" themselves changes. Today's sun is not the same as Ptolemy's Sun.... it may look and act the same from our vantage point... but today's sun is at the center of the solar system... not revolving around the Earth....

[ChrisK]

Hello ChristopherKoch, thanks for the continuing dialogue.
As to your point 1., 2., 3., Regarding Ockham's thought.....his sign theory is well-developed.... he did distinguish between "Categorematic" and "Syncategorematic"... consider the Syn to refer also to "syntax" and you get an explanation for "the" and other such words... And , besides Ockham also proposed a distinction between the "First Intention and Second Intention" (i.e., direct single empirical as distinguished from multiple reasoned abstract) stages of "thinking"....which gets "one" away from a slavish dependence on "first intention categorematic" names of particular things and gets into all other aspects of abstract or comparative thought etc.
http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE/ LOGIC

[1] [See especially Commentaries on the Sentences, I, 2 passim.] Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. Propositions consist of terms. These are of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things; (2) syncategorematic terms, which have only a logical function — to link categorematic terms. Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are called conventional signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English, 'homo' in Latin, for example). But these different signs express the same state of mind (intentio) and thus have something in common. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning (terminus conceptus) of the conventional sign [Comms I, 2, vii] [a (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1a)]. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention' [see also Quodlibetal Questions IV, 19]. Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog, tree. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs (concepts). In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. The referring characteristic of terms is brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. Ockham says they then have a 'suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in a variety of ways. And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century . (1) A term can be said to be 'material' (suppositio materialis). This is the word itself considered as a sound — the sound made when we utter 'man'. (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). Words functioning in this way are called 'personal' (suppositio personalis). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind (man as that which is common to all individual men — the species man). Such terms are called 'simple' ([I]suppositio simplex). It is only in its second function that a word actually relates to something other than itself. Building on Aristotelian foundations, Ockham also examined formally and extensively the logic of modalities, modal terms such as as contingency, possibility, and necessity being regarded by him as properly applicable only to propositions. [B]Contingent propositions state facts about things actually existing (as determinable by the user of the proposition). But if such propositions can be translated into negative or hypothetical propositions involving possibility, then they are said to be necessary [c] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1c), for example, 'All the tables in this room are brown' is contingent, while 'All men are mortal' is necessary (because it means 'If there is a man he is mortal'). As for the truth-values of propositions, Ockham says all propositions must be determinately true or false [d] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1d): there can be no propositions which do not have a truth-value.
.Ockham's views on logic and language, underpin his conceptualism (or 'nominalism') and his attack on what he sees as redundant or superfluous abstract entities. This is important for an understanding of his metaphysics [sec. 3 (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ocksec3)] and theory of knowledge [sec. 2 (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ocksec2)]. His criterion is implicit in 'Ockham's Razor' — "entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary". (There is no evidence that he actually used these words, though he did write "plurality is never to be assumed unless required" [Comms., I, 27, 2] ). He says that misunderstanding of the way language works often leads us to postulate the existence of such, abstract entities. Consider, for example, the proposition 'Socrates is wise'. 'Socrates' always 'supposits' the same entity — the term is absolute. But 'wise' is a connotative term; and although it primarily qualifies Socrates we may also take it to refer secondarily to something else, namely wisdom. It is this tendency that Ockham criticizes, for it shows that we have failed to appreciate the nature of logical predication. However, he does allow the use of abstract names of sensible qualities of things such as whiteness and sweetness. Otherwise he wants to eliminate references to abstract entities by rephrasing or 'reducing' the language in which they occur or are implied. Thus general names are turned into connotative predicates and proper names become descriptions [e] (http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn1e).
This article got the part copied above right, pretty much, but the rest of the article is a jumble in places.

As you can see, Ockham also developed a set of distinctions in what he calls "Supposition"...
I am not as "exclusive" or rigid as Ockham, himself,..... but I think he was on the proper track.....

All of this is well and good, but if fails to address my third point, which is the most important. Ockham's theory fails to be a accurate description of language.


As for Wittgenstein, I think I read his Tractatus and some other of his later works.... when he was subsequently reconciled with Bertrand Russell (his teacher) and tried to get closer to scientific empiricism, than before....

Wittgenstein quite famously criticized both empiricism and scientism. He never reconciled with Russell, who remained opposed to Wittgenstein's later thought until the end of his life.


In my opinion, Wittgenstein in all his work always sought to delimit and absolutely define his terms, be it (so-called) empirically (which in his sense is a disputable term) or even by establishing a definitive "technically" unalterable definition of the word in question....

How on earth did you come to this conclusion? He certainly worked on the limits of language, but he did not deal with any attempt to absolutely define his terms.


That's what I mean by Wittgenstein's recourse to Kant's and Phenomenology's view of the "Noumenon" or the Objective Concept.....
In my opinion (nominalist sort) any truly empirical understanding (as in name definition) of "things" necessarily changes as the (scientific or newly discovered) understanding of the "thing" themselves changes. Today's sun is not the same as Ptolemy's Sun.... it may look and act the same from our vantage point... but today's sun is at the center of the solar system... not revolving around the Earth....

Now you are confusing talking about talk with talk about things.

[nominal9]

3. An extension of the problems associated with all words being names is that you are now open to Bradley's regress. As an example, "Tom sits" is made up of a particular name, "Tom" and a general name, "sits". The general name must be true of the particular, which means that the sentence could be rendered, "Tom possess sitting", which has a third general name, thus "Tom possess possess sitting" and so on and so forth. Meaning that all sentences are infinitely long and communication becomes near impossible. / ChistopherKoch

Hello CristopherKoch, sorry for the tardy reply....
I went back to your point 3. from a few posts back to see how I failed to address your questions about William of Ockham's theory of the "sign". overall, I think Ockhams distinctions in "supposition" that the cited web-entry points out go far in replying to this. I don't get into "supposition" too much in my uses of Ockham's theories for my purposes. I stress a lot more the "First Intention" "Second Intention" explanation and the very important Conceptus / Res fundamental duality which even the best "encyclopedic" commentators usually don't get (understand) or follow up on. As I've tried to explain, I consider the Conceptus / Res duality to affect and be applicable at both First and Second Intention level. In this sense, at the Level of Second Intention, I say that there are certain general or "abstract" terms that are predominantly either Concept based and others that are predominantly Reference based... Also, I use and identify at what I call "course of action" alternatives at the level of Second Intention. For example. I've used the following generalized "thematic dialectic" square to account for sorts of societies that may exist worldwide.
(Second Intention separation in Concept / Reference)
Concept / Reference..........Concept / Reference
Totalitarian / Socialism...... Democratic / Capitalism
(Aristotle square in middle)
Totalitarian / Capitalism......Democratic / Socialism
Concept / Reference...........Concept / Reference

Democracy = One person one vote
Totalitarian = One Person all the votes
Capitalism = One person all the dollars
Socialism = One Person One dollar

Government as in a vote is a concept because it is an "assent" to doing things... no physicality or substance in the vote in and of itself

Economy as in a dollar is a reference because it is a physical thing used in exchange for goods and services... there's substance there.
(Second Intention separation in motivation / action)
Live modestly / work......Live affluently / steal
Concept / Reference......Concept / Reference
(Aristotle square in middle)
Live modestly / steal......Live affluently / work

Live modestly vs Live affluently are concepts because they are intellectual or emotive decisions made by a person that speak to his or her level of self-satisfaction of desires....
work vs steal are references because they are actions that are done or performed to achieve physical ends...

Anyway... there are loads of separate First Intention and Second Intention Concepts and References that "one" can recognize, sort out, explore, identify or discover, etc.....I just "group" them as such.... others, don't....

Now, to get to your 3. point example.... I don't see the problem. I say that Tom is performing the action of "sit".....the action of "sit" is a "transitive verb".... reflexive, I think they call it.... "sit" is not something that can be possessed, but that really doesn't matter....Maybe you can explain what you have in mind by Bradley's regress.... maybe it's a "reasoning" problem inherent in the "game" of predicate logic and nothing more....

[Tim Redd]

What I am saying is that your criteria is flawed and overly simplistic. To use Abelard as the example, his conceptualism argued universals do not exist within particulars, but exist within the mind only. This circumvents realism's belief in objective universals and nominalism's out right rejection of universals. Thus, he is using elements of two so-called contradictory positions. This cannot be done unless they are not actual contradictory.

Actually universals do exist in the particular, otherwise how do we group similar particulars? There are one or more properties that similar particulars objectively hold in common, one or more common properties they each hold. That is why we group them as being similar. The universals are the one or more common properties that reside in each particular.

[Sabot Cat]

nominal9: these aren't epistemological systems of philosophical belief, they're metaphysical systems of philosophical belief. Epistemology is the study of what is true, while metaphysics is describing reality's operations in a holistic fashion, often through deductive analysis.

[Tim Redd]

nominal9: these aren't epistemological systems of philosophical belief, they're metaphysical systems of philosophical belief. Epistemology is the study of what is true

It's not quite accurate to say that epistemology is the study of what is true, it's really more about how we know an idea is true, or how in general we gain true knowledge. The definition of epistemology from Wikipedia and which you'll find in most places is that epistemology "is the branch of philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge)[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#cite_note-1)[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#cite_note-2) and is also referred to as 'theory of knowledge'".


while metaphysics is describing reality's operations in a holistic fashion, often through deductive analysis.

The scientific and major aspect of metaphysics is ontology. Again from Wikipedia: "Ontology is the philosophical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) study of the nature of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being), becoming (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Becoming_%28philosophy%29), existence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence), or reality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality), as well as the basic categories of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_of_being) and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics), ontology deals with questions concerning what entities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entities) exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hierarchy), and subdivided according to similarities and differences."

[Sabot Cat]

It's not quite accurate to say that epistemology is the study of what is true, it's really more about how we know an idea is true, or how in general we gain true knowledge. The definition of epistemology from Wikipedia and which you'll find in most places is that epistemology "is the branch of philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge)[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#cite_note-1)[2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#cite_note-2) and is also referred to as 'theory of knowledge'".

Knowledge is traditionally defined as the whole of facts, or that which is true. So the study of knowledge itself and how we know things, is the study of what is true.


The scientific and major aspect of metaphysics is ontology. Again from Wikipedia: "Ontology is the philosophical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) study of the nature of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being), becoming (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Becoming_%28philosophy%29), existence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence), or reality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality), as well as the basic categories of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_of_being) and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics), ontology deals with questions concerning what entities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entities) exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hierarchy), and subdivided according to similarities and differences."

Yes, the study of existence, reality, basic categories of being, etc. as a whole is perfectly consistent with what I said.

[tallguy]

Idea / Physical "thing"
Conceptus / Res
Mind / Body

Idealism = Subjective Concept / Subjective Reference
Realism = Objective Concept / Objective Reference
Nominalism = Subjective Concept / Objective Reference
Phenomenology = Objective Concept / Subjective Reference


Put them in Aristrotle's "logical sqaure" you get something like this....

Idealism.........................Realism
Conceptus / Res.............Conceptus / Res
Subjective / Subjective....Objective / Objective

(Aristotle square in middle)

Subjective / Objective......Objective / Subjective
Conceptus / Res..............Conceptus / Res
Nominalism......................Phenomenology


It seems so damned obvious and "sensical" to me......This should be the starting point that all agree on.....
I haven't got a clue what you're on about mate

[Tim Redd]

Knowledge is traditionally defined as the whole of facts, or that which is true. So the study of knowledge itself and how we know things, is the study of what is true.

To study what is known to be true is different from studying epistemology - how we come to know what is true. One can know the theory of relativity is true and study that as a truth, but that's different from understanding the methods by which and how one comes to know truths in general. The latter is epistemology. The former is knowing a truth, or set of truths.

[Sabot Cat]

To study what is known to be true is different from studying epistemology - how we come to know what is true. One can know the theory of relativity is true and study that as a truth, but that's different from understanding the methods by which and how one comes to know truths in general. The latter is epistemology. The former is knowing a truth, or set of truths.

The study of what it means to be true would be a better turn of phrase, I suppose. Or alternatively, you could say epistemology is the branch of philosophy where you define truth and knowledge in an analytic manner.

[Tim Redd]

The study of what it means to be true would be a better turn of phrase, I suppose. Or alternatively, you could say epistemology is the branch of philosophy where you define truth and knowledge in an analytic manner.What you say here does not mention as I did above how we come to know truth. This is another key aspect of epistemology in addition to your statement that epistemology "is the branch of philosophy where you define truth and knowledge". At the end you add "in an analytic manner". I'm not sure how you are defining 'analytic' but I would prefer to say that both aspects of epistemology are studied and elaborated in a scientific manner.

Truth is more than a semantic (which is how many define 'analytic'), issue, which is how nominalists grasp truth, if they accept that truth exists at all. From a materialist, or realist perspective it is first of all an objectively (space-time) existing, or formerly objectively existing, fact, event, regularity or law. Truth exists objectively, or existed objectively within one or more contexts and sometimes across one or more contexts.

[Smoth]

Actually universals do exist in the particular, otherwise how do we group similar particulars? There are one or more properties that similar particulars objectively hold in common, one or more common properties they each hold. That is why we group them as being similar. The universals are the one or more common properties that reside in each particular.

Even if this theory of concept formation were true, how does it show anything about 'Universals'?

Let's say I am looking at a dog. I see that it has a snout, and it has a tail. You imply that from such and similar observations, we know there is a 'Universal' existing in the dog.

Well, what does it mean for a 'Universal' to exist 'in' anything? Presumably you won't say it means any of the properties I can list: Having a tail, having a snout, having two eyes, having black fur... Each of these could be false in turn, and we're still left with a dog.

What is the common property of all dogs?

The answer can't be 'that they are dogs' or 'doghood', or anything to that effect, unless you are satisfied with not giving an answer. I, on the other hand, am quite satisfied with this, because 'Universals' is an artifact of Plato's that should have long since been forgotten.

The other responses in this thread use the word 'truth' as if it were a referring term. Only then can there be a question of what it is, as opposed to what it means, i.e. how we use the word 'true'.

But the word 'true' has no reference relation and no referent we attach to it. For instance, to say that it is true that it will rain tomorrow is simply to say that it will rain tomorrow. To say that it's false that Rosie went to school is to say that Rosie didn't go to school. To say "'Africa is a large continent' is true" is to say that Africa is a large continent. Etc.

[Tim Redd]

Originally Posted by Tim Redd
Actually universals do exist in the particular, otherwise how do we group similar particulars? There are one or more properties that similar particulars objectively hold in common, one or more common properties they each hold. That is why we group them as being similar. The universals are the one or more common properties that reside in each particular.
Even if this theory of concept formation were true, how does it show anything about 'Universals'? Let's say I am looking at a dog. I see that it has a snout, and it has a tail. You imply that from such and similar observations, we know there is a 'Universal' existing in the dog.

I'm just saying that it is not in our imagination that certain properties like red, or snouts exist objectively in multiple cases, in multiple particulars. Such properties I call universals.


Well, what does it mean for a 'Universal' to exist 'in' anything? Presumably you won't say it means any of the properties I can list: Having a tail, having a snout, having two eyes, having black fur... Each of these could be false in turn, and we're still left with a dog.My assertion that universal properties objectively exist in the way I mention above is a separate question from whether or we not we have sufficiently grasped the one or more specific universals that a define a dog, or any other thing. Because someone asserts that the presence of some specific universals, in this case snouts and tails is the correct basis for referring to a dog doesn't mean they are correct.


What is the common property of all dogs? The answer can't be 'that they are dogs' or 'doghood', or anything to that effect, unless you are satisfied with not giving an answer. I, on the other hand, am quite satisfied with this, because 'Universals' is an artifact of Plato's that should have long since been forgotten.To me using 'they are dogs' or 'doghood' to define dogs does not define, or pick out dogs, because it uses circular definitions to define dogs. It uses the terms of the what is being defined to define a thing.

I do not think like Plato that there is a realm of universal objects or forms that exist outside of concrete, physical objects that exist in time and space. However I think the color red exists in multiple physical objects and that is universal existence for the color red. Further we abstract the existence of these concrete multiple instances of red into a mental concept red that refers to the concrete instances.


The other responses in this thread use the word 'truth' as if it were a referring term. Only then can there be a question of what it is, as opposed to what it means, i.e. how we use the word 'true'. But the word 'true' has no reference relation and no referent we attach to it. For instance, to say that it is true that it will rain tomorrow is simply to say that it will rain tomorrow. To say that it's false that Rosie went to school is to say that Rosie didn't go to school. To say "'Africa is a large continent' is true" is to say that Africa is a large continent. Etc.I think saying something is "true" means one of two things: 1) that a statement (a contingent one) corresponds to a state of affairs in space-time. For instance "The 1% owns at least 70% of all wealth in the US" is true if that is the case in space-time. 2) it is necessarily true per the logic of the axioms that "2+2 = 4".

In first case 'true' is a referent to the existence of some actuality in space-time and in the second case it is a referent to a necessary logical truth.

[Comrade Jacob]

Okay.... maybe I can improve your opinion of me, with time.... look at it this way.... as your opinion of me improves... your own own opinion of yourself must deflate.... HAR.....Just kidding .... maybe we just do not understand one another.... ignorance can be cured....

You are a strange fellow aren't you...

[nominal9]

nominal9: these aren't epistemological systems of philosophical belief, they're metaphysical systems of philosophical belief. Epistemology is the study of what is true, while metaphysics is describing reality's operations in a holistic fashion, often through deductive analysis.
Hello Redd Rose, HAPPY TO MAKE YOUR ACQUAINTANCE.... SORRY FOR THE TARDY REPLY.... I'VE BEEN AWAY FROM THIS BOARD FOR A WHILE..... I'm basically a nominalist, as you can see so I guess you'd say that for me "words" are what the "speaker" wants them to mean... so, if there is some misunderstanding either on my part as to using the proper word "epistemology" as distinguished from "metaphysics"... then you choose the one that better fits the meaning or sense of the "use" I put the word to with my logical square of opposition and the "subjective vs. objective" observations as to Idealism - Realism- Nominalism- Phenomenology..... I think, myself, that the word Epistemology is better adapted as an academic or scholarly branch of study into a defined area of research...... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology..... whereas Metaphysics is more of the actual application of any one on many chosen different theories within the broader category....http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics....To my way of thinking, (maybe?) Epistemology is the "how" of the question whereas metaphysics is the "what"... the Concept as distinguished from the Reference.... at the broader level.... but then, they're all words, regardless..... it's what the speaker means to say by the words that count.....Respectfully, Redd... I sure would like to hear your own opinion or "choice" as to the way I define the Idealism-Realism-Nominalism-Phenomenology dialectic and the one that you choose, as being closest to "right", yourself....

[ChrisK]

Actually universals do exist in the particular, otherwise how do we group similar particulars? There are one or more properties that similar particulars objectively hold in common, one or more common properties they each hold. That is why we group them as being similar. The universals are the one or more common properties that reside in each particular.

Sorry for the lateness of my reply. My computer was damaged and I had to get a new one.

What are the universals of a game?