Kant - good bloke?

[the demoralist]

Clearly Kant was no commie. But how useful is his philosophy?

Is making freedom the precondition for all perception a pave in the road toward breaking down class society? Or is it just some bourgeois illusion that detracts from the real, historical character of freedom?

Also, the categorical imperative... Does it lead logically to an ethical critique of capitalism, as the bourgeoisie is using the proletariat as means to it's own material ends?
Or is it justification for an austere middle class moral elitism?

[nominal9]

Clearly Kant was no commie. But how useful is his philosophy?

Is making freedom the precondition for all perception a pave in the road toward breaking down class society? Or is it just some bourgeois illusion that detracts from the real, historical character of freedom?

Also, the categorical imperative... Does it lead logically to an ethical critique of capitalism, as the bourgeoisie is using the proletariat as means to it's own material ends?
Or is it justification for an austere middle class moral elitism?

I'll talk about Kant for a bit, for starters... Kant was probably the first Phenomenologist. It all begins with his distinction between "noumenon" and "phenomenon".... which are his terms for "Concept" an "Reference" basically.... Now Kant views the "noumenon" as the "thing in itself" the ultimate reality underlying the false impressions of "physical things" that are furnished us by our fallible sensory apparatus (eyes, ears, nose, mouth and touch) these sensory stimuli are the "phenomenon" ... So, for Kant (phenomenologist) the "objective" real thing is the "noumenon"... the mind image that our sensed stimuli "phenomenon" only vaguely portray "subjectively".....


Do you agree with that... with Kant?


So, to get to your discussion.... define your own terms for me, please... "real"....."freedom......"categorical imperative"...."logic".... start with freedom.... that's a Concept, I think you'lll agree.... I mean, it isn't that one can pointy to a Physical thing and say.... that's a freedom object..... but maybe acts?.....I don't think so acts either..... but you tell me what you think.....

[nominal9]

Clearly Kant was no commie. But how useful is his philosophy?

Is making freedom the precondition for all perception a pave in the road toward breaking down class society? Or is it just some bourgeois illusion that detracts from the real, historical character of freedom?

Also, the categorical imperative... Does it lead logically to an ethical critique of capitalism, as the bourgeoisie is using the proletariat as means to it's own material ends?
Or is it justification for an austere middle class moral elitism?

I'll talk about Kant for a bit, for starters... Kant was probably the first Phenomenologist. It all begins with his distinction between "noumenon" and "phenomenon".... which are his terms for "Concept" an "Reference" basically.... Now Kant views the "noumenon" as the "thing in itself" the ultimate reality underlying the false impressions of "physical things" that are furnished us by our fallible sensory apparatus (eyes, ears, nose, mouth and touch) these sensory stimuli are the "phenomenon" ... So, for Kant (phenomenologist) the "objective" real thing is the "noumenon"... the mind image that our sensed stimuli "phenomenon" only vaguely portray "subjectively".....


Do you agree with that... with Kant?


So, to get to your discussion.... define your own terms for me, please... "real"....."freedom......"categorical imperative"...."logic".... start with freedom.... that's a Concept, I think you'll agree.... I mean, it isn't that one can point to a Physical thing and say.... that's a freedom object..... but maybe acts?.....I don't think so acts either..... but you tell me what you think.....

[blake 3:17]

I'd love to study Kant. He was on to a lot of things that aren't talked about much and also so the pitfalls in many of his own ideas.

[the demoralist]

Don't know if I'd call Kant a phenomenologist. But I do agree that his works were indispensable for phenomenology. Like you say, he establishes the domain with which phenomenology is concerned, phenomena, and stresses that what lays beyond it is unknowable, thus abandoning all metaphysics..

But I'm more interested in the political consequences of Kant. Specifically of his moral theory. I tend to think that if the basis of all moral action is that it must be universalisable, and therefore cannot treat other agents as means to particular ends, it effectively makes capitalism immoral. Capitalism is predicated on the ability to utilise the labour of others (workers) for the end of surplus value.
But I guess the problem with this from a materialist point of view is it makes ethics overly formal and abstract. It also means socialists cannot use people as means to the socialist end, as every action is judged in a static, ahistorical way and doesn't take into account the contingent necessities of history and class difference.

[nominal9]

Don't know if I'd call Kant a phenomenologist. But I do agree that his works were indispensable for phenomenology. Like you say, he establishes the domain with which phenomenology is concerned, phenomena, and stresses that what lays beyond it is unknowable, thus abandoning all metaphysics..

But I'm more interested in the political consequences of Kant. Specifically of his moral theory. I tend to think that if the basis of all moral action is that it must be universalisable, and therefore cannot treat other agents as means to particular ends, it effectively makes capitalism immoral. Capitalism is predicated on the ability to utilise the labour of others (workers) for the end of surplus value.
But I guess the problem with this from a materialist point of view is it makes ethics overly formal and abstract. It also means socialists cannot use people as means to the socialist end, as every action is judged in a static, ahistorical way and doesn't take into account the contingent necessities of history and class difference.

Well, I'm not sure we agree completely as to Kant, but I'll try to get to your other points.... Nice to make your acquaintance demoralist.
Where to start? First , I favor Nominalism mostly along the lines of William of Ockham (but modified by me ) so, universals and universalist morals are just "words"... more precisely abstracted categories in this view, they don't actually exist in the "sphere of actual exiting things"....think along the lines of biological genus and species, etc. there's me, the single "man" then there's the Mankind - Homo Sapien man... then there' s the Ape man... then there's the Mammal man... then there's the Animal man.... well from the particular individual me (or you, etc) man... all the rest are just abstract category groupings that really don't refer to actual singular physical things.....Universals are like that... in my opinion..... Now, get back to Kant.... contrast the nominalist view I gave with what Kant says or believes about universals..... and I think you'll begin to see my point about the different ways that different philosophical "schools" view the distinction between "objective" and "subjective"..... Kant believes that universals are "real" and "objective" does he not?.... the rest of the "moral" discussion then has to proceed from there.....I'll get back to it.....I think we may agree more than disagree....I think morality is a "value judgment", basically

[Mass Grave Aesthetics]

I think Kant´s ethical philosophy is more solid than any of his contenders I´m aware of, as far as that goes. He is a very important philosopher in any case, but I don´t have an opinion on him "as a leftist" as such.

[the demoralist]

Kant believes that universals are "real" and "objective" does he not?....
Not exactly the way I'd describe it.

Kant thinks morals are spontaneous creations of the human mind, but as he thinks the mind is rational, he thinks that this would mean certain universal rational principles would always underlie it.

The important point is that Kant doesn't see morals as something "out there" or "beyond us", created by God or nature and dictating our conduct. Rather, he thinks that if we all chose to act completely rationally, we would be acting along certain universal moral principles (categorical imperative being the most fundamental), which Kant thinks he can deduce.

So I'd say he sees morality as "transcendental" rather than "real", if that makes any sense.

[Thirsty Crow]

Clearly Kant was no commie. But how useful is his philosophy?

How useful is any traditional philosophy...in what, and to whom?

To the working class, communist militants, for the purpose of social revolution? I'd say, useless as pie eating contests.

[the demoralist]

How useful is any traditional philosophy...in what, and to whom?

To the working class, communist militants, for the purpose of social revolution? I'd say, useless as pie eating contests.

Marx certainly saw it as useful. He spent a lot of time reading and discussing it. As did Lenin, Lukacs, Trotsky, Gramsci to name just a few.

I'd say it is useful in clarifying your ideas about the world. The tactics of struggles, the basis for your whole project, etc.
Being anti-philosophical can be dangerous, especially if it leads you into crude formulations that see Communism as some automatic evolutionary outgrowth of capitalism, or prevents you from identifying the way alienation reinforces ideology, or gives you a mistaken view of how organisations should be formed, etc. etc. etc.

I'm not saying that reading Kant will yield all the answers. But I do think that getting our heads around idealism; its strengths, its limitations, does help clarify political tasks.

Just one example of what idealist philosophy has given us: revolution isn't the mechanical outcome of historical process, rather it entails a choice. Philosophy is about how and why people come to make that choice. Maybe if the majority of the working class were outside parliament right now demanding state power, I'd agree that philosophy was somewhat superfluous. But seen as the left is small, misunderstood, mostly irrelevant, and in complete disarray, I reckon philosophy has at least some part to play in understanding why the working class aren't all joining up.

[Thirsty Crow]

Marx certainly saw it as useful. He spent a lot of time reading and discussing it. As did Lenin, Lukacs, Trotsky, Gramsci to name just a few.Of course that someone would find it useful for a certain purpose.


I'd say it is useful in clarifying your ideas about the world.I'd agree, with the reminder of the term I deliberately use, traditional philosophy, and the fact that much of what is known as philosophy is not only useless but an element of the ruling class ideology.



Being anti-philosophical can be a very bad thing, especially if it leads you into crude formulations that see Communism as some automatic evolutionary outgrowth of capitalism, or prevents you from identifying the way alienation reinforces ideology, or gives you a mistaken view of how organisations should be formed, etc. etc. etc.

I'd say that the view of communism as an automatic evolutionary outgrowth of capitalism is a consequence of accepting certain kinds of philosophical ideas, but yeah ok suppose that an anti-philosophical stance (which amounts to a stance against idealism; after all, if we follow the use of the word "philosophy" as it was used by Hegel in discussing its relationship with idealism, the picture is quite clear) can lead to this. Even then this can't be subject to rigorous criticism on the basis of that traditional form of thought.

And no amount of dense and mystificatory jargon will correct an inadequate view on organization as well.

[Rafiq]

We have to separate the organizational and intellectual function of Marxists, yes.

[Thirsty Crow]

We have to separate the organizational and intellectual function of Marxists, yes.
Why and how?

[Czy]

I posted this in another thread, but I'll post it in here:


Kant’s philosophy is remarkable for the importance he assigns to human cognition. Till him, all philosophers had assumed that the possibility of knowledge (including philosophical knowledge) revolves around the world; that is, the world comes with its own structure and to know something about the world is to get that external structure right.

Slowly during his life, Kant realized that matters stand exactly the other way round: the structure that philosophers have sought to attribute to the world is rather the reflex of the very organization of human cognition. This was essentially the 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy that people ascribe to Kant.

Kant's an important philosopher whether you agree with him or not - pretty much every modern philosopher has been influenced in some way by Kant.

[Sabot Cat]

I fail to see the epistemological justification for the whole of Kantian ethics, and thus I find it untenable in its entirety. I am often frustrated that Kant whips out things like his formulations, categories and schemas from incomplete analysis, and then argues that you can't dispute them because they are known a priori. Enlightenment era philosophies have consistently proven themselves to be dead-ends for this very reason, as they do little to encourage a continuing dialogue, and do even less to closely examine the world around one's self in an experimental way, despite continually making broad assertions about it.

Furthermore, I am generally opposed to deontological ethics, as they often entail moral absolutism and the dogma of "natural rights", which places the bourgeois upon an unassailable pedestal of legitimacy in their disproportionate power. Even if a revolution would have more positive consequences for all, the Kantian would argue against it because we presumably wouldn't want to make a universal maxim from a possibly violent regime change or expropriation. Thus, principally on the basis of Kant's first formulation, I believe his philosophy to be antithetical to any revolutionary leftist cause.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

I fail to see the epistemological justification for the whole of Kantian ethics, and thus I find it untenable in its entirety. I am often frustrated that Kant whips out things like his formulations, categories and schemas from incomplete analysis, and then argues that you can't dispute them because they are known a priori. Enlightenment era philosophies have consistently proven themselves to be dead-ends for this very reason, as they do little to encourage a continuing dialogue, and do even less to closely examine the world around one's self in an experimental way, despite continually making broad assertions about it.

Furthermore, I am generally opposed to deontological ethics, as they often entail moral absolutism and the dogma of "natural rights", which places the bourgeois upon an unassailable pedestal of legitimacy in their disproportionate power. Even if a revolution would have more positive consequences for all, the Kantian would argue against it because we presumably wouldn't want to make a universal maxim from a possibly violent regime change or expropriation. Thus, principally on the basis of Kant's first formulation, I believe his philosophy to be antithetical to any revolutionary leftist cause.

I personally find Kant's epistemology and metaphysics to be more compelling than his deontological ethics (though I don't necessarily agree with them - they are still problematic in their own way). There do seem to be some things which most people would agree with, though. For instance, I don't think it's unjustified to argue that rape is categorically wrong, and that is because the victim is not being treated as an end unto themselves but as the object and play-thing of the agent.

Anyhow it's pretty hard to see how one would actually live a Kantian life, as evidenced by Kant's contemporary critics who brought up the example of a murderer at the door - do we tell the murderer that our friend is hiding in the basement because we have a duty to not lie?